Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Counterfactual Conditionals | Armstrong | III 46 Counterfactual Conditionals/Armstrong: law statements support counterfactual conditionals (not vice versa) - when the law statements are true, the counterfactual conditionals are true - findings of GF do not support any counterfactual condiditionals. E.g. If Proton P no proton but electron, then repelled by other electron E - Armstrong: but absurd: Counterfactual Conditionals: if P not a philosopher, but electron, then repelled by E - ArmstrongVs: possible worlds in which this is possible have perhaps different laws of physics. >Law statements, >Regularities. III 48 Regularities: Regularities do not support counterfactual conditionals: nevertheless: if by chance an a is selected (who actually is not in the room), he will be wearing a watch. - Just not, "If he were in the room, he would..." III 163ff Counterfactual conditionals: VsMeinong's swamp, VsPrecarious ontology. Place II 64 Counterfactual conditionals/Place: are always negative: if ... had not happened". There is no empirical evidence. Universal counterfactual conditional: law statement: positive: if ... had happened... Here empirical evidence is possible that supports the truth of the universal counterfactual conditional. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 |
| Fictions | Gärdenfors | I 128 Fictions/fictitious objects/Gärdenfors: if we assume that an object is completely determined by the set of its property (Leibniz' principle), then all points, specified for all domains, can be viewed in a conceptual space as representations of possible objects. >Leibniz Principle. Such fictitious objects can then be viewed as cognitive constructs that do not need a reference in the external world. E.g. unicorns, witches, centaurs. Fictitious objects/Meinong/GärdenforsVsMeinong/Gärdenfors: my approach (of points in a conceptual space) does not allow impossible objects such as Meinong's round square. >Round square, >Non-existence. Solution/Gärdenfors: round and square are represented as separate regions of the form space so that no object can have both properties. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Non-Existence | Frege | I 47 Nonexistence/unicorn-example/truth-value gap/Frege: e.g. unicorn: sentences about non-existent objects are without truth value. Predicates cannot be assigned or denied. The thought is the same whether the name refers (>"meaning"/Frege = reference) or not. For the terminology: see Fregean Sense, >Reference, >Predicate, >Unicorn example. Husted V 102 Name/non-existence/Frege: that the name has a reference is not the condition that it belongs to the language but vice versa. >Proper names. I 107 Non-existence/meaning/FregeVsMeinong/FregeVsRussell: there are quite a lot of contradictory terms. However, there are no contradictory objects. The logic may determine only the limitation of terms. That is, for each object, whether it falls within the definition, or not - a contradictory term is used to prove that there is no corresponding object. >Round square. IV 110 Non-existence/Frege: proper names: are names that refer to nothing, that are logically meaningless. But there are not a concept under which nothing falls - for a name to be entitled it is necessary that the appropriate term is sharp. IV 111 Therefore the term should precede the scope. >Term scope, >Concept. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Husted I Jörgen Husted "Searle" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted II Jörgen Husted "Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted III Jörgen Husted "John Langshaw Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted IV Jörgen Husted "M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Hamburg 1993 Husted V J. Husted "Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 |
| Objects of Thought | Brentano | Prior I 121 Objects of thought/Brentano/Meinong/Findlay: Brentano: is a modern echo of Reid: Prior I 121/122 Brentano: Scholasticism called the intentional existence of an object a "direction (pointing) to an object" (this does not have to be something real) or "an immanent objectivity". Mental state/Brentano: everyone has in himself something that serves as an object, even if not all do this in the same way. Brentano's modern echo is Findlay. Intentional objects/thought objects/Findlay: (like Meinong): we can think of objects that do not exist. We can even make many true claims about them. Meinong: e.g. that the golden mountain does not exist is true but it is undoubtedly that it is both a mountain and a golden one. ((s) VsMeinong: E.g. just as an impossible thing is both: 1. impossible, 2. a thing.) Findlay/Meinong: existence or non-existence does not make any difference in reference to "being what". Non-existence/Meinong: "incomplete objects" that lie before us, whenever we think of them, in the general way "something that is so and so" (Similar to Reid:> triangle). Prior I 123 Intentionality/Brentano: unique logical category. Similar to a relation, without being a real relation. >Intentionality, >Non-existence, >Objectivity. |
Brent I F. Brentano Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014 Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meinong, A. | Brentano Vs Meinong, A. | Brandom I 128 Intending/intention /representation BrentanoVsMeinong: to represent can only be understood as intending to represent the owner. (Success verb). (> Round square). |
Brent I F. Brentano Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Meinong, A. | Frege Vs Meinong, A. | I 106f FregeVsMeinong FregeVsRussell: there are contradictory terms, there are only no contradictory objects - the logic may determine only the limitation of terms, ie for each object, whether it falls within the definition, or not - a contradictory term is used to prove that there is no corresponding object. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
| Meinong, A. | Lewis Vs Meinong, A. | IV 262 Fiction/Quantification/Meinong/Lewis: Meinong's supporters should not say that the quantifiers of descriptions of fictional characters go above everything he thinks exists, fictional and non-fictional. But it is also not easy for him to say how limited the range is. Example comparison of fictional persons: a) with other fictitious persons, 1. within the story. 2. between stories b) with non-fictitious persons. For example "Holmes was smarter than Poirot" "Holmes was smarter than any other person", "Holmes was smarter than Watson". Lewis: one could compare Holmes more with Darwin or Newton than with Conan Doyle or Ramsey. For example "smarter than anyone else in the world" this "world partly encompasses the fictional Meinong world, partly the non-fictional world, but both are not exhausted. ((s) However, the term "intelligence" comes from the real world, otherwise it can mean anything). LewisVsMeinong: finally has to explain how the truths from the fictions are sometimes, but not always, excluded from conclusions they should imply. Example it is said that the only building in 221B Baker Street has always been and still is a bank. It doesn't follow, nor is it true, that Holmes lived in a bank. >Fictions/Lewis. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Meinong, A. | Quine Vs Meinong, A. | Re III 160 QuineVsMeinong "logical slums" others: "Meinong s jungle". Stalnaker I 55 QuineVsWyman/QuineVsMeinong/Stalnaker: (Quine, 1961.5, "On what there is"): (Wyman: fictitious Meinongian): his luxurious universe of possibilities is nullified if we no longer speak of Pegasus but of the round square. If - unless Pegasus would exist - it would be nonsense to say it did not exist, then for the same reason - unless the round square would exist - it would be nonsense to say that it does not exist. Quine: can we then make Wyman to assume that he accepts a realm of unrealized impossibilities? Quine: difference: Pegasus could have existed, not the round square. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Meinong, A. | Russell Vs Meinong, A. | Horwich I 4/5 Believe/mean/doubts/perception/propositional attitude/Russell: everywhere here the mind has something in front of it, which is not identical to it itself. So an object. (> Relation Theory; >SchifferVs). Judgment Object/Russell: but there are now two theories: a) belief/judgment as a relation to a simple object: E.g. that Charles I died on the scaffold. Vs: that does not work, in the case of false judgments: because then the object does not exist, and therefore also no relation. E.g. The belief that Charles I died in bed. b) believe/judgment as a relation to a complex (or complex object). (Russell pro). Ad a): Definition objective/Meinong/Russell: he calls this objects of believe/judgment objects. Whereby false judgments or beliefs have "false objectives". Horwich I 6 Russell: then, we must find a way to divide the objectives into wrong and right. Object of belief/RussellVsMeinong: first, there is no complete expression "the so and so" that would denote something as does a name like "Socrates". However, it will be complete if I say "I think so and so" or "I doubt that so and so". ((s)> Frege: unsaturated). Horwich I 7 RussellVsMeinong: worse is that we have to admit wrong objectives. That is, there would be things in the universe that do not depend on the existence of judgments, that would be objective falsehoods. Problem: thus, the difference between truth and falsehood becomes inexplicable. ((s) Or a property of things, not of propositions). Difference/falsehood/name: the entity that we look for is not a grammatical subject. Objective falsity/Russell: could be constructed logically, but not satisfactory. Horwich I 8 Objective/falsehood/RussellVsMeinong: when we would say now, the objective does not exist in the case of falsehood, it would indeed be a solution, but would implicate the problem, that we then have to give up the theory of relations (of belief/judgment to object) at all. (() because you can believe something wrong just as you believe something true). Belief/judgment/object/truth/falsehood/solution/RussellVsMeinong: we have to abandon the view that the object of believe would be easy. (Russell pro Relation Theory). Believe/Russell: is a relation to a complex of objects (complex object). The individual objects themselves are not fictions. E.g. Charles I, dying, scaffold. Horwich I 9 Truth: exists then, when the objects to each other have the relation, which is claimed in the judgment. Believe: does not exist in a single relationship that I have to Charles I but there are relations for each component. We can call the relation "the awareness of" ((s) a fact or proposition). (1) 1. B. Russell, "On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood", in: Philosophical Essays, New York 1996, pp. 170-185 - reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994 |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Meinong, A. | Meixner Vs Meinong, A. | I 62 Round Square/Description/Meinong/Meixner: the Meinongian does not say that the round square exists, he goes even further and says that it cannot exist at all, he insists only that it is an entity. I 63 MeinongVsRussell: if the description "the golden mountain" designates an incomplete individual, then probably also the following description is exactly the same: "the existing golden mountain". MeixnerVsMeinong: not very convincing. However: "Weak Sense"/Existence: like Holmes, you can say in the weak sense, "it has the property F to exist". But that is not the strong sense. Possibilia/Meixner: individual-like entities that are at least in principle able to exist. ((s) So not a round square). Question: Is there such a thing? That would be exactly the ee maximum consistent individuals. The impossible are not ee maximum consistent. Maximum consistent individuals: e.g. Meixner, Bush, (sets of properties). Pure Posssibilia: only possible individuals. Are there any? Language: interestingly, has no names for pure Possibilia! I 64 Nevertheless, there is some ontological evidence of the presence of pure possibilia: It is clear that some individuals are actual, but could not have been actual (e.g. humans). Meixner: Thesis: the reverse assumption, that some are not actual but could have been actual, naturally occurs next to this fact. Meixner: certain actual individuals refer to non-actual ones: egg and sperm cells from which a human never emerges. Should we now say here that it merely seems as if it refers to a possible human being, and that at the other end there is no reference relationship (reference). Unrealized Possibilities/Meixner: the merely possible human does not have certain qualities, e.g. an exact date of birth, (i.e. he does not have them in the real (actual) world, but nevertheless he has the negation of these qualities. Unrealized Possibilities/Meixner: the predisposition for blue eyes (the egg and sperm cells) leave nothing to be desired in positive determination! Def maximum consistent/Meixner: of every individual characteristic the individual contains either this or his negation. ((s) > continuous determination/Kant). Pure Possibilia/Meixner: this applies to merely possible. The individual is, so to speak, nothing other than this set of properties (see above). |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Russell, B. | Frege Vs Russell, B. | Read III 149 FregeVsMeinong FregeVsRussell: there are quite contradictory concepts, just no contradictory objects - logic can only determine the limitation of concepts, i.e. for each object, whether it falls under the concept, or not - a contradictory concept is needed to prove that there is no corresponding object. Russell/Read: statements, meanings of sentences, and objects of belief: have individual things and universals as constituents. "Socrates is wise" literally has Socrates and wisdom as constituent elements. The meaning of "Socrates" for him was the philosopher himself. (>Meaning). Russell: (naive realist: meaning = extension or reference, FregeVs). |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Actualism | Meixner, U. | I 21 Def Aktualismus: These alles ist wirklich ((s): VsMeinong). I 62 Aktualismus/Meixner: These Alle Entitäten existieren (sind aktual, sind wirklich). Diese These wird von den meisten Ontologen für richtig gehalten. epistemische/theoriefremde Begründung: man könne Nichtexistentes nicht erkennen. Aber selbst wenn dies richtig wäre, könnte man die Existenz von Entitäten nur daraus schließen, wenn man zusätzlich annähme, daß alle Entitäten grundsätzlich erkennbar sind. (Unbegründet). I 65 Def eingeschränkter Aktualismus/Meixner: These alle ee maximalkonsistenten individuenähnlichen Entitäten existieren (sind aktual). Variante: uneingeschränkter: alle Entitäten existieren. (Possibilismus) Variante aktualistische Minimalthese: alle Individuen sind aktual. ("Aktualismus"). I 66 Vertreter: Alvin Plantinga. (Obwohl er doch an nichtaktuale Sachverhalte glaubt). Possibilismus: Vertreter Leibniz, David Lewis. sie beziehen sich aber ausschließlich auf Individuale, mit denen sie wiederum die Individuen identifizieren. I 127 Aktualität/Meixner: soll hier vereinfacht schlechthinnige A. sein, d.h. weder zeitlich relativiert noch unbestimmt zeitgezogen. MeixnerVsAktualismus: (These daß alle Entitäten aktual sind): unplausibel: es kann nicht bestritten werden, daß nicht alle SV aktual sind (es gibt MöWe). Beweis: AG Schleuderargument: es gäbe nur zwei Sachverhalte, davon einer die Negation des anderen: I 128 Würde nun einer der beiden nicht bestehen, wäre immer noch mancher SV nicht aktual. I 139 absolute Aktualität/Meixner: These ist eine Qualität. Eine Qualität, die weder intrinsisch noch essentiell ist, sondern den Entitäten quasi von außen "verpaßt" ist, eine nichtessentielle extrinsische Qualität. LewisVsMeixner: würde sagen, das ist unverständlich. |
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