|Disputed term/author/ism||Author Vs Author
|Physicalism||Schiffer Vs Physicalism||I XVIII
VsPhysicalism: (8th hypothesis) cannot be correct: E.g. if it is a fact that I believe that worms do not have noses, then that is not represented in non-Mentalese and non-intentionalistic vocabulary. Problem: what can you do? we accept
Eliminativism: Thesis: We have no belief with meaning or words with meaning.
Mentalism: Thesis: belief objects as internal entities (QuineVsMentalismus: Z "Sargasso Sea above which somebody slides obliviously). (> Dualism) .
Nominalism/solution/Schiffer: we need to accept none of them: but we deny that the existence of language-independent, objective characteristics of belief. That means
Belief/nominalism/Schiffer: denies that the characteristics of belief are to believe "this and that" or to be a belief that this and that is the case, and he also denies the facts.
Nominalism/Schiffer: allows then to include both:
ontological physicalism: there are no extra-linguistic irreducible psychological entities and the
Def Sentential Dualism: that there are true but irreducible belief-ascribing propositions.
Schiffer: pro. Here the token token physicalism (6th hypothesis) is tentatively accepted. >Kripke: Paradox of rule following, >Kripkes Wittgenstein, (1982).
SchifferVsPhysicalism: it must be wrong, because thesis: if there is true attributions of belief, they cannot be shown without Mentalese or intentional vocabulary.
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987