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The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Necessity | Wittgenstein | I 73 ff Existence/Ontology/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: unlike Frege, Wittgenstein envisages an ontology of possible facts in the Tractatus. According to Wittgenstein, it makes little sense to talk about a possible existence. This means that we have to understand the actual objects as if everyone existed with necessity! >Existence, >Existence statements, >Facts, >Possible worlds. I 157 Necessity/Form/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: according to Wittgenstein, such logical necessities can always be recognized by the logical form of the sentences concerned. This is represented by purely notation-bound characteristics. "It is the special characteristic of the logical propositions that one can recognize only by their form that they are true." All necessary connections are ultimately tautologies. This sheds a new light on "image theory". I 165/166 Color/Colour Word/Necessity/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the question of whether the colour incompatibility means a violation of Wittgenstein's idea that purely logical needs are the only necessities is now being put in a new light. It depends on what we think is the logical form of the color terms (or the correct notation). Is a) each individual color represented by a single-digit predicate, we get necessities that are not of a logical kind. b) Dots in a color space: then the incompatibilities of the different colors do not cause any non-logical necessities. (Wittgenstein is certainly not familiar with this alternative from Anscombe). He constantly deals with the concept of colour space. However, one cannot live up to this concept if one interprets specific color words as undefined predicates . II 79 Necessity/necessary/Wittgenstein: a necessity in the world corresponds to an arbitrary rule in language. II 134 Necessary/Necessity/Physics/Logic/Wittgenstein: we use the expression both in logic and in physics, because there is a certain analogy between them. II 168 The words "possibility" and "necessity" express a piece of grammar, but they are formed according to the pattern of "physical possibility". VI 124 WittgensteinVsNecessity/Schulte: the necessity of the logical "must" is only agreement. VI 169 Necessity/Wittgenstein: not for objects, only for terms - not for colours (that there is necessarily still a level between them) but for the representation system (agreement). |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
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