Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Impartiality | Toulmin | Habermas III 60 Impartiality/Toulmin/Habermas: Toulmin does not want to pay the price of relativism for avoiding a priori rationality standards. It must not only count what the parties involved consider to be "rational". >Rationality, >Relativism, >Objectivity. However, Toulmin - like the Hegel of the "phenomenology" - does not want to assume arbitrarily, but wants to gain from the comprehending acquisition of the collective rational enterprise of the human race. HabermasVsToulmin: but as long as he does not clarify the general communicative prerequisites and procedures of cooperative search for truth... Habermas III 61 ...he cannot formally and pragmatically state what it means to take an impartial position as a participant in the argumentation. This "impartiality" cannot be read off from the structure of the arguments used, but can only be clarified on the basis of the conditions of discursive redemption of claims of validity. >Validity claims, >Disourse, >Discourse theory. Toulmin does not put the correct cuts between the random institutional forms of argumentation on the one hand and the forms of argumentation determined by internal structures on the other. Though Toulmin separates conflict and consensus models, these stand different from what he assumes, and do not stand side by side on equal terms. >Deliberative democracy. The honoring of compromises is not at all a strictly discursive honoring of claims of validity, but rather the coordination of interests that cannot be generalised on the basis of balanced positions of power. |
Toulmin I St. Toulmin The Uses of Argument Cambridge 2003 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Validity | Toulmin | Habermas III 62 Validity/Toulmin/HabermasVsToulmin/Habermas: Toulmin does not clearly separate conventional claims of validity that depend on contexts of action from universal claims of validity. His examples show this: e. g. determination of sports results, causes of an infection, reasons for entrepreneurial decisions, justification of access rights, recommendations for action, aesthetic judgements. >Justification, >Judgments, >Science/Toulmin. III 63 Habermas: only the context determines the type of claim to validity. Example: A botanical classification is about the truth of a proposition. In contrast, the teaching of the same division by a teacher is about the claim to the comprehensibility of a semantic rule. >Language use, >Classification, >Systems. |
Toulmin I St. Toulmin The Uses of Argument Cambridge 2003 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stevenson, Ch.L. | Toulmin Vs Stevenson, Ch.L. | Newen I 134 Ethics/Stevenson/Newen: one can then still argue about ethics - provided that they disagree about empirical characteristics. I 135 ToulminVsStevenson/Toulmin/Stevenson/Newen: (Lit. Toulmin: An Eximination of the Place of Reason in Ethics): Question: even if it is the case, since moral statements do not simply claim qualities, does it follow that we can no longer discuss moral evaluations? Objection/Stevenson: he assumes that the statements are contradictory as to whether a property is present or not. I 136 Rational/Rationality/Toulmin: Thesis: it is about which side has the better reasons for itself. NewenVsToulmin: he also lacks a systematic theory. |
Toulmin I St. Toulmin The Uses of Argument Cambridge 2003 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
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