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The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.

Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
---|---|---|---|

Laws | Armstrong | I 117
Laws of Nature/LoN/sings/Armstrong: there is no sign for the law of gravity! Phenomena are only clues!
Sign/Ex Black Clouds: there must be a true inductive generalization, probability.Designated thing: is like the sign always a particulate fact. There is no sign for the general! (i.e. neither is there for the validity of the laws of nature! III 26f
Local Laws (below cosmic range): local laws force all theories to distinguish exactly between laws (laws of nature) and law statements: II 28
There may then be local laws that can never be determined as a full law statement. III 112
Uninstantiated Laws/UIL/Armstrong: I'll allow them, but as second-class cases of laws. - But there are no uninstantiated universals. III 121
Uninstantiated Laws/Armstrong: disguised counterfactual conditionals, truth depends entirely on the actual (higher-level laws) - probability does not require the law of the excluded third, the non-true is not a fact - (VsWessel: Wessel has an operator for "unfact": >Operators/Wessel).
Probability laws are only instantiated if probability is realized.III 140
Laws with universal scope: "Everything is F" - is that at all possible? - How can a U to make itself necessary? III 141
Law/Form/Armstrong: every law must have a dyadic structure, because otherwise it could not be used for inferences - universal law: Rel between "being something in the universe" and "being F".
Universe/Armstrong:The universe is really big garden! - (>Smith's garden is idiosyncratic) - Law in Smith's Garden: relation between quasi-Universals: "fruit in Smith's Garden" and genuine universal: "being an apple".III 147f
Def Iron Laws/Armstrong: tell us that under certain conditions a state is necessary (or has a certain probability). - No matter what further conditions prevail - they apply, apply no matter what happens (but within certain conditions must be given for the particular). III 148
Def Oaken Laws/Armstrong: are under certain conditions invalid - but only real universals can be involved. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 InHandlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States InDispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted InDispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin InDispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |

Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
---|---|---|---|

Leibniz, G.W. | Wessel Vs Leibniz, G.W. | I 221
Def Identity/Leibniz: match in all properties (traced back to Aristotle).
Identity/WesselVsLeibniz: inappropriate because it suggests searching for two objects to compare and verify properties. In modern mathematics, the problem is circumvented by specifying a fixed range with precisely defined predicates. In an attempt to apply Leibniz's definition to empiricism, an attempt was made to establish the identity relation directly ontologically, without seeing its origin in the properties of language. Wrong approach: in the relative temporal stability of objects: Dilemma: from a = a results not much more than "Socrates is Socrates". Problem: one must then demand that Socrates must have had the same qualities at all times of his life. In fact, some authors have linked the negation of the possibility of change to it. I 228
Def Diversity/Leibniz: "which is not the same or where the substitution sometimes does not apply".
Identity/Leibniz: substitutability salva veritate.x = y = def AP(P(x) ↔ P(y)). (s) All properties of one are also those of the other and vice versa). WesselVsLeibniz: the corresponding bisubjunction (= without def) is existentially loaded and therefore not logically true. Identity/PeirceVsLeibniz: "his principle is completely nonsense. No doubt all things are different from each other, but there is no logical necessity for that". Identity/Peirce:
x = y ↔ AP(P(x) u P(y) v ~P(x) u ~P(y))
WesselVsPeirce: this is also existentially charged!Identity/Indistinguishability/Wessel: in literature there is a distinction between the principle of the identity of the indistinguishable. (x)(y)AP((P(x) ↔ P(y)) > x = y) (e) and the principle of indistinguishability of the identical (also substitution principle): (x)(y)(x = y > AP(P(x) ↔ P(y))) (n) Identity/Vagueness/WesselVsLeibniz: in vagueness the Leibniz's principle of the identity of the indistinguishable does not apply, since in non-traditional predication theory the formulae P(x) ↔ P(y) and -i P(x) ↔ -i P(y) are not equivalent. Additional demand (Wessel 1987; 1988): the same predicates must also be denied! strict identity: x = y =def AP((P(x) ↔ P(y)) u (-i P(x) ↔ -i P(y))). WesselVsWessel: but this cannot be maintained, because the corresponding bisubjunction is existentially loaded! I 229
In term theory, we will define identity with the help of the term relation. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |

Various Authors | Stegmüller Vs Various Authors | Wessel I 344
Modality/Wessel: many factually used modal statements can be replaced by meaning-equal modal-free statements. Especially in mathematics: e.g. "divisible".
StegmüllerVsWessel "divisible" is a disposition expression and therefore also modal! |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis InHauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |