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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Necessity de re | Simons | I 257 Necessity de re/necessary de re/Simons: e.g. Tom cannot exist without a head. Def essential/Simons: e.g. Tom cannot exist otherwise than as a huamn. He is essentially human. OthersVs: ((s) somewhere: Kripke could have been an aardvark.) Simons: against necessity de dicto: this is a property of sentences. >de dicto. Then the following is wrong: the fact that Tom is a human would be necessary. Must de re/Simons: the de re must necessarily ascribes an object to an attribute. >de re necessity/Wiggins. I 269 Necessity/Wiggins: neccessity is based on l-abstraction (lambda abstraction) and is working, instead of using the sentence operator "N". >Lambda abstraction. QuineVsWiggins: misleading: "Nec[(lx)(ly)(x = y)]" " the relation as any r and s have, if they are necessarily identical Â". Correct: "(lx)(ly)(N(x = y)". SimonsVsWiggins:  Nec  seems to be superfluous and Wiggins indicates this himself. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Superposition | Simons | I 128 Def Superposition/Simons: when different individuals with identical parts are at the same time in the same place it is called superposition. SimonsVsQuine: instead of "content of one portion space time". >Spacetime, >Four-dimensionalism. Such occupiers must be continuants anyway. Events: among events the extensionality principle is fulfilled. Masses: masses need different meanings of "part". >Parts, >Mass terms. I 211f Superposition instead of coincidence: e.g. ring/gold, e.g. person/body. These are not two individuals, but relation one-many. They are not identical, but take the same space, e.g. ring/gold: have different stories. >Statue/Clay, >Person, >Individuals. I 223 Superposition/SimonsVsWiggins: that various objects can superimpose follows from the fact that a single piece of material can be in such a state that it simultaneously fulfills different existence conditions ((s) intensionally). Existence conditions: existence conditions are determined by the sortal term (linguistically). Different existence conditions: things can last for different times and still be red at the same time. E.g. (s) an astronaut in the orbit can become uncle. I 237 Superposition/Doepke/Simons: whenever a and b are superimposed, they must have a common part, they must be composed entirely of a third party, c. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Free Logic | Wiggins Vs Free Logic | Simons I 259 Free Logic/Necessity/Existence/Substantial/Simons: exactly these conditionals are rejected in the free logic. But: WigginsVsFree Logic. Instead: Def Good Name/Wiggins: one whose carrier exists. Simons: probably they support existential generalization. Free LogicVsWiggins: good names differ from bad ones exactly in that for good names the existential statement "(Ex)(x = a)" is true and that is exactly what generalization allows us on the basis of the weaker schema: (Ex)(x = a) , Fa I- (Ex)Fx that accepts Free Logic. Simons: if the modal logic allows that not everything that exists necessarily exists. (What it should). |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Geach, P. | Wiggins Vs Geach, P. | Simons I 213 "Relative Identity"-view of super position: a) (Representative: Geach): "Sortal Theory" of relative identity: known as "theory R": for Sortals F and G it is possible to find two objects a and b, so that a and b are both Fs and Gs, a is the same F as b, but not the same G. Nicholas Griffin: pro. WigginsVsGeach: that violates Leibniz' law. And because this applies necessarily, the theory is necessarily wrong. DoepkeVsGeach: "relative identity" is only a false name for similarity. b) Grice/George Myro: (both unpublished): VsWiggins' thesis that things that are ever different are always different. GriceVsWiggins: the assumption depends on finding properties in which the objects differ in the times when they are not superposed. Then identity is relative to time. I.e. TI a = t b ↔ (F)[Ft a ↔ Ft b] Where the quantifier runs only over properties whose instantiation does not include the instantiation of any other property at any other time. This excludes: the property, e.g. to be two years old, e.g. to be ex-president e.g. to be bride-in-spe. Simons: we can call this the relation of "temporal indistinguishability". It is characterized by a limitation of Leibniz's law. I 214 SimonsVsGrice: if we call this similarity "identity", then any other kind of similarity is possible, like for example "surface identity" of a body with its surface. Indistinguishability/Time/Simons: will turn out to be important below (in constitution). System CT/Simons: (see above) with him, we have already rejected "temporal identity". Ad (3): dichrone view of super position: Thesis: superposed objects do not have to exist at the same time. For example, the gold forms into a ring. When the ring is melted, it is replaced by the gold. I.e. they exist at different times. For example, a person does not coincide with its body, it transforms into its body (the corpse). (Only if "body" is understood as "corpse", as is often, but not always the case). Dichrone view: Thesis: there is no substrate that survives the change. Change/Diachronic View: Thesis: is always a replacement of one object by another. SimonsVsDiachronic View: does not explain why so many properties are transferred from the original to the later object. Solution: an (assumed) substrate would explain this. |
Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Loar, B. | Avramides Vs Loar, B. | Avramidis I 29 Meaning theory/M.Th./Pragmatics/Semantics/Loar/Avramidis: (Loar 1976 p.150f) (close to Lewis, VsMcDowell, VsWiggins, pro Grice) Thesis Semantics and pragmatics should not be separated. Acccording to Loar Grice is not only on the side of pragmatics. Semantics cannot be used without psychological terms. Grice: for Loar, Grice is working on the first level (see above). Loar: the line between semantics and pragmatics is difficult to draw. Def Pragmatics/Loar: must be negatively determined: all facts about language use in a community that are not semantic facts. AvramidesVsLoar: this definition of pragmatics is not the standard definition, this comes from Morris: (Foundations of the Theory of Signs) Def Syntax/Morris: the study of the relation of the characters to each other Def Semantics/Morris: the study of the relation of signs to things denominated by them Def Pragmatics/Morris: the study of the relationship between the signs and their interpreters. Thus, for Morris, any investigation involving the speaker would fall into the field of pragmatics. Also Grice’ work. I 30 On the other hand: the model of Wiggins/McDowell (sense/power theory) makes it necessary for the two of them to choose Morris’ definition of pragmatics and Loar’s. That may be why Loar rejects their model and tends to Lewis. Loar: seems to consider the distinction between the possible and actual languages within the semantics possible. Then pragmatism is something that hovers above it. AvramidesVs: one can see Lewis’ model also differently: Thesis The distinction of actual/possible languages is parallel to the distinction semantics/pragmatics by Morris. (And does not bring many new aspects either) AvramiesVsLoar: misinterpretation: he seems to believe that if we accept a layer model of the theory of meaning, we have to keep the levels isolated. Then he fears that Grice would solely be attributed to pragmatics. (Loar 1927, p.149). McDowell/Avramides: according to his interpretation it would not be like that. Here we have an overall picture that includes semantics and pragmatics. Layer Model/M.Th./Avramides: allows a reconciliation of Grice’ approach with the formal M.Th. by Frege/Davidson. I 31 Problem: the reconciliation must be acceptable to both sides. Anyway, according to Loar the distinction pragmatics/semantics is anything but merely terminological: M.Th./Philosophy of mind/Loar: M.Th. is part of the theory of mind, and not vice versa. Loar/Avramides: that means that Loar can only understand the fundamental nature of semantic concepts by reference to psychological terms. (> camp). Therefore he takes a reductive position. Grice: is part of semantics according to Loar. And semantics must be reduced to psychology. I 78 Reduction/Avramides: the question is whether we may use psychological concepts in the analysans that do not rely on just the semantic terms that we first wanted to analyze. Reductive Interpretation/Grice/Avramides: the reductive one has yet another claim: if successful, it should show that our notion of meaning is secondary to our psychological concepts in the overall scheme (overall scheme). I 79 AvramidesVsSchiffer/AvramidesVsLoar: a reduction of the semantic on the psychological does not work because of the second form of circularity. I 110 Cartesianism/Loar: he sees his rejection above all in the rejection of what he called "non-naturalism". AvramidesVsLoar: but those who have the intuition that belief and intentions are primarily linguistic states could reject more than just non-naturalism. I 111 Loar: the view that belief, desires and their content could be explained without assumptions about the natural language, runs the risk of drawing a picture of thinking without language. (Loar 1981 p.2) AvramidesVsLoar: Thinking is not impossible without language. ++ I 137 |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Simons, P. | Wiggins Vs Simons, P. | Simons I 216 Superposition/Simons: it is not just a pragmatic resistance that lets us assume that two objects cannot be superposed and yet have no common part. Simons: nevertheless pro, WigginsVsSuperposition/WigginsVsSimons: he makes this clear in the following principle: Principle/Wiggins: A and a real part or component B of a third thing C, where A unequal C and A ≠ B and where no part or component of A is a part or component of B or of C, cannot completely occupy the same space at the same time. Simons: where does this lead? rta: be the container from a to t. This means that space can become the object of timeless operators and predicates of extensional mereology. Frame of Reference: we assume it as fixed, so that identity of spaces can be determined. Then we can apply all axioms of CEM (Extensional Mereology), also the Sum-Axiom and the SSP are not contradictory. (…+…) I 217 SimonsVsWiggins: that does not seem particularly frightening. It even seems to be able to be amplified. For example, we can assume a Strong Supplement Principle (SSP) that is relativized to times: (…+…) SimonsVsCoincidence Principle: if it were correct, it would establish a very close conceptual link between mereological relations and spatial relations between continuants. Simons pro Wiggins: in any case we can agree that "space" can only be mapped by reference to its occupants. ((s) >no "empty space"). Thus, the conceptual utility of the part-whole relations between continuants will consist in their necessity for the formation of spatial concepts. Coincidence Principle/Simons: it is neat and it provides a seductive simplification. SimonsVsCoincidence Principle/SimonsVsWiggins: one pays too high a price. I 218 But with his rejection we must also reject one of the premises, WP, PP or SSP. Which one? I would reject SSP (see below). But first we want to test WP against a hypothetical counter-example from Sharvy. I 220 WigginsVsSuperposition/Simons: his argument for WP goes like this: Suppose A and B were distinct and at the same place at the same time. Then they cannot be distinguished by location. Then they have to be distinguished by their properties. Problem: no space region (volume) can be described simultaneously by different predicates (be it color, form, texture etc.). (s) It cannot be spherical and cube-shaped at the same time). I 221 Simons: the latter may be true, but that does not speak against the possibility of a perfect mixture, because its qualities do not have to be those of its ingredients in isolation, which is proved by the imperfect mixtures every day. ((s) Contradiction to above I 218: there mixture of compound is distinguished by the fact that the properties of the ingredients are largely preserved in the mixture.) Superposition/Simons: Assuming that it would be possible that the occupation of space by a mass would be a gradual matter, then it would be possible that different masses occupy the same region Simons: although the occupation would have different intensity distributions. Simons: if this were the case, Wiggins' principle would be wrong and then we would have to doubt its necessity. |
Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Wiggins, D. | Wright Vs Wiggins, D. | I 231 Wright: Proposal: the relevance of problems related to convergence is best interpreted for moral discourse under the heading of cognitive coercion. WigginsVsWright: sees relevance differently. Restrictive condition: If X is true, X will cause convergence under favorable circumstances and the best explanation of this convergence will require the actual truth of X. Wiggins: So not the fact that participants hold certain beliefs, but the fact of convergence is the explanandum. I 233 WrightVsWiggins: misguided weighting of causality: the belief that people believe that P because P, P is acceptable only if the facts that P plays a direct causal role! Wiggins: not direct causal role, but rather Def "acquittal explanation": an explanation that a subject is attached to a belief, according to the scheme: For this, that or other reason, there is actually nothing to think other than that P. Therefore, it is a fact that P. I 234 Therefore, given the circumstances, etc., it can come as no surprise that the subject believes that P. Example (i) Nothing else can be thought but that 5 + 7 = 12. (ii) The best explanation for the belief of my son and his classmates is that they follow a rule of calculation that shows that nothing else can be thought of. Wright: this involves two steps: the second involves a procedure! I 235 Moral/Ethics/Wiggins: For example slavery is wrong, nothing else can be thought of. Wright: one could soften the conditions as far as the opinions involved in the discourse at least sometimes fulfill them. The corresponding facts (about these opinions) could then still form a class, even if there is no tendency towards convergence. WrightVsWiggins: it is questionable, however, whether his "acquittal explanation" can fulfill what the Best Explanation is trying to do: Concerns arise when we realize that nothing of meaning is lost if we omit the words "so it is a fact that P"! Then it just says: I 235/236 "for this or that reason, as well as circumstances that do not allow other thoughts, the subject believes that P." Acquitting Explanation/Wiggins: Causal explanation, where causality does not refer between consciousness and values or consciousness and numbers. Wright: It is about the attentive use of appropriate rules. ((s) The causality takes place between the rules and the beliefs.). I 237 WrightVsWiggins: that does not get us any further than minimal anti-realism. Justification/Permissive/Wright: none of the discourses we consider are purely permissive with regard to the conditions: it is simply not true that absolutely everything can be found to be funny or disgusting in a permissible manner. Def Demonstration/Wright: any presentation of circumstances and considerations that require the acceptance of the statement according to the standards of assertibility when the standards are to be observed. I 238 Like "Chernobyl wasn't funny." No matter which discourse it is, some of his statements will allow a demonstration in this sense if the discourse is not purely permissive. According to Wiggin's acquittal explanation (nothing else is conceivable): (i) For one reason or another (here follows the demonstration), nothing else is conceivable. (ii) Since the parties act in accordance with the relevant beliefs, it is not surprising that they agree that P. Minimum Truth Capability/WrightVsWiggins: on condition that the discourse is not purely permissive, the minimum truth capability ensures the fulfillment of Wiggins condition. However, it does not guarantee that the reference to "the facts" in the correspondence platitude can carry the additional content that the game with the best explanation is supposed to secure. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Wiggins, D. | Simons Vs Wiggins, D. | I 130 Event/mereology/relation/Simons: how do the mereological relations between events look like? Here, we do not need to modify the predicates timely like continuants. This makes the event interesting for philosophers who want to preserve the extensionality. Relation currently: is for events direct and narrow. Relation to the space: is for events indirect on the continuants involved in them. Duality/Wiggins: (1980,25-6,n12): events are "dual" to continuants in this regard. SimonsVsWiggins: this is not perfect because continuants occupy space and continue as well. Event/splitting/scattered/Simons: because continuants are involved in them they can be split (to be divided, dispersed, scattered). And therefore they can have both spatial and temporal parts. But not as events involved continuants, e.g. the increase in the intensity of a magnetic field. Field: whether itself is a continuant is controversial. Event/localization: localization is only possible by the continuants involved in them. Entering/time/happening/Simons: the time of the happening (whether continuants are involved or not) can only be calculated by measuring time intervals. We must rely on local cyclic processes. I 221 Superposition/SimonsVsWiggins: what the superposition of things of the same kind is about is that we have no way to track things ((s) in its coming together and breaking up). I 222 Namely, they are temporarily indistinguishable (this is an epistemic problem). Epistemic/(s): why are epistemic problems at all important or interesting? Because we have to revise our language use in epistemic impossibility: for basically indistinguishable we should not use different words (no distinction without difference). Simons: e.g. two bee swarms unite and separate again. We generally do not know if the two are afterwards the same two as before. This could be, however, clarified by tracking each individual bee. Therefore, it is not an ontological problem. Superposition/Simons: there are apparently cases where things can superimpose in the same way and we can still track them: E.g. moving points of light or shadow, which overlap for a moment. E.g. mutually parallel wavefronts, here we assume this in addition to uniform wave velocity. E.g. (shorter): clouds of water vapor that can be manipulated by a "cloud projector", here we have a means of identification: causal paths. I 223 Wiggin's Principle/WP/Wiggins: pro: space can be displayed only by reference to its occupiers (availability), and spatial facts are conceptually independent of the existence of facts about individual things (particulars) and the identities of these particulars. Now, if space is mapped by reference to permanent particulars the non-identity of the particulars A and B, that are both of the type f, has to be sufficient to determine that the place of A to t is different from the place of B to t. Simons is pro illustration by reference to particulars. SimonsVsWiggins: nevertheless, objects of the same type may coincide: because the requirement of illustration only requires that some specific continuants can impossibly coincide with others of their kind. There are exceptions, though they are a minority: e.g. see above clouds, points of light, shadow, waves, etc. VsSimons: it could be argued that these objects are not material or substances. Simons: they actually are not substances. Just like accidents or disruptions. SimonsVsVs: still the answer is not yet there if two things of a kind can superimpose whether they can be substances. The examples suggest that we can appease Wiggins' fear that we cannot retrace the traces if we find the appropriate means, e.g. separate causes or uniform speed. Wiggins/Simons: Wiggins is only right if everything with which we can trace a continuant is, so to speak, in its own container. If this is the case, his principle (WP) is correct. These cases seem to make out the majority, so we have no problem to map the space (illustrating, mapping). Sortal Concept/Simons: (for a continuant): the sortal concept tells us, inter alia, under which conditions the object continues to exist and under which it ceases. These were the "existence-conditions" ((s) meaning linguistically!). Superposition/SimonsVsWiggins: that various objects can superimpose follows from the fact that a single piece of matter can be in such a state that it simultaneously fulfills different existence conditions ((s) meaning intensional). I 260 Neccessary/Nec/Wiggins: "Nec" is a predicate modifier working on λ-abstraction, rather than using the proposition operator "N". QuineVsWiggins: (1977, 236): misleading: "Nec[(λx)(λy)(x = y)]" for "the relation like any r and s have if they are necessary identical" correct: "(λx)(λy)(N(x = y)" (p. 293). SimonsVsWiggins : "Nec" seems to be superfluous and Wiggins suggests this himself. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Loar | Versus | Avramides I 29 Loar / meaning theory: near Lewis, VsMcDowell, VsWiggins, thesis: do not separate semantics and pragmatics - (Grice ditto) - Wiggins/McDowell: Separation th. of sense /th. of force - Loar: ultimately psychologically and thus reductionist. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Relative Identity | Geach, P. | Simons I 213 "Relative Identity"/Geach: ("Theory R"), ("Sortal-Theory"): thesis: for Sortals F and G it is possible to find two objects a and b, so that a and b are both Fs and Gs , a is the same F as b, but not the same G. Against it: b) Grice/George Myro: (both unpublished): VsWiggins thesis: that things that are ever different are always different. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Meaning Theory | Loar, B. | Avramides I 29 Group: Loar/Meaning Theory: close to Lewis, VsMcDowll, VsWiggins, thesis: semantics and pragmatics are not separate - (not even with Grice) - Wiggins/McDowell: separation Theory of Sense/of Power - Loar: ultimately psychological and thus reductionist. I 31 Meaning Theory/Philosophy of Mind/Loar: thesis the meaning theory is part of the theory of mind and not vice versa. I 32 Loar: thinks that if we do not take the psychological concepts as fundamental, they will be forgotten. Avramides: that does not have to be. Thesis: with the reciprocal interpretation of the biconditional (the recognition of the place of the concept in the conceptual system, not reductive) in "Grice" analysis, we can just as well bring the philosophy of language into the realm of the philosophy of mind, whereby the analysis of meaning remains partially autonomous, but under the umbrella of intentional action. Not all questions of public language have to do with the philosophy of mind. EMD II 138 Meaning/Loar: Thesis: semantic concepts are localized within a larger framework of propositional attitudes, and therefore I make substantial use of intentional entities. But nowadays it is common to think that a purely extensional meaning theory is possible. We owe this largely to Davidson. Davidson/Loar: seems to make a compromise to join Quine's attack against intentions without abandoning all our intuitions about certain semantic facts. LoarVsExtensionality: Z meaning theory without intention is like Hamlet without Prince of Denmark. EMD II 146 Loar thesis: the semantic properties of the clauses (constituents) are a certain function of the propositional attitudes of the speaker. Question: Should propositional attitudes then not best be described as relations to sentences or other linguistic entities? But that would be a circle. EMD II 149 Loar thesis: What I want to show is that the meaning theory is part of the theory of mind and not vice versa! II 148 ... KripkeVsVs: E.g. Measuring: one object refers to another, the default, but if it didn't exist, the object would still have had a length - LoarVs: but that doesn't work for the meaning theory - thesis: therefore you have to introduce intensional entities for a meaning theory. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Dissimilarity | Simons, P. | I 213 "Relative Identity"/Geach: ("Theory R"), ("Sortal Theory"): thesis: for Sortals F and G it is possible to find two objects a and b, so that a and b are both Fs and Gs, a is the same F as b, but not the same G. Against it: b) Grice/George Myro: (both unpublished): VsWiggins-™ Thesis that things that are ever different are always different. c) diachronic view of superposition: thesis: superposed objects do not have to exist at the same time. For example, gold forms into a ring. When the ring is melted, it is "replaced" by the gold. I.e. they exist at different times. Change/Diachronic view: thesis: is always a replacement of one object by another. SimonsVsDiachronic view: does not explain why so many properties are transferred from the original to the later object. Solution: an (assumed) substrate would explain this. Ad (4) reductionist view of superposition/Chisholm: thesis: only the final constituents are real. Everything else is only a logical construction from it. SimonsVs: this contains a considerable revisionary element: it eliminates all terms and predicates that are true of such constructions that are familiar to us. ((s) Example machines do not exist then.) Pro: emphasizes the importance of the material constitution. Vs: overlooks the fact that parts are not always ontologically superior to their whole! |
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| Dissimilarity | Wiggins, D. | Simons I 213 "relative identity" / Geach ("Theory R"), ("sortal theory") for sortals F and G, it is possible to find two objects a and b, so that a and b both are F and G, a is the same F as B, but not the same G - On the other hand: b) Grice / George Myro (both unpublished): VsWiggins thesis, that things that are ever different, are always different. I 216 Wiggins: his thesis is: a not = b and a 2I b > ~ (a sup tb) ((s) 2I above) This can be simplified and brought into contraposition: WP (Wiggins principle) a sup t b > a ot b |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
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