Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 10 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
de dicto Lewis IV 144
Knowledge de dicto/Lewis: E.g. encyclopedia - aimed at the world and provides knowledge about the world, not on the reader (de se) E.g. Lingens with memory loss finds himself in the library - (> tour guide example, Lost wanderers) - provides localization in logical space but not in space-time - but you can close the gap - E.g. map: will only be useful when the red dot "you are here" is removed.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Descriptions Tugendhat I 348
Descriptions/Frege (also Husserl): descriptions more fundamental than names - for finding the reference of names. MillVsFrege: Names more fundamental.
>Names/Mill.
VsMill: mysterious: "enclosed to the object itself".
Solution/Mill: not to the object but to the idea of object.
>Imagination.
I 378
Frege: names are abbreviations for descriptions. >Abbreviated descriptions.
I 396
Description/properties/Identification/Tugendhat: doubtful whether descriptions can really pick out an object. "Original" property: E.g. "the highest mountain", "the second highest mountain," and so on.
Problem: there can also be two mountains of the same height, at one point there can be multiple or none so-and-so.
Tugendhat: there must be added something else, ostension, name or location.
E.g. someone who is lead in front of the highest mountain, does not need to know that it is the highest. - ((s) "This mountain" is not a property.)
>Knowledge, >Identification, >haecceitism, cf. >Two lost wanderers.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

I, Ego, Self Perry Frank I 398ff
Extra-sense/I/PerryVsCastaneda: can be recognized by others in the same way, does not explain the difference. >Extra-sense/Castaneda.
Frank I 399f
I/he/reference/relation/sense/meaning: difference: Quasi-indicator attributes reference, but does not establish it. >I/Castaneda, >quasi-indicator.

Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference,
and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55

James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An
International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians,
Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986

Frank I 402ff
I/Castaneda/Perry: "I" is not replaceable by specific labeling, when behavior is explained - "I" is a "key index word". Problem: same sentence, but different speaker: false belief "I'm making a mess ...".
>Sugar trail example.
Incorrect solution: "And I am the one": again a new index word. - "Lack of conceptual component" does not help: I can believe that it is me, with no specific concept of me.
False: description: "the one who makes the mess"; this does not help, because there is no connection to me.
Frank I 403
Belief/I/Perry: Solution: we need a distinction: belief-state/belief-object. E.g. the event starts at 12:00 - that means, "now!" or "already finished" or "there is still time".
Subject: the event beginning at 12:00
State: "now".
Specific decsription without an index is not enough.
>Indexicality, >Index words.
Frank I 414
I/individuation/Perry: The following conditions are not enough: Propositions de re, de dicto, additional conceptual feature localization in space and time, relativization on people and places, two different descriptions without "I". >Propositions, >de re, >de dicto, >Spatial localization, >Description.
Perry like Castaneda: 'I' is not replaceable.
>I, Ego, Self/Castaneda, >H.-N. Castaneda.
Time/Person-Proposition: does not make me different from the others: "J.P. yesterday at the super market" is just as true for others. - judgement context = opinion context: "The event begins now" is true at 12:00 - does not help. True/false/truth value: does not help: that mountain A is higher than B, may be true, but does not lead to the right path. There is nothing what all have in common.
>Wanderers-example.
Solution: the lost wanderers are in the same opinion state (individuated by index words), but not of the same opinion.

Perr I
J. R. Perry
Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Index Words Perry Frank I 22
PerryVsFrege: "today" is not a completing or "saturating" sense, absolutely no sense, but a reference object - meaning remains, reference varies. >Indexicality, >Meaning, >Reference, >Sense, >Contextuality.
Frank I 393f
Index words/Perry: without pointing component. Demonstratives: with pointing component.
>Demonstratives.
Meaning of index-words: their role - similar to the method for the determination of the object.
>Roles, >Verification, >Identification, >Individuation.
I 394f
Today/Meaning: constant, truth value with index word "today it's nice" is not constant, so the meaning is changing - if understanding is knowing the truth value. >Truth value, >Understanding, cf. >Truth conditions, >Understanding/Dummett.
Perry: the role (determination process) changes, the meaning is constant. - Then the meaning cannot be a part of the thought.
>Meaning, >Thoughts.
What the speaker believes is irrelevant to the meaning of the index word.
>Beliefs, >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge.

Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference,
and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55

James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An
International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians,
Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986
---
I 419
Index words/Perry: true-false exam does not help. - E.g. Two lost wanderers: that the Mt. Tallac is higher than Jack's Peak, is affirmed by all. ((s) This presupposes that the two do not stand side by side in sight.)
Perry:There is no mountain, everyone believes it is Mt. Tallac, no customer from which all believe that he has made the mess (sugar trail). No Professor, who does not feel guilty (because he does not know what time it is). What people have in common here is not what they believe.
>Wanderers example, >Sugar trail example.
I 394 ff
Sense/Perry: is oft of understood as a term. - Then question: is the meaning of index words to be equated with an individual-concept or a general term? >Singular terms, >General terms.

Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference,
and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55

James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An
International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians,
Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986

Perr I
J. R. Perry
Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Language Nietzsche Ries II 35
Language/On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense/Nietzsche: Seduction by Language: makes the deception of intellectual judgement performance appear as a natural context. >Predication, >Sentence, >Fiction.
Ries II 86
Language/Twilight of the Idols/Nietzsche:"coarse fetish being": produces reason prejudices: subject, causality and substance. ---
Danto III 51
Language/thinking/order/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche draws his pessimistic conclusions from his epistemological analysis (like B. Russell later): according to them, our perceptions cannot be similar to their causes, so that the language we use (...) does not really describe the world. Order/Nietzsche/Danto: At this point Nietzsche assumes that there could be an order or structure in the world which we are not able to comprehend.
Danto III 107
Language/Nietzsche/Danto: There is a philosophical mythology hidden in language, which breaks out every moment, however cautious one may be otherwise.(1)
Danto III 209
Language/Grammar/Nietzsche/Danto: E. g. humility: is not an achievement of the weak, but their nature, just as brutality is not a crime but the nature of the strong. Danto: Thrasymachos had set up something similar in Politeia: he trivialized his definition of justice as acting in the interests of the stronger party. Analogously, a mathematician is not a mathematician when he makes a mistake.
DantoVsThrasymachos/DantoVsNietzsche: both stumbled upon grammar: they raised a triviality of logic to a metaphysics of morality.
NietzscheVsThrasymachos/Danto: Nevertheless, Nietzsche is more subtle than Thrasymachos: for Nietzsche, the world consists in a way more of pulsations than pulsating objects. Pulsation, however, cannot pulsate, so to speak, only objects can do that.
>Justice/Thrasymachus, >Justice/Nietzsche.
Danto III 210
Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche knew that it would be difficult to come up with a language for all of this - a language that I think is made up of verbs and adverbs, but not nouns and adjectives.
1. F. Nietzsche: Der Wanderer und seine Schatten, KGW IV, 3. p. 215.

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Ries II
Wiebrecht Ries
Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Map Example Lewis IV 144
Knowledge de dicto/Map-Example/Lewis: e.g. encyclopedia - applies to the world and provides knowledge about the world, not about the reader (de se). - E.g. Lingens with memory loss found himself in a library and reads his own story. (-> E.g. Lost wanderers). - Knowledge de dicto provides localization in the logical space but not in space-time - but you can close the gap. - E.g. Map: will only be used if the red dot "you are here" is removed.

Explanation/(s):E.g., Two lost hikers meet. By chance they have the same hiking book. Then they will not find out their localization with the help of this book alone.
Reason: In the printed book, the walkers are not identified, for example, as the one who came from the west and the one who came from the east.
Solution: A modern navigation system registers the route and uses it to identify the user holding the device.
>Propositional knowledge, >Non-propositional knowledge, >Self-identification, >Self-ascription.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Map Example Peacocke I 76
Map/Peacocke: in order to use a map, you have to be able to trace the trail of your own movements. ((s)> e.g. Two lost wanderers/J. Perry).
((s) e.g. GPS: intensional (tells you "who you are").
Map: (extensional) will not help you. It does not tell you who you are.)
>Propositional knowledge, >Intensions, >Intensionality, >Extensions,
>Extensionality, >Spatial localization.


((s) Explanation/(s): E.g., Two lost hikers meet. By chance, they have the same hiking book. Then, with the help of this book alone, they will not find out their localization.
Reason: in the printed book the hikers are not identified, e.g. as the one who came from the west and the one who came from the east.
Solution: modern navigation system: registers the path and identifies by it the user who holds the device in his hand.
Distinction: propositional/non-propositional knowledge).

Peacocke I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Peacocke II
Christopher Peacocke
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Sugar Trail Example Perry Frank I 417f
Supermarket-Example/Perry: (Sugar trail, "Mess in the supermarket" - someone notes that it was he himself who has made a mess). Opinion context: the reader, now.
Judgement context: the man at the supermarket.
Problem: the mere fact that I considered the proposition that I make a mess at any time for true, does not explain why I stopped. - The reader feels the same way and does not stop the cart.
N.B.: for me opinion context and judgement context coincide - but it is not a solution, because self-identification cannot do without a sentence with "I".
I 421f
Wanderer/supermarket/Perry: Solution: distinction opinion state/opinion: E.g. opinion state: "The event will begin" - "it begins now" - "it has begun" - opinion: all the time I believe that it starts at 12:00. Opinion state: for all the same (with index word).
Opinion: different: not the same relation to the same subject.
VsTradition: if it were different, we would all have to expect a common believed proposition if all are in the same opinion state.
Normally one will adjust his opinion states when one goes from one context to the other to preserve his opinions.

See also sugar trail at the grocery store (>Supermarket-example) . (Frank I 402ff).
>Two omniscient Gods.

See also >Identification, >Individuation, >Propositions, >Propositional knowledge, Self-identification, >Self-knowledge, >essential Indexicals.

John Perry (1979): The Problem of the Essential Indexicals, in : Nous 13
(1979), 3-21

Perr I
J. R. Perry
Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Terminology Nietzsche Ries II 11
Crisis/Nietzsche: is to be pushed forward to revaluate all values.
Ries II 11
Amor fati/Nietzsche: the highest state a philosopher can attain: to think Dionysian in relation to existence.
Ries II 13
Noon/Nietzsche: A mature old tree, embraced by the rich love of a vine and hidden from itself. At the moment of happiness, the course of time seems to stop.
Ries II 16
Nietzsche: Seafaring passion for the "unknown", which lies in a direction "where all the suns of mankind have so far gone down".
Ries II 17
Zarathustra/Nietzsche: Thesis: the meaning of life is love.
Ries II 19
Happiness/Nietzsche: Zarathustra: the happiness of my existence, to express its puzzle form, I have already died as my father, as my mother I am still alive, and I am getting old.
Ries II 20
Nietzsche/Biography: Nietzsche met Jacob Burckhardt. During the Franco-German war, he was a voluntary nurse for several months.
Ries II 25
"Dark antiquity": The term comes from Jacob Burckhardt. (Not literally!).
Ries II 28
Apollonian/Nietzsche: Symbol of the world as an apparition, in the sense of the Schopenhauer concept of imagination. Deceptive liberation from the terrible Dionysian knowledge of "primal pain". Apollonian/Nietzsche: Art medium
Dionysian/Nietzsche: Wisdom
Apollonian/Dionysian/Nietzsche: in the end, they both speak each other's language. There is no point in a world game circling in itself, which the will in eternal lust plays with itself.
Ries II 29
Tragedy: Schopenhauer: Pathos as primal pain - Nietzsche primordial lust.
Ries II 30
Nietzsche: Zarathustra: From the smile of Dionysus the Olympic gods were born, from his tears the human was created.
Ries II 30
Pessimism/Nietzsche: "Beyond Good and Evil": a philosophy that dares to lower morality itself into the world of appearances, namely appearance as deception, illusion, delusion, error.
Ries II 29/30
Nietzsche/Biography/Ries: by the "Birth of the Tragedy" he was scientifically dead as a philologist.
Ries II 49
Human/All too human/Nietzsche: 2nd main piece: "The Wanderer and his Shadow": "Shadow philosophy"/Shadow/Nietzsche: in which the "objects" lose their physicality.
Noon/Nietzsche: Whosoever had an active and stormy morning, whose soul is overwhelmed by a strange quietness around the noon of life... It is a death with awake eyes.
Ries II 50
Jesus/Christianity/Nietzsche: Parable "The Prisoners" (The Gay Science): the son of the guard: I will save you, but only those of you who believe that I am the son (Jesus) of the prison guard.
Ries II 55
Gay Science/Nietzsche: Science of the free spirit.
Ries II 57
Eternal return/Nietzsche: (Zarathustra) the thought invaded Nietzsche in August 1881 at the lake of Silvaplana. Like when one day or at night a demon in your loneliest solitude stalked you and said: "You will have to live this life as you loved it and love it now, once more and countless times. And there will be nothing new about it, but every pain and every desire and every thought and sigh and all unspeakably small and big things of your life must come back to you and everything in the same order and also this spider and this moonlight between the trees... would you not bow down and grind your teeth and curse the demon who spoke like that? >Eternal return/Nietzsche.
The question with everyone and everything: 'Do you want to do this again and again and countless times?' would lie as the heaviest weight on your actions!"
Ries II 58/ 59
Zarathustra/Nietzsche: as a classic figure, reversal of history, "overcoming morality". Zarathustra, who once created the most fatal error of morality, himself - he is also the first to recognize him the heavyweight has given way from things. The whole divine horizon has been wiped away.
Ries II 60/61
The last human/Nietzsche: Opposite image of the superhuman, vegetating at the end of civilization. The last man smells badly!
Ries II 62
Three stages: past, present, future: Camel/Nietzsche: idealistic stage, obedience, theological absolutism "thou shalt".
Löwe/Nietzsche: idealism turns against itself, against the thousand-years old "great dragon" of the "thou shalt" dominating it: "I will".
Ries II 63
Kind/Nietzsche: but the freedom of this "I want" is still constituted by what it denies: morality, metaphysics, religion. Only the third stage brings the innocence of becoming beyond good and evil. >Morality/Nietzsche, >Metaphysics/Nietzsche, >Religion/Nietzsche.
Ries II 64
Self-conquest/Nietzsche: Where I found something alive, I found the will to power... life itself spoke to me: I am what must always overcome itself. The will overcomes itself to its purest form: the will to power. Thus constant repetition, thereby circularity, thus return of the same always!
Ries II 65
Dionysian/Nietzsche: Existence in Dionysian immediacy remains subject to appearances.
Ries II 70
Redemption of the "higher humans": Figures/Equalities/Zarathustra/Nietzsche/Ries:
Schopenhauer: Schopenhauer is caricatured by Nietzsche in the Zarathustra as the fortune teller of great fatigue.
The two kings/Zarathustra/Nietzsche:
1. despiser of the false representation of the political
2. the Conscientious of the spirit (the scientist).
The old Sorcerer/Zarathustra/Nietzsche: Richard Wagner.
The old Pope/Zarathustra/Nietzsche: the pious man mourning for the "dead God" and pious in this grief.
The ugliest man/Zarathustra/Nietzsche: "the murderer of God", the great self-loathing and disgusted by humans.
The voluntary beggar/Zarathustra/Nietzsche: the selfless human.
The shadow of Zarathustra: the free spirit.
They are all as the "remnant of God" deeply desperate and failed. They all caricature themselves at the donkey festival. The always same Ries II A of the donkey as the Dionysian saying-yes to the whole of being.
Ries II 71
Noon/Zarathustra/Nietzsche: through the "noon abyss" Zarathustra falls "into the well of eternity". The ship is no longer being praised for its departure into the unknown, but for its return to the "quietest bay". ---
Danto III 207
Terminology/Blonde Beast/Nietzsche/Danto: the expression blonde beast has no direct reference to Germans or Aryans in Nietzsche. This passage refers to "Roman, Arabic, Germanic, Japanese nobility, Homeric heroes, Scandinavian Vikings".(1) Most likely, the "Blonde Beast" is a literary topos for "Lion", the so-called King of the Animals.
Danto III 218
Internalisation/Terminology/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche calls internalisation the phenomenon that a drive still discharges when prohibited, but not against an external object, but rather an internal object, the person himself. This phenomenon plays a role in the further development of consciousness. (2) >Internalization.
Danto III 219
Bad conscience: It is possible that people may remain in the state of mere self-aggression or mere self-loathing. That is what Nietzsche calls a guilty conscience.

1. Vgl. F. Nietzsche, Zur Genealogie der Moral, KGW VI. 2, p. 289.
2. Ibid. p. 338

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Ries II
Wiebrecht Ries
Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Two Omniscient Gods Perry Frank I 404f
Lewis: Two omniscient Gods/Gods-Example/example of the Gods/wanderer-example: E.g. Perry: two lost wanderers need more than just the same travel guide to even detect differences with the situation and each other. - They would call all the same sentences as true.
See also sugar trail at the grocery store.
>Supermarket-example . (Frank I 402ff).
>Two omniscient Gods.

See also >Identification, >Individuation, >Propositions, >Propositional knowledge, Self-identification, >Self-knowledge, >essential Indexicals.

John Perry (1979): The Problem of the Essential Indexicals, in : Nous 13
(1979), 3-21

Perr I
J. R. Perry
Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Wanderers (Expl) Perry, J. Fra I 421
Belief state / opinion state / 2 wanderers / Perry: there is no identity, not even an isomorphic correspondence, but only a systematic relation between the belief states in which you are, and what one believes, based on the way!

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994