Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reliability Theory | Schiffer | I 83 SchifferVsReliability: (as the key to representation, e.g. fuel gauge: there are false truth conditional functions possible: E-functions that do not ascribe situations but false words: E.g. "snow is white"/"Coal is white" (for mentalese). - Even under "optimal conditions". - Then it is uncertain whether the reliability has come about on the wrong way. >Fuel gauge example, >Mentalese/Language of thought. I 83ff Arthritis/reliability/mentalese/relation theory/SchifferVsFodor: ... + ... - Alfred thinks in his idiolect that he has arthritis in his thigh. Supposing there is a second function g that assigns a condition to arthrite that we connect with shmarthritis (rheumatic-like). Then: you cannot determine if Alfred is more reliable according to f (attribution of truth conditions) or g (attribution of false words). Condition (c): an M-function f is the truth conditional function for x' lingua mentis M iff the head-reliability and world-head reliability of x (thinking in M) with respect to f is greater than with respect to any other M-function. This is neither sufficient nor necessary. We do not know by which attribution function the speaker proceeds. Cf. >Quaddition. I 87 Quaddition/reliability/relation theory/belief/Schiffer: if Ralph does not understand anything about mathematics: there is no difference between two attribution functions a) correct addition, b) quaddition. Because they provide the same values for manageable numbers - and are not discernible for inconceivably large numbers because they are incomprehensible. >Reliability theory. I 104 SchifferVsReliability Theory: the functional relation that is correlated by the reliability theory with "true of" has, as one of its realizations. >arthritis/"shmarthritis". Solution: there must be an "designated role". I 104 Reliability Theory/Schiffer: Solution: adequacy by disquotation schema. - The probability that an M-function f* exists is high, given that x s believes and f*(s) e.g. is about the stock market. ((s), i.e. we assume that the people usually believe and know something true what they are talking about.) I 105 Hartry Field: if there is a functional theory for mentalese, then the reliability theory is indispensable. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Way of Givenness | Schiffer | I 53 Givenness/manner of presentation/way of givenness/propositional theory/Schiffer. Variant: instead of "Henry thinks that this girl is wise" (index word) (Em) m is a way of givenness this girl & B (Henry) Problem: that does not tell us which proposition Henry believes, but only that he believes any known feature in the propositional theory. >Propositions, >Beliefs, >Opacity, >Content, >Index words. I 277 Identity/way of presentation/Schiffer: Solution: you can simply accept conflicting beliefs ("it is a dog but not a shmog"). Superman/Clark Kent: Lois Lane believes that Kent is identical with himself. Problem: then you cannot accept for natural kind concepts without even concede it at the same time also for singular terms in sentences. Fido-Fido: explains why dogness and shmogness do not refer to the same proposition - (despite equality extension): because Tanya does not believe that shmogs are dogs. >arthritis/shmarthritis, > Externalism. Nathan SalmonVs all: Fido-Fido example "Fido" = Fido. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Externalism | Newen Vs Externalism | I 174 Natural Species/Putnam/Newen: E.g. water, oil, tiger: in doing so, we single out individual specimens, even if we I 175 are unaware of the essential conditions for the existence of the natural species. I 176 Meaning/Putnam: is therefore dependent on the surroundings. >Externalism. Externalism/Burge: Transfers Putnam's knowledge to the contents of beliefs. Twin Earth: shows that beliefs cannot be fully characterized by the internal states. Arthritis/Shmarthritis/Burge/Newen: Alfred's belief that he had arthritis in the thigh becomes a true statement when changing to a language community in which this is common. I 177 Point: in this, however, we still assume that the use is determined by experts. I.e. we still can make mistakes! We may use it correctly sometimes, even though we connect false beliefs with it! VsExternalism/Newen: Problem: Supervenience! E.g. 1) beliefs depend on the surroundings 2) brain states are independent of the surroundings 3) beliefs supervene on brain states. That is impossible, if some are dependent and the others are independent. I 178 It might so happen that different beliefs are present in the same brain states. VsExternalism/Knowledge/Belief/Newen: 2) argument VsExternalism: it is inconsistent with our self-knowledge. In general, we know what we believe. It might be, however, that the surroundings have such an influence that the content is changed. There are two positions a) incompatibility thesis: either the externalism or the everyday intuition is true b) compatibility thesis: both are compatible at the price that our everyday intuition is significantly attenuated. NS I 139 VsExternalism: simply saying that you need causal chains for successful reference is not enough. You must also say what kind they need to be. E.g. direct visual contact, hearsay, instrument monitoring, etc. E.g. phlogiston: it was believed to be responsible for combustion processes. Question: Why does "phlogiston" not refer to oxygen? Why did this reference not succeed? VsExternalism: Problem: it cannot give the following answer, because it brings out the thesis rejected by him: "Intention determines the extension". Externalism has to say that the theory is so fundamentally wrong that it is not satisfied by any substance. Therefore, "phlogiston" does not reference. VsExternalism: thus it cannot show how the causal chains are linked and owes us a theory of causal chains in general. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Field, H. | Schiffer Vs Field, H. | I 105 SchifferVsField: wrong is his suggestion: physical relations as an explanation for the reference relation would also cover relations to things of which they are not true. (E.g. >"Arthritis"/"shmarthritis", E.g. >Addition/Quaddition. - FieldVsPhysicalism). Conclusion: no functional relation, which operates without disquotation scheme will be appropriate for the "true-of" relation. ((s) Anyway not the relation, but the theory works, if at all with the disquotation scheme.). I 109 Def Conceptual Role/c.r./Field: (Field 1977): the subjective conditional probability-function of an agent Two mental representations S1 and S2 have the same cr for one person, iff. their (the person’s) subjective conditional prblty-function is so that s for any mental representation, given the subjective probability of s1 s is the same as that of s2 where s. SchifferVsField: This is of little use, because not two people have the same conditional probability function. But Field is anyway pessimistic with respect to a precise concept of intersubjective sameness of mental content that goes beyond sameness of referential significance. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
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