Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.

Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
---|---|---|---|

Assertibility | Lewis | V 139
Assertibility/conditional/semantics/: we assume assertibility instead of truth because of the probability. However, assertibility is best gained through truth conditions plus a sincerity condition. Adams: the other way around: there are truth conditions not for the entire conditional, but individually for antecedent and consequent "plus a rule that assertibility of the indicative conditional is possible with the conditional subjective probability of the consequent given by the antecedent. Lewis pro (>Adams Conditional). LewisVsAdams: means something different: he calls this "indicative conditional" what Lewis calls a "probability conditional". Adams: the probability of conditionals is not equal to the probability of truth. AdamsVsLewis: probability of conditionals does not obey the standard laws of probability. Solution/Lewis: if we do not mention truth, probability of conditionals obeys the standard laws. Then the indicative conditional has no truth value and no truth conditions, i.e. Boolean connections, but no truth-functional ones (not Truth Functional). V 142
Assertibility/conditional/Lewis: assertibility should correspond to the subjective probability (Lewis pro Grice). The assertibility is reduced by falsehood or trivial being-true. This leads to conditional probability. From this we have to deduct the measured assertibility from the probability of the truth of the truth-functional conditional (horseshoe, ⊃). |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) InDie Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) InDie Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 InDie Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 InHandlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |

Belief Degrees | Adams | Field II 296
Adams-Conditional/Field: Suppose we add ">" to the general Adams conditional, which can only occur as a main operator, and which obeys the principle that the degree of belief in A > B is always the contingent degree of belief in B given A.
Belief Degree/Field: If we assume that contingent and not contingent belief is represented by conditional or unconditional Q, we obtain that the degree of belief in A > B is equal to Q (B I A).Adams-Conditional/Field: the normal Adams conditional assuming that belief degrees obey the probability laws captures the "if ... then" better than the probability function of the conditional. >Conditional, >Probability functions, >Probability, >Probability law, >Conditional Probability, >cf. >Bayesianism, >Subjective Probability. In any case, this only occurs as a main connection: E.g. "when I try it, I will be added to the team ("If I try out for the yankees, I will make the team"). Then the general Adams-conditional seems appropriate for vagueness. >Vagueness. If that is so, then the belief degree of A > B should be: Q (DA I A).
Probability function/belief degree: Difference: for the probability function, the contingent probability is never higher than the probability of the material conditional.
>Probability function.Williamson/Field: for his argument (1 - 3), this is important: all premisses get the Q value 1 if "if ... then" are read as a general Adams conditional. Then the classic conclusion is not valid in this reading of "if ... then". >T. Williamson. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 InTheories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |

Conditional | Adams | Field II 252/296
Material Conditional/Adams Conditional/Field: (Lit. Adams 1974): (outside of mathematics): few of us would agree with the following conclusion: E.g. from
Clinton will not die in office to If Clinton dies in office, Danny de Vito will become President. That suggests that here the equivalence between A > B and ~(A v B) does not exist. >Counterfactuals, >Counterfactual conditional. In other words: If A then B does not seem to have the same truth conditions as ~A v B. >Truth conditions. Adams-conditional: it may only be used as a main operator. - The degree of belief of A > B is always the conditional belef degree (B I A). >Operators, >Conditional probability. II 253
In the case of the indicative conditional, the premise is always required. - Adams: intuitively, conclusions with conditionals are correct. Problem: then they will say less about the world.
Indicative conditional sentence/material implication/truth/field: further considerations have however led many to doubt that there are truth conditions here at all.>Material implication. Conditional/Field: A > B: here the premise A is always required when concluding. That is, we accept conditional B relative to premise A. Adams: the idea of contingent acceptance justifies our intuitive beliefs according to which conclusions with conditionals are correct. Cf. >Presuppositions, >Principle of Charity. But then it is anything but obvious that conditionals say something about the world. For example, there must not be a statement C whose probability in all circumstances is the same as the conditional (contingent) probability of (B I A). That is, the conditional A > B is not such a C. N.B.: this shows that we do not have to assume "conditional propositions" or "conditional facts". This is the nonfactualist view. >Nonfactualism. ((s) Truth conditions/nonfactualism/conditional/(s): if there are no facts, then there are also no truth conditions.) Borderline case: If the conditional (contingent) probability is 0 or 1, it is justifiable that the assertibility conditions (acceptance conditions) are the same as those of the material conditional. Vs: one could argue that a sentence without any truth conditions is meaningless. >Assertibility, >Assertibility conditions. Field: ditto, but the main thing is that one cannot explain the acceptance conditions without the truth conditions in terms of the truth conditions. >Truth conditions. 1. R. Adams (1974). Theories of Actuality. Nous, 5: 21-231. --- Lewis V 133
Conditional/Adams/Adams-conditional/Lewis: is an exception to the rule that the speaker usually expresses nothing that is probably untrue. - Then the assertibility goes rather with the conditional subjective probability of the consequent.
>Subjective probability, >Conditional probability, >Probability. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 InTheories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) InDie Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) InDie Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 InDie Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 InHandlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |

Sorites | Adams | Field II 297
Adams-Conditional/Sorites/Field: in Sorites, the generalized Adams conditional leads to all assumptions being highly credible, even for the clearest borderline cases. But the Sorites argument does not preserve the credibility in this reading.
>Conditional/Adams.Probability function P/Field: from several different P, the same Q can be constructed, so P is not really important to describe the agent. >Probability function, >Conditional probability. Then one could say: 1. That Q is a fully legitimated belief function. 2. That P is not a legitimate belief function. This would be hard to justify if the process from P to Q could be repeated so that it provides a Q* that is different from Q, but that is not the case. If we define Q*(A) as Q(DA), then Q* is simply equal to Q. This is our reason for using S4. >Systems S4/S5. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 InTheories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |