Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Features | Frege | II 76 Property/feature/Frege: something can be both feature and property, but not of the same. A feature of a term may be the property of an object ((s) features of concepts are essential). >Properties, >Necessity, >Concept. I 86 Term/feature/property/object/Frege: an object has properties. A concept has features: e.g. the statement that there is no right-angled equilateral triangle, expresses a feature of the concept. Existence/Frege: existence is not a property of things but a characteristic (feature) of a term. FregeVsAnselm: therefore fails the ontological proof of God. >Proof of God's existence, >Existence, >Existence statements, >Objects. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
| Proof of God’s Existence | Lewis | IV 17 Proof of God/LewisVsAnselm: demands that our actual world is distinguished by the fact that something exists that cannot be exceeded in size in any world - LewisVs. >Possible worlds/Lewis, >Counterpart theory/Lewis. IV 18 Although our actual world is really the only one, it does not make it a specifical world. >LewisVsAnselm. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Anselm of Canterbury | Lewis Vs Anselm of Canterbury | IV 30 Existence of God/Ontology/Anselm/Lewis: Problem: the ontologist cannot claim that our world is the best world in comparison to other worlds, e.g. this would be the same as a historian who states that he/she lives in a "remarkable time", i.e. the present. >Proof of God's existence. Actual World: the actual world is not special in itself, but there is a particular relationship for the ontologist. And therein lies the problem: Other worlds have the exact same relationship/connection to other ontologists! Therefore, there is absolutely no reason for the ontologist to assume that his/her world is the best in comparison to other possible worlds. LewisVsAnselm: e.g. regarding the size of the object of the worlds, e.g. "the place of the largest size". The only remaining valid argument is 3A (see below). IV 13 Existence of God/Anselm/Lewis: 3 premises: there is a thing that is understandable; its size cannot be surpassed by a being, not even if we imagine one. Size: is relative in the possible world, i.e. it belongs to the objects paired with worlds. What do we then mean if speaking about the size of x? What size of x? In what possible world? Different answers lead to different non-modal translations of premise 3. A: size should be then what cannot be surpassed in the actual world. This is naturally what we mean if we do not mention worlds. This also means, however, when other worlds are discussed as well, that it is plausible... IV 14 ...that we are always speaking about our actual world if we do not explicitly state otherwise. Notation of the actual world: @. Logical Form: 3 A e.g.(Vx & ~EwEy(Ww & ywGx@)) There is a thing x that can be imagined, so there is no world w and no thing y in which w can be surpassed by the size of x in the actual world. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Anselm of Canterbury | Stegmüller Vs Anselm of Canterbury | Stegmüller IV 358 Ontological Proof of God/VsAnselm/Stegmüller: 1. Problematic transition from the formulation "the fool understands" to the supposedly synonymous "there is consciousness". But with it he commits himself to a certain meaning of what it means to understand a linguistic expression. IV 359 2. It is assumed that existence contributes to the greatness of an object. 3. Self-Contradiction: he claims that a being beyond whom greater things cannot be thought is in the consciousness of the fool and at the same time claims that something greater than this can be thought. Anselm should accept and weaken this: "The fool imagines a being,..." then the contradiction is completely transferred into the thinking of the fool. Vs: that doesn't work either: under the condition of 2. The fool would only get into a contradiction if he thought of a being non-existing in reality, beyond which bigger things cannot be thought. But the fool does not have to fall into this trap: he does not have to think more than Anselm's concept contains. Solution (in favour of the fool): he need not include the non-existence of this being in his concept! IV 360 Ontological Proof of God/GauniloVsAnselm: for example we could then also prove the existence of a "lost island" somewhere in the ocean, only imagined, which "in immeasurable glory surpasses all other inhabited countries". For the actual existence is an essential element of such glory. Mackie: that is indeed a devastating objection. VsGaunilo: he only shows that something about the proof of Anselm cannot be true, but he does not show what. AnselmVsGaunilo: it is possible to think of a being of which it cannot be thought that it does not exist. (Modern: a being whose existence is conceptually necessary). Such a being is greater than another, of which non-existence can be thought. Conclusion: a being beyond which greater things cannot be thought of cannot be thought of as non-existent either, in contrast to the lost island, which can be thought of as non-existent. Ontological Prrof of God/MackieVsAnselm: the criticism can be repeated on a higher level: one begins with the concession that there is the following concept: "A being beyond which greater things cannot be thought of, and which cannot be thought of as non-existent". Again, one can ask whether this concept is instantiated (realized). When I say that it is not realized, I do not contradict myself! (((s) Like Frege): when I say that nothing falls under the concept, it is not the same as when I include the thought "can be thought as not existing" in the concept. IV 361 If I did, there would be a contradiction. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Field, H. | Wright Vs Field, H. | Field I 43 Anti-Platonism/AP/WrightVsField: (Hale, 1987): claims that modal considerations undermine my version of the anti-platonism. Because I take mathematics and the existence of mathematical entities (mE) as consistent, and consistency as the modal basic concept (possibility), I would be bound to think that it is wrong that there are mathematical entities - that the existence of mathematical entities is "contingent wrong". ((s) "There could just as well have been mathematical entities, i.e. empirical question"). Contingent/Wright/HaleVsField: is not logical, and thus something other than "neither logically true nor logically contradictory". And that makes Field's position absurd. WrightVsField: where should Fields "contingency" be contingent on? For example, according to Field, the actual world contains no numbers, but it could have contained some. But there is neither an explanation for why not, nor would there be an explanation if there were numbers. FieldVsVs: if the argument were good, it would be equally valid against (nonlogical) platonism, for which mathematics goes back behind logic. Then the denial of all mathematics would be logically consistent and therefore "contingent". But this is a confusion of the different meanings of "possible". Analog: For example, if the existence of God is logically consistent, and there is none, then it is contingent wrong that there would be one. Problem: the atheist has no access to what the contingent is supposed to be on. There would be neither an explanation for the existence nor for the non-existence. There are no favorable conditions for God's existence and no unfavorable ones. (>Anselm, 2. Ontological argument). But WrightVsField: has even more interesting arguments: 1. without the assumption that mathematics consists of necessary truths, the view that mathematics is conservative (preserving) is unjustified. I 44 Analog: without the assumption that mathematics is true, the assumption that it is consistent is unjustified. Justification/FieldVsWright: You can justify any belief by a stronger belief from which it follows. (>Strength of Theories). Wright and Hale would have to show that Platonism has better reasons for the necessary truth of mathematics than Anti-Platonism has for assuming that mathematics is conservative (or consistent). And it is not certain that this is true. WrightVsField: 2. Anyone who represents both: a) that the existence of mathematical entities is "contingent false" and b) that mathematics is conservative, can give no reason not to believe in mathematical entities! Def Conservativity/Mathematics/Field: means that any internally consistent combination of nominalistic statements is also consistent with mathematics. Then no combination of nominalistic statements can provide an argument against belief in mathematics (ontology). WrightVsField: how then can there be any reason at all not to believe in mathematics? He has no proof of his own nominalism. It follows that Field cannot be a nominalist, but that he must be an agnostic. FieldVsWright: this one misjudges the relevance that I attribute to the question of renunciability and indispensability. Conservativity: does not automatically show that there can be no reason to believe in mathematics. To succeed with VsPlatonism, we must also show that mathematics is dispensable in science and meta logic. Then we have reason not to literally have to believe in mathematics. I 45 If that succeeds, we can get behind the agnosticism. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Kierkegaard, S. | Mackie Vs Kierkegaard, S. | Stegmüller IV 485 Religion/faith/Kierkegaard: two options: 1. someone is a believer and therefore is not infinitely interested in all other questions. 2. someone stands in objective observation to faith and then is not infinitely interest in deciding the question of whether God exists. The problem does not occur in this manner since the real problem lies precisely in the decision. (> Existentialism and its emphasis on decisions goes back to Kierkegaard). Religion/faith/Kierkegaard/Stegmüller: the question of the truth of Christianity (God's existence) is formulated as a part of the question whether the querist is infinitely interested in the clarification. IV 486 Stegmüller: paradox: whoever is interested in the truth of Christianity must already be convinced of its truth. MackieVsKierkegaard/Stegmüller: but why shouldn't this also be the case for Islam or Buddhism, for example? If the question is possible, it must also be possible to answer it negatively! IV 487 The question presents itself to everyone, independently of a) the degree of interest in the question, b) the commitment to one of the two possible outcomes. If one denies this, one denies that it is a question of truth. objective/objectivity/Kierkegaard: omits the relation of the questioner to the subject. subjective/subjectivity/Kierkegaard: whoever asks subjectively, reflects on the relationship of the subject to the object. punchline: if only the How of this relationship were in truth, the individual would also be in the truth, even if it related to the untruth. Example: someone is praying to God, but worships an idol, another prays to the true God but in untruth and therefore actually to an idol. The matter is not about truth or falsity of what one believes, but about the nature of the faithful relationship. IV 488 This is "to be in the truth." Only personal interest and commitment. Intentionality/MackieVsKierkegaard/Stegmüller: only similar to relations! IV 490 Kierkegaard/Stegmüller: does not argue in favor of a position, but from a certain position. IV 491 C. L. Stevenson: "definition of persuasion" (Überredungsdefinition). Faith/AnselmVsKierkegaard: searching for justification and knowledge. IV 492 MackieVsKierkegaard: it is an erroneous psychological point of view to believe that one needs a very strong commitment especially to believe the paradoxical (as refuted e.g. by Socrates). It would be a abject God (similar to the one in Pascal) who demanded such a strong commitment of us to believe in something paradoxical. IV 493 MackieVsExistentialism/Stegmüller: plea for dramatic decisions not further substantiated. (Goes back to Kierkegaard). HumeVsKierkegaard: probably would have said that the inclination to believe in something absurd originates from the fact that amazement and astonishment are so pleasant feelings. It is wrong to assume that irrational positions could not be discussed rationally. |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Swinburne, R. | Mackie Vs Swinburne, R. | Stegmüller IV 405 Proof for the existence of God/confirmation/MackieVsSwinburne: 1. How can we assert an output probability indicating that there is a God, if no such universe existed? The data have to be taken from background knowledge. IV 406 Then the background knowledge only contains logical and mathematical truths. How should they make the God hypothesis more likely? Swinburne: seemingly only compares two competing hypotheses: a) That there is no specific cause and no further explanation for the complex universe b) That there is a God. Both hypothesis assume that there is the universe. Background knowledge/Swinburne: our background knowledge includes all the knowledge about the world, but not religious assumptions. Then it is more likely that God exists than not. proof of the existence of God/confirmation/MackieVsSwinburne: 2. The fact that the uncaused universe cannot be explained further, does not justify Swinburne's notion that it is "strange and surprising" or "very unlikely". A hypothesis involving a divine creation is, on the other hand, quite unlikely! If there were a God in the sense of traditional theism, it would certainly be very likely; but this is about the existence and not to the actions of an existing God. IV 407 proof of the existence of God/Swinburne/Stegmüller: leans on considerations of simplicity: to accept omnipotence, infinite knowledge and infinite goodness means as much as "to assume the simplest kind of person"! MackieVs: contradictions between theists. greatness (Anselm) Vs simplicity. MackieVsSwinburne: 1. The simplicity is achieved through the adoption of a series of actual infinities. 2. The peculiarity is not eliminated, but merely covered: why had God the preference, to create exactly this world? 3. A disembodied spirit is very unlikely. (And especially Swinburne workes with his scientific background and probabilities). IV 408 4. If one wants to explain the order of the natural world by a divine plan, one has to explain the order in the divine plan! MackieVsSwinburne: doesn't call for complete explicability and universal intelligibility of the world (as did Leibniz). But he still demands explicability. He attempts to reduce the inexplicable part. Hew ants to do so without relying on a "sufficient reason" or "essential existence". Unfortunately, it turns out that then he has nothing to justify that by adding God we explain something more. IV 425/426 Explanation/MackieVsSwinburne: we as philosophers do not have the right to, first, mentally isolate and/or idealise that simple relation that interests us and is known to us from a truly very complicated procedure, and second to use this as a familiar model. (Argument). SwinburneVsMackie: might reply that it could belong to God's abilities to elicit the appropriate intentions in us. Stegmüller: but that is highly mysterious. Explanation/Theism/MackieVsSwinburne: the personal explanation is not even a competitor but a special case of causal explanation! 1. It is just as fantastic and unlikely as the evolutionary explanation. 2. If each body soul relationship were to be explained, that would be a relapse into occasionalism 3. Locke: if divine omnipotence gave humans the ability to think, then why not also the stones? (> Thinking stones). |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
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