Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 20 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Classification | Mayr | I 133 Classification: Classification usually is done by logical division downwards: how many species are classified and what weight do the different characteristics have: "progressive" or "downwards classification". (Actually identification). >Identification, >Individuation, >Specification. Therefore later: "Upwards classification: hierarchical arrangement of ever-growing groups of related species into classes. >Species. Darwin's method confirmed the upward classification and thus triggered a scientific revolution. >Darwinism, >Evolution. I 134 Classification/20th Century (1950) two new schools: a) Numerical Phenetics b) Cladistics. Cladism: the cladist system is intended to reveal the history of the tribe only, while the evolutionary system strives to form taxa from the most similar and closely related species (useful for ecology and biology). >Ecology. Both species can continue to coexist, because they have very different objectives. I 173 Systematics: not only to describe but to contribute to understanding. I 175 Def Class/Biology/Mayr: Grouping of entities that are similar and related to each other. Classification: two important functions: a) recovery of information b) comparative research. Information storage. 1) Classes should be as homogeneous as possible 2) Attribution according to most common characteristics, 3) If the differences are too great, create a new class 4) The degree of difference between classes is ordered in a hierarchy. I 176 Taxonomy: two steps: 1) Differentiation of species (microtaxonomy). 2) Classification of species into related groups (macrotaxonomy). I 177 Microtaxonomy: The delineation of the species "Species Problem": Species usually means "organism type". Problem: Males and females are also different types of organisms, just like young and adult organisms. Def "Variety": (Linné, even Darwin): Deviations that are slightly smaller than those of a new species. ("typological" or "essential concept of species"). ("Common essence" ("Nature")). >Similarity. "Typological concept of species: four characteristics: 1) Common "nature". 2) Between the species sharp discontinuity 3) Each species is spatially and temporally constant. 4) Possible variation within the species is strictly limited. ("Natural kind"). >Species, >Natural kinds, >Essence, >Essentialism. I 178 MayrVsTypological Concept of Species: Darwin refutes the notion of the "constancy of species". Populations vary geographically, individuals vary within a population. In the animate nature there are no types or essences! Def twin species: (discovered only recently: spatially separated, but equally developed, discovered in almost all animal species), forces a new criterion for the delineatation of species: reproductive isolation of populations. I 178 Biological Concept of Species (VsTypological Concept of Species): derives from this criterion of the lack of reproduction among one another. I 183 Def Species Taxa: special populations or population groups that correspond to the species definition. They are entities ("individuals") and cannot be defined as such. Individuals cannot be defined, but are merely described and delineated. >Definitions, >Definability. I 185 Macrotaxonomy: The classification of species (in superordinate groups) Groups: Usually easily recognizable: birds, butterflies, beetles. Downward classification (actually identification). Dichotomy (Aristotelian), high time of medical botany. E.g. warm-blooded or not warm-blooded, with feathers or not. I 187 Upwards Classification/Mayr: Even Linné himself from 1770 onwards: better suited. Classes are distinguished and then grouped into superordinate groups. Unfortunately no strict methodology. There was no theoretical basis for the hierarchy. Functional Classification: Sub-form of the upwards classification. Only selected features. I 188 Two criteria: genealogy (common descent) and degree of similarity (extent of evolutionary change). Causal classification: E.g. diseases according to causes: pathogen, aging process, toxic substances, genes, malignant changes, harmful radiation, etc. >Causal explanation. Any classification that takes into account the causes is subject to severe restrictions and can never become a purely artificial system. I 189 "Taxon": Separate group of offspring. Each taxon consists of the descendants of the next common ancestor. "Monophyletic". Genealogy: Does not a classification make! Similarity cannot be neglected, because the diverging branches were subject to changes of varying extend. Result: Classification into families, genera, divisions, orders. >Systems, >Theories, >Explanation, >Causes, >Effects, >Single-case causation. Homology/Mayr: Relationship between species and higher taxa is shown by the occurrence of homologous features. I.e. a feature derived from the same feature of its next common ancestor. >Homology. I 373 You must always infer homology! There is a lot of evidence for homology, e.g. position of a structure in relation to other structures, also transitional forms with fossil ancestors. >Evidence. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Denotation | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 328 Denotation/Reference/Wittgenstein: language game: reference occurs only within a language game. - On the other hand: Denotation: runs without a language game. >Reference, >Language game. Hintikka: It is precisely the absence of a language game that Wittgenstein emphasizes with the expression "denotate". I 327 ff Denotation/Description/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: a simple relationship of the type "denotation" only has content if the corresponding object exists and is open to the public. "Naming is something like attaching a name tag to an object." (WittgensteinVs, QuineVs) I 328 Remarks on the philosophy of Psychology/Wittgenstein: e.g. names that have meaning only in company of their bearers. They serve only for the avoidance of the constant pointing/showing, example: lines, points, angles in geometric figures, with A, B, C, ..a, b. etc." Denotation/Wittgenstein/Beetle Example/Hintikka: as Wittgenstein puts it, it is quite possible that everyone has something different in the box. If that were the case, we would not use the word "beetle" to describe a thing. For the word beetle to make sense, a public language game is needed to support it semantically. But it is precisely the lack of a language game that Wittgenstein emphasizes with the expression "denotating". Color/Definition/Reference/Wittgenstein: Now we can understand what Wittgenstein means when he says: ""red" means the color that comes to my mind when I hear the word "red"" would be a definition. No explanation of the nature of the denotation by a word. >Colour. The point loses its essence if "denotation" is understood here in the sense of "name". Even a completely successful definition does not indicate what it means that the definition refers directly - i.e. without language play - to its subject. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Experience | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 342 Private experiences/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: from Wittgenstein does not follow that there are no private experiences - HintikkaVsAnscombe - Wittgenstein: the essence of private experience is that everyone has his own - but that he does not know whether the other has the same - > Beetle-example: see "privileged access".) II 82 Experience/Wittgenstein: is not differentiated by predicates from what is not experience - it is a logical term - not a term such as "chair" or "table". II 101 Experience/causality/cause/border/Wittgenstein: one can get to all causal laws by experience - that is why we cannot find out what the cause is for the experience - if one provide a scientific explanation, one in turn describes an experience - therefore, no sentence can deal with the cause of >sense data. II 261 Experience/rule/Wittgenstein: both is easily confused: experience: that this is blue because - matches the pattern. - In contrast rule: the statement that both match, is a rule that I set up. --- IV 87 Experience/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: (according to 5552) shows the "how", not the "what" - 5634 no part of our experience is also a priori. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Imagination | Avramides | I 141 WittgensteinVsFrege: Wittgenstein goes even further than Frege and does not allow private imaginations. - There is nothing undetectable beyond communication. >Imagination/Wittgenstein, >Private language/Wittgenstein, >Beetle-example/Wittgenstein. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Mentalese | Black | II 99 Mentalese/language of thought/Black: precursor: Ockham. Ockham presumed for it even genus, case, number. BlackVs: neither speaker nor listener uses it to refer to images in the mind. Instead: public articulation. >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief, >Mental states, >Meaning, >Communication, cf. >Beetle example, >Mentalism. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Other Minds | Ryle | I 249 Other minds/Ryle: our self-talk is not something that is reserved for us. ((s) Explanation: we think about ourselves in a public language.) RyleVsPriviledged access. RyleVsAuthority of the First Person. RyleVsIncorrigibility. >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification, >Privileged access, >Introspection, >Incorrigibility, >Authority of the First Person, >Private language, >Beetle-example. >Privileged access/Wittgenstein >Introspection/Dennett. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
| Paradoxes | Rorty | II (b) 58 Raven paradox/Rorty: the existence of any non-black non-raven confirms the proposition that all ravens are black. I 126 Example of an apparent paradox: Sensation/Wittgenstein/Rorty: "no something, but no nothing either! The result was only that a nothing would do the same services as an something about which nothing can be said." (Philosophical investigations § 304.) ((s) >beetle-example). Sensitivity/Privacy/Privileged Access/Rorty: we can avoid the paradox if we distinguish the two statements: We have privileged access to our own pain And We know the mental states in which we find ourselves solely on the basis of their special qualities we feel. In order to move from the 1st to the 2nd thesis, we need the Cartesian model of self-consciousness as analogous to the observation that the image of the inner eye and the thought that stomach cramps, for example, are not given naturally in the same way as the feelings caused by the stomach cramps are given. I 127 Rorty: If we abandon the view that one can only have knowledge of a certain entity by virtue of an acquaintance with its "special qualities felt, not communicable", then we obtain a non-paradoxical approach. For example, the not yet speaking child knows in the same way that it has pain, as the plant knows the direction of the sun and the amoeba the temperature of the water. Knowledge: but this knowledge is not related to what a user of language knows when he knows what pain is. >Pain, >Sensation, >Language use, >Priviledged access, >First Person, >Self-Consciousness, >Self-knowledge, >Descartes. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Perspective | Nagel | Frank I 142ff Perspective/Nagel: is not something that is only accessible to a single individual - it is rather a type. ((s) If we were unable to take the perspective of someone else, we would not know what the concept means - If perspective belonged only to us, the concept would exist just as little as Wittgenstein’s Beetle). >Beetle example. I 145 Nagel: it is the concepts which are bound to perspective, not the physical structure. - Hence the different structure of the bat(1) is not an argument against understanding. - We can give up our perspective in favor of another and yet mean same things.(1) 1. Thomas Nagel (1974): What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, in: The Philosophical Review 83 (1974), 435-450 I 52 Perspective/subjectivity/Nagel: there is no place where the perspectivist could settle. Peacocke I 167 I/Nagel: I am not truer from one point of of view than from another. - The world contains no points of view - no facts of the first person. >First Person, >World, >World/thinking, >Objectivity/Nagel. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Principles | Strawson | V 13 Def "Sense Principle"/Strawson: there is no legitimate use of ideas or concepts that would not refer to the empirical conditions of its application. - (VsMetaphysics) >Language use, >Language behavior, >Sense, >Senseless, >Foundation, >Metaphysics, cf. >Private language, >Beetle example. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Private Language | Private language: according to L. Wittgenstein a private language, i.e. a language which an individual develops only for himself and uses to express his feelings, is not possible. (See L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 1953, § 243, 258). You cannot give yourself instructions. You could not even understand the language. See also rule following, Kripke's Wittgenstein, priviledged access, Wittgenstein's beetle. |
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| Private Language | Wittgenstein | Newen I 36 Private Language/Wittgenstein/Newen/Schrenk: language that is enriched by expressions of private feelings. - Beetle-Example: the thing in the box is not part of the language game - it could also be missing - or constantly changing - a person alone cannot give a meaning. --- Hintikka I 308 Private Language/private/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: pointing and rules can be private but language games cannot. >Ostension, >Rules, >Rule following, >Language games. I 308/309 Private Language/WittgensteinVsPrivate Language/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: because you have to understand the whole language-game, not merely its ostensive definition, or the rule for the use of a word, the language cannot be private - if the language games would not take precedence over the rules, private language would be possible. I 309 Private language/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: understanding only by whole language-game, therefore not purely phenomenological (private). I 310 Self-talk: early: only possible if I can already play on the (public) language piano. I 311 Private Language/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: it is not about the impossibility of a phenomenological language. - We can encourage ourselves, command, blame, etc. - An external researcher could also translate our self-talk. Cf. >Self-talk/Psychology, >Phenomenology. I 314 Private Language/Wittgenstein/HintikkaVsStegmüller/Hintikka: but it is not so that it would be sufficient to only need to pay attention to the role of the utterances in life - as if the private experiences would disappear. -> Beetle-Example: VsStegmüller: Wittgenstein does not deny the existence of private experiences. - The change to the physical language does not even touch the ontological status of phenomenological experiences - the objects remain, even if we have to talk in another language about them. Private language argument: should show how we accomplish this feat. I 337 Private Language/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: wrong: to exclude them because of the impossibility of intersubjective comparisons of private experiences. - One could have a private language in which one only speaks about his beetle - and refuses to translate it into the public language - that would be solipsism. - However, it would not be a unsuitable language philosophy. --- Explanation/(s): Beetle-Example/Wittgenstein: assuming every human has a box with a beetle, which he never shows to anyone else. But he himself can always see if the bug is still in the box. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations § 293. "The thing in the box does not belong to the language game, not even as a something. By this thing in the box it can be shortened. It lifts off, whatever it is." - The example shows that completely privately held entities do not exist as something objective > More authors on private language > more authors on intersubjectivity. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Privileged Access | Ryle | Frank I 638 RyleVsAll other authors: VsPrivileged Access: privileged access is only a better position of the speaker - you cannot discover facts of a different type.(1) 1. Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica 38 (1984), pp. 101-111. RyleVsPriviledged access. RyleVsAuthority of the First Person. RyleVsIncorrigibility. >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification, >Privileged access, >Introspection, >Incorrigibility, >Authority of the First Person, >Private language, >Beetle-example. >Privileged access/Wittgenstein >Introspection/Dennett. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Privileged Access | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 316 ff Beetle-Example/private experiences/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the existence of the beetle is not disputed - Problem: comparison only through public language - Color: problem actually the concept of color uniformity (i.e., the method of comparison). - Experiences: the problem is not that the memory can be deceptive, but it is not defined what it actually is what we should remember. - Wittgenstein: an explanation cannot be uttered. I 320 Sensations are private - sensation language cannot be private. - Wittgenstein does not criticize the metaphysics of Descartes - but his semantics. >Experience, >Sensations. Beetle-Example/language game/private experiences/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the linking of experiences with words or gestures is a semantic (logical) one - it is not about remembering one's own experiences - this is not a step in the language game. - ((s) Because it takes place without words of the public language.) I 342 It's not about imperceptibility but about the impossibility of comparison with others. >Incorrigibility. I 332f I 348 Primary language games/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Steps in them are not correctable - otherwise they could not serve as the basis of the relation language/world - in primary language games there are no criteria - but they can provide criteria as a whole for mental processes. - Terminology: "primary language games": for Wittgenstein: "beginning of the language game". >Language games. I 375 Definition Beetle Example/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: = the question whether the terms for private experiences are actually names of these experiences - that is not the same as the question of "natural expressions" for sensations. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Rule Following | Rule following, philosophy: is an expression for a problem that L. Wittgenstein formulated by excluding that a person could follow a rule that applies only to them as an individual. See also private language, rules, feelings, meaning, beetle example. |
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| Self- Ascription | Ryle | Frank I 650 Self-Ascription/Ryle: self-ascription is like foreign attribution. We observe ourselves as we observes others (WittgensteinVs - DavidsonVs). First, I usually know what I think before I pronounce it. Second, I may be wrong - but still there are the same criteria as for foreign attribution.(1) 1. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987), 441-4 58. RyleVsPriviledged access. RyleVsAuthority of the First Person. RyleVsIncorrigibility. >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification, >Privileged access, >Introspection, >Incorrigibility, >Authority of the First Person, >Private language, >Beetle-example. >Privileged access/Wittgenstein >Introspection/Dennett. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Sensations | Millikan | I 303 Senstation Language/Sensation/Private Language/Wittgenstein/MillikanVsWittgenstein/Millikan: the problem is not quite what Wittgenstein meant. It is not impossible to develop a private language, but one cannot develop languages that speak only of what can be seen only once and from a single point of view. >Private language/Millikan, >Private language/Wittgenstein, cf. >Beetle example. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Sensations | Wittgenstein | Rorty I 128 Wittgenstein: sensations would have some half of an existence between nothingness and something, they would "fell out" of the world like the beetle in the box. >Beetle example. Wittgenstein: sensation "not something, but also not nothing. The result was that a nothing would do the same services as the something about what cannot be stated." (Philosophical Investigations § 304.) RortyVsWittgenstein: confusion of the concept of incorrigibility with the notion of incommunicability. >Incorrigibility. --- Rorty VI 147 Sensation/Wittgenstein: Feeling alone (without language) is not enough. --- Dummett I 35 WittgensteinVsFrege: no personal objects (sensations), otherwise private language, for the subject itself unrecognizable. >Private Language, >Beetle example. --- Wittgenstein VI 118 Sensation/Wittgenstein/Schulte: a sentence about the sensations, because it completely remains at the level of linguistics, is outside the true/false dimension. VI 199f Sensation/Wittgenstein/Schulte: has no object. >Object. VI 200 Expression: is not description (but more direct). >Description. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Sense | Luhmann | Baraldi I 170 Sense/Luhmann/GLU: sense allows the selective production of all social and psychological forms. - The form of sense is the distinction "real"/"possible". Sense is the simultaneous presentation of news and possible. - Sense determines connectivity to additional communication. ((s) Elsewhere: is the dimension that is presented in the negation.) >Communication/Luhmann, >Understanding/Luhmann, >Meaning. Material dimension: "this"/"other" - social dimension: "ego"/"old" - time dimension: past/future. --- Reese-Schäfer II 34 Sense/Luhmann/Reese-Schäfer: the normal form of human experience. - The experience needs to select - for this serves the sense. Experience/action: is selection by sense criteria. >Action/Luhmann, >Experience/Maturana. Reese-Schäfer II 35 Definition sense/Luhmann: the meaning that has something for an observer - Futility: only possible with characters. Reese-Schäfer II 44 Sense/Luhmann/Reese-Schäfer: does not need a carrier - sense carries itself by allowing its own reproduction self-referential. Reese-Schäfer II 139 Sense/Luhmann/Reese-Schäfer: preverbal, language foundational category. >Language/Luhmann. Sense/HabermasVsLuhmann: principle linguistical - inconceivable without intersubjective validity. LuhmannVsHabermas: studies on marriage conflicts show that these cannot be solved with everyday language, because the everyday language holds both positive and negative expressions. --- AU Cass. 10 Sense/Sociology/Luhmann: Problem: if each individual produces sense, is there then a sphere of intersubjectivity? - Solution: we have to apply the sense category on two different system categories: 1. Mental systems, awareness systems that experience meaningfully. 2. Communication systems that reproduce sense in that it is used in communication. Subject: lost. - The subject is not a carrier of meaning. - Sense gets formal. - Solution: extraction through the distinction between medium and form - that means, independent of a particular system. AU Cass 10 Sense/Luhmann sense could be a constant invitation to a specific shape formation, which then is always characterized by the fact that they are formed in the medium by sense. - But these forms do not represent sense as a category at all. - The word "sense" is namely not the only thing what makes sense. AU Cass 10 Sense/Luhmann: a) in the system of consciousness - E.g. references to other options: I have the key in the pocket to unlock the door later - but sense is also the location of that reference in everything we consider as an object - b) in the communication system : to information also belongs the failure area: what surprises me? - All items have only sense in the context of other options. AU Cass 10 Sense is itself a medium - also negation takes place internally. - But sense itself is not negated. - We cannot get out. - A world in which only beetles exist would be one in which no more sense is processed - but we can imagine it only meaningfully. - We imagine the rest as rest - ( "as it would be for the human"). - ((s) Cf. Th. Nagel, What is it like to be a bat?). Animal/Luhmann: it is impossible to distinguish whether there is sense for animals. We depend on the assumption of sense. >Cf. >Animal, >Animal language. No distinction of meaning such as "factual"/"temporal"/"social" are possible. AU Cass. 10 Sense/Luhmann: no sense-needing system can be completely transparent to itself. - That, what we are as a result of a long chain of operations, which structures we have, we cannot reduce this to a formula. But instead we can imagine who we are, or we can describe it. - We also encounter quickly meaningless - that means, something that does not fit into this description. >Senseless, >Meaningless. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Baraldi I C. Baraldi, G.Corsi. E. Esposito GLU: Glossar zu Luhmanns Theorie sozialer Systeme Frankfurt 1997 Reese-Schäfer II Walter Reese-Schäfer Luhmann zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 |
| Species | Mayr | Gould I 216 Species/Darwin/Lamarck: Species are no natural units but "purely artificial combinations"... conceptual definitions. >Order, >Systems, >Definitions, >Definability, >Classification. I 217 Species/Ernst MayrVsDarwin/MayrVsLamarck: "Species are a product of evolution and not of the human mind." >Evolution, >Evolution/Mayr. I 179 Definition Species/Mayr: device for protecting balanced, harmonic genotypes. "Biological concept of species" seeks biological reasons for the existence of species. Maybe there are other properties by chance. Biological species concept: 1. Problem: Asexual organisms do not form populations. 2. Problem: Spatial expansion with subspecies. They can become independent species in isolation over time (by acquiring new isolation mechanisms). (polytypical species). I 181 Nominalist concept of species: in nature exclusively individuals, species artificially created by humans (MayrVs: that would be arbitrariness, and nature shows that there is no arbitrariness.). I 182 Evolutionary species concept: temporal dimension, generational series of populations. MayrVs: the concept does not take into account that there are two possible ways of species development: a) Gradual transformation of a stem line into another species without altering the number of species; and b) The reproduction of species through geographical isolation. >Systems, >Definitions, >Definability. I 183 Species/Mayr: is applied to three very different objects or phenomena: 1. The species concept 2. The category species 3. The species taxa Some authors could not differentiate between them, leading to hopeless confusion in literature. Species concept: biological meaning or definition of the word "species". Category Species: certain rank in the Linnéian system. (Other categories: Order, Kingdom, Genus...) Definition Species Taxa: special populations or population groups corresponding to the species definition. They are entities ("individuals") and cannot be defined as such. Individuals cannot be defined, but can only be described and delimited. I 183 Evolution/Mayr: Species is the decisive entity of evolution. Species: a species, regardless of the individuals belonging to it, interacts as a unit with other species in the common environment. I 185 Macrotaxonomy: the classification of species (in higher-level groups) Group: mostly easily recognizable: birds, butterflies, beetles. Downward classification (actual identification). Division (aristotelian), heyday of medicinal botany. E. g. warm-blooded or non-warm-blooded - having or not having feathers. I 192 Organism types: most new types of organisms do not originate from the gradual transformation of a stem line, i. e. an existing type. Rather, a founder species penetrates into a new adaptive zone and is successful there thanks to rapid adaptive changes. For example, the more than 5000 species of songbirds are no more than the variation of a single theme. I 192 Species: the two evolutionary ways to produce a new species: a) gradual change of the phenotype and b) increasing diversity (speciation) are only loosely related. I 192 Selection pressure: may not apply if a founder species enters its very favourable adaptive zone. I 283 Species/Mayr: very conservative estimate of 10 million animal species, of which are ca. 1.5 million described. So about 15% known. Legitimate estimate: 30 million species. Only 5% are known. On the other hand, 99% of all bird species are discovered and described. In many insects, arachnids, low vertebrates probably less than 10%. The same applies to mushrooms, protists and prokaryotes. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Terminology | Dawkins | I 27 Def Altruistic/Dawkins: An organism behaves altruistically when it increases the welfare of another at its expense. I 28 Def Well-Being/Dawkins: Well-being is defined as survival chances even if the effect on the actual outlook is so small that it can seem negligible. Egoism/Altruism/Dawkins: oriented on actual behavior, not on intentions. No psychology of motives! I 32 Altruism/Dawkins: Altruism is often falsely attributed: when living creatures actually behave in a way that benefits the "well-being of the species" or "well-being of the group". I 126 Def ESS/Dawkins: an evolutionarilly stable strategy is one that - if the majority of a population adopts it - cannot be overruled by any alternative strategy. ((S) Not defined.) I 447 Narrower Def ESS: a strategy that performs well against copies of itself. It will often encounter copies of itself, since a successful strategy is predominant in a population. I 227 Fitness/Dawkins: The expression should not be used, because it falsely emanates from the individual! Instead, the selfish gene is the only entity that matters! Genes in children are selected because of their ability to override parents, genes in the parents' body vice versa. I 377 Def Extended phenotype/Dawkins: phenotypic effects of a gene are all the effects of a gene on the body in which it sits. But it also affects "the world"! E.g. beavers' dams, birds' nests, shell of the quiver flies (movable cement houses). In difference to the eye as a "miracle of nature", we do not have to attribute these achievements to processes that occur within the mothers' interior. They are achievements of the creating individual. (Usually called "instinct"). I 386 Def haplodiploid: unfertilized eggs develop into males. I.e., e.g., male bark beetles have no father (as is the case with bees and ants). But in the case of the bark beetles something must penetrate the eggs. This task is performed by bacteria. (Parasites). |
Da I R. Dawkins The Selfish Gene, Oxford 1976 German Edition: Das egoistische Gen, Hamburg 1996 Da II M. St. Dawkins Through Our Eyes Only? The Search for Animal Consciousness, Oxford/New York/Heidelberg 1993 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des tierischen Bewusstseins Hamburg 1993 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stegmüller, W. | Hintikka Vs Stegmüller, W. | Wittgenstein I 273 Language/World/Language Game/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: according to the popular view (among others, Stegmüller 1975, 584) Wittgenstein abstains from showing in his late philosophy in how far language is directly linked to the reality. Stegmüller: thesis: we should not pay attention to the meaning of our expressions, but to the manner in which they are used. Hintikka: according to this (supposedly Wittgensteinian) view the "vertical" connections do not matter through which our words are linked with objects and our sentences to facts, but it is "horizontal" connections between different moves in the course of our language games that matter. That means suggesting that Wittgenstein says understanding of language is nothing more than understanding the role that different types of statements play in different circumstances in our lives (Vs: Understanding Language = Understanding the Role it Plays). HintikkaVsStegmüller: this interpretation would result in that according to Wittgenstein not even the ordinary descriptive meaning is based on truth conditions. According to that, assertibility and justifiability conditions were a possible Wittgensteinian counterpart to the truth conditions. Then a statement would not be justified if it corresponds to a fact, but if its assertion is justified through its role in our language-related activities - ultimately through its role in our lives. Wittgenstein I 274 HintikkaVsStegmüller: the late Wittgenstein is far from abolishing the vertical relations between language and reality. He rather emphasizes them! The main function of language games (though not the only one) is to accomplish this task. Wittgenstein I 279 ff Use Theory/Wittgenstein/HintikkaVsStegmüller: in the (here criticized) "naturalized" view "X" (Stegmüller among others) Wittgenstein is said to eventually have given up asking questions about meaning, and instead examined the use. Variant: according to a subordinate interpretation Xa, use is to be understood as the language game which is the "logical home" this expression. However, this is not the interpretation that is assumed by the "naturalized" the interpretation of "X". Several facets: in X Wittgenstein understands the use of an expression as something that is not very different from the usual traditional language use. Wittgenstein I 280 Use Theory/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: does this correspond to Wittgenstein, though? In the famous equation of use and meaning Wittgenstein uses a word that essentially has two meanings: for use a) can serve to emphasize the usual, the traditional, or it can. b) indicate that it is about the practical application of a thing (such as "Instructions for Use"). That is consistent with Wittgenstein’s comparison of words with tools and speaks to a high degree in favor of the new interpretation. Wittgenstein speaks of "use" and "application". "Application I understand to be that which makes a language out of the sound combinations or lines. "You can shorten the description of use by saying this word designates the object." Hintikka: if use did not serve as a link between language and the world, it could not be abbreviated in this way. HintikkaVsStegmüller: the mistake is to regard language games as a predominantly intra-linguistic (verbal) games, i.e. games whose moves typically consist in speech acts. Move/Language Game/Hintikka: in contrast, the moves of the interpretation advocated here consist in transitions, where utterances can indeed play a role, but usually not the only role. On the contrary, many moves do not need to contain any linguistic utterances. X/Terminology/Hintikka: we shall call X the "mistake of verbal language games". Wittgenstein already warned against this error in his explanation of the expression "language game": "The word is to emphasize here that the speaking of a language is part of an activity or a way of life". Wittgenstein I 281 Hintikka: according to X, speaking the language would not be a part of the language game, but it would be the whole language game as such. Evidence: in "Über Gewissheit" language games are apparently contrasted to speaking: "Our speech obtains its meaning by the rest of our actions". Wittgenstein I 314/315 E.g. beetle in the box. PU § 293. "The thing in the box does not belong to the language game, not even as a something. Through the thing in the box abbreviations can be made. It lifts off itself, whatever it is". Stegmüller: (according to Hintikka): asserts that Wittgenstein denies the existence of private experiences in general. Hintikka: if we are right, the naturalized conception is not only wrong, but diametrically wrong: Private Language/HintikkaVsStegmüller: the changeover from the phenomenological to the physical language does not even touch the ontological status of the phenomenological objects, including private experiences!. The world in which we live remains for us a world of phenomenological objects, but we need to talk about it in the same language in which we talk about physical objects. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Wittgenstein | Newen Vs Wittgenstein | New I 94 Object/Thing/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Newen: the question of what kind the objects of the Tractatus are is still controversial: 1) James Griffin: simple physical particles 2) Hintikka: points in the visual field 3) H. Ishiguro: exemplifications of not further reducable properties 4) Peter Carruthers: everyday objects. Object/Tractatus/NewenVsTractatus/NewenVsWittgenstein/Newen: there are conflicting principles here, one of which must be abandoned I 95 to be able to determine the object level: (i) elementary propositions have the form "Fa", "Rab"... external properties are attributed. (ii) external and internal properties relate to each other like different dimensions, e.g. lengths and colors. (iii) elementary propositions are logically independent. Problem: then the truth value of a sentence "Ga" may depend on that of a sentence "Fa". E.g. a point cannot be red and blue at the same time. Point: but then the sentences are no longer independent. Wittgenstein/VsWittgenstein/Self-Criticism/Newen: Wittgenstein himself noted this in his 1929 essay Some Remarks on Logical Form. I 98 Elementary Proposition/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Newen: sentences over points in the visual field or physical particles are no elementary propositions there, because they cannot be independent ((s) it must be possible to exclude opposing properties). I 99 Middle Wittgenstein: recognizes a basic structure in dependence that cannot be eliminated. Example "What is blue is not red." Sentence Meaning/PU/Wittgenstein/Newen: the meaning of sentences can therefore not only be guaranteed by the representative relation of names. Representation Theory/WittgensteinVsWittgenstein/Self-Criticism/Wittgenstein/Newen: the representation theory must therefore be revised. 100 Middle Wittgenstein/Newen: Thesis: The meaning of characters is determined by the syntactic rules of his language system. VsWittgenstein/Newen: the question of how these syntactic rules are made is not answered here. NS I 35 Rule-Following/Wittgenstein: means acting according to a custom. Without justification or consideration. It is simply the competency of acting in a learned, conventional and natural way. Custom/Convention: customs are not valid because they have been established or agreed, but because usually everybody feels bound by them. This also applies to rules that define the meaning of a linguistic sign. ((s) Rules/(s): thus establish something, but are not determined themselves, but generally agreed and stable.) NS I 36 VsWittgenstein/Newen/Schrenk: Problem: the vagueness of usages. There are also misuses which would have to be included as meaning constituting. They can be very widely spread. VsWittgenstein/Newen/Schrenk: Problem: holism of usages: when a single new usage is introduced, the meaning of the expression would have to change. NS I 37 Beetle Example/Private Language/Wittgenstein/Newen/Schrenk: the expression "beetle" can have a clear use, even if everyone has a different beetle in their box or if the box is empty! Wittgenstein: even if the thing changed continually. The thing in the box does not belong to the language game. Never even once as a something. (§ 293). Newen/Schrenk: this shows that the meaning of an expression is not defined by the fact that we have a sensation, but by the practice of a community. One person alone cannot give meaning expressions. NS I 38 Newen/SchrenkVsWittgenstein: E.g. Robinson can, however, introduce words for pineapple etc. thanks to a regularity of nature. WittgensteinVsVs/Newen/Schrenk: would argue 1) that Robinson cannot establish customs, because he would not notice if he deviated from them. ((s) Vs: why not? He still has the time sequence.) Then there would be no difference anymore between following and believing to follow. VsVs/Newen/Schrenk: 2) Another objection would be that Robinson can only form categories, because he learned in his community how to make categories. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
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