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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Connotation | Ricoeur | II 46 Connotation/Ricoeur: (...) a good part of literary criticism influenced by [the] positivist tradition transposed the distinction between cognitive and emotive language into the vocabulary of denotation and connotation. (>Metaphor/Ricoeur). For such a position only the denotation is cognitive and, as such, is of a semantic order. A connotation is extra-semantic because it consists of the weaving together of emotive evocations, which lack cognitive value. The figurative sense of a text, therefore, must be seen as being bereft of any cognitive significance. But is this limitation of cognitive significance to just the denotative aspects of a sentence correct? II 4 Such is the problem for which metaphor may function as a test case. If we can show that the relation between the literal and figurative meaning in a metaphor is a relation internal to the overall signification of the metaphor, we will thereby obtain a model for a purely semantic definition of literature, (...) >Metaphor/Ricoeur. |
Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976 |
| Observability | Peacocke | I 90 Observability/Peacocke: Thesis: Observability is a property of certain terms and not of other terms. - The phenomena that are crucial to the concept of observability, are the ones corresponding to the individuation of Fregean thoughts and their constituents: the phenomena of cognitive significance and the epistemic possibility. - That has nothing to do with the correct use of the word "observe". >Observation, >Fregean thoughts, >Cognitive significance. I 103 Observability / PeacockeVsQuine: does not depend on the sophistication and training of the observer nor with the level of science - ((s) because of Peacockes stronger emphasis on the perceptual component.) >Theoretical Terms, >Theoretical Entities, cf. >Theory language, >Observation language, >Terms, >Unobservables, >Method, >Knowledge, >Theory ladenness. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Significance | Hempel | II 110 Cognitive Significance/Hempel: it is false to assume that two statements have the same cognitive significance, if they are verified by the same set of observation sentences. >Verification, >Confirmation, >Observation sentence. Then two laws would always have the same cognitive significance because they are verified by no set. This is something quite different from the positivist criterion of meaning. Positivist criterion of meaning/Russell: two statements, whose verified consequences are the same, have the same significance. - ((s) Most authorsVsHempel.) II 143 Cognitive Significance/Hempel: not individual statements, but systems are cognitive significant. Ultimately, the following aspects are a matter of judgment: clarity, accuracy, forecast capacity, simplicity, degree of confirmation. >Systems. |
Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II Carl Hempel Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950 German Edition: Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 |
| Significance | Peacocke | I 34 Significance/Principle of significance/Peacocke: if we can imagine that an evidence supports a hypothesis, then this is not sufficient to show that the hypothesis is significant. >Evidence, >Confirmation, >Verification, >Verifiability. It could be that either the hypothesis or the evidence is independent of the other. >Dependence, >Independence. I 113 Principle of sensitivity: it is a priori and necessary that the thinker can on evidence* think for x the thought that x (shortened). I 114 Constitutive Role: everything what meets the requirements of the principle of sensitivity. >Constitutive role. Significance/Principle of Significance/Peacocke: if we can imagine that a proof (evidence) supports a hypothesis, then that is not sufficient for to show that the hypothesis is significant - it could be that either the hypothesis or the evidence is independent of the other. I 141 Cognitive Significance/Frege/Peacocke: identity a = b (not a = a) - ("informative"). I 165 Cognitive Significance/Peacocke: only if it is epistemically possible that a thing that as known to me as [you] and so-and-so, perhaps might not be so-and-so - i.e. the identity is informative. (> Identity/Frege). |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
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