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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dependence | Simons | I 293 Dependency/Simons: dependency is always in relation to something, e.g. logical: proposition A cannot be true without proposition B being true, e.g. functional: gas pressure, volume or temperature are functional, e.g. ontological: this whiteness of this paper. >Propositions, >Truth. I 294 Def general function/logical form/Simons: a depends as F in respect to G of b iff a cannot be F without b being G. Easier: necessary: if a is an F, then b is a G. I 294 Ontological Dependency/Simons: ontological dependency exists between objects (unlike other dependencies). It is a must de re, e.g. like an essential part. >de re, >Essence, cf. >de dicto. I 296 Ontological Dependency/Simons: e.g. the largest satellite of Jupiter cannot exist if Jupiter does not exist. However: it is wrong to say that Ganymede could not exist without Jupiter. Solution: let us assume a scope. Against: the dependence Ganymede's of Jupiter is instead a conceptual dependence. It could not be described as a moon of Jupiter if Jupiter did not exist. Conceptual: e.g. there is no husband without a wife. I 296 Def weak, rigid dependency/Simons/(s): y is not necessary, but if x exists, then it is ((s) that is not superimposed by self-dependency.) I 297 Generically Dependent/generic function/Simons: e.g. humans cannot exist without carbon atoms but it does not matter which carbon atoms are part of the human. I 300 Def rigid dependency/Simons: e.g. a smile is not only dependent on one face, but from his/her face. Conceptual rigid dependence: e.g. the species: twin, fiancee, partner, riverside > Independence/Simons. I 302 Dependency/strongest form/Simons: the strongest form of dependency is that of an object that is an essential part of another. I 303 Def strong rigid dependency/Simons: strong rigid dependency excludes cases where objects have significant parts as cases of dependency. An object is dependent, if it requires the existence of something that is not part of it. E.g. a heartbeat is not part of the organism - similar to Husserl's foundation: if an "a" can only exist in a broader unit, which connects it with a Âμ. Def moment/Simons: if "b" consolidates "a" or vice versa, "a" is a moment of "b". I 305 Def accident/Simons: a moment which is always dependent on its foundation is an accident. I 306 Def substrate: the substrate is then the basis for an accident, e.g. at events: "is not part ..." or at continuants: "is never part...". Accident/Simons: e.g. a smile is an accident of the face, or e.g. a headache, or e.g. a thought is an accident of its bearer, e.g. the instantiation of a quality of an object is an accident of the object(!) that it qualifies ((s) so it is not accident of the property). E.g. relational accident: weddings, or e.g. football matches. I 309 Dependency/Simons: accident: an accident excludes, i.e. the dependency of predecessors. Moment: the moment is the one of necessary essences and essential parts. Human: a human could be an accident of the universe at the most. Vs: then the universe would be necessary, then it would be more a description than a name. Solution: the dependence of the human on the environment is generic and not rigid. Human: a human could be an accident at most, because of certain processes in his/her inner side. Substance: substance must not be, in this sense, "absolutely independent". Solution: everything from which the substance is modally and temporally, rigidly dependent, is a part of it, that means it is a weak self-contained unit. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Explanation | Chalmers | I 50 Explanation/Chalmers: a good explanation is often one that covers many cases. Problem: whether the individual case is satisfied. Cf. >Strength of theories, >Stronger/weaker. Solution: in biological phenomena it is often the case that similar cases have a related background. >Phenomena, >Similarity, >Conditions, >Causal explanation, >Initial conditions. I 84 Explanation/Explication/Chalmers/(s): Chalmers distinguishes between explication and explanation. The latter is used in the context of reduction as a reductive explanation, e.g., of phenomenal properties, while he reserves explication for conceptual explanations. >Concepts, >Reduction. E.g. The property of being Rolf Harris does not constitute a phenomenon that needs an explanation, as opposed to an explication. I 121 Explanation/Consciousness/Chalmers: even if we refined our explanations more and more, they would only provide more refined explanations of cognitive functions, but not explanations of our conscious experience. >Consciousness/Chalmers. I 122 The existence of consciousness will always be an additional fact to our structural and dynamic facts. But we do not have to give up any explanation of consciousness. We just have to say goodbye to the idea that this explanation should be reductive. Cf. >Reductionism. I 177 Explanation/Consciousness/Paradoxy/Chalmers: Problem: Consciousness cannot be explained reductively, judgments about consciousness and phenomenal judgments (about experiences) must be explained, however, because they are in the field of psychology. >Experience. Paradoxically, consciousness is ultimately irrelevant to the explanation of phenomenal judgments. (Avshalom Elitzur (1989) (1), Roger Shepard (Psychologist, 1993) (2). I 178 Solution/Chalmers: the content of my experiences cannot be explained reductively. >Content. Problem: if we treat the judgments ("experience reports") of the zombies deflationistically ((s) as simple quotes), they can be explained reductively. >Zombies/Chalmers. Solution: it is often possible to use higher-level properties in order to make lower-level properties superfluous (e.g. molecular motion instead of heat). >Levels/order, >Description Levels. Problem: the higher-level properties are still logically supervenient on the physical. That is, when an action is explained neurophysiologically, this does not render the appeal to memory (as a phenomenal property) irrelevant. >Supervenience. I 179 This relevance is inherited by the logical supervenience. For example, if a single man has a need for female accompaniment, which is explained by the fact that he is male and unmarried, that does not make the fact that he is a bachelor irrelevant. In general, if two sets of properties are conceptually connected, an explanation in terms of the one set does not render the existence of an explanation in terms of the other set irrelevant. Solution: in physical explanations: when logical supervenience is involved, there is no explanatory irrelevancy: a description of a higher level is logically related to one of a lower level. Problem: the consciousness is not logically supervenient on the physical. There is therefore no conceptual dependence of the levels. >Levels/order, >Description Levels, >Dependency. I 188 Explanation/Consciousness/Chalmers: unlike the explanation of religious belief, where the assumption of divine existence is demanded for the explanation of other phenomena, the explanation of consciousness is different: here consciousness is already given and does not have to be added for an assumption. Consciousness is also not explained by judgments about conscious experience ("This is a red object"). >Experience, >Phenomena, >Qualia. I 191 Explanation/Consciousness/Chalmers: There are three ways to argue against the alleged irrelevancy of consciousness for the explanation of behavior. >Behavior. I 192 1. The argument from the self-knowledge/Chalmers: we know that we have conscious experiences ourselves. But it is hard to argue with this. >Self-knowledge, >Self-awareness. Solution: if experiences were by explanation irrelevant, we could not know that we have some. I 193 1st Argument from the Causal Theory of Knowledge: Problem: if experience is causally irrelevant, I cannot argue with it. Then I have no knowledge about my experiences. Shoemaker (1975)(3) thus argues for a materialism of consciousness and for a reductive functionalism. >Causal theory of knowledge, >S. Shoemaker, >Materialism, >Functionalism. Zombie/Shoemaker: for Shoemaker Zombies are logically impossible. >Zombies. Knowledge/Consciousness/Chalmers: a property dualist must argue that knowledge about conscious experiences is a different kind of knowledge than the knowledge about which one is talking about in the context of causation by objects. >Property dualism. I 194 Reliability Theory/Chalmers: is not appropriate in the case of our knowledge about ourselves. However, the phenomenal judgments of my zombie twins are not reliable. Therefore, one could assume that reliability is a distinguishing feature between me and the zombie. But my self-knowledge about consciousness is of a different kind: it is reflected. We are sure that we have a consciousness, which can be doubted at most "philosophically". >Reliability theory. I 195 Reliability/Chalmers: where is reliability missing? E.g. in situations like those of the brains in a vat. Such examples do not endanger our certainty that we have an awareness since there is no causality involved. >Brains in a vat. I 196 Our approach to our consciousness is quite direct, it is not mediated. >Self-consciousness. I 197 Uncorrigibility/Chalmers: uncorrigibility is not meant with this direct access! >Incorrigibility. I 198 Causation/Consciousness/Chalmers: we do not need any causality to explain our conscious experiences: our knowledge of this is based on a much more direct relationship. It's about how I know about it, not how my brain knows about it, so it's not about a physical relation. Cf. >Causality. Problem: beliefs could also form without experiences. >Beliefs. ChalmersVsVs: but then I have certainty about my beliefs. Zombie: would say exactly the same. I 199 ChalmersVsVs: Of course, from a third-person perspective, we do not know whether others have a consciousness (conscious experiences) anyway. But we know it from ourselves. >First person, >Other minds. Beliefs/Zombies: in the end, the zombie could have the same beliefs as I do. ChalmersVsVs: yes, but the evidence for my beliefs is much simpler: it is the experiences. They are the primary. >Experience, >Evidence. Deflationist/inflationist/Chalmers: our argumentation is here deflationary anyway, i.e. about the purely functional role of beliefs. Cf. >Deflationism. Inflationistically, beliefs themselves would be a part of the phenomenal experience. 1. A. Elitzur, Consciousness and the incompleteness of the physical explanation of behavior. Journal of Mind and Behavior 10, 1989,: pp. 1-20. 2. R. N. Shepard, On the physical baisis, ölinguistic representation and conscious experiences of colors. In: G. Harman (Ed) Conceptions of the human Mind: Essays in Honor of George A. Miller, Hillsdale NJ 1993. 3. Sydney Shoemaker, Functionalism and qualia, Philosophical Studies 27 (May):291-315 (1975). |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Possible Worlds | Plantinga | Schwarz I 68 Def Possible worlds/Plantinga: Plantinga defines possible worlds as maximum possible facts ("magic ersatzism"). >Ersatz worlds. Schwarz I 69 Facts as abstract entities about whose structure not much can be said. >States of affairs, >Abstract objects. At any case, they are no real universes or constructions of real things. Existence/"existence"/Plantinga: existence is a fundamental property that cannot be further analyzed. Other facts do not exist, but could exist. >"there is", >Existence. Def maximum/state of aafairs/Plantinga: a fact is maximum if its existence implies either its existence or non-existence for any other fact. Cf. >Maximum, >Dependence, >Conceptual dependence, >Counterfactual dependence, >Logical dependence. Possible worlds/Plantinga: possible worlds are maximum possible facts. For example, that "in" a world donkeys can speak means that donkeys could speak if the facts had the property of existence. VsPlantinga: this connection between a primitive property of abstract entities and the existence of talking donkeys must be accepted as inexplicable. In particular, it has nothing to do with the internal structure or composition of the abstract entity: it contains neither a talking donkey nor a picture or model of a donkey, nor a sentence or sign that somehow represents talking donkeys. LewisVsPlantinga: 1. Why can't this abstract entity have that primitive quality even though there are no talking donkeys? Why this necessary relationship between distinct entities? Plantinga's facts make it impossible to reduce modal truths to truth about what things with what qualities exist. Plantinga thus presupposes modality in the characterization of worlds. ((Lewis 1986e(1),§3,4) 2. Plantingas states of affairs make it impossible to reduce modal truths to truth about what things with what properties exist. Plantinga thus already assumes modality in the characterization of worlds. 3. We also want to talk not only about worlds, but also about their inhabitants. Plantinga must accept Sherlock Holmes as an irreducible abstract entity. (Plantinga 1976(2),262, 272). >Fictions. This is a non-qualitative (haecceitistic) property that is necessarily instantiated by an object x exactly when x is Holmes. >Haecceitism. So if in modal realism we have countless merely possible things, then in Plantinga we have countless entities of merely possible things. >Modal realism, >Realism, >Possibilism, >Possibilia, cf. >Actualism. 1. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 2. Alvin Plantinga 1976]: “Actualism and Possible Worlds”. Theoria, 42: 139–160. In [Loux 1979] |
Plant I A. Plantinga The Nature of Necessity (Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy) Revised ed. Edition 1979 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Qua-Objects | Fine | Simons I 298 Qua-objects/Kit Fine/Simons: x qua F - or x under the description of F. Definition Basis: the underlying object Def Explanation/Fine: x qua F is always differentiated from the base. SimonsVsFine: this is too strong, because then one would also have to distinguish "x qua self-identity" from x - also essential properties should not make up the qua. - Only contingent properties are ment to occur in the explanation. >Mereology, >P. Simons, >Explanations. Simons: most qua-objects have incorporated their explanation, not as a property. - (This already exists in Principia Mathematica(1)). Qua-objects provide an ontological dependency for a conceptual dependency - e.g. fist qua clenched hand. - e.g. statue qua shaped clay. >Statue/clay, >Conceptual dependence, >Ontological dependence. SimonsVs: they do not achieve anything, one cannot form with them new singular terms from old. >Singular terms, >Concepts, >Identification, >Distinctions. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Fin I K. Fine The Limits of Abstraction Oxford 2008 FinA I A. Fine The Shaky Game (Science and Its Conceptual Foundations series) Chicago 1996 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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Reference |
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| Possibilia | Boer Vs Possibilia | I 12 Existential Independence/Conceptual Dependence/Non-Actualism/"there is"/"exists"/Boer: distinction between "exists" and "there is": VsNon-Actualism/Boer: this is fixed on dubious entities like possible fat men. (Unrealized possibilities). BoerVsVs: these are overreactions. Solution/Boer: a metaphysical basis for the distinction existing/being without ontological overpopulation ...+.... I 13 Def Normal/Terminology/Boer: let us call things "normal" for which it is possible that they exist/are actual. Def Abstract/Terminology/Boer: be a thing for which it is not possible that it exists/is actual. Fiction/fictive/Boer: a) in the first sense: (mere Possibilia): normal, though non-existent. b) as essential fictional: abstract. |
Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986 |
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