Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.

Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
---|---|---|---|

Bayesianism | Putnam | V 252f
Bayes-Theorem/Putnam: the Bayes-Theorem implies the acceptance of a certain number of reliable observation records in an observation language.
>Observation, >Observation language, >Observation sentence, >Conditional probability, >Probability. MethodsVsFetishism: the Bayes-Theorem suggests that division into formal and non-formal part is possible. PutnamVsBayes: differences in the functions of the output probability lead to irrational large differences in the actual confirmation degrees of theorems. PutnamVsSeparation: the definition of the formal part of the scientific method guarantees no rationality. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt InVon einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) InVon einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 InVon einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. InVon einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. InVon einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth InVon einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 InVon einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) InVon einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 InVon einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 InVon einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 InVon einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 InKünstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 InTruth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 InTheories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |

Probability Theory | Norvig | Norvig I 503
Probability theory/Norvig/Russell: Probability theory was invented as a way of analyzing games of chance. In about 850 A.D. the Indian mathematician Mahaviracarya described how to arrange a set of bets that can’t lose (what we now call a Dutch book). In Europe, the first significant systematic analyses were produced by Girolamo Cardano around 1565, although publication was posthumous (1663). By that time, probability had been established as a mathematical discipline due to a series of Norvig I 504
results established in a famous correspondence between Blaise Pascal and Pierre de Fermat in 1654. As with probability itself, the results were initially motivated by gambling problems (…).
The first published textbook on probability was De Ratiociniis in Ludo Aleae (Huygens, 1657)^{(1)}. The “laziness and ignorance” view of uncertainty was described by John Arbuthnot in the preface of his translation of Huygens (Arbuthnot, 1692)^{(2)}: “It is impossible for a Die, with such determin’d force and direction, not to fall on such determin’d side, only I don’t know the force and direction which makes it fall on such determin’d side, and therefore I call it Chance, which is nothing but the want of art...” Laplace (1816)(3) gave an exceptionally accurate and modern overview of probability; he was the first to use the example “take two urns, A and B, the first containing four white and two black balls, . . . ” The Rev. Thomas Bayes (1702–1761) introduced the rule for reasoning about conditional probabilities that was named after him (Bayes, 1763) ^{(4)}. Bayes only considered the case of uniform priors; it was Laplace who independently developed the general case. Kolmogorov (1950 ^{(5)}, first published in German in 1933) presented probability theory in a rigorously axiomatic framework for the first time. Rényi (1970) ^{(6)} later gave an axiomatic presentation that took conditional probability, rather than absolute probability, as primitive.Objectivism: Pascal used probability in ways that required both the objective interpretation, as a property of the world based on symmetry or relative frequency, and the subjective interpretation, based on degree of belief—the former in his analyses of probabilities in games of chance, the latter in the famous “Pascal’s wager” argument about the possible existence of God. However, Pascal did not clearly realize the distinction between these two interpretations. The distinction was first drawn clearly by James Bernoulli (1654–1705). Subjectivism: Leibniz introduced the “classical” notion of probability as a proportion of enumerated, equally probable cases, which was also used by Bernoulli, although it was brought to prominence by Laplace (1749–1827). This notion is ambiguous between the frequency interpretation and the subjective interpretation. The cases can be thought to be equally probable either because of a natural, physical symmetry between them, or simply because we do not have any knowledge that would lead us to consider one more probable than another. Principle of indifference: The use of this latter, subjective consideration to justify assigning equal probabilities is known as the principle of indifference. The principle is often attributed to Laplace, but he never isolated the principle explicitly. Principle of insufficient reason: George Boole and John Venn both referred to [the principle of indifference] as the principle of insufficient reason; the modern name is due to Keynes (1921) ^{(7)}. Objectivism/Subjectivism: The debate between objectivists and subjectivists became sharper in the 20th century. Kolmogorov (1963) ^{(8)}, R. A. Fisher (1922)^{(9)}, and Richard von Mises (1928)^{(10)} were advocates of the relative frequency interpretation. Propensity: Karl Popper’s (1959 ^{(11)}, first published in German in 1934) “propensity” interpretation traces relative frequencies to an underlying physical symmetry.Belief degree: Frank Ramsey (1931) ^{(12)}, Bruno de Finetti (1937)(13), R. T. Cox (1946)^{(14)}, Leonard Savage (1954)^{(15)}, Richard Jeffrey (1983)^{(16)}, and E. T. Jaynes (2003)^{(17)} interpreted probabilities as the degrees of belief of specific individuals. Their analyses of degree of belief were closely tied to utilities and to behavior - specifically, to the willingness to place bets. Subjectivism: Rudolf Carnap, following Leibniz and Laplace, offered a different kind of subjective interpretation of probability - not as any actual individual’s degree of belief, but as the degree of belief that an idealized individual should have in a particular proposition a, given a particular body of evidence e. Norvig I 505
Confirmation degree: Carnap attempted to go further than Leibniz or Laplace by making this notion of degree of confirmation mathematically precise, as a logical relation between a and e.
Induction/inductive Logic: The study of this relation was intended to constitute a mathematical discipline called inductive logic, analogous to ordinary deductive logic (Carnap, 1948^{(18)}, 1950^{(19)}). Carnap was not able to extend his inductive logic much beyond the propositional case, and Putnam (1963)^{(20)} showed by adversarial arguments that some fundamental difficulties would prevent a strict extension to languages capable of expressing arithmetic.Uncertainty: Cox’s theorem (1946) ^{(14)} shows that any system for uncertain reasoning that meets his set of assumptions is equivalent to probability theory. This gave renewed confidence to those who already favored probability, but others were not convinced, pointing to the assumptions (primarily that belief must be represented by a single number, and thus the belief in ¬p must be a function of the belief in p). Halpern (1999)^{(21)} describes the assumptions and shows some gaps in Cox’s original formulation. Horn (2003)^{(22)} shows how to patch up the difficulties. Jaynes (2003)^{(17)} has a similar argument that is easier to read. The question of reference classes is closely tied to the attempt to find an inductive logic.Reference class problem: The approach of choosing the “most specific” reference class of sufficient size was formally proposed by Reichenbach (1949) ^{(23)}. Various attempts have been made, notably by Henry Kyburg (1977^{(24)}, 1983^{(25)}), to formulate more sophisticated policies in order to avoid some obvious fallacies that arise with Reichenbach’s rule, but such approaches remain somewhat ad hoc. More recent work by Bacchus, Grove, Halpern, and Koller (1992)^{(26)} extends Carnap’s methods to first-order theories, thereby avoiding many of the difficulties associated with the straightforward reference-class method. Kyburg and Teng (2006)^{(27)} contrast probabilistic inference with nonmonotonic logic. >Uncertainty/AI research. 1. Huygens, C. (1657). De ratiociniis in ludo aleae. In van Schooten, F. (Ed.), Exercitionum Mathematicorum. Elsevirii, Amsterdam. Translated into English by John Arbuthnot (1692 2. Arbuthnot, J. (1692). Of the Laws of Chance. Motte, London. Translation into English, with additions, of Huygens (1657). 3. Laplace, P. (1816). Essai philosophique sur les probabilit´es (3rd edition). Courcier Imprimeur, Paris. 4. Bayes, T. (1763). An essay towards solving a problem in the doctrine of chances. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, 53, 370–418. 5. Kolmogorov, A. N. (1950). Foundations of the Theory of Probability. Chelsea. 6. Rényi, A. (1970). Probability Theory. Elsevier/North-Holland. 7. Keynes, J. M. (1921). A Treatise on Probability. Macmillan. 8. Kolmogorov, A. N. (1963). On tables of random numbers. Sankhya, the Indian Journal of Statistics, Series A 25. 9. Fisher, R. A. (1922). On the mathematical foundations of theoretical statistics. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series A 222, 309–368. 10. von Mises, R. (1928). Wahrscheinlichkeit, Statistik und Wahrheit. J. Springer 11. Popper, K. R. (1959). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Basic Books. 12. Ramsey, F. P. (1931). Truth and probability. In Braithwaite, R. B. (Ed.), The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 13. de Finetti, B. (1937). Le prévision: ses lois logiques, ses sources subjectives. Ann. Inst.Poincaré, 7, 1-68. 14. Cox, R. T. (1946). Probability, frequency, and reasonable expectation. American Journal of Physics, 14(1), 1–13.
15. Savage, L. J. (1954). The Foundations of Statistics. Wiley.
16. Jeffrey, R. C. (1983). The Logic of Decision (2nd edition). University of Chicago Press.17. Jaynes, E. T. (2003). Probability Theory: The Logic of Science. Cambridge Univ. Press. 18. Carnap, R. (1948). On the application of inductive logic. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 8, 133-148. 19. Carnap, R. (1950). Logical Foundations of Probability. University of Chicago Press 20. Putnam, H. (1963). ‘Degree of confirmation’ and inductive logic. In Schilpp, P. A. (Ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, pp. 270–292. Open Court. 21. Halpern, J. Y. (1999). Technical addendum, Cox’s theorem revisited. JAIR, 11, 429–435. 22. Horn, K. V. (2003). Constructing a logic of plausible inference: A guide to cox’s theorem. IJAR, 34, 3–24. 23. Reichenbach, H. (1949). The Theory of Probability: An Inquiry into the Logical and Mathematical Foundations of the Calculus of Probability (second edition). University of California Press 24. Kyburg, H. E. (1977). Randomness and the right reference class. J. Philosophy, 74(9), 501-521. 25. Kyburg, H. E. (1983). The reference class. Philosophy of Science, 50, 374–397. 26. Bacchus, F., Grove, A., Halpern, J. Y., and Koller, D. (1992). From statistics to beliefs. In AAAI-92, pp. 602-608. 27. Kyburg, H. E. and Teng, C.-M. (2006). Nonmonotonic logic and statistical inference. Computational Intelligence, 22(1), 26-51. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |

Probability Theory | Russell | Norvig I 503
Probability theory/Norvig/Russell: Probability theory was invented as a way of analyzing games of chance. In about 850 A.D. the Indian mathematician Mahaviracarya described how to arrange a set of bets that can’t lose (what we now call a Dutch book). In Europe, the first significant systematic analyses were produced by Girolamo Cardano around 1565, although publication was posthumous (1663). By that time, probability had been established as a mathematical discipline due to a series of Norvig I 504
results established in a famous correspondence between Blaise Pascal and Pierre de Fermat in 1654. As with probability itself, the results were initially motivated by gambling problems (…).
The first published textbook on probability was De Ratiociniis in Ludo Aleae (Huygens, 1657)^{(1)}. The “laziness and ignorance” view of uncertainty was described by John Arbuthnot in the preface of his translation of Huygens (Arbuthnot, 1692)^{(2)}: “It is impossible for a Die, with such determin’d force and direction, not to fall on such determin’d side, only I don’t know the force and direction which makes it fall on such determin’d side, and therefore I call it Chance, which is nothing but the want of art...” Laplace (1816)(3) gave an exceptionally accurate and modern overview of probability; he was the first to use the example “take two urns, A and B, the first containing four white and two black balls, . . . ” The Rev. Thomas Bayes (1702–1761) introduced the rule for reasoning about conditional probabilities that was named after him (Bayes, 1763) ^{(4)}. Bayes only considered the case of uniform priors; it was Laplace who independently developed the general case. Kolmogorov (1950 ^{(5)}, first published in German in 1933) presented probability theory in a rigorously axiomatic framework for the first time. Rényi (1970) ^{(6)} later gave an axiomatic presentation that took conditional probability, rather than absolute probability, as primitive.Objectivism: Pascal used probability in ways that required both the objective interpretation, as a property of the world based on symmetry or relative frequency, and the subjective interpretation, based on degree of belief—the former in his analyses of probabilities in games of chance, the latter in the famous “Pascal’s wager” argument about the possible existence of God. However, Pascal did not clearly realize the distinction between these two interpretations. The distinction was first drawn clearly by James Bernoulli (1654–1705). Subjectivism: Leibniz introduced the “classical” notion of probability as a proportion of enumerated, equally probable cases, which was also used by Bernoulli, although it was brought to prominence by Laplace (1749–1827). This notion is ambiguous between the frequency interpretation and the subjective interpretation. The cases can be thought to be equally probable either because of a natural, physical symmetry between them, or simply because we do not have any knowledge that would lead us to consider one more probable than another. Principle of indifference: The use of this latter, subjective consideration to justify assigning equal probabilities is known as the principle of indifference. The principle is often attributed to Laplace, but he never isolated the principle explicitly. Principle of insufficient reason: George Boole and John Venn both referred to [the principle of indifference] as the principle of insufficient reason; the modern name is due to Keynes (1921) ^{(7)}. Objectivism/Subjectivism: The debate between objectivists and subjectivists became sharper in the 20th century. Kolmogorov (1963) ^{(8)}, R. A. Fisher (1922)^{(9)}, and Richard von Mises (1928)^{(10)} were advocates of the relative frequency interpretation. Propensity: Karl Popper’s (1959 ^{(11)}, first published in German in 1934) “propensity” interpretation traces relative frequencies to an underlying physical symmetry.Belief degree: Frank Ramsey (1931) ^{(12)}, Bruno de Finetti (1937)(13), R. T. Cox (1946)^{(14)}, Leonard Savage (1954)^{(15)}, Richard Jeffrey (1983)^{(16)}, and E. T. Jaynes (2003)^{(17)} interpreted probabilities as the degrees of belief of specific individuals. Their analyses of degree of belief were closely tied to utilities and to behavior - specifically, to the willingness to place bets. Subjectivism: Rudolf Carnap, following Leibniz and Laplace, offered a different kind of subjective interpretation of probability - not as any actual individual’s degree of belief, but as the degree of belief that an idealized individual should have in a particular proposition a, given a particular body of evidence e. Norvig I 505
Confirmation degree: Carnap attempted to go further than Leibniz or Laplace by making this notion of degree of confirmation mathematically precise, as a logical relation between a and e.
Induction/inductive Logic: The study of this relation was intended to constitute a mathematical discipline called inductive logic, analogous to ordinary deductive logic (Carnap, 1948^{(18)}, 1950^{(19)}). Carnap was not able to extend his inductive logic much beyond the propositional case, and Putnam (1963)^{(20)} showed by adversarial arguments that some fundamental difficulties would prevent a strict extension to languages capable of expressing arithmetic.Uncertainty: Cox’s theorem (1946) ^{(14)} shows that any system for uncertain reasoning that meets his set of assumptions is equivalent to probability theory. This gave renewed confidence to those who already favored probability, but others were not convinced, pointing to the assumptions (primarily that belief must be represented by a single number, and thus the belief in ¬p must be a function of the belief in p). Halpern (1999)^{(21)} describes the assumptions and shows some gaps in Cox’s original formulation. Horn (2003)^{(22)} shows how to patch up the difficulties. Jaynes (2003)^{(17)} has a similar argument that is easier to read. The question of reference classes is closely tied to the attempt to find an inductive logic.Reference class problem: The approach of choosing the “most specific” reference class of sufficient size was formally proposed by Reichenbach (1949) ^{(23)}. Various attempts have been made, notably by Henry Kyburg (1977^{(24)}, 1983^{(25)}), to formulate more sophisticated policies in order to avoid some obvious fallacies that arise with Reichenbach’s rule, but such approaches remain somewhat ad hoc. More recent work by Bacchus, Grove, Halpern, and Koller (1992)^{(26)} extends Carnap’s methods to first-order theories, thereby avoiding many of the difficulties associated with the straightforward reference-class method. Kyburg and Teng (2006)^{(27)} contrast probabilistic inference with nonmonotonic logic. >Uncertainty/AI research. 1. Huygens, C. (1657). De ratiociniis in ludo aleae. In van Schooten, F. (Ed.), Exercitionum Mathematicorum. Elsevirii, Amsterdam. Translated into English by John Arbuthnot (1692 2. Arbuthnot, J. (1692). Of the Laws of Chance. Motte, London. Translation into English, with additions, of Huygens (1657). 3. Laplace, P. (1816). Essai philosophique sur les probabilit´es (3rd edition). Courcier Imprimeur, Paris. 4. Bayes, T. (1763). An essay towards solving a problem in the doctrine of chances. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, 53, 370–418. 5. Kolmogorov, A. N. (1950). Foundations of the Theory of Probability. Chelsea. 6. Rényi, A. (1970). Probability Theory. Elsevier/North-Holland. 7. Keynes, J. M. (1921). A Treatise on Probability. Macmillan. 8. Kolmogorov, A. N. (1963). On tables of random numbers. Sankhya, the Indian Journal of Statistics, Series A 25. 9. Fisher, R. A. (1922). On the mathematical foundations of theoretical statistics. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series A 222, 309–368. 10. von Mises, R. (1928). Wahrscheinlichkeit, Statistik und Wahrheit. J. Springer 11. Popper, K. R. (1959). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Basic Books. 12. Ramsey, F. P. (1931). Truth and probability. In Braithwaite, R. B. (Ed.), The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 13. de Finetti, B. (1937). Le prévision: ses lois logiques, ses sources subjectives. Ann. Inst.Poincaré, 7, 1-68. 14. Cox, R. T. (1946). Probability, frequency, and reasonable expectation. American Journal of Physics, 14(1), 1–13.
15. Savage, L. J. (1954). The Foundations of Statistics. Wiley.
16. Jeffrey, R. C. (1983). The Logic of Decision (2nd edition). University of Chicago Press.17. Jaynes, E. T. (2003). Probability Theory: The Logic of Science. Cambridge Univ. Press. 18. Carnap, R. (1948). On the application of inductive logic. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 8, 133-148. 19. Carnap, R. (1950). Logical Foundations of Probability. University of Chicago Press 20. Putnam, H. (1963). ‘Degree of confirmation’ and inductive logic. In Schilpp, P. A. (Ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, pp. 270–292. Open Court. 21. Halpern, J. Y. (1999). Technical addendum, Cox’s theorem revisited. JAIR, 11, 429–435. 22. Horn, K. V. (2003). Constructing a logic of plausible inference: A guide to cox’s theorem. IJAR, 34, 3–24. 23. Reichenbach, H. (1949). The Theory of Probability: An Inquiry into the Logical and Mathematical Foundations of the Calculus of Probability (second edition). University of California Press 24. Kyburg, H. E. (1977). Randomness and the right reference class. J. Philosophy, 74(9), 501-521. 25. Kyburg, H. E. (1983). The reference class. Philosophy of Science, 50, 374–397. 26. Bacchus, F., Grove, A., Halpern, J. Y., and Koller, D. (1992). From statistics to beliefs. In AAAI-92, pp. 602-608. 27. Kyburg, H. E. and Teng, C.-M. (2006). Nonmonotonic logic and statistical inference. Computational Intelligence, 22(1), 26-51. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus InEigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" InWahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |

Truth | Putnam | Rorty I 309
Concept of Truth/truth/Putnam/Rorty: the concept of truth has certain properties. Putnam: if a statement is true, then its logical consequences are also true, when two statements are true, then their conjunction is also true. If a statement is now true, then it is always true.
>Logical omniscience.--- Putnam VI 394
Truth has to do with speaker-use (success), not with what is going on "in the head" (> verification degrees, confirmation degrees).
>Use, >Convention, >Speaker meaning, >Confirmation, >Verification, >Graduals, >Confirmation degrees.Meaning/Putnam: meaning is also a function of the reference (not only in the head). Reference/Putnam: reference is determined by social practices and actual physical paradigms. --- Harman II 431
Truth/Putnam: the only reason one can have to deny that truth is a property would be that one is a physicalist or phenomenalist (= reductionist) or cultural relativist.
>Physicalism, >Reductionism, >Phenomenalism, >Cultural relativism, cf. >Deflationism.--- Horwich I 456
Truth/Putnam: if it was not a property, the truth conditions were everything you could know about them.
Putnam: then our thoughts would not be thoughts.>Thoughts. (Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994.) --- Putnam III 96f
Truth/deconstructivism/PutnamVsDerrida: Derrida: "The concept of truth itself is inconsistent but indispensable". PutnamVs: the failure of a large number of contradictory statements is something else than a failure of the concept of truth itself.
Truth/Putnam: truth is not "what I would believe if I continue researching". Putnam: the philosophy of language got only troubled because they believed that they could clear out the normative.>Norms/Putnam. --- Putnam I (h) 204f
Truth/PutnamVsRorty: when some ideas "pay out", then there is the question of the nature of this accuracy.
>Truth/Rorty, cf. >Pragmatism. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt InVon einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) InVon einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 InVon einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. InVon einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. InVon einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth InVon einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 InVon einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) InVon einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 InVon einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 InVon einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 InVon einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 InKünstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 InTruth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 InTheories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 InPhilosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 InPhilosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 InPhilosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam InPhilosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg InPhilosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 InPhilosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 InEine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 InEine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 InEine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 InEine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 InSolidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 InSolidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) InSolidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Harman I G. Harman Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995 Harman II Gilbert Harman "Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam’s Reason, Truth and History" The Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1982) pp. 568-75 InTheories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.

Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
---|---|---|---|

Justification | Field, Hartry | II 365
Explanation / justification / Field: declarations can only be considered as a justification if they are not too easy to reach!
Dummett, Black, Friedman thesis: the use of credible methods initially increased their credibility. II 367
Rationality / FieldVs coherence theory: I prefer the lower threshold: the good induction and perception rules are a priori weak. II 371
It is misguided to try to reduce epistemic properties such as rationality to other terms. Horwich I 431
Confirmation / Field: there is no objective notion of "confirmation degree" or of justification. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |