Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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Entry
Reference
Atomic Sentences Kripke III 344
Atomic sentence/Truth/Kripke: Davidson only requires that atomic truth is to be characterized, not truth in general (>effectiveness). - E.g. Number theory is decidable for atomic sentences but not for sentences in general.

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984

Calvinism Weber Habermas III 308
Calvinism/Weber/Habermas: Weber does not want to explain why Catholic inhibitions against commercial profit-seeking have fallen, but what made the conversion possible. He discovered the corresponding teachings in Calvinism and around the Protestant sects. In religious community life he finds the institutions that ensured the socializing effectiveness of the teachings in the supporting layers of early capitalism. (1)
Habermas III 309
He emphasizes the Calvinist trait that urges the believer to undress the everyday practice of its lack of systems, i.e. to practice the individual search for salvation in such a way that the ethical conviction and principle-led morality penetrate all spheres of life and all stages of life equally. The system of lifestyle is based on the fact that the lay cannot rely on the priestly grace of the sacrament to be assisted by an official institution of grace such as the Catholic Church. This means that he must not divide his world into salvific and other spheres of life, and regulate his life autonomously, according to the principles of postconventional morality.

1. M. Weber, M. Weber, Die protestantische Ethik, hrsg. v. J. Winckelmann, Bd 2, Hamburg 1972, S. 232.

Weber I
M. Weber
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930
German Edition:
Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013


Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Capitalism Surowiecki I 164
Capitalism/Surowiecki: Surowiecki shows an explanation for the emergence of an early far-reaching trading system by the Quakers, who were connected by a network of mutual trust. (1) ---
I 165
The Quakers, for their part, had no access to the free professions because they rejected the Anglican Church. As businessmen, the Quakers became famous for their diligence and accuracy of accounting. They introduced innovations such as fixed prices for goods in order to make trading activities transparent. Thus, the Quakers became sought-after trading partners for heterodox people. The key term for this development is trust.
---
I 168
Historian Richard Tilly shows that after 1800 merchants in England and Germany came to understand the value of honesty as a source of profit. (2) ---
I 169
Capitalism/Surowiecki: The core element was the orientation towards long-term capital formation instead of the interest in short-term profits. According to Tilly, the economy began to see individual transactions as links in a comprehensive chain of profitable enterprises, rather than as "singular opportunities that must be exploited to the last." (2) Surowiecki: Trust became impersonal, so to speak. Buying and selling was no longer a matter of personal contact.
---
I 171
Trust could not be maintained over distance without an institutional and legal framework. The high degree of effectiveness of laws and treaties can be measured by the fact that they are rarely invoked.
1. Zum Thema Quäker siehe Jacob M. Price, »The Great Quaker Business Families of 18th Century London«, Overseas Trade and Traders – Essays on Some Commercial, Financial, and Political Challenges Facing British Atlantic Merchants, 1600-1775 (Ashgate, Brookfield, VT, 1996); James Walvin, The Quakers – Money and Morals (Trafalgar Square, London 1998); und Peter Mathias, »Risk, Credit, and Kinship in Early Modern Enterprise«, in: John J. McCusker und Kenneth Morgan (Hrsg.), The Early Modern Atlantic Economy (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2000), S. 15-35.
2. Richard Tilly, »Moral Standards and Business Behavior in Nineteenth-Century Germany and Britain«, in: Jürgen Kocka und Allan Mitchell (Hrsg.), Bourgeois Society in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Berg, Oxford 1998), S. 182 ff.

Surowi I
James Surowiecki
Die Weisheit der Vielen: Warum Gruppen klüger sind als Einzelne und wie wir das kollektive Wissen für unser wirtschaftliches, soziales und politisches Handeln nutzen können München 2005

Carbon Pricing Coordination Stavins Stavins I 169
Carbon Pricing Coordination/Stavins: (…) the location of greenhouse gas emissions has no effect on the global distribution of damages. Hence free-riding problems plague unilateral and multilateral approaches. Furthermore, nations will not benefit proportionately from greenhouse gas mitigation policies. Thus mitigation costs are likely to exceed direct benefits for virtually all countries.
Stavins I 170
In principle, internationally employed market-based instruments can achieve overall cost effectiveness. Three basic routes stand out. 1. Countries could agree to apply the same tax on carbon (harmonized domestic taxes) or adopt a uniform international tax.
2. The international policy community could establish a system of international tradable permits—effectively a nation-state level cap-and-trade program.
3. A more decentralized system of internationally linked domestic cap-and-trade programs could ensure internationally cost-effective emission mitigation.
>Carbon price strategies/Stavins, >Emission permits/Stavins, >Cap-and-Trade Linkages/Stavins.


Robert N. Stavins & Joseph E. Aldy, 2012: “The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and
Experience”. In: Journal of Environment & Development, Vol. 21/2, pp. 152–180.

Stavins I
Robert N. Stavins
Joseph E. Aldy
The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience 2012

Carbon Taxation Fankhauser Fankhauser I 1
Carbon Taxation/EU/US/Carattini/Carvalho/Fankhauser: Carbon taxation, in conjunction with other regulatory measures, could be an effective way of closing policy gaps in sectors that are not already covered by a functioning emissions trading system. In the EU, carbon taxes could play a role in reducing
Fankhauser I 2
emissions outside the EU ETS [Emissions Trading System], where much of the future policy effort must lie, according to the European Environment Agency (2016)(1). In the United States, senior Republicans have laid out their arguments for a US $40 carbon tax in The Conservative Case for Carbon Dividends (Baker III, Feldstein, Halstead, et al., 2017)(2). >Emissions Trading. A carbon tax is a relatively simple instrument to impose on the individual emitters, including the many smaller ones that dominate the non-ETS sectors and are less likely than large emitting facilities or sources to engage in carbon trading. According to the expertise collected by the World Bank, cap-and-trade systems—like the EU ETS—are best suited for industrial actors that have the capacity and skills to engage in the market actively (World Bank, 2016)(3). With their high transaction costs, such systems are less appealing for sectors with a large number of small emission sources, such as transportation and buildings (Goulder & Parry, 2008)(4). Economists advocate the use of carbon taxes because they provide the price incentive to reduce emissions without being technologically prescriptive, are simpler to administer, and do not draw on government budgets (Aldy & Stavins, 2012(5); Baranzini et al., 2017(6); Baumol & Oates, 1971(7); Goulder & Parry, 2008(4); Mankiw, 2009(8); Metcalf, 2009(9); Weitzman, 2015(10)).
Fankhauser I 4
The required tax level is determined by the environmental objective and more specifically by the marginal costs of meeting a given emissions target (Bowen & Fankhauser, 2017)(11).
Fankhauser I 2
VsCarbon Taxation/VsCarbon Tax/Objections to Carbon Taxation/Carattini/Carvalho/Fankhauser: Despite these advantages, carbon taxes are one of the least used climate policy instruments. Carbon tax proposals have been undone, sometimes at an advanced political stage, for example in Australia (in 2014), France (in 2000), Switzerland (in 2000 and 2015), and most recently in the United States in Washington State (in 2016). Objections to carbon taxation are often not about the introduction of the tax itself, but about its design (Dresner, Dunne, Clinch, & Beuermann, 2006)(12) and the way relevant information is shared. Sociopsychological factors—such as perceived coerciveness, equity, and justice—all affect the extent to which voters accept different climate policy instruments (Drews & van den Bergh, 2015)(13). Factoring them into the design from the outset could make carbon tax legislation easier to pass. Opposition by vested interests has proved to be very effective in limiting public intervention in a wide range of environmental issues (Oates & Portney, 2003)(14), and their lobbying efforts can influence voters' views, preventing the passage, or even revoking the implementation of a carbon tax. Other studies, for instance by Hammar, Löfgren, and Sterner (2004)(15), Van Asselt and Brewer (2010)(16), Dechezleprêtre and Sato (2017)(17), and Neuhoff et al. (2015)(18), provide insights into how vested interests and other political economy aspects have affected the design of carbon pricing in recent times.
Fankhauser I 3
Recognizing that there are variations in attitudes and perceptions across individuals, we identify five general reasons for aversion to carbon taxes that have been recurrently emphasized in the literature. 1. VsCarbon Taxation: The personal costs are perceived to be too high. A Swedish survey by Jagers and Hammar (2009)(19) found that people associate carbon taxes with higher personal costs, more than they do with alternative policy instruments. A discrete choice experiment by Alberini, Scasny, and Bigano (2016)(20) showed that Italians had a preference, among climate policy instruments, for subsidies over carbon taxes. Participants in a lab experiment by Heres, Kallbekken, and Galarraga (2015)(21) similarly expected higher payoffs from subsidies than from taxes, especially when there was uncertainty on how tax revenues would be “rebated.” Ex ante, individuals tend to overestimate the cost of an environmental tax, and underestimate its benefits (Carattini et al., 2018(22); Odeck & Bråthen, 2002(23); Schuitema, Steg, & Forward, 2010(24)). The literature in social psychology also suggests that individuals prefer subsidies because they are perceived as less coercive than taxes. Taxes are “pushed” onto polluters, imposing a mandatory cost, while subsidies are seen as “pull” measures, which supposedly reward climate-friendly behavior (de Groot & Schuitema, 2012(25); Rosentrater et al., 2012(26); Steg et al., 2006(27)).
2. VsCarbon Taxation: Carbon taxes can be regressive. [Voters] perceive, rightly, that without counterbalancing measures carbon taxes may have a disproportionate negative impact on low-income households. These counterbalancing measures can, however, offset the adverse distributional effects of carbon taxes, and even make them progressive. Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that alternative climate policy instruments such as subsidies for renewable energy can also have similar regressive effects and may not generate revenues to counter them (Baranzini et al., 2017)(28).
3. VsCarbon Taxation: Carbon taxes could damage the wider economy. This has been illustrated in Switzerland, where, in two different instances more than 10 years apart, concern about the potential competitiveness and employment effects of energy taxes contributed to their rejection in public ballots, even in the context of very limited unemployment (Carattini, Baranzini, Thalmann, Varone, & Vöhringer, 2017(29); Thalmann, 2004(30)). While these concerns are partly justified, voters may tend to overestimate competitiveness and job effects. [This] may also result from specific information campaigns led by energy-intensive companies, as in the case of Australia (cf. Spash & Lo, 2012)(31).
4. VsCarbon Taxation: Carbon taxes are believed not to discourage high-carbon behavior (…) (Klok, Larsen, Dahl, & Hansen, 2006(32); Steg et al., 2006(27)). [Individuals] consider low-carbon subsidies to be a more powerful way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, especially if the cost of switching from consuming high-carbon goods to low-carbon goods is considered high. [They] believe that the price elasticity of demand for carbon-intensive goods is close to zero. The expectation that carbon taxes do not work is one of the main reasons for their rejection by people in surveys and real ballots (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017(6); Carattini et al., 2017(29); Hsu, Walters, & Purgas, 2008(33); Kallbekken & Aasen, 2010(34); Kallbekken & Sælen, 2011(35)).
Fankhauser I 4
5. VsCarbon Taxation: Governments may want to tax carbon to increase their revenues. [Individuals] assume—as a direct consequence of concern 4 above—that the purpose of introducing a carbon tax is not to reduce greenhouse gases but to increase government revenues (Klok et al., 2006)(32). Trust issues sometimes concern the specific environmental tax proposal under consideration, but they may also be broader, related to people's general view of tax policy or even to trust in the government itself (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017(6); Beuermann & Santarius, 2006(36); Dietz, Dan, & Shwom, 2007(37); Hammar & Jagers, 2006(38)). VsVs: Some of these perceptions are incorrect. There is evidence that carbon pricing does in fact reduce emissions (J. Andersson, 2015(39); Baranzini & Carattini, 2014(40); Martin, de Preux, & Wagner, 2014(41)) and has so far had a minimal impact on the wider economy, in terms of adversely affecting the competitiveness of domestic industry, at least in the presence of adjustments and specific measures tailored to support the most exposed firms (Dechezleprêtre & Sato, 2017)(17). On the other hand, voters are right to suspect that governments would probably welcome the extra revenues. Indeed, its benign fiscal implications are often highlighted as one of the merits of a carbon tax (Bowen & Fankhauser, 2017)(11). It is also the case that carbon taxes are often regressive; without counter measures they may affect poor households disproportionately (Gough, Abdallah, Johnson, Ryan Collins, & Smith, 2012(42); Metcalf, 2009(9); Speck, 1999(43); Sterner, 2011(44)). (…) the accuracy of public perceptions is less important than the fact that they are widely held and can hinder the adoption of otherwise desirable policies. People's attitudes to carbon taxes appear to be influenced more by the direct personal cost of the measure than by an appreciation of the environmental objective (Kallbekken, Kroll, & Cherry, 2011)(45). Consequently, the public acceptability of an environmental tax depends heavily on its policy stringency, since the proposed tax rate determines the direct costs to consumers.


1. European Environment Agency (2016). Chapter 1. Overall progress towards the European Union's 20-20-20 climate and energy targets. In Trends and projections in Europe 2016—Tracking progress towards Europe's climate and energy targets (pp. 1–12). Brussels, Belgium: Author.
2. Baker, J. A. III, Feldstein, M., Halstead, T., Mankiw, N. G., Paulson, H. M. Jr., Schultz, G. P., … Walton, R. (2017). The conservative case for carbon dividends. Washington, DC: Climate Leadership Council.
3. World Bank. (2016). State and trends of carbon pricing 2016. Washington, DC: Author.
4. Goulder, L. H., & Parry, I. W. H. (2008). Instrument choice in environmental policy. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 2(2), 152–174.
5. Aldy, J. E., & Stavins, R. N. (2012). The promise and problems of pricing carbon: Theory and experience. The Journal of Environment and Development, 21(2), 152–180.
6. Baranzini, A., & Carattini, S. (2017). Effectiveness, earmarking and labeling: Testing the acceptability of carbon taxes with survey data. Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 19(1), 197–227.
7. Baumol, W. J., & Oates, W. E. (1971). The use of standards and prices for protection of the environment. The Swedish Journal of Economics, 73(1), 42–54.
8. Mankiw, N. G. (2009). Smart taxes: An open invitation to join the Pigou club. Eastern Economic Journal, 35(1), 14–23.
9. Metcalf, G. E. (2009). Designing a carbon tax to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 3(1), 63–83.
10. Weitzman, M. L. (2015). Voting on prices vs. voting on quantities in a World Climate Assembly (NBER Working Paper No. 20925). Boston, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
11. Bowen, A., & Fankhauser, S. (2017). Good practice in low-carbon policy. In A. Averchenkova, S. Fankhauser, & M. Nachmany (Eds.), Climate change legislation (pp. 123–140). London, England: Edward Elgar.
12. Dresner, S., Dunne, L., Clinch, P., & Beuermann, C. (2006). Social and political responses to ecological tax reform in Europe: An introduction to the special issue. Energy Policy, 34(8), 895–904.
13. Drews, S., & van den Bergh, J. C. J. M. (2015). What explains public support for climate policies: A review of empirical and experimental studies. Climate Policy, 16(7), 1–20.
14. Oates, W. E., & Portney, P. R. (2003). The political economy of environmental policy. In K.-G. Mäler & J. R. Vincent (Eds.), Handbook of environmental economics (pp. 325–354). Elsevier Science B.V.
15. Hammar, H., Löfgren, A., & Sterner, T. (2004). Political economy obstacles to fuel taxation. The Energy Journal, 25(3), 1–17.
16. van Asselt, H., & Brewer, T. (2010). Addressing competitiveness and leakage concerns in climate policy: An analysis of border adjustment measures in the US and the EU. Energy Policy, 38(1), 42–51.
17. Dechezleprêtre, A., & Sato, M. (2017). The impacts of environmental regulations on competitiveness. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 11(2), 183–206.
18. Neuhoff, K., Ancygier, A., Ponssardet, J., Quirion, P., Sartor, O., Sato, M., & Schopp, A. (2015). Modernization and innovation in the materials sector: Lessons from steel and cement. Berlin, Germany: Climate Strategies and DIW Berlin. Retrieved from http://climatestrategies.org/publication/modernization-and-innovation-in-thematerials-
sector-lessons-from-steel-and-cement/
19. Jagers, S. C., & Hammar, H. (2009). Environmental taxation for good and for bad: The efficiency and legitimacy of Sweden's carbon tax. Environmental Politics, 18(2), 218–237.
20. Alberini, A., Scasny, M., & Bigano, A. (2016). Policy vs individual heterogeneity in the benefits of climate change mitigation: Evidence from a stated-preference survey (FEEM Working Paper No. 80.2016). Milan, Italy: FEEM
21. Heres, D. R., Kallbekken, S., & Galarraga, I. (2015). The role of budgetary information in the preference for externality-correcting subsidies over taxes: A lab experiment on public support. Environmental and Resource Economics, 66(1), 1–15.
22. Carattini, S., Baranzini, A., & Lalive, R. (2018). Is taxing waste a waste of time? Evidence from a supreme court decision. Ecological Economics, 148, 131–151.
23. Odeck, J., & Bråthen, S. (2002). Toll financing in Norway: The success, the failures and perspectives for the future. Transport Policy, 9(3), 253–260.
24. Schuitema, G., Steg, L., & Forward, S. (2010). Explaining differences in acceptability before and acceptance after the implementation of a congestion charge in Stockholm. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 44(2), 99–109.
25. de Groot, J. I. M., & Schuitema, G. (2012). How to make the unpopular popular? Policy characteristics, social norms and the acceptability of environmental policies. Environmental Science and Policy, 19–20, 100–107.
26. Rosentrater, L. D., Sælensminde, I., Ekström, F., Böhm, G., Bostrom, A., Hanss, D., & O'Connor, R. E. (2012). Efficacy trade-offs in individuals' support for climate change policies. Environment and Behavior, 45(8), 935–970.
27. Steg, L., Dreijerink, L., & Abrahamse, W. (2006). Why are energy policies acceptable and effective? Environment and Behavior, 38(1), 92–111.
28. Baranzini, A., van den Bergh, J. C. J. M., Carattini, S., Howarth, R. B., Padilla, E., & Roca, J. (2017). Carbon pricing in climate policy: Seven reasons, complementary instruments, and political economy considerations. WIREs Climate Change, 8(4), 1–17.
29. Carattini, S., Baranzini, A., Thalmann, P., Varone, P., & Vöhringer, F. (2017). Green taxes in a post-Paris world: Are millions of nays inevitable? Environmental and Resource Economics, 68(1), 97–128.
30. Thalmann, P. (2004). The public acceptance of green taxes: 2 million voters express their opinion. Public Choice, 119, 179–217.
31. Spash, C. L., & Lo, A. Y. (2012). Australia's carbon tax: A sheep in wolf's clothing? The Economic and Labour Relations Review, 23(1), 67–86.
32. Klok, J., Larsen, A., Dahl, A., & Hansen, K. (2006). Ecological tax reform in Denmark: History and social acceptability. Energy Policy, 34(8), 905–916.
33. Hsu, S. L., Walters, J., & Purgas, A. (2008). Pollution tax heuristics: An empirical study of willingness to pay higher gasoline taxes. Energy Policy, 36(9), 3612–3619.
34. Kallbekken, S., & Aasen, M. (2010). The demand for earmarking: Results from a focus group study. Ecological Economics, 69(11), 2183–2190.
35. Kallbekken, S., & Sælen, H. (2011). Public acceptance for environmental taxes: Self-interest, environmental and distributional concerns. Energy Policy, 39(5), 2966–2973.
36. Beuermann, C., & Santarius, T. (2006). Ecological tax reform in Germany: Handling two hot potatoes at the same time. Energy Policy, 34(8), 917–929.
37. Dietz, T., Dan, A., & Shwom, R. (2007). Support for climate change policy: Social psychological and social structural influences. Rural Sociology, 72(2), 185–214. Doda, B. (2016). How to price carbon in good times ... and bad! WIREs Climate Change, 7(1), 135–144.
38. Hammar, H., & Jagers, S. C. (2006). Can trust in politicians explain individuals' support for climate policy? The case of CO2 tax. Climate Policy, 5(6), 613–625.
39. Andersson, J. (2015). Cars, carbon taxes and CO2 emissions (Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment Working Paper 212/Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy Working Paper 238). London, England: London School of Economics and Political Science.
40. Baranzini, A., & Carattini, S. (2014). Taxation of emissions of greenhouse gases: The environmental impacts of carbon taxes. In B. Freedman (Ed.), Global environmental change (pp. 543–560). Heidelberg, Germany and New York, NY: Springer.
41. Martin, R., de Preux, L. B., & Wagner, U. J. (2014). The impact of a carbon tax on manufacturing: Evidence from microdata. Journal of Public Economics, 117, 1–14.
42. Gough, I., Abdallah, S., Johnson, V., Ryan Collins, J., & Smith, C. (2012). The distribution of total greenhouse gas emissions by households in the UK, and some implications for social policy. London, England: Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion.
43. Speck, S. (1999). Energy and carbon taxes and their distributional implications. Energy Policy, 27(11), 659–667.
44. Sterner, T. (Ed.). (2011). Fuel taxes and the poor: The distributional effects of gasoline taxation and their implications for climate policy. Abingdon, England: Routledge.
45. Kallbekken, S., Kroll, S., & Cherry, T. L. (2011). Do you not like Pigou, or do you not understand him? Tax aversion and revenue recycling in the lab. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 62(1), 53–64.


Stefano Carattini, Maria Carvalho & Sam Fankhauser, 2018: “Overcoming public resistance to carbon taxes”. In: Stéphane Hallegatte, Mike Hulme (Eds.), WIREs Climate Change, Vol. 9/5, pages 1-26.

Fankhauser I
Samuel Fankhauser
Stefano Carattini
Maria Carvalho,
Overcoming public resistance to carbon taxes 2018

Carbon Taxation Stavins Stavins I 155
Carbon Taxation/Aldy/Stavins: In principle, the simplest approach to carbon pricing would be through government imposition of a carbon tax (Metcalf, 2007)(1). The government could set a tax in terms of dollars per ton of CO2 emissions (or CO2-equivalent on greenhouse gas emissions) by sources covered by the tax, or—more likely—a tax on the carbon content of the three fossil fuels (coal, petroleum, and natural gas) as they enter the economy. Over time, an efficient carbon tax would increase to reflect the fact that as more greenhouse gas emissions accumulate in the atmosphere, the greater is the incremental damage from one more ton of CO2. Imposing a carbon tax would provide certainty about the marginal cost of compliance, which reduces uncertainty about returns to investment decisions, but would leave uncertain economy-wide emission levels (Weitzman, 1974)(2). The government could apply the carbon tax at a variety of points in the product cycle of fossil fuels, from fossil fuel suppliers based on the carbon content of fuel sales (“upstream” taxation/regulation) to final emitters at the point of energy generation (“downstream” taxation/regulation). A carbon tax would be administratively simple and straightforward to implement in most industrialized countries, since the tax could incorporate existing methods for fuel-supply monitoring and reporting to the regulatory authority. Some developing countries with effective tax systems, including monitoring and enforcement regimes to minimize tax evasion, could also implement carbon taxes in a relatively straightforward manner.
Stavins I 156
The effects of a carbon tax on emission mitigation and the economy will depend in part on the amount and use of the tax revenue. The carbon tax revenue could be put toward a variety of uses (cf. >Carbon Taxation Strategies/Fankhauser). VsCarbon Taxation: The implementation of a carbon tax (or any other meaningful climate policy instrument) will increase the cost of consuming energy and could adversely affect the competitiveness of energy-intensive industries. This competitiveness effect can result in negative economic and environmental outcomes: firms may relocate facilities to countries without meaningful climate change policies, thereby increasing emissions in these new locations and offsetting some of the environmental benefits of the policy. Additional emission leakage may occur through international energy markets—as countries with climate policies reduce their consumption of fossil fuels and drive down fuel prices, those countries without emission mitigation policies increase their fuel consumption in response to the lower prices. Since leakage undermines the environmental effectiveness of any unilateral effort to mitigate emissions, international cooperation and coordination becomes all the more important. >Carbon Taxation/Geroe, >Carbon Taxation/Fankhauser, >Carbon Pricing/Stavins.


1. Metcalf, G. E. (2007). A proposal for a U.S. carbon tax swap (The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2007-12). Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
2. Weitzman, M. L. (1974). Prices vs. quantities. The Review of Economic Studies, 41(4), 477–491.


Robert N. Stavins & Joseph E. Aldy, 2012: “The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and
Experience”. In: Journal of Environment & Development, Vol. 21/2, pp. 152–180.

Stavins I
Robert N. Stavins
Joseph E. Aldy
The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience 2012

Carbon Taxation International Policies Stavins I 170
Carbon taxation/Carbon Tax/International Taxes/Harmonized Domestic Taxes/Carbon Pricing Coordination/International policies/Stavins: In principle, a carbon tax could be imposed on nation states by an international agency. The supporting agreement would have to specify both tax rates and a formula for allocating the tax revenues. Cost-effectiveness would require a uniform tax rate across all countries. It is unclear, however, what international agency could impose and enforce such a tax, and so an alternative more frequently considered has been a set of harmonized domestic carbon taxes (Cooper, 2010)(1). In this case, an agreement would stipulate that all countries are to levy the same domestic carbon taxes and retain their revenues. But some developing countries may argue that the resulting distribution of costs does not conform to principles of distributional equity and call for significant resource transfers. Under a harmonized tax system, an agreement could include fixed lump-sum payments from developed to developing countries, and under an international tax system, an agreement could specify shares of the total international tax revenues that go to participating countries. As an alternative to these explicit transfers, developed countries could commit to constrain the use of their tax revenues in ways that produce global benefits. In some developing countries reluctant to implement a carbon tax, an initial cost-effective contribution to combat climate change could take the form of reducing fossil fuel subsidies.
Stavins I 171
Lowering energy subsidies can free up government revenues that could be directed to other beneficial uses and improve the allocation of resources in the economy to promote faster economic growth. >Carbon Pricing Coordination/Stavins.


1. Cooper, R. N. (2010). The case for charges on greenhouse gas emissions. In J. E. Aldy & R. N. Stavins (Eds.), Post-Kyoto international climate policy: Implementing architectures for agreement (pp. 151-178). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.


Robert N. Stavins & Joseph E. Aldy, 2012: “The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and
Experience”. In: Journal of Environment & Development, Vol. 21/2, pp. 152–180.


Stavins I
Robert N. Stavins
Joseph E. Aldy
The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience 2012
Carbon Taxation Strategies Fankhauser Fankhauser I 6
Carbon Taxation Strategies /Carattini/Carvalho/Fankhauser: Another defining feature of a carbon tax is how its revenues are proposed to be spent. The literature has explored three revenue recycling strategies in particular: the earmarking of revenues to support emission reduction projects, the redistribution of revenues to achieve a fairer (less fiscally regressive) outcome, and the reduction of other taxes to achieve a revenue-neutral outcome. Using tax revenues for additional emissions reduction reassures voters that the tax will be effective and the environmental objective will be met (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017(1); Kallbekken et al., 2011(2); Sælen & Kallbekken, 2011(3)). 1. Earmarking proceeds: The attractiveness of earmarking carbon tax revenues has been established in a range of contexts (cf. Baranzini & Carattini, 2017(1); Beuermann & Santarius, 2006(4); Bristow, Wardman, Zannia, & Chintakayalab, 2010(5); Carattini et al., 2017(6); Clinch & Dunne, 2006(7); Deroubaix & Lévèque, 2006(8); Dresner, Jackson, & Gilbert, 2006(9); Gevrek & Uyduranoglu, 2015(10); Kallbekken & Aasen, 2010(11); Kallbekken & Sælen, 2011(3); Klok et al., 2006(12); Thalmann, 2004(13)). The interest in earmarking reflects two voter concerns. The first is a lack of trust in government [.] The second concern is doubt about the effectiveness of carbon taxes (…). Earmarking signals to the public that efforts are being made to make low-carbon options both technologically and commercially more viable and so will reduce the personal cost of changing behavior (Kallbekken & Aasen, 2010)(11). Earmarking is also seen as a potential solution to a perceived underinvestment in low-carbon research and development. It should, however, be noted that earmarking revenues for environmental purposes may not be a universal solution. A Swedish survey conducted by Jagers and Hammar (2009)(14) showed that respondents were unwilling to increase carbon tax rates, as they felt the carbon taxes they paid on transport fuels were high enough already. Respondents preferred alternative
Fankhauser I 7
such as decreasing taxes on clean energy sources, expanding public transport, and increasing information campaigns about vehicles' contribution to climate change. Additional evidence suggests that preferences for revenue recycling may be context dependent. Carattini et al. (2017)(6) found that providing information about the environmental effectiveness of different carbon tax designs reduces the preference for environmental earmarking. 2. Compensating low-income households: Several strategies have been put forward in the literature to address potential adverse distributional effects of a carbon tax, including in the influential perspectives of Speck (1999)(15), Baranzini, Goldemberg, and Speck (2000)(16), and Metcalf (2009)(17). [There are two main options on compensation:] compensation via lump-sum transfers and social cushioning.
Fankhauser I 8
(…) when there is a clear trade-off in the use of revenues between environmental earmarking and socially progressive redistribution forms, people tend to prefer to use revenues for environmental earmarking (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017(1); Sælen & Kallbekken, 2011(3)). In the study by Carattini et al. (2017)(6), the most favored options for using revenue were redistribution through lump-sum transfers, and social cushioning. 3. Cutting other taxes and secur[ing …] full or partial revenue neutrality: Empirical studies show that cutting other taxes is the least popular redistribution strategy among the public (Beuermann & Santarius, 2006(4); Dresner, Jackson, & Gilbert, 2006(9); Klok et al., 2006(12); Thalmann, 2004(13)). This is in contrast to many economists, for whom using tax revenues to reduce distortionary taxes is the ideal solution. By using carbon tax revenues levied on “bads,” such as greenhouse gas emissions, to reduce distortionary taxes on labor, profits, or consumption, which discourage desirable activities, one can hope to achieve higher economic output on top of emissions abatement, and so obtain a “double dividend” (cf. Goulder, 1995)(18). One reason for public opposition is that voters do not necessarily buy into the logic behind the double dividend. They perceive these to be separate problems requiring separate solutions. Another reason for public opposition is a lack of trust in politicians and fiscal authorities (Hammar & Jagers, 2006)(19). Once the policy is implemented, governments could use information devices to increase the visibility of the tax shift. Compensation can be made visible by displaying the amount of income that is rebated on payslips, tax slips, or in contributions to social insurance (Clinch, Dunne, & Dresner, 2006(20); Dresner, Dunne, et al., 2006(21); Hsu et al. 2008(22)).
Below we [Carattini, Carvalho, Fankhauser] offer some concrete design options that appear particularly promising to increase public support.
Fankhauser I 9
1. Phasing in carbon taxes over time: By phasing in carbon taxes gradually, policymakers can take advantage of the fact that aversion tends to abate once people have experienced a policy. A slow ramp-up, or even a trial period, provides individuals with the opportunity to gauge the costs and benefits of the tax. Taxes can then be raised progressively until they reach the level required to meet the environmental objective. Note that this may imply renouncing to allowing the carbon tax rate to fluctuate depending on the business cycle, although this type of flexibility might be welfare improving (cf. Doda, 2016)(23). The risk with this strategy is that carbon taxes may be frozen at a level that is not sufficient to achieve their intended objectives. There are two potential, and complementary, solutions to overcome this risk. The first solution relies on societal learning. The second solution uses commitment devices. 2. Earmarking tax revenues for additional climate change mitigation: Voters have a preference for earmarking tax revenues and using the proceeds for additional greenhouse gas emissions reductions. They are particularly keen on support for low-carbon research and development, along with subsidies to promote deployment. The demand for environmental earmarking may decrease over time as people observe the impact of the tax and update their beliefs. Governments can again support this process by providing effective information about emissions trends, the distributional effects of the tax, and any ancillary benefits. Revenues may then be freed up gradually to address other sources of voter aversion, or to obtain economic gains. Tapering the degree of earmarking can also allay a government's concerns about fiscal management.
3. Redistributing taxes to improve fairness: Carbon taxes can be made more acceptable if tax revenues are used to address important societal concerns.
Fankhauser I 10
While the objective of a carbon tax is to address the climate externality, and not to address the issue of raising inequalities, there may still be the expectation that carbon taxes are designed in a way that at least does not lead to a more unequal distribution. Carbon taxes can be designed to be both revenue neutral and progressive through lump-sum transfers and social cushioning measures to reduce costs for low-income households. Some voters may, however, be suspicious about a government's long-term commitment to redistribution. To allay those fears, governments can use commitment devices, such as explicit plans on how revenues are to be redistributed. 4. Information sharing and communication: A final suggestion applies to all efforts to implement a carbon tax, regardless of the use of revenues, or level of stringency. As soon as policymakers start considering the design of a carbon tax, they should provide detailed information (obtained through analysis and perhaps model simulations) to navigate the process of public consultations and to pre-emptively address voter concerns. This disclosure would ideally occur before voters are called to a ballot, or before lawmakers consider a carbon tax bill in the parliament.
Fankhauser I 11
Communication efforts need to continue once the policy is implemented. Because the effects of carbon taxes are often not visible, governments are encouraged to measure their effects regularly and inform their citizens about them transparently. Communication strategies may need to be adapted to the beliefs and worldviews of the targeted population (Cherry et al., 2017)(24), and also take into account the potential implications of political polarization and bipartisan divides (Hart & Nisbet, 2012(25); Kahan et al., 2011(26)).

1. Baranzini, A., & Carattini, S. (2017). Effectiveness, earmarking and labeling: Testing the acceptability of carbon taxes with survey data. Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 19(1), 197–227.
2. Kallbekken, S., Kroll, S., & Cherry, T. L. (2011). Do you not like Pigou, or do you not understand him? Tax aversion and revenue recycling in the lab. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 62(1), 53–64.
3. Sælen, H., & Kallbekken, S. (2011). A choice experiment on fuel taxation and earmarking in Norway. Ecological Economics, 70(11), 2181–2190.
4. Beuermann, C., & Santarius, T. (2006). Ecological tax reform in Germany: Handling two hot potatoes at the same time. Energy Policy, 34(8), 917–929.
5. Bristow, A. L., Wardman, M., Zannia, A. M., & Chintakayalab, P. K. (2010). Public acceptability of personal carbon trading and carbon tax. Ecological Economics, 69(9), 1824–1837.
6. Carattini, S., Baranzini, A., Thalmann, P., Varone, P., & Vöhringer, F. (2017). Green taxes in a post-Paris world: Are millions of nays inevitable? Environmental and Resource Economics, 68(1), 97–128.
7. Clinch, J. P., & Dunne, L. (2006). Environmental tax reform: An assessment of social responses in Ireland. Energy Policy, 34(8), 950–959.
8. Deroubaix, J.-F., & Lévèque, F. (2006). The rise and fall of French ecological tax reform: Social acceptability versus political feasibility in the energy tax implementation process. Energy Policy, 34, 940–949.
9. Dresner, S., Jackson, T., & Gilbert, N. (2006). History and social responses to environmental tax reform in the United Kingdom. Energy Policy, 34(8), 930–939.
10. Gevrek, Z. E., & Uyduranoglu, A. (2015). Public preferences for carbon tax attributes. Ecological Economics, 118, 186–197.
11. Kallbekken, S., & Aasen, M. (2010). The demand for earmarking: Results from a focus group study. Ecological Economics, 69(11), 2183–2190.
12. Klok, J., Larsen, A., Dahl, A., & Hansen, K. (2006). Ecological tax reform in Denmark: History and social acceptability. Energy Policy, 34(8), 905–916.
13. Thalmann, P. (2004). The public acceptance of green taxes: 2 million voters express their opinion. Public Choice, 119, 179–217.
14. Jagers, S. C., & Hammar, H. (2009). Environmental taxation for good and for bad: The efficiency and legitimacy of Sweden's carbon tax. Environmental Politics, 18(2), 218–237.
15. Speck, S. (1999). Energy and carbon taxes and their distributional implications. Energy Policy, 27(11), 659–667.
16. Baranzini, A., Goldemberg, J., & Speck, S. (2000). A future for carbon taxes. Ecological Economics, 32(3), 395–412.
17. Metcalf, G. E. (2009). Designing a carbon tax to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 3(1), 63–83.
18. Goulder, L. H. (1995). Environmental taxation and the double dividend: A reader's guide. International Tax and Public Finance, 2(2), 157–183.
19. Hammar, H., & Jagers, S. C. (2006). Can trust in politicians explain individuals' support for climate policy? The case of CO2 tax. Climate Policy, 5(6), 613–625.
20. Clinch, J. P., Dunne, L., & Dresner, S. (2006). Environmental and wider implications of political impediments to environmental tax reform. Energy Policy, 34(8), 960–970.
21. Dresner, S., Dunne, L., Clinch, P., & Beuermann, C. (2006). Social and political responses to ecological tax reform in Europe: An introduction to the special issue. Energy Policy, 34(8), 895–904.
22. Hsu, S. L., Walters, J., & Purgas, A. (2008). Pollution tax heuristics: An empirical study of willingness to pay higher gasoline taxes. Energy Policy, 36(9), 3612–3619.
23. Doda, B. (2016). How to price carbon in good times ... and bad! WIREs Climate Change, 7(1), 135–144.
24. Cherry, T. L., Kallbekken, S., & Kroll, S. (2017). Accepting market failure: Cultural worldviews and the opposition to corrective environmental policies. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 85, 193–204.
25. Hart, P. S., & Nisbet, E. C. (2012). Boomerang effects in science communication: How motivated reasoning and identity cues amplify opinion polarization about climate mitigation policies. Communication Research, 39(6), 701–723.
26. Kahan, D., Wittlin, M., Peters, E., Slovic, P., Ouellette, L., Braman, D., & Mandel, G. (2011). The tragedy of the risk-perception commons: Culture conflict, rationality conflict, and climate change (SSRN Scholarly Paper). Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network.


Stefano Carattini, Maria Carvalho & Sam Fankhauser, 2018: “Overcoming public resistance to carbon taxes”. In: Stéphane Hallegatte, Mike Hulme (Eds.), WIREs Climate Change, Vol. 9/5, pages 1-26.

Fankhauser I
Samuel Fankhauser
Stefano Carattini
Maria Carvalho,
Overcoming public resistance to carbon taxes 2018

Causal Laws Cartwright I 10
Asymmetry: causal laws are asymmetrical: cause and effect cannot be interchanged. - By contrast, symmetrical: Laws of Association/Hume: E.g. length of the shadow/height of the mast. - Fraassen: Thesis: asymmetries by explanation are not real. - There is no fact about what explains what. - CartwrightVsFraassen - Association/CartwrightVsHume: not sufficient E.g. malaria control: for distinguishing effective from ineffective strategies.
I 30
Causal Law/Causal Explanation/Cartwright: causal laws are not transitive - i.e. the causal chain does not have to be determined by a single causal law.
I 32
Causal Law/Cartwright: something that is always the case ((s) universal occurrence, universal fact, "permanence") cannot be consequent of a causal law. - ((s) this is a convention). - Alternatively: universal fact: Alternatively, it could be said that everything is the cause of a universal fact. - ((s) Def Universal Fact/Cartwright/(s): probability = 1.).
I 36
Causal Laws/Cartwright: the reason why we need them for the characterization of effectiveness is that they pick out the right properties to which we apply our conditions.
I 43
Effective Strategy/Cartwright: can only be found with assumption of causal laws. - Partition: the right one is the one that is determined by which causal laws exist - without causal laws it is impossible to pick out the right factors.

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983

CartwrightR I
R. Cartwright
A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

CartwrightR II
R. Cartwright
Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954

Clean Energy Standards Stavins Stavins I 159
Clean Energy Standards/Aldy/Stavins: The purpose of a clean energy standard is to establish a technology-oriented goal for the electricity sector that can be implemented cost-effectively (Aldy, 2011)(1). Under such standards, power plants generating electricity with technologies that satisfy the standard create tradable credits that they can sell to power plants that fail to meet the standard, thereby minimizing the costs of meeting the standard’s goal in a manner analogous to cap-and-trade.
Stavins I 160
VsClean Energy Standards: Clean energy standards that focus on technology targets do not explicitly price the greenhouse gas externality and thus impose a higher cost for a given amount of emission reductions than a carbon tax or cap-and-trade program. A renewable mandate treats coal-fired power, gas-fired power, and nuclear power as equivalent—none of these technologies create credits necessary for compliance—despite the fact that a natural gas combined cycle power plant typically produces a unit of generation with half the CO2 emissions of a conventional coal power plant, and a nuclear plant produces zero-emission power, as do wind, solar, and geothermal. Thus, mandating power from a limited portfolio of technologies can result in higher costs by providing no incentive to switch from emission-intensive coal to emission-lean gas or emission-free nuclear. 1. Clean Energy Standards/VsVs: A more cost-effective approach to a clean energy standard would employ a technology-neutral performance standard, such as tons of CO2 per megawatt hour of generation. All power sources, from fossil fuels to renewables, could be eligible under such a performance standard. This has the advantage over the portfolio approach of providing better innovation incentives and of enabling all possible ways of reducing the emissions intensity of power generation. Tradable credits promote cost-effectiveness by encouraging the greatest deployment of clean energy from those plants that can lower their emission intensity at lowest cost. Those power plants could then sell their extra credits to other power plants that face higher costs for deploying clean energy. The creation and sale of clean energy credits would provide a revenue stream that could conceivably enable the financing of low- and zero-emission power plant projects.
2. Clean Energy Standards/VsVs: Extending the price on carbon to a broader set of activities could improve cost-effectiveness, but allowing for energy efficiency and other offsets poses risks. As emphasized above, estimating offsets is complex, requires extensive review and monitoring by third parties or regulatory agencies, and risks undermining the objective of a policy because of the
additionality problem.
Stavins I 161
A clean energy standard represents a de facto free allocation of the right to emit greenhouse gases to the power sector. Suppose that the U.S. government created a clean energy performance standard of 0.5 tons of CO2 per megawatt hour (…) this is roughly comparable to a 50% clean energy standard that allows all technologies with lower emission intensity than conventional coal to qualify (…). As a result, a clean energy standard could not generate the revenues that a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade program with an allowance auction could. >Carbon Pricing Strategies/Stavins.


1. Aldy, J. E. (2011). Promoting clean energy in the American power sector (The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2011-04). Washington, DC: The Hamilton Project.



Robert N. Stavins & Joseph E. Aldy, 2012: “The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and
Experience”. In: Journal of Environment & Development, Vol. 21/2, pp. 152–180.

Stavins I
Robert N. Stavins
Joseph E. Aldy
The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience 2012

Command and Control Stavins Stavins I 154
Command-and-Control Regulations/Aldy/Stavins: command-and-control regulatory standards are either technology based or performance based. Technology-based standards typically require the use of specified equipment, processes, or procedures. In the climate policy context, these could require firms to use particular types of energy-efficient motors, combustion processes, or landfill-gas collection technologies. Performance-based standards are more flexible than technology-based standards, specifying allowable levels of pollutant emissions or allowable emission rates, but leaving the specific methods of achieving those levels up to regulated entities. VsCommand-and-Control: (…) given the ubiquitous nature of greenhouse gas emissions from diverse sources in an economy, it is unlikely that technology or ordinary performance standards could form the centerpiece of a meaningful climate policy. Furthermore, these command-and-control mechanisms lead to non-cost-effective outcomes in which some firms use unduly expensive means to control pollution. Beyond considerations of static cost-effectiveness, conventional standards would not provide dynamic incentives for the development, adoption, and diffusion of environmentally and economically superior control technologies. Once a firm satisfies a performance standard, it has little incentive to develop or adopt cleaner technology.
The key limitations of command-and-control regulations can be avoided through the use of market-based policy instruments. In the context of climate change, this essentially means carbon pricing.
>Carbon Pricing Policy Instruments/Stavins.


Robert N. Stavins & Joseph E. Aldy, 2012: “The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and
Experience”. In: Journal of Environment & Development, Vol. 21/2, pp. 152–180.

Stavins I
Robert N. Stavins
Joseph E. Aldy
The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience 2012

Computation Pauen Pauen I 147f
Computation / Fodor: in binary symbols semantic and physical properties are connected.
I 148
The differences of meaning of "0" and "1" correspond to physical differences between the switching states - you have to imagine the effectiveness of significant states in a human cognitive system just like that.

Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001

Consensus Deliberative Democracy Gaus I 160
Consensus/Deliberative democracy/Bohman: for some proponents of deliberative democracy, a strong distinction between reasoned argumentation and mere discussion provides the basis for the claim that deliberation must be oriented to consensus (Habermas, 1996(1); Cohen, 1997(2)). Deliberation is not merely discourse or dialogue, Cohen argues, because it must be 'reasoned', that is based on 'public argument and reasoning among equal citizens' that yield the single best answer (1997(2): 74).
VsHabermas/VsCohen: Critics often charge that both of these claims are exclusionary and lead to undemocratic consequences under the
Gaus I 161
circumstance of background injustice and pervasive inequalities. It might seem that an orientation to consensus is not a requirement of deliberation, even if it may function as a regulative ideal. Deliberation must at least resemble argumentation to the extent that it is a matter of giving and asking for reasons. The reasons that make a decision acceptable ought to be distinguished from modes by which they are communicated. Democratic standards demanded for decisions need not apply to the medium of communication as such, and not all formal public spheres need to be ideally inclusive. This means that formal theories of communication and rationality cannot decide in advance precisely what modes and forms of communication are empirically appropriate in various settings. >Deliberative democracy/Dryzek, cf. >Argumentation/Crosswhite.
Gaus I 161
Bohman: (...) disagreement is precisely what makes democratic deliberation not only necessary, but also fruitful and productive when tested through the variety of perspectives typical of a diverse and pluralistic audience. Argumentative discourse need not presuppose unanimity, or seek consensus, but rather places conflicts within a mutually constructed space of reasons. >Argumentation/Crosswhite. This fact of disagreement raises the issue of whether or not public deliberation is 'oriented to con-
sensus'. Consensus is meant here to contrast with mere aggregation of preferences in voting and with bargaining or compromise. Certainly, if democracy were only voting and bargaining, it would lack the self-critical testing and responsiveness of reason giving and discourse; the problems of the tyranny of the majority and aggregation problems of social choice would undermine the effectiveness of
Gaus I 162
Democracy and its claims to ligitimacy. >Consensus/Discourse theories.

1. Habermas, Jürgen (1996) Between Facts and Norms. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
2. Cohen, Joshua (1997) 'Deliberation and democratic legitimacy'. In J. Bohman and W. Rehg, eds, Deliberative Democracy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Bohman, James 2004. „Discourse Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Cultural Differences Jensen Slater I 122
Cultural differences/intelligence/skills/capacities/Jensen: Jensen (1969)(1) addressed issues related to SES (socioeconomic status) more generally as well as race. He evaluated the effectiveness of the intervention programs that had been implemented at that time ((s) e.g., the Head Start Program in the United States 1964(2)), accurately reporting the basic observation that those programs showed gains in IQ test scores in the short-run, sometimes substantially so, but the gains tended to fade and within a couple years generally had faded to nonsignificance. [Jensen] raised many fascinating questions about why this might be the case. He concluded that it was probably impractical to try to raise IQ scores; educators would have more success simply teaching basic skills rather than trying to encourage cognitive development. >Intelligence/Jensen, >Intelligence tests/Jensen, >Heritability/Jensen, >Racism/Jensen.
Slater I 123
Cultural differences/Jensen: Thesis: the differences arose because there were different genetic influences on associative learning abilities and the kinds of abilities tapped by IQ tests, which he termed „higher reasoning“. >Genetic variation/Jensen. Solution/Jensen: Given this, he suggested that education for the culturally disadvantaged should be tailored to what he claimed were their inherently more limited abilities.


1. Jensen, A. R. (1969). How much can we boost IQ and scholastic achievement? Harvard Educational Review, 3, 1–123.
2. For the history of Head start see: https://www.acf.hhs.gov/ohs/about/history-of-head-start



Wendy Johnson: „How Much Can We Boost IQ? Updated Look at Jensen’s (1969) Question and Answer“, in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications


Slater I
Alan M. Slater
Paul C. Quinn
Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Demand for Money Tobin Mause I 225
Demand for Money/Keynesianism/Tobin: The Keynesian theory of money demand in the tradition of James Tobin(1) largely takes up the considerations of monetarist theory.
(Economic policy/Monetarism: Thesis: All economic policy interventions are (...) assessed on the extent to which they influence the overall economic interest rate level. An expansive monetary policy initially causes interest rate cuts (liquidity effect) and thus considerable effects on the goods markets in the form of volume and price adjustments.
Tobin: Thesis: Market participants have a wealth of different investment opportunities for their assets. However, the portfolio theoretical transmission process calls into question the high substitutability between the individual asset classes. (...) This restricts the effectiveness of monetary policy.


1. James Tobin, “The Interest Elasticity of the Transactions Demand for Cash”. Review of Economics and Statistics. 38 (3), 1956, S. 241– 247.

EconTobin I
James Tobin
The Interest Elasticity of the Transactions Demand for Cash 1956


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Discourse Habermas III 40
Discourse/theoretical/practical/Habermas: I myself have a tendency to adopt a cognitivist position, according to which practical questions can basically be decided on an argumentative basis. However, this position can only be defended in a promising way if we do not hastily assimilate practical discourses, which have an internal reference and interpreted needs of the persons concerned, into theoretical discourses with their relation to the interpreted experiences of an observer.
III 41
Arguments used to justify value standards do not meet the requirements of discourses. In the prototypical case they have the form of aesthetic criticism. (See also Culture/Habermas)
III 45
Theoretical discourse: cognitive-instrumental - it is about the truth of propositions and the effectiveness of teleological actions Practical discourse: moral-practical - it is about the correctness of actions
Aesthetic critique: evaluative - it is about the appropriateness of value standards
Therapeutic critique: expressive - it is about the truthfulness of expressions
Explicative discourse: - this is about the comprehensibility or well-formedness of symbolic constructs.
III 71
Definition Discourse/Habermas: I only speak of discourses when the meaning of the problematic claim to validity forces the participants conceptually to assume that a rational, motivated agreement could basically be achieved, whereby "basically" expresses the idealizing reservation: if the argumentation could only be led openly enough and continued for long enough. (1)

1. Das geht auf Ch. S. Peirce zurück. Vgl. dazu H. Scheit, Studien zur Konsensustheorie der Wahrheit, Habilitationsschrift Universität München, 1981.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981

Effect Habermas III 26
Effect/Action/Habermas: The effectiveness of an action is in an internal relationship to the truth of the conditional prognoses which is implied by the action plan or rule of action.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981

Efficiency Economic Theories Mause I 420
Efficiency/Economic Theory: Different types of efficiency are distinguished in connection with the question of state intervention in environmental policy. Ecological effectiveness: Accuracy in achieving specified environmental goals (volume targets)
Static efficiency: Achieving an environmental goal at the lowest overall economic cost.
Dynamic efficiency: Incentive for the improvement of given damage avoidance technologies of an instrument. (1)(2)(3)


1. Alfred Endress, Ujmweltökonomie, Stuttgart, 2000, Sp105f
2. Michaelis, Peter. Ökonomische Instrumente in der Umweltpolitik. Eine anwendungsorientierte Einführung. Heidelberg 1996.
3. Hartwig, Karl-Hans, Umweltökonomie. In Vahlens Kompendium der Wirtschaftstheorie und Wirtschaftspolitik, ed. Dieter Bender, Hartmut Berg, Dieter Cassel, Günter Gabisch, Karl-Hans Hartwig, Lothar Hübl, Dietmar Kath, Rolf Peffekoven, Jürgen Siebke, H. Jörg Thieme und Manfred Willms, Vol. 2, 5. Aufl., 122– 162. München 1992.


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Emission Permits Stavins Stavins I 171
International Tradable Permits/Carbon Pricing Coordination/Stavins: Under an international tradable permit scheme, all participating countries would be allocated permits for “net emissions,” that is, emissions minus sequestration. A permit would define a right to emit a given volume over some time period, such as a year. In each period, countries would be free to buy and sell permits on an international exchange. Initial permit allocations could reflect a variety of criteria, such as previous emissions, gross domestic product, population, and fossil fuel production. Whatever the initial allocation, subsequent trading can, in theory, lead to a cost-effective outcome (Montgomery, 1972)(1), if transaction costs are not significant (Stavins, 1995)(2). This potential for pursuing distributional objectives while assuring cost-effectiveness is an important attribute of the tradable permit approach. From a distributional point of view, developing countries would receive compensation, whereas developed countries would have to pay for their own emission abatement and for permit purchases from abroad to cover the balance of their emissions (Olmstead & Stavins, 2012)(3). An important obstacle to the successful operation of such a system is that by its very nature, the trading would be among nations (Hahn & Stavins, 1999)(4). Nation states are hardly simple cost-minimizers, like private firms, so there is no reason to anticipate that competitive pressures would lead to equating of marginal abatement costs across countries. Even if nations were cost-minimizers, they do not have sufficient information about the marginal abatement costs of firms within their jurisdiction to define their own aggregate marginal costs. If every country participating in such a system were to devolve the tradable permits to firms within its jurisdiction, that is, if each country instituted a domestic tradable permit system as its means of achieving its national target, then the trading could be among firms, not governments, both within countries and internationally (Hahn & Stavins, 1999)(4). Such a system could indeed be cost-effective. In the near term, this
Stavins I 172
trading system could be integrated with an emission-reduction-credit system, such as the CDM [Clean Development Mechanism], for countries that do not take on emission caps. >Carbon Pricing Coordination/Stavins.


1. Montgomery, D. W. (1972). Markets in licenses and efficient pollution control programs. Journal of Economic Theory, 5, 395-418.
2. Stavins, R. N. (1995). Transaction costs and tradeable permits. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 29, 133-148.
3. Olmstead, S. M., & Stavins, R. N. (2012). Three key elements of post-2012 international climate policy architecture. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 6(2), 1-22.
4. Hahn, R. W., & Stavins, R. N. (1999). What has the Kyoto Protocol wrought? The real architecture of international tradeable permit markets. Washington, DC: The AEI Press.



Robert N. Stavins & Joseph E. Aldy, 2012: “The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and
Experience”. In: Journal of Environment & Development, Vol. 21/2, pp. 152–180.

Stavins I
Robert N. Stavins
Joseph E. Aldy
The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience 2012

Emotion System Gray Corr I 358
Emotion System/Gray: reduction of pathological emotions can be achieved in one of two ways: (a) deconditioning aversive reinforcing stimuli, which weakens the strength of stimulus inputs into the innate emotion systems; or
(b) by dampening down the activity in the systems themselves (e.g., by the use of drugs that target key molecules in parts of the innate system).
We may see the effectiveness of cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) as another way to ‘decondition’ the power of hitherto aversive stimuli to activate the emotion systems (e.g., by restructuring ‘irrational’ cognitions that serve as inputs into these systems) Gray 1970)(1). >GrayVsEysenck, >Conditioning/Gray, >Emotion/Gray.



1. Gray, J. A. 1970. The psychophysiological basis of Introversion–Extraversion, Behaviour Research and Therapy 8: 249–66


Philip J. Corr, „ The Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory of Personality“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Environmental Protection Public Choice Mause I 424
Environmental Protection/New Political Economy/Public Choice: From the perspective of the New Political Economy (Schneider and Kirchgässner 2005 (1); Holzinger 1987 (2)), politicians should prefer regulatory measures because they suggest a high degree of effectiveness. These measures, because of their direct impact, can be well communicated to voters as a symbol of an active environmental policy, while the costs of environmental protection are often not directly clear and can be better concealed from the majority of voters (Benkert 1993 (3)).

1. Schneider, Friedrich, und Gebhard Kirchgässner.Zur Politischen Ökonomie der Umweltpolitik: Hat die Politikberatung etwas bewirkt? Einige Überlegungen aus der Perspektive der Neuen Politischen Ökonomie. In Umweltpolitik und umweltökonomische Politikberatung in Deutschland, Hrsg. Bernd Hansjürgens und Frank Wätzold, 84– 111. Berlin 2005.
2. Holzinger, Katharina. 1987. Umweltpolitische Instrumente aus Sicht der staatlichen Bürokratie. Versuch einer Anwendung der ökonomischen Theorie der Bürokratie. München: ifo-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung.
3. Benkert, Wolfgang, Warum sind Umweltabgaben ebenso populär wie selten? Ein Beitrag zur Theorie der umwelt- und finanzpolitischen Willensbildung. In Umweltpolitik mit hoheitlichen Zwangsabgaben? Hrsg. Klaus Mackscheidt, Dieter Ewringmann und Erik Gawel, 47– 58. Marburg 1993.


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Equality Weale Gaus I 217
Equality/democracy/efficiency/welfare state/Weale/Moon: (...) the commitment to equality can sometimes sit uneasily with the commitment to democracy. Consider, for example, Albert Weale's argument for earnings-related welfare state schemes, such as social security in the US. Weale argues that such schemes increase the total volume of government transfers, thus leading to greater 'egalitarian effectiveness'. Weale explains this egalitarian effectiveness in part as follows: ‚Of course, there is no necessary incentive to redistribute savings in the public earnings-related system, but equally there is little practical opportunity to resist any modest redistribution that managers of the public scheme determine. Denied the 'exit' option of shopping around, the typical citizen is confronted merely with the costly 'voice' option of changing the terms of the public
scheme. Since people are often highly ignorant of the details of pension schemes, participation to change their terms is extremely costly.‘ (1990(1): 481)
Moon: In short, because democratic control is difficult, popular opposition to redistribution will be ineffective, allowing elites to achieve greater 'egalitarian effectiveness' than citizens would be willing to support directly. >Equal opportunities/welfare economics.


1. Weale, Albert (1990) 'Equality, social solidarity, and the welfare state'. Ethics, 100: 473—88.

Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Foreign Aid Acemoglu Acemoglu I 452
Foreign aid/Acemoglu/Robinson: (...) foreign aid is one of the most popular policies that Western governments, international organizations such as the United Nations, and NGOs of different ilk recommend as a way of combating poverty around the world. And of course, the cycle of the failure of foreign aid repeats itself over and over again. The idea that rich Western countries should provide large amounts of “developmental aid” in order to solve the problem of poverty in sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean, Central America, and South Asia is based on an incorrect understanding of what causes poverty. Institutions: Countries such as Afghanistan are poor because of their extractive institutions - which result in lack of property rights, law and order, or well-functioning legal systems and the stifling dominance of national and, more often, local elites over political and economic life. >Institutions/Acemoglu, >Terminology/Acemoglu.
The same institutional problems mean that foreign aid will be ineffective, as it will be plundered and is unlikely to be delivered where it is supposed to go. In the worst-case scenario, it will prop up the regimes that are at the very root of the problems of these societies. If sustained economic
Acemoglu I 453
growth depends on inclusive institutions, giving aid to regimes presiding over extractive institutions cannot be the solution. Conditional aid: One solution (...)is to make aid “conditional.” According to this view, continued foreign aid should depend on recipient governments meeting certain conditions—for example, liberalizing markets or moving toward democracy. The George W. Bush administration undertook the biggest step toward this type of conditional aid by starting the Millennium Challenge Accounts, which made future aid payments dependent on quantitative improvements in several dimensions of economic and political development.
VsConditional aid: (...) the effectiveness of conditional aid appears no better than the unconditional kind. Countries failing to meet these conditions typically receive as much aid as those that do. There is a simple reason: they have a greater need for aid of either the developmental or humanitarian kind.
Acemoglu/Robinson: 1) foreign aid is not a very effective means of dealing with the failure of nations around the world today. Countries need inclusive economic and political institutions to break out of the cycle of poverty. Foreign aid can typically do little in this respect (...). >Institutions/Acemoglu.
2) since the development of inclusive economic and political institutions is key, using the existing flows of foreign aid at least in part to facilitate such development would be useful. (...) perhaps structuring foreign aid so that its use and administration bring groups and leaders otherwise excluded from power into the decision-making process and empowering a broad segment of population might be a better prospect [than conditional aid].
Acemoglu I 460
Empowerment: what can be done to kick-start or perhaps just facilitate the process of empowerment and thus the development of inclusive political institutions? The honest answer of course is that there is no recipe for building such institutions. Naturally there are some obvious factors that would make the process of empowerment more likely to get off the ground. These would include the presence of some degree of centralized order so that social movements challenging existing regimes do not immediately descend into lawlessness; some preexisting political institutions that introduce a modicum of pluralism, such as the traditional political institutions in Botswana, so that broad coalitions can form and endure; and the presence of civil society institutions that can coordinate the demands of the population so that opposition movements can neither be easily crushed by the current elites nor inevitably turn into a vehicle for another group to take control of existing extractive institutions. But many of these factors are historically predetermined and change only slowly. See also Reinikka and Svensson (2004) and Easterly (2006) on problems of foreign aid.(1)

1.Reinikka, Ritva, and Jacob Svensson (2004). “Local Capture: Evidence from a Central Government Transfer Program in Uganda.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119: 679–705.

Acemoglu II
James A. Acemoglu
James A. Robinson
Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy Cambridge 2006

Acemoglu I
James A. Acemoglu
James A. Robinson
Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012

Foreign Aid Robinson Acemoglu I 452
Foreign aid/Acemoglu/Robinson: (...) foreign aid is one of the most popular policies that Western governments, international organizations such as the United Nations, and NGOs of different ilk recommend as a way of combating poverty around the world. And of course, the cycle of the failure of foreign aid repeats itself over and over again. The idea that rich Western countries should provide large amounts of “developmental aid” in order to solve the problem of poverty in sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean, Central America, and South Asia is based on an incorrect understanding of what causes poverty. Institutions: Countries such as Afghanistan are poor because of their extractive institutions - which result in lack of property rights, law and order, or well-functioning legal systems and the stifling dominance of national and, more often, local elites over political and economic life. >Institutions/Acemoglu, >Terminology/Acemoglu.
The same institutional problems mean that foreign aid will be ineffective, as it will be plundered and is unlikely to be delivered where it is supposed to go. In the worst-case scenario, it will prop up the regimes that are at the very root of the problems of these societies. If sustained economic
Acemoglu I 453
growth depends on inclusive institutions, giving aid to regimes presiding over extractive institutions cannot be the solution. Conditional aid: One solution (...)is to make aid “conditional.” According to this view, continued foreign aid should depend on recipient governments meeting certain conditions—for example, liberalizing markets or moving toward democracy. The George W. Bush administration undertook the biggest step toward this type of conditional aid by starting the Millennium Challenge Accounts, which made future aid payments dependent on quantitative improvements in several dimensions of economic and political development.
VsConditional aid: (...) the effectiveness of conditional aid appears no better than the unconditional kind. Countries failing to meet these conditions typically receive as much aid as those that do. There is a simple reason: they have a greater need for aid of either the developmental or humanitarian kind.
Acemoglu/Robinson: 1) foreign aid is not a very effective means of dealing with the failure of nations around the world today. Countries need inclusive economic and political institutions to break out of the cycle of poverty. Foreign aid can typically do little in this respect (...). >Institutions/Acemoglu.
2) since the development of inclusive economic and political institutions is key, using the existing flows of foreign aid at least in part to facilitate such development would be useful. (...) perhaps structuring foreign aid so that its use and administration bring groups and leaders otherwise excluded from power into the decision-making process and empowering a broad segment of population might be a better prospect [than conditional aid].
Acemoglu I 460
Empowerment: what can be done to kick-start or perhaps just facilitate the process of empowerment and thus the development of inclusive political institutions? The honest answer of course is that there is no recipe for building such institutions. Naturally there are some obvious factors that would make the process of empowerment more likely to get off the ground. These would include the presence of some degree of centralized order so that social movements challenging existing regimes do not immediately descend into lawlessness; some preexisting political institutions that introduce a modicum of pluralism, such as the traditional political institutions in Botswana, so that broad coalitions can form and endure; and the presence of civil society institutions that can coordinate the demands of the population so that opposition movements can neither be easily crushed by the current elites nor inevitably turn into a vehicle for another group to take control of existing extractive institutions. But many of these factors are historically predetermined and change only slowly.

EconRobin I
James A. Robinson
James A. Acemoglu
Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012


Acemoglu II
James A. Acemoglu
James A. Robinson
Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy Cambridge 2006

Acemoglu I
James A. Acemoglu
James A. Robinson
Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012
Genetic Programming Norvig Norvig I 155
Genetic Programming/Russell/Norvig: The field of genetic programming is closely related to genetic algorithms. The principal difference is that the representations that are mutated and combined are programs rather
Norvig I 156
than bit strings. The programs are represented in the form of expression trees; the expressions can be in a standard language such as Lisp or can be specially designed to represent circuits, robot controllers, and so on. Crossover involves splicing together subtrees rather than substrings. This form of mutation guarantees that the offspring are well-formed expressions, which would not be the case if programs were manipulated as strings. Interest in genetic programming was spurred by John Koza’s work (Koza, 1992(1), 1994(2)), but it goes back at least to early experiments with machine code by Friedberg (1958)(3) and with finite-state automata by Fogel et al. (1966)(4).
VsGenetic Programming: As with genetic algorithms, there is debate about the effectiveness of the technique. Koza et al. (1999)(5) describe experiments in the use of genetic programming to design circuit devices. Good overview texts on genetic algorithms are given by Mitchell (1996)(6), Fogel (2000)(7), and Langdon and Poli (2002)(8), and by the free online book by Poli et al. (2008)(9).



1. Koza, J. R. (1992). Genetic Programming: On the Programming of Computers by Means of Natural Selection. MIT Press
2. Koza, J. R. (1994). Genetic Programming II: Automatic discovery of reusable programs. MIT Press.
3. Friedberg, R. M. (1958). A learning machine: Part I. IBM Journal of Research and Development, 2, 2–13.
4. Fogel, L. J., Owens, A. J., and Walsh, M. J. (1966). Artificial Intelligence through Simulated Evolution.
Wiley.
5. Koza, J. R., Bennett, F. H., Andre, D., and Keane, M. A. (1999). Genetic Programming III: Darwinian invention and problem solving. Morgan Kaufmann
6. Mitchell, M. (1996). An Introduction to Genetic Algorithms. MIT Press.
7. Fogel, D. B. (2000). Evolutionary Computation: Toward a New Philosophy of Machine Intelligence.
IEEE Press.
8. Langdon, W. and Poli, R. (2002). Foundations of Genetic Programming. Springer 9. Poli, R., Langdon, W., and McPhee, N. (2008). A Field Guide to Genetic Programming. Lulu.com.

Norvig I
Peter Norvig
Stuart J. Russell
Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010

Government Policy Crouch Brocker I 948
Politics/Government/Government Policy/Crouch: as a result of a "race to the bottom", in which labour law, taxes and the quality of public services deteriorate in a battle for effectiveness, three developments occur: 1. public services are increasingly organised in market form, 2. only those functions of services of general interest are taken over that are not of interest to private firms.
Brocker I 949
3. Advice is sought from private consultancies. >Public Private Partnership/Crouch.
Brocker I 955
StreeckVsCrouch: the main reason for the control limits of the democratic state lies not in its economization, but in the deregulation of market processes and the streamlining of administrative processes that are politically desired. Thus it is not the economy, but politics that bears the main responsibility for the denationalization of services of general interest, the privatization of public services, and the transition from the tax state to the debt state.(1)

1. Wolfgang Streeck, Gekaufte Zeit. Die vertagte Krise des demokratischen Kapitalismus, Berlin 2013, p. 109

Ludger Heidbrink, „Colin Crouch, Postdemokratie“, in: Manfred Brocker (ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

PolCrouch I
Colin Crouch
Henry Farrell
Breaking the path of institutional development? Alternatives to the new determinism 2004

PolCrouch II
Colin Crouch
Post-democracy London 2004


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Human Capital Economic Theories Mause I 510f
Human Capital/Education Policy/Economic Theories: At the centre of educational economic studies is the concept of human capital (Becker 1962 (1); Mincer 1962(2); Oi 1962(3)). In his book "Prosperity of Nations", Adam Smith (1776) already formed analogies between abilities and qualifications into physical capital. The modern version of what is discussed today under human capital theory began in the 1960s. At that time, attempts were made to explain the different effectiveness of tangible investments in industrialised and developing countries (see Sesselmeier et al. 2010 for an overview) (5).
Human Capital theory is an extension of the neoclassical economic model.
Human Capital/Becker: the homogeneity of the factor labour is dissolved into a new inhomogeneity (Becker 1992, 1993a, b.) (6)(7). Demanders for human capital, as well as demanders for other forms of capital and for the production factors work and land, are companies, the state and other employers. The core of human capital theory is the view that human capital increases the productivity of an actor and that increased productivity results in higher income for the actor and growth of the economy as a whole.
Question: how is the amount of human capital and its overall economic impact determined?
Solution: Comparison of costs and benefits of education expenditure.
Narrow view: Investments in human capital are only those actions that will increase productivity in the future.
Individual: An individual's human capital stock is the stock of productive skills and abilities that result in a flow of income.
Human Capital/David Friedman/Economic Theory: "Human capital is assets created through investment in education and training that are initially immaterial and can later lead to higher future incomes. The main difference to the real capital is that it is neither transferable at will, nor can it be lent or used as collateral without difficulty". (Friedman 1999, p. 450).
Human capital is provided by private households. They make their human capital available to customers (companies, the state) and thus generate income. Individuals themselves decide on their school education or vocational training by weighing costs and benefits.
By investing in education, the productivity of the labour provider is increased. The wage then corresponds to the marginal productivity of the work.


1. Becker, Gary S. 1962. Investment in human capital: A theoretical analysis. Journal of Political Economy 70: 9– 49.
2. Mincer, Jacob. 1962. On-the-job training: Costs, returns and some implications. Journal of Political Economy 70( Supplement): 50– 79.
3. Oi, Walter Y. 1962. Labor as a Quasi-fixed factor. Journal of Political Economy 70: 538– 555.
4.(4)
4. Smith, Adam. 1776. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, London; deutsche Übersetzung: Der Wohlstand der Nationen. Eine Untersuchung seiner Natur und seiner Ursachen. München 1974.
5. Sesselmeier, Werner, Funk Lothar, und Bernd Waas, Arbeitsmarkttheorien, 3.   Aufl. Heidelberg 2010.
6. Gary S. Becker, Menschliches Dasein aus ökonomischer Sicht. Nobel-Lesung vom 9. Dezember 1992. In Die Nobelpreisträger der ökonomischen Wissenschaft, Hrsg. Karl-Dieter Grüske, Vol. III, 206– 236. Düsseldorf 1992
7. Gary. S. Becker 1993 Human capital. A theoretical and empirical analysis with special references to education, 3. ed. Chicago: NBER..
8. David Friedman, Der ökonomische Code. Wie wirtschaftliches Denken unser Handeln bestimmt. Frankfurt a. M. 1999.


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Instrumental Reason Horkheimer Habermas III 461
Instrumental Reason/Horkheimer/Habermas: With Max Weber, Horkheimer is of the opinion that formal rationality "underlies contemporary industrial culture". (1) Formal Rationality/Weber/Habermas: the provisions that enable the "predictability" of actions: from the instrumental aspect the effectiveness of the available means and from the strategic aspect the correctness of the choice of means under given preferences, means and boundary conditions. Weber uses this term synonymously with procedural rationality.
Habermas III 462
HorkheimerVsWeber: In contrast, Horkheimer emphasizes the loss of rationality that occurs to the extent that actions can only be judged, planned and justified under cognitive aspects. Habermas: The irony is that reason, which according to Kant refers to the capacity of ideas and includes practical reason and judgement, is identified with what Kant distinguishes from it, namely with the activity of the mind. (2) See Sense/Horkheimer.



1.M. Horkheimer, Zur Kritik der instrumentellen Vernunft, Frankfurt 1967, p. 13.
2.Ibid. p. 21.


Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Interest Rates Taylor Taylor III
Inflation targeting/interest rates/central banking/Wages/Economics/TaylorVsSummers/TaylorVsStansbury/Lance Taylor: Regarding inflation, both central banks and [Summers and Stansbury] ignore the facts that inflation is a cumulative process driven by conflicting claims to income and wealth and that for the past five decades profits have captured almost all the claims. >Inflation targeting/Summers. Consider the real “product wage,” the nominal or money wage divided by a producer price index (PPI) to correct for cost inflation confronting business. A little algebra (…) shows that the labor or wage share of output, which equals real “unit labor cost,” is equal to the real wage divided by productivity or the output/labor ratio. The profit share equals one minus the wage share. (…) the profit share and growth rates of real wages and productivity have varied over time (…). The growth rate of nominal unit labor cost is the difference between rates of wage and productivity growth. As with the other labor market indicators, cost growth slowed after 2000.
To unravel the dynamics, we need a theory of inflation. Around the turn of the 20th century the Swedish economist Knut Wicksell pointed out that inflation is a “cumulative process” involving feedback between price and wage inflation rates. Even after their long decline [it] shows that labor payments still make up 55% of production costs and have to enter inflation accounting.
The “real balance effect” (or the “inflation tax” in a dynamic version) says that a jump in the price level will reduce the real value of assets with prices fixed in nominal terms – money is the usual example. Wealth is eroded and households are supposed to save more as a consequence. Along with a wage lag, the real balance effect is the key adjustment mechanism in Milton Friedman’s (1968) “inflation” model which still underlies contemporary monetary policy. “Forced saving” happens when a price jump against a constant money wage reduces real payments to wage-earners. If their capacity to borrow is limited, they have to cut consumption, sliding the demand curve downward. If an expansionary package does drive up the price level, middle class and low income households who rely on wages would be the ones to suffer.
Conflict arises because price increases are controlled by business while the money wage is subject to bargaining between business and labor. Both sides seek to manipulate the labor share as a key distributional indicator. In an overall inflationary environment, business can respond immediately to increases in the wage share or output by pushing up the rate of price increase in Phillips curve fashion along the “Inflation” schedule (…). Money wages on the other hand are not immediately indexed to price inflation so that they will follow with a lag. Labor will push for faster wage inflation when the wage share is low.
Suppose that there is an initial inflation equilibrium (…). The [Summers and Stansbury] proposal to use fiscal policy to stimulate aggregate demand would shift the inflation locus upward (…) with more rapid inflation and a somewhat lower wage share in macro equilibrium (…) along the stable share schedule. In light of the vanishing NAIRU [Non Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment] over the past two decades, it is not clear how strong this upward shift could be.
The way that expansionary policy could pay off in terms of inequality and (possibly) faster inflation would be though an upward movement in the stable share schedule if the labor market tightens, leading to greater bargaining power for labor.
The new Keynesian inventors are now the ruling elders of macroeconomics, unlikely to change their minds. (…) [Summers and Stansbury] might remember with Max Planck that science advances one funeral at a time. They are certainly correct in saying that “the role of particular frictions and rigidities in underpinning economic fluctuations should be de-emphasized relative to a more fundamental lack of aggregate demand.”
(…) many of the correct observations that [Summers and Stansbury] make about the likely ineffectiveness of interest rate changes were raised almost 90 years ago by Keynes’s colleague Piero Sraffa (1932a (1), 1932b (2)) in a controversy with Friedrich von Hayek. Sraffa’s main emphasis was on the inapplicability of a “natural rate” of interest, a point amplified by Keynes in the General Theory.
The natural rate, nevertheless, remains a topic of great interest to left-leaning new Keynesians. How they reconcile that idea with the fiscalist Keynesian perspective adoped by [Summers and Stansbury] remains to be seen. >Central banking/Summers.


1. Sraffa, Piero (1932a) “Dr. Hayek on Money and Capital,” Economic Journal, 42: 42-53.
2. Sraffa, Piero (1932b) “Money and Capital: A Rejoinder,” Economic Journal, 42: 249-25.



Taylor, Lance: Central Bankers, Inflation, and the Next Recession, in: Institute for New Economic Thinking (03/09/19), URL: http://www.ineteconomics.org/perspectives/blog/central-bankers-inflation-and-the-next-recession

EconTayl I
John Brian Taylor
Discretion Versus Policy Rules in Practice 1993

Taylor III
Lance Taylor
Central Bankers, Inflation, and the Next Recession, in: Institute for New Economic Thinking (03/09/19), URL: http://www.ineteconomics.org/perspectives/blog/central-bankers-inflation-and-the-next-recession 9/3/2019

TaylorB II
Barry Taylor
"States of Affairs"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

TaylorCh I
Charles Taylor
The Language Animal: The Full Shape of the Human Linguistic Capacity Cambridge 2016

International Law Morgenthau Brocker I 287
International Law/Morgenthau: because of the limited possibilities for sanctions, which according to Morgenthau are decisive for the social power of law, the effectiveness of international law is precarious. The governments of sovereign states will only make state sanction potentials available to international law if it corresponds to their interests. Even the United Nations Security Council is not able to overcome the non-central basic structure of international law, but rather to depict it in the narrowest space through the veto of the permanent members (1). International law is a weak law.

1. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York 1948. Dt.: Hans J. Morgenthau, Macht und Frieden. Grundlegung einer Theorie der internationalen Politik, Gütersloh 1963, S. 236.


Christoph Frei, „Hans J. Morgenthau, Macht und Frieden (1948)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Pol Morg I
Hans Morgenthau
Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York 1948
German Edition:
Macht und Frieden. Grundlegung einer Theorie der internationalen Politik Gütersloh 1963


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
International Relations Morgenthau Brocker I 289
International Relations/War/Peace/Morgenthau: The technique of peaceful settlement of disputes can only go so far as sovereign states are prepared to actually surrender objects in order to submit them to an international court. What would be the most effective solution to the problem of peace and transnational stability? Question: Which central factor supports stability at the national level and which central factor is responsible for continuing instability at the international level? (1) The answer falls into one: It is the sovereignty of the state itself. To the outside, it cements anarchy. Internally, it provides continuity in time and space; it provides a home; it nurtures and protects a space in which social change remains in peaceful paths; it ensures the effectiveness of law (2).
Peace/Morgenthau: Whoever wants to put world peace on the safest possible foundation cannot avoid the world state.


1. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York 1948. Dt.: Hans J. Morgenthau, Macht und Frieden. Grundlegung einer Theorie der internationalen Politik, Gütersloh 1963, S. 391f.
2. Ebenda S. 397.

Christoph Frei, „Hans J. Morgenthau, Macht und Frieden (1948)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Pol Morg I
Hans Morgenthau
Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York 1948
German Edition:
Macht und Frieden. Grundlegung einer Theorie der internationalen Politik Gütersloh 1963


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Inverted Spectra Pauen Pauen I 143
Inverted spectra/DennettVs inverted spectra/Pauen: behavior and phenomenal experience cannot be separated because they are interwoven on the neural level. - With that consciousness and behavior are inseparable.
I 184
Inverted spectra/missing Qualia/Pauen: common thesis of both arguments: it is impossible to establish a connection between phenomenal and physiological knowledge - so neurobiological theories would be fundamentally unsuited for knowledge of phenomenal processes. - Nevertheless, causal effectiveness of mental properties possible. - No epiphenomenalism.
I 186
Phenomenal states/Vs Inverted spectra/Pauen: the specific quality of a phenomenal state is rarely determined only by its location within a frame of reference - so there is probably no sensation of red itself. - One cannot talk reasonable of differences of the spectrum between people. Maximum change in a person.
I 187
Inverted spectra/Vs inverted spectra/Pauen: the spectrum is not symmetric. - This is noticeable in our discernment. - Primary colors and mixed colors would be displayed on each other in different numbers. - Orange and Red are turning both into Brown, if they are darkened. - Solution: could be corrected, if one sets exactly the mirror axis through the axis of orange/brown. - Problem: that would display secondary colors on primary colors. - Pauen: therefore the thought experiment fails through the imaginability.

Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001

Jigsaw Method Psychological Theories Haslam I 221
Jigsaw method/psychological theories: in the years since Aronson’s experiments (>Jigsaw method/Aronson; Aronson et al. (1)) research on the jigsaw classroom has continued to yield positive results in terms of enhanced academic performance and esteem, particularly among students from economically or educationally disadvantaged backgrounds, as well as improved intergroup relations within the classroom and the school (Johnson et al., 2000(2); Tomcho and Foels, 2012(3)). It has been applied successfully to diverse topical
Haslam I 222
areas such as English as a second language (ESL; Ghaith and El-Malak, 2004(4)) and physics classes (Hänze and Berger, 2007)(5), and positive results have been replicated internationally (Walker and Crogan, 1998)(6). Robert Cialdini initiated an influential set of studies on social influence that drew on observations of strategies used by individuals, such as salespeople, in applied settings, identified underlying psychological principles, and tested these ideas in field settings (Cialdini, 2009)(7). Also, basic research on attitudes and behaviour, such as the work of Ajzen and Fishbein’s (1980)(8) theory of reasoned action (…), significantly guided the development of effective interventions to change sexual practices and promote medical adherence to help curb the emerging international AIDS epidemic (Albarracin et al., 2001)(9).
Ingroup relations: research on this topic was also inspired by the jigsaw classroom research; see Paluck and Green (2009)(10).
Haslam I 223
Publications: Indeed, the earliest publications publications on the jigsaw classroom – also known as cooperative learning – were published in education journals rather than social psychological journals. Limitations of the method:/VsAronson: Aronson’s work spawned a new generation of cooperative learning interventions that were constructed to be effective in a wider range of classroom situations, not just under the specific circumstances associated with recently desegregated schools. These newer cooperation-based interventions were more generally effective educationally. So it was that when David Johnson and colleagues (2000)(2) ranked eight commonly used cooperation-based teaching methods in terms of their effectiveness the jigsaw classroom was only ranked sixth in terms of impact on educational achievement.
By the early 1990s, 79% of US elementary schools used cooperative learning methods (Puma et al., 1993)(11) attests to the influence of the jigsaw classroom on policy implementation. >Jigsaw method/Social psychology.


1. Aronson, E., Stephan, C., Sikes, J., Blaney, N. and Snapp, M. (1978) The Jigsaw Classroom. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
2. Johnson, D., Johnson, R.T. and Stanne, M.B. (2000) ‘Cooperative learning methods: A meta-analysis’, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/David_Johnson50/publication/220040324_Cooperative_learning_methods_A_meta-analysis/links/00b4952b39d258145c000000.pdf (04.05. 2019)).
3. Tomcho, T.J. and Foels, R. (2012) ‘Meta-analysis of group learning activities: Empirically-based teaching recommendations’, Teaching of Psychology, 39: 159–69.
4. Ghaith, G. and El-Malak, M.A. (2004) ‘Effect of Jigsaw II on literal and higher-order EFL reading comprehension’, Educational Research and Evaluation, 10: 105–55.
5. Hänze, M. and Berger, R. (2007) ‘Cooperative learning, motivational effects, and student characteristics: An experimental study comparing cooperative learning and direct instruction in 12th grade physics classes“, Learning and instruction, 17: 29-41.
6. Walker, I. and Crogan, M. (1998) ‘Academic performance, prejudice, and the jigsaw classroom: New pieces to the puzzle’, Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 8: 381–93.
7. Cialdini, R.B. (2009) Influence: Science and Practice (5th edn). New York: Pearson.
8. Ajzen, I. and Fishbein, M. (1980) Understanding Attitudes and Predicting Social Behavior: Attitudes, Intentions, and Perceived Behavioral Control. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
9. Albarracin, D., Johnson, B.T., Fishbein, M. and Muellerleile, P.A. (2001) ‘Theories of reasoned action and planned behavior as models of condom use: A meta-analysis’. Psychological Bulletin, 127: 142–61.
10. Paluck, E.L. and Green, D.P. (2009), ‘Prejudice reduction: What works? A review and assessment of research and practice’, Annual Review of Psychology, 60: 339-67.
11. Puma M.J., Jones C.C., Rock D. and Fernandez, R. (1993) ‘Prospects: The congressionally mandated study of educational growth and opportunity’, Interim Report. Bethesda, MD: Abt Associates.



John F. Dovidio, „ Promoting Positive Intergroup Relations. Revisiting Aronson et al.’s jigsaw classroom“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications


Haslam I
S. Alexander Haslam
Joanne R. Smith
Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Liquidity Trap Monetarism Mause I 224
Def Liquidity Trap/Monetarism: If interest rates are already comparatively low, so that no actor expects further interest rate cuts, the additional liquidity of monetary policy measures is no longer used to buy bonds. In this case, there will not be the desired interest rate cuts, which should lead to additional demand for goods in the economy as a whole. In this case one speaks of a liquidity trap that leads to the ineffectiveness of monetary policy. These considerations are in contradiction to neoclassical theory. MonetarismVsNeoclassicism.


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Mathematics Wigner Wilson I 67
Mathematics/Logics/Wigner/Wilson, E. O.: (E. Wigner, The unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences, in: Communications on Pure and Applied Mathematis 13 (1969), s. 1. -14.): Wilson: Wigner spoke of the illogical effects of mathematics in the natural sciences. For reasons that have been closed to scientists and philosophers alike, the agreement between mathematical theory and experimental physics is so great that the conclusion that mathematics is the natural language of science in a deeper sense is virtually imposed.
Wigner: The enormous usefulness of mathematics for the natural sciences is something that borders on a mystery and for which there is no reasonable explanation. It is not natural that "laws of nature" exist, and even less so that the human is able to recognize them.

Wigner I
Eugene P. Wigner
Symmetries and Reflections: Scientific Essays Carbridge, MA 1970


WilsonEO I
E. O. Wilson
Consilience. The Unity of Knowledge, New York 1998
German Edition:
Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge New York 1998
Mind Body Problem Dewey Suhr I !75
Mind Body Problem/Dewey: Solution: modern science makes qualities into relations, the immediate qualities have been driven into a realm of psychic being. But they are not apparent, but real qualities of being.
Mind/antiquity: The Greeks had no problem with the mind because they attribute effectiveness to the natural qualities.

Mind Body Problem: If we deny the immediate qualities, psychical functions, indeed, the mind itself, become an abnormal phenomenon. The error of antiquity was not to attribute qualities to natural existence, but to misunderstand the place of their efficacy: outside of any connection with organic action.

Dew II
J. Dewey
Essays in Experimental Logic Minneola 2004

Monetary Policy Tobin Mause I 225
Monetary Policy/Tobin: Market participants have a wealth of different investment opportunities for their assets. (1) However, the portfolio theoretical transmission process calls into question the high substitutability between the individual asset classes. (...) This restricts the effectiveness of monetary policy. (2)

1. James Tobin, “The Interest Elasticity of the Transactions Demand for Cash”. Review of Economics and Statistics. 38 (3), 1956, S. 241– 247.
2. Duwendag, Dieter, Karl-Heinz Ketterer, Wim Kösters, Rüdiger Pohl, und Diethard B. Simmert. Geldtheorie und Geldpolitik. Eine problemorientierte Einführung mit einem Kompendium monetärer Fachbegriffe, Berlin/ Heidelberg 1999.

EconTobin I
James Tobin
The Interest Elasticity of the Transactions Demand for Cash 1956


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Monetary Policy Keynesianism Mause I 224
Monetary Policy/Keynesianism/KeynesianismVsNeoclassics: Liquidity trap: if interest rates are low, so that no actor expects further rate cuts, the additional liquidity of monetary policy measures is no longer used to buy bonds. In this case, there will not be the desired interest rate cuts, which should lead to additional demand for goods in the economy as a whole. This is referred to as a liquidity trap, which leads to the ineffectiveness of monetary policy.
VsNeoclassics: VsCapital Market Theory: See Capital Market Theory/Neoclassics.


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Networks Shirky Morozov I 125
Networks/Shirky/Morozov: Shirky thesis: New capable groups gather and they work... outside the previous structures that restricted their effectiveness. These changes will change the world wherever groups of people come together to achieve something... (1). It is groups and networks that are distributed, often spanning borders, which have the power; hierarchies and states that are limited to defined territories and action programmes are outwitted at every turn. (See also Wikileaks/Shirky, MorozovVsShirky). ---
Shirky I 215
Networks/Small World/Shirky: you can connect 10 points (individuals) by placing them on a circle and drawing all kinds of connections. Or you can form small groups of maybe 2 x 5 points connected to each other, but there are only one or two connections between these subgroups. This corresponds to another strategy called "Small World". (2) ---
I 216
Small world networks provide a result that is better than a random constellation when you accept the cost for the number of connections. ---
I 217
Within a small world network there is a hierarchy of points to which more or less connections lead. Malcolm Gladwell refers to individuals who sit at switching points between subgroups as connectors. (3) ---
I 218
Society/Watts/Strogatz/Shirky: Watts and Strogatz discovered that societies correspond to different types of such constructions. Some societies are more strongly organized according to tribal hierarchies, some are more deeply rooted locally, etc. ((s) No citation of source f. Strogatz). Blogs/Shirky: also different weblogs have such structural differences: there are some where a central author acts like a radio station, others are made up of small groups, where most of them take part in the exchange of contributions.

1. Clay Shirky, Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing without Organizations (New York: Penguin, 2009), 24.
2. Duncan Watts, Small Worlds: The Dynamics of Networks between Order and Complexity, Princeton University Press (1999). Duncan Watts, Six Degrees: The Science of a Connected Age, W.W. Norton and Company (2003).
3. Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference, Brown (2000).

Shirky I
Clay Shirky
Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing Without Organizations New York 2009


Morozov I
Evgeny Morozov
To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism New York 2014
Norms Morgenthau Brocker I 287
Norms/Morgenthau: Question: What about the normative barriers of politics in the middle of the 20th century? The analyst's focus is not on abstract norms, but on the conditions of their effectiveness. What makes law, custom and morality effective forces is precisely not the content of the individual norms, but expectations of what follows the violation of such rules.

Christoph Frei, „Hans J. Morgenthau, Macht und Frieden (1948)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Pol Morg I
Hans Morgenthau
Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York 1948
German Edition:
Macht und Frieden. Grundlegung einer Theorie der internationalen Politik Gütersloh 1963


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Nudging Thaler Morozov I 198
Nudging/Behavior/Regulation/Thaler/Morozov: What Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler call "Nudges" are clever manipulations of standard settings - what the authors call "Choice Architecture" - to make you eat healthy food or save money for retirement. (1) For manipulation, nudging is what public relations work is for advertising: it makes things run smoothly while making all the background, implicit and invisible, disappear. The most effective nudges give the actors the appearance of independence without offering them a wide choice.
Roger BrownswordVsSunstein/BrownswordVsThaler/Morozov: this kind of regulation appeals to our self-interest, but in a democratic society such attitudes should be discussed publicly. For example, it is not unproblematic to assume that the right reason to drive an energy-efficient car is to save money. It could also be that you want to protect the climate. (2)
Morozov I 199
MorozovVsSunstein/MorozovVsThaler/Morozov: Transforming something into a nudge by a mere technocratic commandment requires a social consensus - on both, goals and means - where this consensus may not yet exist. While the nudges are multiplying, divergent views on what needs to be done (and how) could actually vanish, but this should not be understood as an indication that the nudge in question has worked. Its presumed effectiveness is more likely to be the result of a forced consensus than the result of real consultation. Morozov: in addition, the only thing that counts as nudge is what actually has the result that the regulator wanted.
Brownsword: this makes it more difficult to challenge and change laws and standards if they are woven into (nudging) technology. (2)

Mause I 178f
Nudging/Thaler: A nudge must be avoidable - easily and without much effort. It is just a push, not an order. For example: Draping the fruit at eye level in the canteen counts as nudge. Taking junkfood from the offer however not. (3) For example, banning or taxing smoking because it is harmful to health would be a very traditional compulsion, but putting warnings ("smoking kills") or banning tobacco to the farthest corner of the shop would be a nudge.
Costs/SchnellenbachVsNudging: the counter-financing of the costs of nudging would hardly be possible other than through the traditional forcing instrument of taxation of completely uninvolved third parties.


1. Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness, updated ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 2009).
2. Roger Brownsword, “Whither the Law and the Law Books? From Prescription to Possibility,” Journal of Law and Society 39, no. 2 (2012): 296– 308; Brownsword, “Lost in Translation: Legality, Regulatory Margins, and Technological Management,” Berkeley Technology Law Journal 26 (2011): 1321– 1366; and Brownsword, Rights, Regulation and the Technological Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).
3. Thaler, Richard H., und Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Wie man kluge Entscheidungen anstößt. Berlin 2009, S. 15.

EconThaler I
Richard Thaler
Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral Economics New York 2016


Morozov I
Evgeny Morozov
To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism New York 2014

Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Nudging Sunstein Morozov I 198
Nudging/Behavior/Regulation/Sunstein/Morozov: What Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler call "Nudges" are clever manipulations of standard settings - what the authors call "Choice Architecture" - to make you eat healthy food or save money for retirement. (1) For manipulation, nudging is what public relations work is for advertising: it makes things run smoothly while making all the background, implicit and invisible, disappear. The most effective nudges give the actors the appearance of independence without offering them a wide choice.
Roger BrownswordVsSunstein/BrownswordVsThaler/Morozov: this kind of regulation appeals to our self-interest, but in a democratic society such attitudes should be discussed publicly. For example, it is not unproblematic to assume that the right reason to drive an energy-efficient car is to save money. It could also be that you want to protect the climate. (2)
---
Morozov I 199
MorozovVsSunstein/MorozovVsThaler/Morozov: Transforming something into a nudge by a mere technocratic commandment requires a social consensus - on both, goals and means - where this consensus may not yet exist. While the nudges are multiplying, divergent views on what needs to be done (and how) could actually vanish, but this should not be understood as an indication that the nudge in question has worked. Its presumed effectiveness is more likely to be the result of a forced consensus than of real deliberations. Morozov: in addition, the only thing that counts as nudge is what actually has the result that the regulator wanted.
Brownsword: this makes it more difficult to challenge and change laws and standards if they are woven into (nudging) technology. (2)

1. Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness, updated ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 2009).
2. Roger Brownsword, “Whither the Law and the Law Books? From Prescription to Possibility,” Journal of Law and Society 39, no. 2 (2012): 296– 308; Brownsword, “Lost in Translation: Legality, Regulatory Margins, and Technological Management,” Berkeley Technology Law Journal 26 (2011): 1321– 1366; and Brownsword, Rights, Regulation and the Technological Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

Sunstein I
Cass R. Sunstein
Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge Oxford 2008

Sunstein II
Cass R. Sunstein
#Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media Princeton 2017


Morozov I
Evgeny Morozov
To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism New York 2014
Ontology AI Research Norvig I 437
Ontology/AI research/Norvig/Russell: instead of trying to represent everything - which is impossible - we will leave placeholders where new knowledge for any domain can fit in. Complex domains such as shopping on the Internet or driving a car in traffic require (…) general and flexible representations. (…) these representations [concentrate] on general concepts - such as events, time, physical objects, and beliefs. >Knowledge representation/Norvig.
Norvig I 438
Upper ontology: The general framework of concepts is called an upper ontology because of the convention of drawing graphs with the general concepts at the top and the more specific concepts below them (…).A more general ontology would consider signals at particular times, and would include the wire lengths and propagation delays. This would allow us to simulate the timing properties of the circuit, and indeed such simulations are often carried out by circuit designers.
Norvig I 439
General purpose ontology: A general-purpose ontology should be applicable in more or less any special-purpose domain (with the addition of domain-specific axioms). In any sufficiently demanding domain, different areas of knowledge must be unified, because reasoning and problem solving could involve several areas simultaneously.
Norvig I 440
Categories: The organization of objects into categories is a vital part of knowledge representation. Although interaction with the world takes place at the level of individual objects, much reasoning takes place at the level of categories. Categories also serve to make predictions about objects once they are classified. One infers the presence of certain objects from perceptual input, infers category membership from the perceived properties of the objects, and then uses category information to make predictions about the objects. There are two choices for representing categories in first-order logic: predicates and objects.
Norvig I 445
Objects: > href="https://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-list.php?concept=Individuation">Individuation/Philosophical theories, >Mass terms/Philosophical theories, >Intrinsic/extrinsic/Philosophical theories, >Categories/philosophical theories, >Description logic/AI research.
Norvig I 469
Interest in larger-scale ontologies is increasing, as documented by the Handbook on Ontologies (Staab, 2004)(1). The OPENCYC project (Lenat and Guha, 1990(2); Matuszek et al.,
2006(3)) has released a 150,000-concept ontology, with an upper ontology (…)I as well as specific concepts like “OLED Display” and “iPhone,” which is a type of “cellular phone,” which in turn is a type of “consumer electronics,” “phone,” “wireless communication device,” and other concepts.
The IEEE working group P1600.1 created the Suggested Upper Merged Ontology (SUMO) (Niles and Pease, 2001(4); Pease and Niles, 2002(5)), which contains about 1000 terms in the upper ontology and links to over 20,000 domain-specific terms. Stoffel et al. (1997)(6) describe algorithms for efficiently managing a very large ontology. A survey of techniques for extracting knowledge from Web pages is given by Etzioni et al. (2008)(7).
On the Web, representation languages are emerging. RDF (Brickley and Guha, 2004)(8) allows for assertions to be made in the form of relational triples, and provides some means for evolving the meaning of names over time. OWL (Smith et al., 2004)(9) is a description logic that supports inferences over these triples.
So far, usage seems to be inversely proportional to representational complexity: the traditional HTML and CSS formats account for over 99% of Web content, followed by the simplest representation schemes, such as microformats (Khare, 2006)(10) and RDFa (Adida and Birbeck, 2008)(11), which use HTML and XHTML markup to add attributes to literal text. Usage of sophisticated RDF and OWL ontologies is not yet widespread, and the full vision of the Semantic Web (Berners-Lee et al., 2001)(12) has not yet been realized. The conferences on Formal Ontology in Information Systems (FOIS) contain many interesting papers on both general and domain-specific ontologies. >Knowledge representation/AI research.
An inspirational discussion of the general project of commonsense knowledge representation appears in Hayes’s (1978(13), 1985b(14)) “Naive Physics Manifesto.”
Norvig I 470
Problems: Doubts about the feasibility of a single ontology for all knowledge are expressed by Doctorow (2001)(15), Gruber (2004)(16), Halevy et al. (2009)(17), and Smith (2004)(18), who states, “the initial project of building one single ontology . . . has . . . largely been abandoned.”


1. Staab, S. (2004). Handbook on Ontologies. Springer.
2. Lenat, D. B. and Guha, R. V. (1990). Building Large Knowledge-Based Systems: Representation and Inference in the CYC Project. Addison-Wesley.
3. Matuszek, C., Cabral, J., Witbrock, M., and DeOliveira, J. (2006). An introduction to the syntax and semantics of cyc. In Proc. AAAI Spring Symposium on Formalizing and Compiling Background knowledge and Its Applications to Knowledge Representation and Question Answering.
4. Niles, I. and Pease, A. (2001). Towards a standard upper ontology. In FOIS ’01: Proc. International conference on Formal Ontology in Information Systems, pp. 2-9.
5. Pease, A. and Niles, I. (2002). IEEE standard upper ontology: A progress report. Knowledge Engineering Review, 17(1), 65–70.
6. Stoffel, K., Taylor, M., and Hendler, J. (1997). Efficient management of very large ontologies. In Proc. AAAI-97, pp. 442–447.
7. Etzioni, O., Banko, M., Soderland, S., and Weld, D. S. (2008). Open information extraction from the web. CACM, 51(12).
8. Brickley, D. and Guha, R. V. (2004). RDF vocabulary description language 1.0: RDF schema. Tech. rep., W3C.
9. Smith, M. K., Welty, C., and McGuinness, D. (2004). OWL web ontology language guide. Tech.
rep., W3C.
10. Khare, R. (2006). Microformats: The next (small) thing on the semantic web. IEEE Internet omputing, 10(1), 68-75.
11. Adida, B. and Birbeck, M. (2008). RDFa primer. Tech. rep., W3C
12. Berners-Lee, T., Hendler, J., and Lassila, O. (2001). The semantic web. Scientific American, 284(5), 4-43.
13. Hayes, P. J. (1979). The logic of frames. In Metzing,D. (Ed.), Frame Conceptions and Text Understanding, pp. 46–61. de Gruyter.
14. Hayes, P. J. (1985a). Naive physics I: Ontology for liquids. In Hobbs, J. R. andMoore, R. C. (Eds.), Formal Theories of the Commonsense World, chap. 3, pp. 71–107. Ablex.
15. Doctorow, C. (2001). Metacrap: Putting the torch to seven straw-men of the meta-utopia.
16. Gruber, T. (2004). Interview of Tom Gruber. AIS SIGSEMIS Bulletin, 1(3).
17. Halevy, A., Norvig, P., and Pereira, F. (2009). The unreasonable effectiveness of data. IEEE Intelligent Systems, March/April, 8–12.
18. Smith, B. (2004). Ontology. In Floridi, L. (Ed.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Computing and Information, pp. 155–166.Wiley-Blackwell


Norvig I
Peter Norvig
Stuart J. Russell
Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010
Peer-to-Peer Networks Benkler Benkler I 83
Peer-to-Peer Networks/Communications Platforms/Benkler: Like distributed computing projects, peer-to-peer file-sharing networks are
I 84
an excellent example of a highly efficient system for storing and accessing data in a computer network. These networks of sharing are much less “mysterious,” in terms of understanding the human motivation behind participation. Nevertheless, they provide important lessons about the extent to which large-scale collaboration among strangers or loosely affiliated users can provide effective communications platforms.
I 85
What is truly unique about peer-to-peer networks as a signal of what is to come is the fact that with ridiculously low financial investment, a few teenagers and twenty-something-year-olds were able to write software and protocols that allowed tens of millions of computer users around the world to cooperate in producing the most efficient and robust file storage and retrieval system in the world. The broader point to take from looking at peer-to-peer file-sharing networks, however, is the sheer effectiveness of large-scale collaboration among individuals once they possess, under their individual control, the physical capital necessary to make their cooperation effective.
The only actual social cost involved at the time of the transmission is the storage capacity, communications capacity, and processing capacity necessary to store, catalog, search, retrieve, and transfer the information necessary to replicate the files from where copies reside to where more copies are desired.
I 86
By cooperating in these sharing practices, users construct together systems with capabilities far exceeding those that they could have developed by themselves, as well as the capabilities that even the best financed corporations could provide using techniques that rely on components they fully owned. >Peer Production/Shirky, >Peer Production/Zittrain.

Benkler I
Yochai Benkler
The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom New Haven 2007

Personality Buss Corr I 266
Personality/evolutionary psychology/Buss: Buss and Greiling 1999)(1) whose personality theory suggests that individual differences lead to differences in the effectiveness with which people can adopt different strategies in our complex social groups. Furthermore, Buss has suggested that people are especially aware of personality variation among group members because it is something that must be noticed and contended with in order to be successful in our daily interactions. MacDonald (e.g., 1995(2), 1998(3)) has taken a similar approach to explaining the adaptive nature of personality differences and expanded it a step further. >Personality/MacDonald, >Heritablity/Tooby/Cosmides.

1. Buss, D. M. and Greiling, H. 1999. Adaptive individual differences, Journal of Personality 67: 209–43
2. MacDonald, K. B. 1995. Evolution, the five-factor model, and levels of personality, Journal of Personality 63: 525–67
3. MacDonald, K. B. 1998. Evolution, culture, and the five-factor model, Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 29: 119–49


Aurelio José Figueredo, Paul Gladden, Geneva Vásquez, Pedro Sofio, Abril Wolf and Daniel Nelson Jones, “Evolutionary theories of personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Protestant Ethics Weber Habermas III 299
Protestant Ethics/Weber/Habermas: in traditional society, the cognitive potential created by the rationalized worldviews within which the disenchantment process takes place cannot yet become effective. It is only delivered in modern societies. This process means the modernisation of society. (1)
Habermas III 307
Profession/Protestantism/Weber: modern professional culture is precisely that implementation of ethics of conviction that ensures motivationally the procedural rationality of entrepreneurial action in a way that has consequences for the capitalist enterprise.
Habermas III 308
Weber does not want to explain why the Catholic inhibitions against commercial profit-seeking have fallen, but what made the conversion possible. He discovered the corresponding teachings in Calvinism and around the Protestant sects. In religious community life he finds the institutions that ensured the socializing effectiveness of the teachings in the supporting layers of early capitalism. (2)
Habermas III 310
Profession/Weber/Habermas: professional work as a whole is ethically charged and dramatised. The sphere of the profession is released from traditional morality and becomes the sphere of procedural professional probation. This is connected with an ethics of conviction limited to individual graces, which eliminates the Catholic coexistence of monk, priest and lay ethics in favour of an elitist separation between virtuoso and mass religiosity. Consequences are the inner loneliness of the individual and the understanding of one's neighbor as another neutralized in strategic contexts of action. (3)
Habermas III 311
Protestant ethics/Schluchter: the ethics of ascetic Protestantism puts the relationship of the individual to God above his relationships to people and gives these relationships a new meaning: they are no longer interpreted in piety terms. (4) Habermas: even the objectification of these relationships destroys the basis of legitimacy of piety. It degrades all traditional norms to mere conventions. However, this does not require the special objectification required for capitalist economic transactions and which allows segmentation of a legally organized area of strategic action.
HabermasVsWeber: he denies such a possibility of development.
Habermas III 312
This is because of the structural incompatibility of any consistently ethicized religion of redemption with the impersonal orders of a rationalized economy and objective politics.

1.Vgl. H.V. Gumbrecht, R. Reichardt, Th. Schleich (Hrg), Sozialgeschichte der Französischen Aufklärung, 2 Bde, München, 1981
2. M. Weber, Die protestantische Ethik, hrsg. v. J. Winckelmann, Bd 2, Hamburg 1972, p. 232.
3. Schluchter, Die Entwicklung des okzidentalen Rationalismus, Tübingen 1979, p. 250f.
4. Schluchter ibid p. 251.

Weber I
M. Weber
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930
German Edition:
Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013


Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Reinforcement Learning AI Research Norvig I 831
Reinforcement Learning/AI Research/Norvig/Russell: In many complex domains, reinforcement learning [by reward and punishment] is the only feasible way to train a program to perform at high levels. For example, in game playing, it is very hard for a human to provide accurate and consistent evaluations of large numbers of positions, which would be needed to train an evaluation function directly from examples. Instead, the program can be told when it has won or lost, and it can use this information to learn an evaluation function that gives reasonably accurate estimates of the probability of winning from any given position. Similarly, it is extremely difficult to program an agent to fly a helicopter; yet given appropriate negative rewards for crashing, wobbling, or deviating from a set course, an agent can learn to fly by itself. A. Passive Reinforcement learning
Situation: an agent is placed in an environment and must learn to behave successfully therein.
A utility-based agent learns a utility function on states and uses it to select actions that maximize the expected outcome utility.
A Q-learning agent learns an action-utility function, or Q-function, giving the expected utility of taking a given action in a given state.
A reflex agent learns a policy that maps directly from states to actions.
Exploration: an agent must experience as much as possible of its environment in order to learn how to behave in it. >Markov decision processes/Norvig.
Norvig I 833
Passive reinforcement learning: A simple method for direct utility estimation was invented in the late 1950s in the area of adaptive control theory by Widrow and Hoff (1960)(1). The idea is that the utility of a state is the expected total reward from that state onward (called the expected reward-to-go), and each trial provides a sample of this quantity for each state visited. Utility: the utilities of states are not independent! The utility of each state equals its own reward plus the expected utility of its successor states. That is, the utility values obey the Bellman equations for a fixed policy. (>Values/AI Research).
Problem: By ignoring the connections between states, direct utility estimation misses opportunities for learning.
Norvig I 834
Adaptive Dynamic Programming /ADP: An adaptive dynamic programming (or ADP) agent takes advantage of the constraints among the utilities of states by learning the transition model that connects them and solving the corresponding Markov decision process using a dynamic programming method. Alternatively, we can adopt the approach of modified policy iteration (…), using a simplified value iteration process to update the utility estimates after each change to the learned model.
Norvig I 836
Temporal difference learning/TD: All temporal-difference methods work by adjusting the utility estimates towards the ideal equilibrium that holds locally when the utility estimates are correct.
Norvig I 839
B. Active reinforcement learning: A passive learning agent has a fixed policy that determines its behavior. An active agent must decide what actions to take. First, the agent will need to learn a complete model with outcome probabilities for all actions, (…). Next, we need to take into account the fact that the agent has a choice of actions. The utilities it needs to learn are those defined by the optimal policy; they obey the >Bellman equations (…).The final issue is what to do at each step. Having obtained a utility function U that is optimal for the learned model, the agent can extract an optimal action by one-step look-ahead to maximize the expected utility; alternatively, if it uses policy iteration, the optimal policy is already available, so it should simply execute the action the optimal policy recommends.
Norvig I 843
Q-Learning: There is an alternative TD method, called Q-learning, which learns an action-utility representation instead of learning utilities. [A] TD [temporal difference] agent that learns a Q-function does not need a model of the form P(s’| s, a), either for learning or for action selection. For this reason, Q-learning is called a model-free method.
Norvig I 845
Function approximation: simply means using any sort of representation for the Q-function other than a lookup table. The representation is viewed as approximate because it might not be the case that the true utility function or Q-function can be represented in the chosen form.
Norvig I 846
Generalization: The compression achieved by a function approximator allows the learning agent to generalize from states it has visited to states it has not visited. That is, the most important aspect of function approximation is not that it requires less space, but that it allows for inductive generalization over input states.
Norvig I 848
Policies: a policy π is a function that maps states to actions. (…) we could represent π by a collection of parameterized Q-functions, one for each action, and take the action with the highest predicted value (…).if the policy is represented by Q-functions, then policy search results in a process that learns Q-functions. This process is not the same as Q-learning! In Q-learning with function approximation, the algorithm finds a value of θ such that ˆQ θ is “close” to Q ∗, the optimal Q-function. Policy search: Policy search, on the other hand, finds a value of θ that results in good performance; (…).
VsPolicy search: Problems: One problem with policy representations of the kind (…) is that the policy is a discontinuous function of the parameters when the actions are discrete.
Solution: This means that the value of the policy may also change discontinuously, which makes gradient-based search difficult. For this reason, policy search methods often use a stochastic policy representation πθ(s, a), which specifies the probability of selecting action a in state s.
Norvig I 854
History of reinforcement learning: Turing (1948(2), 1950(3)) proposed the reinforcement-learning approach, although he was not convinced of its effectiveness, writing, “the use of punishments and rewards can at best be a part of the teaching process.” Arthur Samuel’s work (1959)(4) was probably the earliest successful machine learning research. Around the same time, researchers in adaptive control theory (Widrow and Hoff, 1960)(1), building on work by Hebb (1949)(5), were training simple networks using the delta rule. The cart–pole work of Michie and Chambers (1968)(6) can also be seen as a reinforcement learning method with a function approximator. The psychological literature on reinforcement learning is much older; Hilgard and Bower (1975)(7) provide a good survey. Neuroscience: The neuroscience text by Dayan and Abbott (2001)(8) describes possible neural implementations of temporal-difference learning, while Dayan and Niv (2008)(9) survey the latest evidence from neuroscientific and behavioral experiments.
Markov decision process: The connection between reinforcement learning and Markov decision processes was first made by Werbos (1977)(10), but the development of reinforcement learning in AI stems from work at the University of Massachusetts in the early 1980s (Barto et al., 1981)(11). The paper by Sutton (1988) provides a good historical overview.
Temporal difference learning: The combination of temporal-difference learning with the model-based generation of simulated experiences was proposed in Sutton’s DYNA architecture (Sutton, 1990)(12). The idea of prioritized sweeping was introduced independently by Moore and Atkeson (1993)(13) and
Norvig I 855
Peng and Williams (1993)(14). Q-learning: was developed in Watkins’s Ph.D. thesis (1989)(15), while SARSA appeared in a technical report by Rummery and Niranjan (1994)(16).
Function approximation: Function approximation in reinforcement learning goes back to the work of Samuel, who used both linear and nonlinear evaluation functions and also used feature-selection methods to reduce the feature CMAC space. Later methods include the CMAC (Cerebellar Model Articulation Controller) (Albus, 1975)(17), which is essentially a sum of overlapping local kernel functions, and the associative neural networks of Barto et al. (1983)(18). Neural networks are currently the most popular form of function approximator. The best-known application is TD-Gammon (Tesauro, 1992(19), 1995(20)), (…).
Policy search: Policy search methods were brought to the fore by Williams (1992(21)), who developed the REINFORCE family of algorithms. Later work by Marbach and Tsitsiklis (1998)(22), Sutton et al. (2000)(23), and Baxter and Bartlett (2000)(24) strengthened and generalized the convergence results for policy search. The method of correlated sampling for comparing different configurations of a system was described formally by Kahn and Marshall (1953)(25), but seems to have been known long before that. Its use in reinforcement learning is due to Van Roy (1998)(26) and Ng and Jordan (2000)(27); the latter paper also introduced the PEGASUS algorithm and proved its formal properties.
Norvig I 857
Inverse reinforcement learning: Russell (1998)(28) describes the task of inverse reinforcement learning - figuring out what the reward function must be from an example path through that state space. This is useful as a part of apprenticeship learning, or as a part of doing science—we can understand an animal or robot by working backwards from what it does to what its reward function must be.

1. Widrow, B. and Hoff, M. E. (1960). Adaptive switching circuits. In 1960 IRE WESCON Convention
Record, pp. 96–104.
2. Turing, A. (1948). Intelligent machinery. Tech. rep. National Physical Laboratory. reprinted in (Ince,
1992).
3. Turing, A. (1950). Computing machinery and intelligence. Mind, 59, 433–460. 4. Samuel, A. L. (1959). Some studies in machine learning using the game of checkers. IBM Journal of Research and Development, 3(3), 210–229.
5. Hebb, D. O. (1949). The Organization of Behavior. Wiley.
6. Michie, D. and Chambers, R. A. (1968). BOXES: An experiment in adaptive control. In Dale, E. and
Michie, D. (Eds.), Machine Intelligence 2, pp. 125–133. Elsevier/North-Holland.
7. Hilgard, E. R. and Bower, G. H. (1975). Theories of Learning (4th edition). Prentice-Hall.
8. Dayan, P. and Abbott, L. F. (2001). Theoretical Neuroscience: Computational and Mathematical Modeling of Neural Systems. MIT Press.
9. Dayan, P. and Niv, Y. (2008). Reinforcement learning and the brain: The good, the bad and the ugly.
Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 18(2), 185–196.
10. Werbos, P. (1977). Advanced forecasting methods for global crisis warning and models of intelligence. General Systems Yearbook, 22, 25–38.
11. Barto, A. G., Sutton, R. S., and Brouwer, P. S. (1981). Associative search network: A reinforcement learning associative memory. Biological Cybernetics, 40(3), 201–211.
12. Sutton, R. S. (1990). Integrated architectures for learning, planning, and reacting based on approximating dynamic programming. In ICML-90, pp. 216–224.
13. Moore, A. W. and Atkeson, C. G. (1993). Prioritized sweeping—Reinforcement learning with less data and less time. Machine Learning, 13, 103–130.
14. Peng, J. and Williams, R. J. (1993). Efficient learning and planning within the Dyna framework. Adaptive Behavior, 2, 437–454.
15. Watkins, C. J. (1989). Models of Delayed Reinforcement Learning. Ph.D. thesis, Psychology Department, Cambridge University.
16. Rummery, G. A. and Niranjan, M. (1994). Online Q-learning using connectionist systems. Tech.
rep. CUED/F-INFENG/TR 166, Cambridge University Engineering Department.
17. Albus, J. S. (1975). A new approach to manipulator control: The cerebellar model articulation controller (CMAC). J. Dynamic Systems, Measurement, and Control, 97, 270–277.
18. Barto, A. G., Sutton, R. S., and Anderson, C. W. (1983). Neuron-like adaptive elements that can solve difficult learning control problems. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, 13, 834–
846.
19. Tesauro, G. (1992). Practical issues in temporal difference learning. Machine Learning, 8(3–4), 257–
277.
20. Tesauro, G. (1995). Temporal difference learning and TD-Gammon. CACM, 38(3), 58–68.
21. Williams, R. J. (1992). Simple statistical gradient following algorithms for connectionist reinforcement learning. Machine Learning, 8, 229–256.
22. Marbach, P. and Tsitsiklis, J. N. (1998). Simulation based optimization of Markov reward processes.
Technical report LIDS-P-2411, Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
23. Sutton, R. S., McAllester, D. A., Singh, S. P., and Mansour, Y. (2000). Policy gradient methods for reinforcement learning with function approximation. In Solla, S. A., Leen, T. K., andM¨uller, K.-R. (Eds.),
NIPS 12, pp. 1057–1063. MIT Press.
24. Baxter, J. and Bartlett, P. (2000). Reinforcement learning in POMDP’s via direct gradient ascent. In
ICML-00, pp. 41–48.
25. Kahn, H. and Marshall, A. W. (1953). Methods of reducing sample size in Monte Carlo computations. Operations Research, 1(5), 263–278. 26. Van Roy, B. (1998). Learning and value function approximation in complex decision processes. Ph.D. thesis, Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems, MIT.
27. Ng, A. Y. and Jordan, M. I. (2000). PEGASUS: A policy search method for large MDPs and POMDPs.
In UAI-00, pp. 406–415.
28. Russell, S. J. (1998). Learning agents for uncertain environments (extended abstract). In COLT-98, pp. 101–103.


Norvig I
Peter Norvig
Stuart J. Russell
Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010
Reliability Theory Field II 96
Reliability Theory/Reliability/FieldVsReliability theory: Problem: most people are not reliable about politics. - False: to say that they are under "abnormal conditions". Correct: they are not under optimal conditions.
Problem: Optimum: is difficult to determine non-intentionally.
Problem: E.g. a sect member is not reliable in relation to reality but reliable in relation to the opinions of the guru.
---
II 99
Solution: FieldVsStalnaker: needs something that he does not want: more delicate belief states than those with Boolean structure. ---
II 369
Reliability/Field: cannot be everything we strive for. For example, there are completely reliable inductive rules: e.g. to believe in nothing at all, no matter what evidence there is. - E.g. to only believe in logical truths - but the theory of reliability wants more. It wants to pick out a special class which constitutes the rationality of a believe. Reliability/Field: is divided into many different terms:
a) over short - over long time
b) high probability exact truth - high probability approximate truth
c) providing reliability in the actual world.
Reliability via a lot of similar possible worlds.
---
II 380
Reliability/Field: For example, an initial observation turns out to be wrong. - Three possibilities: i): The rule is not reliable at the beginning, but it becomes more reliable.
ii) there is no rule at the beginning, the later ones are better. (FieldVs, GoldmanVs.) - Vs: this makes reliability unreachable and declares us to be unreasonable forever.
iii) The rule was always reliable, only the observation period was too short.
---
II 384
Field: we also need goals and effectiveness: then a rule can be more reliable but less powerful.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Right of Resistance Locke Höffe I 255
Right of Resistance/Locke/Höffe: Locke advocates a right of resistance with two arguments. 1) According to the first argument(1), tyranny begins where an authority exceeds the legal powers in the exercise of its official authority. Thus it encroaches on the rights of others, against which one may resist as against private individuals. See >Civil Disobedience.
2) The second argument from the final chapter(2) on the dissolution of the government refers to the pre-contractual alternative to the natural state: whoever proceeds by force without being entitled to do so, that is, whoever violates the principle of legality, puts himself in a state of war. Because this removes all previous obligations, one has the right
Höffe I 256
to defend, that is, to resist those who use violence. This legitimate resistance need not be satisfied with a merely symbolic resistance or only verbal opposition. For the sake of effectiveness, it may resort to violence itself and even punish a superior, because the state of war dissolves all hierarchy. >War/Locke. Monarchy: the right to resist: even in a (constitutional) monarchy, state power ultimately rests with the authority from which all political power emanates, the people, who conclude the treaties. Even if he does not use the term yet, Locke is a pioneer of the principle of sovereignty of the people.
Problem/Höffe: Quis iudicabit? Locke mentions some aspects, for example that the legislature is attacking the property of the subjects. However, the question of when and at what level of public charges this happens is a recurring problem: who decides?


1. Locke, Second treatise of Government, § 202
2. Ibid., Chap. XIX

Loc III
J. Locke
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding


Höffe I
Otfried Höffe
Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016
Selection Darwin Gould I 53
Selection/Darwin: suggested two types of sexual selection. (a) competition among male members of a species for access to females, and (b) a selection made by the females themselves.
Gould I 54
WallaceVsSexual Selection: it attaches too much importance to the "wanting" of animals. It puts emphasis on characteristics, which are rather hindering for a well-functioning machine. GouldVsWallace, who had an exaggerated idea of the effectiveness of the selection, abruptly stopped short of the brain. He argued that our morality and our intellect cannot be the product of natural selection. However, since it is the only way to develop forms, a divine being must have intervened.
Nowadays, absurdly, an attitude is called "Neo Darwinism" which is much closer to Wallace's rigorous selectionism than to Darwin.
Gould IV 266
Natural selection/Darwin: admitted that two authors before him had discovered the natural selection: Patrick Matthew, Scottish naturalist and fruit grower, 1831.
Williams Charles Wells, famous doctor, member of the Academy of Sciences.
IV 269
William Charles Wells: clarified a mistake regarding a disease with large black spots on the skin of white people. They are by no means genealogically or otherwise very similar to people of color.
IV 270
Black skin: has an advantage in hot climates. This is the traditional Darwinian argument! In fact, it is about the combination with other characteristics, e. g. better protection against tropical diseases accidentally paired with darker skin.
IV 271
Wells: Recognized that animals cannot be considered as an amalgam of independent parts. That was new at the time.
IV 272
Selection/tradition, old view: the fight between individuals within a population. Selection, new: Wells preferred variants cannot assert theirselves in stable populations with a large number of individuals!
Inheritance/Mendel: (Mendel's results have not yet been known to Wells): Mendel: preferred characteristics are often caused by mutation, and these characteristics cannot be diluted by crossbreeding with normal individuals.
The mutation may not be phenotypic (if it is recessive) in the next generation, but it does not disappear.
Selection, new: Today, increased attention is paid to group selection.
IV 273
Variation: everybody knew at Wells' time that organisms vary. However, experience from dog breeding cannot be transferred to the development from fish to humans.


Gould I
Stephen Jay Gould
The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980
German Edition:
Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009

Gould II
Stephen Jay Gould
Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983
German Edition:
Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991

Gould III
Stephen Jay Gould
Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996
German Edition:
Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004

Gould IV
Stephen Jay Gould
The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985
German Edition:
Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989
Selection Wallace Gould I 52
Selection/Wallace/Gould: In England there was a small group of rigid selectionists,"Darwinists", their leader was Wallace. They attributed any change to the selection. They gave the selection a quasi central divine status, which Darwin as a convinced pluralist could not tolerate.
I 53
Selection: Darwin proposed two types of sexual selection. a) competition among male conspecifics for access to females, and b) a selection made by the females themselves.
I 54
WallaceVsSexual selection: on the whole, it attaches too much importance to the "wanting" of animals, it attached importance to characteristics that are more difficult for a well-functioning machine.(1) GouldVsWallace, who had an exaggerated idea of the effectiveness of selection, stopped abruptly in front of the brain. He argued: our morality and intellect cannot be product of natural selection. But since it is the only way to create forms, a divine being must have intervened.
Today, absurdly enough, one calls "Neo Darwinism" a mindset that is much closer to Wallace's rigid selectionism than Darwin.
I 56
Wallace truly believed that all people at birth have the same mental abilities. He argued that the brain is much too big to have been arisen in primitive societies. He concludes that a "higher intelligence" has guided development. (Natural theology). GouldVsWallace: The exaggerated insistence on evolution produces such conclusions: if every part of every living being is trained only for its immediate use, then Wallace cannot be contradicted.
Purpose/GouldVsWallace: The all too rigid insisting on the selection represents the scientific version of the myth of natural harmony in the late 19th century. According to him, everything is for the best in the best of all possible worlds (respectively all structures are designed for a specific purpose).
I 60
E.g. Dr Pangloss, Voltaire, Candide: "The world is not necessarily good, but it is the best we can have. "Things can't be any different than they are now. Everything is created for the best purpose. Our noses were created to wear glasses, so we wear glasses, our legs were made to wear pants, so we wear pants" (Written 100 years before Wallace).
1. A. R. Wallace (1895). Natural Selection and Tropical Nature. London: MacMillan.


WallaceAR I
Alfred Russell Wallace
The Malay Archipelago London 2016


Gould I
Stephen Jay Gould
The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980
German Edition:
Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009

Gould II
Stephen Jay Gould
Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983
German Edition:
Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991

Gould III
Stephen Jay Gould
Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996
German Edition:
Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004

Gould IV
Stephen Jay Gould
The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985
German Edition:
Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989
Society Harris Gaus I 216
Society/David Harris/Moon: Because concepts of positive rights and equal opportunity are not well defined outside of specific social contexts, they are often combined with arguments appealing to ideals of citizenship and social solidarity. The basic argument is that the welfare state should guarantee the inclusion of all citizens as full members of a democratic society, which
requires that an extensive range of social rights be provided.
David Harris: Harris offers a communitarian version of the argument from solidarity. He argues that 'full membership' in a society requires that each person be able to enjoy 'a certain style of life' and 'certain life chances' (1987(1): 147). Although he recognizes that modern societies include a plurality of different groups, he insists that there are more or less common standards of what an individual must be able to do and how one must be able to live if one is not to be excluded or socially marginalized. These standards determine the needs of members of that society, and should be equally available to all citizens as a matter of right, for only in that way can the equal status of members be recognized and respected (1987(1): 154-7).
Moon: This line of argument supports the institutional welfare state in which services are provided in kind in part because 'citizens have a right to that specific resource', such as 'edu-cation', rather than a right 'to income which may or may not be spent on education' (1987(1): 150).
Further, the universal provision of certain services is expressive of, and may contribute to, a sense of community and equal citizenship.
Finally, providing services in kind may be a form of 'justified paternalism' to the extent that 'some persons may be imprudent or wasteful or be unable to make adequate use of cash' (1987(1): 150-1).
Family: Harris's account relies upon an analogy between political society and the family: just as we have obligations towards, and rights against, members of our family, irrespective of what they may have done for us individually, so we have obligations towards, and rights against, our fellow citizens.
Moon: The stress on obligations is crucial, for the possibility of enjoying one's rights depends upon the willing support of social policies on the part of the citizenry, and to claim one's rights one must be prepared to fulfil the 'system of duties' that 'underlies the structure of citizen rights' (1987(1): 160).
Fundamental needs: (...) Harris goes on to argue that the pragmatic difficulties involved in determining whether someone's unfulfilled needs are a result of his own choices are so great that we should presume that there are no such cases, and should rely upon a 'sense of duty or community to prevent or minimize abuse of the system' (1987(1): 161).
Gaus I 217
MoonVsHarris: 1) (...) the founding of rights and obligations on 'membership' is deeply problematic, in as much as it begs the question of whether the social order of which we are to be members is just.
2) (...) ironically, welfare states have a systematic tendency to undermine the very communitar-
ian sentiments and relationships that would support the values of solidarity and equality. Although
participating in a common programme, such as a national health service or medicare, may give rise to feelings of solidarity with others, what people actually experience may often be quite different. In many cases it is more like being reduced to the status of a client, attempting to meet one's needs through an impersonal and unresponsive bureaucracy. *
3) (...) the commitment to equality can sometimes sit uneasily with the commitment to democracy. Consider, for example, Albert Weale's argument for earnings-related welfare state schemes,
such as social security in the US. Weale argues that such schemes increase the total volume of government transfers, thus leading to greater 'egalitarian effectiveness'. >Equality/Weale, >Solidarity/Welfare economics.

*This is an important theme in Wolfe's analysis and critique of state provision (see 1989(2): esp. chs 4 and 5).


1. Harris, David (1987) Justifying State Welfare. Oxford: Blackwell.
2. Wolfe, Alan (1989) Whose Keeper? Social Science and Moral Obligation. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications

LingHarris I
Zellig S. Harris
A Theory of Language and Information: A Mathematical Approach Oxford 1991


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
State (Polity) Humboldt Mause I 43
State/Society/Humboldt: Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835) sums up the "free work of the nation among themselves" in his ideas written in 1792 as an attempt to determine the limits of the effectiveness of the state, "it is actually which preserves all goods whose longing leads people into a society. The actual state constitution is subordinate to it, as its purpose, and is always chosen only as a necessary means and, since it is always associated with restrictions of freedom, as a necessary evil". (1)
1.W. v. Humboldt, Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Grenzen der Wirksamkeit des Staats zu bestimmen, Hrsg. Robert Haerdter, Stuttgart 1967, S. 192.



Höffe I 322
State/Humboldt/Höffe: In his ideas(1) (...) and in other political writings, Humboldt sets narrow limits on all state activity. As a liberal thinker of the state, whom Mill holds in high esteem, he pleads for a free and functional constitutional state, but rejects the paternalistic welfare state. For a government that is committed to the physical and moral well-being of the population would fall into the "worst and most oppressive despotism". Freedom: [Humboldt] calls for the fight against feudalism.
Equal rights: He stands up for the equal rights of the Jews, not only gradually, but immediately. For it was against the "true concept of human dignity" to treat someone not as an individual but as a member of a race.

1.Humboldt, Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Grenzen der Wirksamkeit des Staates zu bestimmen (1792)


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018

Höffe I
Otfried Höffe
Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016
Structures Lévi-Strauss I 23
Structures/Lévi-Strauss: the number of structures is limited. "Structuring" would therefore have an inner effectiveness, which may also be the principles and methods by which it is guided.

LevSt I
Claude Lévi-Strauss
La pensée sauvage, Paris 1962
German Edition:
Das Wilde Denken Frankfurt/M. 1973

LevSt II
C. Levi-Strauss
The Savage Mind (The Nature of Human Society Series) Chicago 1966

Supervised Learning AI Research Norvig I 694
Supervised Learning/AI Research/Norvig/Russell: In unsupervised learning the agent learns patterns in the input even though no explicit feedback is supplied. The most common unsupervised learning task is clustering: detecting
Norvig I 695
potentially useful clusters of input examples. Def Supervised learning: In supervised learning the agent observes some example input–output pairs and learns a function that maps from input to output.
In semi-supervised learning we are given a few labeled examples and must make what we can of a large collection of unlabeled examples. Even the labels themselves may not be the oracular truths that we hope for. Imagine that you are trying to build a system to guess a person’s age from a photo. You gather some labeled examples by snapping pictures of people and asking their age. That’s supervised learning. But in reality some of the people lied about their age. It’s not just that there is random noise in the data; rather the inaccuracies are systematic, and to uncover them is an unsupervised learning problem involving images, self-reported ages, and true (unknown) ages. Thus, both noise and lack of labels create a continuum between supervised and unsupervised learning.

The task of supervised learning is this:
Given a training set of N example input–output pairs
(x1, y1), (x2, y2), . . . (xN, yN) ,
where each yj was generated by an unknown function y = f(x),
discover a function h that approximates the true function f.

Norvig I 696
Classification: When the output y is one of a finite set of values (such as sunny, cloudy or rainy), the learning problem is called classification, and is called Boolean or binary classification if there are only two values. Regression: When y is a number (such as tomorrow’s temperature), the learning problem is called regression.
Hypotheses: In general, there is a tradeoff between complex hypotheses that fit the training data well and simpler hypotheses that may generalize better. >Representation/Norvig, >Knowledge/AI Research, >Learning/AI Research.
Norvig I 697
Realization: We say that a learning problem is realizable if the hypothesis space contains the true function. Unfortunately, we cannot always tell whether a given learning problem is realizable, because the true function is not known. There is a tradeoff between the expressiveness of a hypothesis space and the complexity of finding a good hypothesis within that space.
Norvig I 759
History: Cross-validation was first introduced by Larson (1931)(1), and in a form close to what we show by Stone (1974)(2) and Golub et al. (1979)(3). The regularization procedure is due to Tikhonov (1963)(4). Guyon and Elisseeff (2003)(5) introduce a journal issue devoted to the problem of feature selection. Banko and Brill (2001)(6) and Halevy et al. (2009)(7) discuss the advantages of using large amounts of data. It was Robert Mercer, a speech researcher who said in 1985 “There is no data like more data.” (Lyman and Varian, 2003)(8)o estimate that about 5 exabytes (5 × 1018 bytes) of data was produced in 2002, and that the rate of production is doubling every 3 years. Theoretical analysis of learning algorithms began with the work of Gold (1967)(9) on identification in the limit. This approach was motivated in part by models of scientific discovery from the philosophy of science (Popper, 1962)(10), but has been applied mainly to the problem of learning grammars from example sentences (Osherson et al., 1986)(11).


1. Larson, S. C. (1931). The shrinkage of the coefficient of multiple correlation. J. Educational Psychology, 22, 45–-55.
2. Stone, M. (1974). Cross-validatory choice and assessment of statostical predictions. J. Royal Statistical Society, 36 (111-133).
3. Golub, G., Heath, M., and Wahba, G. (1979). Generalized cross-validation as a method for choosing a good ridge parameter. Technometrics, 21 (2).
4. Tikhonov, A. N. (1963). Solution of incorrectly formulated problems and the regularization method.
Soviet Math. Dokl., 5, 1035-1038.
5. Guyon, I. and Elisseeff, A. (2003). An introduction to variable and feature selection. JMLR, pp. 1157-
1182.
6. Banko, M. and Brill, E. (2001). Scaling to very very large corpora for natural language disambiguation. In ACL-01, pp. 26-33. 7. Halevy, A., Norvig, P., and Pereira, F. (2009). The unreasonable effectiveness of data. IEEE Intelligent
Systems, March/April, 8-12.
8. Lyman, P. and Varian, H. R. (2003). How much information? www.sims.berkeley. edu/how-much-info-2003.
9. Gold, E. M. (1967). Language identification in the limit. Information and Control, 10, 447-474.
10. Popper, K. R. (1962). Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. Basic Books.
11. Osherson, D. N., Stob, M., and Weinstein, S. (1986). Systems That Learn: An Introduction to
Learning Theory for Cognitive and Computer Scientists. MIT Press.


Norvig I
Peter Norvig
Stuart J. Russell
Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010
Teleology Jonas Brocker I 614
Teleology/Purposes/Nature/Existence/Ultimate Justification/JonasVsAristoteles/Jonas: Jonas Thesis: We must accept purposes in nature instead of locating them in the subject's actions. (1) This can be explained by the instinct of self-preservation found in nature in all life. (2) Context: the question is how to justify that we should limit our lives today for the sake of future generations. See Intergenerational Justice/Jonas, Existence/Jonas, Responsibility/Jonas, Humanity/Jonas.
Jonas speaks of the "superiority of purpose per se over futility" and adds: "In purposefulness as such, whose reality and effectiveness in the world according to the previous [...] is to be considered established, we can see a fundamental self-affirmation of being, which sets it absolutely as the better against non-being. In every purpose being explains itself and against nothingness" (3).


1. Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation, Frankfurt/M. 1979, p. 138.
2. Ibid. p. 142f.
3. Ibid. p. 155.
Manfred Brocker, „Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Jonas I
Hans Jonas
Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation Frankfurt 1979


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Translation Mayer-Schönberger I 36
Translation/Computer/Mayer-Schönberger: teaching computers to translate means not only teaching them the rules, but also the exceptions.
I 35
Algorithms/Big Data/Mayer-Schönberger: the more data available, the more algorithms are trumped. This can be seen in the way computers learn to deal with everyday language and translate it.
I 36
With larger amounts of data, an older, simpler algorithm worked even better. (1)
I 38
Google Translate: as of 2006, Google Translate did not use comparisons of finished translated text pages, but a larger and much messier amount of data: the global Internet and more. Existing translations of official documents such as the United Nations and the EU were also taken into account, as were translations from Google Books' scanned books. Instead of 300 carefully translated sentences from Candide (2) , there were now billions of pages of varying quality. See also the history of machine translation. (3) For Google Translate: see (4), (5).
Algorithms/Translation/Big Data/Mayer-Schönberger: the new automatic translations did not work better because better algorithms were available, but larger amounts of data were taken into account.
I 39
The material also contained all kinds of uncorrected errors and incomplete words. But the fact that the new body was a million times larger outweighed these disadvantages.

1. Michele Banko and Eric Brill, “Scaling to Very Very Large Corpora for Natural Language Disambiguation,” Microsoft Research, 2001, p. 3 (http://acl.ldc.upenn.edu/P/P01/P01-1005.pdf).
2. Adam L. Berger et al., “The Candide System for Machine Translation,” Proceedings of the 1994 ARPA Workshop on Human Language Technology, 1994 (http://aclweb.org/anthology-new/H/H94/H94-1100.pdf).
3. History of machine translation—Yorick Wilks, Machine Translation: Its Scope and Limits (Springer, 2008), p. 107. [>] Candide’s millions of texts versus Google’s billions of texts—Och interview with Cukier, December 2009.
4. Alex Franz and Thorsten Brants, “All Our N-gram are Belong to You,” Google blog post, August 3, 2006 (http://googleresearch.blogspot.co.uk/2006/08/all-our-n-gram-are-belong-to-you.html).
5. Halevy, Norvig, and Pereira, “The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Data.”

MSchoen I
Viktor Mayer-Schönberger
Big Data: A Revolution That Will Transform How We Live, Work, and Think New York 2013

Unity Wilson I 16
Unit/Science/Wilson: (See href="https://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/search.php?erweiterte_suche_1=conciliation&erweiterte_suche_2=Wilson&x=0&y=0">Conciliation/Terminology): the belief in the possibility of an association that includes all major fields of knowledge beyond the natural sciences is not scientific itself. Its most convincing test will be their effectiveness in the social sciences and humanities.

WilsonEO I
E. O. Wilson
Consilience. The Unity of Knowledge, New York 1998
German Edition:
Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge New York 1998

Vitalism Mayr I 29
Vitalists/Vitalism/Mayr: Appropriateness (before Kant).
"Protoplasm": a special substance that inanimate matter lacks.
---
I 31
Vitality, "élan vital". Fluid: (no liquid)
Debate "Preformations/Epigenesis Theory 2nd half of the 18th century.
Preformationists: believed that the parts of an adult individual were already present in smaller form at the beginning of its development. (Caspar Friedrich Wolff refuted preformation, needed causal power "vis essentialis").
---
I 33
Epigenetics: assumed that they appeared as products of a development, not at the beginning. Blumenbach, rejected "vis essentialis" and spoke of "educational drive" that plays a role not only in the embryo but also in growth, regeneration and reproduction. ---
I 35
Selection theory: made vitalism superfluous: Haeckel:"We recognize in Darwin's selection the decisive proof for the exclusive effectiveness of mechanical causes in the entire field of biology... definitive end of all teleological and vitalistic interpretations of organisms". ---
I 35
Protoplasm: the search for it promoted a flourishing branch of chemistry: colloid chemistry. It was finally discovered that there is no protoplasm! Word and concept disappeared. Life: it became possible to explain it by means of molecules and their organisation!
Organic/inorganic: in 1828 urea was synthesized: first proof of the artificial conversion of inorganic components into an organic molecule!
---
I 38
Vitalism: Strange phenomenon: among the physicists of the 20th century vitalistic ideas arose. Bohr: in organisms, certain laws could have an effect that cannot be found in inanimate matter. Bohr looked in biology for evidence of its complementarity and drew on some desperate analogies.
MayrVsBohr: there is really nothing that can be considered.(Unclear only in the subatomic field).

Mayr I
Ernst Mayr
This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997
German Edition:
Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998


The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Identity Theory Verschiedene Vs Identity Theory Lanz I 280
VsIdentity Theory: Sensations cannot be identical with brain processes, because one can know that one feels something certain without knowing that the corresponding brain process takes place. Complete ignorance of neurophysiology does not prevent anyone from being a good everyday psychologist.
Identity/Leibniz: (VsIdentity Thesis) all characteristics must be shared. Popular argument against the identity thesis: if one finds characteristics that possess mental phenomena, but not the supposedly identical neural states or processes, one believes that the thesis is done.
For example, pain can be like stabbing, neuronal events cannot, thoughts can be astute, neural states cannot, my memory picture of the Eiffel Tower has shape, form and color, but not the neural state, thoughts cannot be localized, but neuronal processes, etc. Allegedly, a category mistake is made here.
VsVs: confusion of word and object, word meaning (description) different, nevertheless the object can be the same.
Te I 45
Mind/Brain/TetensVsIdentity Theory: the answer to the question: "are mental states brain states? In the end it turns out to be more complicated: on the one hand, they are revealed as causes of behaviour:
Te I 145
No identity due to psycho-physical laws, the same behavior can be accompanied by different brain states (>Davidson). On the other hand, we refer to interaction patterns that include the attribution of mental states. In this respect, it makes no sense to say that we only refer to brain states. So there is no unambiguous answer for an identity of both states.
Te I 147
TetensVsIdentity Theory: this leaves out the effectiveness of the attributions of mental states for interactions.
Vollmer I 108
Identity Theory/Monism/Vollmer: most important monistic theory: mind is a function of the central nervous system that only emerges at a certain evolutionary level. Representative: Feigl, Armstrong, Smart, Place, Bunge, Lewis.
Function/Explanation/Evolution Theory/Vollmer: by evolution one can explain a function only if this function means a selective advantage.
For example memory, representing function of our central nervous system, simulation function.
VsIdentity Theory/Vollmer: there is an evolutionary argument: if mental processes are identical with physical processes, then the selective advantage of mental processes must be an advantage of physical processes at the same time.
But then this advantage would also exist if the physical processes had no internal aspect at all. The biological significance (and selective advantage) would be ensured without any psychological by-products (>epiphenomenalism).
Then the whole internal aspect, that the world somehow feels to us, is unexplained, superfluous. Then why did it develop at all?
Vollmer II 89
VsIdentity Theory/Vollmer: psychological processes are subjective, but undeniable! In this respect it is easier to doubt the existence of matter (>Descartes).
II 90
VsIdentity Theory/Vollmer: psychological and physical processes seem completely incomparable. Neuronal processes are localized, consciousness is not. Vollmer:(pro identity theory): Some identity theorists do not take this seriously at all, but the argument is not a threat: we can interpret difference projectively: as subjective and objective aspects of one and the same thing. For example, a cylinder appears from different sides as a circle or cuboid.
VollmerVsVs: Identity: not all properties must match: the optical and haptic impression of an apple are also not identical.





Lanz I
Peter Lanz
Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988
Property Dualism Schiffer Vs Property Dualism I 150
Schiffer: Thesis: There is no irreducible belief properties. Suppose there were, then we have the following reductio ad absurdum: if there are any, they cannot be irreducible. This has unacceptable consequences:
(1) Ava is n in a neural state token. n has B, the non-pleonastic property to be a belief that a car is coming) and B is not identical to any property which is intrinsically to be specified in a non-mentalist, non-intentionalist vocabulary.
We have already said that there is a full neuro physical explanation for Ava's stepping back, and we assume that implies:
(2) there is a neurophysiological property P of n's, which is the most comprehensive property that enters the neurophysiological explanation of Ava's stepping back and therefore is necessary and sufficient that n is a cause of the stepping back.
The property P is now completely explanatory of the body movement.
(3) But if there is a non-pleonastic property B, then it also is a causal essential property, in view of the cause of stepping back. If n had not have had B, n (the neural state token) had not caused Ava's stepping back.
Def Property Dualism/Schiffer/(s): assumes the simultaneous existence of physical and irreducible mentalistic or intentional properties.
SchifferVsProperty Dualism: assuming the property dualism for (1), it is not possible, then one have to explain the simultaneous truth of (1) - (3), and follow one of the four ways (A) - (D), which are all wrong:
A.
Property Dualism/Schiffer: could argue that the causal efficacy of B (the irreducible mental, intentional property) cannot be explained in terms of the effectiveness of P. So that there is no causal overdetermination at the level of the causes (as we assume, as belief-Z-tokens = neural Z-Tokens) but at the level of causal laws. (…+…)
I 152
B. Property Dualism/Schiffer: could be argued that the belief properties must not be embedded in a causal law, but that it is a simple, primitive, naked metaphysical fact that B (mental Z-Token) is causally significantly in this way.
SchifferVs: 1. that is as if to say that B is causal, but not included in any law of causality. (…+…)
C.
Property Dualism/Schiffer: could try as epiphenomenalism: that the neural Z token has n P caused that it also has B.
Causality/Epiphenomenalism: the causal relevance is then inherited.
SchifferVsProperty Dualism/SchifferVsEpiphenomenalism: the talk of "nomological appendages" shows that B does not even now do the empty part of a superfluous jobs! (…+…)
D.
Property Dualism/Schiffer: last rescue: supervenience: to have B "superveniere" on the Doing of P, where "supervenience" to be a primitive metaphysical relationship that is to have nothing to do with causation, but rather to have something to do with a primitive form of Entailment (to Include).
So: although B is not identical or contained in P, and although there is no formal Entailment, it should be a naked, inexplicable fact that there is no possible world in which a state has P but not B. (…+…)

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Whitehead, A.N. Kanitscheider Vs Whitehead, A.N. II 176
KanitscheiderVsProcess Philosophy/KanitscheiderVsWhitehead: the weakness lies in the double aspect character: there is no possibility of testing the divine effectiveness in the sequence of events. The explanatory force is zero. No Iota changes if there is no transcendent causer at work.
Metaphysical "Bandwagon Effect".
((s) The "influence on everything" can be shortened away! (If it is uniform.).
Kanitscheider: the expression "influence on everything" can only be meant metaphorically.

Kanitsch I
B. Kanitscheider
Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991

Kanitsch II
B. Kanitscheider
Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Computation Fodor, J. Fodor/Lepore IV 126
Computation/Fodor/Lepore: thesis: the causal role of representations is determined by the same syntactic properties on which their compositionality depends.
IV 179
Computation/Fodor/Lepore: thesis: causal relations reconstruct inferential relations. The hope of a unification of semantics and psychology is connected with this.
Pauen I 147
Computation/Johnson-Laird: thesis, once one understands how a computer works, the mind can be examined independently of the brain.
Pauen I 148
The meaning differences of "0" and "1" correspond to physical differences of the switching states. In the same way one must imagine the effectiveness of meaningful states in the cognitive system of a human being.
Fodor: in contrast to this (computer) neuronal networks function completely differently, namely associatively.

Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001