Dictionary of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute

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Disputed term/author/ism	Author	Entry	Reference
Bandura	Psychological Theories	Slater I 183 Bandura/aggression/Bobo doll study/psychological theories: Bandura’s Bobo doll studies (Bandura 1961⁽¹⁾) (>Aggression/Bandura) have been criticized since for methodological and ethical reasons. 1) Some critiques have questioned whether Bandura’s study would have been approved by a 21st century IRB [Institutional Review Boards] given the explicit modeling of aggression to which the children were exposed as well as the provocation in denying them access to the attractive toys that was meant to elicit the children’s own aggressive responses. 2) Scholars have questioned the generalizability of the findings given that the child participants were all recruited from the Stanford University preschool, and, thereby, more socioeconomically advantaged than the general population. The original study does not provide information about the children’s race, ethnicity, parents’ education, or other sociodemographic variables that are typically reported in the literature today. Subsequent research has documented sociodemographic differences in children’s mean levels of aggression. For example, children with more educated parents (Nagin & Tremblay, 2001)⁽²⁾, from families with fewer stressors (Sanson, Oberklaid, Pedlow, & Prior, 1991)⁽³⁾, and from two-parent households (Vaden-Kiernan, Ialongno, Pearson, & Kellam, 1995)⁽⁴⁾, on average, demonstrate lower levels of aggression than do children with less educated parents, from families with more stressors, and from single parent households, respectively. However, the lack of attention to sociodemographic characteristics of the children in the original study would only pose a problem if these characteristics moderated links between exposure to an aggressive model and one’s own imitative learning of aggression. To date, evidence of this kind of moderation does not exist. >Aggression/Bandura. Slater I 184 Some critics have questioned whether the Bobo doll study constitutes evidence regarding children’s imitation of aggression or merely behaviors the children regarded as play. This argument hinges on how aggression is defined. Contemporary researchers generally define aggression as an act perpetrated by one individual that is intended to cause physical, psychological, or social harm to another (Anderson & Bushman, 2002)⁽⁵⁾. It is plausible that the intention to harm was missing from children’s imitative behaviors toward the Bobo doll, even if by their nature (e.g., kicking, hitting), they seem aggressive. 1. Bandura, A., Ross, D., & Ross, S. A. (1961). Transmission of aggression through imitation of aggressive models. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 63, 575—582. 2. Nagin, D. S., & Tremblay, R. E. (2001). Parental and early childhood predictors of persistent physical aggression in boys from kindergarten to high school. Archives of General Psychiatry, 58, 389—394. 3. Sanson, A., Oberklaid, F., Pedlow, R., & Prior, M. (1991). Risk indicators: Assessment of infancy predictors of pre-school behavioral maladjustment. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 32, 609— 626. 4. Vaden-Kiernan, N., Ialongno, N. S., Pearson, J., & Kellam, S. (1995). Household family structure and children’s aggressive behavior: A longitudinal study of urban elementary school children. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 23, 553—568. 5. Anderson, C. A., & Bushman, B. J. (2002). Human aggression. Annual Review of Psychology,, 53, 27- 51. Jenifer E. Lansford, “Aggression. Beyond Bandura’s Bobo Doll Studies“, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications	Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Communication Media	Parsons	Habermas IV 385 Communication media/Parsons/Habermas: Question: 1. What is the conceptual status of money as a medium that occupies the internal systemic exchange between real variables such as labour and consumer goods? 2. Do the other social subsystems also regulate the exchange in their environments via similar media?⁽¹⁾ Parsons later regarded his attempt to see power as a control medium anchored in the political system with structural analogies to money as a successful test for the generalizability of the media concept.⁽²⁾ Habermas IV 386 In the order of money, power, influence and value retention, Parsons has analyzed four media in broad lines, each of which is assigned to one of the social subsystems: Money: the economic, Power: the political system, Influence: the system of social integration Value retention: the system for the preservation of structural patterns. Habermas: in another round of generalization, Parsons introduced four more media: Intelligence, performance, affect and interpretation.⁽³⁾ >Communication media, >Money, >Power, >Values. HabermasVsParsons: the analogies to the medium of money become less clear and even metaphorical during the course of theory formation. This applies all the more to the media that Parsons recently assigned to the subsystems of the all-encompassing system of the human condition: transcendental order, symbolic meaning, health and empirical order. ⁽⁴⁾ Habermas IV 387 In the end, money is for Parsons only one of 64 socio-theoretically remarkable media. Problem: then one cannot know which of the structural characteristics read off the money medium are characteristic of media at all. Habermas IV 388 Problem: are we dealing here with an overgeneralization, i.e. with the thesis that there is something like a system of control media? Double Contingency/Parsons. Habermas IV 393 Media/Parsons/Habermas: serve not only to save information and time, and thus to reduce the effort of interpretation, but also to cope with the risk that the action sequences will break off. Media such as power and money can largely save the costs of dissent because they uncouple the coordination of action from the formation of linguistic consensus and neutralize it against the alternative of agreement and failed understanding. They are not specifications of language, they replace special language functions. Habermas IV 394 Lifeworld/Parsons/Habermas: the conversion of the coordination of actions from language to control media means a decoupling of the interaction from lifeworld contexts. >Communicative action/Parsons, >Communication theory/Habermas. 1. T.Parsons, Social Systems and the Evolution of Action Theory, NY 1977, S. 128 2. T. Parsons, On the Concept of Power, in: Social Theory and Modern Society, NY 1967 3. Talcott Parsons, Some Problems of General Theory, in: J.C. McKinney, E. A. Tiryakian (Eds.), Theoretical Sociology, NY 1970 S. 27ff. 4. T. Parsons, Action, Theory and the Human Condition, NY 1978, S. 393.	ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Cultural Psychology	De Raad	Corr I 133 Cultural psychology/cultural differences/generalizability/five-factor model/personality traits/De Raad: replicability. In pursuit of a cross-lingual trait-structure, Hofstee, Kiers, De Raad et al. (1997)⁽¹⁾, De Raad, Perugini and Szirmák (1997)⁽²⁾ and De Raad, Perugini, Hrebícková and Szarota (1998)⁽³⁾ compared several psycholexically derived five factor structures using psychometric criteria. The general conclusion of those studies was that congruence coefficients calculated for corresponding Big Five factors suggested the replicability of the first three factors of the Big Five (Extraversion, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness) and moderate replicability of the fourth factor, Emotional Stability. Moreover, cross-cultural comparisons based on the substance of Big Five factors from six different psycholexical studies also led to the conclusion that Extraversion, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness are cross-culturally coherent, Emotional Stability and Intellect are not (De Raad and Peabody 2005⁽⁴⁾; Peabody and De Raad 2002)⁽⁵⁾. >Language/Psychological theories. 1. Hofstee, W. K. B., Kiers, H. A. L., De Raad, B., Goldberg, L. R. and Ostendorf, F. 1997. A comparison of Big-Five structures of personality traits in Dutch, English, and German, European Journal of Personality 11: 15-31 2. De Raad, B., Perugini, M. and Szirmák, Z. 1997. In pursuit of a cross-lingual reference structure of personality traits: comparisons among five languages, European Journal of Personality 11: 167–85 3. De Raad, B., Perugini, M., Hrébicková, M. and Szarota, P. 1998. Lingua franca of personality: taxonomies and structures based on the psycholexical approach, Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 29: 212–32 4. De Raad, B. and Peabody, D. 2005. Cross-culturally recurrent personality factors: analyses of three factors, European Journal of Personality 19: 451–74 5. Peabody, D. and De Raad, B. 2002. The substantive nature of psycholexical personality factors: a comparison acrosss languages, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 83: 983–97 Boele De Raad, “Structural models of personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Cultural Psychology	Deary	Corr I 90 Cultural psychology/cultural differences/generalizability/five-factor model/personality traits/Deary: The applicability of the Five-Factor Model to other cultures and language groups has been questioned, and the model has largely done well in this sphere too. The NEO Personality Inventory-Revised has been translated into many different languages. In a study of twenty-six cultures, many non-Western, McCrae (2001)⁽¹⁾ reported that factor analyses retrieved very similar structures of personality description. A later report, in which almost 12,000 students in fifty cultures rated another person’s traits, found good agreement with regard to the American self-report structure (McCrae and 79 others 2005)⁽²⁾. This study found similar sex and age differences across cultures. Eysenck’s personality questionnaires perform well on this type of cross-cultural comparison too (e.g., Eysenck and Eysenck 1982)⁽³⁾. A. This type of research is known as the ‘etic’ approach, in which a personality personality questionnaire developed in one culture (usually Western) is translated and applied to others. B. The other type of research is ‘emic’, which starts with the culture’s own lexicon and asks if a similar personality structure is found in each. Peabody and De Raad’s (2002)⁽⁴⁾ summary of emic research was that the ‘effort to achieve Big Five universality has been overextended’. They found the best generality across cultures for >Conscientiousness, >Extraversion and >Agreeableness. >language/psychological theories, >Five-Factor Model. 1. McCrae, R. R. 2001. Trait psychology and culture: exploring intercultural comparison, Journal of Personality 69: 819–46 2. McCrae, R. R. and 79 others 2005. Universal features of personality traits from the observer’s perspective: data from 50 cultures, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 88: 547–61 3. Eysenck, H. J. and Eysenck, S. B. G. 1982. Recent advances in the cross-cultural study of personality, in C. D. Spielberger and J. N. Butcher (eds.), Advances in personality assessment, pp. 41–69. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum 4. Peabody, D. and De Raad, B. 2002. The substantive nature of psycholexical personality factors: a comparison across languages, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 83: 983–97 Ian J. Deary, “The trait approach to personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Empiricism	Economic Theories	Parisi I 30 Empiricism/Economics theories/Gelbach/Klick: The central problem in much empirical work is omitted variables bias. a) Sometimes this problem can be solved by controlling for more covariates—if the problem is omission, then inclusion should be a good solution. But this solution is often not feasible, because many omitted variables will be unknown to the researcher, and still others that theory suggests should be included will be unavailable or unquantifiable. Despite these issues, simply adding more control variables was standard operating procedure in empirical law and economics before the mid-1990s. b) Another approach was to admit the existence of the bias but to assert that the bias necessarily is in a given direction or to speculate about its probable magnitude. But if there are multiple omitted variables, this approach is more problematic, because the sign and magnitude of the bias from excluding omitted variables then depends on the relationship between the policy variable of interest and all the omitted variables, as well as the signs and magnitudes of the coefficients on those omitted variables’ coefficients.* Randomized controlled experiments: In the mid-1990s, many empirical micro-economists began to shift focus to research designs they motivated in terms linked to the method of randomized controlled experiments. Omitted variable bias is not a concern in such experiments since the “treatment” is assigned randomly, so that assignment is statistically independent of any otherwise important omitted variables. In a random assignment experiment, average treatment effects can then be measured simply, using the average change in the outcome of interest for the experimental treatment group, minus the average change in the experimental control group. Parisi I 30 FN Estimation: (...)that average effects are not the only type of treatment effects that can be esti- mated. For examples of studies that consider distributional effects, see Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997)⁽³⁾ and Bitler, Gelbach, and Hoynes (2006)⁽⁴⁾. Parisi I 31 Randomized controlled experiments: Empirical law and economics embraced this approach, implementing so-called difference-in-differences research designs to examine a host of legal changes. In general, this approach compares the change in outcomes in jurisdictions adopting a given policy with any contemporaneous change in non-adopting jurisdictions. Policy changes: Some studies bearing the “natural experiments” moniker (...) use instrumental variables to purge their estimates of endogenous policy choice. A valid instrumental variable in this context is one that is correlated with the adoption of a policy change, but not otherwise correlated with the outcome of interest. The first requirement is easy Parisi I 32 to demonstrate empirically, if it holds. But the second requirement, which is an “exactly identifying assumption,” cannot be tested and therefore is adopted only because it appears reasonable in context; intuition may be the only real guide to whether the second condition holds. Causality: Obtaining causal estimates from non-experimental data always requires a judgment that omitted variables bias can be eliminated, so that treatment and comparison jurisdictions can be made comparable. This might be done by adding covariates, by using difference in differences, by using instrumental variables, or by using some other approach (...). Experiments/generalization: (...) perhaps the most important limitation on the usefulness of natural experiments-motivated work, involves the degree of generalizability, or “external validity.” The most plausibly exogenous natural experiments may be the ones in which the “shocks” inducing identifying variation are the most limited in terms of what they can tell us about the effects of policy change in other settings. That is, precisely the oddity that gives rise to the shock may make the effects we can estimate from the shock least relevant to other circumstances of interest. This problem has contributed both to Angus Deaton’s criticism of the natural experiment methodology (2010)⁽⁵⁾ and to other authors’ arguments in favor of structural econometric methods to generate estimates that can be more policy relevant than those provided by quasi-experimental methods (see, e.g., Nevo and Whinston, 2010⁽⁶⁾; Heckman and Urzúa, 2010⁽⁷⁾. For a response, see Imbens, 2010)⁽⁸⁾ (ImbensVsKeckman). Internal validity: Even regarding internal validity, the credibility of a quasi-experimental research design depends crucially on untestable assumptions concerning which treatment and comparison groups are sufficiently comparable. (...)(see, e.g., Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller, 2010⁽⁹⁾. More generally, see Rosenbaum, 2010⁽¹⁰⁾). Natural experiments: Some natural experiment designs also generate problems with respect to statistical inference, to the degree that the policy shocks are sticky over time, necessitating careful attention to hypothesis testing and covariance estimation (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004⁽¹¹⁾; Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller, 2008⁽¹²⁾, 2011⁽¹³⁾). *On omitted variables bias with multiple omitted variables, see Greene (2012)⁽¹⁾; for an approach to the omitted variables bias formula that views omitted variables bias in terms of the joint heterogeneity due to all omitted variables bias simultaneously, see Gelbach (2016)⁽²⁾. 1. Greene, William H. (2012). Econometric Analysis. 7th edition, Upper Saddle Lake, NJ: Prentice Hall. 2. Gelbach, Jonah B. (2016). “When Do Covariates Matter? And Which Ones, and How Much?” Journal of Labor Economics 34: 509–543. 3. Heckman, James J., Jeffrey Smith, and Nancy Clements (1997). “Making the Most Out of Programme Evaluations and Social Experiments: Accounting for Heterogeneity in Programme Impacts.” Review of Economic Studies 64(4): 487–535. 4. Bitler, Marianne P., Jonah B. Gelbach, and Hilary W. Hoynes (2006). “What Mean Impacts Miss: Distributional Effects of Welfare Reform Experiments.” American Economic Review 96(4): 988–1012. 5. Deaton, Angus (2010). “Instruments, Randomization, and Learning about Development.” Journal of Economic Literature 48(2): 424–455. 6. Nevo, Aviv and Michael D. Whinston (2010). “Taking the Dogma Out of Econometrics: Structural Modeling and Credible Inference.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 24(2): 69–82. 7. Heckman, James J. and Sergio Urzúa (2010). “Comparing IV with Structural Models: What Simple IV Can and Cannot Identify.” Journal of Econometrics 156(1): 27–37. 8. Imbens, Guido W. (2010). “Better LATE than Nothing: Some Comments on Deaton (2009) and Heckman and Urzua.” Journal of Economic Literature 48(2): 399–423. 9. Abadie, Alberto, Alexis Diamond, and Jens Hainmueller (2010). “Synthetic Control Methods for Comparative Case Studies: Estimating the Effect of California’s Tobacco Control Program.” Journal of the American Statistical Association 105(490): 493–505. 10. Rosenbaum, Paul R. (2010). Observational Studies (Springer Series in Statistics). 2nd edition. Springer-Verlag New York: New York. 11. Bertrand, Marianne, Esther Duflo, and Sendhil Mullainathan (2004). “How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(1): 249–275. 12. Cameron, A. Colin, Jonah B. Gelbach, and Douglas L. Miller (2008). “Bootstrap-Based Improvements for Inference with Clustered Errors.” Review of Economics and Statistics 90(3): 414–427. 13. Cameron, A. Colin, Jonah B. Gelbach, and Douglas L. Miller (2011). “Robust Inference with Multi-way Clustering.” Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 29(2): 238–249. Gelbach, Jonah B. and Jonathan Klick „Empirical Law and Economics“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press.	Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017
Ethics	Mackie	Stegmüller IV 169 Ethics/moral/Mackie: (similar to Field): our everyday understanding calls for a realm of moral characteristics, which should be as autonomous as material objects, but which do not exist. Moral error theory: (Field, Mackie): our search for a true-making realm of facts is caused by a semantic error. >Truth makers. The correct explanation of the truth conditions of moral judgments deprives those judgments of the valuation by everyday reasoning. (Due to the metaphysical hair-raising properties). >Truth condition, >Metaphysics. Ethics/Mackie: Thesis: there are no objective values (ontologically). >Ontology. Stegmüller IV 173 Objectivistic ethics/MackieVsObjectivism/Stegmüller: leads to strange entities like "Shall Be Done". MacKieVsintuitionism/VsEmotivism: Riddle of income: what is the link between the natural fact that murder is cruel and the moral fact that it is wrong? IV 179 Metaethical fallacy: - Conclusion of beliefs on their accuracy. >Belief, >Correctness, cf. >Naturalistic fallacy. IV 280 Morality/ethics/wisdom/generalizability/generalization/universalization/Mackie/Stegmüller: everyone wants to live according to his conscience - that tends to raise the tension between morality and self-interest . Under these circumstances, however, what is wise, does not coincide with, what would be wise if we do not have a moral sense. >Generalization. Stegmüller IV 263 Morality/Ethics/Mill: Mill believed in gradual change of human nature toward a "general love of man". StephenVsMill: "impartial charity" could also lead to Stalinism. Mackie ditto - MackieVsMill. IV 269 Freedom/Mill/Stegmüller: Thesis: The only justification for interfering with the freedom of others is to prevent harm to others. MackieVsMIll: This is too weak. Freedom of thought cannot be justified with this. Instead: "Principle of legitimate intervention. >Freedom.	Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Ethics	Singer	I XIII Ethics/P. Singer: In the third edition of my Practical Ethics⁽¹⁾, I have made a transition towards an ethics that assumes more objective ethical truths. This is partly due to the reading of Derek Parfits book "On What Matters"⁽²⁾. I 4 Ethics/P. Singer: Where does our ethics come from? Observations on animals such as chimpanzees show that higher animals have a sense of reciprocity. >Animals. Nature/P. Singer: it is a mistake to believe that everything natural is good and we just have to follow our natural intuitions. >Nature, >Intuitions, >Good, >Values. P. Singer: Thesis: we have inherited the standards from our ancestors. Our task is to find out which of these must be changed. >Community, >Society. I 9 Ethics/P. Singer: how can we distinguish between ethical and unethical behavior? >Ethics. Objectively, we can distinguish whether someone acts according to our conventions, according to his conventions, or after no conventions at all. >Objectivity. I 10 Convention: a mere self-interest will not be considered an ethical behavior. Why? Solution: Ethics must stand on a broader basis than the interests of the individual. >Generalizability, > Universality, >Interest. 1.Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 3rd ed. Cambridge University Press (2011) 2. Derek Parfit, On what Matters, Oxford (2011).	SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015
Facts	Poundstone	I 59 Fact opinion/facts/interpretation/Hume/Poundstone: directly, without interpretation. E.g. a mind would collect all the black raven, but can draw no conclusion from it. E.g. someone would not find any non-green Centaurs and conclude: the phrase "all centaurs are green" is true. >Induction, >Raven paradox, >Generalization, >Generality, >Generalizability, cf. >Grue.	Poundstone I William Poundstone Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988 German Edition: Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995
Generality	William of Ockham	Holz I 15ff Generality/General/Ockham/Holz: in his entourage, all theoretical generalizations were referred to the area of subjective constructions and thus, in principle, were put up for discussion. >Particulars, >Individuals, >Knowledge, >Cognition, >Generalizability, >Generality. Individual/Ockham: the individual has precedence over the general - (intuitive knowledge) - Generality/Ockham: subjective construction - no combination of world elements is necessary. >Subjectivity.	Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994
Generalization	Political Philosophy	Gaus I 60 Generalization/Political philosphy/Forbes: [there is a] maturing of the kind of positive science of politics that the partisans of the ‘behavioural’ movement in political science were calling for 50 years ago. The early behaviouralists could provide only vague outlines and very simple examples of the more scientific research that they thought should replace intellectual history and institutional description as the core political science disciplines (e.g. Easton, 1965⁽¹⁾; Easton and Dennis, 1968⁽²⁾). Their opponents could reasonably argue that nothing coherent or worthwhile would ever come of their attempts to build ‘empirical theory’. Impatient critics could wave away the whole enterprise, saying that it might serve to show how Catholics voted in Detroit, but not much else (Taylor, 1968⁽³⁾: 90). Such high-handed dismissals are less effective today, where research workers in the social sciences have access to vast archives of machine readable data from scores of countries, and they routinely employ far more powerful methods of statistical analysis than were generally available even a generation ago. The embarrassingly nebulous grand theories of the recent past – systems theory, structural-functional theory, group theory, and the like – have receded from view. Attention now focuses on demonstrable relationships between measurable variables of obvious importance, such as democracy and war, and their analysis does not stop with the establishment of a few simple correlations. Cf. >Empirical Laws/Political philosophy, >Social capital/Putnam, >Social capital/Political philosophy. Gaus I 61 Problems/Forbes: The difficulty of operationalizing key concepts such as democracy, war, nationalism, and good government is obviously a source of serious problems. Such ‘essentially contested’ political ‘variables’ do not lend themselves to easy quantification, or even identification, for statistical analysis. In addition, a serious, often insurmountable source of difficulties is the complexity of the background conditions that may have to be untangled before any simple causal connections can be shown. A realistic statistical model of the phenomena of interest may involve many variables whose effects rebound on their causes, making statistical estimation extremely difficult. Nonetheless, statistically based causal analysis does not require for its justification that every statistical study make a major contribution to scientific knowledge or that it be beyond reproach. It requires only that there be rigorous ways of testing hypothesized relationships and untangling the webs of conditioning variables in which they are embedded. >Positive Political Theory/Forbes, >Generality, >Generalizability, >Method. 1. Easton, David (1965) A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: Wiley. 2. Easton, David and Jack Dennis (1969) Children in the Political System: Origins of Political Legitimacy. New York: McGraw-Hill. 3. Taylor, Charles (1985 [1968]) ‘Neutrality in political science’. In his Philosophy and the Human Sciences, Philosophical Papers, vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 58–90. Forbes, H. Donald 2004. „Positive Political Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.	Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Hypotheses	Poundstone	I 48 Hypotheses/Poundstone: most are generalizations. >Generalization, >Induction, >Generality, >Generalizability. Nicods criterion (Raven paradox): Relevance. Black and non-black non-ravens are irrelevant. >Relevance, >Statistics. I 60 Poundstone: even observing black ravens is virtually irrelevant. >Observation, >Observability. I 88 Poor hypotheses spoil good supporting evidence. >Evidence I 55 Auxiliary hypotheses/Coherence theory/Poundstone: additional hypotheses usually areassumptions about the functioning of the instruments. >Additional hypotheses, >Measurements. Problem: often the applicability of the modus tollens is not guaranteed. >modus tollens. E.g. Uranus was correctly predicted due to perturbations, Neptune wrongly predicted based on the same assumptions and methods.	Poundstone I William Poundstone Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988 German Edition: Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995
Judgments	Poundstone	I 59 Factal verdict/facts/interpretation/Hume/Poundstone: directly, without interpretation - E.g. assume, the mind would collect all black ravens, but can draw no conclusion from it - e.g. would find any non-green Centaurs and say the phrase "all centaurs are green" is true. >Induction, >Raven paradox, >Generalization, >Generality, >Generalizability, cf. >Grue.	Poundstone I William Poundstone Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988 German Edition: Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995
Kant	Sandel	Gaus I 111 Kant/Sandel/Gaus: Benn and Gewirth both seek a direct route from agency to liberal rights: if we understand the type of agents we are, we see that we must claim certain liberal rights and grant them to others. >Person/Benn, >Rights/Gewirth. KantVsGewirth/KantVs/Benn: in contrast, what is often called ‘Kantian liberalism’ seeks to establish liberal rights via a hypothetical contract, which then generates basic rights. SandelVsKant: In the words of Sandel, its most famous critic, according to ‘deontological’ or ‘Kantian liberalism’, ‘society, being composed of a plurality of persons, each with his own aims, interests, and conceptions of the good, is best arranged when it is governed by principles that do not themselves presuppose any particular conception of the good’ (1982(1): 1–7). Respect/recognition: Because, on this view, each is a chooser of her own ends in life, respect for the person of others demands that we refrain from imposing our view of the good life on her. Only principles that can be justified to all respect the personhood of each. Respect, then, requires a certain mode of justification, according to which moral principles are acceptable to all free moral persons in a fair choice situation. Liberal principles are then generated via this mode of justification. Cf. >Reason/Scanlon. 1. Sandel, Michael (1982) Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. Brocker I 670 Kant/SandelVsRawls/SandelVsKant/SandelVsLiberalism/Sandel: Kant has perhaps most consistently decoupled ethics and law from the vanishing point of good living and instead fully relied on a theory of right, understood in the sense of the reasonable generalizability of maxims of action. Rawls builds on this with his theory of justice (1975). See Principles/Rawls. SandelVsRawls, SandelVsKant: propagates the priority of an idea of good and successful life (Aristotle's eudaimonia) as a starting point. See Liberalism/Sandel, Law/Kant, SandelVsRawls. Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	Sand I Michael Sandel The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Law	Kant	Brocker I 670 Law/Justification/Kant: Kant's conception of the law is based on the assumption of a transcendental subject whose capacity for moral autonomy lies in the fact that it is not part of the world of appearances determined by natural laws and can therefore orient itself on the idea of generalizability, instead of acting on the basis of its tendencies, urges and desires. Transcendental Subject/Kant: has a purely formal character in that it neither pursues certain content purposes nor has preferences. Subjectivity/Kant: this subjectivity is free and yet individualized, as each transcendental subject relates purely to itself as a being of freedom. RawlsVsKant: Rawls tries to reformulate Kant without these "metaphysical" (more precisely transcendental philosophical) prerequisites. Brocker I 671 SandelVsRawls: Rawls's attempt fails because Rawls implicitly has to base his theory on a theory of the "self" that is not substantially different from Kant's theory. Kant's theory and deontological liberalism cannot be saved from the difficulties that the Kantian subject brings with it (1) Transcendental Subject/Rawls: Rawl's "veil of ignorance" in an assumed initial state of a society to be established, in which people do not know what role they will play later, is an attempt to reconstruct Kant's transcendental subject without metaphysical assumptions. See Veil of Ignorance/Rawls. 1. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), S. 14. Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 Höffe I 304 Law/Ultimate Justification/Kant/Höffe: [Kant declares] metaphysical convictions themselves indispensable for a theory of law and state, if it wants to be philosophical. Höffe I 306 Kant divides his moral system, the metaphysics of morals, into two parts: the doctrine of law as the epitome of what humans owe one another, and the doctrine of virtue as the epitome of meritorious extra work. For both he represents a general law of moral rank. In contrast to the general law of virtue, the general law of rights does not depend on the inner motive force, which is why one must obey the law of rights, but not make obeying it the maxim of one's action. The external action is sufficient for morality of the right, provided that it is considered in relation to the external actions of other persons, that is, for Kant: other sane beings. What counts for the law is only the external cohabitation, which in moral terms must submit to a strictly general law: "Act outwardly in such a way that the free use of your arbitrariness with the freedom of everyone according to a general law could exist together"⁽¹⁾. Coercion/Law/Kant: To the mere concept of law, Kant shows conclusively, belongs a power of coercion. Here, in contrast to a philosophical anarchism, Kant denies the view that there should be any coercion between people. KantVsLocke: The morally permissible coercion does not, however, include the right to punish as in Locke's natural state; it is only the right to defend oneself against injustice. One may, for example, prevent a theft or retrieve the stolen goods, but one may neither injure the thief nor take more than what was stolen. >Property/Kant, >Rule of Law/Kant, >State/Kant. 1. I. Kant, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre § C	I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016
Lexical Studies	Saucier	Corr I 386 Lexical studies/psychology/Saucier: to a key premise of the lexical approach: the degree of representation of an attribute in language has some correspondence with the general importance of the attribute in real-world transactions. >Lexical hypothesis. Lexical studies in relation to personality: A. 1. Lexicalized concepts can be found in standard sources created by disinterested parties (e.g., linguists and lexicographers), and basing variable selection on such a source reduces the likelihood of investigator bias in deciding what is or is not an important variable. 2. Because lexicalized concepts constitute a finite domain, one can sample them representatively to establish content-validity benchmarks for personality variables. B. The lexical-study paradigm gives special importance to cross-cultural generalizability. The lexical approach involves an indigenous research strategy. Analyses are carried out separately within each language, using a representative set of native-language descriptors, rather than merely importing selections of variables from other languages Personality: The majority of lexical studies of personality descriptors have attempted to test the most widely influential structural model of the last two decades, the Big Five factor structure (Goldberg 1990⁽¹⁾; John 1990⁽²⁾). Corr I 387 Several lexical studies have reported evidence about factor solutions containing only one factor (Boies, Lee, Ashton et al. 2001⁽³⁾; Di Blas and Forzi 1999⁽⁴⁾; Goldberg and Somer 2000⁽⁵⁾; Saucier 1997(⁶⁾, 2003b(7); Saucier, Georgiades, Tsaousis and Goldberg 2005⁽⁸⁾; Saucier, Ole-Kotikash and Payne 2006⁽⁹⁾; Zhou, Saucier, Gao and Liu in press), with consistent findings. The single factor contrasts a heterogeneous mix of desirable attributes at one pole with a mix of undesirable attributes at the other pole. This unrotated factor can be labelled Evaluation (following Osgood 1962)⁽¹⁰⁾, or as Socially Desirable versus Undesirable Qualities. 1. Goldberg, L. R. 1990. An alternative ‘description of personality’: the Big-Five factor structure, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 59: 1216–29 2. John, O. P. 1990. The ‘Big Five’ factor taxonomy: dimensions of personality in the natural language and in questionnaires, in L. A. Pervin (ed.), Handbook of personality: theory and research, pp. 66–100. New York: Guilford 3. Boies, K., Lee, K., Ashton, M. C., Pascal, S. and Nicol, A. A. M. 2001. The structure of the French personality lexicon, European Journal of Personality 15: 277–95 4. Di Blas, L. and Forzi, M. 1999. Refining a descriptive structure of personality attributes in the Italian language: language: the abridged Big Three circumplex structure, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 76: 451–81 5. Goldberg, L. R. and Somer, O. 2000. The hierarchical structure of common Turkish person-descriptive adjectives, European Journal of Personality 14: 497–531 6. Saucier, G. 1997. Effects of variable selection on the factor structure of person descriptors, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 73: 1296–1312 7. Saucier, G. 2003b. Factor structure of English-language personality type-nouns, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 85: 695–708 8. Saucier, G., Georgiades, S., Tsaousis, I. and Goldberg, L. R. 2005. The factor structure of Greek personality adjectives, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 88: 856–75 9. Saucier, G., Ole-Kotikash, L. and Payne, D. L. 2006. The structure of personality and character attributes in the language of the Maasai. Unpublished report. University of Oregon 10. Osgood, C. E. 1962. Studies on the generality of affective meaning systems, American Psychologist 17: 10–28 Gerard Saucier, „Semantic and linguistic aspects of personality“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Liberalism	Kant	Brocker I 670 Liberalism/State/Kant: Kant has perhaps most consistently decoupled ethics and law from the vanishing point of good living and instead based himself entirely on a theory of the right, understood in the sense of the reasonable generalizability of maxims of action. Rawls builds on this with his theory of justice (1971)⁽¹⁾. >Principles/Rawls. SandelVsRawls, SandelVsKant: propagates the priority of an idea of good and successful life (Aristotle's eudaimonia) as a starting point. >Liberalism/Sandel. See Law/Justification/Kant. 1. Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Liberalism	Sandel	Brocker I 668 Liberalism/Communitarianism/Sandel: Sandels Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, together with Alasdair MacIntyres After Virtue and Michael Walzer's Spheres of Justice, are considered the main work of communitarianism. Sandel, however, is more concerned with a differentiation from John Rawl's liberalism (and his main work Theory of Justice (1975)⁽¹⁾). SandelVsLiberalism, SandelVsRawls. Def Liberalismus/Rawls/Rothhaar: Rawls's liberalism is usually characterized in that it postulates a priority of the "right" over the "good", whereby these terms stand for two different possibilities to justify ethical and legal norms at all. A. Teleology: ethical theories aimed at the good or a successful life (eudaimonia), Brocker I 669 are usually called teleological. >Eudemonia. Norms/values: are justified here by the fact that a good or successful life is realized through them. B. Law/Rightfulness/Ethics/Liberalism: ethical theories, on the other hand that are aimed at the right, are characterized by the fact that norms are to be founded here independently of any idea of a good life. The concept of "right" only makes sense as a counter-concept to a teleological theory of normativity and can only occur where teleological theories have already become questionable. HobbesVsTeleology: Hobbes rejects the idea of a "highest good" himself. >Order/Hobbes. Other (liberal) approaches assume a plurality of conceptions of a good life. Norms: are usually defined in such theories of the right in relation to the generalizability of rules of action or to the concept of freedom. >Norms. State/Liberalism: such theories normally confer on the state the role of guaranteeing, through a legal system, the freedom it needs to pursue its respective notions of good. Liberalism/Rawls: this is about the priority of the right over the good in a twofold sense: a) at the level of justification, b) at the level of the state and society itself. SandelVsLiberalism/SandelVsRawls: Sandel criticizes above all the priority of rights at the level of justification: he criticizes the "claim that the principles of justice (...) do not depend on a particular conception of good living (...) to justify them. ⁽²⁾ >The Good, >Life, cf. >Utilitarianism. Brocker I 676 SandelVsLiberalism: liberalism demands that the state and politics be shaped in such a way, i.e. that the subjects leave behind those moments of communality that constitute their identity ((s) and quasi reinvent it). Sandel: this must almost inevitably lead to an unpleasure in democracy. ⁽³⁾ >Democracy. 1. John Rawls, (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), S. x. 3. Vgl. M. Sandel Democracy’s Discontent. America in Search of a Public Philosophy, London/Cambridge 1996. Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	Sand I Michael Sandel The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Personality Traits	Allport	Corr II 29 Trait-names/personality traits/lexicon/study background/ Allport/Odbert/Saucier: The essence of [Allport’s and Odbert’s article ‘Trait-names: A psycho-lexical study’] was a classification of (…) English ‘trait-name’ words (terms distinguishing the behavior of one human being from another) into four categories. (…) from a scientific standpoint, some of the most basic personality attributes might be discovered from studying conceptions implicit in use of the natural language. If a distinction is highly represented in the lexicon – and found in any dictionary – it can be presumed to have practical importance. This is because the degree of representation of an attribute in language has some correspondence with the general importance of the attribute in real-world transactions. Therefore, when a scientist identifies personality attributes that are strongly represented in the natural language, that scientist is simultaneously identifying what may be the most important attributes. >H.S. Odbert, >G. Allport. II 30 Study Design/Allport/Odbert: Allport and Odbert turned to Webster’s New International Dictionary (1925)⁽¹⁾, a compendium of approximately 400,000 separate terms. Combining judgments of three investigators (themselves plus a person designated only as ‘AL’, (…)), they built a list of 17,953 trait-names in the English language that drew on the following criterion for inclusion: ‘the capacity of any term to distinguish the behavior of one human being from that of another’ (p. 24) (1). Allport and Odbert went further and differentiated terms into four categories or columns. The (…) terms in Column I were ‘neutral terms designating possible II 31 personal traits’ (p. 38)⁽¹⁾, more specifically defined as ‘generalized and personalized determining tendencies – consistent and stable modes of an individual’s adjustment’ to his/her environment (p. 26)⁽¹⁾. The (…) terms in Column II were ‘terms primarily descriptive of temporary moods or activities’ (…). The (…) terms in Column III were ‘weighted terms conveying social and characterial judgments of personal conduct, or designated influence on others’ (p. 27)⁽¹⁾ (…).The other (…) terms fell into the miscellaneous category in Column IV, labeled as ‘metaphorical and doubtful terms’ (p. 38)⁽¹⁾. This last grab-bag category included terms describing physical characteristics and various abilities (…). II 33 Findings/Allport/Odbert: 1. Allport and Odbert cogently argue that, basically, normal human life cannot proceed without some reference to personality dispositions. There is no better argument than their trenchant words from the monograph: “Even the psychologist who inveighs against traits, and denies that their symbolic existence conforms to ‘real existence’ will nevertheless write a convincing letter of recommendation to prove that one of his favorite students is ‘trustworthy, self-reliant, and keenly critical’” (pp. 4–5)⁽¹⁾. 2. Allport and Odbert indicate that the dispositions to which trait-names refer are more than conversational artifact, a form of everyday error (though in part they may be that). They are to some degree useful for understanding and prediction, as confirmed by later research (Roberts et al., 2007)⁽³⁾. [The follow-on assertion constitutes that] the degree of representation of an attribute in language has some correspondence with the general importance of the attribute in real-world transactions. II 34 3. (…) science can lean on and build on the body of commonsense concepts in language. Rather than relying exclusively on the top-down gambits of theorists, there is opportunity for a generative bottom-up approach. II 35 4. (…) Allport and Odbert recognized a difficulty inherent in personality language: trait-names mean different things to different people. To a degree, these meanings are contingent on one’s ‘habits of thought’ (p. 4)⁽¹⁾. One reason builds on the polysemy (multiple distinct meanings) that many words have. 5. Within science, the difficulty might be even further resolved by explicit communication and consensus. For Allport and Odbert, this meant naming traits in a careful and logical way, and not merely codifying but also ‘purifying’ natural-language terminology (p. vi)⁽¹⁾. II 36 6. Allport and Odbert’s prime interest was in tendencies that are ‘consistent and stable modes of an individual’s adjustment to his environment’ rather than ‘merely temporary and specific behavior’ (p. 26)⁽¹⁾. 7. (…) trait-names reflect a combination of the biophysical influences and something more cultural (perhaps historically varying). (…) characterizations of human qualities are determined partly by ‘standards and interests peculiar to the times’ (p. 2)⁽¹⁾ in a particular social epoch. [In this way] culture, trait-names are partly ‘invented in accordance with cultural demands’ (p. 3)⁽¹⁾. II 37 VsAllport/VsOdbert: 1. (…) they ignore and give short-shrift to culture, both with regard to issues of cross-cultural generalizability and of how traits themselves may reflect culture-relevant contents. 2. According to their distinctive ‘trait hypothesis’ (p. 12), no two persons ‘possess precisely the same trait’ (p. 14)⁽¹⁾ and each ‘individual differs in every one of his traits from every other individual’ (p. 18)⁽¹⁾. The problem is not that individualism is wrong; rather, it may be ethnocentric to impose an individualistic filter throughout personality psychology, and in fact such idiothetic approaches are outside the mainstream of current and recent personality psychology. II 38 3. Another aspect of the thinking (…) that might appear odd, in retrospect, is the notion of a single, cardinal trait that provides determining tendencies in an individual life. (…) a particular attribute becomes so pervasive in a person that it becomes a distinct focus of organization. Seventy years later, there seems still to be a lack of evidence for cardinal traits that perform a more or less hostile take-over, coming to determine and structure the remainder of the personality system. II 39 4. Allport and Odbert argue for the desirability of neutral terminology in science. Unfortunately, it appears that they extend the desire for unweighted emotion-free vocabulary into the very attribute-contents evident in the trait-names in language, with confusing consequences. On this view, the trait-names in language that are judgmental and ‘emotionally toned’ (p. v)⁽¹⁾, having affective polarity, are suspect and less worthy of study than the neutral ones. But affectively toned concepts like evil and virtue are particularly worthy of study particularly because of their extreme affective tone (…). II 40 5. (…) the numerically largest category of trait-names was social evaluation. However, they offer no account for why the third column – reflecting social judgments likely unconnected with biophysical traits – would be the biggest component in person perception. 6. (…) the notion that censorial and moral terms – and virtues, II 41 vices, whatever is associated with blame or praise, not to mention social effects – have no use for a psychologist seems now obsolete. 7. To accept at face value the particular Allport and Odbert classification of trait-names into four categories is to take on the assumptions of a specialized theory of traits, whose main propositions can be construed based on the classification itself. (…) attention to emotions and morality would distract us from the central aspects of personality which reflect enduring consistencies operating intrinsically in the person, and outside the influence of society (…). 1. Webster’s new international dictionary of the English language (1925). Springfield, MA: Merriam. 2. Allport, G. W., & Odbert, H. S. (1936). Trait-names: A psycho-lexical study. Psychological Monographs, 47 (1, Whole No. 211). 3. Roberts, B. W., Kuncel, N. R., Shiner, R., Caspi, A., & Goldberg, L. R. (2007). The power of personality: The comparative validity of personality traits, socioeconomic status, and cognitive ability for predicting important life outcomes. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 2, 313–345. Saucier, Gerard: “Classification of Trait-Names Revisiting Allport and Odbert (1936)”, In: Philip Corr (Ed.), 2018. Personality and Individual Differences. Revisiting the classical studies. Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne: Sage, pp. 29-45.	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Personality Traits	Odbert	Corr II 29 Trait-names/personality traits/lexicon/study background/ Allport/Odbert/Saucier: The essence of [Allport’s and Odbert’s article ‘Trait-names: A psycho-lexical study’] was a classification of (…) English ‘trait-name’ words (terms distinguishing the behavior of one human being from another) into four categories. >Lexical hypothesis, >Lexical studies. (…) from a scientific standpoint, some of the most basic personality attributes might be discovered from studying conceptions implicit in use of the natural language. >Everyday language, >Concepts, >Language use, >Language community, >Personality, >Character traits. If a distinction is highly represented in the lexicon – and found in any dictionary – it can be presumed to have practical importance. This is because the degree of representation of an attribute in language has some correspondence with the general importance of the attribute in real-world transactions. Therefore, when a scientist identifies personality attributes that are strongly represented in the natural language, that scientist is simultaneously identifying what may be the most important attributes. >Relevance. II 30 Study Design/Allport/Odbert: Allport and Odbert turned to Webster’s New International Dictionary (1925)⁽¹⁾, a compendium of approximately 400,000 separate terms. Combining judgments of three investigators (themselves plus a person designated only as ‘AL’, (…)), they built a list of 17,953 trait-names in the English language that drew on the following criterion for inclusion: ‘the capacity of any term to distinguish the behavior of one human being from that of another’ (p. 24) (1). Allport and Odbert went further and differentiated terms into four categories or columns. The (…) terms in Column I were ‘neutral terms designating possible II 31 personal traits’ (p. 38)⁽¹⁾, more specifically defined as ‘generalized and personalized determining tendencies – consistent and stable modes of an individual’s adjustment’ to his/her environment (p. 26)⁽¹⁾. The (…) terms in Column II were ‘terms primarily descriptive of temporary moods or activities’ (…). The (…) terms in Column III were ‘weighted terms conveying social and characterial judgments of personal conduct, or designated influence on others’ (p. 27)⁽¹⁾ (…).The other (…) terms fell into the miscellaneous category in Column IV, labeled as ‘metaphorical and doubtful terms’ (p. 38)⁽¹⁾. This last grab-bag category included terms describing physical characteristics and various abilities (…). II 33 Findings/Allport/Odbert: 1. Allport and Odbert cogently argue that, basically, normal human life cannot proceed without some reference to personality dispositions. There is no better argument than their trenchant words from the monograph: “Even the psychologist who inveighs against traits, and denies that their symbolic existence conforms to ‘real existence’ will nevertheless write a convincing letter of recommendation to prove that one of his favorite students is ‘trustworthy, self-reliant, and keenly critical’” (pp. 4–5)⁽¹⁾. 2. Allport and Odbert indicate that the dispositions to which trait-names refer are more than conversational artifact, a form of everyday error (though in part they may be that). They are to some degree useful for understanding and prediction, as confirmed by later research (Roberts et al., 2007)⁽³⁾. [The follow-on assertion constitutes that] the degree of representation of an attribute in language has some correspondence with the general importance of the attribute in real-world transactions. >Dispositions, >Representation. II 34 3. (…) science can lean on and build on the body of commonsense concepts in language. Rather than relying exclusively on the top-down gambits of theorists, there is opportunity for a generative bottom-up approach. II 35 4. (…) Allport and Odbert recognized a difficulty inherent in personality language: trait-names mean different things to different people. To a degree, these meanings are contingent on one’s ‘habits of thought’ (p. 4)⁽¹⁾. One reason builds on the polysemy (multiple distinct meanings) that many words have. >Conventions, >Language use, >Language community, >Meaning, >Reference. 5. Within science, the difficulty might be even further resolved by explicit communication and consensus. For Allport and Odbert, this meant naming traits in a careful and logical way, and not merely codifying but also ‘purifying’ natural-language terminology (p. vi)⁽¹⁾. II 36 6. Allport and Odbert’s prime interest was in tendencies that are ‘consistent and stable modes of an individual’s adjustment to his environment’ rather than ‘merely temporary and specific behavior’ (p. 26)⁽¹⁾. 7. (…) trait-names reflect a combination of the biophysical influences and something more cultural (perhaps historically varying). (…) characterizations of human qualities are determined partly by ‘standards and interests peculiar to the times’ (p. 2)⁽¹⁾ in a particular social epoch. [In this way] culture, trait-names are partly ‘invented in accordance with cultural demands’ (p. 3)⁽¹⁾. II 37 VsAllport/VsOdbert: 1. (…) they ignore and give short-shrift to culture, both with regard to issues of cross-cultural generalizability and of how traits themselves may reflect culture-relevant contents. 2. According to their distinctive ‘trait hypothesis’ (p. 12), no two persons ‘possess precisely the same trait’ (p. 14)⁽¹⁾ and each ‘individual differs in every one of his traits from every other individual’ (p. 18)⁽¹⁾. The problem is not that individualism is wrong; rather, it may be ethnocentric to impose an individualistic filter throughout personality psychology, and in fact such idiothetic approaches are outside the mainstream of current and recent personality psychology. II 38 3. Another aspect of the thinking (…) that might appear odd, in retrospect, is the notion of a single, cardinal trait that provides determining tendencies in an individual life. (…) a particular attribute becomes so pervasive in a person that it becomes a distinct focus of organization. Seventy years later, there seems still to be a lack of evidence for cardinal traits that perform a more or less hostile take-over, coming to determine and structure the remainder of the personality system. II 39 4. Allport and Odbert argue for the desirability of neutral terminology in science. Unfortunately, it appears that they extend the desire for unweighted emotion-free vocabulary into the very attribute-contents evident in the trait-names in language, with confusing consequences. On this view, the trait-names in language that are judgmental and ‘emotionally toned’ (p. v)⁽¹⁾, having affective polarity, are suspect and less worthy of study than the neutral ones. But affectively toned concepts like evil and virtue are particularly worthy of study particularly because of their extreme affective tone (…). II 40 5. (…) the numerically largest category of trait-names was social evaluation. However, they offer no account for why the third column – reflecting social judgments likely unconnected with biophysical traits – would be the biggest component in person perception. 6. (…) the notion that censorial and moral terms – and virtues, II 41 vices, whatever is associated with blame or praise, not to mention social effects – have no use for a psychologist seems now obsolete. 7. To accept at face value the particular Allport and Odbert classification of trait-names into four categories is to take on the assumptions of a specialized theory of traits, whose main propositions can be construed based on the classification itself. (…) attention to emotions and morality would distract us from the central aspects of personality which reflect enduring consistencies operating intrinsically in the person, and outside the influence of society (…). 1. Webster’s new international dictionary of the English language (1925). Springfield, MA: Merriam. 2. Allport, G. W., & Odbert, H. S. (1936). Trait-names: A psycho-lexical study. Psychological Monographs, 47 (1, Whole No. 211). 3. Roberts, B. W., Kuncel, N. R., Shiner, R., Caspi, A., & Goldberg, L. R. (2007). The power of personality: The comparative validity of personality traits, socioeconomic status, and cognitive ability for predicting important life outcomes. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 2, 313–345. Saucier, Gerard: “Classification of Trait-Names Revisiting Allport and Odbert (1936)”, In: Philip Corr (Ed.), 2018. Personality and Individual Differences. Revisiting the classical studies. Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne: Sage, pp. 29-45.	Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Social Psychology	Berkovitz	Haslam I 217 Social Psychology/VsSocial Psychology/Sherif/Berkowitz: In the 1970s, the field of social psychology, many argued, was in a state of crisis. Many critics questioned the generalizability of social psychological findings and, ultimately, the practical relevance not only of its findings but also of the field itself. Leonard Berkowitz observed that ‘social psychology is now in a “crisis stage”…. We seem to be somewhat at a loss for important problems to investigate’ (as quoted by Smith, 1972⁽¹⁾: 86). Muzafer Sherif further noted ‘the skyrocketing volume of research which yields but little of substance’ (Sherif, 1977⁽²⁾: 368). >M. Sherif. It was at this time that Aronson developed his Jigsaw method. >Jigsaw method/Aronson. 1. Smith, M.B. (1972) ‘Is experimental social psychology advancing?’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 8: 86–96. 2. Sherif, M. (1977) ‘Crisis in social psychology: Some remarks towards breaking through the crisis’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 3: 368–82. John F. Dovidio, „ Promoting Positive Intergroup Relations. Revisiting Aronson et al.’s jigsaw classroom“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications	Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Socialization	Honneth	Brocker I 797 Socialization/Social Relationships/Community/Honneth: For Honneth, relationships of a "symbiosis broken by recognition", which "arises through mutually desired delimitation, form the basis for any "autonomous participation in public life" and "the psychological prerequisite for the development of all further attitudes of self-respect". ⁽¹⁾ Honneth sees this kind of relationship preformed in love: Brocker I 796 Love/Honneth: In the mutual recognition of their need and affect nature according to the basic pattern of love, individuals develop a positive relationship to their own needs, or the basic belief of being able to fundamentally trust their own need impulses.⁽²⁾ Brocker I 797 Since the form of love as a relationship of two is inherent in an element of "moral particularism"⁽³⁾, it is necessary to introduce another sphere for generalization or generalizability: the sphere of law. According to Honneth, love in its limitation refers of its own accord to this second basic type of mutual recognition relationships. Law/Honneth: in the sphere of law, the particularity of primary relationships is replaced by the generality of the relationship between free and equal subjects, and the "idea of a rational agreement on contentious norms" instead of affective ties.⁽⁴⁾ In contrast to the sphere of affective primary relationships, the sphere of recognition of law is also dependent on historical prerequisites that only fully unfolded in modernism. ⁽⁵⁾ >Self-Respect/Honneth, >Law/Hegel. Brocker I 800 Solidarity/Honneth: results in modern societies from "social relationships of symmetrical appreciation" ⁽⁶⁾ in which "the abilities and characteristics of the other are recognized as important for common practice", which "not only implies passive tolerance Brocker I 801 towards the "individual special of the other person", but affective participation in it.⁽⁷⁾ >Modernism/Honneth. 1. Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, mit einem neuen Nachwort, Frankfurt/M. 2014 (zuerst 1992) p. 172, 174. 2. Ibid. p. 170 3. Ibid. p. 174 4. Ibid. p. 177 5. Ibid. p. 175-177. 6. Ibid. p. 209 7. Ibid. p. 209f. Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (Ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	Honn I A. Honneth Das Ich im Wir: Studien zur Anerkennungstheorie Frankfurt/M. 2010 Honn II Axel Honneth Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte Frankfurt 2014 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Understanding	Poundstone	I 279 Understanding/Poundstone: is about generality, not about details. >Generalization, >Generality, >Generalizability, >Induction, >Knowledge, >World/Thinking.	Poundstone I William Poundstone Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988 German Edition: Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995

The author or concept searched is found in the following controversies.

Disputed term/author/ism	Author Vs Author	Entry	Reference
Hare, R.M.	Newen Vs Hare, R.M.	NSI 155 "Good"/"Should"/Prescriptivism/Hare: Thesis: these words have even primarily prescriptive meaning. E.g. speaking about a good book, a good exhibition is to recommend these things. (s) VsHare: then it would be conceptually contradictory, e.g. to say of a finished exhibition that it was good. Or e.g. to praise for a sold-out book) Def Secondary Prescriptive/Hare: e.g. "proper", "hardworking". Universalizability/Moral/Hare/Newen/Schrenk: every should-statement contains a principle that this statement is applicable to all exactly similar cases. E.g. Dagmar is pregnant, you should carry the groceries into her apartment for her. And that is what every healthy person should do who has nothing better to do at the moment. This universalizability is reminiscent of Kant's categorical imperative which is, however, not linguistically motivated. NS I 156 HareVsKant: it is the logic of language that imposes the categorical imperative on us. Moral/Logic/Hare: Thesis: someone who acts contrary to a moral statement does not understand the meaning. Hare: e.g. in a train compartment it says: "Please do not smoke, there are children on board." If the smoker then says, well, I'll smoke next door where there are also children, he did not understand the meaning. On the other hand: e.g. "No smoking!" Such signs were distributed at random in otherwise identical compartments. Point: there is no universalizable principle. Therefore, the sign expresses no moral should-sentence. Moral Principles/Principle/Moral/Hare/Newen/Schrenk: Problem: how to generate moral principles. Problem: how to recognize the essential in a situation. E.g. Dagmar is pregnant. Is it necessary for the principle that she could swap roles with her husband? Is imaginability sufficient? VsHare: some authors see a fundamental impossibility when comparing such situations. Universalizability: must also accommodate subjective desires and dislikes. This makes the objective description of situations very difficult. NS I 157 Utilitarianism/Hare/Newen/Schrenk: Hare is close to utilitarianism in as far as a theory instructs to ensure the fulfillment of the preferences of the greatest number of parties. Universalizability/Generalizability/Moral/Descriptivism/Hare: moral judgments possess their descriptiveness because of their universalizability. Newen/Schrenk: the descriptive portion then consists of the should-portion along with the situation in which it is expressed. So moral statements can certainly be assessed as correct or incorrect.	New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008