Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 17 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aspects | Searle | VI 169 Def Primary Aspect/Searle: if nothing fulfills the primary aspect, the speaker had nothing in mind (he/she just thought he/she had it), e.g. hallucination. The statement cannot be true. Def Secondary Aspect/Searle: a secondary aspect is any aspect expressed by the speaker to which the following applies: the speaker tries to talk to him/her about the object that fulfills his/her primary aspect, but is not himself/herself meant to be part of the truth conditions that the speaker wants to make. There must be a primary aspect to each secondary aspect. VI 169/170 Example: the man with the champagne in the glass over there. Even if it is water, the man is still standing over there. >Champagne example. The secondary aspect does not appear in the truth conditions. For example, we both look at the same man, even if he is not Smith's murderer. For example, even if Shakespeare did not exist at all, I can say: "Shakespeare did not design the figure of Ophelia as convincingly as the Hamlets." (Secondary aspect). Searle: this statement can also be true. II 75 Aspect/Searle: an aspect has no intermediate instance like sensory data. ((s) Therefore, there is also no risk of regress as with all intermediate instances.) Searle: there is a morning star aspect and an evening star aspect of Venus. If it is not a case of perception, the intentional object is always represented under some aspect, but what is represented is the object and not the aspect! II 76 ff Rabbit-Duck-Head: Wittgenstein: the rabbit-duck-head exhibits various uses of the word "see". SearleVsWittgenstein: we see not only objects but also aspects. We love people, but also aspects. III 185 Representation: each representation is bound to certain aspects, not to others. >Rabbit-Duck-Head. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Attributive/referential | Searle | IV 101 Attributive/Tradition/Grammar: attributive includes relative expressions such as "large" or "hot". Searle: we require background. All tall women are similar in terms of height. Attributive/Searle: what is meant and the sentence meaning are the same thing. IV 161 Referential/Donnellan/Searle: S talked about e, no matter if e is actually F. You can then also report with other expressions than "the F". Attributive: here there is no entity e, the speaker would not even have had in mind that they existed. Attributive: the statement can then not be true. IV 164 Donnellan: E.g. "The winner, whoever it is": here, in the attributive sense nothing is actually talked about. Referential/attributive: there is no distinction between beliefs. IV 165ff Referential/Attributive/SearleVsDonnellan: instead: aspects: you can choose the aspect under which you speak about an object. Primary A: if nothing satisfies it, the speaker had nothing in mind (hallucination). Secondary A: any aspect for which it is true that S tried to talk with it about the object, that fulfils its primary A, without being meant to belong to the truth conditions. >">Truth condition, >Aspects/Searle. The Champagne example even works if water is in the glass. Searle: then the statement may also be true. The meaning does not change if no other aspect could assume the role of the primary one. IV 175 Referential/Searle: the referential brings the secondary aspect. Attributive: brings the primary aspect. IV 176 Both readings can be intensional and extensional. >Intension, >Extension. IV 175 What is meant is decisive. Difference sentence/finding: finding is decided, a sentence is not (what was said literally). >Meaning(Intending), >Intention, >Speaker intention. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Colour | Millikan | I 270 Standard Conditions/Contents/Millikan: 1. To give them a content, "standard observers" must mean more than "observers for whom red things look red, under standard conditions." And according to "standard conditions". Cf. >Ideal observer, >Idealization, >Observation. Solution: Standard conditions for red must be spelled out. Problem: no human being has any idea how this should work. Problem: if you had every reason to believe that you are a standard observer, there are circumstances where an object appears to have a different color than it has. But then you would not conclude that the thing was not red. Problem: if a thing is defined by its opposite properties, an observer must also be able to identify these opposing properties. And it can be the case that these never come to light! Problem: how can my experience testify the opposite of red and green? Many authors: think that you can never assert at all that red and green could be in the same place at the same time. I 271 MillikanVsTradition: this is not true, in reality, there are many possibilities, e.g. squinting. Complementary colors/perception/seeing/certainty/Millikan: our confidence in the fact that red and green are opposites, (perhaps built into nature) is an empirical certainty. And this is certainty for the objective validity of these concepts, for the fact that red and green are properties - and not just hallucinations. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Content | Searle | I 66f Wide Content: wide content encompasses the causal relations to the world beyond the words so that meanings are not in the head (Putnam pro, but not "wide content". (> Content/Fodor), >Meanings not "in the head", >wide/narrow content. II 26f The fulfillment of conditions is fixed by propositional content. There is not a desire or belief without fulfillment conditions (i.e. no regress). >Satisfaction condition/Searle, >Regress. II 80 Deception: e.g. the moon is bigger on the horizon - that is part of the content. Solution: if we had no beliefs, we would believe the moon had changed its size. II 87 Content/Searle: the content is not the same as the object. II 196 Hallucination/deception: brains in the vat have exactly the same intentional content. II 319 Intentional Content/Pierre Example/Searle: intentional content is sufficient, and that is different in "London is ugly" and "Londres est jolie". Kripke: intentional content is not rigid, because descriptions are not rigid either. Names: names are neither equivalent to descriptions nor to intentional contents. >Pierre-Example. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Experience | Sellars | McDowell I 163 Experience/Sellars/McDowell: experience is not possible without concepts that play a role in the system of beliefs. What we regard as the message of experience, is already a part and no external constraint of the system. >Concepts/Sellars, >Consciousness/Sellars. Experience/experience history/Sellars: experience history not the result of impressions, but of phenomena. Phenomena/Sellars: phenomena are conceptually (in order to establish them in a rational relationship to beliefs). >Beliefs/Sellars. --- I XXXVIII Sellars: Three possible experiences: 1. This is a red object, 2. The object appears to be red (maybe it is white in red light). 3. It looks like it would be an object. (Also hallucination is possible). >Appearance/Sellars. One might assume that they cherish the same thought in all three cases, but obtain a new setting every time towards this thought. (Reductive-materialistic: Armstrong, Dennett). Ambiguity: process or result of process: experience, activities, non-descriptive content - experience object. I 44 Fact/Sellars: the fact that something seems to be red over there, is not experiencing. (Although it is a fact, of course.) >Appearance. But that does not mean that the common descriptive core might be perhaps experiencing. Facts: are experienced but are not experiencing. And also no experience. Experience: we need a name for the experience, which is not only an abbreviation for a description. Does the everyday language have such names? I 44 Experience/Sellars: ambiguity: experiencing: activity, non-descriptive content - experience object: the fact that something over there this seems to be red, is not experiencing. -However: the common descriptive core can be an experiencing - facts: are experienced, but are not an experiencing- and no experience. I 45 Experience/Sellars: Problem: sensation always seems to presuppose an object. - Possible solution: should we align sensations and propositional attitudes? >Sensations. - "Vs: this is the approximation leading to Locke/Descartes - Descartes/Locke: sensations on a stage with ideas. - SellarsVs. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Exterior/interior | Maturana | I 98 Recursion/within/without/Maturana: through recursive distinctions the observer can operate as if he moves outside his circumstances. (Self-reference, application of operations an operations). >Recursion, >Self-reference. I 113f Unity/closed system/Maturana: within/without is only for the observer not by Input/Output describable, otherwise open system. >Systems, >Input/Output. I 121 Distinction from hallucination for nervous system not possible, part of the cognitive domain of the observer. >Observation/Maturana, >Nervous system. I 183 Definition Life/Maturana: in ontogenetic drift push through a range of interference, while a constantly changing niche is realized. >Life, >Niche. Living System/: operates only in the present. - It is open for the passage of molecules (parts of autopoietic systems). Purpose: is part of the observer. >Purposes. Living systems have no within/without - they are in the process of autopoiesis or disintegrated. >Autopoiesis. Environment: is not "used" by the system. - Instead living systems they bring their own niche out. I 194 Life is knowledge - living systems are cognitive systems. >Knowledge, >Cognition. |
Maturana I Umberto Maturana Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000 |
| Incorrigibility | Peacocke | I 140 Certainty/Peacocke/(s): demonstrative way of givenness: guarantees that the object has properties that are determined by the perception (not that he has certain properties for sure). - In any case that these properties do not depend on other beliefs. >Certainty, >Properties, >Observation, >Way of givenness, >Pointing, cf. >Ostensive definition. I 140 f Infallibility/incorrigibility/immunity to error/perception: visual condition: E.g. "This man is bald": infallible in reference of "this man". >Reference, >Appearance, cf. >Appearance/Sellars, Peacocke: this is no identification, not of identity with something dependent, which is just not given - "There is (in this perception situation) no one, so he would be bald, but not this man" presented by the perception at this location. - It cannot be that the way of givenness refers to "this box" while this box is not the thing which is cubical. >Reference. Hallucination: also in this case the thought "Dummett amuses himself" is a thought about Dummett! >Hallucination. I 175 Immunity/infallibility/tradition/Evans: the judgement, to be the judgment of a specific content, can be constituted that this judgement responds to this condition. >Judgments. I/Evans: The reference may fail. >I, Ego, Self, >Self-identification, >Self-reference, cf. >Quasi-indicator. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Information Retrieval | Minsky | I 205 Information Retrieval/Minsky: [association]: (…) if you start with enough clues to arouse one of your apple-nemes, it will automatically arouse memories of the other properties and qualities of apples and create a more complete impression, simulus, or hallucination of the experience of seeing, feeling, and even of eating an apple. >Terminology/Minsky. This way, a simple loop machine can reconstruct a larger whole from clues about only certain of its parts! Many thinkers have assumed that such abilities lie beyond the reach of all machines. Yet here we see that retrieving the whole from a few of its parts requires no magic leap past logic and necessity, but only simple societies of agents that recognize when certain requirements are met. >Society of Minds/Minsky. This method for arousing complete recollections from incomplete clues — we could call it reminding — is powerful but imperfect. Our speaker might have had in mind not an apple, but some other round, red, fruit, such as a tomato or a pomegranate. Nonetheless, to think effectively, we often have to turn aside from certainty — to take some chance of being wrong. Our memory systems are powerful because they're not constrained to be perfect! >Memory, >Memory/Minsky. |
Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003 |
| Observation | Millikan | I 270 Standard conditions/content/Millikan: 1. to give them a content, "standard observers" must mean more than "observer for whom red things look red under standard conditions." And accordingly for "standard conditions". >Ideal observer, >Idealization, >Conditions. Solution: Standard conditions for "red" must be spelled out. Problem: no human being has any idea how this should work. Problem: if you had every reason to believe that you are a standard observer, there are circumstances where an object appears to have a different color than it has. But then you would not conclude that the thing was not red. Problem: if sameness of a thing is defined by its opposite properties, an observer must also be able to identify these opposing properties. And it may be that these never come to light! >Identity/Millikan. Problem: how can my experience testify the opposite of red and green? Many authors: thinking that you can never assert at all that red and green could be in the same place at the same time. I 271 MillikanVsTradition: this is not true, in reality, there are many ways, e.g. squinting. Complementary colors/perception/seeing/certainty/Millikan: our confidence in the fact that red and green are opposites, (perhaps built into nature) is an empirical certainty. And this is certainty for the objective validity of these concepts, for the fact that red and green are properties - and not just hallucinations. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Perception | Chisholm | I, 136ff Perception/ChisholmVsTradition: Appearance rather than feeling - adverbial speech: "feels reddish" - cannot be comparative - hallucination: here it depends on the mode of experience - appearance: divisible> sense data language is permissible. See also phenomenological language., >Sense data. - perception: it is epistemically evident to me that the object is there - transcendent evidence: judgment about the object is related to me - perceptible properties: secondary qualities - 1. primary qualities: indirect attribution of a property, 2. non-propositional: the subject takes possession of the property true, self-presenting - does not imply the object . I 150 Perception/Knowledge/Theory of Knowledge/Chisholm: Epistemic Principle 9 de re: x is such that it is evident to x that it is F (less pure) - not applicable if thing does not exist - not to reveal existence non-reflectively, not self-presenting. I 152 Negative perception: seems to demand incompatibility, but it does not have to - Russell: negative perception: empirical propositions, directly known, not developed - Chisholm: e.g. hear nothing: psychological state - negative perception/Whitehead: creates consciousness in first place. - Chisholm pro: Awareness of one's own intentional attitudes. --- II 24 Perception/Rutte: more than experience: taking an external through the senses - experience: could also be purely immanent. --- II 24 Aporia of perception/Hartmann: how is correspondence possible if the one is consciousness-immanent and the other consciousness-transcendent? - Causing of experiences has very different properties than having experiences. II ~ 25 Perception problem: not whether we perceive things as they are, but whether we can infer from our experiences a causer. - Rutte: experience-like core of the immediate given (SellarsVs) - perception/Rutte: effect of the object evokes a legal order of experience which causally determines the experiences and provokes expectations. II 27 Perception/Helmholtz: not as an image of properties but their "indications". These are interpreted on the basis of hypotheses - the mode of appearance of a thing is structurally reflected in a certain regular order of our sensory experiences. Hypothetical realism: Schlick, Kraft, Popper, Konrad Lorenz et al. II 34 Perception/Rutte: success/failure already presupposes realism. - linguistic analytical philosophy: criteria for deception - Berkeley: does not exist. VsBerkeley: then there is not even a conceptual distinction of hallucination, but this is presupposed by Berkeley himself. II 36 Realism/Truth/Rutte: whoever wants to know whether there are outside things can perhaps guess the truth about it - there is no truth-oriented way to find it out because no successes or failures can be demonstrated that might speak for or against the assumptions. Rutte, Heiner. Mitteilungen über Wahrheit und Basis empirischer Erkenntnis, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Wahrnehmungs- und Außenweltproblems. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Picture (Image) | Flusser | Blask I 26 Picture/Flusser: Thesis: The human forgets that he was the one who created the pictures. Imagination turned into hallucination. >Imagination, >Hallucination. --- Flusser I 111 ff Picture/Flusser: Specific definition: (sur)face covered with symbols. Definition Picture: A picture is a reduction of the "concrete" four-dimensional relations to two dimensions. Cave paintings in Lascaux, for example, can be regarded as "prospective projections": their intention was probably not to depict "concrete situations" (such as anatomy lessons) but to create desired situations: to serve a hunting magic. They do not want to show what ponies are like, but what you have to do to hunt them. On the other hand, for example, there is little magic on a street map: it does not show how roads should be, but how they really are. And yet it has a "value", showing the driver what to do to get into town. Then they're good pictures. I 112 For example, Lascaux: they are "good pictures" if they help to a successful hunt, and they do so if they reproduce the anatomy of the ponies correctly. Many pictures are pleasingly designed surfaces, neither streets nor ponies, and these are commonly referred to as pictures. I 135 Picture/Flusser: Technical images/techno-images: Pictures that do not mean scenes, but texts: For example, equations that lead to atomic bombs consist of unimaginable symbols. Therefore, the text that these equations cannot be regarded as meaningless. But the atomic bomb itself is unimaginable in a strange sense. And the same applies to the TV, the car, in short, to most of our technical products. If such texts work, they lead to even more insane codes. I 137 ff Technical Images/techno-images: We believe we criticize films, we think we understand TV programs: this is a dangerous mistake. Decryption is much more difficult. Traditional Picture: Scene picture < human Techno-images: Scene > Picture > human Traditional pictures are made by people, technical pictures are made by devices. I 138 In the traditional picture, the causal chain between scene and picture is interrupted by the human being. The technical images' causal chain is not interrupted, the technical image is a direct consequence of the scene, but there is no causal chain between reality and picture. The naïve belief that one does not have to learn to decipher cinema posters or advertisements contributes to the alienation that these pictures cause. Technical Text ↔ Apparatus Operator ↔ techno-image >Alienation, >Understanding, >Interpretation, >Interpretation("Deutung"). I 139 Def techno-images/Flusser: technical images are (sur)faces covered with symbols, which mean symbols of linear texts. For example, an X-ray of the broken arm is for the doctor both a map and a model of how the arm is to be treated, i.e. "prospective" and it is "beautiful" insofar as it is true and good. >Symbols, >Text. The specificity of the technical images is not to be found in the method of production (by apparatus) nor in the material (cathode tubes). Technical images are like all images symbols, but they do not mean scenes like traditional images, they mean concepts. Def techno-images: means terms, means texts. >Concepts. In this respect, traditionally created pictures are also technical images insofar they mean concepts: blueprints, diagrams, curves in statistics, etc. Strange kinship of technical images with ideograms: both are images that mean concepts. However, "concept" does not have the same meaning in both cases. >Meaning, >Meaning/intending. For example, one "feels" that the number "2", i.e. an ideogram, is a completely different kind of symbol than e.g. the photography of a bra in advertising, i.e. a technical image, although both terms mean. The essentially important of the technical codes always melts between the fingers. Ideogram translation into alphabetical code. "Two and two is four" and 2+2=4: the first seems to be the description of the second. We have the tendency to see to see pictorial scriptures in ideogrammatic codes, although they are linear. "2+2=4" is not the picture of a linear situation, however! It is the description of a scene! >Numbers, >Numerals. I 141 Ideograms: are not images but symbols of the type "letter". Def Scene: non-linear. Def Text: linear. Def ideograms: concepts which mean pictures. I 142 Ideograms are like technical picture above language. For example, you can also be translated with "Two and two makes four" and "Buy a bra!". Traditional pictures are "under language". They're being discussed. Although people can communicate with images, the belief that they are "generally understandable"is wrong. I 143 techno-images: the translation of technical images lies in a completely different direction beyond the spoken language than the translation of H20 into "water". "P", for example, means "Parking permitted" at first glance, but this new type of code has to destroy the alphabet over time. >Translation. Even if the "P" is replaced by the pictogram of a car. It could also be replaced by a reproduction of the Mona Lisa. >Convention. The way we learn to follow them is a different way than the way we learn mathematical formulas or alphabetical texts. >Learning. I 146 Technical pictures mean texts. For example, photography in the electron microscope depicts physical texts, the film depicts relationships from a film script, the statistical curve depicts relationships that set up economic texts with regard to an economic tendency. Technical codes a) Posters: directly understandable b) X-ray image: must be decoded. For example, when we hit the brake at a red traffic light, we do not pretend to read a text, but to see a picture where a foot hits a brake pedal. (See also Code/Flusser and Technology/Flusser). I 162 Techno-images/Flusser: only archeologists or biologists, astronomers or physicists use technical images "correctly", namely as symbols of concepts. Picture/Flusser: Video art does not provide technical images. Because they are not images there for concepts. I 163 Misbelief: technical images are codes of the mass media. Society is only interested in technical images that are broadcast amphitheatrically, and is left completely cold by the art discussion. >Society, >Art, >Aesthetics. |
Fl I V. Flusser Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996 Blask I Falko Blask Jean Baudrillard zur Einführung Hamburg 2013 |
| Reference | Peacocke | I 47 Reference/meaning: sensation/representational/Peacocke: Question: intrinsically spatial sense? not necessary, because it is about reference, not about meaning. E.g. Horn / Oboe reversed: not monaurally audible, but monocularly visible! >Distinctions, >Qualia, >Meaning, >Sensory impressions, cf. >Individuation/Strawson. I 150 Guaranteed reference/Peacocke: e.g. my paternal grandfather - e.g. "the oldest living person, or else I". - This is even a priori guaranteed. >Identification, >Names, cf. >Referential/attributive, E.g. Hallucination: if I was hallucinating Dummett, this is still a thought about Dummett. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Reference | Quine | Rorty I 219f Quine: inscrutability of reference: not talking of what the objects of a theory are in an absolute sense is useful, but the question of how a theory of objects can be interpreted or re-interpreted in another one. E.g. How can you find out if someone sees everything upside down, or in complementary colors? It makes sense to talk about subordinate theories, but only relative to the theoretical framework with its own preliminarily appropriated and ultimately inscrutable ontology. >Inscrutability. Hartry FieldVsQuine: has shown that Quine’s talk of "relativization to a background language," and of "taking the reference literally" is not consistent with his general reasoning. RortyVsQuine: a real holism would consider the question "are we referring in reality to rabbit or rabbit parts? To formulas or to Goedel numbers" neither meaningless nor meaningful only relative to a background language, but in reality to be a question such as " Are we are really talking about nations or groups of individual persons?" "Are we talking about witches or hallucinations?" These questions make sense if we give them meaning. That means that something else depends on their answer. --- Quine I 273 Shared reference: Terms, not objects! - Nevertheless, it is water, which is spread - mass terms: cumulative reference, (grammatically like singular term) - singular term: shared reference. >Language acquisition, >Triangulation, >Mass terms. I 166 Opaque verb: "hunts lions" puts nothing in relation, does not refer to a lion - relative term police chasing a man. I 273 Theories and things: Prerequisite of an object is not the same as reference, but same motivation - Fido-Fido principle: individual chairs mostly nameless, "chair" refers to virtually any chair. Reference: comes out through the predication: it is the same in dogs and milk: Milk is white, Fifi is a dog - But: milk and dog cannot be. compare II 13f. --- II 33 Inscrutability of reference: there is no difference: "x is a dog" or "x is the space time portion, which is filled by a dog" - only statement about the terminology used and its translation, not physical object (proxy function). - inscrutability: in translation or permutation. Putnam II 194 Reference/Quine: there are definitely true and false sentences, but no specific reference relation - reason: the true sentences have an infinite number of models, and there is not the one designated model (Loewenheim) - in various true models, there are then various reference relations. --- Quine I 129 Translation: translatable: observation sentences, truth functions (conjunction, negation, alternation) - identifiable: stimulus analytic sentences, stimulus-synonymous occasion sentences of the natives - untranslatable: stimulus-synonymous occasion sentences. --- VII (g) 130f Reference/Theory of reference/th.o.r./Quine: name, truth, denotation (designating ("true-by")), extension, values of variables, ontological commitments - theory of reference includes the semantic paradoxes. --- Lauener XI 175 Reference/extensions/Singular term/general term/Follesdal/Lauener: singular term: have a reference - general term and sentences have an extension. >Singular terms, >Extension, >Intension. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Q XI H. Lauener Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982 |
| Seeing | Lewis | V 274 Perception/Seeing/Match/Lewis: certainly does not mean that the same is going on in the mind or the soul as before one’s eyes, rather it is about the informational content. Visual experience: is best characterized by the typical causal role. >Causal role/Lewis. The content is the content of the belief, which tends to be caused by it. >Content/Lewis. Problem: the same visual experience can cause very different beliefs - but not all the content can be characterized by belief. E.g. Rabbit-Duck-Head: the belief can be characterized by the disjunction rabbit or duck, but then results in the belief that there are ink and paper. >Experience/Lewis, >Belief/Lewis, >Rabbit-duck-head/Lewis. V 275 Hallucination/Lewis: not seeing, because the scene did not cause the experience. - E.g. If I hallucinated my brain and it just happens to be in accordance. t’s my brain that causes this, but it’s not the same as seeing. - (>veridical). V 280 Seeing/Grice: requires a causal standard process. V 281 Hallucination: no real counterfactual dependence on the scene - if it changes, the hallucination does not necessarily have to change - the other way around: congruence with real seeing: not caused by the scene itself. V 280 Seeing/Perception/Kripke/Lewis: (Kripke 1972)(1) LewisVsGrice: causal standard process would lead to the fact that no one knew enough about reflection in the past to be able to have had a concept about seeing. Solution/Kripke: descriptions made rigid. >Description/Kripke, >Rigidity/Kripke. V 283 Seeing/Lewis: is distinguishing - but: perfect match - e.g. in a dark scene - that would allow a wide range of alternatives - which is undesirable. - Seeing a dark scene is not seeing. 1.Saul A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, in: Davidson/Harmann (eds.) (1972), 253-355 |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Selective Attention | Cognitive Psychology | Corr I 409 Selective Attention/cognitive psychology/Matthews: Selective attention refers to focusing attention on one of several stimulus sources. Personality may influence the efficiency of selective attention. Furnham and Strbac (2002)(1) found that extraverts were more resistant to background noise than introverts across a range of tasks; extraverts may indeed prefer to study with music or other noise in the background. Anxiety and Neuroticism are also commonly found to be associated with selective attention deficits, a result that may reflect a more general attentional impairment related to these traits. Newton, Slade, Butler and Murphy (1992)(2) found that both Extraversion and low Neuroticism were associated with faster speed of visual search, when subjects were required to find a single letter target in a random display of letters. Schizophrenia: Difficulties in inhibiting aberrant thoughts and images may contribute to the ‘positive symptoms’ of schizophrenia including hallucinations and delusions (Lubow and Gewirtz 1995)(3). Schizotypal individuals may be deficient in inhibition of irrelevant stimuli. Studies using attentional tasks that provide measures of latent inhibition have confirmed this hypothesis (e.g., Tsakanikos 2004)(4). Anxiety: A variety of paradigms have been used to demonstrate that anxiety relates to preferential selection of threat stimuli (see Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin et al. 2007(5); Williams, Watts, MacLeod and Mathews 1997(6) for reviews). Corr I 410 Unconscious bias: is bias unconscious or does it reflect a voluntary strategy of active search for potential threats? (See Matthews and Wells 2000(7)). It is plausible that both types of process may be involved. Mathews and Mackintosh (1998)(8) proposed a dual-process approach, within which bias is produced initially by an automatic threat evaluation system, but may be compensated by voluntary effort. >Attention/Cognitive psychology, >Attention control/Cognitive psychology. 1. Furnham, A. and Strbac, L. 2002. Music is as distracting as noise: the differential distraction of background music and noise on the cognitive test performance of introverts and extraverts, Ergonomics 45: 203–17 2. Newton, T., Slade, P., Butler, N. M. and Murphy, P. 1992. Personality and performance on a simple visual search task, Personality and Individual Differences 13: 381–2 3. Lubow, R. E. and Gewirtz, C. 1995. Latent inhibition in humans: data, theory, and implications for schizophrenia, Psychological Bulletin 117: 87–103 4. Tsakanikos, E. 2004. Latent inhibition, visual pop-out and schizotypy: is disruption of latent inhibition due to enhanced stimulus salience?, Personality and Individual Differences 37: 1347–58 5. Bar-Haim, Y., Lamy, D., Pergamin, L., Bakermans-Kranenburg, M. J. and van IJzendoorn, M. H. 2007. Threat-related attentional bias in anxious and nonanxious individuals: a meta-analytic study, Psychological Bulletin 133: 1–24 6. Williams, J. M. G., Watts, F. N., MacLeod, C. and Mathews, A. 1997. Cognitive psychology and emotional disorders, 2nd edn. Chichester: Wiley 7. Matthews, G. and Wells, A. 2000. Attention, automaticity and affective disorder, Behaviour Modification 24: 69–93 8. Mathews, A. and Mackintosh, B. 1998. A cognitive model of selective processing in anxiety, Cognitive Therapy and Research 22: 539–60 Gerald Matthews, „ Personality and performance: cognitive processes and models“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Sensory Impressions | Frith | I 179 Sensory Impression/sense-perception/meaning/Frith: thesis: we are not the slaves of our senses. Cf. >Sensualism, >D. Hume. I 180 Experience/Frith: experience is not constantly dominated by sensory signals. We could not have hallucinations, but it would not be a good idea. >Experience. Problem: sensory signals are too unreliable. We should not be slaves of our senses. This only occurs in brain damage. For example, when these people see a glass, they have to drink from it. >Stimuli. Fantasy: controlled fantasy saves the brain from the tyranny of the environment. Imagination/phantasy/brain/Frith: 1. How do we know that the model of the world that our brain designs is the right one? Solution: this is not a real problem: the model does not have to be the right one, it just has to work so that we can influence the world. >Imagination, >Reality, >Actions, >Causality, >Self-efficacy. 2. How does the brain know whether I actually see a face or just imagine one? Solution: Imagination: in a pure representation there are no sensory signals, and thus also no possible error message. I 182 Reality/Frith: reality is always unexpected. Imagination/Frith: imagination is boring in the long run, e.g. there is no deception in the imagination, an imagined necker cube never veers round. Creativity/Frith: we create nothing in our head alone. Solution: first by doodling, writing, sketching, etc.: we are shifting to the outside. >Creativity. |
Frith I Chris Frith Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World, Hoboken/NJ 2007 German Edition: Wie unser Gehirn die Welt erschafft Heidelberg 2013 |
| Unconscious | Searle | I 192f Unconscious/Searle: according to the model of consciousness (pro, VsHeidegger) e.g. hammering is not done unconsciously but aware. There are two differences: conscious/unconscious, peripherals/center . Cf. >Awareness. I 160f SearleVsFreud: unconscious for him is like fish deep down in the sea (wrong idea of mental constance). They seem to have the same form. Problem: there is a false analogy: consciousness/perception (regress) requires yet another level of description, which does not exist, unconscious on the model of consciousness. >Regress. ((s) Cf. >Perception/Rorty). What is the ontology of the unconscious, as long as it is unconscious (revolt? hatred of the father?). If I take away the object (bicycle) from the perception, it is a hallucination, but that is what I cannot do in case of conscious thought, to obtain the unconscious. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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Reference |
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| Anscombe, E. | Chisholm Vs Anscombe, E. | I 40 I/Self/Identity/Proposition/Other philosophers: four recent attempts: 1) Anscombe: "I am this thing here" is a real proposition, but not a proposition of identity. It means: This thing here is the thing, the person of whose action this idea of an action is an idea, of whose movements this notion of movement is a notion, etc. I 42 ChisholmVsAnscombe: She tries to explain her use of "I" by the demonstrative "this". It is clear that she cannot explain my use of "I" with this. Therefore, she has no theory for indirect I 73 I/Anscombe: "I am this one" is a real proposition, but not a proposition of identity. Instead, it means: this thing here is the thing of whose action this idea of an action is an idea. ChisholmVsAnscombe: she tries to explain her use of "I" through the use of "this", I 74 but it is clear that she cannot explain my use of "I" with it. Peacocke I 150 Guaranteed reference/Peacocke: this idea can be found in connection with demonstrative thoughts. It now appears that neither the field of the identificationally basic nor that of the constitutive identificationally basic types exactly matches the class of guaranteed referring types. Def Guaranteed reference/Peacocke: E.g. whenever someone suspects themselves to be thinking a thought with a certain way of givenness, then there is indeed such a way of givenness and it refers. In this sense, some identificationally basic cases have no guaranteed reference. E.g. unrealized hallucination. Guaranteed reference is not sufficient for identificational basality (independence from identification): guaranteed reference: E.g. "my paternal grandfather" has a guaranteed reference for a normal human. E.g. a way of givenness of form "the oldest now living person and otherwise I." In both cases, reference is even guaranteed a priori! But from inference, not from identification. But these examples are not identification ally basic, nor is it sufficient for identification independence that a way of givenness type m is guaranteed to apply to an object, so that the subject then believes that it is a way of givenness type m! Not sufficient: as ability to recognize also passes the test ((s) but is dependent on identification). E.g. If someone hallucinates that Dummett is standing in front of them, this is still a thought about Dummett. Which object the thought picks out does not depend on the object meeting a certain description. Rather, it depends on certain complex relations with the thinker. Demonstrative thoughts/Peacocke: not all of these relations are independent from identification, and that needs to be explained by the theory of dG. Identificationally basic/Peacocke: does not imply that any substantial identity was definitely true in the case of an i.g. way of givenness. I 151 It is only about a way of knowledge that is not based on other beliefs. I/Guaranteed reference/Anscombe: (The First Person, p.57): "I" is an expression X which has a guaranteed reference in the following sense: not only that there is such a thing X, but also that what I suppose to be X actually is X."... the person of whose movements these movement ideas are ideas..." Self-identification/PeacockeVsAnscombe: you can identify someone else falsely with these conditions! E.g. Anscombe would allow the bishop to see a woman disguised as a bishop in the mirror, and falsely sees her as himself. (ChisholmVsAnscombe: she shows how she identifies herself, but not how I identify myself). |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Armstrong, D. | Rorty Vs Armstrong, D. | Frank I 583 Incorrigibility/RortyVsArmstrong: no epistemic notion of truth: that not to say "implies its own truth". >Incorrigibility. Instead: conventional standards of the respective culture!Later: RortyVsRorty: should science produce a disagreement Ex retinal images with the reports of a person: as in hallucination the representation may then indeed be false, without rendering the report of the hallucinating subject wrong! Rorty: "There are no recognized methods to resolve doubts about p if p fits into a pattern of sincere reports of the subject S, even if p does not fit into a general theory". I 584 Rorty adjusts to the "ontology of the man on the street", who would have a hard time without mental entities in the foreseeable future. Rorty thesis: before we give up incorrigibility, we may one day abandon the mentalist speech. I 589 mental state/Armstrong: This term refers to what is being caused by certain stimuli and causes certain reactions - whatever that may be. I 590 RortyVsArmstrong: if that were true, we could never understand the contrast between a) materialism and dualism or b) the mental and the physical or c) materialism and behaviorism. I 591 mental state/Armstrong: Ex a specific condition of the liver can cause ill-tempered behavior. Problem: What characterizes mental states compared to others? Complexity? I 592 Problem: if the complexity of the cause to achieve complex effects is missing. Sufficiently complex processes occur only when the causal chain has reached the brain. Solution/Armstrong: our notion of a mental state is the notion of a "cause, the complexity which reflects the complexity of the behavior that it is capable of producing". RortyVs: confuses the degree of complexity of physical and mental states. RortyVsArmstrong: presupposes already, it were part of our concept of the mental state that it must be identified with one or another physiological process. I 595 Identity theory/Rorty: its significance lies in the statement that the entities of which one has always thought that they could not be physical, now turn out to be physical. If materialism is made a truth a priori this pointe is missing. VsArmstrong: when in his "ontologically neutral" analysis the mental is a mere deputy (and nothing in itself), then one side of the distinction is missing. There is nothing that could turn out to be identical to physical particles! RortyVsArmstrong/RortyVsRyle: mental entities that yby their nature can not be physical must be maintained, because otherwise no identity could be adopted. Phenomenology/disposition/Armstrong: unlike the realist, the phenomenalist cannot explain dispositions. ((s) otherwise circular because dispositions can also only be described). He can not explain why counterfactual conditionals are true. I 607 The Mental/RortyVsArmstrong: whether an entity is mental does not determine whether it explains behavior, and whether a property is mental, can not determine whether it is the property of a physical entity or not. Only feature: incorrigibility. Incorrigibility/Armstrong: A believes that p logically implies (p). Fra I 608 RortyVsArmstrong: I want to avoid necessities. 1. because of Quine's doubts about "natural" necessities). 2. Otherwise we would conclude that the meaning of the terms "thinking" and "thought" made it impossible to have false opinions, what one believes. Richard Rorty (I970b) : Incorrigibility as th e Mark of the Mental, in: The Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 399-424 |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Berkeley, G. | Chisholm Vs Berkeley, G. | II 33 Def Immanence/Rutte: E.g. Berkeley: the concept of real external thing is absurd, because this would mean wanting to grasp the idea of an imaginary thing not thought of by anyone. (Contradiction). VsBerkeley: confusion between "not thought of" with "thought independent". Reality/Verification/Berkeley: experiences and their courses are reviewing instances for the assumption of external things. There are no specific experiences for such reviews. We can make the same predictions when denying the outside world. We cannot appeal to any other instance than our order of experience. II 34 In order to show that things are causes we would have to be able to show that we could have an experience of the external things without our experiences. But this is impossible. The same experience might exist if there were no external things. BerkeleyVsRealism: that makes realism obsolete! VsBerkeley: the same is also true of spiritualism, which Berkeley does not seem to see! (The fact that it is as superfluous as realism). II 35 Analytical philosophy/ Philosophy of language/Rutte: the language-analytical counterpart to realism is the assumption that we have learned on the basis of criteria to distinguish perception from illusion: without criteria we could not learn it. BerkeleyVs: such criteria do not exist! VsBerkeley: then we cannot even make the distinction by concepts between a perception of external things and a total hallucination! Berkeley himself already presupposes this conceptual distinction! ((s) Why?). (Rutte: elsewhere Berkeley already sees the concept of external things as absurd, but not here). Berkeley: needs no criteria, since we will never learn this distinction anyway. VsBerkeley: nevertheless this distinction can be thought in a meaningful way. The concepts "experience" and "subject-independent" are available to everyone. They can be made explicit without referring to a specific perceptual situation. III 36 RationalismVsBerkeley/Rutte: the representatives of reason can point out that de facto such a decision situation does not exist: we believe in the outside world from the start. Hume: has referred to a similar natural belief with view to the even more fundamental question of the uniformity of the world. |
Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Empiricism | Maturana Vs Empiricism | I 154 There are well-known hallucinations, e.g. shadows that are seen in color, although they are gray. This is often referred to as illusion. Maturana: it must be clear to us that we do not describe an independent reality. Illusion can only be distinguished by comparing different types of experiences, i.e. outside of a concrete experience! In the experience itself, we can not distinguish between illusion, hallucination or perception. This is a constitutive feature of all living systems. Perception / MaturanaVsEmpiricism: that should cause us to question any certainty that is based on perception. |
Maturana I Umberto Maturana Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000 |
| Freud, S. | Searle Vs Freud, S. | I 175 SearleVsFreud: it is clear that we envision the unconscious along the lines of the subconscious. The unconscious in Freud is based on a fairly simple model of conscious states. Like fish deep down in the sea. The fish that we cannot see below the surface, have exactly the same shape when they come to the surface. They are like objects that are stored in the dark attic of the mind. Could there be unconscious pain? >Unconscious. I 188 Example Suppose we have a case in which we had use for terms "unconscious pain". Shall we say that during sleep actually no pain was present, that it rather only began at opening? I 189 Or that it continued, was however unconscious during sleep? Searle: here it is not about a dispute with a tangible content. There is simply a different vocabulary to describe the same fact. Freudians insist that there really are unconscious mental states. The other side says that conditions in which there really are mental states, then surely must be conscious. I 190 But what facts in the world are to meet these two different statements? E.g. someone crawls under hypnosis around on the floor. After waking up, he turns a seemingly rational explanation: like, that he would have probably lost his watch somewhere. Question: what is the ontology of the unconscious supposed to be exactly in this moment? What kind of a fact corresponds to the attribution? Example The reason of the adolescent boy who revolted against the authority of the school is that he hates his father, so they say. Nevertheless, we have to ask again: what is the ontology of the unconscious supposed to be as long as it is unconscious? I 190/191 As with hypnosis, it must be also implied here that in neurophysiology the ability exists to produce a conscious thought with precisely this aspect figure. (SearleVsFreud). Then apparently the ontological question "do unconscious mental states really exist?" cannot have any factual substance. The question can only mean: there are non-conscious neurophysiological states of the brain that are able to develop conscious thoughts and the corresponding behavior. That was not a point of contention in ontological reality. Def Consciousness: manner of perception of states that are in their mode of existence unconsciously. Freud thinks that our unconscious minds are at once both unconsciously and intrinsically intentional, even if they are unconscious, they are actually present. They are like furniture in the attic of the mind that we spotlight with the torches of our perception. >Consciousness. I 193 SearleVsFreud: 1. is not to reconcile with what we know about the brain. 2. can I not formulate the comparison between perception and consciousness so that it is coherent. Regarding 1.: Suppose I go through a sequence of unconscious mental states without having any consciousness, then only neurophysiological processes are playing. What a fact is it now to make that they are unconscious mental states? If we consider what characteristics must have unconscious mental states as mental states: 1. an aspect shape, 2. they must be "subjectively" in any sense. But how can the unconscious neurophysiology at the times during which it is unconscious have aspect shape and subjectivity? Freud obviously means that there are also still some description level at which they invariably have all the features of conscious mental states, despite their complete unconsciousness (also intentionality and subjectivity). I 194 The unconscious has everything the conscious has only minus consciousness. He has, however, not made to understand what might happen in the brain via the neurophysiological events out of events to form unconscious subjectivity and intentionality. Freud's evidence for the existence of the unconscious is always the patient's behavior, that it is as if he was in a certain state of mind. And because we know it independently, that the patient has no conscious mental state of this kind, Freud postulated an unconscious state of mind. A verificationist would say that this postulate has only one meaning: the patient behaves in such and such a manner, and such behavior would usually be caused by a state of consciousness. But Freud is no verificationist. It's hard for to find an interpretation which implies no dualism, since Freud does not postulate neurophysiological mental phenomena. It looks as if this opinion has the consequence that consciousness is something completely externalistic. So nothing much what is linked to any state of consciousness. The analogy between consciousness and perception is an attempt to let the consciousness still fit into the picture. I 195 We are forced to postulate that consciousness is a kind of perception of conditions and events that have their intrinsic nature unconsciously. However, this solution leads us from bad to worse. In the investigation of introspection we had seen that the model of perception based on the fact that there is a difference between perceived object and perceptual. If I take away the bike, a perception remains to me that has no object (a hallucination, for example). But precisely this distinction we cannot do in the case of conscious thought. There seems to be an infinite regress: what about the act of perception: is it a mental phenomenon? If so, it has to "per se" be unconscious, and then I would probably need some higher stage of act of perception of my act of perception to be aware of this act. >Perception. I 195/196 Recent problems with this analogy: perception works because the object perceived exerts causal effect on my nervous system. But how can this work in the case where the object perceived is an unconscious experience itself? |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Grice, P.H. | Lewis Vs Grice, P.H. | V 280 Seeing/Grice: (1961) Demands a causal standard process. This explains why e.g. cases 3.,4. and 5. are not examples of seeing: 3. the brain in front of the eyes: this time it is the brain in front of the eyes that causes the experience: (connected by wires). 4. the sorcerer: performs a spell and causes me to hallucinate accidentally. 5) Light measurement: I am blind, but electrodes are implanted in my brain, V 278 so that I have the impression of a certain landscape. By chance there is a landscape in front of my eyes that corresponds exactly to this landscape. LewisVsGrice: Dilemma: If the standard process is defined as involving the reflection of light, this should mean a) that today some of us (but nobody in the past) know enough to have a term of seeing (because some of us know sufficiently enough to have a term/an idea of seeing (since there was insufficient knowledge about optics in the past). Or b) if it needs to be a daily practical term, truthful hallucination is also included. Both would be absurd. V 279 Solution/Kripke: to refer to rigidized designators (descriptions). (Was very new in the days, 1972). Unfortunately, the standard process would disqualify both good and bad cases. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Hume, D. | Searle Vs Hume, D. | II 101 Perception/cause/SearleVsHume: my knowledge that my car has caused my visual experience, is because I know that I see the car, and not vice versa. I do not conclude that there is a car, but I just can see it. >Perception/Searle. II 102 Perception: the experience is not literally yellow, but it is caused literally. Moreover, it is experienced as caused, whether it is satisfied or not. But it is not experienced as yellow, but as of something yellow. II 103 Causality: I may very well experience directly! However, not independent but the being caused belongs to the experience. (This does not mean that the experience confirms itself). II 104 Causality: also for things characteristic, which are not directly observable such as ultraviolet and infrared.. If they could not have an impact on our measuring instruments, then we might not know about their existence. >Causality/Hume. ((s) Ultraviolet cannot be hallucination. But one can imagine a sunburn.) II 156 Causality/SearleVsHume: I believe that "to cause" describes a real relationship in the real world, but it does not follow a universal correlation of similar cases. II 160 Tradition: one never has a causing experience. SearleVsTradition: you have not often a causing experience, but every perception or action experience is indeed just such a causing experience! SearleVsHume: he looked for a wrong spot, he looked for a power. II 170 Regularity/SearleVsHume: not all regularities are causal. It is wrong to think that we can have in addition of an experience of cause and effect a hypothesis about regularities in the world. II 171 I have not the hypothesis, but I have the ability to distinguish regularity from irregularity. Regularity becomes the background. >Regularity/Hume. II 173 SearleVsCausal Law/SearleVsHume: does not need to be derived from the existence of causation. After 300 years of unsuccessful attempts with the regularity you have to see that the concept of to make something happening differs from the concept of regularity. II 174 There are not two types of causation: "Regularity causation" and "intentional causation". There is exactly one way: this is the action-causation. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Kaplan, D. | Newen Vs Kaplan, D. | NS I 117 Index Words/Indicators/Direct Reference/Kaplan: Thesis: typical usage contexts: here. they must be treated according to an object theory (theory of direct reference) of meaning. Namely if they only have to fulfill the state of affairs adequacy (SA). NS I 118 E.g. (1) I am here today. Truth Conditions: are only given adequately here if the content of the sentence is recognized as true, but not necessary. a priori: the sentence is indeed a priori true, but not necessary! E.g. if Carina Silvester speaks the sentence in Bochum, it has the meaning that Carina is in Bochum that day, but Carina is not necessarily in Bochum. It is true because of the expression conditions. NS I 118 Index Words/Indicators/Kaplan: Thesis: indicators are referential expressions, i.e. the standard meaning is always the designated object. Newen/Schrenk: this is considered the common understanding after Kaplan. VsKaplan: Objection: we must not neglect the other types of adequacy. Cognitive adequacy and knowledge adequacy. E.g. Karl receives a threatening letter, "I will rob you someday". This is intuitively the contribution of "I" to the utterance content, not the person who wrote the letter, but the description associated by means of language competence. Then the content of "I" is: the writer of this incident. Here, knowledge adequacy is in the foreground. (Anonymous/Anonymity). Cognitive Adequacy: is paramount if our behavioral attitude is expressed. E.g. Ernst Mach after memory loss: "I'm hungry": This does not have the meaning of "The author of "Die Analyse der Empfindung" is hungry". Mach with amnesia would not have agreed to that. NS I 119 Likewise, it would be wrong to paraphrase. "Ernst Mach believes that Ernst Mach is hungry". EGO Mode/I/Terminology/Newen/Schrenk: some authors call this kind of immediate self-reference the EGO mode of givenness. (Immunity against misidentification). Point: this is about the subject of a thought and not about the speaker of an utterance. (He might be be irritated, e.g. by delay through headphones). Index Words/Indicators/Names/Newen/Schrenk: the situation is like with names: there are three modes of interpretation. The contribution of an indexical expression can be 1) the designated object 2) the description associated by means of language competence 3) cognitive way of givenness. Deictic expressions: applies for them accordingly. E.g. hallucination: here, the content is determined through language competence. Deixis/Cognitive Adequacy. The cognitive adequacy may also play a role: E.g. someone looks through two widely separated windows of his apartment at an extremely long ship, which is moored at the quay. He believes that there are two ships. "This is a Chinese and this is a Russian ship". NS I 120 The content of the statements can only reflect the cognitive situation if in each case the way of givenness of the ship is taken into account (front: Chinese lettering, rear: rusty stern). Index Words/Newen/Schrenk: the explanation interest chooses between the various explanations (interest, interpretation interest). Index Words/Names/Kaplan: according to his theory they are always referential expressions - i.e. the meaning is always the designated object. Then explanations must be shifted from the field of semantics to that of pragmatics (what the speaker means) in line with the knowledge adequacy (language competence) and cognitive adequacy. There is currently debate about whether this is legitimate. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Reid, Th. | Anscombe Vs Reid, Th. | Prior I 124 Thought Object/Anscombe: (like Reid, like Findlay): Intentionality should be treated as what it is "and not as another thing". AnscombeVsReid: sensory object, perceptual object: is closer to thinking than in Reid. I 126 Intentionality/Uncertainty/Mental Objects/Anscombe: 2. Property: their "indeterminacy": For example, I can think of a man without thinking of a man of a certain size, but I cannot hit a man without striking a man of a certain size. Because there is no man with indeterminate size (but as a thought object). 3. Property: (Like Findlay, VsReid): When I think of a certain man, it is possible that not every true description of him is one under which I think of him. (>DavidsonVsHume). (E.g. >Quine, Tullius, Cicero). Example Anscombe: someone thinks his father is a deer. Father: "material object" (of aiming!). For example, a tribe worships a god: material object: nothing but a piece of wood. Intentional object: God. N.B.: perhaps the "father" was only a dark spot in front of the foliage, but the dark spot was really there! Hallucination/Prior: does not provide identification! ((s) Not public). Intentionality/Thought Objects/Anscombe: gives a warning even here. Example: One cannot say: "They worship nothing"! That would imply that no sentence of the form: "They worship that so and so " (description) is true. But only: "What they worship is nothing". (de re, de dicto). |
Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank Frankfurt/M. 1994 Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Tradition | Frege Vs Tradition | Stepanians I 68 Number/Numbers/FregeVsTradition/Stepanians: (basics) 1) Numbers are not properties of physical things such as color, hardness, etc. 2) They are not images like sensations or hallucinations 3) They are not "quantity" (in the sense of mereological aggregates (Stepanians: For Frege, they are of course indeed quantities in the mathematical sense, but he calls these classes (terminology). Frege: (§ 47) the number is not abstracted from things like color, weight, etc., it is not a property of these things... the number is nothing physical, but also nothing subjective... The expressions "multiplicity", I 69 "majority" are unfit to serve to explain the number because of their indeterminacy. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Step I Markus Stepanians Gottlob Frege zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 |
| Tradition | Millikan Vs Tradition | I 13 classical realism: thought and knowledge are separated and intentionality is transparent. Intentionality/about/aboutness/MillikanVsTradition: intentionality is not transparent: many processes which are "about" something, are not done consciously. Ex von Frisch knew what a bee dance is, but bees do not know. Bees merely react adequately to bee dances. Thought: requires that the reference is identified. Inference: involves acts of identification of what the thoughts are. That's why they are representations. Ontology/Millikan: we are interested in what general structure the world has to have so that subject-predicate sentences, negation, etc. can be projected onto it. Realism/Millikan: properly understood realism does not require that the world must be "allocated correctly" for that. I 17 Eigenfunction/Millikan: Ex heart has something to do with the fact that it pumps blood. But what kind of connection to the blood pump must be given? Some hearts are malformed and can not pump, others, Ex water pumps could perfectly pump blood, but they are not hearts. Ex artificial hearts: do not belong to the biological category. So it's not the actual constitution, the actual forces, dispositions etc that make something an element of a biological category. Eigenfunction/Millikan: causes to submit something into a biological category. It has nothing to do with forces and dispositions, but with history. Having an intrinsic function means to be "slated for something", "to want" something ("supposed to", designed to "). We must now examine in a naturalistic, non-normative way. Language/propositional attitude/Millikan: So we have to ask, "what are they good for." Sentence/Millikan: Just as a heart sometimes may be deformed, a sentence can also not be well-formed. Other sentences are simply wrong. Tradition/falsehood/Millikan: the tradition was obliged to accept that false beliefs are beliefs. Then we also have to have the forces to influence our dispositions. MillikanVsTradition: but a broken kidney does not have the power to fulfill its function. I 18 And wrong and confused thoughts also do not have such forces. Tradition: here has more to do with input-output relations. Millikan: thesis: we are dealing with the biological functions, the functions that "something thought for". Millikan: thesis: by focusing on the intrinsic function (biological function), we are free to find the defining characteristics between true convictions and the world outside. Eigenfunction/Millikan: 1. direct eigenfunction: the first part of the theory relates only to the functions of things that are members of families that are similar to each other Ex hearts, or are similar to an archetype Ex sentences, words, Ex shaking hands. 2. derived eigenfunction: here we have to show that new things can have eigenfunction: Ex new behavior, new bee dances, new convictions. I 133 Intension/tradition/Millikan: always has to do with the application criteria. 1. set of properties or characters that are associated in the mind. 2. this criterion defines what the term is applied to - the extension! Extension/intension/tradition: the two are connected in spirit. Intension/MillikanVsTradition/Millikan: instead, it is the evolution that defines the connection between intention and extension. Sense/Millikan: results from the combination of term and reference, how the term "is intended to project". We still need the concept of testing. I 157 Rationalism/rationalist/tradition/Millikan: (similar argument): what a term means in one idiolect must be known to the speaker of this idioleckt a priori. But all that can be known a priori is whether two expressions in the idiolect have the same intension. If a term now has more than one intension, one can not know a priori whether the intensions will converge in the application. Therefore, each unambiguous term must have only one intension. meaning/sense/MillikanVsTradition: importance of Frege'ian sense, not intension. Then emptiness is the primary type of insignificance and neither ambiguity nor synonymy are determined by reasoning that is purely a priori. Intension/Millikan: is only the secondary meaning. I 158 They can be meaningful only insofar as these intentions are explicit and have meaning themselves. I 171 Error/delusion/to show/indexical word/Millikan: Ex there are two items on the table, an ashtray, which I do not consider an ashtray and a thing that is not an ashtray but I think it is and say "This is a nice Ashtray". Question: have I thereby said that the ashtray is nice, although I meant the other object? Ex I hold up a book and say, "This belonged to my grandfather." However, I am mistaken and am holding up the wrong book. I 172 What I have said, of course, is wrong. What is not so clear is whether what I meant is something other than what I said. Millikan: thesis: here it is not the case that I and my token of "this" have meant different things. Solution: "this" is ambiguous with respect to Frege's sense. MillikanVsTradition: philosophers have so often ignored that. Solution/Millikan: perception can lead us to temporary concepts. temporary concepts/intensions/Millikan: intensions are then linked to our ability to pursue things and to re-identify them. preliminary concept: Ex this coffee mug for me is totally indistinguishable from a dozen others, but at the moment it's my cup. I 173 Question: whether that even counts as a concept. Ability to track the object leads to an interior concept. This leads to the distinction between perception and thought. Thinking/Millikan: if thinking is not mediated by perception the objects one thinks of are not indexed. Perception: here the objects are provided with an index. I 174 Error/delusion/indexical word/perception/misidentification/Millikan: Ex Suppose I'm wrong when I identify a recurring object. Then my inner concept has two senses, it has an ambiguous Fregean sense. 1. derived meaning from the ability to track the object. 2. inner concept I already had previously. "This" is therefore ambiguous. I 270 Standard conditions/content/Millikan: 1. in order to give them a content a "standard observer" must mean more than "observers to whom red things appear red under standard conditions". And accordingly for "standard conditions". Solution: standard conditions for red must be spelled out. Problem: no one has any idea how that could work. Problem: if you have every reason to believe that to be a standard observer, there are circumstances in which an object seems to have a different color than it has. But one would not conclude that the thing would not be red. Problem: if sameness of a thing is defined by its opposite properties, an observer must be able to identify these opposite characteristics, also. And it may be that these never come to light! Problem: how can my experience testify to the oppositeness of red and green? Many authors: think that one could never argue that red and green could even be in the same place at the same time. I 271 MillikanVsTradition: but that is not true, in fact there are many ways, Ex strabismus. Complementary colors/perception/seeing/certitude/Millikan: our trust in the fact that red and green are opposites (perhaps incorporated into nature) is an empirical certainty. And this is exactly the objective validity of these concepts, of the fact that red and green are properties - and not just hallucinations. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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