Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning | Dummett | I 18 Sense: according to Frege, the term has the meaning simply. The user need not always have the sense before his mind. In itself the meaning is objective. I 29 Wittgenstein/Dummett: use theory makes use of the concept of truth superfluous > Meaning before Truth. I 45 f .... Husserl: a statement adopts the meaning with which it is met by an internal act . ((s)> Humpty- Dumpty Theory of Meaning). Def Meaning/Dummett: what one must know in order to understand the term (an expression). I 152 Def meaning: what makes a sentence true. I 154/55 Dummett : meaning must not be explained by understanding. ( Speakers have no explicit theory.) - but also: DummettVsWittgenstein: mastery over practical ability. I 188 Dummett/Frege: Knowledge of Meaning = knowledge of the truth conditions - WittgensteinVs A criterion of meaning has no basis when it is no theory of meaning as a proposition. II 109 Meaning/DummettVsDavidson: trivial axioms ( . " Snow..." / snow) does not even show understanding, but push the task of explaining the theory of meaning - it explains what it means to capture the corresponding proposition. II 133 Meaning/Dummett: remains an unsolved problem. I 29 Correspondence Theory/Coherence Theory: meaning before truth - Davidson truth before meaning (Defined truth conditions - later the theory) - Dummett both together. Use/truth /Wittgenstein/Dummett: use theory makes the concept of truth superfluous. > Meaning before Truth. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Meaning | Husserl | Gadamer I 249 Meaning/Husserl/Gadamer: Intention of meaning and fulfillment of meaning belong in essence to the unity of meaning, and, like the meanings of the words we use, every being that is valid for me has, correlatively and in essence necessity, an "ideal generality of the real and possible experiencing modes of giving"(1). >Consciousness/Husserl. 1. Husserliana VI. 169. --- Chisholm II 135 f Meaning/Husserl/Universals: the contents of universals are incarnations of facts or documents. Acts with meaning are: judgments, questions and hypotheses. Acts without meaning are: perception and memory. These cannot be expressed. Meaning and perception belong to different spheres. The perspective never changes the meaning. II 136 Making true: is on one hand propositional, on the other hand simply by names. This also contains a non-expressable part: seeing the object. This part is non-propositional. --- Dummett I 85 Meaning/Husserl: the speaker fills the word with meaning. DummettVsHusserl: this is the >Humpty-Dumpty View. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Meaning | Minsky | Minsky I 64 Meaning/Minsky: We'll take the view that nothing can have meaning by itself, but only in relation to whatever other meanings we already know. (…) there's nothing basically wrong with the idea of a society in which each part lends meaning to the other parts. Communication/Minsky: If every mind builds somewhat different things inside itself, how can any mind communicate with a different mind? In the end, surely, communication is a matter of degree but it is not always lamentable when different minds don't understand each other perfectly. For then, provided some communication remains, we can share the richness of each other's thoughts. Understanding/Minsky: The secret of what anything means to us depends on how we've connected it to all the other things we know. That's why it's almost always wrong to seek the real meaning of anything. A thing with just one meaning has scarcely any meaning at all. Creativity/Minsky: Rich meaning-networks, however, give you many different ways to go: if you can't solve a problem one way, you can try another. True, too many indiscriminate connections will turn a mind to mush. But well-connected meaning-structures let you turn ideas around in your mind, to consider alternatives and envision things from many perspectives until you find one that works. And that's what we mean by thinking! Minsky I 67 The words and symbols we use to summarize our higher-level goals and plans are not the same as the signals used to control lower-level ones. So when our higher-level agencies attempt to probe into the fine details of the lower-level submachines that they exploit, they cannot understand what's happening. Meaning itself is relative to size and scale: it makes sense to talk about a meaning only in a system large enough to have many meanings. Cf. >Translation/Minsky. ((s) For the philosophical discussion of problems in relation to the concept of meaning: >Meaning/Philosophical theories, especially: >Humpty-Dumpty Theory.) |
Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003 |
| Meaning (Intending) | Davidson | I (e) 101f E.g. If I do not know the difference between a short-beaked echidna and a porcupine, it might be that I describe all the short-beaked echidnas which cross my path as porcupines. But since I have learned the word "porcupine" in a certain environment, my word "porcupine" does not refer to short-beaked echidnas, but to porcupins. It is the porcupine to which I am referring, and it is the porcupine, which I believe to have in front of me, when I sincerely assert, "This is a porcupine." My ignorance of the circumstances which determine what I mean is not the least to show that I do not know what I mean and think. There is, indeed, no physical difference between my actual condition and the one I would be in if I had meant "short-beaked echdina or porcupine," but this does not mean that there is no psychological difference. E.g. there may be no physical difference between mountain-sunburn and sunburn, but there is a difference, because the causation is different. Glüer II 164f Someone does not mean that p, if he did not intend to be interpreted as if he would mean p. Well, this is not a Humpty-Dumpty theory. It would only be one, if it was thought sufficient, to intend to be interpreted as if one would mean p to mean p. This is, however, a necessary condition and not a sufficient condition and therefore it is not a Humpty-Dumpty theory. Humpty-Dumpty says, "You cannot know it!". II 164 f Davidson: If he knows that she cannot know, then he cannot intend it, because one cannot intend what one does not consider possible. McGinn I 111 Burge and Dummett mean what speakers mean with their words - it very strongly depends on how the community uses these words. DavidsonVsDummett, DavidsonVsBurge: that is nonsense, because it has nothing to do with successful communication. If you talk differently than the community or someone else finds out, then you can communicate all day long. And this is happening all the time. McGinn: Domestication theory: There is also another approach that refuses to answer the constitutional question regarding the meaning (to mean), and instead conceive the meant meaning as an essentially combination-conditioned phenomenon. (Davidson). In order to tame the intended meaning, we would have to show how semantic basic units connect according to determinable rules. Glüer II 169f Meaning/to mean/intention/intent/Grice/DavidsonVsGrice: pro: Feedback is very important - Vs: nevertheless, intention is probably a necessary but not sufficient condition for meaning. - Intention is at least as difficult to explain as meaning. >Intention, >Meaning, >Communication. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Meaning (Intending) | Cavell | I 14 To mean/meaning/Cavell: There is a difference between the meaning of the words we use and what we mean when we give them a voice. >Speaking, >Implicature. Thesis: Our ability to mean what we say is dependent on two characteristics of our situation: 1. from the everydayness, the ordinariness of the resources at our disposal. 2. from the fact that we are the ones that access these resources. >Convention, >Community, >Understanding. We sometimes achieve or sometimes we do not achieve to mean what we say with our words! --- II 168 Cavell thesis: what we usually say and mean can have a direct and profound control over what we can say and mean in the philosophical sense. II 205 To mean/must/Cavell: this is not about reproducing the meaning as what you "must mean". Intension is not a substitute for intention. >Intension, >Intention. Cavell Thesis: Still, if we say "we must something", we imply that we are convinced of it, although it is not analytically, it is necessarily true! >Analytical, >a priori, >necessarily. Truth/Necessity/Cavell: if truth (with Aristotle) means: From what it is to say that it is, Then necessary truth is From what is, to say what it is. ((s) How it is done). But it is a profound prejudice to mean that it was a matter of content. It does not apply to all statements, but to those who are concerned with actions, and therefore have a rule description complementarity. >Truth. II 207 Necessity/Language/Cavell: 1. it is perfectly correct that the German language could have developed differently. 2. There is no way out when you say "I can say what I want, I do not always have to use the normal forms". You do not want to argue that you can talk without the language providing the possibility for this? II 208 E.g. A baker could use "voluntarily" and "automatically" synonymously. If it then follows that the professor does not understand the baker, then the professor would not understand another professor any more! >Language use, >Speaking. II 208 Method/Mates: Grewendorf/Meggle S 160): two methods: 1. Extensional: one brings out the meaning of a word by finding out what it has in common with other cases of its use. >Extension. 2. Intensive method: one asks the person concerned what he means. >Intension. II 209 Language/Cavell: it is not the case that we always know only by empirical investigations what words mean. We could not then come to generalizations. For example, half of the population could use "voluntarily" and "automatically" without any difference, but it does not show that the two are synonymous, but that both apply to the action of the person in question! II 210 It may be that the baker even insists that the two words mean the same. One could then argue: "You can say it, but you cannot mean it!" "You cannot mean what you would mean if you had chosen the other wording." Why is the baker not entitled to his argument then? >Assertibility. II 211 To a philosopher we would say in this situation (> Humpty Dumpty): 1. That he limits his expressive possibilities. 2. That he has a shortened theory of what it means to do something. Likewise, the philosopher who asks in everything: "analytical or synthetic?" has a shortened concept of communication. >Communication. II 213 Language/Cavell: The error is based on the assumption that the normal use of a word represents a function of the internal state of the speaker. To mean/Cavell: the false assumption that a statement about what we mean is synthetic comes from the fact that we believe that it describes the mental processes of a speaker. In reality, it is about the use of language. >Mental states, >Mind. For example, to a child, we might say, "You do not know, you believe it". The child learns the word usage. II 215 To mean/Cavell: there is no such activity as finding out what I mean with a word. But there is a finding out what a word means. >Language acquisition. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Meaning Change | Cavell | II 215 Meaning/meaning change/concept change/to mean/Cavell: the opponents of Socrates did not have to repeal their definitions because they did not know what their words meant, but because they knew what they meant, and therefore they knew that Socrates had entangled them into Paradoxes. How could I be involved in paradoxes if I could mean what I want with my words? Socrates' conversation partners, however, were not clear what they were saying or what they really said, and therefore they did not know what they meant! >Words, >Word meaning, > >Meaning, >Meaning/Intending, >Paradox, >Humpty-Dumpty. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Private Language | Wright | I 180/81 Private Language/Wittgenstein/Wright: does not have the discipline required, since there is no distinction between seeming right and being right. >Rule following, >Objectivity, >Meaning, >Humpty-Dumpty theory, cf. >Speaker meaning, >Language community, >Conventions. Wright: But of course, for example, sensation is not epistemically private. (Frequent misunderstanding). >Sensation, >Epistemic/ontologic, >First Person, >Intentionality. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chisholm, R.M. | Nominalism Vs Chisholm, R.M. | Frank I 260 Universals/VsChisholm/Heckmann: he represents an extreme Platonic universals realism. Thus he brings himself into a contradiction to both the moderate Aristotelian universals and to the ontological nominalism. I 261 Concepts/Nominalism/Chisholm/Heckmann: Chisholm is not only in contradiction to the ontological, but also to the conceptual nominalism: whatever does it mean "to have concepts"? Certainly knowing the importance of predicates. NominalismVsChisholm: but that's no approach to universalism of any kind, you are not acquainted with a universal that you think first and then express with a predicate. Rather, those who know the meaning of the predicate can use it in compliance with the rules. I 262 Nominalism/Utility Theory/VsChisholm: the meaning of predicates and sentences cannot be explicated mentalistically (by resorting to intentional performance) >(Humpty Dumpty Theory). MentalismVsNominalism/Chisholm: everything semantic has its origin in the mind. Direct Attribution/Attribution Theory/VsChisholm: E.g. an infant recognizes his mother, but not by first judging that it recognizes the mother and then attributing this state to himself. (Chisholm: must actually assume that the mother is only an indirect object of attribution). I 263 Consciousness/Chisholm: emerges from an act of direct consideration of a self-presenting property. VsChisholm: this ignores a fundamental trait of any type of consciousness or fails to make it understood: the self-disclosure of the self-translucency of consciousness. Consciousness should be acquainted and familiar with itself whenever it occurs, and that in a pre-reflective and irreflexive way. (Frank, >Sartre). E.g. I have direct knowledge of my pain, not only by reflection and subsequent direct attribution. (That would be of a higher level). Consciousness/HeckmannVsChisholm: there is a third between the self-presenting and self-presented: the self present: the which has always been disclosed, known and familiar by pre-attributive knowledge. (>Background). Roderick M. Chisholm (1981): The First Person. An Essay on Reference and Intentionality, Brighton 1981 |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Field, H. | Stalnaker Vs Field, H. | Field II 28 Equality of the inferential role/Field: must be defined only in relation to an idiolect here. This solves the problem that we otherwise might incorporate the meaning of the token in what the reference comes from. ((s) circular). VsField: (Wallace 1977, Davidson 1977, 1979, McDowell 1978 Stalnaker 1984): the reduction of the truth conditions on the semantics of the basic concepts were too atomistic. It takes too little account that the proposition itself is a unit of meaning. FieldVsVs: I should understand reduction a bit "wider". Field II 94 StalnakerVsField: would argue 1. that the causal theories of reference require the public language intentional concepts: what a word means depends on the attitude of the language user. ((s) Problem: >Humpty Dumpty theory VsVs: is this about the >speech community? Or >attitude semantics?). Field: then a non-intentional causal theory would be more successful for the "morphemes" of a thought language than words for a public language. A non-intentional theory for the public language seems irrelevant. StalnakerVsField. 2. (deeper): Field's access was too atomistic: he thinks the basic representation exists between words instead of between propositions or "morphemes" of the thought language instead of whole states. Field: he might be right with this. Two points about this: FieldVsStalnaker: 1. he thinks for me the "name-object"- or "predicate-property"-relations come first. The sentence-proposition-relation is then derived. Does that mean that people first invented names and predicates and then awesomely put them together? I have never claimed that. Rather, truth conditions are characterized by "name-object" - or "predicate property"-relations. 2. an atomistic theory can explain much of the interaction between the atoms. Stalnaker's theory is not atomistic enough. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Husserl, E. | Dummett Vs Husserl, E. | Dummett I 36 Husserl generalizes the concept of sense and meaning until he arrives at his concept of the noema, thus making the turn to language impossible. A generalization of Frege’s concept of sense is excluded. DummettVsHusserl: Noema not linguistically deducible. Husserl: An utterance as such is certainly not a consciousness act, but the fact that it actually has this specific meaning, goes back to an accompanying consciousness act: the "meaning-giving act." I 55 DummettVsHusserl: it is difficult to spare him the accusation that he represents here a Humpty Dumpty-view. In no case the intention of the speaker that the word could be interpreted in a certain sense consists in the fact that he performs an internal act by which it is filled with meaning. Noema/DummettVsHusserl: His assertion that the slipping into idealism would be prevented by the distinction between noema and object is not readily evident. We cannot say that the subject perceives the object only indirectly, for it is mediated by the noema. Namely, there is no concept of direct perception which we could oppose to this. I 104 DummettVsFrege, DummettVsHusserl: both go too far if they make the linguistic ideas expressed similar to the "interpretation". I 106 Thoughts/DummettVsFrege: are not necessarily linguistic: Proto thoughts (also animals) (linked to activities) - Proto thoughts instead of Husserl’s noema. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Mill, J. St. | Tugendhat Vs Mill, J. St. | I 349 Mill regards names as elementary. Distinguishes general and individual names. Individual names: "denotative". Only descriptions are also connotative. They refer to the object by means of the attribute. Proper names: not connotative, they are "attached to the object itself." TugendhatVsMill: Problem: it would have to be like in the fairy tale of Alibaba where the house is marked with a chalk mark to be able to recognize it. Mill sees this objection himself. His solution: we do not mark the object, but our image of the object. I 350 Presentation/Tradition/Tugendhat: irredeemable metaphor of traditional philosophy. Also for modern tradition. Problem: the fact that the image is supposed to be something like an internal image more problems than it solves. It is no coincidence, however, that philosophy came up with this concept, initially there was no alternative but to look towards something sensual for orientation if you did not want to use a language itself for orientation. I 352 Mill/Tugendhat: however, we can reformulate his theory such that it is not about an imagination, but about "standing for": namely for an imagined object. However, his theory implies that our relation to the objects is not a linguistic one. Object/Frege: Object: is not anything imaginable as a simple fact, but something to which showing itself in manifold ways of givenness belongs essentially. I 353 Image/Sign/Tugendhat: do signs not need to be conceivable at least? Tugendhat: yes: sign types are conceivable, i.e. in a non-metaphorical sense. I 354 TugendhatVsTradition/TugendhatVsMill: 1) The metaphor of a non-sensual, somehow intellectual image makes no sense. 2) Excessive tendency to think the object as a counterpart. I 355 However, it is not controversial between tradition and analytic philosophy that singular terms "stand for objects". (> Proxy/Tugendhat). I 356 3) images are not understood by tradition as intersubjective. (Humpty-Dumpty Theory). |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
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