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Meaning | Dummett | I 18 Sense: according to Frege, the term has the meaning simply. The user need not always have the sense before his mind. In itself the meaning is objective. I 29 Wittgenstein/Dummett: use theory makes use of the concept of truth superfluous > Meaning before Truth. I 45 f .... Husserl: a statement adopts the meaning with which it is met by an internal act . ((s)> Humpty- Dumpty Theory of Meaning). Def Meaning/Dummett: what one must know in order to understand the term (an expression). I 152 Def meaning: what makes a sentence true. I 154/55 Dummett : meaning must not be explained by understanding. ( Speakers have no explicit theory.) - but also: DummettVsWittgenstein: mastery over practical ability. I 188 Dummett/Frege: Knowledge of Meaning = knowledge of the truth conditions - WittgensteinVs A criterion of meaning has no basis when it is no theory of meaning as a proposition. II 109 Meaning/DummettVsDavidson: trivial axioms ( . " Snow..." / snow) does not even show understanding, but push the task of explaining the theory of meaning - it explains what it means to capture the corresponding proposition. II 133 Meaning/Dummett: remains an unsolved problem. I 29 Correspondence Theory/Coherence Theory: meaning before truth - Davidson truth before meaning (Defined truth conditions - later the theory) - Dummett both together. Use/truth /Wittgenstein/Dummett: use theory makes the concept of truth superfluous. > Meaning before Truth. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
Meaning | Husserl | Gadamer I 249 Meaning/Husserl/Gadamer: Intention of meaning and fulfillment of meaning belong in essence to the unity of meaning, and, like the meanings of the words we use, every being that is valid for me has, correlatively and in essence necessity, an "ideal generality of the real and possible experiencing modes of giving"(1). >Consciousness/Husserl. 1. Husserliana VI. 169. --- Chisholm II 135 f Meaning/Husserl/Universals: the contents of universals are incarnations of facts or documents. Acts with meaning are: judgments, questions and hypotheses. Acts without meaning are: perception and memory. These cannot be expressed. Meaning and perception belong to different spheres. The perspective never changes the meaning. II 136 Making true: is on one hand propositional, on the other hand simply by names. This also contains a non-expressable part: seeing the object. This part is non-propositional. --- Dummett I 85 Meaning/Husserl: the speaker fills the word with meaning. DummettVsHusserl: this is the >Humpty-Dumpty View. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
Meaning | Minsky | Minsky I 64 Meaning/Minsky: We'll take the view that nothing can have meaning by itself, but only in relation to whatever other meanings we already know. (…) there's nothing basically wrong with the idea of a society in which each part lends meaning to the other parts. >Society of Minds. Communication/Minsky: If every mind builds somewhat different things inside itself, how can any mind communicate with a different mind? In the end, surely, communication is a matter of degree but it is not always lamentable when different minds don't understand each other perfectly. For then, provided some communication remains, we can share the richness of each other's thoughts. Understanding/Minsky: The secret of what anything means to us depends on how we've connected it to all the other things we know. That's why it's almost always wrong to seek the real meaning of anything. A thing with just one meaning has scarcely any meaning at all. Creativity/Minsky: Rich meaning-networks, however, give you many different ways to go: if you can't solve a problem one way, you can try another. True, too many indiscriminate connections will turn a mind to mush. But well-connected meaning-structures let you turn ideas around in your mind, to consider alternatives and envision things from many perspectives until you find one that works. And that's what we mean by thinking! Minsky I 67 The words and symbols we use to summarize our higher-level goals and plans are not the same as the signals used to control lower-level ones. So when our higher-level agencies attempt to probe into the fine details of the lower-level submachines that they exploit, they cannot understand what's happening. Meaning itself is relative to size and scale: it makes sense to talk about a meaning only in a system large enough to have many meanings. Cf. >Translation/Minsky. ((s) For the philosophical discussion of problems in relation to the concept of meaning: >Meaning/Philosophical theories, especially: >Humpty-Dumpty Theory.) |
Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003 |
Meaning (Intending) | Davidson | I (e) 101f E.g. If I do not know the difference between a short-beaked echidna and a porcupine, it might be that I describe all the short-beaked echidnas which cross my path as porcupines. But since I have learned the word "porcupine" in a certain environment, my word "porcupine" does not refer to short-beaked echidnas, but to porcupins. It is the porcupine to which I am referring, and it is the porcupine, which I believe to have in front of me, when I sincerely assert, "This is a porcupine." My ignorance of the circumstances which determine what I mean is not the least to show that I do not know what I mean and think. There is, indeed, no physical difference between my actual condition and the one I would be in if I had meant "short-beaked echdina or porcupine," but this does not mean that there is no psychological difference. E.g. there may be no physical difference between mountain-sunburn and sunburn, but there is a difference, because the causation is different. Glüer II 164f Someone does not mean that p, if he did not intend to be interpreted as if he would mean p. Well, this is not a Humpty-Dumpty theory. It would only be one, if it was thought sufficient, to intend to be interpreted as if one would mean p to mean p. This is, however, a necessary condition and not a sufficient condition and therefore it is not a Humpty-Dumpty theory. Humpty-Dumpty says, "You cannot know it!". II 164 f Davidson: If he knows that she cannot know, then he cannot intend it, because one cannot intend what one does not consider possible. McGinn I 111 Burge and Dummett mean what speakers mean with their words - it very strongly depends on how the community uses these words. DavidsonVsDummett, DavidsonVsBurge: that is nonsense, because it has nothing to do with successful communication. If you talk differently than the community or someone else finds out, then you can communicate all day long. And this is happening all the time. McGinn: Domestication theory: There is also another approach that refuses to answer the constitutional question regarding the meaning (to mean), and instead conceive the meant meaning as an essentially combination-conditioned phenomenon. (Davidson). In order to tame the intended meaning, we would have to show how semantic basic units connect according to determinable rules. Glüer II 169f Meaning/to mean/intention/intent/Grice/DavidsonVsGrice: pro: Feedback is very important - Vs: nevertheless, intention is probably a necessary but not sufficient condition for meaning. - Intention is at least as difficult to explain as meaning. >Intention, >Meaning, >Communication. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
Meaning Change | Cavell | II 215 Meaning/meaning change/concept change/to mean/Cavell: the opponents of Socrates did not have to repeal their definitions because they did not know what their words meant, but because they knew what they meant, and therefore they knew that Socrates had entangled them into Paradoxes. How could I be involved in paradoxes if I could mean what I want with my words? Socrates' conversation partners, however, were not clear what they were saying or what they really said, and therefore they did not know what they meant! >Words, >Word meaning, > >Meaning, >Meaning/Intending, >Paradox, >Humpty-Dumpty. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
Private Language | Wright | I 180/81 Private Language/Wittgenstein/Wright: does not have the discipline required, since there is no distinction between seeming right and being right. >Rule following, >Objectivity, >Meaning, >Humpty-Dumpty theory, cf. >Speaker meaning, >Language community, >Conventions. Wright: But of course, for example, sensation is not epistemically private. (Frequent misunderstanding). >Sensation, >Epistemic/ontologic, >First Person, >Intentionality. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
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Mill, J. St. | Tugendhat Vs Mill, J. St. | I 349 Mill regards names as elementary. Distinguishes general and individual names. Individual names: "denotative". Only descriptions are also connotative. They refer to the object by means of the attribute. Proper names: not connotative, they are "attached to the object itself." TugendhatVsMill: Problem: it would have to be like in the fairy tale of Alibaba where the house is marked with a chalk mark to be able to recognize it. Mill sees this objection himself. His solution: we do not mark the object, but our image of the object. I 350 Presentation/Tradition/Tugendhat: irredeemable metaphor of traditional philosophy. Also for modern tradition. Problem: the fact that the image is supposed to be something like an internal image more problems than it solves. It is no coincidence, however, that philosophy came up with this concept, initially there was no alternative but to look towards something sensual for orientation if you did not want to use a language itself for orientation. I 352 Mill/Tugendhat: however, we can reformulate his theory such that it is not about an imagination, but about "standing for": namely for an imagined object. However, his theory implies that our relation to the objects is not a linguistic one. Object/Frege: Object: is not anything imaginable as a simple fact, but something to which showing itself in manifold ways of givenness belongs essentially. I 353 Image/Sign/Tugendhat: do signs not need to be conceivable at least? Tugendhat: yes: sign types are conceivable, i.e. in a non-metaphorical sense. I 354 TugendhatVsTradition/TugendhatVsMill: 1) The metaphor of a non-sensual, somehow intellectual image makes no sense. 2) Excessive tendency to think the object as a counterpart. I 355 However, it is not controversial between tradition and analytic philosophy that singular terms "stand for objects". (> Proxy/Tugendhat). I 356 3) images are not understood by tradition as intersubjective. (Humpty-Dumpty Theory). |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
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