Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 35 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bayesianism | Schurz | I 110 Bayes Theorem/Schurz: Its importance lies in cases where one is mainly interested in w(Ai I B) (subjective probability), but only the inverse conditional probability w(B I Ai) is accessible. >Subjective probability/Schurz, >Probability/Schurz, >Probability theory/Schurz. I 61 Bayes/Bayesianism/Schurz/Basic principle: certain init. prblties must always be assumed. Indifference principle: the same init. prblties for competing hypotheses. Vs: the output distributions are language dependent - E.g. a distribution can be indifferent with respect to the wavelength, but in relation to frequency it is no longer indifferent. I 161 Bayes/Bayesianism/Schurz: Basic principle: certain initial probabilities must always be assumed. However, the initial probability of E can be eliminated if one restricts oneself to comparative hypothesis evaluations. Indifference principle: the assumption of equal initial probabilities for competing hypotheses. Likelihood intuition: subjective justification: assuming the indifference principle, the level of likelihood of E given H is an indicator of the subjective probability of H given E. Vs: this suffers from the fact that the indifference principle itself is problematic: I 162 Vsindifference principle/Schurz: output distributions are language-dependent! E.g. a distribution indifferent for wavelength (X) is no longer indifferent after conversion to frequency (Y :=1/X)! >Likelihood/Schurz. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Consciousness | Churchland | Güzeldere I 397f Consciousness of mental states: "perceptual-like": Locke, Armstrong, Paul and Patricia Churchland, Lycan "Thought-like": Rosenthal, Carruthers, Dennett, also Descartes. Güzeldere I 404 Awareness/Locke/Churchland/Armstrong/Lycan: speaking of "scanning" or "monitoring". Question: What is perceived, the content, or the state itself? Güzeldere I 411 Consciousness/Churchland: introspective awareness is a subspecies of perception. Thesis: In the language of a mature neuroscience, there might be a more differentiated representation of "human subjective consciousness". E.g. Dopamine level could be interpreted as Gm7 chords in music. We need to learn this conceptual system and practice its application. (Davidson's conceptual scheme). Güzeldere: Churchland is thus not only convinced that mental states are identical with brain states, but also that their properties are identical. --- Churchland II 475 Consciousness/Dennett: is a virtual machine. Thesis: People become aware of the extent to which they acquire language and learn to talk about themselves. In this transition, a parallel machine (the neural networks in the brain) simulates a serial machine (which performs the operations step by step on the basis of rules that can be recursive). Dennett: Consciousness behaves like the flight simulator to the processes within the computer. II 476 ChurchlandVsDennett: 1. The assumption of the language dependence of consciousness denies children and animals consciousness. II 477 2. It has been known for some time that recurrent neural networks can produce temporal sequencing. 3. No virtual machine is required, a particular class of operations can be the output of a single, if heavily distributed, network. Dennett could be quite right, but not on this way. |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Güzeldere I Güven Güzeldere "Is consciousness the perception of what passes in the mind?" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Empiricism | Locke | Höffe I 244 Empiricism/Locke/Höffe: [Locke's empiricism has, initially] two dimensions. 1) According to the "empiricism of principles and ideas" even these come from experience (Book 1-111) (1). 2) According to the "Empiricism of Statements", all statements about facts are to be checked against experience (Book IV). 3) "Empiricism of language": according to him, words that neither directly nor indirectly refer to experience, nor - like "and", "also", "or" - serve these words, are considered meaningless. According to the first dimension, experience is not preceded by elements free of experience, neither finished ideas (basic elements of knowledge) nor finished theoretical or practical principles. Even an imperative as basic in moral and legal terms as the fundamental imperative, the prohibition of harm ("no one harms the other!"), is not considered innate. >Innate/Locke. 1. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690). Euchner I 169 Locke / Euchner: today: his empiricism overcame the old worldview of divinely revealed knowledge - thesis: "there is nothing in the mind, which was not previously in the senses". LeibnizVsLocke: "apart from the mind itself". KreimendahlVsLocke: by limiting knowledge to the ideas he questioned his own empirical program. Arndt II 177 Locke/Arndt:Locke is the ancestor of empiricism - knowledge should be treated language dependent. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 Loc I W. Euchner Locke zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 Loc II H.W. Arndt "Locke" In Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen - Neuzeit I, J. Speck (Hg) Göttingen 1997 |
| Expressions | Goodman | I 25 Exemplification and expression/Goodman: exemplification and expression point in the same direction, which is exactly opposite to the denotation (name). (Denotation belongs more to saying and writing). >Denotation. I 60 For the direct quote both are important: naming and including. Each expression is a paraphrase of itself. --- III 55ff Definition "expressions"/Goodman: expressions are here the first reference to a sense or another property. Not to their presence! One can also express emotions that one does not have. Expression: an expression is e.g. a feeling. Representation: a representation is an object or event. III 58 The gray image, does not denote the color gray, but is denoted by the predicate "gray". III 59 Not every exemplification is expression but each expression is exemplification. III 60 Definition exemplification: exemplification is ownership plus reference. (The ostension is missing reference.) >Reference. III 61 A figure which exemplifies the triangularity, exemplifies not always a "three sided-ness"! Although it is three-sided. Also language dependent: "rouge" does not exemplify "red"! III 88 Definition what is expressed: what is expressed, is exemplified metaphorically. >Metaphors. III 92 While almost everything can denote almost everything else or even represent, a thing can only express what belongs to it, but not what originally belonged to it (e.g. glue factory). Ultimately, it is a matter of habit. >Representation. III 94 Name a feature and express it are two different things. And a poem or a story does not need to express what he/she says, or to say what it expresses. III 94 Def exemplification: exemplification relates the symbol to a description, which it denotes. >Descriptions, >Symbols. III 96 Def expression: the expression relates the symbol to a description which it denotes metaphorically and by that not only indirectly on the metaphorical but also onto the literal area of this label. Conclusion: when a expresses b then: 1. a owns b or is denoted by it, 2. this possession or this denotation is metaphorical, 3. a refers to b. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Given | Field | I 218 Given/Givenness/Field: it is not clear what it means for a situation to be "given". - Which is linguistics- and theory-dependent. >Language dependence, >Theory depenence, >Ontology, >Existence, >Theories, >Knowledge. Problem: there is no way to describe a situation in which the relation - "double distance". (P3) "MG Eu (u is a matter particle and u is between x and y and xuCuy and uyCzw and the spatial relationships between x, y, z and w are the same as they actually are)" diverge. Spelling: C: congruent. Problem: if we define "triple distance" according to (P3), we have to show that the distance is not at the same time twice and three times. - Then we need Substantivalism or Heavy-Duty Platonism. >Platonism, >Heavy duty platonism, >Substantivalism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Grue | Schurz | I 219 Grue/gred/reen/Goodman/Schurz: logical form: (B: observed. G*: gred). G*: <> ((Bxt0 > Gx) u (~Bxt0 > Rx)). Sa: emerald. Sample: {a:1 ≤ i ≤ n} Then the assertions Sai u Bat0 u Gai and Sai u Bat0 u G*ai are definitionally equivalent. If we apply the inductive generalization inference for both "green" and "gred," our sample yields the two all-hypotheses H:= "All emeralds are green" and H*: = "All emeralds are gred". Problem: However, H and H* imply contradictory predictions (green versus red) for all emeralds not observed before t0. Schurz: There is the following connection to subjective inductive permutability assumptions: for regular probability functions the permutability assumption cannot be valid for a predicate (Gx) and its pathological counterpart (G*) at the same time. Question: What criteria should we use to decide which predicates we consider to be exchangeable or inductively projectable? Many criteria have been proposed and proved to be unsuitable. Carnap: (1947(1),146, 1976(2), 211): Thesis: only qualitative predicates are inducible (projectable) "grue" is a Def "positional" predicate/Carnap, i.e. a predicate that in its definition refers to time t0. Ex grue. Def qualitative predicate/Carnap: has no definitional reference to individual constants. GoodmanVsCarnap: (Goodman 1955/75(3), 105): Problem of language dependence (sic: dependence): By mutual redefinition one can pass from our language (with "green" and "red") to a language equivalent in expressive power, in which "gred" and "reen" (G*x, R*x) function as basic terms (basic predicates): Language L (Gx,Rx primitive) Definitions in L G*x: <> ((Bxt0 > Gx) u (~Bxt0 > Rx)) R*x: <> ((Bxt0 > Rx) u (~Bxt0 > Gx)) Language L* (G*x, R*x primitive) Definitions in L* Gx: <> ((Bxt0 > G*x) u (~Bxt0 > R*x)) Rx: <> ((Bxt0 > R*x) u (~Bxt0 > G*x)). Solution/Schurz: One can distinguish between qualitative and positional predicates language-independently with respect to ostensive learnability! (s) Properties dependent on a future time cannot be shown). I 220 GoodmanVsInduction/Schurz: but this still does not answer why induction should be based on qualitative and not on positional predicates. Induction consists in extending patterns previously observed as constant into the future. In order to formulate induction rules in a meaningful way, we need to know what remained constant! And that depends on qualitative features. Positional features are pseudo-features. Pointe: That individuals are "constant" "grot" means that they change their color from green to red at t0. In this case we have done "anti-induction" and not induction. This is the reason why we have (with Carnap) for induction rules basic predicates for qualitative and not positional features. 1. Carnap, R. "On the Application of Inductive Logic", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 8, 133-147. 2. Carnap, R. (1976). Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaft, 3. Aufl. München: Nymphenburger. (Engl. Orig. 1966). 3. Goodman, N. (1955/75) Tatsache, Fiktion, Voraussage, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp. Engl, Orig. Fact, Fiction and Forecast (1955). |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Individuation | Gärdenfors | I 177 Individuation/Thoughts/Sentence/GärdenforsVsFrege/Gärdenfors: thoughts cannot be sentences, because sentences cannot be identified language-independent. >Sentences, >Propositions, >Thoughts, >Thinking, >Language dependence. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Inflationism | Field | II 104 Inflationism: Frege/Russell/Tractatus/Ramsey: truth conditions are central to meaning and content. >Truth conditions. Vs: Deflationism: no truth conditions instead perhaps verification theory. >Deflationism. Verification conditions/Verification/Verificationism/Field: Verification conditions (perhaps via stimuli) are given without the that-sentences - i.e., without propositional content - then class of verification conditions instead of proposition. >Verification conditions. Inflationism: would say that these are no real propositions because these must include truth conditions. InflationismVsVerificationism. II 126 Inflationism/Field: proceeds from facts (unlike the deflationism) - in particular, facts about the use of a language. FieldVs: what kind of facts are these supposed to be? - Deflationism: homophony condition is sufficient to rule out the fact that we do not use a language with deviating reference - there are no more facts. ((s) homophony condition: "Snow is white" is true iff is snow is white). >Homophony. II 114 Deflationism: can assume facts. >Facts, cf. >Nonfactualism. Inflationist relation: "S has the truth conditions p". II 126 Questions about the truth conditions: become questions about which language the person speaks. >Language dependence. Inflationism: would consider that as a question of use - (because he assumes facts). II 220 Inflationism/FieldVsInflationism: increases the indeterminacy. >Indeterminacy, >Translation. II 230 Inflationism/Vagueness/FieldVsInflationism: Problem: Inflationism needs a thing that is "neither bald nor non-bald". Inflationism: explains example "weakly true" compositionally. >Compositionality. Supervaluation/Sorites/Inflationism: "candidate of an extension". >Supervaluation. Def strongly true: is a sentence with a vague predicate then iff it is true relative to each of the candidates of an extension. Then it is a borderline case without definition-operator (dft-operator): "Jones is bald in some, but not in all extensions". |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Interpretation | Cresswell | I 112 Interpretation/Cresswell: is language-relative. - Then belief is a three-place relation again: Speaker - object (word, sentence, variable) - language. >Language dependence. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Justification | Esfeld | I 146 ~ Justification/McDowell/Esfeld: thesis: the space of reasons (justifications) is further than that of the conceptual. >Space of reasons, >Concepts, >Conceptual role, >Language dependence. I 161 ~ I-you-relations/Brandom/Esfeld: I-you-relations show in contrast to relativistic I-we-relationships that the community as a whole can be wrong. I-we: I-we is the myth of the given. I-you: I-you replaces representationalism by inferentialism. I- you-relationship. There is no enforcement of consensus, the community has no privileged status. >Myth of the given. I 191ff Justification/belief/Esfeld: justification is only possible by other beliefs because these have statement form - but circumstances are not sufficient, however inferential practices are. Ultimately, we need the coherence theory. Social holism: only beliefs are isolated from the world, nothing in the world is conceptual (VsMcDowell). >Beliefs/McDowell, >Holism, >Beliefs. But beliefs are bound to the world by not being epistemically self-sufficient. (Epistemically self-contained: the content of belief state is ontological dependent on physical texture.) >Belief state, >Content. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Language and Thought | Piaget | Upton I 75 Language and thought/Piaget/Upton: Piaget claimed that, although language and thought are closely related, language depends on thought for its development. Language is not possible until children are capable of symbolic thought; they must understand that one thing can stand for another before they can use words to represent objects, events and relationships. Rationale: fundamental principles of thought (e.g. understanding concepts) are displayed well before language; and the simultaneous emergence of language and other processes (…) are suggesting that language is just one of a number of outcomes of fundamental changes in cognitive ability. >Symbolic play/Piaget. VsPiaget > |
Piag I J. Piaget The Psychology Of The Child 2nd Edition 1969 Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Language and Thought | Plato | Gadamer I 411 Language and Thought/Plato/Gadamer: The pure thinking of ideas, the Dianoia, is mute as a dialogue of the soul with itself (aneu phones).(1) Logos: The Logos(2) is the stream that emanates from such thinking and sounds through the mouth (rheuma dia tou stomatos meta phthongou). It is obvious that vocal sensualization does not claim any meaning of truth of its own. There is no doubt that Plato does not reflect on the fact that the process of thinking, if it is conceived as a dialogue of the soul, itself includes a linguistic dependency, and if we do read something about it in the 7th letter, it is in the context of the dialectic of cognition, i.e. the orientation of the whole movement of cognition towards the One (auto). Even if the language dependence is basically recognized there, it does not really stand out in its importance. It is only one of the Gadamer I 412 moments of cognition, all of which are revealed in their dialectical precariousness from the very thing on which cognition is based. One must therefore conclude that Plato's discovery of ideas obscures the very essence of language even more thoroughly than did the sophistic theorists who developed their own art (techne) in the use and abuse of language. >Correctness/Plato, cf. >Sophists. 1. VIl. letter 342ff. 2. soph. 263 e, 264 a. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Language Use | Field | II 132 Use dependent/Field: E.g. the T-predicate (truth predicate) is use-dependent, if we demand that in each world the truth conditions depend on the meanings in the actual world (are "rigid"). I.e. the meaning depends on our use. >Actual world, >Language dependence, >Actuality, >Actualism, >Truth conditions. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Mind Body Problem | Maturana | I 289 Mind-body problem/domains/Maturana: physicality (corporeality) and behavior are two non-overlapping domains. - They are coupled in their realization, however, because a living system operates as structurally determined. >Operation/Maturana. Physiology: disassembled into parts - in contrast: behavior: interactions (as wholes). >Behavior. Separate domains: solutions for mind-body problem: language depends on physicality, but does not act in its field. - This solves the problem of consciousness, self, soul. >Consciousness, >Self, >Soul. Mind-body: recursive coupling of the areas of behavior and physiology. >Recursion, >Mind, >Body, cf. >Materialism, >Identity theory. |
Maturana I Umberto Maturana Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000 |
| Natural Kinds | Stalnaker | I 80 Natural Kind/necessary properties/Stalnaker: the characteristics of kangaroos are empirical, not linguistic, i.e. actual kangaroos play a necessary role. >Language dependence, >Empricism. N.B.: but that is not sufficient for the fact that kangaroos are necessarily kangaroos. >Necessary identity. E.g. standard meter/Kripke: the object itself could be longer or shorter - so actual kangaroos can specify the reference of "kangaroo", without themselves being genuine elements of the natural kind. >Standard meter. I 208 Natural kind/rigidity/rigid/Stalnaker: names and natural kind terms are rigid. >Rigidity. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Ontological Relativity | Esfeld | I 116 Ontological Relativity/Quine: in the native language we can avoid indeterminacy if we understand the meanings literally. >Literal meaning, >Language dependence, >Indefiniteness, >Theories, >Ontology, >Translation. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Paratactic Analysis | Cresswell | II 137 Paratactic Analysis/Propositional Attitude/Davidson/Cresswell: here there is no attitude sentence - we need instead a semantics for demonstratives. >Demonstratives, >Propositional attitudes. II 161 Paratactic Analysis/ArnaudVsDavidson/Cresswell: (Arnaud 1976)(1): a sentence like E.g. "What Galileo said, namely, that the earth moves, is true," involves reference to a language as well as reference to synonymy. >Language dependence, >Synonymy. 1. Richard B. Arnaud (1976).entence, Uttarance, and Samesayer Nous No. 10. (pp. 283-304). |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Possibility | Stalnaker | I 8 Def possibility/Stalnaker: a possibility is a way in which the world can be - but just as the concept of truth does not say what is true and that of existence what exists, the term possibility does not say which possibilities there are. >Description levels, >Possible worlds/Stalnaker. I 66 Possibility/criterion/Lewis/Stalnaker: there is no criterion for possibility. Solution: to understand what is possible rather than to decide about it, e.g. whether water could have been something else than H2O. Ultimately a possibility is about understanding expressions - not about the status of worlds (possible world or impossible world). >Impossible world. I 170 Possibility/Stalnaker: a possibility can only be described by way of its possible implementation. >Description. I 171 It is useful to distinguish options from the language in which they are being described. It is not excluded that one thing can be reduced to the other in the end. >Language dependence, >Description-dependence. I 172 Assertion: a main function of assertions is to transmit information by distinguishing between possibilities. >Assertions. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Propositions | Prior | I 12/13 Propositions/Prior: propositioes are logical structures (i.e. no real objects), (facts and phrases are not). >Objects, >Intensions, >Facts, >Sentences. Therefore propositions are language independent. >Language dependency, >Language independence, >Translation, >Meaning. I 19 Proposition/fact/Prior: "Grass is not pink": complex sentence on grass, not sentence about "proposition" Grass is pink"". >About, >Levels/order, >Description levels. I 29 Proposition/Prior: you cannot only think P, but also about P, but other form than about objects: E.g. "__ thinks that the proposition __ is absurd": because the second gap is not for name but a sentence. >Names, >Sentences, >Meta language, >Thinking. "about"/Prior: belief-that, thinking-that: this is never about propositions, but about what propositions are about. "about" is systematically ambiguous, what it means depends on what kind of name or quasi-name (for example, numbers) follows it. >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief. I 42 Propositions/Wittgenstein/Ramsey: no matter from what "order" are always truth functions of independent sentences. I 52 Propositions/Prior: have only Pickwick's importance. (WittgensteinVsBroad: (W II 94), there is not a "special" meaning besides the "ordinary" B.) - Proposition/Church: propositions have the property, "to be the concept of truth or falsehood". >Thoughts, >A. Church. I 53 Proposition/Prior: when we speak of propositional identity, we are forced, to no longer see them as logical constructions. We need to treat them as real objects. (PriorVs). >Intensions, >Intensionality, cf. >Hyperintensionality, >Identification, >Individuation. I 53 Name/proposition/Prior: "the proposition that p" only apparent name. >Names, >Names of sentences. I 64 Identity of propositions/Prior: no substantive equivalence. >Equivalence, >Material equivalence. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Realism | Churchland | Pauen I 99 "Scientific Realism"/Terminology/Pauen: (Scientific Realism): Churchland's and Sellar's approach: Thesis: The ontology is determined by the entities whose existence asserts our best scientific theories. >Best explanation, >Ontology, >Existence, >W. Sellars. The dependence of the language on the ontology will then only exist because it is irrelevant to the above mentioned argument on what our existence assumptions depend. >Language dependence, >Language independence. Churchland/Pauen: committs the sciences to a very strong conception of nature as a kind of "thing-in-itself," ultimate authority in deciding on theories. |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Roles | Cresswell | I 106 Semantical Role/"say"/Lycan/Cresswell/(s): in idiosyncratic language ( "birds" means in L*, what "pigs" means in L) - Solution: The sentence with "pigs" plays in L* the same semantic role such as the sentence with "birds" in L. Problem: one cannot isolate a class of sentences if this class is in any way relative to the language that is in question ((s) circular). Saying/Cresswell: becomes a three-digit relation between person, sentence and interpreted language. (Cresswell pro). CresswellVsRelation theory. >Relation-theory, >Context-dependence, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Language dependence. I 107f Semantical Role/Conceptual Role/Lycan/Boer: E.g. Cicero/Tullius play the same semantic role but different conceptual roles. >Conceptual role. E.g. Hb and Gc play the same sR, iff DEN(b) = DEN(c) and DEN(H) = DEN(G). This is only relative to DEN. DEN: if H is a predicate, DEN H is the property (the denotated). >Denotation. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Satisfaction | Chisholm | II 70 Satisfaction/Sauer: closed sets: each ordered pair (x) (Qx> Rx) , if it is satisfied, is fulfilled by every thing - but not every open set (Qx> Rx). To try to solve that with a meaning postulate is to bring back the old problem of language dependencs without reference to the world. >Dependence, >Reference, >Meaning postulates. Sauer, W. Über das Analytische und das synthetische Apriori bei Chisholm. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Semantic Facts | Soames | I 474 Semantic facts/language dependency/Soames: Ex "b" refers (in L) to Boston. Ex "C" refers to cities. Ex "Cb" is true in L gdw. Boston is a city. These statements are speaker dependent. No semantic fact is: Ex "b" = "b" and Boston = Boston. Ex For all objects o, "C" = "C" and o is a city gdw. o is a city. These are speaker-independent. One cannot simply identify the two types. Semantic properties have expressions only by virtue of their use by speakers of the language. Non-semantic (speaker-independent) facts are not physicalistically reducible. >Reduction, >Reducibility. I 475 Language independence/Field: with primitive reference and true, if the logical constants and syntax are held constant, we obtain a language-independent W term. >Logical constants, >Syntax, >Language dependence. ((s) Semantic property/(s): not negation itself, but that the negation of a particular expression is true or applies in a situation). |
Soames I Scott Soames "What is a Theory of Truth?", The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 411-29 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Soames II S. Soames Understanding Truth Oxford 1999 |
| Semantics | Stalnaker | I 17 Meta-Semantics/Stalnaker: meta-semantic facts: meta-semantic facts are e.g. which language is spoken in a possible world - or whether we interpret the language with our language from the real world or with the one they speak there - or if we actually denote the language of the real world or the local language of the possible worlds from the perspective of the possible worlds itself. These facts ensure that our signs have the representational properties that they have. On these facts, it depends what is said or thought. Cf. >Semantic facts. I 82 Semantics/syntax/language-independent/Stalnaker: the step from syntax to semantics frees the theory from language dependence. >Language dependence. I 149 Modal Semantics/Stalnaker: modal semantics should allocate a separate range to each possible world ((s) but then you can no longer call possible worlds "ways of how things could be"). I 191 Semantics/Stalnaker/(s): semantics is the meanig from the real world. Meta-semantics: meta-semantics is the meaning from respective possible worlds because meta-semantics asks by which facts the semantic value is created and the facts must be from the respective possible world. I 192 Semantics: semantics says which semantic values have the expressions of a language. Meta-semantics: meta-semantic says what facts determine the semantic values. Pre-Semantics/Kaplan: pre-semantics refers to those who believe that a name that is at the end of a historic chain means something. >David Kaplan. Semantics/Kaplan: semantics rather gives us the meaning than telling us how it could be discovered. this is similar to Kripke. I 196 Possible world/actual world/meta-semantics/MS/Stalnaker: meta-semantics: takes into account the facts that determine the semantic values, i.e. ultimately it takes into account the differences between possible worlds. Therefore, meta-semantics is suitable if you want to consider a possible world as actual world. It is the meta-semantically understood primary intension of a statement that provides the information that we want to transmit. >Intensions/Stalnaker. I 199 Two-dimensional semantics/Stalnaker: two-dimensional semantics should be interpreted meta-semantically - not semantically. >Twodimensional semantics. Meta-semantics: meta-semantics is fact based, therefore we do not have access to a priori truth. Semantics: semantics must take internal states. I 213/14 Semantics/meta-semantics/semantics/Stalnaker: e.g. assuming we can only say how things possibly are, given the facts, how they actually are. Then: semantics: the set S only expresses the proposition Q under condition P. Meta-semantics: sentence S expresses only a conditional proposition, not a singular one, i.e. not the content depends on the facts, but it is relative itself. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Sense Data Theory | Millikan | I 302 Sense Data/contradiction/Millikan: a contradiction can only arise if one and the same judgment is applied several times. Object: the same object must have been identified in more than one way. That is, it must be possible that there is more than one intension of an object. >Identification/Millikan, >Intension/Millikan. Sense data/MillikanVsSense Data theory: sense data cannot be the object because a sense date cannot be given in several ways. ((s) There is always only one way of givenness of a sense date, otherwise it is about several sense data). Sense Data/Millikan: Every sense date presents itself only to one sense (e.g. touch, sense of smell). (s) i.e. it cannot be said that this soft object smells rotten or that it is the same object). Millikan: one needs a fully developed theory about law-like relationships between sense data. Otherwise you cannot test them at all! And therefore no concepts can be developed from them. And this would be contrary to the first condition that the concepts to be tested should only form small groups. I 312f Sense Data Theory/today/Millikan: the prevailing view seems to be that neither an inner nor an outer language actually describes sense data, except that the language depends on previous concepts of external things that normally cause sense data. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Supervaluation | Field | II 231 Supervaluation/Field: Supervaluation can be used as a kind of semantics with Boolean values: the Boolean value of a formula is the set of all those (combinations of) candidates of extensions in which the sentence is true - which in turn is a special case of a lattice-value semantics (lattive-valued semantics). >Extensions, >Truth, >Semantics. II 288 Supervaluation/Field: E.g. "determined p" is true iff p is true in all permissible interpretations of the language. >Language dependence, >Interpretation. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Synonymy | Cresswell | II 59 Synonymy/Reality/World/Language/Cresswell: the knowledge of some synonyms does not tell us anything about the relation between language and the world - and it is about that when we study meaning. >Language, >World, >World/thinking, >Reality, >Foundation, >Observation, >Observation language, >Observation sentence. Equality of meaning is not suitable for definition. >Meaning. II 106 Synonymy/Cresswell: is language-relative - therefore, we cannot say for the attribution of propostional attitudes: "He expressed a sentence that is synonymous with ...". >Language dependence. II 161 Synonymy/Cresswell: is attractive for people who do not want any language-independent meanings - But that would not be a real semantic relation. No one has hitherto attempted a recursive specification of a synonymy relation. Synonymy: is always relative to a particular language - ((s) That means you cannot assume any more propositions.) >Propositions. QuineVsSynonymy: you cannot create identity criteria for language. >Synonymy/Quine. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Tarski | Soames | I 481 VsTarski/Soames: two kinds of critique: 1st: FieldVsTarski: semantic properties should be dependent on speakers in a way that Tarski's are not. 2nd: Other authors VsTarski: Importance and truth conditions should be contingent, but analytically connected, characteristics of a sentence in a way that it is incompatible with Tarski. SoamesVsVs: both can be rejected. >Truth definition, >Quote/Disquotation, >Tarski scheme, >Truth theory, >Semantic properties, >Semantic facts, >Language dependence, >Speaker meaning, >Circumstances, >Logical constants/Soames. |
Soames I Scott Soames "What is a Theory of Truth?", The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 411-29 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Soames II S. Soames Understanding Truth Oxford 1999 |
| Term Scope | Tarski | I Berka 446 Term scope/Tarski: language-dependent. - The same expression can be used in a language for a true statement, for a false or nonsensical statement in another language. - So there is no general Truth-Definition.(1) >Language dependence, >Truth definition, >True-in-L 1. A.Tarski, Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen, Commentarii Societatis philosophicae Polonorum. Vol. 1, Lemberg 1935 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 |
| Theory Dependency | Schurz | I 57 Theory dependence/observation/Schurz: at present, theory dependence is half-heartedly accepted by the majority of scientists. (Chalmers 1994(1),20-31, Nagel 1979(2),79). E.g. Suppose two theories with conflicting predictions: with complete theory dependence, I 58 then the observations of the representatives would be determined only by their theoretical expectations! These would then be self-fulfilling predictions Total circle of justification: one believes in the theory because one has observed its prediction and this because one believes in the theory. Theory dependence/Schurz: five arguments in favor: 1. Experience is theory-guided: selection of experience for relevance is essential. This selection is theory-guided: according to it, I determine which observations to look for. >Theory-ladenness. Vs: this is true, but it does not follow that observation itself is theory-guided. Proponents of contradictory theories can make the same observations. 2. Perception is an (unconscious) process of construction and interpretation: ex. ambiguities and illusions, ex. R-D-head (Jastrow), tilt pictures: are supposed to prove the theory dependence of perception. >Rabbit-Duck-Head. Vs: the cognitive psychological findings only refute the so-called direct realism, according to which we see things as they are. But they also show something else: that our perceptions are radically independent of background assumptions and background knowledge! (Fodor 1984(3), Pylyshyn, 1999(4)) Deception/Fodor: Deceptions present themselves equally to everyone, no matter how much the person has been educated about the fact that it is a deception. >Deceptions. I 59 Solution: the processes of perception are based on innate mechanisms. Theory dependence/perception/solution/Schurz: The solution is then the dependence on acquired background knowledge (not on innate mechanisms). Theory independence/perception/Schurz: individuals with different background knowledge make the same perceptions. >Background, >Perception. 3. Scientific observation data are theory dependent: here it is about observation by means of instruments (telescope, microscope etc.). Then the theories are mostly theories about the functioning of the measuring instruments. >Theory/Duhem, >Method/Duhem. pragmatic notion of observation/VsQuine: one cannot check everything at the same time. I 60 4. Continuity argument/Maxwell 1962(5)/Carnap 1962(6)/Hempel 1974(7)/Schurz: thesis: there is a continuous transition from observability with the naked eye, via glasses, magnifying glasses etc. to finally the electron microscope. Then "observation" is arbitrary. >Observation. Vs: First, the fact that there is a continuous transition between black and white does not imply that there is no difference between black and white. Second, there are distinctive cuts in this transition. 5th observation is language and culture dependent/cultural relativism: >Humboldt, >Sapir-Whorf thesis. Thesis we can only perceive what is pre-drawn in our language by concepts, Vs: from the fact that languages have special concepts, it does not follow that one cannot have certain sense experience. Sense experience/VsWhorf: experience itself is not language-dependent. This would only be so if others were not able to learn foreign observational terms by ostension. However, this ability to learn is always present. I 61 Ostension/VsWhorf: Ostension works just essentially nonverbal! >Pointing, >Ostension, >Language dependence. 1. Chalmers, D. (1994). Wege der Wissenschaft. Berlin: Springer. 2. Nagel, E. (1979). Teleology Revisited and Other Essays, New York: Columbia University Press. 3. Fodoer, J. (1984). "Observation Reconsidered". Philosophy of Science 51, 23-43. 4. Pylyshyn, Z. (1999). "Is Vision Continouus with Cognition?", Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22, 341-365. 5. Maxwell, G. (1962). "The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities". In. Feigl,H. and Maxwell,G. (eds.): Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol III, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1962. 6. Carnap, R. (1976). Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaft, 3. Aufl. München: Nymphenburger. (Engl. Orig. 1966). 7. Hempel, C. (1974). Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften. München: DTV. (Engl. Orig. 1966). |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Translation | Field | II 147ff Untranslatable/Translation/Extension/Deflationism/Field: Problem: Incorporation of untranslatable sentences. - Solution: potential extension of one's own language by accepting truth-preservation in conclusion. >Truth transfer, >Extensions, >Deflationism, >Language dependence. II 148 Names by index: "Georg-i": the George, to which Mary refered at the occasion of Z. Cf. >Situation semantics. II 149 Per sentence theory: "UTT Guru, Z": the sentence the Guru uttered at Z. - The special sentence is then superfluous. II 152 Disquotational truth: Problem: untranslatable sentences are not disquotational true. >Disquotational truth, >Disquotationalism. II 161 Def Quasi-translation/Def Quasi-meaning/FieldVsChurch/FieldVsSchiffer/Field: this is what most understand as meaning: not literal translation but reproduction as the interpreter understands the use of the corresponding words in his own language at the point of time in his actual world. >Stephen Schiffer. Comparison: is preserved in the quasi-translation at the moment, not in a literal translation. >Comparisons, >Comparability. Sententialism/Sententionalism/Field: Thesis: If we say that someone says that snow is white, we express a relation between the person and the sentence. 1. Quasi-translation and quasi-meaning instead of literal. 2. "La neige est blanche" quasi-means the same as #Snow is white# - (#) what stands between #, should be further translated (quasi-). - In quasi-translation, the quasi-meaning is preserved. >Speaker intention, >Intention-based semantics, >Truth conditions. II 273 Translation/Parameter/Field: in many cases, the relativization of the translation to a parameter is necessary to make it recognizable as a translation. - E.g. "finite": the non-standard argument tells us that there are strange models, so that "is in the extension of "finite" in M" functions as a "translation" of "finite" which maintains the inferential role of all what we say in pure mathematics. N.B.: "Is in the extension of "finite" in M" is a parameterized expression. Solution: what we are doing is to "translate" the one-digit predicate "finite" into the two-digit predicate "is in the extension of "finite" in x", along with the statements to determine the value of x on a model M with the necessary characteristics. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Truth Conditions | Rescher | In: Skirbekk, Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996 I 342 Truth conditions/Tarski: The condition does not provide a definition of truth at all, but an adequacy criterion. - ((s) Truth conditions alternate with propositions and facts). >Adequacy, >Criteria, >Truth, >Facts, >Propositions. Definition of truth/Rescher: We rather need "that-p is true gdw. p" than the original schema "x is true gdw. p". >Disquotation, >Disquotational scheme. Quine/Church: X believes "there are unicorns" is not equivalent to "X believes the proposition that there are unicorns is true in German". >Equivalence. At most systematic correspondence of truth values - language dependence of truth. ((s) Other authors: criterion not equal to condition.) |
Resch I Nicholas Rescher The Criteriology of Truth; Fundamental Aspects of the Coherence Theory of Truth, in: The Coherence Theory of Truth, Oxford 1973 - dt. Auszug: Die Kriterien der Wahrheit In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Resch II N. Rescher Kant and the Reach of Reason: Studies in Kant’ s Theory of Rational Systematization Cambridge 2010 |
| Use | Field | II 132 Use dependent/Field: E.g. the T-predicate (truth predicate) is use-dependent, if we demand that in each world the truth conditions depend on the meanings in the actual world (are "rigid"). I.e. the meaning depends on our use. >Actual world, >Language dependence, >Actuality, >Actualism, >Truth conditions. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Vagueness | Field | II 227 Vagueness/revision of the logic/Field: some authors: to allow double negation, to prohibit explicit contradictions, thus also not to allow negations of the law of the excluded middle (l.e.m.). >Negation, >Double negation, >Contradictions, >Stronger/Weaker, >Excluded middle. Then old version: if Jones is a limiting case for "Jones is bald", we cannot claim either "bald" or "not-bald", so we can now. New: neither claim: E.g. "Jones is bald or not bald" nor "It is not the case that Jones is either bald or not bald." On the other hand: Field: with definite-operator (definite): "It is not the case that Jones is either definitely bald or definitely not bald". - Without law of the excluded middle: "neither bald nor not bald". II 228 Limiting case/vagueness/definite-Operator/Field: we need the definite-operator to avoid a limiting case of the a limiting case. >dft-operator, >Terminology/Field. II 228 Def Weakly true/vagueness/truth/truth-predicate/Field: to be able to say general things about borderline cases. Not only that somebody represents a certain limiting case. >Generalization. Def paradigmatic borderline case: definitely a borderline case. Not weakly true/deflationism: e.g. "Either bald or not-bald is true". Then the Truth-predicate itself inherits the vagueness. It is not definitely true whether or not. Def Strongly true/Field: assuming, Jones is a limiting case: then neither "bald" nor its negation (strongly) plus classical logic: then the disjunction "bald or not bald" should be true even in strong interpretation. Law of the excluded middle: if we give it up: a) weakly true: then the disjunction is not true b) strongly true: then the disjunction is without truth value. Strongly true: is less vague, does not inherit the vagueness. Correctness: which interpretation is the correct one is only dependent on utility. >Correctness. Per weak truth: allows infinite conjunction and disjunction. This corresponds more to the theory of validity. - Only the weak Truth-concept is supplied by the disquotation scheme. Deflationism: deflationism additionally requires the definite-operator to declare the predicate strongly true. >Deflationism. II 230 Inflationism/Vagueness/FieldVsInflationism: Problem: the I. needs a thing that is "neither bald nor not bald". Inflationism: explains e.g. "weakly true" compositional. >Inflationism. Supervaluation/Sorites/Inflationism: "candidate of an extension". >Supervaluation. Def strongly true: is a sentence with a vague predicate then iff it is true relative to each of the candidates of an extension. - Then the limiting case without definite-operator: "Jones is bald in some extensions but not in all". II 233 Vagueness/Ontology/Field: Thesis: vgueness is a deficiency of language, not of the world. >Language dependence. II 234 Vagueness/radical non-classical logic/Field: here we do not need a definite-operator or distinction between strong/weak truth: e.g. Jones is a limiting case iff it is not the case that he is either bald or not bald. Deflationism/Field: seems to save a lot of trouble, because there is no definite-operator, one would have to understand. Vs: that deceives: the trouble is only postponed: here the logical rules for "not", etc. are much more complicated. ... + ... II 228 Weakly true:...++... |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Verificationism | Esfeld | I 62 ~ Holism/FodorVsQuine: verificationism refers to something linguistic. Confirmation holism on the other hand refers to something across languages, like propositions. EsfeldVsFodor: beliefs combine both. >Holism, >Holism/Fodor, >Holism/Quine, >Confirmation, >Verification, >Propositions, >Language dependence. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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Reference |
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| Carnap, R. | Goodman Vs Carnap, R. | II 67 GoodmanVsCarnap/Reduction Sentences: the whole thing is pretty absurd. In my opinion, philosophy has the task to explicate, not to describe science (and the everyday language). The explication shall refer to pre-systematic use of the expressions of consideration, but does not need to comply with the order. It s all about economy and standardization. Schurz I 219 Grue/Bleen/Goodman/Schurz: logical form: (B: observes G*: grue) G*: ((Bxt0 > Gx) u (~Bxt0 > Rx)). Sa: Emerald. Sample: {a:1 ‹ i ‹ n} Then the assertions Sai u Bat0 u Gai and Sai u Bat0 u G*ai are equivalent b< definition. If we apply the inductive generalization conclusion both for "green" and for "grue", our sample results in the two universal hypotheses H: = "All emeralds are green" and H*: = "All emeralds are grue". Problem: H and H* imply for all emeralds not observed before t0 conflicting forecasts (green vs red). Schurz: the following relationship exists to subjective inductive exchangeability assumptions: for regular probability functions the exchangeability assumption cannot be valid at the same time for the predicate (Gx) and its pathological counterpart (G*). Question: according to which criteria should we decide which predicates we consider as exchangeable or inductively projectable? Many criteria were proposed and proved to be unsuitable. Carnap: (1947.146 1976, 211): Thesis: only qualitative predicates are inducible (projectable) "grue" is a Def "Positional" Predicate/Carnap, that is a predicate that refers to the time t0 in its definition. E.g. grue. Def Qualitative Predicate/Carnap: has no definitional reference to individual constants. GoodmanVsCarnap: (Goodman 1955/75, 105): Problem of language dependence (sic: dependence): through reciprocal re-definition it is possible to move from our own language (with "green" and "red") to a language which is equivalent in its expressiveness and in which "grue" and "bleen"(G * x * x R,) act as basic concepts (basic predicates): Re-Definition/Language Dependence/Logical Form: Language L (Gx, Rx primitive) language L* (G*x, R*x primitive) Definitions in L Definitions in L* G*x: ‹› ((Bxt0 > Gx) u (~Bxt0 › Rx)) Gx: ‹› ((Bxt0 › G*x) u (~Bxt0 › R*x)) R*x: ‹› ((Bxt0 › Rx) u (~Bxt0 › Gx)) Rx: ‹› ((Bxt0 > R*x) u (~Bxt0 › G*x)). Solution/Schurz: it is possible to distinguish between qualitative and positional predicates in terms of ostensive learnability independent of the language! I 220 GoodmanVsInduction/Schurz: this does not answer why induction should be based on qualitative and not on positional predicates. Induction consists in extending pattern that were so far observed as consistent into the future. To be able to formulate useful induction rules we need to know what remained constant! And that depends on the qualitative features. Positional features are pseudo-features. Important argument: the fact that individuals are "constantly" "grue" means that they change their color from green to red at t0 . In this case, we have carried out "anti-induction" and not induction. That is the reason why we (with Carnap) have basic predicates for qualitative and not positional features for induction rules. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Conceptual Role | Fodor Vs Conceptual Role | IV 163 Conceptual Role/CRT/Block/Fodor/Lepore: "conceptual role theory" or theory of the conceptual role, semantics of conceptual role. Thesis: the meaning of an expression is its semantic role (or inferential role). Block: believes that one version of this theory is true, but does not want to decide which one. Anyway, it is, according to Block, the only one that fulfills the conditions of the cognitive sciences. Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: Block's arguments for the conceptual role theory are not the decisive ones. But this does not lead to semantic holism anyway. It would have to be asserted together with the distinction analytic/synthetic. Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: perhaps the psychology, which Block has in mind, needs these conditions, but we do not believe that a version of the conceptual role theory fulfills them. IV 166 Fodor/Lepore/GriceVsBlock: ad 6.: (autonomous/inherited meaning) each Gricean semantics can tell the same story as Block: namely, that the meanings of sentences in a natural language depend on contents of propositional attitudes expressed by these sentences (propositional attitudes may be, for example, the communicative intentions). Grice: thesis: meanings are derived from the content of propositional attitudes (e.g. communicative intentions, >Position). IV 169 Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: 1) Now it becomes obvious: distinctions between inferential roles only solve Frege’s problem if there is an adequate principle of individuation for them. But there is no criterion for that! Block also names this as the main problem. So it is not easier to distinguish between the inferiential roles than between meanings. Twin Earth/TE/CRT/Block/Fodor/Lepore: problems with the Twin Earth are going in the a different direction than Frege’s problems (intention/extension). Frege: needs more finely grained concepts than extensions. Putnam: needs less finely grained concepts than extensional equivalence. (Eng) Synonymous expressions must be treated as extensionally different (water/twin earth water). Therefore, a common theoretical approach (CRT - conceptual role theory) is unlikely to work. Solution/Block: "two factors" version of the CRT. The two are orthogonal to each other: a) actual CRT: covers the meaning aspect of Frege IV 170 b) independent, perhaps causal theory of reference: (twin earth/water/twin earth water). Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: that has almost nothing to do with conceptual role theory. But also neither a) (meaning) nor b) (causality) are available. But let’s assume it anyway: E.g. suppose distinction meaning/reference: with "two factor" theory: we do have enough discrimination capability, but we pay a high price for it: Question: what actually holds the two factors together? IV 171 Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: precisely in the case of the twin earth, the conceptual role cannot determine the reference! Conceptual Role/Block: seems to be saying that it is indeed not the conceptual role of water that determines what it refers to, but the conceptual role of names! Their reference is causally determined, after all, according to Kripke. Conceptual Role/(s): difference: a) conceptual role of a particular concept, e.g. water. b) a word class, e.g. names. Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: but that does not solve the problem! We need something that prevents the confusion of extension and intension. What is it that excludes an expression like (see above) "prime/moisture"? Block: T is not a species concept if the causal theory of species concepts is not true of it. Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: that does precisely not prevent "water" from having the extension of a species concept, while having the logic of a numerical concept. Mention/use/Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: Block seems to be guilty of this confusion here: the problem here is how the meaning of an expression is related to the denotation if the intension does not determine the extension. Block only tells us that the concpet T, etc. falls under the extension of expressions such as "name", "species concept" if a certain semantic theory is true. This tells us how the inferential roles of "name", "species concept", etc. are related to their extensions. For those it proposes a kind of description theory: E.g. "name" is applied to "Moses", iff "Moses" has the semantic properties which the causal theory defines for names. IV 172 Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: but it does not tell us how the meaning of "Moses" defines its extension! And that is exactly the problem that the "two-factor" theory raises. Narrow Content/Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: the idea that narrow meanings are conceptual roles sheds no light on the distinction meaning/reference. A semantic theory should not only be able to ascertain the identity of meaning, but also provide a canonical form that can answer the questions about the meaning of expressions. If the latter succeeds, it is not entirely clear whether the first must succeed as well. Narrow Content/categories/twin earth/Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: problem: how to express narrow contents. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Dennett, D. | Churchland Vs Dennett, D. | II 477 ChurchlandVsDennett: 1st, the thesis of the language dependency of consciousness depreves children and animals from consciousness. 2nd It has been known for some time that recurrent neural networks can produce temporal sequencing! 3rd, there is no virtual machine required - a certain class of operations can be the output of a single, albeit highly distributed network. Dennett may well be right, but not this way. |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Dennett, D. | Stalnaker Vs Dennett, D. | II 180 DennettVsSententialism/Dennett/Stalnaker: Vs propositions as belief objects. (relation theory). Solution/Dennett: "Organismic contribution" of the believer. Neutral with respect to the manner in which it is represented. Def notional attitude-Psychology/not. att./Dennett: (instead of propositional attitude) neutral in terms of the manner of representation. Defined in concepts of possible worlds (poss.w.), "notional worlds". Def prop att-psychology/Dennett: describes attitudes in concepts of wide content. Def sentential attitudes/sent. att./Dennett: syntactic, assumes Mentalese. Def notional world/Dennett: a fictional world that is constructed from a theorist as an external observer, II 181 to characterize the narrow attitudes of a subject. That means my twin on Twin Earth and I have the same notional world. Def narrow content/Dennett: is defined by a set of notional worlds that is the way in which a person who had actual world. notional world/Stalnaker: seem to be exactly the poss.w. that characterize the wide content in the psychology of propositional attitudes. StalnakerVsDennett: all poss.w. except one are fictitious – how can notional attitudes be different propositional attitudes. Why should not. att. be narrow and prop. att. wide? Narrow content/StalnakerVsDennett: are then according to Dennett simply propositions. The difference is neither to be found in the worlds themselves nor the nature of the content if both are just sets of poss.w.. The difference lies in the different responses of the two theories to the question by virtue of which fact someone has a conviction with this content. Propositional atitude-psychology/Dennett/Stalnaker: according to it contents are a function of relation to the actual world although the Twin-Earth-Example shows that they cannot be purely internal. Notional attitudes/not. att.-psychology/Dennett/Stalnaker: shall explain how purely internal (intrinsic) properties can pick a set of poss.w. that is different than the set that is picked by propositional attitudes. Wide content: e.g. O'Leary (correctly) thinks that there is water on the ground floor. This is wrong in the twin earth (tw.e.) because it is not water but XYZ. narrow content/solution: "water-like stuff". Dennett/Fodor/Stalnaker: we can compare both approaches: II 182 Narrow content/Fodor/Stalnaker: he changes the nature of the belief object, narrow contents are no longer propositions but functions of context on propositions. Narrow content/Dennett/Stalnaker: is for Dennett of the same kind as further content: both are propositions - function of poss.w. (=notional worlds) to truth values (tr.v.). What changed compared to the wide content is the relation between a believer in a proposition by virtue of which the proposition correctly describes the conviction. StalnakerVsDennett: but in addition he still has to explain how the purely internal (intrinsic) properties of the subject determine the narrow content. Solution/Dennett: e.g. Suppose we know all about the dispositions and skills of a subject but nothing about its causal history. Then that is similar as if we find an ancient object and ask what it was good for ((s)Cf. > Paul Valéry, find on the beach, objet ambigu). Dennett: then we imagine what it was ideally created for. In the notional world of an organism we imagine how the environment looks like to which it is best suited. Solution: propositions that are true in such possible worlds (poss.w.) will be the narrow content of the convictions of these subjects. StalnakerVsDennett: which is now not what we want: those poss.w. look more so that the desires and needs of the organisms in them are fulfilled and not that their propositions are true in them. E.g. it is not clear that the antelope with its properties to respond to lions is better off in a world of lions or in one without. It could then do a better job in terms of survival and to reproduce. Ideal/ideal environment/Dennett: could also be a very ugly poss.w. in which the organisms are, however, prepared to survive in it. II 183 StalnakerVsDennett: that is better, surely we try to cope with the world in which we think we live. But something is missing: a) many properties that enable organisms to survive, have nothing to do with their convictions, b) the fact that some counterfactual skills would help us to survive in a counterfactual poss.w. is not sufficient for saying that such a counterfactual possibility is compatible with the poss.w. which we believe to be the actual world. E.g. Suppose there are no real predators of porcupines in the actual world, they carry their spines simply like that. Then it would be unrealistic to artificially populate their notional world with predators. E.g. Suppose a poss.w. with beings who would like to eat us humans because of our special odor. Then we should not use such a poss.w. to characterize our convictions. Solution/Stalnaker: a belief state must serve in any way to be receptive to information from the environment and the information must have a role in determining behavior. StalnakerVsDennett: if we understand him like that we are still dealing with wide content. II 184 Representation system/Stalnaker: is then able to be used in a set of alternative internal states that are systematically depending on the environment. S1, S2,.. are internal states Ei: a state of the environment. Then an individual is normally in a state Si if the environment is in state Si. Representation: then we could say that the organism represents the environment as being in state Ei. Content: we could also say that the states contain information about the environment. Assuming that the states determine a specific behavior to adequately behave in the environment Ei. Belief state/BS: then we can say that these representations are likely to be regarded as a general type of BS. That is like Dennett understands narrow content. Problem/StalnakerVsDennett: 1. the description of the environment is not ascribed to the organism. 2. Information is not distinguished from misinformation (error, deception). That means if it is in state Si it represents the environment as in Ei being no matter if it is. Problem: the concept which originates from a causal relation is again wide content. Important argument: if the environment would be radically different the subject might otherwise be sensitive to it or sensitive to other features ((s) would reverse everything) or it would not be sensitive to the environment at all! narrow content/StalnakerVsDennett: problem: if the skills and dispositions of the organism are included in the descriptions of the content the actual world is initially essential. ((s) problem/Stalnaker/(s): how should we characterize their skills in a counterfactual poss.w.?) II 185 Dennett: if organisms are sneaky enough we might also here ascribe a narrow ((s) counterfactual) content. StalnakerVsDennett: I see no reason for such optimism. You cannot expect any information about virtual poss.w. expect when you do not make any assumptions about the actual world (act.wrld.) (actual environment). Ascription/content/conviction/belief/Stalnaker: in normal belief attributions we ignore not only fairytale worlds but in general all possibilities except the completely everyday! E.g. O’Leary: distinguishes only poss.w. in which the ground floor is dry or wet, II 186 not also such in which XYZ is floating around. Question: Would he then behave differently? Surely for olive oil but not for XYZ. Twin earth/tw.e./ascription: even if the behavior would not change in twin earth-cases, it is still reasonable not to ascribe tw.e.-cases. Context dependence/revisionism/Stalnaker: could argued that it is not twin earth but normal world which makes it unsuitable for scientific ascriptions. Dennett: stands up for his neutral approach (notional world). StalnakerVsDennett: nevertheless causal-informational representation is substantially relative to a set of alternative options (poss.w.). internal/intrinsic/causality/problem: the system of causal relations cannot itself be intrinsical to the representing. Theory: has admittedly a scope to choose between different possibilities of defining content II 187 StalnakerVsDennett: but there is no absolute neutral context without presuppositions about the environment. Narrow content/Dennett/Stalnaker: binds himself a hand on the back by forbidding himself the information that is accessible to wide content. StalnakerVsDennett: I believe that no sensible concept of content results from this restriction. II 238 Language dependency/ascription/belief/Stalnaker: this third type of language dependence is different from the other three. II 239 People must not be predisposed to express belief that type of language dependency at all. It may be unconscious or tacit assumptions. The content must also not involve any language. Dennett: e.g. Berdichev: we should distinguish simple language-specific cases - whose objects are informational states - from those, so propositions are saved - E.g. approval or opinions. StalnakerVsDennett: we should rather understand such cases as special cases of a more general belief that also non-linguistic beings like animals might have. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Millikan Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 215 descriptive/referential/denotation/classification/Millikan: you can force a descriptive denotation to work referentially, Ex "He said that the winner was the loser." Ex (Russell) "I thought your yacht was larger than it is." I 216 Solution: "the winner" and "larger than your Yacht" must be regarded as classified according to the adjusted (adapted) sense. On the other hand: "The loser" probably has only descriptive of meaning. "Your Yacht" is classified by both: by adjusted and by relational sense, only "your" is purely referential. Quine: (classic example) Ex "Phillip believes that the capital of Honduras is in Nicaragua." MillikanVsQuine: according to Quine that's not obviously wrong. It can be read as true if "capital of Honduras" has relational sense in that context. referential/descriptive/attribution of belief/intentional/Millikan: there are exceptions, where the expressions do not work descriptively, nor purely referential, but also by relational sense or intension. Ex "the man who us drove home" is someone the speaker and hearer know very well. Then the hearer must assume that someone else is meant because the name is not used. Rule: here the second half of the rule for intentional contexts is violated, "use whichever expression that preserves the reference". This is often a sign that the first half is violated, "a sign has not only reference but also sense or intension, which must be preserved. Why else use such a complicated designation ("the man who drove us home"), instead of the name? Ortcutt/Ralph/spy/Quine/Millikan: Ex there is a man with a brown hat that Ralph has caught a glimpse of. Ralph assumes he is a spy. a) Ralph believes that the man he has caught a glimpse of is a spy. I 217 b) Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is a spy. Millikan: The underlined parts are considered relational, b) is more questionable than a) because it is not clear whether Ralph has explicitly perceived him as wearing a brown hat. Quine: In addition, there is a gray-haired man that Ralph vaguely knows as a pillar of society, and that he is unaware of having seen, except once at the beach. c) Ralph believes that the man he saw on the beach is a spy. Millikan: that's for sure relational. As such, it will not follow from a) or b). Quine: adds only now that Ralph does not know this, but the two men are one and the same. d) Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is not a spy. Now this is just wrong. Question: but what about e) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy. f) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is not a spy. Quine: only now Quine tells us the man's name (which Ralph is unaware of). Millikan: Ex Jennifer, an acquaintance of Samuel Clemens, does not know that he is Mark Twain. I 218 She says: "I would love to meet Mark Twain" and not "I'd love to meet Samuel Clemens". language-dependent: here, "Mark Twain" is classified dependent on language. So also language bound intensions are not always irrelevant for intentional contexts. It had o be language-bound here to make it clear that the name itself is substantial, and also that it is futile to assume that she would have said she wanted to meet Samuel Clemens. Ralph/Quine/Millikan: Quine assumes that Ralph has not only two internal names for Ortcutt, but only one of them is linked to the external name Ortcutt. Millikan: Description: Ex you and I are watching Ralph, who is suspiciously observing Ortcutt standing behind a bush with a camera (surely he just wants to photograph cobwebs). Ralph did not recognize Ortcutt and you think: Goodness, Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy ". Pointe: in this context, the sentence is true! ((S) Because the name "Ortcutt" was given by us, not by Ralph). referential/Millikan: Solution: "Ortcutt" is classified here as referential. referential/Millikan. Ex "Last Halloween Susi actually thought, Robert (her brother) was a ghost." ((S) She did not think of Robert, nor of her brother, that he was a ghost, but that she had a ghost in front of her). MillikanVsQuine: as long as no one has explicitly asked or denied that Tom knows that Cicero is Tullius, the two attributions of belief "Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline" and "... Tullius ..." are equivalent! Language-bound intension/Millikan: is obtained only if the context makes it clear what words were used, or which public words the believer has as implicit intentions. Fully-developed (language-independent) intension/Millikan: for them the same applies if they are kept intentionally: I 219 Ex "The natives believe that Hesperus is a God and Phosphorus is a devil." But: Pointe: It is important that the intrinsic function of a sentence must be maintained when one passes to intentional contexts. That is the reason that in attribution of belief one cannot simply replace "Cicero is Tullius" by "Cicero is Cicero". ((S) trivial/non-trivial identity). Stabilizing function/statement of identity/Millikan: the stabilizing function is that the listener translates "A" and "B" into the same internal term. Therefore, the intrinsic function of "Cicero is Cicero" is different from that of "Cicero is Tullius". Since the intrinsic function is different one can not be used for the other in intentional contexts. Eigenfunction: Ex "Ortcutt is a spy and not a spy": has the Eigenfunkion to be translated into an internal sentence that has a subject and two predicates. No record of this form can be found in Ralph's head. Therefore one can not say that Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy and not a spy you. I 299 Non-contradiction/Millikan: the test is also a test of our ability to identify something and whether our concepts represent what they are supposed to project. MillikanVsQuine: but this is not about establishing "conditions for identity". And also not about "shared reference" ("the same apple again"). This is part of the problem of uniformity, not identity. It is not the problem to decide how an exclusive class should be split up. I 300 Ex deciding when red ends and orange begins. Instead, it's about learning to recognize Ex red under different circumstances. Truth/accuracy/criterion/Quine/Millikan: for Quine a criterion for right thinking seems to be that the relationship to a stimulus can be predicted. MillikanVsQuine: but how does learning to speak in unison facilitate the prediction? Agreement/MillikanVsQuine/MillikanVsWittgenstein: both are not aware of what agreement in judgments really is: it is not to speak in unison. If you do not say the same, that does not mean that one does not agree. Solution/Millikan: agreement is to say the same about the same. Mismatch: can arise only if sentences have subject-predicate structure and negation is permitted. One-word sentence/QuineVsFrege/Millikan: Quine goes so far as to allow "Ouch!" as a sentence. He thinks the difference between word and sentence in the end only concernes the printer. Negation/Millikan: the negation of a sentence is not proven by lack of evidence, but by positive facts (supra). Contradiction/Millikan: that we do not agree to a sentence and its negation simultaneously lies in nature (natural necessity). I 309 Thesis: lack of Contradiction is essentially based on the ontological structure of the world. agreement/MillikanVsWittgenstein/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: both do not see the importance of the subject-predicate structure with negation. Therefore, they fail to recognize the importance of the agreement in the judgment. agreement: this is not about two people getting together, but that they get together with the world. agreement/mismatch/Millikan: are not two equally likely possibilities ((s) > inegalitarian theory/Nozick.) There are many more possibilities for a sentence to be wrong, than for the same sentence to be true. Now, if an entire pattern (system) of coinciding judgments appears that represent the same area (for example color) the probability that each participant reflects an area in the world outside is stupendous. ((s) yes - but not that they mean the same thing). Ex only because my judgments about the passage of time almost always matches with those of others, I have reason to believe that I have the ability to classify my memories correctly in the passage of time. Objectivity/time/perspective/mediuma/communication/Millikan: thesis: the medium that other people form by their remarks is the most accessible perspective for me that I can have in terms of time. I 312 Concept/law/theory/test/verification/Millikan: when a concept appears in a law, it is necessary I 313 to test it along with other concepts. These concepts are linked according to certain rules of inference. Concept/Millikan: because concepts consist of intensions, it is the intensions that have to be tested. Test: does not mean, however, that the occurrence of sensual data would be predicted. (MillikanVsQuine). Theory of sensual data/today/Millikan: the prevailing view seems to be, thesis: that neither an internal nor an external language actually describes sensual data, except that the language depends on the previous concepts of external things that usually causes the sensual data. I 314 Forecast/prediction/to predict/prognosis/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: we project the world to inhabit it, not to predict it. If predictions are useful, at least not from experiences in our nerve endings. Confirmation/prediction/Millikan: A perceptual judgment implies mainly itself Ex if I want to verify that this container holds one liter, I don't have to be able to predict that the individual edges have a certain length.That is I need not be able to predict any particular sensual data. I 317 Theory/Verification/Test/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: is it really true that all concepts must be tested together? Tradition says that not just a few, but most of our concepts are not of things that we observe directly, but of other things. Test/logical form/Millikan: if there is one thing A, which is identified by observing effects on B and C, isn't then the validity of the concepts of B and C tested together with the theory that ascribes the observed effects onto the influence of A, tested together with the concept of A? Millikan. No! From the fact that my intension of A goes back to intensions of B and C does not follow that the validity of the concepts, that govern B and C, is tested when the concept that governs A is tested and vice versa. Namely, it does not follow, if A is a specific denotation Ex "the first President of the United States" and it also does not follow, if the explicit intention of A represents something causally dependent. Ex "the mercury in the thermometer rose to mark 70" as intension of "the temperature was 70 degrees." I 318 Concept/Millikan: concepts are abilities - namely the ability to recognize something as self-identical. Test/Verification: the verifications of the validity of my concepts are quite independent of each other: Ex my ability to make a good cake is completely independent of my ability to break up eggs, even if I have to break up eggs to make the cake. Objectivity/objective reality/world/method/knowledge/Millikan: we obtain a knowledge of the outside world by applying different methods to obtain a result. Ex different methods of temperature measurement: So we come to the conclusion that temperature is something real. I 321 Knowledge/context/holism/Quine/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: doesn't all knowledge depend on "collateral information", as Quine calls it? If all perception is interwoven with general theories, how can we test individual concepts independently from the rest? Two Dogmas/Quine/Millikan. Thesis: ~ "Our findings about the outside world do not stand individually before the tribunal of experience, but only as a body." Therefore: no single conviction is immune to correction. Test/Verification/MillikanVsHolismus/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: most of our beliefs never stand before the tribunal of experience. I 322 Therefore, it is unlikely that such a conviction is ever supported or refuted by other beliefs. Confirmation: single confirmation: by my ability to recognize objects that appear in my attitudes. From convictions being related does not follow that the concepts must be related as well. Identity/identification/Millikan: epistemology of identity is a matter of priority before the epistemology of judgments. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| substit. Quantific. | Quine Vs substit. Quantific. | V 158 VsSubstitutional Quantification/SQ/Quine: the SQ has been deemed unusable for the classic ML for a false reason: because of uncountability. The SQ does not accept nameless classes as values of variables. ((s) E.g. irrational numbers, real numbers, etc. do not have names, i.e. they cannot be Gödel numbered). I.e. SQ allows only a countable number of classes. Problem: Even the class of natural numbers has uncountably many sub-classes. And at some point we need numbers! KripkeVs: in reality there is no clear contradiction between SQ and hyper-countability! No function f lists all classes of natural numbers. Cantor shows this based on the class {n:~ (n e f(n))} which is not covered by the enumeration f. refQ: demands it in contrast to a function f enumerating all classes of natural numbers? It seems so at first glance: it seems you could indicate f by numbering all abstract terms for classes lexicographically. Vs: but the function that numbers the expressions is not quite the desired f. It is another function g. Its values are abstract terms, while the f, which would contradict the Cantor theorem, would have classes as values... V 159 Insertion character: does ultimately not mean that the classes are abstract terms! ((s) I.e. does not make the assumption of classes necessary). The cases of insertion are not names of abstract terms, but the abstract terms themselves! I.e. the alleged or simulated class names. Function f: that would contradict Cantor's theorem is rather the function with the property that f(n) is the class which is denoted by the n-th abstract term g(n). Problem: we cannot specify this function in the notation of the system. Otherwise we end up with Grelling's antinomy or that of Richard. That's just the feared conflict with Cantor's theorem. This can be refute more easily: by the finding that there is a class that is not denoted by any abstract term: namely the class (1) {x.x is an abstract term and is not a member of the class it denotes}. That leaves numbers and uncountability aside and relates directly to expressions and classes of expressions. (1) is obviously an abstract expression itself. The antinomy is trivial, because it clearly relies on the name relation. ((s) x is "a member of the class of abstract expressions and not a member of this class"). V 191 Substitutional Quantification/SQ/Nominalism/Quine: the nominalist might reply: alright, let us admit that the SQ does not clean the air ontologically, but still we win something with it: E.g. SQ about numbers is explained based on expressions and their insertion instead of abstract objects and reference. QuineVsSubstitutional Quantification: the expressions to be inserted are just as abstract entities as the numbers themselves. V 192 NominalismVsVs: the ontology of real numbers or set theory could be reduced to that of elementary number theory by establishing truth conditions for the sQ based on Gödel numbers. QuineVs: this is not nominalistic, but Pythagorean. This is not about the extrapolation of the concrete and abhorrence of the abstract, but about the acceptance of natural numbers and the refutal of the most transcendent nnumbers. As Kronecker says: "The natural numbers were created by God, the others are the work of man." QuineVs: but even that does not work, we have seen above that the SQ about classes is, as a matter of principle, incompatible with the object quantification over objects. V 193 VsVs: the quantification over objects could be seen like that as well. QuineVs: that was not possible because there are not enough names. Zar could be taught RZ coordination, but that does not explain language learning. Ontology: but now that we are doing ontology, could the coordinates help us? QuineVs: the motivation is, however, to re-interpret the SQ about objects to eliminate the obstacle of SQ about classes. And why do we want to have classes? The reason was quasi nominalistic, in the sense of relative empiricism. Problem: if the relative empiricism SQ talks about classes, it also speaks for refQ about objects. This is because both views are closest to the genetic origins. Coordinates: this trick will be a poor basis for SQ about objects, just like (see above) SQ about numbers. Substitutional/Referential Quantification/Charles Parsons/Quine: Parsons has proposed a compromise between the two: according to this, for the truth of an existential quantification it is no longer necessary to have a true insertion, there only needs to be an insertion that contains free object variables and is fulfilled by any values of the same. Universal quantification: Does accordingly no longer require only the truth of all insertions that do not contain free variables. V 194 It further requires that all insertions that contain free object variables are fulfilled by all values. This restores the law of the single sub-classes and the interchangeability of quantifiers. Problem: this still suffers from impredicative abstract terms. Pro: But it has the nominalistic aura that the refQ completely lacks, and will satisfy the needs of set theory. XI 48 SQ/Ontology/Quine/Lauener: the SQ does not make any ontological commitment in so far as the inserted names do not need to designate anything. I.e. we are not forced to assume values of the variables. XI 49 QuineVsSubstitutional Quantification: we precisely obscure the ontology by that fact that we cannot get out of the linguistic. XI 51 SQ/Abstract Entities/Quine/Lauener: precisely because the exchange of quantifiers is prohibited if one of the quantifiers referential, but the other one is substitutional, we end up with refQ and just with that we have to admit the assumption of abstract entities. XI 130 Existence/Ontology/Quine/Lauener: with the saying "to be means to be the value of a bound variable" no language dependency of existence is presumed. The criterion of canonical notation does not suppose an arbitrary restriction, because differing languages - e.g. Schönfinkel's combinator logic containing no variables - are translatable into them. Ontological Relativity/Lauener: then has to do with the indeterminacy of translation. VsSubstitutional Quantification/Quine/Lauener: with it we remain on a purely linguistic level, and thus repeal the ontological dimension. But for the variables not singular terms are used, but the object designated by the singular term. ((s) referential quantification). Singular Term/Quine/Lauener: even after eliminating the singular terms the objects remain as the values of variables. XI 140 QuineVsSubstitutional Quantification: is ontologically disingenuous. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Use Theory | Searle Vs Use Theory | III 64 Use theory of meaning/SearleVsSearleVsUse theory: E.g. it is said that in Muslim countries a man can divorce his wife by simply saying three times "I divorce myself from you," while throwing three white pebbles. This is obviously a deviating use of the word compared to the use of the word in our societies. Anyone who thinks that meaning is use, would have to conclude that the word "divorce" has a different meaning for Muslims than for others. But that is not the case! III 64/65 Solution/Searle: an existing proposition form has been assigned a new status function. The proposition form "I divorce myself from you," does not change its meaning when a new status function is added. Rather, it is now simply used to create a new institutional fact. (Declaration). E.g. that does not apply to every institutional fact: you cannot make a touchdown (baseball), by simply saying that you make it. III 79 Causality/Status Function/Searle: Status functions differ from causal use functions in terms of their language dependency: E.g. one can think without all the words that this is a screwdriver because you can easily think that this thing is used to screw in these other things, because you may have seen it many times. To treat an object as a screwdriver and to use it, no words are logically necessary! (> Use) There are structural properties available that may be perceived without using words. Status: here no physical features are available. V 221 Searle: the concept of use is too vague. SearleVsUse theory: 1. no indication of the distinction between the use of a word and the use of a proposition! 2. false conviction: because we could not say this or that under certain conditions, it could under these conditions not be the case! V 221/222 E.g. "under what conditions would we say that he can remember this or that or the act was carried out voluntarily?" False: 1. What does W mean? 2. How is W used? 3. How is W used in simple present indicative propositions of the form "X is W"? (Way too specific!). 4. how are such propositions used? V 223 5. Which illocutionary act is performed? 6. When would we say such propositions? The assumption that the answers to the fifth question represent necessary answers to the first leads to speech fallacy. ((s) as Tugendhat: meaning not from circumstances.) Relation to the fallacy of criticism of the naturalistic fallacy: V 224 SearleVsUse theory: "Use" is too vague to distinguish between the truth-conditions of the proposition expressed and the truth conditions of the illocutionary strength of the expression. V 229 SearleVsUse theory: there is a difference between the question "What does it mean to call something good?" and "What is the meaning of" good "?" V 234 SearleVsUse theory: E.g. obscenities: the use of obscenities is substantially different from that of the corresponding courteous synonyms. E.g. "He is not a nigger" is just as derogatory as "He is a nigger". |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Theory/Observ. Language | Versus | Fraassen I 56 FraassenVsRamsey-Satz/FraassenVsCarnap/FraassenVsCraig - Vs distinction observation language/ theory language irrelevant technical questions - Vs syntatical interpretation of theories - FraassenVsLanguage Dependence. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Ramsey-Sentence | Versus | I 56 FraassenVsRamsey Sentence / FraassenVsCarnap / FraassenVsCraig - Vs separation observation language / theory of language - irrelevant technical questions - Vs syntactic representation of theories - FraassenVsLanguage Dependence. |
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| Theory/Observ. Language | Separation of theory language and observation language, theoretical terms, etc. > Ramsey sentence, Carmap sentence> Language dependence |
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