Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 20 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Belief Degrees | Adams | Field II 296 Adams-Conditional/Field: Suppose we add ">" to the general Adams conditional, which can only occur as a main operator, and which obeys the principle that the degree of belief in A > B is always the contingent degree of belief in B given A. Belief Degree/Field: If we assume that contingent and not contingent belief is represented by conditional or unconditional Q, we obtain that the degree of belief in A > B is equal to Q (B I A). Adams-Conditional/Field: the normal Adams conditional assuming that belief degrees obey the probability laws captures the "if ... then" better than the probability function of the conditional. >Conditional, >Probability functions, >Probability, >Probability law, >Conditional Probability, >cf. >Bayesianism, >Subjective Probability. In any case, this only occurs as a main connection: E.g. "when I try it, I will be added to the team ("If I try out for the yankees, I will make the team"). Then the general Adams-conditional seems appropriate for vagueness. >Vagueness. If that is so, then the belief degree of A > B should be: Q (DA I A). Probability function/belief degree: Difference: for the probability function, the contingent probability is never higher than the probability of the material conditional. >Probability function. Williamson/Field: for his argument (1 - 3), this is important: all premisses get the Q value 1 if "if ... then" are read as a general Adams conditional. Then the classic conclusion is not valid in this reading of "if ... then". >T. Williamson. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Belief Degrees | Field | II 257 Belief Degree/BD/Conditional/Field: the classic laws of probability for belief degrees do not apply with conditionals. - Disquotational Truth/Conditional: refers to the complete: "If Clinton dies, Gore becomes President" is true iff Clinton dies and Gore becomes President. Non-disquotational: behaves like disquotational truth in simple sentences. With conditionals: simplest solution: without truth value. >Disquotationalism, >Truth values, >Conditionals. II 295 Belief Degree/Probability/Field: the classic law of the probability of disjunctions with mutually exclusive disjuncts does not apply for degrees of belief when vagueness is allowed. >Probability, >Probablilty law. II 296 Probability Function/Belief Degree: difference: for probability functions the conditional probability is never higher than the probability of the material conditional. >Probability function. II 300 Indeterminacy/Belief Degree/Field: the indeterminacy of a sentence A is determined by the amount for which its probability and its negation add up to less than 1. ((s) i.e. that there is a possibility that neither A nor ~A applies.) II 302 Indeterminacy/Belief/Field: some: E.g. "belief" in opportunities is inappropriate, because they are never actual. Solution: Acceptance of sentences about opportunities. - Also in indeterminacy. Solution: belief degrees in things other than explanation. II 310 Non-classical Belief Degrees/Indeterminacy/Field: E.g. that every "decision" about the power of the continuum is arbitrary, is a good reason to assume non-classical belief degrees. Moderate non-classical logic: that some instances of the sentence cannot be asserted by the excluded middle. >Excluded middle, >Non-classical logic. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Conditional | Adams | Field II 252/296 Material Conditional/Adams Conditional/Field: (Lit. Adams 1974): (outside of mathematics): few of us would agree with the following conclusion: E.g. from Clinton will not die in office to If Clinton dies in office, Danny de Vito will become President. That suggests that here the equivalence between A > B and ~(A v B) does not exist. >Counterfactuals, >Counterfactual conditional. In other words: If A then B does not seem to have the same truth conditions as ~A v B. >Truth conditions. Adams-conditional: it may only be used as a main operator. - The degree of belief of A > B is always the conditional belef degree (B I A). >Operators, >Conditional probability. II 253 In the case of the indicative conditional, the premise is always required. - Adams: intuitively, conclusions with conditionals are correct. Problem: then they will say less about the world. Indicative conditional sentence/material implication/truth/field: further considerations have however led many to doubt that there are truth conditions here at all. >Material implication. Conditional/Field: A > B: here the premise A is always required when concluding. That is, we accept conditional B relative to premise A. Adams: the idea of contingent acceptance justifies our intuitive beliefs according to which conclusions with conditionals are correct. Cf. >Presuppositions, >Principle of Charity. But then it is anything but obvious that conditionals say something about the world. For example, there must not be a statement C whose probability in all circumstances is the same as the conditional (contingent) probability of (B I A). That is, the conditional A > B is not such a C. N.B.: this shows that we do not have to assume "conditional propositions" or "conditional facts". This is the nonfactualist view. >Nonfactualism. ((s) Truth conditions/nonfactualism/conditional/(s): if there are no facts, then there are also no truth conditions.) Borderline case: If the conditional (contingent) probability is 0 or 1, it is justifiable that the assertibility conditions (acceptance conditions) are the same as those of the material conditional. Vs: one could argue that a sentence without any truth conditions is meaningless. >Assertibility, >Assertibility conditions. Field: ditto, but the main thing is that one cannot explain the acceptance conditions without the truth conditions in terms of the truth conditions. >Truth conditions. 1. R. Adams (1974). Theories of Actuality. Nous, 5: 21-231. --- Lewis V 133 Conditional/Adams/Adams-conditional/Lewis: is an exception to the rule that the speaker usually expresses nothing that is probably untrue. - Then the assertibility goes rather with the conditional subjective probability of the consequent. >Subjective probability, >Conditional probability, >Probability. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Conditional | Dummett | III (a) 19 Gap/Dummett: a gap does not occur in material conditional - but probably with bets that leave it unclear whether the antecedent is satisfied at all. III (a) 21/22 Statements/truth/Dummett: assuming simple language without counterfactual conditionals: then two types of conditionals are possible: 1) conditional statement a) if the antecedent is fulfilled, then like categorical statement b) if antecedent is not fulfilled: No statement! 2) as material conditional it is true if antecedent is false. III (a) 23 E.g. Indigenous people: then the behavior does not show which of the two statements is correct - then empty distinction - Conclusion: every sit in which nothing can be conceived as being false is one of being true. -> Truth value gap. - Analogy: Command: suspension of the test: no disobedience - conditional: no abuse possible. - The speaker implies that he precludes that the antecedent is true and the consequent is wrong - otherwise: > Atomic sentence. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Conditional | Field | II 253 Conditional/Deflationism/Field: the nonfactualist view is not the only one possible, both classical and non-classical logic can be used. - >Nonfactualism. Disquotational truth: it seems to require truth conditions. - E.g. "If Clinton dies in office, Danny de Vito will become President" is true iff Clinton dies in office and de Vito becomes President. >Disquotationalism. II 254 Conditional/Facts/Stalnaker/Field: (Stalnaker 1984)(1): Thesis: the conditional facts are not expressible in 1st order logic, but in indicative "If .. then .." clauses. >Logic, >Second order logic. II 255 Conditional/Factualism/Field: 1st Variant: assumes that "if A, then B" has the same truth conditions as "~A v B". Factualism: factualism does not accept counterintuitive conclusions - Non-factualism: seems committed to them. II 255 Material Conditional/Paradoxes of Material Implication/Jackson/Field: Best Solution: (Jackson 1979)(2): Thesis: counterintuitive conclusions are unacceptable here: Thesis: the conclusions are not assertible, but nevertheless they are true. There is a conventional implicature for that when we assert "if A, then B", that not only the probability P (A> B) is high, but also the conditional probability P (A > B I A). Field: the requirement that P(A > B I A) should be high is equivalent to the demand of the nonfactualist that P(B I A) is high - "Surface logic" has to do with assertibility. "Deep logic": says what is truth preserving. II 256 Factualism: must then distinguish between levels of total unacceptability (i.e. on the surface) and the acceptability on a deep level. >Acceptability. Deflationism: in the same way the deflationism can then distinguish between non-factualism and factualism without using the concepts "true" or "fact". Factualism: factualism does not accept counterintuitive conclusions - non-factualism: seems committed to them. >Facts. II 257 Non-Factualism/Field: must assume that the acceptance of conditionals is not regulated by the normal probability laws governing the acceptance of "fact sentences". >Probability laws. 1. Robeert C. Stalnaker. Inquiry. Cambridge, Mass: MIT PRess. 2.Frank Jackson, On Assertion and Indicative Conditionals. The Philosophical Review Vol. 88, No. 4 (Oct., 1979), pp. 565-589 |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Conditional | Wessel | I 124 Entailment/Wessel: = implication (not an operator, but a predicate). >paradoxes, because content can be contradictory, even if the form is valid. Conditional: (e.g. scientific statement) would be false for the same reason (because the content does not form a context). I 138 Logical Entailment/Wessel: statement about the context (of two statements), not about two objects. - in the rules of entailments no semantic terms must occur - tA: "the statement A" (term or name) - I 140 Entailment/Sense/Wessel: If A I- B, then not only with regard to the truth value, but also in terms of sense. - But not merely assertion that "linked by sense". Context is guaranteed by occurrence of the same variables or the "same material of terms and statements. >Content, >Material conditional. I 286 Use/Mention: logical entailment: A I- B: talks about statements (i.e. precisely not content). Conditional: A -> B: talks about content and about what is being talked about in the statements (e.g. current, magnetic field). "A is true" - precisely does not mean "the current flows". I 279 Conditional/Wessel (s): empirical if-then, no logical necessity conditional operator I- not truth-functional. >Operators, >Truth functions. I 283 Conditional/Wessel: e.g. from empirical studies, from statements about entailment, from axioms, from definitions, from other statements according to rules of inference. I 294 Conclusions on the conditional cannot be made from a conjunction (empirical) - E.g. Potsdam >100,000 inhabitants and state capital, i.e. if P >.... false. I 297 Conditional/Wessel: subjunction follows from a conditional statement. - ((s) but not vice versa.) I 308 Existence Load/Wessel: cannot be determined like this in conditionals, because not truth-functional. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Consequence | Cresswell | I 38 Logical Consequence/Cresswell: crucial difference to the entailment: it combines forms of sentence or sentence schemes ((s) no content, not sentences). >Entailment, >Conditional, >Material conditional. It is not a question of which propositions are involved and what are the truth values of the individual sentences. Propositions, Truth value. Entailment: if all the worlds where p and q are true, are exactly those, where p is true, then that means in this particular case, that p entails p u q. >Possible worlds. That q follows from p intensionally. >Intensions. Logical consequence: but p u q is not a logical consequence of p, because there are ways to ascribe truth values to p and q that make p true, but p u q wrong. >Valuation. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Counterfactual Conditionals | Fraassen | I 13 Counterfactual conditional/Fraassen: objectively neither true nor false. I 115f Counterfactual conditionals/Fraassen: truth conditions use similarities between possible worlds: "If A, then B" is true in possible world w iff B is true in most similar world to w in which A is also true. - Similarity: is again context-dependent E.g. "Three Barbers"/Carroll: one in three must always be there: 1) if A is ill, B must accompany him, but 2) if C is gone as well, B has to stay there. Contradiction: if A is ill, B must be there and gone. VsCarroll: 1) and 2) are not in contradiction. Material conditional: "either B or not A". Solution/Fraassen: everyday language: not material conditional. >Everyday language. Solution/Fraassen: Context Dependency: 1) is true if we only consider the illness, 2) is true if we only consider the shop - general: what situation is more like ours? -> Lewis: E. g. Bizet/Verdi, Similarity Metrics. I 118 FraassenVsCounterfactual conditionals: but they are no solution here: scientific statements are not context-dependent. Therefore science implies no counterfactual conditionals (if they, as I believe, are context-dependent. Counterfactual Conditionals/Laws of Nature/Reichenbach/E. Goodman: only laws, not general statements imply counterfactual conditionals. - Therefore they are a criterion for laws. FraassenVsGoodman, E.: conversely: if laws imply counterfactual conditionals, it is because they are context-dependent. >Context. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Counterfactual Conditionals | Lewis | V 5 Counterfactual conditional/Lewis: variably strict conditional: if there are closer possible worlds, disregard the more distant ones. >Possible world/Lewis. V 5f Counterfactual conditionals/Negation/Lewis: from "would" through "could" (not): with logical antecedent and negated consequent - from "could": with "would" with the same A and negated consequent. V 10 Counterfactual conditionals: Analysis 0: A were>>would C is true in world i iff C is true every A-World, so that __". Analysis 1: A were>>would C is true in world i iff C is true in the (accessible) A-world closest to i if there is one. A were>>would C is true in the world i iff C i is true in every (accessible) A-World closest to i. Analysis 1 1/2: A were>>would C is true in the world i iff C is true in a specific, arbitrarily selected (accessible) A-World closest to i. Analysis 3: A were>>would C is true in the world i if a (accessible) AC-World is closer to i than any A~C-world. "Def A were>>could C is true in i iff for every (accessible) A~C-world there is an AC-world, which is at least as close to i, and if there are (accessible) A-worlds. V 8 Counterfactual conditionals/Negation: here: through "could" in the rear part - E.g. ~(A were>>would C) ↔ A were>>could ~C. ((s) could = not necessarily"). - That will do for Analysis 2: ... true in every next possible world ...- then Bizet/Verdi: not necessarily French and not necessarily non-French... etc. - "all true" false: not necessarily French-and-Italian...- that is ok. V 14 Definition counterfactual conditionals: = variably strict conditional; i.e. if there is a closer possible world, disregard the more distant ones. V 18 Counterfactual Conditional: I use it when the antecedent is probably wrong - Counterfactual Conditionals are more like the material conditional - with true antecedent are only true if the consequent is true - Problem: the Counterfactual Conditional with true antecedent are difficult to determine - they are in fact inappropriate! - Assuming someone unknowingly expressed such: - then both are convincing: a) A, ~C, ergo ~(A were>>would C: wrong, because A but not C, b) A, C, ergo A were>>would C.: true, because A and in fact C- Important argument: this depends on the adequacy of "because". Lewis: I think a) is more appropriate (should be assumend to be true) - Definition centering assumption: is thus weakened: every world is self-accessible and at least so similar to itself as any other world is with it - so a) is valid, but b) is invalid. Centering assumption: if it was violated, worlds which deviate in a neglected way would count the same as the actual world). Actual world/Counterfactual conditionals: if you want to distinguish the actual world in Counterfactual Conditionals, you can do that by expanding the comparative similarity of possible worlds so that they also include certain impossible worlds where not too impossible antecedents are true. Vs: but they are even worse than the impossible borderline worlds. >Truth value, >Impossible world/Lewis. V 25 Counterfactual conditionals/Axioms:.. system C1 the Counterfactual Conditional implies the implication "were A>>would B. >. A>B" (s) That is the Counterfactual Conditional is stronger than the implication - AB > were A>>would B. - that is, from the conjunction follows the counterfactual conditional. V 62 Counterfactual conditional: needs similarity between worlds to be comparable. Analysis 1/A1: (VsLewis) without similarity - counterfactual dependence/Lewis: always causal and thus consisting mostly in chronological order. V 62 Counterfactual conditional: antecedent normally assumed to be wrong - with assumed true antecedent. V 95/96 Counterfactual conditional: Advantage: not truth-functionally established - either both antecedent and consequent or neither applies in a possible world. V 179 Counterfactual conditional: are not transitive. - Therefore there is no specific course of increase or decrease of probability through a causal chain. V 284 Backwards/Counterfactual conditional: there is counterfactual dependence in the backward direction, but no causal dependency: false "if the effect had been different, the cause would have been something else". V 288 Probabilistic counterfactual conditional/Lewis: Form: if A were the case, there would be this and this chance for B. >Possible world/Lewis. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Dependence | Lewis | V 166 Nomic dependence/Lewis: two families of law propositions or individual fact p imply together all material conditionals between the two families. >Conditionals. Then the material conditionals are implied by the counterfactual conditionals which include the counterfactual dependence (conD). >Counterfactual dependence. The nomic dependence explains the counterfactual dependence. Important argument: the law propositions and the fact propositions must be counterfactually independent. Nomic dependence: is reversible. Counterfactual dependence is irreversible - E.g. Barometer/pressure. V 312f Dependence hypothesis/Lewis: here: set of propositions (sets of possible worlds) which specify everything the (omniscient) actor knows about causal dependence and independence of his actions - they form a partition. - I.e. they do not overlap. Expected benefits: Do not refer to individual dependency hypotheses. - ((s) i.e. it must not be assumed to be without alternative.) - You have to spread your beliefs on several dependencies.) Benefit: to be understood as a non-conditional belief of a variation K of an alternative dependence hypothesis. When options and dependency hypotheses differ, the difference shows the aspect which brings the novelty. >Benefit. Wrong: wanting to maximize the expected benefits to any partition - This would lead to different answers for different partitions - the partition for propositions of the value level would tell us fatalistically that all options are equally good. >Proposition. V 320 Dependence hypothesis/illustration/probability distribution/Lewis: If the same dependence applies in several worlds, the images represent the worlds in the same way. - If the images are the same, we have equivalence classes. - Then we have the partition of these equivalence classes. >Possible world/Lewis, >Equivalence class. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Dialetheism | Priest | Field II 145 Dialethism/Priest/Paradoxa/Field: (Priest 1998): Thesis: the sentence of the liar as well as its negation are both assertable (and also their conjunction). The rules of the logic are weakened (> stronger/weaker; >strength of theories), so that not every assertion can be asserted by this. Most attractive variant: builds on Kleene's trivalent logic. Trivalent logic/Kleene/Priest/Field: Priest assumes here that the valid inferences are those that guarantee "correct assertion". But an assertion is only correct if it has one of the two highest truth values in the truth value table. Curry paradox: is thus excluded, since the only conditional in this language is the material conditional. Material conditional/Field: the material conditional is defined by ~ and v. It does not fully support the modus ponens in the logic of Kleene/Priest. Liar/KleeneVsPriest: (and other "deviant" sentences): have truth-value gaps. But there are no agglomerations of truth values. Deviating Sentence: E.g. Liar sentence, has no truth-value agglomerations but truth-value gaps. Liar/PriestVsKleene: (and other deviating sentences): have, conversely, truth-value agglomerations and no gaps. Problem/Kleene: here one cannot establish an equivalence between "p" and "p" is true! For to assert a truth-value gap in a sentence "A" would be to assert: "~ [true ("A") v true ("~A")]" and this should be equivalent to "~ (A v ~ A)". But one sentence of this form can never be legitimate in Kleene. Truth-value gap/logical form/Field: to assert a truth-value gap in a sentence "A" would mean to assert: "~ [true ("A") v true ("~ A")]" and this should be equivalent to "~ (A v ~ A)". Solution/Priest: if "A" is a deviating sentence, this is then a correct assertion in Priest. Also the assertion of the absence of a truth-value agglomeration in a sentence "A" would be the assertion "~ [(true ("A") u true ("A)"]" which should be equivalent to "~(a u ~A)". Kleene cannot claim this absence for deviant sentences, Priest can do this. |
Pries I G. Priest Beyond the Limits of Thought Oxford 2001 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Entailment | Prior | I 139ff Entailment/logical form/logic/entailment/Chisholm: if certain features of a situation are "requiring" that a particular reaction takes place, then this requirement can be overridden by other traits of this situation. So it may be that p requires that q, and p-and-r not require that q. - Although p-and-q includes (entails) that p. >Consequence, >Inference, >Conditional, >Material Conditional, >Material Implication, >Situations, >Contextuality. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Excluded Middle | Wessel | I 296 Sentence of the conditional excluded middle/Wessel: the conditional (empirical) form can not be represented as a logical consequence relationship. - Most conditionals of this form are perceived as senseless and eliminated. >Conditional, >Material conditional, >Empiricism, >Contingency, >Necessity, cf. >Implication. The s. e.g. middle is not a conditional tautology: empirically not always true. >Tautologies. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Implication | Field | II 255 Material conditional/paradoxes of the material implication/Jackson/Field: best solution: (Jackson, 1979)(1): Thesis: Contraintuitive conclusions are unacceptable here: the conclusions cannot be asserted, but nevertheless true. >Acceptability, >Truth, >Conclusions. There is a conventional implication for that if we assert "if A then B", not only the probability is high (A > B), but also the conditional probability P (A > B I A). >Probability, >Probability conditionals. N.B.: the demand that P (A > B I A) should be high is equivalent to the demand of the nonfactualist that P (B I A) is high. >Nonfactualism. "Surface logic": has to do with assertibility - "depth logic": says what is truth-maintaining. >Assertibility, >Truth transfer. II 256 Factualism: has then to distinguish between levels of total unacceptability (i.e., on the surface) and acceptability at a deep level. >Facts/Field. Deflationism: in the same way the deflationism can distinguish between nonfactualism and factualism without using the terms "true" or "fact". >Deflationism. Factualism: the factualism does not accept any contraintive conclusions. Nonfactualism: seems committed to it. 1.Frank Jackson, On Assertion and Indicative Conditionals. The Philosophical Review Vol. 88, No. 4 (Oct., 1979), pp. 565-589 |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Implication | Russell | I 15 Implication/Principia Mathematica(1)/Russell: is not a conclusion. I 18 Conclusion: a proposition "p" is claimed, and a proposition "p implies q" is claimed. Then the proposition "q" is claimed as a consequence. >Conclusion, >Inference, >Proposition. I 33 Formal implication/Principia Mathematica/Russell: E.g. "Socrates is a man" implies "Socrates is mortal"- here only the values that make the antecedent true are important. >Antecedent, >make true, >Material conditional. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 |
| Logic | Cresswell | I 40 Logic/natural language/semantics/Cresswell: not every logic can be taken as the basis of semantics: difference Entailment/Consequence: in the natural language, "Monday follows Sunday" must not be taken as a consequence of "Snow is white" - (only formal, not correct content-wise). >Everyday language, >Material conditional, >Consequence. I 42 Logic/Semantics/entailment/meaning postulates/Cresswell: E.g. meaning postulate: (x) (x is bachelor > x is male). - Then the conclusion of "roses are red" and "violets are blue" on roses and violets ..and snow is white" becomes valid. ((Vs). >Meaning postulates. CresswellVsMeaning postulates: false alignment of entailment and consequence. Snow is not white in all possible worlds. >Entailment. Solution: possible world semantics. >Possible world semantics Difference between necessary and contingent truths. >Necessity, >Contingency. Quine/Cresswell : This seems to reject analytically/synthetically the distinction together with the distinction. >Analyticity/syntheticity/Quine, >Necessity/Quine. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Multi-valued Logic | Field | II 144 Three-valued logic/Kleene/Field: Def correct/Kleene: an assertion is correct only if it has the highest of the three truth values. >Correctness. Field: Problem: not all of Tarski’s biconditionals remain correct. Even e.g. "If A, then A" is not generally assertible. Therefore, the Kleene logic is weak. >Stronger/weaker. "If A then A" is not generally assertible -> Restall: "n-fold jump" ... + ... II 145 Material conditional/Three-valued logic/Kleene/Field: the materal conditional is a conditional that has one of the two highest truth values. So the Curry paradox is impossible: "If this statement is true, then p". >Material conditional, >Curry paradox. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Nonfactualism | Adams | Field II 255 Definition "surface logic"/material conditional/paradoxes of implication/Field: the surface logic tells us which conclusions are acceptable. (This is just the logic of Adams offered by nonfactualism). >Conditional/Adams, >Acceptability. Def "depth logic"/material conditional/Field: the depths logic tells us which conclusions are truth maintaining. This is the standard logic for ">". >Truth transfer. Problem: does the depth logic do anything at all, even if our mental performance is explained by the surface logic? Solution/Field: Perhaps one can say that at the deepest level classical logic prevails and the special conventions of the assertion only come later. II 256 Factualism/Field: It must then distinguish between levels of total unacceptability (i.e., on the surface) and acceptability at a deep level (which only seems unacceptable by a superficial violation of the convention). Deflationism/Field: the deflationism between nonfactualism and factualism can be distinguished in the same way without using the terms "true" or "fact". >Deflationalism. Field II 256 Factualism/Conditional/Stalnaker/Field: (Stalnaker 1984)(1): (here, at first limited to non-embedded conditionals): here his approach provides the logic of Adams, i.e. Factualism is indistinguishable from nonfactualism in relation to which conclusions ("paradox of material implication") are considered correct. >Paradox of Implication. Deflationism/Field: can he differentiate between nonfactualism and factualism? One possibility is that if there are conditionals where the antecedent is logically and metaphysically possible, but not epistemically. Nonfactualism: thesis: in epistemic impossibility of the anteceding of a conditional, there is no question of acceptability. For the joke of conditionals consists in the assumption that their antecedents are possible epistemically. N.B.: then all conditionals with epistemically unacceptable antecedents are equally acceptable. FieldVsStalnaker: for him there is a fact due to which a conditional is true or false. And some conditionals with epistemically impossible antecedents will be true and others false! Factualism/Deflationism/Field: the test of whether someone adheres to this type of factualism is then whether he takes acceptability of such conditionals seriously. 1. R. Stalnaker (1984). Inquiry. Cambridge University Press. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Truth Values | Dummett | I 11 f Def Truth Value/Frege/Dummett: of the sentence: the reference - the (Fregean) " Bedeutung" ("meaning") of the sentence. I 20f Dummett: E.g. assuming the condition for true/Fals would be stated, but the two truth values were only marked with A and B, then it would be impossible to figure out which one, A or B, stood for t. One would have to recognize at least in a sample sentence what weight the speakers assign to the assertoric statement of this sentence. II 112 Def Non-designated Truth Value/Dummett: the way in which a sentence can be wrong. Def Designated truth value/Dummett: the way in which a sentence can be true - this is irrelevant for atomic sentences, only relevant for the way they contribute to a complex sentence - i.e. what the condition for an designated truth value for a composite sentence is. The truth value of the whole sentence does not arise simply from the truth value of the sub-sentences - or the subsentences do not only contribute their own truth value - or if we had a meaning theory for the whole language, perhaps we might not be able to explain the meanings of the logical constants by verification of the subsentences. - (These are three formulations for the same fact). >Compositionality. III (a) 20 Truth Value/Dummett: not by property of statements, but by behavior. - Compared to bet/command: requires: the antecedent lies in the power of the receiver: II (a) 21 Gap: if the child does not go out, it cannot have forgotten the jacket. - "Unconditional command": = material conditional: here there is no gap. III (a) 20 Meaning/Truth Value/Bet/Command/Dummett: There is an asymmetry: disobedience clearly leads to the right of disapproval - obedience does not lead to the right of reward (gap). Consequence: truth values are more likely to be extracted from bets (win/lose) than from command/behavior. III (a) 28 Designated Truth Value/Dummett: true or conditional with false antecedent (EFQ, >ex falso quodlibet) Non-designated truth value: wrong or the object is nonexistent. Validity/Multi-valued logic: valid in multi-value logic are the formulas that have a designated truth value for each allocation. >Multi-valued logic. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Understanding | Loar | II 140 Understanding/Loar: Problem: knowledge of the truth conditions is not the same as knowledge of the material conditional "S is true iff p". >Truth conditions, >Material conditional. Problem: propositions as entities? >Propositions. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kleene, St. C. | Priest Vs Kleene, St. C. | Field II 145 Dialethism/Priest/Paradoxes/Field: (Priest 1998): Thesis: the sentence of the liar and its negation are both assertible (and also their conjunction). The rules of logic are attenuated (>stronger/weaker; >strenght of theories), so that not every assertion is assertible. Most attractive variant: builds on Kleene's trivalent logic. Trivalent Logic/Kleene/Priest/Field: Priest assumes here that the valid inferences are those that guarantee "correct assertion". But an assertion is only correct if it has one of the two highest truth values in the truth value table. Curry Paradox: is thus precluded, because the only conditional in this language is the material conditional. Material Conditional/Field: defined by ~ and v. In the logic of Kleene/Priest it does not entirely support the modus ponens. Liar/KleeneVsPriest: (and other "deviating" sentences): have truth value gaps. But there are no truth value clusters. Deviating Sentence: E.g. liar-sentence has no truth value clusters, but truth value gaps. Liar/PriestVsKleene: (and other deviating sentences): conversely have truth value clusters and no gaps. Problem/Kleene: here you cannot establish an equivalence between "p" and ""p"is true"! Because to assert a truth value gap in a sentence "A" would be to say: "~[true ("A") v true ("~A")]" and that should be equivalent to "~(A v ~A)", but a sentence of this form can never be legitimate in Kleene. Truth Value Gap/Logical Form/Field: asserting a truth value gap in a sentence "A" would be to say: "~[true ("A") v true ("~A")]" and that should be equivalent to "~(A v ~A)". Solution/Priest: if "A" is a deviating sentence, then it is a correct assertion as by Priest. The assertion of the absence of a truth value cluster in a sentence "A" would be the assertion "~ [(true ("A") and true ("~A)"]" which should be equivalent to "~(a u ~A)". Kleene cannot assert this absence for deviating sentences, Priest can. |
Pries I G. Priest Beyond the Limits of Thought Oxford 2001 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Modal Logic | Quine Vs Modal Logic | Chisholm II 185 QuineVsModal Logic: instead space time points as quadruples. Reason: permanent objects (continuants) seem to threaten the extensionality. SimonsVsQuine: the Achilles heel is that we must have doubts whether anyone could learn a language that refers not to permanent objects (continuants). --- Lewis IV 32 QuineVsModal Logic: which properties are necessary or accidental, is then dependent on the description. Definition essentialism/Aristotle: essential qualities are not dependent on description. QuineVs: that is as congenial as the whole modal logic. LewisVsQuine: that really is congenial. --- I 338 But modal logic has nothing to do with it. Here, totally impersonal. The modal logic, as we know it, begins with Clarence Lewis "A survey of Symbolic Logic" in 1918. His interpretation of the necessity that Carnap formulates even more sharply later is: Definition necessity/Carnap: A sentence that starts with "it is necessary that", is true if and only if the remaining sentence is analytic. Quine provisionally useful, despite our reservations about analyticity. --- I 339 (1) It is necessary that 9 > 4 it is then explained as follows: (2) "9 > 4" is analytically. It is questionable whether Lewis would ever have engaged in this matter, if not Russell and Whitehead (Frege following) had made the mistake, the philonic construction: "If p then q" as "~ (p and ~ q)" if they so designate this construction as a material implication instead of as a material conditional. C.I.Lewis: protested and said that such a defined material implication must not only be true, but must also be analytical, if you wanted to consider it rightly as an "implication". This led to his concept of "strict implication". Quine: It is best to view one "implies" and "is analytical" as general terms which are predicated by sentences by adding them predicatively to names (i.e. quotations) of sentences. Unlike "and", "not", "if so" which are not terms but operators. Whitehead and Russell, who took the distinction between use and mention lightly, wrote "p implies q" (in the material sense) as it was with "If p, then q" (in the material sense) interchangeable. --- I 339 Material implication "p implies q" not equal to "p > q" (>mention/>use) "implies" and "analytical" better most general terms than operators. Lewis did the same, he wrote "p strictly implies q" and explained it as "It is necessary that not (p and not q)". Hence it is that he developed a modal logic, in which "necessary" is sentence-related operator. If we explain (1) in the form of (2), then the question is why we need modal logic at all. --- I 340 An apparent advantage is the ability to quantify in modal positions. Because we know that we cannot quantify into quotes, and in (2) a quotation is used. This was also certainly Lewis' intention. But is it legitimate? --- I 341 It is safe that (1) is true at any plausible interpretation and the following is false: (3) It is necessary that the number of planets > 4 Since 9 = the number of planets, we can conclude that the position of "9" in (1) is not purely indicative and the necessity operator is therefore opaque. The recalcitrance of 9 is based on the fact that it can be specified in various ways, who lack the necessary equivalence. (E.g. as a number of planets, and the successor to the 8) so that at a specification various features follow necessarily (something "greater than 4 ") and not in the other. Postulate: Whenever any of two sentences determines the object x clearly, the two sentences in question are necessary equivalent. (4) If Fx and only x and Gx and exclusively x, it is necessary that (w)(Fw if and only if when Gw). --- I 342 (This makes any sentence p to a necessary sentence) However, this postulate nullifies modal distinctions: because we can derive the validity of "It is necessary that p" that it plays no role which true sentence we use for "p". Argument: "p" stands for any true sentence, y is any object, and x = y. Then what applies clearly is: (5) (p and x = y) and exclusively x as (6) x = y and x exclusively then we can conclude on the basis of (4) from (5) and (6): (7) It is necessary that (w) (p and w = y) if and only if w = y) However, the quantification in (7) implies in particular "(p and y = y) if and only if y = y" which in turn implies "p"; and so we conclude from (7) that it is necessary that p. --- I 343 The modal logic systems by Barcan and Fitch allow absolute quantification in modal contexts. How such a theory can be interpreted without the disastrous assumption (4), is far from clear. --- I 343 Modal Logic: Church/Frege: modal sentence = Proposition Church's system is structured differently: He restricts the quantification indirectly by reinterpreting variables and other symbols into modal positions. For him (as for Frege) a sentence designated then, to which a modal operator is superior, a proposition. The operator is a predicate that is applied to the proposition. If we treat the modalities like the propositional attitude before, then we could first (1) reinterpret (8) [9 > 4] is necessary (Brackets for class) and attach the opacity of intensional abstraction. One would therefore interpret propositions as that what is necessary and possible. --- I 344 Then we could pursue the model from § 35 and try to reproduce the modality selectively transparent, by passing selectively from propositions to properties: (9) x (x > 4) is necessary in terms 9. This is so far opposed to (8) as "9" here receives a purely designated position in one can quantify and in one can replace "9" by "the number of planets". This seemed to be worth in the case of en, as we e.g. wanted to be able to say (§ 31), there would be someone, of whom is believed, he was a spy (> II). But in the case of modal expressions something very amazing comes out. The manner of speaking of a difference of necessary and contingent properties of an object. E.g. One could say that mathematicians are necessarily rational and not necessarily two-legged, while cyclist are necessarily two-legged but not necessarily rational. But how can a bicycling mathematician be classified? Insofar as we are talking purely indicatively of the object, it is not even suggestively useful to speak of some of its properties as a contingent and of others as necessary. --- I 344 Properties/Quine: no necessary or contingent properties (VsModal Logic) only more or less important properties Of course, some of its properties are considered essential and others unimportant, some permanently and others temporary, but there are none which are necessary or contingent. Curiously, exactly this distinction has philosophical tradition. It lives on in the terms "nature" and "accident". One attributes this distinction to Aristotle. (Probably some scholars are going to protest, but that is the penalty for attributing something to Aristotle.) --- I 345 But however venerable this distinction may be, it certainly cannot be justified. And thus the construction (9) which carries out this distinction so elegantly, also fails. We cannot blame the analyticity the diverse infirmities of modality. There is no alternative yet for (1) and (2) that at least sets us a little on something like modal logic. We can define "P is necessary" as "P = ((x) (x = x))". Whether (8) thereby becomes true, or whether it is at all in accordance with the equation of (1) and (2), will depend on how closely we construct the propositions in terms of their identity. They cannot be constructed so tightly that they are appropriate to the propositional properties. But how particularly the definition may be, something will be the result that a modal logic without quantifiers is isomorphic. --- VI 41 Abstract objects/modal logic/Putnam/Parsons: modal operators can save abstract objects. QuineVsModal Logic: instead quantification (postulating of objects) thus we streamline the truth functions. Modal logic/Putnam/Parsons/Quine: Putnam and Charles Parsons have shown how abstract objects can be saved in the recourse to possibility operators. Quine: without modal operators: E.g. "Everything is such that unless it is a cat and eats spoiled fish, and it gets sick, will avoid fish in the future." ((s) logical form/(s): (x) ((Fx u Gx u Hx)> Vx). Thus, the postulation of objects can streamline our only loosely binding truth functions, without us having to resort to modal operators. --- VI 102 Necessity/opportunity/Quine: are insofar intensional, as they do not fit the substitutivity of identity. Again, vary between de re and de dicto. --- VI 103 Counterfactual conditionals, unreal conditionals/Quine: are true, if their consequent follows logically from the antecedent in conjunction with background assumptions. Necessity/Quine: by sentence constellations, which are accepted by groups. (Goes beyond the individual sentence). --- VI 104 QuineVsModal logic: its friends want to give the necessity an objective sense. --- XI 52 QuineVsModal Logic/Lauener: it is not clear here on what objects we are referring to. --- XI 53 Necessesity/Quine/Lauener: ("Three Grades of Modal Involvement"): 3 progressive usages: 1. as a predicate for names of sentences: E.g. "N "p"": "p is necessarily true". (N: = square, box). This is harmless, simply equate it with analyticity. 2. as an operator which extends to close sentence: E.g. "N p": "it is necessarily true that p" 3. as an operator, too, for open sentences: E.g. "N Fx": through existence generalization: "(Ex) N Fx". |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Various Authors | Jackson Vs Various Authors | Field II 255 Material Conditional/Paradoxes of Material Implication/Jackson/Field: Best Solution: (Jackson 1979): Thesis: Counterintuitive conclusions are unacceptable here: Thesis: Although the conclusions are not assertible, they are nevertheless true. (Assertibility/Truth). Field: in explanation of non-assertibility the classical truth conditions do play a role, but not an indispensable one. Conventional Implicature/Jackson: Thesis: there is a conventional implicature for that if we assert "if A then B" not only the probability P(A>B) is high, but also the conditioned probability P(A>BIA). A violation of this implicature would be very misleading. ((s) I.e., we assume that the premise is realized when we express a conditional). Important Argument/Field: the requirement that P(A>BIA) should be high is equivalent to the demand of the non-factualist that P(BIA) is high. Field: thus, Jackson arrives at the same assertibility conditions as non-factualism. EdgingtonVsJackson/Field: (Edgington, 1986, standard objection): it seems that we do not not only assert things like E.g. Clinton/de Vito, but we actually do not believe them, too!. JacksonVsEdgington/Field: would probably say that the conventional implicature makes it even inappropriate to even "assert it mentally". The perceived invalidity then consists in that these conclusions do not receive mental assertibility, although they received truth. So we get both: surface and logic "deeper logic". |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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Reference |
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| Material Conditional | Jackson, F. | Field II 255 material conditional / paradoxes of material implication / Jackson / Field: best solution: (Jackson 1979): counter-intuitive conclusions are unacceptable here: Although the conclusions are not assertible, but nevertheless true. (Assertibility / truth). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 |
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