Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Assertibility Wittgenstein Nagel I 71
Assertibility: (this view was attributed to Wittgenstein): assertibility was an authorization to attribute an infinite concept to a person. - Using it in a finite number of appropriate cases in accordance with the naturalized use. (See also problems in relation to addition/"quaddition"). - NagelVs: this cannot have been Wittgenstein's belief. Cf. >Rule following, >Private language, >Kripke's Wittgenstein.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979

Nagel I
Th. Nagel
The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997
German Edition:
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

Nagel II
Thomas Nagel
What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987
German Edition:
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

Nagel III
Thomas Nagel
The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980
German Edition:
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

NagelEr I
Ernest Nagel
Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982
Community Blackburn Esfeld I 119
Community/Individual/Simon Blackburn: (S. Blackburn,"The Indivdual strikes back", Synthesis, vol 58, No. 3,1984 pp. 281-301): Thesis: Members of a community behave to each other like temporal phases of an individual. (Corrections are possible). Private language/rule order/BlackburnVsKripke/BlackburnVsWittgenstein: Therefore, when viewed in isolation, an individual can follow rules in the same way as a community.
KripkeVs: Someone could have followed the addition yesterday and today follow the quaddition. In the light of the rule she is now trying to follow, she can judge previous actions as correct/incorrect, but whatever you now seem to be correct/incorrect in these judgments is correct or incorrect.
I 120
EsfeldVsBlackburn: a social solution is not available for the isolated skeptic (>sanctions). Convergence cannot be negotiated. The present dispositions always have a privileged position! The same applies to the simulation of another person: they cannot give feedback.
I 121
Private language/rule sequence/field: second reason why an individual in isolation cannot determine a disagreement: I may not be scheduled to predetermine a property F now, but earlier but already (although the thing in question has not changed). Problem: why is this not a case of disagreement with myself?
Pointe: what counts as a change of a thing is not independent of the fact that conceptual content is determined. To determine the change, conceptual content must be defined.

Blckbu I
S. Blackburn
Spreading the Word : Groundings in the Philosophy of Language Oxford 1984


Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Kripke’s Wittgenstein Esfeld I 99ff
Kripke's Wittgenstein: each finite row of examples satisfies an infinite number of possible logical rules. Kripke does not proceed from behavior, but from intention: how do you know that you should say 125, if you intend to act in accordance with your previous answers? There is nothing mental, which determines the content - with infinite possibilities there is no conceptual content - the term is independent of certain applications.
I 102
Kripke's Wittgenstein: dispositions/Kripke: dispositions do not help because they are also limited. Why would the act that you are dispositional be the one that should be done? Form/KripkeVsAristoteles: same problem: how can one recognize the right "natural characteristics" (normativity problem)?
I 105f
Kripke's Wittgenstein/skeptical solution: results can only be obtained in assertibility conditions. No truth conditions: means there are no facts which make statements about meaning come true. Esfeld: solution: social practice is the middle way between skeptical solution (nonfactualism) and a direct solution which tries to find the facts of meaning in the equipment of the world. KripkeVs: one could have addition today and yesterday quaddition. Whatever appears correctly in the moment, is correct. Current dispositions have always a privileged position. Change is not independet from conceptual content: to determine change, this must be established first. See also >Private Language, >Rule Following.

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002

Kripke’s Wittgenstein Schiffer I 174
Belief/Meaning/Fact/Nonfactualism/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Schiffer: there is simply no property that is equivalent to the meaningful predicate "believes that Harvard lies not in Miami", and there is not a fact, that corresponds to the closed sentence that contains the predicate. - Quaddition: for the past, there was not a fact, and a fortiori not for the present. - Problem: it is not true that he meant addition instead of Quaddition. - Solution: - "fact" is ambiguous: pleonastic and non-pleonastic. ---
I 176
Nonfactualism/Solution: there is no (non-pleonastic) property which is ontologically or conceptually separated from the predicate and expressed by it. - Direct solution: physicalist reduction - this is impossible when it is abpout meaning (intending). See also >Private Language, >Rule Following.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

Kripke’s Wittgenstein Wright I 264ff
Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Kripkenstein: no behavior allows us to infer internal rules (in the past) about addition, so there are no rules about meaning, not in the present, therefore, not about truth.
I 269
Kripke’s Wittgenstein: Vs: the skeptical thought confused mention and use by concluding that all that is true of meanings, also applies to truth. See also >Private Language, >Rule Following, >Quaddition.

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

Kripke’s Wittgenstein Stegmüller Stegmüller IV 15
Skeptical Solution/Kripke's Wittgenstein/KW/Kripkenstein/Stegmüller: Reference to common terminology and rule sequences instead of "facts" and truth conditions.
IV 19f
"Bizarre Skepticism" KW/Stegmüller: Example "Quus": in additions of larger numbers 7 could always come out, only that such numbers have never been added in the past - therefore we ourselves do not know whether we apply the addition or the "Quaddition" - so far only finitely many cases have been followed - an extension to infinitely many cases allows infinitely many different interpretations of the previous practice, which explain the previous cases, but predict deviations for the future - N.B.: then in the past I meant something different than I thought I meant.
IV 23
Kripke's Wittgenstein: wrong solutions: 1. "Do what you did in the past": that's what he does! - 2. algorithm (calculation method): one must have learned this somehow! - I just cannot know that in the past I meant the "standard interpretation" 3. Exclusion of wrong rules: could only be done by further rules: Return of the old problem.
IV 27
N.B.: that the current use is the right one is not doubted at all!
IV 35ff
Kripke's Wittgenstein/Disposition/KripkeVsRyle: the crucial dispositions were acquired in the past - the difference already existed in the past - KripkeVsRyle: 1. Dispositions are irrelevant at all - a) If I have a hypothesis about my dispositions, I still do not know if it is the right one instead of another.
IV 37
b) If we wanted to let "the past rest" and just ask what seems right to me now, we lose the term "right".
IV 38
Kripke: N.B.: I have always had the same dispositions!
IV 47
Kripke's Wittgenstein/KripkeVsDisposition Theory: If one understands mine in such a way that what I mean now determines what I should mean in the future, then that is normative, not descriptive. IV 50 KW: no fact: even an "omniscient being" could not know what we mean - the fact of thinking does not exist.
IV 63
Kripke's Wittgenstein/VsIntrospection/Stegmüller: two people can agree completely in their inner experiences, and yet one can mean "plus" and the other "Quus" - experience content: can also tell us nothing about the treatment of new cases - grasping a meaning is not an experience.
IV 65
Example experience: the beginner has another than the advanced one, e.g. when reading aloud - but: the feeling "I can read" is not a sufficient condition for real reading.
IV 72
Kripke's Wittgenstein: for Platonism, facts exist, yet problem of access to these entities: not clear whether I grasp the right sense. See also >Private Language, >Rule Following.

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989

Kripke’s Wittgenstein Katz Esfeld I 102
Disposition/Rule/Rule Sequencenes/Kripke's Wittgenstein/Esfeld: KripkeVsDispositions: (1982): they do not help because they are also limited. Nor can they solve the problem of normativity: why would the action that one has to dispose to do, the one that one should do if one were to follow the rule? No distinction correct/incorrect.
Kripke: is here further than Quine, who is limited to the behavior (in Word and Object, explicitly referring to Wittgenstein).
---
I 103
Meaning/content: assuming that they are Platonic objects, one only shifts the problem: How can a person grasp these senses? What makes it that a finite sequence of mental acts capture the right meaning? (e.g. addition). Katz: suggests that such Platonic objects (Fregean senses) are themselves finite.
VsKatz: any finite sequence can express more than one such sense. What distinguishes the comprehension of addition from the comprehension of quaddition? See also >Private Language, >Rule Following.

Katz I
Jerrold J. Katz
"The philosophical relevance of linguistic theory" aus The Linguistic Turn, Richard Rorty Chicago 1967
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974

Katz II
Jerrold J. Katz
Jerry Fodor
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Katz III
Jerrold J. Katz
Jerry Fodor
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Katz V
J. J. Katz
The Metaphysics of Meaning


Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Reliability Theory Schiffer I 83
SchifferVsReliability: (as the key to representation, e.g. fuel gauge: there are false truth conditional functions possible: E-functions that do not ascribe situations but false words: E.g. "snow". Coal - (for Mentalese) - even under "optimal conditions" - Then it is uncertain whether the reliability has come about on the wrong way. ---
I 83ff
Arthritis/reliability/mentalese/Relation Theory/SchifferVsFodor: ... + ... - Alfred thinks in his idiolect. - Supposing there is a second function g that assigns a condition to Arthritis that we connect with shmarthritis (rheumatic-like). - Then: you cannot determine if Alfred is more reliable according to f (attribution of truth conditions) or g (attribution of false words). - Condition (c): an M-function f is the truth conditional function for x' lingua mentis M iff (a preferred balance of) the head-reliability and world-head reliability of x (thinking in M) with respect to f is greater than with respect to any other M-function, this is neither sufficient nor necessary. - We do not know by which attribution function the speaker goes. - Like > Quaddition. ---
I 87
Quaddition/reliability/relation theory/belief/Schiffer: if Ralph does not understand anything about mathematics : There is no difference between two attribution functions (a) correct addition, b) Quaddition). - Because they provide the same values for manageable numbers - and are not discernible for inconceivably large numbers because they are incomprehensible. ---
I 104
SchifferVsReliability Theory: the functional relation that is correlated by the reliability theory with "true of" has, as one of its realizations >arthritis/"shmarthritis". - Solution: there must be an "excellent role". ---
I 104
Reliability Theory/Schiffer: Solution: adequacy by disquotation schema. - probability that M-function f* exists is high, given that x s believes and f*(s) e.g. is about the stock market. - (S), i.e. we assume that the people usually believe and know something true what they are talking about.) ---
I 105
Field: if functional theory for mentalese, then the reliability theory is indispensable.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

Rules Rorty VI 53
Addition / Wittgenstein: all previous additions may be construed, as if they correspond to countless different rules for your use of "plus". > Every causal event can satisfy many input-output functions. >Quaddition, >Kripke's Wittgenstein, >Rule Following.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Brentano, Fr. Wittgenstein Vs Brentano, Fr. Stegmüller IV 54
Mental states/WittgensteinVsBrentano: (also Locke, Hume): no such thing as "understanding" but something like a toothache, depression, great excitement (emotional state); understanding is at a different level. ---
IV 59
N.B.: E.g. assuming even if my meaning (to mean) of the addition would always be connected with a particular headache, I could not decide if it would not be Quaddition because only previous given cases.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Disposition Theory Kripke Vs Disposition Theory Esfeld I 102
Disposition/Rule/Rule-following/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Esfeld: KripkeVsDispositions: Kripke (1982) (S.A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Cambridge, 1982): Do not help, because they are also limited. They are also unable to solve the Problem of Normativity: Why would the act that one is predisposed to do the same one should do if intending to follow the rule?
No distinction possible between correct/incorrect.
Kripke: He takes it on further than Quine who concentrated on behavior (Quine in Word and Object, explicitly based on Wittgenstein).
I 103
Meaning/Contents: If one assumes that they were platonic objects, the problem is only deferred: How can a person capture these senses? What does it matter that a finite sequence of mental acts grasps the true meaning? (E.g. addition). Katz: Proposes that such platonic objects (Fregean Sense) themselves are finite.
VsKatz: Every finite sequence can express more than one particular sense. What is the difference between both the conception of addition and quaddition?
Form/KripkeVsAristotle: same problem: If you wanted to assume like A. that natural properties are inherent in all physical objects, the question is how to recognize the right ones!
I 104
Grue/Natural Property: N.P. is e.g. "green" contrary to grue. Problem: Every finite number of examples instantiates more than just one natural characteristic. E.g. a table can be brown, and can also have four legs. We may not figure out which aspects a person refers to.
Kripke: Asserts that Wittgenstein himself advocates the skeptical position
I 105
and proposes a skeptical solution, in analogy to Hume’s solution regarding the Problem of Causation.

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Disposition Theory Verschiedene Vs Disposition Theory Stegmüller IV 34
Disposition/Mind/Ryle: mean, meaning, intentionality: are not occurrences in consciousness, but abilities, dispositions.
IV 35
I.e. in the case of plus/quus as of grue exactly the same mental history runs off together with identical mental states and consciousness processes. Conclusion: the decisive dispositions were acquired in the past.
The difference then does not only exist in the present, it already existed in the past!
RyleVsKripke: then I would also have used the standard function of addition in the past.
IV 35/36
KripkeVsRyle: triple criticism: 1. External criticism: denies that any assumptions about dispositions are relevant at all. The problem is not understood at all. How can he invoke disposition as justification? An instruction to myself shows nothing at all.
VsVs: a) I just have a hypothesis about myself.
VsVsVs: why should precisely this hypothesis of countless other possible ones be the right one?
IV 37
VsVs: b) We let the past rest. Right is what seems right to me now! WittgensteinVsVsVs: this leads to the fact that one can no longer speak of "right" here!
2. Internal criticism: (some people mistakenly think that Wittgenstein himself represented them): consists in specifying a criterion for a function F, which I mean by such a symbol.
Def "Finity Problem"/Stegmüller: the finite cannot simply be transferred to the infinite. (Not only experiences, but also dispositions are finite).
IV 38
Def "quus"/grue/Kripke's Wittgenstein/Stegmüller: Re-Definition: the skeptical problem is reproduced: the function is the quaddition that corresponds to the addition for all pairs that are sufficiently small to be added by me, and returns the result 7 for the others. Thus I have always had the same dispositions. VsDisposition Theory.
Disposition Theory/Stegmüller: a) can try to defend itself by understanding disposition not literally, but as an idealization of actual practice. Ceteris paribus disposition.
KripkeVs: then I would have to make more and more fantastic assumptions about what I would do if this and that happened to me.
IV 39
b) The idealization could be interpreted differently: "if I had the ability..." KripkeVs: that becomes circular. It assumes that the function I mean is something fixed. The "fact" would have to be assumed that I have a very specific intention!

Dilemma for the disposition theory:
a) Either only disposition for a finite number of cases, or
b) Idealization of the reaction. Problem:
ba) if these conditions are specified precisely, nothing can be said about my reaction.
bb) a fact is assumed.
IV 40
KripkeVsDisposition Theory: it leaves no room for possible errors! The disposition theorist cannot defend himself here by saying that there is a gap between what he meant and what he "should mean".
Because the "function that he actually means" is not fixed for him from the outset by a table independent of the disposition.
IV 41
Rather, in the opinion of the dispositionalist, the function can be read from disposition. For this reason, the disposition, to make mistakes must be part of the overall disposition.
Def "Skaddition"/Kripke: would be the disposition of our person including the disposition to make mistakes.
IV 42
Rule/Competence/Kripke: Competence cannot explain rules because it requires rules. (This does not apply to VsChomsky).
VsDisposition Theory: Similarities can also be based on the fact that we sometimes make mistakes.
IV 47
Addition/Disposition Theory/Kripke's Wittgenstein: (see above "external criticism (1)"): Suppose it were true that by "+" I mean addition. Problem: what is the relation between this assumption and the kind of answer I will give to the question !117 + 159"?
Disposition Theory: all variants falsely state that it is this and that descriptively comprehensible relation.
Mean/intention/normative: but if one understands to mean in such a way that what I mean now determines what I should say in the future, that is normative, not descriptive.
This is the main point VsDisposition.





Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Field, H. Schiffer Vs Field, H. I 105
SchifferVsField: wrong is his suggestion: physical relations as an explanation for the reference relation would also cover relations to things of which they are not true. (E.g. >"Arthritis"/"shmarthritis", E.g. >Addition/Quaddition. - FieldVsPhysicalism). Conclusion: no functional relation, which operates without disquotation scheme will be appropriate for the "true-of" relation. ((s) Anyway not the relation, but the theory works, if at all with the disquotation scheme.).
I 109
Def Conceptual Role/c.r./Field: (Field 1977): the subjective conditional probability-function of an agent Two mental representations S1 and S2 have the same cr for one person, iff. their (the person’s) subjective conditional prblty-function is so that s for any mental representation, given the subjective probability of s1 s is the same as that of s2 where s. SchifferVsField: This is of little use, because not two people have the same conditional probability function. But Field is anyway pessimistic with respect to a precise concept of intersubjective sameness of mental content that goes beyond sameness of referential significance.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Kripke, S. A. Schiffer Vs Kripke, S. A. I 175
Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Kripkenstein/SchifferVsKripke: Paradox/Schiffer: Solution: Usually, by showing that one of the propositions must be rejected.
Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Schiffer: we represent so canonically:
(P1)
(1) Yesterday Clem meant addition instead of quaddition with "plus". (2) But there is nothing in Clem's past, which could find that he meant the one in place of the other, there is simply not a fact.
(3). But (1) and (2) are incompatible: if there was not a fact that it stipulated, then it is not that he meant addition instead of quaddition in the past.
(P2) The same for the present.
I 176
Schiffer: if (P1) and (P2) are paradox, then also (P3):
(1) Clem believes that there are lions in Africa
(2)But there is nothing in Clem's past, which specifies that he believes that. There is no fact of belief about Clem, specifying this.
(3) Because (1) and (2) are incompatible, it is not the case that he believes that there are lions in Africa.
((s) difference to Kripke's Wittgenstein: there it says in (3) that he believes either addition or Quaddition (wherein Quaddition can be any deviation). But in (P3) it is said that he cannot believe that there are lions in Africa, and even Clem itself would have to notice that.). So that it is not possible at all to have an attitude is something different than the inability to determine the exact content of the attitude).
Schiffer: Here too it can be said that there is neither a "reducible" nor a "irreducible" fact.
Pointe: Pointe: if there is a solution to (P3), it could also be used for Kripke's Wittgenstein. How would the solution look like?
"Direct solution"/Kripke's Wittgenstein would ultimately be a physicalist reduction. That many want. But that is impossible. We cannot reduce "to mean".
Fact/Schiffer: if we are talking about the fact, then from the non-pleonastic, ontologically serious fact, that, however, does not exist for Kripke's Wittgenstein.
Kripke’s Wittgenstein/solution/Schiffer: both (2) and (3) are ambiguous in terms of "fact", it can be read here pleonastic or non-pleonastic.
pleonastic: here (3) is true and (2) false: Clem meant addition and believes that there are lions in Africa, so it is a fact that he does. ((s) in the "superfluous", non-ontological sense of "fact".)
non-pleonastic: here (2) is true and (3) false: there is indeed no objective language-independent fact which stipulates that Clem thinks or believes this and that.
Nonfactualism/solution: there is no property that is ontologically or conceptually separated from the predicate and expressed by it.
I 177
Belief-predicate/propositional attitude: E.g. "means by "plus" the addition" E.g. "believes that there are lions in Africa". SchifferVsKripke/Kripke's Wittgenstein: the fact that there are no non-pleonastic facts regarding belief and meaning, does not conclude that you cannot mean anything.
Conclusion/Schiffer:
(a) Clem means addition and believes that there are lions in Africa.
(b) the propositions about Clem's meaning and belief are not reducible to propositions without semantic, Intentional or Mentalese vocabulary. (They are irreducible intentionalistic).
(c) there is no non-pleonastic, ontologically serious fact or property in respect of meaning or belief, that is in relation to the predicate "means addition" or "believes that lions ..." as the name "Greta Garbo" to Greta Garbo.
Schiffer: which makes the way for the ontological physicalism.
VsSchiffer: it could be argued: E.g. Clem died yesterday after he has used "plus" for 50 years. Now we have a complete sound film his life along with complete records of its neurophysiological life and his stream of consciousness.
I 178
Then we can formulate two empirically adequate hypotheses which exclude each other: 1. Clem meant addition, 2. Clem meant Quaddition. That is a mystery, isn't it? SchifferVsVs: this is indeed a mystery. Here I have another one: there are two empirically adequate hypotheses about myself, one that my sensory experience originates from physical objects, 2. that they are caused by Descartes evil demon. ((s)> brains in a vat). Nevertheless, I believe in physical objects.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Various Authors Schiffer Vs Various Authors I 283
Quaddition/John Carroll: that goes without non-standard interpretations: one would only have to redefine Quaddition like this: that if numbers are> = # in the game, delivers x + y = zt + 1. ((s) then you cannot notice this at incredibly large numbers.)
SchifferVsCarroll: if you understand general propositions about addition, one will also appreciate that the sum of two numbers can never be equal to this sum plus 1! ((s) So if you look at the general shape notated with variables. But for this z would at first has to be written as a sum and then + 1!).

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987