Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 12 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cognition | Brandom | II 143 Non-cognitive/Brandom: E.g. iron rusts in moist air - e.g. bulls respond to red towels - this uses no concepts - nevertheless they are reliable (>RDRD reliable differential responsive dispositions) - such beings have no knowledge - that: "conceptual blind spot" of the reliability theory. >Terminology/Brandom, >Reliability theory. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Cognition | Esfeld | I 108/9 Cognition/Esfeld: a cognitive access exists in RDRD (Brandom: reliable differential responsive dispositions). It is not a conceptual content ((s) reliably distinguishing reaction MRP.) -> Terminology/Brandom, >Content, >Thinking, >Concepts. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Gavagai | Brandom | I 576 BrandomVsQuine: Sentences about rabbit parts predict pruned properties, namely by reference to the merged objects to which they belong. >Reference, >Pointing, >Ostension. I 578ff Gavagai/BrandomVsQuine: if you want to use singular terms for (rabbit) parts, there must be predications of them, which do not only address them through the wholenesses in which they appear - if "Gavagai" is to be a real sortal, then language must be able to individuate objects that it sorts - there must be a term for "the same Gavagai" (in the derived scheme) - no natural language can be as non-autonomous that it needs a richer meta-language (of the theorist) - only artificial languages can do without it. >Meta-language, >Sortals, >Individuation. 580 I Solution/Brandom: it is about accuracy of inferences, not superficial stimuli. VsQuine: since no natural language can be non-autonomous in this sense - only artificial languages whose use is specified in a richer metalanguage can be that - a straightforward translation is to be preferred. BrandomVsQuine: this is about correctness of inferences, not about Quine’s thin base of surface stimuli. Gavagai: how do you distinguish whether the rabbit fly or the flash of bright stumpy tail triggers the expression? You cannot know, it does not depend on the RDRDs(reliable differential responsive dispositions) and the corresponding causal chains, but on their inferential role. >Inferential role. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Indexicality | Peacocke | I 106f Demonstrative way of givenness/Peacocke: here, now, this is also non-linguistically possible. >Demonstratives, >Index words, >Way of givenness. Demonstraviely: "Today", descriptively: "the day after today". Instead of phrase and language only capacity for different reaction. cf. >RDRDs/Brandom, >Capability, >Concepts, >Language use. I 118 Summary/Peacocke: what is determinative of a given demonstrative type, is the pattern of evidence or prior conditions so that judgments that contain tokens of this type, must be sensitive for it. The constitutive role that is associated with this type, must capture this complex pattern of evidential sensitivity. >Evidence, >Type/Token, >Roles, >Conceptual Role, >Causal Role. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Inference | Brandom | I 255 Inferential Structure/Brandom: Three Dimensions: 1) Determination and authorization to commitment. I 256 2) Differentiation of accompanying and communicative inheritance deontic status. I 257 3) Inferential structure: in a broader sense: authority, responsibility, authorizationty. I 284 Brandom: Keyword: Concluding combines semantic content and pragmatic significance. >Semantic content. I 496 Inference/Brandom: premises and conclusions: are complete sentences ("free-standing") - Opposite: Conditional: antecedent and consequent: are subsentential expressions ("embedded"). >Subsententials. I 650 Inference/Brandom: semantic significance of types - anaphora: semantic significance of tokenings - Inference: reporting use sentences - anaphora: deictic use of singular terms - conceptual structure is primarily inferential structure - the use of a demonstrative refers to an object and thus becomes a singular term - (other than "ouch") and can also play an anaphoric role. >Singular terms. --- II 9 Inference/Brandom: Priority of reference. >Reference II 35 Non-inferential/Brandom: E.g. perception of circumstances. >Circumstances II 70 Inference/Brandom: even non-inferential reports (perception reports) must be structured inferentially (Sellars and Hegel) - otherwise not distinguishable from RDRDs (reliable differential responsive dispositions) (machines) - Parrot: does not understand his own reactions - non-inferential concept: E.g. red - but: just like one acquires concepts through the mastery of other concepts, one needs inferential concepts to arrive at non-inferential ones. --- Newen I 164 Inferential Roles/Brandom/Newen/Schrenk: a) voice exit rule: actions are considered to be adequate practical conclusions E.g. "The pot is boiling over" > urges the action of taking it from the stove - b) entry rule: involves perceptions of both the environment and of one's own body conditions. This leads to perception reports. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Justification | Brandom | I 265ff Justification/Brandom: no regress, you have to assume a number of problematic assertions. >Assertions, >Regress. I 268 There is no fixed point beforehand anyway where justifications must end, but there are enough points, where they may end. I 480/81 Justification/Brandom: no justification can be demanded for >RDRDs (reliable differential responsive dispositions) - but for observation reports. >Observation. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Language | Brandom | I 238 Language/Brandom: linguistic skills consist of reliable disposition to respond differently to stimuli - more is not necessary. >RDRDs. I 648 You cannot describe a language coherently in which expressions are used demonstratively, but not pronominally. (vice versa it is possible). >Pronouns. I 519 Language/Infinite/Brandom: if there are correct and incorrect uses of phrases that are formed for the first time, there must be some kind of extrapolation. Substitution: if two sentences are substitutional variants, then they are applications of the same function. >Substitution. I 545 Language/Richness/Expressiveness/Brandom: if the language is expressively rich, there must be no asymetrical SMSICs for substitutable expressions (singular terms). >SMSICs, >Singular terms. This would mean that (Vs): for every sentential frame Pa, whenever the interence from Pt to Pt" is correct, but not vice versa, there was a sentence frame P"a in a way that the inference from P"t" to P"t was correct, but not vice versa! It would be impossible to codify inferences in such a language. I 815 Language/Brandom: There are not so many words - the language would be poor if they all had the same meaning in the mouths of different speakers. - Speakers who do not accept the same definition cannot assign every assertion de dicto - E.g. "that scoundrel". >de dicto, >de re. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Measurements | Brandom | I 317 Measuring: parrots and thermometera can have reliable dispositions. However, they have no knowledge. They do not consider their reactions as reasons for further action. >Knowledge. For reliable dispositions >RDRDs, >Reasons, >Actions. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Reference | Dretske | Brandom I 600 Reference/Triangulation: The crossing point of two chains can help understand reference: e.g., the views of teacher and learning person. >Triangulation. Also Dretske: e.g. thermostat: one cannot say whether the system reacts to the temperature of the room, to the bimetallic strip, to the curvature of the bimetallic strip, or to the closing of the contact. (> Measuring). The practical consequences do not help. If the thermostat has a second sensor, such as a mercury thermometer which closes a contact accordingly and, if necessary, turns the heater on and off, the two causal chains intersect at two points: upstream with the change of the room temperature and downstream with the reaction to turn the heater on or off. --- I 951 Since the two chains intersect at two points, one must imagine them curved. BrandomVsDretske: does that really solve the problem? Is there not still the reaction to the closest disjunctive stimulus? Closing the bimetal strip or the mercury contact? --- I 601 Concept: Mere differing ability to react (cf. > RDRD reliable differential responsive dispositions, Brandom) is not enough to recognize the use of terms! Rationalistic supplementation: the inferential role of the reaction is crucial. |
Dretske I Fred Dretske "Minimal Rationality", in: S. L. Hurley and M. Nudds (Eds.) Rational Animals?, Oxford 2005 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dretske II F. Dretske Naturalizing the Mind Cambridge 1997 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Reliability Theory | Wright | I 81 Reliability Theory: (extreme form): one can o know that P, by simply indicating a dispositional reliable litmus test that P or not P, even if one has absolutely nothing to say, which could support or explain why one believes or rejects P. >Reasons. Knowledge without any anchoring of reasons. >Knowledge. I 81f Reliability theory/Wright: extreme form: makes the subject the bearer of reliable differential responsive dispositions, RDRDs. >RDRDs/Brandom. No reasons are needed, only a regular reaction. >On the other hand: Assertibility: needs reasons. >Assertibility. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Semantics | Brandom | I 297 Brandom's thesis: understanding the semantics based on the pragmatics. >Pragmatics. --- II 145 Semantic theory/BrandomVsDretske/VsMillikan/VsFodor: Problem: Cannot explain how real representations (beliefs) differ from simple indicator states (>RDRDs, reliable differential responsive dispositions, > Terminology/Brandom). II 146 Reliability theory/Brandom: cannot be applied to the semantics. - Epistemology is its suitable working area. >Reliability theory. --- Newen I 161 Brandom/Newen/Schrenk: reverses the conventional semantics. - Justifying the correctness of e.g. "If A is located east of B, B is located west of A". - By the meaning of "west" and "east". Newen I 162 West and east acquire their meaning precisely because they occur in such inferences - " basic concepts: not truth and reference (Tarski's truth concept is too weak). >Truth/Tarski. "Correctness: from social practice - "Meaning: arises from the inferential roles. >Inferential roles. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Terminology | Brandom | I 327 RDRD/Brandom: reliable distinctive reaction disposition: basis for non-inferential (direct) authority of observations. I 486f Designation/Brandom: that there is a truth value at all. I 509 Free-standing content/multi-value I 530 Definition SMSIC/Brandom: simple material substitution-inferential definition - connects the expression "the inventor" with another one - additional information which makes the attribution of the true identity of "Franklin was an inventor, but also Postmaster General, and printer, and spoke French ..." to a single object possible - but not within propositional attitudes. I 531 Content of an expression: is determined by the set of SMSICs (simple material substitution-inferential definitions) that link it with other expressions. I 532 SMSIC symmetrical for singular term. I 487 Multi-valued logic/Brandom: Definition designated: the fact that a statement has any truth value at all. Designation indicates what truth is designated: requires a definition on the assertion. Definition Multi-valued: embedded content - ((s) a particular one of several possible truth values). Interpretation: assigns two types of value: a) whether designated, b) which multi- value. Standard situation: it is defined which multi-values are designated. Designation value: everything that plays a role for pragmatic significance of free-standing sentences. bottom-up: Designation > formal validity Basic principle: the substitution never changes with the same multi-value designation. I 488 Multi-values = equivalence classes from logically derivable sentences - Designation = logical validity. --- II 178 Status/Brandom: its transmission means: a particular status of the premise ensures that it is also attributed to the conclusion - this applies to definition-preserving inferences: Deduction - but not for Definition authority-preserving inferences: Induction. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Davidson, D. | Brandom Vs Davidson, D. | I 268 Objectivity/error: it is claimed that social practices suffice to impart objective representational content on allegations! These are then objective truth conditions. Even the entire community may be wrong with such an assessment! Universal error only possible with standards, not with concepts). (BrandomVsDavidson). I 931 Davidson: wants to derive all action from reasons. Therefore, irrational acts constitute a problem for him. I 932 BrandomVsDavidson: he confuses a global condition of intentions with a local one, because he makes no distinction between determination and authorization. I 383 VsDavidson: it may be that only the score keeper (not the actor) can demonstrate the practical justification. Even in such cases, the reasons would not act as causes. I 383 In addition, you can act on the grounds that you have or not. Davidson: intentions are comprehensive judgments in the light of all beliefs and desires. I 954 BrandomVsDavidson: unsatisfactory because desires and beliefs are treated as unanalyzed basic concepts. He did not explain the practices according to which those contents can be transferred. BrandomVsDavidson: Davidson does not distinguish between interpretations between languages and within a language. The interpretation at Davidson requires explanatory hypotheses and inferences from sounds which are emanated by another person. This was rightly countered with the argument that if you speak a common language, you do not hear sounds but meanings! This is about the necessary subcompetencies. I 692 Objectivity of conceptual standards: not only can we all individually (each of us) be wrong about it, but also all together! (electron, mass in the universe). Error about proper use. > BrandomVsDavidson: collectively false beliefs possible. I 957 Davidson: even if the powder had been wet, she would have managed to bend her finger. So there is something in every action that the actor intended and that he succeeded in doing. I 958 BrandomVsDavidson: our approach does not require such a theoretical definition. Citing RDRD is enough to solve the problem with the nervous mountain climbers (Davidson). This is a concrete alternative to Davidsons’ proposal of the "causation in the right way." I 729 Brandom: it does not matter whether the usually reliable ability fails in individual cases. If I spill the wine while reaching for the bread, there does not need to be anything that I intended to do and also succeeded in doing, according to our approach. I 747 Problem: the substitution in the field of "that" does not receive the truth value of the whole attribution. Solution: the sentence tokening in this field does not belong to the actual attribution! Davidson: reference and truth value changed with attribution. I 961 BrandomVsDavidson: he does not consider the possibility of considering the relationship between "that" and the following sentence tokening as an anaphoric one instead of a demonstrative one. II 48 BrandomVsDavidson: establishing prior request! Action/BrandomVsDavidson: we started elsewhere. Three distinctions: II 126 Acting intentionally: recognition of a practical definition b. Acting with reasons: be entitled to a definition. c. Acting for reasons: here, reasons are causes in cases where the recognition of a definition is triggered by suitable reflection. NS I 166 Reference/Brandom: is not a fundamental concept for him. But he has to explain it, because it is still a central concept. Solution/Brandom: formation of equivalence classes of sentences whose position in the network of inferences is preserved when terms are exchanged by co-referential terms. Truth/BrandomVsTarski/BrandomVsDavidson: he has to bend their definition in such a way that instead of truth characterizing the concept of inference ("from true premises to true conclusions"), conversely the concept of inference characterizes that of truth. To this end, Brandom considers the position of sentences beginning with "it is true that..." in our inference-networked language game. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Empiricism | Dewey Vs Empiricism | Suhr I 84 DeweyVsEmpiricism: Spirit does notsimply response to external stimuli, but understanding of meaning. ((s) Empiricism without spirit would only be "reliable differential responsive dispositions". See RDRDs/Brandom). |
Dew II J. Dewey Essays in Experimental Logic Minneola 2004 Suhr I Martin Suhr John Dewey zur Einführung Hamburg 1994 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Brandom Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 577 E.g. Gavagai: sentences are the smallest units that can make a move in the language game. Therefore, there remains a margin for dividing the responsibility between the subsentential linguistic units. I 578 BrandomVsQuine: sentences about rabbit parts predict pruned properties, namely by reference to the merged objects to which they belong!. If you want to use singular terms for parts, there must be predications of them which they do not only address through the entities in which they occur. I 579 Some symmetrical SMSICs must be essential for the use of sentences as translated ones - allow substitutions from one rabbit-part term to another - and exist on a finer distinction than that they belong to the same entitiy. If "Gavagai" is to be a real sortal, then language must be able to individuate objects which it sorts. There must be a concept of "the same Gavagai". (In derived scheme). The native language cannot have expressions for rabbit molecules without absurd pullups. I 580 VsQuine: because no natural language can be non-autonomous to that effect - only an artificial language whose use is established in a richer metalanguage can be that - the way towards a non-circumstantial translation is preferable. Unqualified proposal for solution: "re-individuating translations": speaking of "integral parts of rabbit" instead of talking about rabbits, or even coarser individuations: "Rabbitness": not enough. BrandomVsQuine: here it comes to the accuracy of inferences, not to Quine’s dire basis of superficial stimuli. I 601 Gavagai: how do you decide whether the rabbit fly or a flash of the bright stub tail triggers the expression? You cannot know, the RDRDs and the corresponding causal chains do not matter, but their inferential role. It can, for example, specify whether it is about something flying or something flashing. I 666 BrandomVsQuine: fluctuates constantly whether his "networks of beliefs" or "general theories" are of an individual or communal nature. Therefore, it is not clear whether he sees our communication in general from this perspective. II 217/218 The significance of a belief depends on what else one convinced of. (Holism). II 224 BrandomVsQuine: but then two interlocutors refer to different things if they have different beliefs. (With the same utterances). So it is not clear how the communication can be made understandable as a matter of sharing of meanings. BrandomVsQuine: stuck too much to his dislike of singular terms, grappling with the question of when the "exportation" is legitimate. |
Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
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