Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 27 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Allocation | Cosmopolitanism | Norgaard I 329 Allocation/Emissions/Individuals/Cosmopolitanism: [A] relatively recent development is the emergence of allocation principles which take the cosmopolitan approach even further by focusing on individuals rather than countries. Two recent proposals which look at inequality within countries (and thus implicitly at individuals) are Norgaard I 330 the Greenhouse Development Rights framework (Baer et al. 2008(1), 2010(2)) and the proposal of Chakravarty et al. (2009(3)). The former allocates obligations on the basis of a combined indicator of responsibility and capacity, exempting both income and emissions below a threshold; the latter focuses only on emissions and would require high‐emitting individuals to reduce while low emitters are allowed to increase emissions. Both are thus compatible with the long‐standing recognition of the distinction between ‘luxury’ and ‘subsistence’ emissions (Agarwal and Narain 1991(4); Shue 1993(5)), but both still conclude that obligations, even if derived from looking at individuals, would still be incumbent on countries. (…) Paul Harris (2010)(6) develops the cosmopolitan focus on individuals in much greater detail, focusing at length on the wealth and emissions of the middle and wealthy classes in developing countries, and arguing for a more direct assessment of obligations on individuals. This approach is implicitly backed up by Simon Caney (2009)(7), who argues against collective notions of responsibility but includes capacity and recent (e.g. since 1990) historical emissions in his account of individually based obligations. 1. Baer, P. et al. 2008. The Greenhouse Development Rights Framework. 2nd edn., Heinrich Böll Stiftung, EcoEquity, Stockholm Environment Institute and Christian Aid. Available at (http://gdrights.org/wp‐content/uploads/2009/01/thegdrsframework.pdf) (Link does not work as of 14/04/19) 2. Bear, P. et al. 2010. Greenhouse development rights: A framework for climate protection that is ‘more fair’ than equal per capita emissions rights. Pp. 215–30 in S. M. Gardiner, S. Caney, D. Jamieson, and H. Shue (eds.), Climate Ethics: Essential Readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 3. Chakravarty, S., Chikkatur, A., de Coninck, H., Pacala, S., Socolow, R., and Tavoni, M. 2009. Sharing global CO2 emission reductions among one billion high emitters. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 106:11885–8. 4. Agarwal, A., and S. Narain, S. 1991. Global Warming in an Unequal World: A Case of Environmental Colonialism. New Delhi: Centre for Science and Environment. 5. Shue, H. 1993. Subsistence emissions and luxury emissions. Law and Policy 15: 39–59. 6. Harris, P. G. 2010. World Ethics and Climate Change: From International to Global Justice. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 7. Caney, S. 2009. Human rights, responsibilities and climate change. In C. R. Beitz and R. E. Goodin (eds.), Global Basic Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Baer, Paul: “International Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011 |
| Bioethics | Ecological Theories | Norgaard I 344 Bioethics/Rights-Based Ethics:/Ecological Theories: (…) Vanderheiden (2006: 343)(1) notes that ‘neither spatial nor temporal distance between agents and their victims can excuse acts of intentional or predictable harm.’ A related interpretation is provided by Caney (2008: 538)(2), who argues that climate stabilization is necessary to secure and defend at least three kinds of fundamental human rights. In particular, Caney argues that climate change: 1. Violates people's right to subsistence by imposing risks of ‘widespread malnutrition’ that are well documented by the scientific literature. 2. Threatens people's capacity to ‘attain a decent standard of living’ (emphasis added), a point that resonates with the economic arguments advanced by Weitzman (2009)(3). 3. Poses unacceptable risks to human health due to a range of mechanisms that include heat stress and the increased incidence of tropical diseases. >Environmental ethics, >Ethics. 1. Vanderheiden, S. 2006. Conservation, foresight, and the future generations problem. Inquiry 49: 337–52. 2. Caney, S. 2008. Human rights, climate change, and discounting. Environmental Politics 17: 536–55. 3. Weitzman, M. L. 2009. On modeling and interpreting the economics of catastrophic climate change. Review of Economics and Statistics 91: 1–19. Howarth, Richard: “Intergenerational Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011 |
| Classical Economics | Economic Theories | Kurz I 15 Physiocracy/classical economics/economic theories/Kurz: Input–output analysis has its roots in the classical economists from William Petty via Richard Cantillon and the Physiocrats to Robert Torrens and David Ricardo and to authors working in the classical tradition, such as Karl Marx, Vladimir K. Dmitriev, Ladislaus von Bortkiewicz and Georg von Charasoff. >Physicrats, >D. Ricardo, >K. Marx. The arguably most important and closely intertwined features of the starting point of the classical approach to the theory of production, distribution and value are the following. (1) Production consists essentially in a transformation of matter and energy into other forms of matter and energy; this process is subject to the laws of science (especially physics, chemistry and biology). (2) Production involves destruction, and the real cost of a commodity consists first and foremost in the commodities necessarily destroyed in the course of its production. This leads to the concept of physical real cost. (3) For the reason just given there is no such thing as production carried out by unassisted labour: it is impossible to produce something out of nothing. (4) Production is essentially a circular flow: commodities are produced by (means of) commodities. (5) Production typically generates a social surplus. The surplus refers to those quantities of the different commodities that are left over after the necessary means of production are used up and the means of subsistence in the support of labourers have been deducted from the gross outputs produced during a year. >Production theory, >Costs. Kurz I 16 Kurz/Salvadori: Without too much of an exaggeration one can indeed say that in their analyses the classical economists tried to respect what nowadays are known as the laws of thermodynamics. >Entropy. Feature (5) raises a number of important issues and is the source of major conceptual and analytical problems that constituted (and still constitute) formidable stumbling blocks to economists. First, in systems characterized by the conservation of matter (and energy) the question is, in what sense is it possible to have a surplus? Second, once this question is satisfactorily answered, Kurz I 17 how is this surplus distributed amongst different claimants, and what are the implications of different distributions with respect (a) to the properties of the given system of production in use and (b) the forces at work that transform the system over time? The former problem leads directly to the classical analysis of the relationship between income distribution and relative prices, the latter to the analysis of the relationship between income distribution on the one hand and capital accumulation and economic growth and development on the other. >Value, >Economic growth, >Price, >Income, >Distribution. Heinz D. Kurz and Neri Salvadori 2015. „Input–output analysis from a wider perspective. A comparison of the early works of Leontief and Sraffa“. In: Kurz, Heinz; Salvadori, Neri 2015. Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). London, UK: Routledge. |
Kurz I Heinz D. Kurz Neri Salvadori Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). Routledge. London 2015 |
| Climate Costs | Shue | Norgaard I 326 Climate Costs/Shue/Singer: (…) there is a near consensus among the philosophers who have written on the topic that considerations of justice do in fact justify the obligation of rich and high‐emitting countries to reduce their emissions, pay for emissions reductions in poor countries, and aid poor countries in adapting to climate change. Both Henry Shue (1993(1), 1995(2)) and Peter Singer (2002)(3) (…) arguing that on all plausible moral accounts, one reaches this general interpretation of the obligations of the wealthy and the rights of the poor. The few scholarly efforts to rebut these arguments—not from philosophers—rely on a variety of counter‐strategies, arguing for example that if the rich have any obligations to the poor, preventing climate change is a very inefficient way to fulfill them (e.g. Beckerman and Pasek 2005(4); Lomborg 2006(5)) (…). Norgaard I 331 A country‐based assessment can hardly lead to a conclusion other than that the rich countries still need to ‘go first,’ as they pledged in the UNFCCC (Brown et al. 2006)(6). Norgaard I 326 Climate Costs/Nations/Individuals/Shue: (…) nation‐to‐nation obligations unjustly permit the poor in the North to have obligations to the non‐poor in the South (Posner and Sunstein 2008)(7). Norgaard I 327 Some (Shue 1993 (1); Neumayer 2000 (8)) have defended broad ‘historical accountability’, by which nations as a whole have obligations proportional to their historical emissions of greenhouse gases. Others (Caney 2009(9); Baer et al. 2010(10); Harris 2010(11)) have argued that such collective, historical accounts are problematic (especially for emissions prior to the recognition of the risks of global warming) and that obligations should also or instead be International Justice based on ability to pay. These ‘ability to pay’ arguments also focus on individuals rather than countries, which is consistent with the fundamental principles of a cosmopolitan approach. >Cosmopolitanism. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Shue, H. 1993. Subsistence emissions and luxury emissions. Law and Policy 15: 39–59. 2. Shue; H. 1995. Ethics, the environment and the changing international order. International Affairs 71: 453–61. 3. Singer, P. 2002. One World: The Ethics of Globalization. New Haven: Yale University Press. 4. Beckermann, W., and J. Pasek. 2005. Justice, posterity, and the environment. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5. Lomborg, B. (ed.) 2006. How to Spend $50 Billion to Make the World a Better Place. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 6. Brown, D. et al. 2006. White Paper on the Ethical Dimensions of Climate Change. Available at (http://www.psu.edu/dept/rockethics/climate/whitepaper/edcc‐whitepaper.pdf) (Link not available as of 15/04/19) 7. Posner, E. A., and Sunstein, C. R. 2008. Climate change justice. Georgetown Law Journal 96: 1565–612. 8. Neumayer, E. 2000. In defence of historical accountability for greenhouse gas emissions. Ecological Economics 33: 185–92. 9. Caney, S. 2009. Human rights, responsibilities and climate change. In C. R. Beitz and R. E. Goodin (eds.), Global Basic Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 10. Bear, P. et al. 2010. Greenhouse development rights: A framework for climate protection that is ‘more fair’ than equal per capita emissions rights. Pp. 215–30 in S. M. Gardiner, S. Caney, D. Jamieson, and H. Shue (eds.), Climate Ethics: Essential Readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 11. Harris, P. G. 2010. World Ethics and Climate Change: From International to Global Justice. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Baer, Paul: “International Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011 |
| Climate Costs | Singer | Norgaard I 326 Climate Costs/Shue/Singer: (…) there is a near consensus among the philosophers who have written on the topic that considerations of justice do in fact justify the obligation of rich and high‐emitting countries to reduce their emissions, pay for emissions reductions in poor countries, and aid poor countries in adapting to climate change. Both Henry Shue (1993(1), 1995(2)) and Peter Singer (2002)(3) (…) arguing that on all plausible moral accounts, one reaches this general interpretation of the obligations of the wealthy and the rights of the poor. The few scholarly efforts to rebut these arguments—not from philosophers—rely on a variety of counter‐strategies, arguing for example that if the rich have any obligations to the poor, preventing climate change is a very inefficient way to fulfill them (e.g. Beckerman and Pasek 2005(4); Lomborg 2006(5)) (…). Norgaard I 331 A country‐based assessment can hardly lead to a conclusion other than that the rich countries still need to ‘go first,’ as they pledged in the UNFCCC (Brown et al. 2006)(6). Norgaard I 326 Climate Costs/Nations/Individuals/Shue: (…) nation‐to‐nation obligations unjustly permit the poor in the North to have obligations to the non‐poor in the South (Posner and Sunstein 2008)(7). Norgaard I 327 Some (Shue 1993(1); Neumayer 2000(8)) have defended broad ‘historical accountability’, by which nations as a whole have obligations proportional to their historical emissions of greenhouse gases. Others (Caney 2009(9); Baer et al. 2010(10); Harris 2010(11)) have argued that such collective, historical accounts are problematic (especially for emissions prior to the recognition of the risks of global warming) and that obligations should also or instead be International Justice based on ability to pay. These ‘ability to pay’ arguments also focus on individuals rather than countries, which is consistent with the fundamental principles of a cosmopolitan approach. >Cosmopolitanism. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Shue, H. 1993. Subsistence emissions and luxury emissions. Law and Policy 15: 39–59. 2. Shue; H. 1995. Ethics, the environment and the changing international order. International Affairs 71: 453–61. 3. Singer, P. 2002. One World: The Ethics of Globalization. New Haven: Yale University Press. 4. Beckermann, W., and J. Pasek. 2005. Justice, posterity, and the environment. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5. Lomborg, B. (ed.) 2006. How to Spend $50 Billion to Make the World a Better Place. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 6. Brown, D. et al. 2006. White Paper on the Ethical Dimensions of Climate Change. Available at (http://www.psu.edu/dept/rockethics/climate/whitepaper/edcc‐whitepaper.pdf) (Link not available as of 15/04/19) 7. Posner, E. A., and Sunstein, C. R. 2008. Climate change justice. Georgetown Law Journal 96: 1565–612. 8. Neumayer, E. 2000. In defence of historical accountability for greenhouse gas emissions. Ecological Economics 33: 185–92. 9. Caney, S. 2009. Human rights, responsibilities and climate change. In C. R. Beitz and R. E. Goodin (eds.), Global Basic Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 10. Bear, P. et al. 2010. Greenhouse development rights: A framework for climate protection that is ‘more fair’ than equal per capita emissions rights. Pp. 215–30 in S. M. Gardiner, S. Caney, D. Jamieson, and H. Shue (eds.), Climate Ethics: Essential Readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 11. Harris, P. G. 2010. World Ethics and Climate Change: From International to Global Justice. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Baer, Paul: “International Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011 |
| Climate Targets | Caney | Norgaard I 327 Climate Targets/Rights/Gardiner/Caney: Stephen Gardiner (2006)(1) [is] arguing that the interests at risk from potentially catastrophic climate change vastly outweigh considerations of reduced economic growth. Others, notably Simon Caney (2005a(2), 2009(3)), have argued that the right to a stable climate should be considered a fundamental human right, because the basic interests of life, health, subsistence, and security of place, all of which are endangered by climate change, are the foundations of both moral and legal human rights. Neither Gardiner nor Caney endorse particular targets, but their arguments would seem to support the most stringent targets currently entertained in the policy debates (e.g. reduction of CO2 concentrations to 350 ppm, well below today's levels). Rights/Utilitarianism/VsGardiner/VsCaney: One counterargument is that loss of life is commonplace and should simply be treated as one more economic cost; otherwise resources will be wasted on climate mitigation that could save more lives through other means, such as the reduction of malaria (Schelling 1997(4); Lomborg 2006(5)). Yet it also seems wrong to say that we'll let millions of people die from Norgaard I 328 pollution because we can spend part of the savings preventing harms to others more cheaply. There is, it seems, a fundamental tension between the utilitarian intuition that the sum of all suffering is what matters and the intuition about rights that what matters is precisely who is exposed to harm or risk and why (Baer and Sagar 2009(6)). >Utilitarianism. Climate Targets: A consensus has gradually emerged that we should aim to keep temperature increase below 2 °C above pre‐industrial; yet many of the least developed countries and small island states now argue that the objective should be 1.5 °C. However, the emissions reduction pledges made by various nations through June of 2010 seem to fall far short of meeting even a 2°C objective, suggesting that, whatever the rhetoric, national economic interests still take precedence over global justice concerns. Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Gardiner, S. M. 2006. A core precautionary principle. Journal of Political Philosophy 14: 33–60. 2. Caney, S. 2005a. Cosmopolitan justice, responsibility and climate change. Leiden Journal of International Law 18: 747–75. 3. Caney, S. 2009. Human rights, responsibilities and climate change. In C. R. Beitz and R. E. Goodin (eds.), Global Basic Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 4. Schelling, T. C. 1997. The cost of combating global warming: Facing the tradeoffs. Foreign Affairs 76: 8–14. 5. Lomborg, B. (ed.) 2006. How to Spend $50 Billion to Make the World a Better Place. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 6. Baer; P. and A. Sagar 2009. Ethics, rights and responsibilities. Pp. 262–9 in S. H. Schneider, A. Rosencranz, and M. D. Mastrandrea (eds.), Climate Change Science and Policy. Washington, DC: Island Press. Baer, Paul: “International Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011 |
| Climate Targets | Gardiner | Norgaard I 327 Climate Targets/Rights/Gardiner/Caney: Stephen Gardiner (2006)(1) [is] arguing that the interests at risk from potentially catastrophic climate change vastly outweigh considerations of reduced economic growth. Others, notably Simon Caney (2005a(2), 2009(3)), have argued that the right to a stable climate should be considered a fundamental human right, because the basic interests of life, health, subsistence, and security of place, all of which are endangered by climate change, are the foundations of both moral and legal human rights. Neither Gardiner nor Caney endorse particular targets, but their arguments would seem to support the most stringent targets currently entertained in the policy debates (e.g. reduction of CO2 concentrations to 350 ppm, well below today's levels). Rights/Utilitarianism/VsGardiner/VsCaney: One counterargument is that loss of life is commonplace and should simply be treated as one more economic cost; otherwise resources will be wasted on climate mitigation that could save more lives through other means, such as the reduction of malaria (Schelling 1997(4); Lomborg 2006(5)). Yet it also seems wrong to say that we'll let millions of people die from Norgaard I 328 pollution because we can spend part of the savings preventing harms to others more cheaply. There is, it seems, a fundamental tension between the utilitarian intuition that the sum of all suffering is what matters and the intuition about rights that what matters is precisely who is exposed to harm or risk and why (Baer and Sagar 2009(6)). >Utilitarianism. Climate Targets: A consensus has gradually emerged that we should aim to keep temperature increase below 2 °C above pre‐industrial; yet many of the least developed countries and small island states now argue that the objective should be 1.5 °C. However, the emissions reduction pledges made by various nations through June of 2010 seem to fall far short of meeting even a 2°C objective, suggesting that, whatever the rhetoric, national economic interests still take precedence over global justice concerns. Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Gardiner, S. M. 2006. A core precautionary principle. Journal of Political Philosophy 14: 33–60. 2. Caney, S. 2005a. Cosmopolitan justice, responsibility and climate change. Leiden Journal of International Law 18: 747–75. 3. Caney, S. 2009. Human rights, responsibilities and climate change. In C. R. Beitz and R. E. Goodin (eds.), Global Basic Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 4. Schelling, T. C. 1997. The cost of combating global warming: Facing the tradeoffs. Foreign Affairs 76: 8–14. 5. Lomborg, B. (ed.) 2006. How to Spend $50 Billion to Make the World a Better Place. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 6. Baer; P. and A. Sagar 2009. Ethics, rights and responsibilities. Pp. 262–9 in S. H. Schneider, A. Rosencranz, and M. D. Mastrandrea (eds.), Climate Change Science and Policy. Washington, DC: Island Press. Baer, Paul: “International Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.. |
Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011 |
| Cogito | Hintikka | II 113 Cogito/Descartes/Hintikka: the cogito is not a premise whose conclusion would be the sum. Solution/Hintikka: it is an act of thinking that proves the existence of the subject itself. Analogously: a speech act also proves the existence of itself to the subject. Mark Twain says: "I exist". HintikkaVsDescartes: Problem: 1. What kind of entity is this, which should prove "res" with it? 2. To answer the question, what has been proved at all, we need to clarify the status of the entity. E.g. Italo Calvino: Charlemagne asks a knight why he has closed the visor. He answers: "Sir, I do not exist". II 114 Existence/non-existence/subsistence/Hintikka: in this example, the knight does not exist in a certain way, but in another, namely, in which he can be the hero of history. N.B.: i.e. here the speech act is not a conclusive proof of its existence ((s) within fiction). >Non-existence, >Fiction, >Proof. Cogito/Descartes/Hintikka: it would have been wrong, too, had Descartes concluded: "Cogito, ergo Descartes exists". ((a) So for the "I", which is explicit in "sum", insert the name). Analog: e.g. if someone tells me in the street: "Mark Twain exists" that would be just as little evidence for the existence of Mark Twain. It would have to be him who performs the speech act. Cogito/knowledge/Hintikka: problem: Descartes must also know additionally that the questionable thinker is this entity, or that type of entity. Existence/identity/entity/identification/Quine/Hintikka: Quine: "No entity without identity": that is, Descartes needs to know something about himself to be able to say about himself that he exists. Solution/Hintikka: we must distinguish two types of cross-world identification (cross-identification): a) perspective (subject-centric) identification: this is not subjective, even if it is relative to a person II 115 (It only uses one coordinate system defined by reference to the user. It itself depends on objective general principles.) b) public (object-centered) identification. >Cross-world-identifiacation, >Identification. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Distribution | Sraffa | Kurz I 152 Value/Distribution/Sraffa/Classical Economics/Kurz: In November 1927 Sraffa began to elaborate his systems of equations. He quite naturally started with an economy that produces just enough, neither more nor less, to recover the necessary means of production used up in the process of production and the necessary means of subsistence in the support of workers - a situation reflected in what he called his "first equations." He emphasized that this amounts to considering wages "as amounts of fuel for production" (D3/12/7: 138)(1) and identified the situation as the realm of pure necessities, or "natural economy." In this case the concept of physical real cost applied in an unadulterated way. With respect to value in such conditions, Sraffa insisted that there was no problem of "incentives," the grand theme of marginalism: what mattered were exclusively the material costs of production of a commodity. The means of subsistence in the support of workers were an indispensable part of these physical real costs, because only Kurz I 153 their (recurrent) consumption "enabled" workers to perform their function. The periodic destruction of such commodities is a necessary condition for the economic system to realize a "self-replacing State," but it is not alone sufficient. The system must be able to restore periodically the initial distribution of resources in order for the (re)productive process to continue unhampered. Commodities must be exchanged for one another at the end of the uniform period of production. But which exchange ratios guarantee the repetition of the process? Sraffa showed that the sought-after ratios, or what Ricardo had called "absolute" values, were uniquely determined by the sociotechnical conditions of production and could be ascertained by solving a set of linear homogeneous production equations. >Economic Surplus/Sraffa, >Wages/Sraffa. 1. Taken from the work Sraffa carried out in the period 1927–1931 (unpublished papers). Kurz, Heinz D. „Keynes, Sraffa, and the latter’s “secret skepticism“. In: Kurz, Heinz; Salvadori, Neri 2015. Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). London, UK: Routledge. |
Sraffa I Piero Sraffa Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities. Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Cambridge 1960 Kurz I Heinz D. Kurz Neri Salvadori Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). Routledge. London 2015 |
| Elasticity (Economics) | Saez | Saez I 12 Elasticity/capital/labour/Saez/Zucman: Tax incidence: The question of who pays the taxes collected by governments today is (...) what economists call, quite confusingly, “tax incidence.” For example, what would happen if the corporate tax rate were cut? Saez I 100 Elasticity: the most inelastic factor of production bears the burden of taxes, while the most elastic factor dodges them. Concretely, if capital is very elastic - saving and investment collapse whenever capital is taxed—then labor bears the burden of capital taxation. But just as capital taxes can be shifted to labor, so too can labor taxes be shifted to capital. This happens if labor is very elastic - that is, if people work substantially less when the taxation of their earnings rises. In one of the oldest and most famous analyses of tax incidence, Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations explained how taxes on wages could be shifted to capital. If farmers are at the subsistence level (they earn no more than what they need to barely survive), taxing their wage would make them starve. Question: How elastic are capital and labor? Does the capital stock, in particular, vanish when capital taxes Saez I 101 rise? If it does, then taxing capital is indeed harmful and slashing corporate taxation can be in the long-run interest of workers. >Tax incidence/Saez. Tradition: According to most commentators, capital’s extreme elasticity is a law of nature, as certain as gravity. But this belief—like other stark predictions from basic economic theory (for instance, that the minimum wage must destroy employment)—needs a reality check. Saez I 105 Capital/SaezVsTradition/ZucmanVsTradition: Capital is not very elastic, but it can be obscured. Rich people can hide wealth offshore. Multinational companies can shift profits to Bermuda. Corporation profits: The same conclusion holds true for the taxation of corporate profits, the form of capital income that’s widely seen as most elastic. The way that corporations respond to international differences in tax rates is not primarily by moving their factories to low-tax places, but by shifting paper profits to tax havens. Saez I 131 Elasticity/Ramsey/Saez/Zucman: In the 1920s, the prodigy mathematician and economist Frank Ramsey formally proved that if all taxpayers faced the same tax rate, the rate that maximizes government revenue is inversely proportional to the elasticity of taxable income.(1) What does this mean? >Taxation/Ramsey. If taxable income is inelastic, it means that when tax rates rise, reported income does not change much. Example: In that case, the US Treasury mechanically collects more revenue by hiking tax rates. By contrast if taxable income is very elastic, then high tax rates reduce the tax base so significantly that they don’t raise much revenue and are undesirable. Ramsey rule: That’s the cardinal rule of optimal taxation, called the Ramsey rule: governments should not tax too much what’s elastic. >Ramsey rule/Saez. 1. Ramsey, Frank P. “A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation.” Economic Journal 37, no. 145 (1927): 47–61. |
|
| Elasticity (Economics) | Zucman | Saez I 12 Elasticity/capital/labour/Saez/Zucman: Tax incidence: The question of who pays the taxes collected by governments today is (...) what economists call, quite confusingly, “tax incidence.” For example, what would happen if the corporate tax rate were cut? Saez I 100 Elasticity: the most inelastic factor of production bears the burden of taxes, while the most elastic factor dodges them. Concretely, if capital is very elastic - saving and investment collapse whenever capital is taxed—then labor bears the burden of capital taxation. But just as capital taxes can be shifted to labor, so too can labor taxes be shifted to capital. This happens if labor is very elastic - that is, if people work substantially less when the taxation of their earnings rises. In one of the oldest and most famous analyses of tax incidence, Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations explained how taxes on wages could be shifted to capital. If farmers are at the subsistence level (they earn no more than what they need to barely survive), taxing their wage would make them starve. Question: How elastic are capital and labor? Does the capital stock, in particular, vanish when capital taxes Saez I 101 rise? If it does, then taxing capital is indeed harmful and slashing corporate taxation can be in the long-run interest of workers. >Tax incidence/Saez. Tradition: According to most commentators, capital’s extreme elasticity is a law of nature, as certain as gravity. But this belief—like other stark predictions from basic economic theory (for instance, that the minimum wage must destroy employment)—needs a reality check. Saez I 105 Capital/SaezVsTradition/ZucmanVsTradition: Capital is not very elastic, but it can be obscured. Rich people can hide wealth offshore. Multinational companies can shift profits to Bermuda. Corporation profits: The same conclusion holds true for the taxation of corporate profits, the form of capital income that’s widely seen as most elastic. The way that corporations respond to international differences in tax rates is not primarily by moving their factories to low-tax places, but by shifting paper profits to tax havens. Saez I 131 Elasticity/Ramsey/Saez/Zucman: In the 1920s, the prodigy mathematician and economist Frank Ramsey formally proved that if all taxpayers faced the same tax rate, the rate that maximizes government revenue is inversely proportional to the elasticity of taxable income.(1) What does this mean? >Taxation/Ramsey. If taxable income is inelastic, it means that when tax rates rise, reported income does not change much. Example: In that case, the US Treasury mechanically collects more revenue by hiking tax rates. By contrast if taxable income is very elastic, then high tax rates reduce the tax base so significantly that they don’t raise much revenue and are undesirable. Ramsey rule: That’s the cardinal rule of optimal taxation, called the Ramsey rule: governments should not tax too much what’s elastic. >Ramsey rule/Saez. 1. Ramsey, Frank P. “A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation.” Economic Journal 37, no. 145 (1927): 47–61. |
|
| Emissions Trading | Singer | I 225 Emissions trading/P. Singer: emissions trading is based on the simple economic principle that if you can buy something cheaper than you can make it yourself, it is better to buy it than to produce it. In this case, these are transferable rights to pollute the environment, which can be traded. They are calculated on the basis of an equal share per capita. >Trade, >Markets, >Price, >Climate Change, >Climate Protection. For international trade, this means that cuts in carbon dioxide pollution are made at the lowest possible cost, thus causing the least damage to the global economy. In addition, nations with a low level of pollution - usually poorer countries - will be encouraged to keep their emissions low, so that they will have more emission rights available to sell to rich countries. This would mean a transfer of resources from rich to poor countries - without altruism. VsEmissions Trading: Problem: 1. Lack of verifiability. 2. Payments from richer to poorer countries only make sense if the money reduces poverty and does not disappear into the pockets of the elite, which often happens in dictatorships. 3. J. E. HansenVsEmissions Trading: Hansen proposes a carbon tax system instead. >HansenVsEmissions Trading. I 228 Emissions trading/Henry Shue/Singer, P. (H. Shue, 1993)(1): Thesis: it is necessary to distinguish between emissions that contribute to livelihoods, such as methane emissions from rice cultivation areas and "luxury emissions" caused by urban car traffic. >Carbon tax. Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. H. Shue, „Subsistence Emissions and Luxury Emissions“, in: Law and Policy, 15 (1993), pp. 39-59. |
SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| Fundamental Rights | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 214 Fundamental rights/welfare state/ welfare rights/Political philosophy/Moon: (...) many of the considerations that can be invoked to support strong property rights also support welfare or 'positive' rights, and so can be used to justify the redistributive activities of a welfare state. vities of a welfare state. When we think about why we are attracted to the idea that humans have rights at all, including a (defeasible) right not to be coerced by others, the reasons we are likely to come up with will support the idea that people ought to be accorded certain basic welfare rights, rights to goods and services necessary for human functioning. >Rights, >Society, >Community, >State. Nozick/Moon: For example, Nozick refers to the idea that people are capable of leading meaningful lives, and so they have (or should have) a right against being coerced by others because such a right is necessary to protect that fundamental human capacity. I can only create projects for myself, and organize my life to realize those projects, and thus find meaning in my life, if I am free from coercion by others: they can't force me to do their bidding rather than fulfil my own aspirations. >R. Nozick. Problem: This is a powerful argument, but it is equally true that to live my own life requires not only protection against interference from others, but also access to the resources necessary to life itself. If those resources can be appropriated as private property, then a person could be deprived of anything resembling a decent life, or even life itself, because she lacked the necessary resources. Fundamental rights/Waldron: Jeremy Waldron (1993(1): 309-38) gives the example of a homeless person, in a setting in which all land and other amenities, such as toilets or sleeping places, are pri- vately owned. Under those circumstances, she would not be able to live, or at least to live without violating someone's 'rights'. But what reason would she have to acknowledge a duty not to take Gaus I 215 what she needed, when her life depended on it? It is hard to see why people, recognizing the possibility that they might become impoverished, would have reason to accept a system of property rights that could leave them in such desperate straits. Property rights: As Waldron (1993(1): ch. I and passim) argues, the only system of property rights that all have a reason to endorse would be one that ensured that no one need be deprived of essential resources, and the obvious way of achieving that would be to make property holdings subject to taxation, so that the state could provide essential goods and services, or at least a minimum income, when necessary.* >Property. Social minimum state/Moon: This line of argument supports what might be called a social minimum state, not necessarily an institutional welfare state. The core argument is that some fundamental human values - the idea of a meaningful life, personal autonomy, or life itself - can be realized (or at least guaranteed) only if there are government programmes providing enough income at least for subsistence. Welfare state/social minmum/Hayek: F. A. Hayek, for example, is renowned as a critic of the welfare state, but he accepts the idea of a social minimum, arguing that citizens may feel that there is 'a clear moral duty of all to assist, within the organized community, those who cannot help themselves' and so the society could provide 'a uniform minimum income... outside the market' to those who are indigent (1976(2): 87).** >Welfare State. Political theories: Others have argued that people have prepolitical welfare rights, on all fours with the 'negative' rights to non-interference such as the right to bodily integrity, and that it is the government's responsibility to secure those rights. Welfare rights/Political philosophy: The view that we have welfare rights that are, in some sense, prepolitical, which require that the state provide various goods and services, is subject to well known difficulties. The standards defining the scope of such rights claims are notoriously vague. Plant: Raymond Plant et al. (1980)(3), for example, base positive rights claims in 'needs', but what are the boundaries of need? I may 'need' an enormously expensive kind of medical treatment in order to prolong my life, if only for a few days, but is it plausible to say that I have a right to such treatment? Dworkin: Ronald Dworkin argues the traditional practice of medicine may be based on the 'rescue principle' , which answers that question affirmatively: 'it says we should spend all we can [on health care] until the next dollar would buy no gain in health or life expectancy at all', but he insists that 'No sane society would try to meet that standard' (2000(4): 309): it would require sacrificing too many competing goods, including other rights claims, like the right to an education or a minimal standard of living. >Ronald Dworkin. Gewirth: Alan Gewirth views positive rights claims as implicit in the commitment to human agency, a commitment one necessarily undertakes in performing any intentional action, because doing so presupposes that one views oneself as an agent, and so is implicitly committed to those conditions necessary for the exercise of agency, which include access to certain resources. (...) when I cannot meet my needs through my own efforts, others have an obligation 'posi tively to assist' me (1978(5): 134). Moon: But what standards are they to use to determine what constitutes a reasonable effort on my part? Holmes/Sunstein: These concerns may not be decisive to reject the idea of basic welfare rights, but they do mean that specifying them is impossible in the absence of some political process through which the standards governing responsibility and trade-offs among conflicting uses can be determined (see Holmes and Sunstein, 1999)(6). And because these rights cannot be specified except through a political process, it is implausible to view them as establishing a pre-political standard of justice to which that political process must conform. >Equal opportunities/Welfare economics. * See Lomasky (1987)(3) for a rights-based defence of a mmimal welfare state, which taxes people to provide for a minimum standard of living for all. ** Although generally critical of the welfare state, Hayek seems to allow for certain forms of public provision and compulsory insurance (1960(4):285-394). 1. Waldron, Jeremy (1993) Liberal Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge Umversity Press. 2. Hayek, Friedrich (1976). The Mirage of Social Justice. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 3. Plant, Raymond, H. Lesser and P. Taylor-Gooby (1980) Political Philosophy and Social Welfare: Essays on the Normative Basis of Welfare Provision. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 4. Dworkin, Ronald (2000) Sovereign Virtue. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 5. Gewirth, Alan (1978) Reason and Morality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 6. Holmes, Stephen and Cass Sunstein (1999) The Cost of Rights. New York: Norton. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Inequalities | International Political Theory | Gaus I 294 Inequalities/International political theory/Brown: The international human rights regime initially stressed a political conception of rights, but economic and social rights have never been far from the agenda. The most influential account here has been that of Henry Shue (1983)(1), who argues the focus should be on basic rights seen as 'everyone's minimum reasonable demand upon the rest of humanity'. Basic rights can be broken down into two components: 1) security rights, that is, the right not to be sub jected to murder, torture, mayhem, rape or assault; and 2) subsistence rights, that is, the right to minimal economic security, 'unpolluted air, unpolluted water, adequate food, adequate clothing, adequate shelter and minimum preventive public health care' (1983(1): 19, 23). >Human rights, >Civil rights, >Rights, >Law, >Society. Brown: An obvious question is whether these are 'rights' in the full sense of the term, as opposed to desiderata. Are there correlative duties to theserights? Can the 'rest of humanity' be seen as the kind of entity that could deliver on such duties? These are difficult questions to answer in a satisfactory way, and the notion of basic rights is probably best seen as a rhetorical device to draw attention to the great inequalities that characterize the contemporary international order, such inequalities are the subject of theories of lobal social justice. >Justice. 1. Shue, H. (1983) Basic Rights: Famine, Affluence and United States Foreign Policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Brown, Chris 2004. „Political Theory and International Relations“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Inequalities | Shue | Gaus I 294 Inequalities/Henry Shue/Brown: The international human rights regime initially stressed a political conception of rights, but economic and social rights have never been far from the agenda. The most influential account here has been that of Henry Shue (1983)(1), who argues the focus should be on basic rights seen as 'everyone's minimum reasonable demand upon the rest of humanity'. Basic rights can be broken down into two components: 1) security rights, that is, the right not to be sub jected to murder, torture, mayhem, rape or assault; and 2) subsistence rights, that is, the right to minimal economic security, 'unpolluted air, unpolluted water, adequate food, adequate clothing, adequate shelter and minimum preventive public health care' (1983(1): 19, 23). >Human rights, >Civil rights, >Rights, >Law, >Society. Brown: An obvious question is whether these are 'rights' in the full sense of the term, as opposed to desiderata. Are there correlative duties to theserights? Can the 'rest of humanity' be seen as the kind of entity that could deliver on such duties? These are difficult questions to answer in a satisfactory way, and the notion of basic rights is probably best seen as a rhetorical device to draw attention to the great inequalities that characterize the contemporary international order, such inequalities are the subject of theories of lobal social justice. >Justice. 1. Shue, H. (1983) Basic Rights: Famine, Affluence and United States Foreign Policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Brown, Chris 2004. „Political Theory and International Relations“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Money | Locke | Höffe I 245 Money/Locke/Höffe: While labour serves to meet actual needs, i.e. a traditional subsistence economy, a non-perishable medium of exchange, which everyone has agreed to, makes money possible, a far more productive economic system: trade enables an expansion of production and a far greater accumulation of property(1). >Labour/Locke, >Property/Locke. Locke does not close his eyes to the consequences worthy of criticism, the inequality of property and the emergence of wage labour. However, the advantage of a far more productive overall economy benefits everyone - not only the wealthy, but also the poor. Economy/Locke/Höffe: [Locke] shows himself to be a liberal economic theorist, oriented on the well-being of his country, a global trading power, and at the same time a precursor of Adam Smith: Through the free development of production and open world trade, a wealth is created that is beneficial to its own community and all its citizens. 1. J. Locke, Second treatise of Government,§§ 46ff |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| National Economy | Marx | Höffe I 364 National Economy/Marx/Höffe: (...) Marx [seeks] to show how a national economy which is designed from the standpoint of the capitalists who own the means of production, among their own assumptions did not achieve its claimed goal. MarxVsSmith, Adam: While Smith, according to the title of his work, promises the "prosperity of nations"(2), in truth, according to Marx, the crass opposite takes place: an impoverishment, eventually impoverishment of the worker. Profit: The capital utilization aiming at profit increase favors on the one hand the large capital, because it destroys the small capital and seizes the property. Labor: On the other hand, it leads to an abundance of labor, which pushes the wage below the subsistence level. Impoverishment: Later, Marx abandoned the idea of absolute impoverishment. He only claims that the wage does not keep pace with the growing wealth of the capital owners (...). >Adam Smith. 1. K. Marx, Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte (1844) (Pariser Manuskripte) 2. A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 1776 |
Marx I Karl Marx Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Observation | Sraffa | Kurz I 72 Observation/Sraffa/Kurz: [Sraffa] introduces and compares different observers with specific analytical attitudes and investigates how these attitudes may be useful to or detrimental for grasping some specific aspects of the object under investigation. This procedure explains why Sraffa is particularly attentive in separating the elements which are part of the object under analysis and those which depend on the special theoretical lenses used by the observer: in our view Sraffa’s implicit assumption is that theoretical lenses are indeed required for the investigation to be carried out and therefore an effort is to be made in order to choose which are the best ones in the given situation. >Method/Sraffa. Kurz I 79 In the Preface to PC (1) Sraffa introduces one object of analysis, ‘the properties of an economic system’ which ‘do not depend on changes in the scale of production or in the proportions of factors’, and two observers of that object. The former observer is introduced as (i) ‘anyone accustomed to think in terms of the equilibrium of demand and supply’, the latter as (ii) the scholar adopting the ‘standpoint … of the old classical economists from Adam Smith to Ricardo’. According to Sraffa, observers (i) and (ii) adopt two different attitudes towards the object under investigation. Such differences have a direct bearing on the observer’s ability to comprehend it. Observer (i) ‘may be induced’ by the symmetrical theory of value to interpret a model in which demand conditions play no explicit analytical role in price determination as a model based on an implicit assumption of constant returns to scale. Observer (ii) appears to be better equipped than observer (i) to perform the task of studying the properties of the object under investigation: „In a system in which, day after day, production continued unchanged in those respects, the marginal product of a factor (or alternatively the marginal cost of a product) would not merely be hard to find - it just would not be there to be found.“ (Sraffa 1960: v) Kurz I 81 Surplus/Method/Sraffa: In Chapter II of PC(1) Sraffa introduces an economy which ‘produces more than the minimum necessary for replacement and there is a surplus to be Kurz I 82 distributed’ (p. 6). The observer-Sraffa remarks: ‘the system becomes selfcontradictory’. This ‘contradiction’, however, is not inherent in the object under observation. Thus Sraffa’s remark amounts to a warning concerning the observer and her theoretical schemes: the observer would fall into a contradiction if she analysed the object ‘production with a surplus’ by means of the same analytical tools used for the object ‘production for subsistence’. A different theoretical scheme is needed. Kurz: In our view Sraffa’s warning is justified by the fact that at least two substantive differences exist between the object of Chapter I and the object of Chapter II: the existence of a surplus, in fact, determines the necessity for the observer (i) to choose a rule for the distribution of the surplus; and (ii) to distinguish between basic commodities and non-basic commodities. 1. Sraffa, P. (1960). Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities. Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Salvadori, Neri and Signorino, Rodolfo. 2015. „Piero Sraffa: economic reality, the economist and economic theory. An interpretation.“ In: Kurz, Heinz; Salvadori, Neri 2015. Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). London, UK: Routledge. |
Sraffa I Piero Sraffa Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities. Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Cambridge 1960 Kurz I Heinz D. Kurz Neri Salvadori Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). Routledge. London 2015 |
| Personality Traits | Evolutionary Psychology | Corr I 265 Personality traits/evolutionary psychology: the argument that personality differences are selectively neutral is unable to account for the fact that our closest living relative, the chimpanzee, exhibits similar versions of the >Big Five personality traits (plus Dominance) (King and Figueredo 1997)(1). >Five-Factor Model, >Causality/psychology/evolutionary theories, >Heritability/Tooby/Cosmides. Corr I 272 Personality traits/evolutionary psychology/Figueredo: we propose that sociality is the major cause of personality variation in humans. Specifically, adaptation to different micro-niches within the overall social ecology of the species is what leads to the differentiation of personality traits among individuals. Climactic and ecological fluctuations during repeated Ice Ages may have historically provided much of the initial impetus by exacerbating social competition, but the larger population densities occasioned by the Neolithic Revolution in human subsistence economies (e.g., farming, herding, industrial and now information-based) have largely taken their place in recent human history. >Ecology/evolutionary psychology, >Niches/evolutionary psychology, >Adaption/evolutionary psychology, >Selection/evolutionary psychology. 1. King, J. E. and Figueredo, A. J. 1997. The five-factor model plus dominance in chimpanzee personality, Journal of Research in Personality 31: 257–71 Aurelio José Figueredo, Paul Gladden, Geneva Vásquez, Pedro Sofio, Abril Wolf and Daniel Nelson Jones, “Evolutionary theories of personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Physiocracy | Economic Theories | Kurz I 15 Physiocracy/classical economics/economic theories/Kurz: Input–output analysis has its roots in the classical economists from William Petty via Richard Cantillon and the Physiocrats to Robert Torrens and David Ricardo and to authors working in the classical tradition, such as Karl Marx, Vladimir K. Dmitriev, Ladislaus von Bortkiewicz and Georg von Charasoff. >Physicrats, >D. Ricardo, >K. Marx. The arguably most important and closely intertwined features of the starting point of the classical approach to the theory of production, distribution and value are the following. (1) Production consists essentially in a transformation of matter and energy into other forms of matter and energy; this process is subject to the laws of science (especially physics, chemistry and biology). (2) Production involves destruction, and the real cost of a commodity consists first and foremost in the commodities necessarily destroyed in the course of its production. This leads to the concept of physical real cost. (3) For the reason just given there is no such thing as production carried out by unassisted labour: it is impossible to produce something out of nothing. (4) Production is essentially a circular flow: commodities are produced by (means of) commodities. (5) Production typically generates a social surplus. The surplus refers to those quantities of the different commodities that are left over after the necessary means of production are used up and the means of subsistence in the support of labourers have been deducted from the gross outputs produced during a year. >Production theory, >Costs. Kurz I 16 Kurz/Salvadori: Without too much of an exaggeration one can indeed say that in their analyses the classical economists tried to respect what nowadays are known as the laws of thermodynamics. >Entropy. Feature (5) raises a number of important issues and is the source of major conceptual and analytical problems that constituted (and still constitute) formidable stumbling blocks to economists. First, in systems characterized by the conservation of matter (and energy) the question is, in what sense is it possible to have a surplus? Second, once this question is satisfactorily answered, Kurz I 17 how is this surplus distributed amongst different claimants, and what are the implications of different distributions with respect (a) to the properties of the given system of production in use and (b) the forces at work that transform the system over time? The former problem leads directly to the classical analysis of the relationship between income distribution and relative prices, the latter to the analysis of the relationship between income distribution on the one hand and capital accumulation and economic growth and development on the other. >Value, >Economic growth, >Price, >Income, >Distribution. Heinz D. Kurz and Neri Salvadori 2015. „Input–output analysis from a wider perspective. A comparison of the early works of Leontief and Sraffa“. In: Kurz, Heinz; Salvadori, Neri 2015. Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). London, UK: Routledge. |
Kurz I Heinz D. Kurz Neri Salvadori Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). Routledge. London 2015 |
| Property | Rousseau | Höffe I 272 Property/Rousseau/Höffe: Instead of helping people to significant achievements, a “being-with-oneself”, the two interwoven basic evils of private property and the state create a threefold inequality among people and, as a result, a threefold alienation (aliénation)(1): If property - someone fences in a piece of land and declares it his own - surrounds itself with law and justice, it creates rich and poor, if an authority is added, additionally rulers and ruled, and in case of arbitrariness and tyranny, masters and slaves as well. >Civilization/Rousseau. Höffe I 275 État civil: With the conclusion of the social contract, people leave the state of nature and enter into the (civic) civil state (état civil). On the debit side [thereby] is the loss of natural freedom with Höffe I 276 its unlimited right to everything to which the request is directed. In return, for the loss of independence, everyone receives the freedom of a citizen with the ownership of all that one owns. According to the Partnership Contract(2), legitimate property begins historically and de facto with the possession of a piece of land, that is, with the erection of fences, as rejected by the Second Treatise(1). Conditions: Like Locke, Rousseau ties legitimate property to three conditions: 1) The corresponding area must not already be inhabited, which tacitly makes European colonialism appear illegitimate (RousseauVsColonialism); 2) One may not take possession of more than is necessary for subsistence, which is contrary to large scale properties (RousseauVsColonialism) 3) Where legal titles are lacking, "empty ceremony" is not enough, but "work and cultivation" is needed. >Property/Locke, >Colonialism. 1. Rousseau, Discours sur l'inégalité parmi les hommes, 1755 2. Rousseau, The Social Contract (Du contrat social ou Principes du droit politique, 1762, I, 8. Mause I 47 Property/Rousseau: According to Rousseau, the extensive homogeneity of property relations belongs to the social functional conditions of a good, republican order. The guarantee of property, which is constitutive for the existence of a republican community, is in tension with its sovereign self-determination, since not only a policy aimed at equality of property, but taxes already levied by the state "directly attack property rights and thus the true basis of political society".(1) For taxes today see: >Tax avoidence, >Tax competition, >Tax compliance, >Tax evasion, >Tax havens, >Tax incidence, >Tax loopholes, >Tax system, >Taxation. 1. J.-J. Rousseau, Abhandlung über die Politische Ökonomie. In Politische Schriften, Hrsg. Ludwig Schmidts, Bd. 1, Paderborn 1977, S. 56. |
Rousseau I J. J. Rousseau Les Confessions, 1765-1770, publ. 1782-1789 German Edition: The Confessions 1953 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Rate of profit | Marx | Kurz I 164 Rate of profit/Marx/MarxVsRicardo/Sraffa/Kurz: In Sraffa's reading, Marx had detected an important error in Ricardo's line of reasoning, which emanated from his neglect of nonwage Capital in the analysis of the wage-profit relationship.26 As Marx ([1861—63] 1989, 73)(1) stressed over and over again, this neglect had serious implications, and in particular had misled Ricardo into focusing attention on the wrong causes in his explanation of a falling tendency of the rate of profits: But because for Ricardo the rate of profit and the rate of surplus value are identical terms, a permanent fall in profit or the tendency of profit to fall can only be explained as the result of the same causes that bring about a permanent fall or tendency to fall in the rate of surplus value, i.e. in that part of the day during which the worker does not work for himself but for the capitalist. What are these causes? If the length of the working day is assumed to remain constant, then the part of it during which the worker works for nothing for the capitalist can only fall, diminish, if the part during which he works for himself grows. And this is only possible (assuming that LABOUR is paid at its VALUE) if the value of the NECESSARIES - the means of subsistence on which the worker spends his wages - increases. But as a result of the development of the productive power of labour, the value of industrial commodities is constantly decreasing. The diminishing rate of profit c»an therefore only be explained by the fact that the value of FOOD, the principal component part of the means of subsist- ence, is constantly rising. For Ricardo, the general rate of profits falls if, and only if, proportional wages rise. MarxVsRicardo: This proposition was not correct: as Marx had pointed out, it only holds if one disregards the nonwage capital and argues as if capital advances consist only of the wages bill. However, once this very restrictive assumption is abandoned, the rate of profits can fall (or rise) even if proportional wages remain constant. >Marx/Sraffa. Kurz I 165 Marx/Ricardo/Sraffa: In Sraffa's reading, Marx had developed his law as a critique of Ricardo's explanation of the falling rate of profits, incorporating major elements of Ricardo's in his own analysis. Thus Marx had argued that an accumulation process without technical change is bound up with a tendency of rising money wages and a falling rate of exploitation (i.e, rising proportional wages) - quite independently of rising costs of food production or the so-called law of population (see Marx [1867] 1954, 581—582).(1) Ricardo: According to Sraffa, Marx had incorporated also another element of Ricardo's doctrine in his own analysis: Ricardo's "machinery substitution argument" recurs in Marx's law of the falling rate of profits in terms of an "increasing organic composition of capital." Moreover, in Sraffa's understanding Marx had based his argument on the same "natural course" Scenario as Ricardo had: both had started with Kurz I 166 an analysis of the case of accumulation with given technical knowledge, where known but hitherto unused methods may be introduced in consequence of changes in the distributive variables and relative prices, but technical progress proper is set aside. >Rate of profits/Sraffa. 1. K. Marx. 1867. The Capital.The Process of Production of Capital. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ (21.11.2024) Kurz, Heinz; Salvadori, Neri 2015. Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). London, UK: Routledge. |
Marx I Karl Marx Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957 Kurz I Heinz D. Kurz Neri Salvadori Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). Routledge. London 2015 |
| Tax Incidence | Saez | Saez I 12 Tax Incidence/Saez/Zucman: The question of who pays the taxes collected by governments today is (...) what economists call, quite confusingly, “tax incidence.” For example, what would happen if the corporate tax rate were cut? In principle, many things could change: firms could boost shareholder income with higher dividend payments or share buybacks; they could increase the wages of their employees; they could slash the price of the products they sell; they could Saez I 13 expand investment in factories or in research and development. Saez I 99 Incidence is a key part of any tax policy analysis(...).Tracing the myriad ways in which changes in taxation affect economic behavior, the level of economic output, Saez I 100 and the distribution of income across the population is what tax incidence is all about. In one of the oldest and most famous analyses of tax incidence, Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations explained how taxes on wages could be shifted to capital. If farmers are at the subsistence level (they earn no more than what they need to barely survive), taxing their wage would make them starve. In that event a wage tax would be shifted away from poor peasants toward wealthier landowners, as those owners would be forced to increase pay to keep their workforce alive. Tax incidence boils down to simple empirical questions: How elastic are capital and labor? >Elasticity/Saez/Zucman. Saez I 103 (...) [the] evidence(1) does not prove that capital taxation has no economic cost. What it shows is that since saving and investment rates do not change much, capital taxes are borne by capital owners in the long run - not labor. Since the capital stock is no lower (and hence wages no lower) when capital taxes are high, the incidence of capital taxes falls squarely on capital. Because the rich derive most of their income from capital, while the working class and the middle class derive most of theirs from labor, capital taxes primarily hurt the rich - not the working class. >Tax Avoidance, >Tax Competition, >Tax Compliance, >Tax Evasion, >Tax Havens, >Tax Incidence, >Tax Loopholes, >Tax System, >Taxation. 1. Thomas Piketty and Gabriel Zucman. “Capital Is Back: Wealth-Income Ratios in Rich Countries 1700–2010.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 129, no. 3 (2014): 1255–1310. |
|
| Taxation | Friedman | Gaus I 212 Taxation/minimal welfare state/public goods/Friedman/Moon: (...) are typical welfare goods public goods (...)? To some degree, perhaps. If we all wanted to live in a society where no one suffered from destitution, and were willing to pay something to see that achieved, then we would all be better off if the government provided a safety net. Reasoning along these lines, Milton Friedman (1962(1):191) has argued for a minimal welfare state, in which a 'negative income tax' would be employed to provide a subsistence income to people without other means of support. The minimal welfare state would not, however, be an 'institutional welfare state', since its main concern would be to ensure that everyone had enough income to avoid destitution. Presumably, it would also provide other public goods such as public health and sanitation, for each of us is better off if others are inoculated against infectious diseases, or if the town disposes of every household's sewage and garbage in a sanitary manner. Vs: but many welfare programmes do not seem to provide public goods: the principal beneficiary of an old age pension is the pensioner, the principal beneficiary of a high school or college education is the student whose skills are improved and whose life is enriched, the principal beneficiary of open heart surgery is the patient whose life is saved, and so forth. >Welfare State/Political Philosophy, >Institutions/Barr, >Unemployment/Moon. 1. Friedman, Milton (1962) Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications Brocker I 408 Taxation/Friedman: Friedman's proposal is to cancel all individual social and distributional measures and replace them with a negative income tax. This saves a lot of bureaucracy and the idea of self-determination of individual lifestyles is given an economic basis. (1) 1. Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago 1962. Dt.: Milton Friedman, Kapitalismus und Freiheit, München 2004. Peter Spahn, „Milton Friedman, Kapitalismus und Freiheit“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 >Tax Avoidance, >Tax Competition, >Tax Compliance, >Tax Evasion, >Tax Havens, >Tax Incidence, >Tax Loopholes, >Tax System, >Optimal tax rate. |
Econ Fried I Milton Friedman The role of monetary policy 1968 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Wages | Ricardo | Kurz I 26 Wages/Ricardo/Kurz: Ricardo’s labour-based share concept(1) was subsequently adopted by Marx in terms of a given ‘rate of surplus value’, S/V [German Mehrwert], that is, the ratio between the portion of the net (labour) value added that goes to capital owners, or surplus value, S, and the portion that goes to workers, or variable capital, V. (…) Ricardo’s argument was not meant to be limited to the case of a given economy at a given time but was designed to cover in at least one important respect also the development of the economy over time. More specifically, Ricardo’s demonstration of the inverse relationship between the rate of profits and wages was seen to encompass the case in which the productivity of labour changes. It was on the basis of the new wage concept (and on the premise that the social capital consisted only of, or could be reduced to, wages) that Ricardo had felt he could assert what may be called his ‘fundamental proposition on distribution’: that the rate of profits depends on proportional wages, and on nothing else (see Kurz, 2006)(2). SraffaVsRicardo: While Ricardo (and Marx) had consistently assumed wages to be paid ante factum, that is, at the beginning of the (uniform) production period, and thus as belonging to the capital advanced in each industry, Sraffa, after some deliberation, decided to treat wages as paid post factum, that is, at the end of the production period and thus out of the product. He admitted that this was a hard choice because of the undeniable ever-present element of subsistence in wages, but compared with the alternatives at hand it was the least unsatisfactory one.(3) >Wages/Sraffa. 1. Ricardo, D. (1951–1973) The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo, 11 volumes, edited by Piero Sraffa with the collaboration of M.H. Dobb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). (In the text referred to as Works, volume number.) 2. Kurz, H.D. (2006) The agents of production are the commodities themselves. On the classical theory of production, distribution and value, Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 17, pp. 1–26. 2. Taken from the work Sraffa carried out in the period 1927–1931 (unpublished papers). Kurz, Heinz; Salvadori, Neri 2015. Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). London, UK: Routledge. |
EconRic I David Ricardo On the principles of political economy and taxation Indianapolis 2004 Kurz I Heinz D. Kurz Neri Salvadori Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). Routledge. London 2015 |
| Welfare State | Friedman | Gaus I 212 Welfare state/public goods/Friedman/Moon: (...) are typical welfare goods public goods (...)? To some degree, perhaps. If we all wanted to live in a society where no one suffered from destitution, and were willing to pay something to see that achieved, then we would all be better off if the government provided a safety net. Reasoning along these lines, Milton Friedman (1962(1): 191) has argued for a minimal welfare state, in which a 'negative income tax' would be employed to provide a subsistence income to people without other means of support. The minimal welfare state would not, however, be an 'institutional welfare state' , since its main concern would be to ensure that everyone had enough income to avoid destitution. Presumably, it would also provide other public goods such as public health and sanitation, for each of us is better off if others are inoculated against infectious diseases, or if the town disposes of every household's sewage and garbage in a sanitary manner. Vs: but many welfare programmes do not seem to provide public goods: the principal beneficiary of an old age pension is the pensioner, the principal beneficiary of a high school or college education is the student whose skills are improved and whose life is enriched, the principal beneficiary of open heart surgery is the patient whose life is saved, and so forth. >Welfare state/Political philosophy, >Unemployment/Moon. 1. Friedman, Milton (1962): Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Econ Fried I Milton Friedman The role of monetary policy 1968 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Welfare State | Hayek | Gaus I 214 Welfare state/social minimum/Hayek/Moon: Property rights: As Waldron (1993(1): ch. I and passim) argues, the only system of property rights that all have a reason to endorse would be one that ensured that no one need be deprived of essential resources, and the obvious way of achieving that would be to make property holdings subject to taxation, so that the state could provide essential goods and services, or at least a minimum income, when necessary.* >Property. Social minimum state/Moon: This line of argument supports what might be called a social minimum state, not necessarily an institutional welfare state. The core argument is that some fundamental human values - the idea of a meaningful life, personal autonomy, or life itself - can be realized (or at least guaranteed) only if there are government programmes providing enough income at least for subsistence. >Minimal state, >Social minimum. Welfare state/social minmum/Hayek: F. A. Hayek, for example, is renowned as a critic of the welfare state, but he accepts the idea of a social minimum, arguing that citizens may feel that there is 'a clear moral duty of all to assist, within the organized community, those who cannot help themselves' and so the society could provide 'a uniform minimum income... outside the market' to those who are indigent (1976(2): 87).** >Fundamental rights/Political philosophy. * See Lomasky (1987)(3) for a rights-based defence of a mmimal welfare state, which taxes people to provide for a minimum standard of living for all. ** Although generally critical of the welfare state, Hayek seems to allow for certain forms of public provision and compulsory insurance (1960(4):285-394). 1. Waldron, Jeremy (1993) Liberal Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge Umversity Press. 2. Hayek, Friedrich (1976). The Mirage of Social Justice. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 3. Lomasky, Loren (1987) Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community. New York: Oxford University Press. 4. Hayek, Friedrich (1960) The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago: Umversity of Chicago Press. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Hayek I Friedrich A. Hayek The Road to Serfdom: Text and Documents--The Definitive Edition (The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, Volume 2) Chicago 2007 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Anscombe, E. | Prior Vs Anscombe, E. | Prior I 127 PriorVsReid/VsAnscombe/VsFindlay: it is not easy to hold the following two sentences together: (1) That which X thinks of Y, plans with him, adores about him, always includes a Y just like an X. - (2) There are cases in which X thinks of Y (adores, etc.) and there is no Y at all. - At least it is difficult to reject the following three considerations in this context that merely seem to make them consistent: - a) Thinking of an unreal object is another way of thinking than thinking of a real object. - b) our thinking would not put us in relation to the object, but only to an "idea" of it. - c) there would be strong and weak kinds of reality. (> Subsistence). I 128 Thinking/Anscombe/Prior: could "thinking" not be replaced by any other (at least intentional) verb? - Object/Tradition/Anscombe: something cannot just be an object without being the object of something. I.e. "relational property" of being an object. I 129 Thinking/Prior: one might think that thinking of Y or Z are just different types (modifications) of the same activity. Not as if being father of Y and being father of X were "different ways of being father", but rather like thinking quickly and slowly. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Descartes, R. | Hintikka Vs Descartes, R. | II 113 Cogito/Descartes/Hintikka: the cogito is not a premise whose conclusion would be the sum. Solution/Hintikka: it is an act of thought which itself proves the subject its existence. analog: a speech act also proves its existence to the subject E.g. Mark Twain says: "I exist". HintikkaVsDescartes: Problem: 1) What kind of entity is the "res" which is to be proved by that? 2) In order to answer the question of what was actually proved, we need to clarify what status the entity has. E.g. Italo Calvino: Charlemagne asks a knight, why he has the visor closed. He responds: "Sir, I do not exist". II 114 Existence/Nonexistence/Subsistence/Hintikka: in this example, the knight does not exist in a certain way, but does in another, in the one in which he can be the hero of the story. Important argument: i.e. here the speech act is no conclusive evidence of his existence. ((s) Within the fiction). Cogito/Descartes/Hintikka: it would also have been wrong, had Descartes drawn the following conclusion: "Cogito, ergo Descartes exists". ((s) I.e. use the name instead of the "I" that is implied in "sum"). analogously: E.g. if someone told me on the street: "Mark Twain exists" it would be just as little proof for the existence of Mark Twain. It would have to be Mark Twain himself who carries out the speech act. Cogito/Knowledge/Hintikka: Problem: Descartes must know additionally that the thinker in question is this entity, or this type of entity. Existence/Identity/Entity/Identification/Quine/Hintikka: Quine: "No entity without identity": i.e. Descartes needs to know something else about himself in order to be able to say that he exists. Solution/Hintikka: we must distinguish two kinds of cross-world identification (cross identification). a) perspective (subject-centered) identification: it is not subjective, however, even if it is relative to a person. II 115 It uses only one coordinate system that is defined by reference to the user. It depends, however, on objective general principles. b) public (object-centered) idenification. Knowing Who/Seeing/Visual Perception/Perspective Identification/Hintikka: Def Seeing/Hintikka: seeing an object: persons and bodies that take the same space in John’s field of perception can be identified by him. He also knows there can be different objects at different times in that place. Important argument: John does not need to know who this person is! Knowing Who/Seeing Who/Hintikka: for this we need an additional identification that is based on public (object-centered) criteria. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Frege, G. | Russell Vs Frege, G. | Dummett I 59 RussellVs distinction sense / reference (meaning / reference) (RussellVsFrege) --- Stepanians I 44 Proof/Frege/Stepanians: Frege requests with the demand for completeness and rigor much stronger requirements for evidence than his mathematical contemporaries. Mathematics/VsFrege: mathematicians were more interested in truth than in the epistemological status. Intuitively plausible transitions were sufficient. --- Stepanians I 87 Explicit definition/Frege/Stepanians: must satisfy two conditions 1. Frege's adequacy criterion: Hume's principle must follow from it. The justification for this principle is that the basic laws of arithmetic have to be provable on the principle's basis. 2. the explicit definition must master the problem with recourse to concept scope, where the context definition fails: it must solve the Caesar-problem (see above). --- I 88 VsFrege: his explicit definition of the number concept does not solve the Caesar problem, but shifts it only to concept scope. Solution: would it only be if the concept scope excluded from the outset that Caesar is such a one. Solution/Frege: requires here simply that the knowledge of the concept scope excludes this. Value-over-time/terminology: = concept scope. I 88 Concept scope/Frege/StepaniansVsFrege/VsFrege/Stepanians: Frege's own view of concept scopes will prove to be contradictory (see Russell's paradox). I 91 Concept scope/Frege/Stepanians: was a newly introduced logical object by Frege for solving the Caesar-problem. They were not present yet in the concept script. Frege must justify them. Additional axiom: "Basic Law V": The scope of F = is the scope of G bik All Fs are G and vice versa. Russell's paradox/antinomy/RussellVsFrege/Stepanians: Basic Law V allows the transition from a general statement via terms to a statement about objects that fall under F - the scope of F. It is assumed that each term has a scope, even if it might be empty. I 92 RussellVsFrege/Stepanians: shows that not all definable terms in Frege's theory have a scope: Concept scope/Frege/RussellVsFrege: since concept scopes are objects the question has to be allowed whether a concept scope falls under the concept whose extent/scope it is. If so, it includes itself, otherwise not. Example: the scope of the term cat is itself not a cat. On the other hand: Example: the scope of the term non-cat contains very well itself, since it is not a cat. Contradiction: a concept scope which includes all concept scopes that do not contain themselves. If it contained itself, it should not to contain itself by definition, if it did not contain itself, it must include itself by definition. I 96 Object/concept/Frege/Stepanians: we discover (in a purely logical way) objects on concepts as their scopes. I 97 VsFrege/VsConcept scope/Stepanians: the idea of the concept scope is based on a linguistic deception (See Chapter 6 § 2). That was Frege's own diagnosis. I 114 Sentence/declarative sentence/statement/designating/VsFrege/Stepanians: one has often accused Frege that a declarative sentence does not want to denote anything but wants to claim (a truth value as an object) something. FregeVsVs/Stepanians: sentences as names for truth values are actually about subsets, whereas these subsets make a contribution to the truth value of the sentence structure (complete sentence). Sentence/assertion/declarative sentence/Frege: (later, function and concept, 22, footnote): the total sentence means F nothing. Basic Laws/terminology/Frege: (later): in the basic laws he differentiates terminologically and graphically between sentential "truth value names" that contribute towards the determination of the truth value and "concept type sets" that mean F nothing, but claim something. --- Horwich I 57 RussellVsFrege/Cartwright: Russell's analysis differs from Frege, by not using unsaturation. (1) 1. R. Cartwright, „A Neglected Theory of Truth“ , Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994 --- Newen I 61 Meaning determination/meaning/Russell/Newen: Two modes are possible: a) syncategorematic: according to the occurrence in a sentence. b) categorematic; independent from the occurrence in a sentence. Relational principle of meaning: applies to categorematic expressions: the meaning is the object (or the property). They are defined by acquaintance. --- I 62 RussellVsFrege: Thesis: simple expressions mean what they signify. Syncategorematic/meaning/Russell. E.g. "and", "or": indicating their meaning means indicating the meaning of sentences in which they occur. ((s)> Context, contextually). Contextually/Russell/Newen: syncategorematic expressions: their meaning is indicated by their meaning in schemes (sentence scheme). --- Quine II 103 Russell: classes, if there are any, must exist, properties at best must be in place (weaker). Quine: I think this is arbitrary. In Russell's analysis of the concept of meaning, its relative indifference reappears opposite the existence-term (subsistence): Frege: threefold distinction a) expression, b) what it means, c) that to what it (if at all) refers to. This is not natural for Russell. RussellVsFrege: ~ the whole distinction between mean and designate is wrong. The relationship between "C" and C remains completely mysterious, and where should we find the designating complex that supposedly refers to C? QuineVsRussell: Russell's position seems sometimes to come from a confusion of terms with their meanings, sometimes from a confusion of the expression with its mention. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Step I Markus Stepanians Gottlob Frege zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Nominalism | Russell Vs Nominalism | Quine II 102 RussellVsNominalism: Even if it was somehow possible to reinterpret astutely all speech about qualities by paraphrase in speech on similarity to individual things that exemplify these qualities, one universal would still be left: the relationship of similarity. Quine: here Russell even admits too much to the Platonists: the maintenance of the double-digit predicate "is similar" is no evidence that a corresponding abstract entity assumes the similarity relationship, as long as this relationship is not taken as the value of a bound variable. One lesson that can be drawn from all this is: ignoring the semantics of reference has results in two directions: a) some ontological conditions are hidden, b) a mirage of further ontological conditions is conjured. Questions with respect to what is there, are twofold for Russell. a) existence in the limited sense of this term b) otherwise questions of being in place ("subsistence") for Russell are less important than questions of existence. (This prejudice in favor of the existent would explain his indiscriminate use of existence-attribution in Principia Mathematica(1).) II 103 Of course, he stops this approach through the identification theory, yet he proceeds afterwards extremely wasteful with attributions of existence. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Various Authors | Prior Vs Various Authors | I 123 Intentionality/Findlay: relational property with only one side. ((s) Vs: absurd.) Of course, "thinking about T" is a property of the thinker. I 124 Touchstone for Intentionality: is the "built-in reference to what is not part of it and what does not need to exist anywhere". There is absolutely no intrinsic difference between thinking and speaking about what does and what does not exist. (>Anscombe pro: >Objects of Thougt/Anscombe). That would only be a Pickwickian distinction (>difference without a difference). FindlayVsRussell: VsTheory of Descriptions. PriorVsFindlay: that's not fair, because he just offered the solution. I 127 PriorVsReid/VsAnscombe/VsFindlay: it is not easy to hold the following two sentences together: (1) What X thinks of Y, plans to do with him, appreciates about him, always involves Y as much as X. (2) There are cases in which X thinks of Y (appreciates, etc.), and there is no Y at all. At least it's difficult in this case to dismiss the following three considerations that merely seem to make them consistent: a) Thinking about an unreal object is a different kind of thinking than that about a real object. b) our thinking would not put us in relation to an object, but only to an "idea" of it. c) there would be strong and weak types of reality. (>Subsistence). I 128 Thinking/Anscombe/Prior: could "think" not be replaced with any other (at least intentional) verb? Object/Tradition/Anscombe: something cannot just be an object without being object of something. I.e. "relational property" of being an object. Simons I 119 Identity/Simons: is transitive. Prior: this is questionable (the only one). (PriorVsTransitivity of identity). |
Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| |||