Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Allocation Cosmopolitanism Norgaard I 329
Allocation/Emissions/Individuals/Cosmopolitanism: [A] relatively recent development is the emergence of allocation principles which take the cosmopolitan approach even further by focusing on individuals rather than countries. Two recent proposals which look at inequality within countries (and thus implicitly at individuals) are
Norgaard I 330
the Greenhouse Development Rights framework (Baer et al. 2008(1), 2010(2)) and the proposal of Chakravarty et al. (2009(3)). The former allocates obligations on the basis of a combined indicator of responsibility and capacity, exempting both income and emissions below a threshold; the latter focuses only on emissions and would require high‐emitting individuals to reduce while low emitters are allowed to increase emissions. Both are thus compatible with the long‐standing recognition of the distinction between ‘luxury’ and ‘subsistence’ emissions (Agarwal and Narain 1991(4); Shue 1993(5)), but both still conclude that obligations, even if derived from looking at individuals, would still be incumbent on countries. (…) Paul Harris (2010)(6) develops the cosmopolitan focus on individuals in much greater detail, focusing at length on the wealth and emissions of the middle and wealthy classes in developing countries, and arguing for a more direct assessment of obligations on individuals. This approach is implicitly backed up by Simon Caney (2009)(7), who argues against collective notions of responsibility but includes capacity and recent (e.g. since 1990) historical emissions in his account of individually based obligations.


1. Baer, P. et al. 2008. The Greenhouse Development Rights Framework. 2nd edn., Heinrich Böll Stiftung, EcoEquity, Stockholm Environment Institute and Christian Aid. Available at (http://gdrights.org/wp‐content/uploads/2009/01/thegdrsframework.pdf) (Link does not work as of 14/04/19)
2. Bear, P. et al. 2010. Greenhouse development rights: A framework for climate protection that is ‘more fair’ than equal per capita emissions rights. Pp. 215–30 in S. M. Gardiner, S. Caney, D. Jamieson, and H. Shue (eds.), Climate Ethics: Essential Readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
3. Chakravarty, S., Chikkatur, A., de Coninck, H., Pacala, S., Socolow, R., and Tavoni, M. 2009. Sharing global CO2 emission reductions among one billion high emitters. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 106:11885–8.
4. Agarwal, A., and S. Narain, S. 1991. Global Warming in an Unequal World: A Case of Environmental Colonialism. New Delhi: Centre for Science and Environment.
5. Shue, H. 1993. Subsistence emissions and luxury emissions. Law and Policy 15: 39–59.
6. Harris, P. G. 2010. World Ethics and Climate Change: From International to Global Justice. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
7. Caney, S. 2009. Human rights, responsibilities and climate change. In C. R. Beitz and R. E. Goodin (eds.), Global Basic Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press.



Baer, Paul: “International Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.


Norgaard I
Richard Norgaard
John S. Dryzek
The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011
Bioethics Ecological Theories Norgaard I 344
Bioethics/Rights-Based Ethics:/Ecological Theories: (…) Vanderheiden (2006: 343)(1) notes that ‘neither spatial nor temporal distance between agents and their victims can excuse acts of intentional or predictable harm.’ A related interpretation is provided by Caney (2008: 538)(2), who argues that climate stabilization is necessary to secure and defend at least three kinds of fundamental human rights. In particular, Caney argues that climate change: 1. Violates people's right to subsistence by imposing risks of ‘widespread malnutrition’ that are well documented by the scientific literature.
2. Threatens people's capacity to ‘attain a decent standard of living’ (emphasis added), a point that resonates with the economic arguments advanced by Weitzman (2009)(3).
3. Poses unacceptable risks to human health due to a range of mechanisms that include heat stress and the increased incidence of tropical diseases.



1. Vanderheiden, S. 2006. Conservation, foresight, and the future generations problem. Inquiry 49: 337–52.
2. Caney, S. 2008. Human rights, climate change, and discounting. Environmental Politics 17: 536–55.
3. Weitzman, M. L. 2009. On modeling and interpreting the economics of catastrophic climate change. Review of Economics and Statistics 91: 1–19.


Howarth, Richard: “Intergenerational Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.


Norgaard I
Richard Norgaard
John S. Dryzek
The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011
Climate Costs Singer Norgaard I 326
Climate Costs/Shue/Singer: (…) there is a near consensus among the philosophers who have written on the topic that considerations of justice do in fact justify the obligation of rich and high‐emitting countries to reduce their emissions, pay for emissions reductions in poor countries, and aid poor countries in adapting to climate change. Both Henry Shue (1993(1), 1995(2)) and Peter Singer (2002)(3) (…) arguing that on all plausible moral accounts, one reaches this general interpretation of the obligations of the wealthy and the rights of the poor. The few scholarly efforts to rebut these arguments—not from philosophers—rely on a variety of counter‐strategies, arguing for example that if the rich have any obligations to the poor, preventing climate change is a very inefficient way to fulfill them (e.g. Beckerman and Pasek 2005(4); Lomborg 2006(5)) (…).
Norgaard I 331
A country‐based assessment can hardly lead to a conclusion other than that the rich countries still need to ‘go first,’ as they pledged in the UNFCCC (Brown et al. 2006)(6).
Norgaard I 326
Climate Costs/Nations/Individuals/Shue: (…) nation‐to‐nation obligations unjustly permit the poor in the North to have obligations to the non‐poor in the South (Posner and Sunstein 2008)(7).
Norgaard I 327
Some (Shue 1993(1); Neumayer 2000(8)) have defended broad ‘historical accountability’, by which nations as a whole have obligations proportional to their historical emissions of greenhouse gases. Others (Caney 2009(9); Baer et al. 2010(10); Harris 2010(11)) have argued that such collective, historical accounts are problematic (especially for emissions prior to the recognition of the risks of global warming) and that obligations should also or instead be International Justice based on ability to pay. These ‘ability to pay’ arguments also focus on individuals rather than countries, which is consistent with the fundamental principles of a cosmopolitan approach. >Cosmopolitanism.


1. Shue, H. 1993. Subsistence emissions and luxury emissions. Law and Policy 15: 39–59.
2. Shue; H. 1995. Ethics, the environment and the changing international order. International Affairs 71: 453–61.
3. Singer, P. 2002. One World: The Ethics of Globalization. New Haven: Yale University Press.
4. Beckermann, W., and J. Pasek. 2005. Justice, posterity, and the environment. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
5. Lomborg, B. (ed.) 2006. How to Spend $50 Billion to Make the World a Better Place. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
6. Brown, D. et al. 2006. White Paper on the Ethical Dimensions of Climate Change. Available at (http://www.psu.edu/dept/rockethics/climate/whitepaper/edcc‐whitepaper.pdf) (Link not available as of 15/04/19)
7. Posner, E. A., and Sunstein, C. R. 2008. Climate change justice. Georgetown Law Journal 96: 1565–612.
8. Neumayer, E. 2000. In defence of historical accountability for greenhouse gas emissions. Ecological Economics 33: 185–92.
9. Caney, S. 2009. Human rights, responsibilities and climate change. In C. R. Beitz and R. E. Goodin (eds.), Global Basic Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
10. Bear, P. et al. 2010. Greenhouse development rights: A framework for climate protection that is ‘more fair’ than equal per capita emissions rights. Pp. 215–30 in S. M. Gardiner, S. Caney, D. Jamieson, and H. Shue (eds.), Climate Ethics: Essential Readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
11. Harris, P. G. 2010. World Ethics and Climate Change: From International to Global Justice. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.



Baer, Paul: “International Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

SingerP I
Peter Singer
Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011

SingerP II
P. Singer
The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015


Norgaard I
Richard Norgaard
John S. Dryzek
The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011
Climate Costs Shue Norgaard I 326
Climate Costs/Shue/Singer: (…) there is a near consensus among the philosophers who have written on the topic that considerations of justice do in fact justify the obligation of rich and high‐emitting countries to reduce their emissions, pay for emissions reductions in poor countries, and aid poor countries in adapting to climate change. Both Henry Shue (1993(1), 1995(2)) and Peter Singer (2002)(3) (…) arguing that on all plausible moral accounts, one reaches this general interpretation of the obligations of the wealthy and the rights of the poor. The few scholarly efforts to rebut these arguments—not from philosophers—rely on a variety of counter‐strategies, arguing for example that if the rich have any obligations to the poor, preventing climate change is a very inefficient way to fulfill them (e.g. Beckerman and Pasek 2005(4); Lomborg 2006(5)) (…).
Norgaard I 331
A country‐based assessment can hardly lead to a conclusion other than that the rich countries still need to ‘go first,’ as they pledged in the UNFCCC (Brown et al. 2006)(6).
Norgaard I 326
Climate Costs/Nations/Individuals/Shue: (…) nation‐to‐nation obligations unjustly permit the poor in the North to have obligations to the non‐poor in the South (Posner and Sunstein 2008)(7).
Norgaard I 327
Some (Shue 1993 (1); Neumayer 2000 (8)) have defended broad ‘historical accountability’, by which nations as a whole have obligations proportional to their historical emissions of greenhouse gases. Others (Caney 2009(9); Baer et al. 2010(10); Harris 2010(11)) have argued that such collective, historical accounts are problematic (especially for emissions prior to the recognition of the risks of global warming) and that obligations should also or instead be International Justice based on ability to pay. These ‘ability to pay’ arguments also focus on individuals rather than countries, which is consistent with the fundamental principles of a cosmopolitan approach. >Cosmopolitanism.


1. Shue, H. 1993. Subsistence emissions and luxury emissions. Law and Policy 15: 39–59.
2. Shue; H. 1995. Ethics, the environment and the changing international order. International Affairs 71: 453–61.
3. Singer, P. 2002. One World: The Ethics of Globalization. New Haven: Yale University Press.
4. Beckermann, W., and J. Pasek. 2005. Justice, posterity, and the environment. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
5. Lomborg, B. (ed.) 2006. How to Spend $50 Billion to Make the World a Better Place. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
6. Brown, D. et al. 2006. White Paper on the Ethical Dimensions of Climate Change. Available at (http://www.psu.edu/dept/rockethics/climate/whitepaper/edcc‐whitepaper.pdf) (Link not available as of 15/04/19)
7. Posner, E. A., and Sunstein, C. R. 2008. Climate change justice. Georgetown Law Journal 96: 1565–612.
8. Neumayer, E. 2000. In defence of historical accountability for greenhouse gas emissions. Ecological Economics 33: 185–92.
9. Caney, S. 2009. Human rights, responsibilities and climate change. In C. R. Beitz and R. E. Goodin (eds.), Global Basic Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
10. Bear, P. et al. 2010. Greenhouse development rights: A framework for climate protection that is ‘more fair’ than equal per capita emissions rights. Pp. 215–30 in S. M. Gardiner, S. Caney, D. Jamieson, and H. Shue (eds.), Climate Ethics: Essential Readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
11. Harris, P. G. 2010. World Ethics and Climate Change: From International to Global Justice. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.



Baer, Paul: “International Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.


Norgaard I
Richard Norgaard
John S. Dryzek
The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011
Climate Targets Gardiner Norgaard I 327
Climate Targets/Rights/Gardiner/Caney: Stephen Gardiner (2006)(1) [is] arguing that the interests at risk from potentially catastrophic climate change vastly outweigh considerations of reduced economic growth. Others, notably Simon Caney (2005a(2), 2009(3)), have argued that the right to a stable climate should be considered a fundamental human right, because the basic interests of life, health, subsistence, and security of place, all of which are endangered by climate change, are the foundations of both moral and legal human rights. Neither Gardiner nor Caney endorse particular targets, but their arguments would seem to support the most stringent targets currently entertained in the policy debates (e.g. reduction of CO2 concentrations to 350 ppm, well below today's levels). Rights/Utilitarianism/VsGardiner/VsCaney: One counterargument is that loss of life is commonplace and should simply be treated as one more economic cost; otherwise resources will be wasted on climate mitigation that could save more lives through other means, such as the reduction of malaria (Schelling 1997(4); Lomborg 2006(5)). Yet it also seems wrong to say that we'll let millions of people die from
Norgaard I 328
pollution because we can spend part of the savings preventing harms to others more cheaply. There is, it seems, a fundamental tension between the utilitarian intuition that the sum of all suffering is what matters and the intuition about rights that what matters is precisely who is exposed to harm or risk and why (Baer and Sagar 2009(6)). >Utilitarianism. Climate Targets: A consensus has gradually emerged that we should aim to keep temperature increase below 2 °C above pre‐industrial; yet many of the least developed countries and small island states now argue that the objective should be 1.5 °C. However, the emissions reduction pledges made by various nations through June of 2010 seem to fall far short of meeting even a 2°C objective, suggesting that, whatever the rhetoric, national economic interests still take precedence over global justice concerns.



1. Gardiner, S. M. 2006. A core precautionary principle. Journal of Political Philosophy 14: 33–60.
2. Caney, S. 2005a. Cosmopolitan justice, responsibility and climate change. Leiden Journal of International Law 18: 747–75.
3. Caney, S. 2009. Human rights, responsibilities and climate change. In C. R. Beitz and R. E. Goodin (eds.), Global Basic Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4. Schelling, T. C. 1997. The cost of combating global warming: Facing the tradeoffs. Foreign Affairs 76: 8–14.
5. Lomborg, B. (ed.) 2006. How to Spend $50 Billion to Make the World a Better Place. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
6. Baer; P. and A. Sagar 2009. Ethics, rights and responsibilities. Pp. 262–9 in S. H. Schneider, A. Rosencranz, and M. D. Mastrandrea (eds.), Climate Change Science and Policy. Washington, DC: Island Press.


Baer, Paul: “International Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press..


Norgaard I
Richard Norgaard
John S. Dryzek
The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011
Climate Targets Caney Norgaard I 327
Climate Targets/Rights/Gardiner/Caney: Stephen Gardiner (2006)(1) [is] arguing that the interests at risk from potentially catastrophic climate change vastly outweigh considerations of reduced economic growth. Others, notably Simon Caney (2005a(2), 2009(3)), have argued that the right to a stable climate should be considered a fundamental human right, because the basic interests of life, health, subsistence, and security of place, all of which are endangered by climate change, are the foundations of both moral and legal human rights. Neither Gardiner nor Caney endorse particular targets, but their arguments would seem to support the most stringent targets currently entertained in the policy debates (e.g. reduction of CO2 concentrations to 350 ppm, well below today's levels). Rights/Utilitarianism/VsGardiner/VsCaney: One counterargument is that loss of life is commonplace and should simply be treated as one more economic cost; otherwise resources will be wasted on climate mitigation that could save more lives through other means, such as the reduction of malaria (Schelling 1997(4); Lomborg 2006(5)). Yet it also seems wrong to say that we'll let millions of people die from
Norgaard I 328
pollution because we can spend part of the savings preventing harms to others more cheaply. There is, it seems, a fundamental tension between the utilitarian intuition that the sum of all suffering is what matters and the intuition about rights that what matters is precisely who is exposed to harm or risk and why (Baer and Sagar 2009(6)). >Utilitarianism. Climate Targets: A consensus has gradually emerged that we should aim to keep temperature increase below 2 °C above pre‐industrial; yet many of the least developed countries and small island states now argue that the objective should be 1.5 °C. However, the emissions reduction pledges made by various nations through June of 2010 seem to fall far short of meeting even a 2°C objective, suggesting that, whatever the rhetoric, national economic interests still take precedence over global justice concerns.



1. Gardiner, S. M. 2006. A core precautionary principle. Journal of Political Philosophy 14: 33–60.
2. Caney, S. 2005a. Cosmopolitan justice, responsibility and climate change. Leiden Journal of International Law 18: 747–75.
3. Caney, S. 2009. Human rights, responsibilities and climate change. In C. R. Beitz and R. E. Goodin (eds.), Global Basic Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4. Schelling, T. C. 1997. The cost of combating global warming: Facing the tradeoffs. Foreign Affairs 76: 8–14.
5. Lomborg, B. (ed.) 2006. How to Spend $50 Billion to Make the World a Better Place. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
6. Baer; P. and A. Sagar 2009. Ethics, rights and responsibilities. Pp. 262–9 in S. H. Schneider, A. Rosencranz, and M. D. Mastrandrea (eds.), Climate Change Science and Policy. Washington, DC: Island Press.


Baer, Paul: “International Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.


Norgaard I
Richard Norgaard
John S. Dryzek
The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011
Cogito Hintikka II 113
Cogito/Descartes/Hintikka: the cogito is not a premise whose conclusion would be the sum. Solution/Hintikka: it is an act of thinking that proves the existence of the subject itself.
Analogously: a speech act also proves the existence of itself to the subject. Mark Twain says: "I exist".
HintikkaVsDescartes: Problem: 1. What kind of entity is this, which should prove "res" with it?
2. To answer the question, what has been proved at all, we need to clarify the status of the entity.
E.g. Italo Calvino: Charlemagne asks a knight why he has closed the visor. He answers; "Sir, I do not exist".
II 114
Existence/non-existence/subsistence/Hintikka: in this example, the knight does not exist in a certain way, but in another, namely, in which he can be the hero of history. N.B.: i.e. here the speech act is not a conclusive proof of its existence. ((s) Within fiction).
Cogito/Descartes/Hintikka: it would have been wrong, too, had Descartes concluded:
"Cogito, ergo Descartes exists". ((a) So for the "I", which is explicit in "sum", insert the name).
Analog: For example, if someone tells me in the street: "Mark Twain exists" that would be just as little evidence for the existence of Mark Twain. It would have to be him who performs the speech act.
Cogito/knowledge/Hintikka: Problem: Descartes must also know additionally that the questionable thinker is this entity, or that type of entity.
Existence/Identity/Entity/Identification/Quine/Hintikka: Quine: "No entity without identity": that is, Descartes needs to know something about himself to be able to say about himself that he exists.
Solution/Hintikka: we must distinguish two types of cross-world identification (cross-identification).
a) perspective (subject-centric) identification: this is not subjective, even if it is relative to a person.
II 115
It only uses one coordinate system defined by reference to the user. It itself depends on objective general principles. b) public (object-centered) identification.

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

Emissions Trading Singer I 225
Emissions trading/P. Singer: emissions trading is based on the simple economic principle that if you can buy something cheaper than you can make it yourself, it is better to buy it than to produce it. In this case, these are transferable rights to pollute the environment, which can be traded. They are calculated on the basis of an equal share per capita. For international trade, this means that cuts in carbon dioxide pollution are made at the lowest possible cost, thus causing the least damage to the global economy.
In addition, nations with a low level of pollution - usually poorer countries - will be encouraged to keep their emissions low, so that they will have more emission rights available to sell to rich countries. This would mean a transfer of resources from rich to poor countries - without altruism.
VsEmissions Trading: Problem:
1. Lack of verifiability.
2. Payments from richer to poorer countries only make sense if the money reduces poverty and does not disappear into the pockets of the elite, which often happens in dictatorships.
3. J. E. HansenVsEmissions Trading: Hansen proposes a carbon tax system instead. See HansenVsEmissions Trading.
---
I 228
Emissions trading/Henry Shue/Singer, P. (H. Shue, "Subsistence Emissions and Luxury Emissions", in: Law and Policy, 15 (1993), pp. 39-59.): Thesis: it is necessary to distinguish between emissions that contribute to livelihoods, such as methane emissions from rice cultivation areas and "luxury emissions" caused by urban car traffic.

SingerP I
Peter Singer
Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011

SingerP II
P. Singer
The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015

Personality Traits Evolutionary Psychology Corr I 265
Personality traits/evolutionary psychology: the argument that personality differences are selectively neutral is unable to account for the fact that our closest living relative, the chimpanzee, exhibits similar versions of the >Big Five personality traits (plus Dominance) (King and Figueredo 1997)(1). >Five-Factor Model, >Causality/psychology/evolutionary theories, >Heritability/Tooby/Cosmides.
Corr I 272
Personality traits/evolutionary psychology/Figueredo: we propose that sociality is the major cause of personality variation in humans. Specifically, adaptation to different micro-niches within the overall social ecology of the species is what leads to the differentiation of personality traits among individuals. Climactic and ecological fluctuations during repeated Ice Ages may have historically provided much of the initial impetus by exacerbating social competition, but the larger population densities occasioned by the Neolithic Revolution in human subsistence economies (e.g., farming, herding, industrial and now information-based) have largely taken their place in recent human history. >Ecology/evolutionary psychology, >Niches/evolutionary psychology, >Adaption/evolutionary psychology, >Selection/evolutionary psychology.

1. King, J. E. and Figueredo, A. J. 1997. The five-factor model plus dominance in chimpanzee personality, Journal of Research in Personality 31: 257–71


Aurelio José Figueredo, Paul Gladden, Geneva Vásquez, Pedro Sofio, Abril Wolf and Daniel Nelson Jones, “Evolutionary theories of personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Anscombe, E. Prior Vs Anscombe, E. Prior I 127
PriorVsReid/VsAnscombe/VsFindlay: it is not easy to hold the following two sentences together: (1) That which X thinks of Y, plans with him, adores about him, always includes a Y just like an X. - (2) There are cases in which X thinks of Y (adores, etc.) and there is no Y at all. - At least it is difficult to reject the following three considerations in this context that merely seem to make them consistent: - a) Thinking of an unreal object is another way of thinking than thinking of a real object. - b) our thinking would not put us in relation to the object, but only to an "idea" of it. - c) there would be strong and weak kinds of reality. (> Subsistence).
I 128
Thinking/Anscombe/Prior: could "thinking" not be replaced by any other (at least intentional) verb? - Object/Tradition/Anscombe: something cannot just be an object without being the object of something. I.e. "relational property" of being an object. I 129 Thinking/Prior: one might think that thinking of Y or Z are just different types (modifications) of the same activity. Not as if being father of Y and being father of X were "different ways of being father", but rather like thinking quickly and slowly.

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Descartes, R. Hintikka Vs Descartes, R. II 113
Cogito/Descartes/Hintikka: the cogito is not a premise whose conclusion would be the sum. Solution/Hintikka: it is an act of thought which itself proves the subject its existence. analog: a speech act also proves its existence to the subject E.g. Mark Twain says: "I exist". HintikkaVsDescartes: Problem: 1) What kind of entity is the "res" which is to be proved by that? 2) In order to answer the question of what was actually proved, we need to clarify what status the entity has. E.g. Italo Calvino: Charlemagne asks a knight, why he has the visor closed. He responds: "Sir, I do not exist".
II 114
Existence/Nonexistence/Subsistence/Hintikka: in this example, the knight does not exist in a certain way, but does in another, in the one in which he can be the hero of the story. Important argument: i.e. here the speech act is no conclusive evidence of his existence. ((s) Within the fiction). Cogito/Descartes/Hintikka: it would also have been wrong, had Descartes drawn the following conclusion: "Cogito, ergo Descartes exists". ((s) I.e. use the name instead of the "I" that is implied in "sum"). analogously: E.g. if someone told me on the street: "Mark Twain exists" it would be just as little proof for the existence of Mark Twain. It would have to be Mark Twain himself who carries out the speech act. Cogito/Knowledge/Hintikka: Problem: Descartes must know additionally that the thinker in question is this entity, or this type of entity. Existence/Identity/Entity/Identification/Quine/Hintikka: Quine: "No entity without identity": i.e. Descartes needs to know something else about himself in order to be able to say that he exists. Solution/Hintikka: we must distinguish two kinds of cross-world identification (cross identification). a) perspective (subject-centered) identification: it is not subjective, however, even if it is relative to a person.
II 115
It uses only one coordinate system that is defined by reference to the user. It depends, however, on objective general principles. b) public (object-centered) idenification. Knowing Who/Seeing/Visual Perception/Perspective Identification/Hintikka: Def Seeing/Hintikka: seeing an object: persons and bodies that take the same space in John’s field of perception can be identified by him. He also knows there can be different objects at different times in that place. Important argument: John does not need to know who this person is! Knowing Who/Seeing Who/Hintikka: for this we need an additional identification that is based on public (object-centered) criteria.

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Frege, G. Russell Vs Frege, G. Dummett I 59
RussellVs distinction sense / reference (meaning / reference) (RussellVsFrege) ---
Stepanians I 44
Proof/Frege/Stepanians: Frege requests with the demand for completeness and rigor much stronger requirements for evidence than his mathematical contemporaries. Mathematics/VsFrege: mathematicians were more interested in truth than in the epistemological status. Intuitively plausible transitions were sufficient.
---
Stepanians I 87
Explicit definition/Frege/Stepanians: must satisfy two conditions 1. Frege's adequacy criterion: Hume's principle must follow from it. The justification for this principle is that the basic laws of arithmetic have to be provable on the principle's basis.
2. the explicit definition must master the problem with recourse to concept scope, where the context definition fails: it must solve the Caesar-problem (see above).
---
I 88
VsFrege: his explicit definition of the number concept does not solve the Caesar problem, but shifts it only to concept scope. Solution: would it only be if the concept scope excluded from the outset that Caesar is such a one.
Solution/Frege: requires here simply that the knowledge of the concept scope excludes this.
Value-over-time/terminology: = concept scope.
I 88
Concept scope/Frege/StepaniansVsFrege/VsFrege/Stepanians: Frege's own view of concept scopes will prove to be contradictory (see Russell's paradox).
I 91
Concept scope/Frege/Stepanians: was a newly introduced logical object by Frege for solving the Caesar-problem. They were not present yet in the concept script. Frege must justify them. Additional axiom: "Basic Law V":
The scope of F = is the scope of G
bik
All Fs are G and vice versa.
Russell's paradox/antinomy/RussellVsFrege/Stepanians: Basic Law V allows the transition from a general statement via terms to a statement about objects that fall under F - the scope of F.
It is assumed that each term has a scope, even if it might be empty.
I 92
RussellVsFrege/Stepanians: shows that not all definable terms in Frege's theory have a scope: Concept scope/Frege/RussellVsFrege: since concept scopes are objects the question has to be allowed whether a concept scope falls under the concept whose extent/scope it is.
If so, it includes itself, otherwise not.
Example: the scope of the term cat is itself not a cat.
On the other hand:
Example: the scope of the term non-cat contains very well itself, since it is not a cat.
Contradiction: a concept scope which includes all concept scopes that do not contain themselves. If it contained itself, it should not to contain itself by definition, if it did not contain itself, it must include itself by definition.
I 96
Object/concept/Frege/Stepanians: we discover (in a purely logical way) objects on concepts as their scopes.
I 97
VsFrege/VsConcept scope/Stepanians: the idea of the concept scope is based on a linguistic deception (See Chapter 6 § 2). That was Frege's own diagnosis.
I 114
Sentence/declarative sentence/statement/designating/VsFrege/Stepanians: one has often accused Frege that a declarative sentence does not want to denote anything but wants to claim (a truth value as an object) something. FregeVsVs/Stepanians: sentences as names for truth values are actually about subsets, whereas these subsets make a contribution to the truth value of the sentence structure (complete sentence).
Sentence/assertion/declarative sentence/Frege: (later, function and concept, 22, footnote): the total sentence means F nothing.
Basic Laws/terminology/Frege: (later): in the basic laws he differentiates terminologically and graphically between sentential "truth value names" that contribute towards the determination of the truth value and "concept type sets" that mean F nothing, but claim something.
---
Horwich I 57
RussellVsFrege/Cartwright: Russell's analysis differs from Frege, by not using unsaturation. (1)
1. R. Cartwright, „A Neglected Theory of Truth“ , Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994
---
Newen I 61
Meaning determination/meaning/Russell/Newen: Two modes are possible: a) syncategorematic: according to the occurrence in a sentence.
b) categorematic; independent from the occurrence in a sentence.
Relational principle of meaning: applies to categorematic expressions: the meaning is the object (or the property). They are defined by acquaintance.
---
I 62
RussellVsFrege: Thesis: simple expressions mean what they signify. Syncategorematic/meaning/Russell. E.g. "and", "or": indicating their meaning means indicating the meaning of sentences in which they occur. ((s)> Context, contextually).
Contextually/Russell/Newen: syncategorematic expressions: their meaning is indicated by their meaning in schemes (sentence scheme).
---
Quine II 103
Russell: classes, if there are any, must exist, properties at best must be in place (weaker). Quine: I think this is arbitrary. In Russell's analysis of the concept of meaning, its relative indifference reappears opposite the existence-term (subsistence): Frege: threefold distinction
a) expression,
b) what it means,
c) that to what it (if at all) refers to.
This is not natural for Russell.
RussellVsFrege: ~ the whole distinction between mean and designate is wrong. The relationship between "C" and C remains completely mysterious, and where should we find the designating complex that supposedly refers to C?
QuineVsRussell: Russell's position seems sometimes to come from a confusion of terms with their meanings, sometimes from a confusion of the expression with its mention.

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Step I
Markus Stepanians
Gottlob Frege zur Einführung Hamburg 2001

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Nominalism Russell Vs Nominalism Quine II 102
RussellVsNominalism: Even if it was somehow possible to reinterpret astutely all speech about qualities by paraphrase in speech on similarity to individual things that exemplify these qualities, one universal would still be left: the relationship of similarity. Quine: here Russell even admits too much to the Platonists: the maintenance of the double-digit predicate "is similar" is no evidence that a corresponding abstract entity assumes the similarity relationship, as long as this relationship is not taken as the value of a bound variable.
One lesson that can be drawn from all this is: ignoring the semantics of reference has results in two directions:
a) some ontological conditions are hidden,
b) a mirage of further ontological conditions is conjured.
Questions with respect to what is there, are twofold for Russell.
a) existence in the limited sense of this term
b) otherwise questions of being in place ("subsistence") for Russell are less important than questions of existence. (This prejudice in favor of the existent would explain his indiscriminate use of existence-attribution in Principia Mathematica.)
---
II 103
Of course, he stops this approach through the identification theory, yet he proceeds afterwards extremely wasteful with attributions of existence.

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Various Authors Prior Vs Various Authors I 123
Intentionality/Findlay: relational property with only one side. ((s) Vs: absurd.) Of course, "thinking about T" is a property of the thinker.
I 124
Touchstone for Intentionality: is the "built-in reference to what is not part of it and what does not need to exist anywhere". There is absolutely no intrinsic difference between thinking and speaking about what does and what does not exist. (>Anscombe pro: >Objects of Thougt/Anscombe).
That would only be a Pickwickian distinction (>difference without a difference).
FindlayVsRussell: VsTheory of Descriptions.
PriorVsFindlay: that's not fair, because he just offered the solution.
I 127
PriorVsReid/VsAnscombe/VsFindlay: it is not easy to hold the following two sentences together: (1) What X thinks of Y, plans to do with him, appreciates about him, always involves Y as much as X.
(2) There are cases in which X thinks of Y (appreciates, etc.), and there is no Y at all.
At least it's difficult in this case to dismiss the following three considerations that merely seem to make them consistent:
a) Thinking about an unreal object is a different kind of thinking than that about a real object.
b) our thinking would not put us in relation to an object, but only to an "idea" of it.
c) there would be strong and weak types of reality. (>Subsistence).
I 128
Thinking/Anscombe/Prior: could "think" not be replaced with any other (at least intentional) verb? Object/Tradition/Anscombe: something cannot just be an object without being object of something. I.e. "relational property" of being an object.

Simons I 119
Identity/Simons: is transitive. Prior: this is questionable (the only one). (PriorVsTransitivity of identity).

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987