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The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Laws | Barrow | I 54f Laws/Natural Laws/Barrow: there is no system of mechanical rules or laws that can be verified other than statistically. - There are always uncertainties, which can be reduced only by repetition. >Repetition, >Laws of nature, >Experiments, >Verification, >Knowledge, >Ignorance. I 55 A statistical law can never be falsified because the result of observations in the future may always be different. >Falsification, >Rules, cf. >Rule following. I 186 Universal Law/Laws/Theory of everything/TOE/Great Unifying theory/GUT/Universality/Eugene Wigner: if the universal law of nature should be discovered, invariance principles would only be mathematical transformations that leave the law invariant. >Theory of Everything, >Invariants. I 187 Relativity/Barrow: when we say that the natural laws match that does not mean that different observers will measure the same quantities. >Observation, >Relativity, >Measurement, >Coordinate systems, >Quantities/Physics. |
B I John D. Barrow Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996 B II John D. Barrow The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988 German Edition: Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993 B III John D. Barrow Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001 |
| Necessity | Genz | II 59 Contingent/necessary/understanding/Genz: contingent: the special elliptical shape of the earth's orbit is contingent and necessary. Necessary: it is necessary that planetary orbits are elliptical. Understanding: the understanding of this necessity is deeper understanding. >Understanding, >Cognition. II 60 Natural Laws/Genz: natural laws are necessary characteristics of systems, but this is tautological. >Systems, >Natural laws. Are the laws of nature themselves necessary or contingent? Solution/Genz: there is a hierarchy of natural laws. World Formula/contingent/Genz: if there were a world formula, it would not be necessary itself, because other worlds are possible. Nevertheless, it could be distinguished by properties that other formulas do not possess. Cf. >Theory of Everything, >Contingency. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Prediction | Kauffman | I 32 Explanation/forecasts/theory/Kauffman: Difference: a tide table predicts events, but does not explain them. >Explanation, >Causal explanation, >Levels/order. Newton's theory predicts and explains events. Darwin: in the opinion of many, his theory has little predictive value. GUT/Great Unifying Theory: our final theory of physics should provide explanations, but also no predictions. >Great Unifying Theory, >Theory of everything. |
Kau II Stuart Kauffman At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity New York 1995 Kauffman I St. Kauffman At Home in the Universe, New York 1995 German Edition: Der Öltropfen im Wasser. Chaos, Komplexität, Selbstorganisation in Natur und Gesellschaft München 1998 |
| Symmetries | Barrow | I 89 Symmetry/Barrow: A "TEO": "Theory of everything" searches for the all-embracing symmetry. The computer image is completely different, it neither refers to symmetry as the primary assumption, nor does it make the assumption of continuity, but on the contrary: One gives a discontinuous structure to the world with the bits. Discontinuous worlds are not only more complicated than continuous worlds, they are even infinitely more complicated. (Number of transformations). >Theory of Everything, >Analog/digital, >Complexity, >Simplicity. I 309f Symmetry/Barrow: nature uses it to make natural laws independent of motion and shape of objects and observation. >Conservatrion laws. Two approaches: a) totalitarian: what is not forbidden by the demand for symmetry must be a necessary condition of natural laws b) liberal: everything is forbidden that is not necessary to maintain symmetry. I 345 Topology influences the role that symmetry can play in nature. I 412 Symmetry/Reversibility/Arithmetic/Barrow: in arithmetics there is certainly no clear reversibility - e.g. the sum 2+2=4 has no clear inverse. The sum can be decomposed in several ways, but there is only one sum. Edward Fredkin: a logical circuit is possible whose operation is reversible, and which in principle can convey information without entropy gain and generation of waste heat. Fredkin-Gate: three inputs and three outputs, the left one remains unchanged, the other two can cross, depending on whether the value of the first one is 1 or 0. This circuit does not convey any information and is its own inverse. |
B I John D. Barrow Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996 B II John D. Barrow The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988 German Edition: Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993 B III John D. Barrow Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001 |
| Theories | Barrow | I 285ff Gauge Theories/Barrow: modern theories of elementary particles and their interaction. The first gauge theory was Maxwell's theory of electromagnetism. Such theories are entirely based on symmetries. - The descriptions of gravitation, electromagnetism, strong and weak nuclear force are all gauge theories. >Symmetries. The new additional symmetries are called inner symmetries. They correspond to invariants in renaming particle identity. >Invariants. For example, when the identity of all protons in the world is swapped with that of neutrons. The gauge age systematically reduced the laws of the microworld to symmetries. - We are not dependent on observation then. >Proofs, >Provability, >Observation, >Unobservables. Gauge symmetries can also be the key to generating new laws of nature. They describe what kind of particles is allowed, but not how many variants each allowed particle has. It tells us that certain quantities are proportional to others, but it does not determine the values of the proportionality factors. Therefore, gauge theories are not the ultimate descriptions of nature. >Proportions, >Objectivity, cf. >Theory of Everything. I 290 The solutions of symmetric equations do not need to have symmetry! It follows that the true symmetries are hidden, they determine the laws, not their consequences. When a calibration theory is broken in a certain way, the carrier particle necessary to mediate the local calibration invariance assumes a mass. This is probably the origin of the mass. Some calibration theories are not broken (gravitation, electrodynamics) Their carrier particles, graviton and photon, are massless. >Symmetry breaking. |
B I John D. Barrow Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996 B II John D. Barrow The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988 German Edition: Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993 B III John D. Barrow Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001 |
| Unity | Feynman | I 116 Unification/Theory of Everything/TOE/Feynman: If one day we find a "universal equation", one of its roots could be this number 1/4,170000000000000.... If we compare the time required by light to travel through a proton to the age of the universe, the answer is 1042. Thus it has the same number of zeros! So it was suggested that the gravitational constant is connected to the age of the world. But if it is connected, it would have to change over time! Vs: if that were the case, the world would have been 100° hotter at the time when life on it emerged, because it would have been closer to the sun. Life could not have developed. >Unification, >Life/Richard Dawkins, >Life/Stuart Kauffman, >Life/Ernst Mayr, >Life/Jacques Monod, cf. >Evolution, >Theory of Everything. |
Feynman I Richard Feynman The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963 German Edition: Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001 Feynman II R. Feynman The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA/London 1967 German Edition: Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993 |
| Unity | Putnam | II 46f Unit/theory of everything/Putnam: a theory of the unity of all science is not definable. >Theory of Everything, cf. >Exterior/Interior. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Various Authors | Deutsch Vs Various Authors | DeutschVsinduction. I 36 Deutsch: induction needs no understanding, you could just explore all the character strings sequentially and randomly find a proper proof. ((s) but not randomly recognize it as correct! In addition, the evidence would not just happen to be right.) Deutsch: Hilbert’s rules could tell us almost nothing about reality. They would all be predicted, but not explained. Just like the "theory of everything". (DeutschVsTOE) I 220 Hilbert: "On the Infinite": scoffed at the idea that the demand for a "finite number of steps" was essential. DeutschVsHilbert: he was wrong. I 236 What is a "step" and what is "finite"? |
Deutsch I D. Deutsch Fabric of Reality, Harmondsworth 1997 German Edition: Die Physik der Welterkenntnis München 2000 |
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