Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Animals | Dennett | II 26 Conscious Mind/Animal/Dennett: We will never know where to draw the line, where animals have no consciousness: trouts, rats? But this is just another aspect of the inevitable limitation of our knowledge. Such facts are in principle beyond our knowledge. >Thought and Language. II 59 Thinking/Animal/Dennett: Animals do have certain special "concepts": because they have their special methods to distinguish things. It does not require an English sentence to allocate contents to animals. >Animal language, >Thinking, >Thoughts. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Content | Dretske | I 218 Content/Thinking/Animal/Dretske: What a living thing "thinks" (the content) can be causally quite irrelevant. - E.g. bimetallic strip, it is the degree of curvature [that has a consequence], not what the curvature states. >Causal theory of knowledge, >Thinking, >Animals, >Animal language, >Language and thought, >Propositional content. I Fred Dretske Minimale Rationalität in D. Perler/M. Wild (Hg.)Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Dretske I Fred Dretske "Minimal Rationality", in: S. L. Hurley and M. Nudds (Eds.) Rational Animals?, Oxford 2005 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dretske II F. Dretske Naturalizing the Mind Cambridge 1997 |
| Intentionality | Proust | I 233 Animal/Mind/Intentionality/Premack/Woodruff/Proust: Premack/Woodruff's famous studies of "Theory of the Mind" in animals, "beliefs and desires", etc. Theory of the Mind, >Premack, >Woodruff, >Beliefs, >Thinking, >Thinking without language, >Desires. Proust: if one speaks of a theory of the mind, one should distinguish it from a social one not from a psychological competence in the strict sense by which social animals try to influence each other. Premack: an animal can deliberately act on what another is doing (social) or thinks (then also psychologically). >Intentions. "Spoilsport version": the explanation of behavior: not intention but only established correlation is intended to explain the behavior of an animal. I 234 Then the psychological side can be dispensed with. Speechless animals simply establish a correlation. Cf. >Animals, >Animal language, >Thinking/animal. DennettVs: intentional attitude for explanation. >Correlation, >Animals/Dennett, >Intentional stance. I 234 Intentionality/Dennett: Levels: 1. Desires and beliefs can be attributed. 2. Beliefs and desires about beliefs and desires 3. Beliefs and desires about beliefs and desires of the second level, etc. >Levels/order, >Description levels. I 235 ProustVsDennett: opens the door for the human to apply his psychological concepts to apparently concept-less processes: cars, dogs, cats. It is slightly different with primates. >Concepts, >Language and thinking, >Thinking without language. |
Proust I Joelle Proust "L’animal intentionnel", in: Terrain 34, Les animaux, pensent-ils?, Paris: Ministère de la Culture/Editions de la maison des Sciences de l’Homme 2000, pp. 23-36 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Learning | Dretske | I 220 Learning/Behavior/Animal/Consciousness/Dretske: E.g. birds avoid certain butterflies that make them vomit. I 221 Now there are non-toxic butterflies that mimic the color of these poisonous. Now we can ask: why did the bird not eat it? We know why but we have to choose our words carefully: because he does not want to get sick again, but what he saw was not a disgusting insect. No recognition has taken place. The bird thinks (wrongly) that the insect tastes bad. The thought directs his behavior. Similar causal behavior as with the thermostat and the plant. So there is something inside the bird, which means (like the bimetallic strip in the thermostat) that an m-kind insect is present, and a switch is actuated. I 222 Unlike the thermostat and the plant: however, the representation for the behavior is directly relevant to the bird. >Representation/Dretske. Purpose: Is the behavior of the bird purposeful? Is the bird thinking of something? >Purposes. The meaning of the internal element is genuinely explanatory. ((s) but for us, not for the bird). Thinking/Animal/Dretske: for me this sounds sufficiently of thoughts, in order not to have to bargain what is still missing. >Animals, >Meaning/Dretske, >Thermostats. I Fred Dretske Minimale Rationalität in D.Perler/M. Wild (Hg.)Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Dretske I Fred Dretske "Minimal Rationality", in: S. L. Hurley and M. Nudds (Eds.) Rational Animals?, Oxford 2005 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dretske II F. Dretske Naturalizing the Mind Cambridge 1997 |
| Purposes | Papineau | I 246 Purpose/means/thinking/animal/evolution/Fodor/Papineau: newer direction: Fodor: the adoption of purpose-built modules selected for certain tasks. >J. Fodor, >Language of thought. Problem: this bypasses the actual thinking, especially the consideration of the means. >Thinking, >Animal language. Papineau: nevertheless, pro module. But as a later addition in evolution, for the coordination of perception and action. I 247 Purpose-Means-Thinking: is a very special mechanism, not a "universal pocket knife". >Rationality/Papineau. I 254 Thinking/Knowledge/Animal/Papineau: Levels: Purpose-Means-Thinking/Papineau: Level 0: "Monomats": do V Level 1: "Opportunists": If B, do V I 248 Level 2: "people in need": If B and T, do V Level 3: "Voter": If B1 and T1, do V1, IF T1 is the dominant need A comparative mechanism is needed here. Level 4: "Learners": AFTER experience has shown that B1, T1, and V1 result in a reward, then ... (like 3). Level 0 - 4 apply to simple living beings. Nowhere is general information of the form "all A's or B's" or generic, causal information "A's cause B's". I 255 Or even conditionals about present circumstances, "If A occurs, B will also occur." I 259 Purpose-Means-Thinking/Papineau: requires explicit representation of general information so that it can be processed to provide new items of general information. Thesis: this is a biological adaptation that specifically applies to human beings. Vs: 1. Purpose-means-thinking is too simple, and therefore widespread in the animal kingdom. 2. Purpose-means-thinking is too difficult and therefore not an essential component... I 261 ... of our evolutionary heritage. Then the purpose-means-thinking is a by-product. Papineau: that does not mean that they cannot take over any function. I 276 Purpose-means-thinking/Papineau: must also use non-egocentric causal facts. (> Map, Map-Example). I 273 Cognition/space/spatial orientation/content/animal/Papineau: many birds and insects do not have egocentric maps of their environments. Nevertheless, this is not necessary purpose-means-thinking. It depends on how they use these maps! >Map-example. For example, they might just simply draw a straight line from their respective position to the destination, which would be no purpose-means-thinking. For example, it would be purpose-means-thinking if they were to use cognition to imagine a continuous path, which avoids all obstacles, from their initial position within the non-egocentric map, and then plan on taking the path. This would be a combination of causal individual information. |
Papineau I David Papineau "The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Papineau II David Papineau The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Papineau III D. Papineau Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004 |
| Rationality | Papineau | I 246 Purpose/means/thinking/animal/evolution/Fodor/Papineau: newer direction: Fodor: the adoption of purpose-built modules selected for certain tasks. Problem: this bypasses the actual thinking, especially the consideration of the means. Papineau: nevertheless, per modules, Papineau per Fodor. >J. Fodor, >Language of thought. But as a later addition in evolution, for the coordination of perception and action. I 247 Purpose-Means-Thinking: is a very special mechanism, not a "universal pocket knife". Purpose-Means-thinking/Papineau: Level 0: "Monomats": do V Level 1: "Opportunists": If B, do V I 248 Level 2: "people in need": If B and T, do V I 250 Level 3: "Voter": If B1 and T1, do V1, IF T1 is the dominant need. A comparative mechanism is needed here. Level 4: "Learners": AFTER experience has shown that B1, T1, and V1 result in a reward, then ... (like 3). >Purposes/Papineau, >Learning, >Learning/Papineau. |
Papineau I David Papineau "The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Papineau II David Papineau The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Papineau III D. Papineau Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004 |
| Thinking | Dennett | II 58 Thinking/Animal/Dennett: Can dogs think? Problem: An idea must be composed of certain concepts. Question of the description or formulation: E.g. bowl with meat, bucket with feed, "the delicious stuff that tastes so and so" ... Translation: Could we, for example, just express the exact thought the dog thinks in English? If not, dogs can either not think at all or their thoughts cannot be expressed, and thus lie beyond our horizon. II 157 Thinking/Speech/Dennett: All in all, these considerations suggest that our way of thinking had to wait for speech to develop. Speech, in turn, had to wait for keeping of secrets to develop, and that in turn required the development of a certain complexity of the environment. Cf. >Speaking. II 202 DennettVsRyle: Notorious are Ryle's assertions that thinking could only take place in the public world and would not need to occur in a personal place. II 190 Speech/Thinking/Dennett: No thinking without speech - (Thinking is not the same as consciousness. E.g. A dog has no concept of cat as an animal). >Thinking without language. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Thoughts | Malcolm | I 127 Thought/thinking/animal/language//DavidsonVsMalcolm: his concept of "thought" only covers the higher level of thinking - I cover all propositional positions with that - Malcolm: E.g. the dog believes de re of the cat that she climbed the oak but not de dicto. >Animal language, >Thinking, >de re, >de dicto. Malcom: Thesis: belief de dicto, but not de re requires language - a) thinking (belief): the dog is aware that p - b) have thoughts: the creature is aware that it is aware that p - DavidsonVsMalcolm: even to think one must have a concept of a thought - so language is required. >Language and thinking, >Thinking without language. |
Malcolm I Norman Malcolm "Thoughtless Brutes" in: The Nature of Mind, D. M. Rosenthal (Ed), Oxford 1991, pp. 445-461 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Malcolm II N. Malcom Problems of Mind: Descartes to Wittgenstein (Harper Essays in Philosophy) 1971 |
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