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The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Homophony | Kripke | III 338 Homophone Truth Theory: "snow is white" is true iff snow is white: the metalanguage contains the object language. >Object language, >Meta language. Alternative: an alternative is the canonical translation of meta language to object language. K ripke: in general we let the truth theory itself determine the translation of the object language into the meta language (but not always: more than one formula f can fulfill all criteria). III 338 Homophony/homophone truth theory/Kripke: homophony occurs when the metalanguage contains the object language ("snow is white"/snow is white). >Convention T, >Truth value. III 344 The truth theories of sections 1 and 2 are non-homophone. Section 5: is homophone. III 346 Homophone truth theory: the homophone truth theory is a theory that provides the consequences of the form T(f) biconditional f. Non-homophone truth theory: with a non-homophone truth there we may request an f in the metalanguage at most for each f. This is often more useful than a homophone but it is only useful when the object language is already understood. The non-homophone theory is sufficient for someone’s intuition who does not have the concept yet, but already understands what the truth is in L0. He/she also needs to know the concept of chaining and the referential quantification about expressions. Then he/she can give the truth conditions of the poorly understood language in the language he/she understands. E.g. a Frenchman can give French truth conditions for German that he does not understand well. >Truth conditions. III 358 Homophony: homophony can be made quite mechanically from a non-homophone truth theory. 1) The metalanguage is expanded so that it contains the object language. 2) All findings of the form f biconditional f are added to the old axioms, while f is from the object language and f is its translation into the metalanguage - then, since T(f) biconditional f followed from the old axioms, it follows also from the new ones - that violates Davidson’s claim of the finite axiomatization of truth theory! There are now infinitely many axioms of the form f biconditional f. But there is only a finite number that include T - this excludes a trivial truth theory. III 357 Homophone Truth Theory/Kripke: the homophone truth theory does not provide T(f) biconditional f alone. ((s) The truth of the representing is equivalent to the represented). (DavidsonVs) - ((s) The representing can be a very different chain of characters.) E.g. Kripke: not T((x1)(x1 bold) biconditional (x1)(x1 bold), but T((x1)(x1 bold) biconditional there is a sequence s such that each sequence s that differs from s at most in the first position, has a bold first element. Problem: how do you decide which sentences show the correct structure? F is not determined here - it differs in any case in the structure and ontology of f. The truth theory does not uncover the structure. >Truth theories. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Nominalism | Searle | V 162 Nominalism/Searle: correct: the existence of particular entities of facts in the world and the existence of universals depend merely on the meaning of words. >Universal, cf. >Sortal. SearleVsNominalismus: it is incomprehensible to deny such trivial truths as that there are properties such as the ones of beeing-red or beeing-centaur. From such assumptions no compulsion to further conclusions result besides that certain predicates are meaningful! NominalismVsFrege: there is no "third realm". >Third realm/Frege. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Non-Existence | Field | I 54 Non-existence/truth/quantification/Field: if the quantified object does not exist, every statement with a existential quantifier is wrong and every statement with a universal quantifier is trivially true. - ((s) Talking of mathematical entities we do not have a problem with empty names). - ((s) Universal statements are true for the conditional "if there are mathematical entities, then .."). Mathematics/Field: if you wanted to keep only the true statements thereafter, mathematics would be uninteresting. >Quantification, >Existential quantification, >Universal quantification, >Implication, >Trivial truth, >Empty names, >Ontology. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Structures | Kripke | III 357 Structure/Kripke: the structure is not revealed to the truth theory. We must define it in advance. >Truth theory. Of course, the "true structure" of a quantification over individuals is not the quantification on chains of characters and that of a universal quantification in reality existential quantification followed by universal quantification. >Quantification, >Universal quantification, >Existential quantification. E.g., the structure which is revealed by the recursion rules is different for "(x2)(x2 bold)" and "(x1)(x1 bold)". And that is because of different predicates. III 358 Def "trivial truth theory"/DavidsonVs: a trivial truth definition is one with infinitely many axioms: "T(f) ↔ f"". Kripke: this theory really does not uncover any structure but these are precisely the ones recommended by Tarski. >Truth theory/Tarski, >Truth definition/Tarski. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Truth | Goodman | I 31 Truth/Goodman: provided that a world consists of statements, truth may be relevant. But truth cannot be defined or be checked by compliance with "the world". Truth is a docile and an obedient servant, no severe master. >Reality, >World, >Nature, >Correspondence theory. I 34 The scientist who assumes he is especially looking for truth deceives himself. He does not care about trivial truths he could grind out. "The truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth": this would be a wrong and paralyzing policy for any world producer. The whole truth would be too much, it is too large, too variable and too burdened by trivial. Nothing but the truth would be too little, for some right versions are not true (they are either false or neither true nor false). I 147 GoodmanVsTarski: Tarski must be revised: "'Snow is white' is true according to a version if and only if snow is in accordance with this version of white". >Truth definition/Tarski, >Disqotation scheme. I 149 Truth/Goodman: truth is like intelligence exactly what the tests test. I 146 ff GoodmanVsPragmatism: then the pragmatist thesis loses at the moment of victory its force: because that truths best meet the purpose of acquiring truths is as empty as it is obvious. Accuracy/Goodman: Goodman suggests high acceptability as an accuracy scale. >Acceptability. --- III 242 The truth of a hypothesis is a matter of fitting. Of fitting to a theory building and the fitting of hypotheses and theory to the existing data and the facts one will encounter. Truth/Goodman: we should reserve truth for the symbols in sentence form. --- IV 208 Accuracy/Goodman: accuracy does not seek a formal definition. Accuracy is a matter of fitting and activity. IV 205 Accuracy and truth sometimes go apart even in statements. Although snow is white, the statement 'snow is white' can sometimes be incorrect. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
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