Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 79 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Attributive/referential | Donnellan | I 183 Def Referential/Donnellan: is supposed to enable the listener to single out the person the speaker is talking about. - E.g. "The killer of Schmidt is insane": in any case, the person who rioted in court, even if he is not the killer. - Here, empty descriptions do not fail. - ((s) The description may also be wrong, and still identify the person.) Attributive/Donnellan: "whoever it is": E.g. An absent murderer can be anyone, but definitely the murderer - ((s), the description must be apply). >Descriptions. I 191 Referential/Donnellan: Here it is probable that the speaker believes that the reference is satisfied. An incorrect description would mislead the listeners. Attributive/Donnellan: the same possibility of incorrect description does not exist here: "Whoever it is" cannot be described incorrectly, the speaker believes a disjunction: "him or him or him..." - attributively used descriptions may fail and yet express something true. E.g. "The House of Deputies (correctly House of Representatives) includes representatives of two parties" - No problem, if it is clear what the speaker means, you can correct him. >Meaning (Intending). I 195 Intent/Intention/Meaning/Donnellan: it's not about what someone wanted to say - otherwise you could take any description - nevertheless, the intention decides about referential or attributive use. I 199 Champagne Example/Donnellan: attributively no problem. I ~ 202 Referential/Donnellan: could also be called a weak reference: whatever - real reference: attributive. >Champagne example. I 202 Problem of the Statement/Donnellan: E.g. (Linsky): her husband is kind to her (in the café, but he is not her husband) - referentially true - attributive: if phi, then psi, but there is no phi, then it's not correct to say: he says of him... (de re) - but referential: he said correctly of the so described that he ... ((s) also de re!) - Kripke: precisely not like distinction de re/de dicto - E.g. If the described person is also the president of the college, it is true of the president that he is kind - referential: here the speaker does not even have to agree. Wolf I 18 Name/Description/Donnellan: a) referential use: the reference can succeed, even if the description is not true: E.g. The man in court is not the murderer, but he is correctly determined as the one who behaves wildly. b) attributive use: "whoever it was" applies if we have no specific person in mind. ((s)> role functional role: what ever it is.) >Roles, >Functional role. Chisholm II 109 Donnellan/referential/attributive/Brandl: can the distinction not be explained by the fact that in one instance reference is made by signs and in another instance by speakers? No, then the referential use would only have drawn attention to a problem of pragmatics. Then Russell could have simply expanded his theory pragmatically. Brandl: one can make the distinction referential/attributive even more pronounced if one applies it to precisely those signs with which the speaker makes it clear from the outset that he/she is not referring to a whole range of objects. Newen I 94 Referential/Predicative/Singular Terms/Identification/Name/Strawson: Thesis: Proper names/demonstratives: are largely used referentially - descriptions: have at most predicative, i.e. descriptive, meaning (but can also refer simultaneously) Ad Newen I 94 Referential/(s): selecting an object - attributive/(s): attributing properties. Newen I 95 Attributive/Donnellan/(s): in the absence of the subject matter in question - referential/(s): in the presence of the subject matter in question Newen I 95 DonnellanVsRussell: he has overlooked the referential use. He only considers the attributive use, because... Descriptions/Russell: ...are syncategorematic expressions for him, which themselves cannot refer. >Syncategorematic. Newen I 96 Referential/description/KripkeVsDonnellan: the referential use of descriptions has absolutely nothing to do with the semantics of descriptions. Referential use is possible and communication can succeed with it, but it belongs to pragmatics. Pragmatics: examines what is meant (contextual). It does not examine the context-independent semantics. Solution/Kripke: to make a distinction between speaker reference and semantic reference. >Speaker reference, >Reference. Semantic meaning: is given by Russell's truth conditions: the murderer of Schmidt is insane iff the murderer of Schmidt is insane. >Truth conditions. |
Donnellan I Keith S. Donnellan "Reference and Definite Descriptions", in: Philosophical Review 75 (1966), S. 281-304 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Axioms | Kripke | III 389ff Axioms/infinite/Kripke: not all Tarski sentences are derivable anymore. Proof/Kripke: Kripke only has a finite number of steps and cites only a finite number of axioms - otherwise rule (rule of evidence): "implicit definition" (Hilbert: "Which axioms are valid?" >Rule following/Kripke. III 389 Infinitely many axioms/Kripke: one cannot derive Tarski sentences for any kind of f's, from an infinite number of truth sentences T(f) ↔ f, e.g. assuming we add a biconditional to a simple predicate P(x) and take P(0), P(1), P(2)... as number-theoretic axioms. These new axioms have the power that P(x) is valid for every number - does (x)P(x) still follow the normal rules of deduction? No, evidence cites only a finite number of axioms. Reductio ad absurdum: if (x)P(x) was deducible (derivable), it would have to be derived from a finite number of axioms: P(m1)...P(mn). M: m is the number name in the formal language of the biconditional which denotes the number m. It is clear that it cannot be derived from a finite number of axioms. If we define P(x) as true of m1...mn, each of the finite axioms will be true, but (x)P(x) will be false. Every instance is known but not the generalization. This is also applicable to finite systems. III 390 Solution: we must allow an infinity rule (e.g.> omega rule) III 391 KripkeVsWallace: the same problems apply to the >referential quantification. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Brain Development | Developmental Psychology | Upton I 70 Brain development(Developmental psychology/Upton: between the ages of two and five years the changes that occur in the brain enable children to plan their actions, pay greater attention to tasks and increase their language skills. The brain does not grow as rapidly during this time period as it did in infancy, but there are still some dramatic anatomical changes that take place (Thompson et al., 2000)(1). During early childhood, children’s brains show rapid growth in the prefrontal cortex in particular. The prefrontal cortex is an area of the frontal lobes that is known to be involved in two very important activities: planning and organising new actions, and maintaining attention to tasks (Blumenthal et al., 1999)(2). Other important changes include an increase in myelination of the cells in the brain. This myelination speeds up the rate at which information travels through the nervous system (Meier et al., 2004)(3). E.g.myelination of the area of the brain that controls hand–eye coordination is not completed until around four years of age. Brain-imaging studies have shown that children with lower rates of myelination in this area of the brain at four years of age show poorer hand–eye coordination than their peers (Pujol et al., 2004)(4). Upton I 71 Language/right hemisphere: Handedness has traditionally been thought to have a strong link to brain organisation. Paul Pierre Broca first described language regions in the left hemisphere of right-handers in the nineteenth century and, from then on, it was accepted that the reverse, that is, right-hemisphere language dominance, should be true of left-handers (Knecht et al., 2000)(5). However, in reality the left-hand side of the brain dominates in language processing for most people: around 95 per cent of right-handers process speech predominantly in the left hemisphere (Springer and Deutsch, 1985)(6), as do more than 50 per cent of left-handers (Knecht et al., 2000)(5). According to Knecht et al., left-handedness is neither a precondition nor a necessary consequence of right-hemisphere language dominance (Knecht et al., 2000(5), p. 2517). >Learning, >Learning theory, >Language acquisition, >Brain, >Lateralization of the brain, >Language. 1. Thompson, P.M., Giedd, J. N., Woods, R. P., MacDonald D. Evans, A. C. & Toga, A. W. 2000. Growth patterns in the developing brain detected by using continuum mechanical tensor maps. Nature, 404, 190-3. 2. Blumenthal, J. A., Babyak M. A., Moore, K.A., Craighead, W.E:, Herman, S. Khatri, P., Waugh, R, Napolitano, M.A., Forman, L.M., Appelbaum, M., Doraiswamy, P.M. & Krishnan, K.R. 1999. Effects of exercise training on older patients with major depression, Archives of internal Medicine, 159: 2349-56. 3. Meier, B.P. and Hinsz, V.B. (2004) A comparison of human aggression committed by groups and individuals: an interindividual-intergroup discontinuity. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 40: 551–59. 4. Pujol,J, López-Sala, A., Sebastiá-Gallés, N, Deus, J, Cardoner, N., Soriano-Mas, C, Moreno, A. and Sans, A. (2004) Delayed myelination in children with developmental delay detected by volumetric MRI. NeuroImage, 22 (2): 897–903. 5. Knecht, S., Dräger, B., Deppe, M., Bobe, L. and Lohmann, H. (2000) Handedness and hemispheric language dominance in healthy humans. Brain, 123(12): 2512–18. 6. Springer, S.P. and Deutsch, G. (1985) Left Brain, Right Brain. New York: W.H. Freeman. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Causal Relation | Schiffer | I 102 Causal relation/Schiffer/(s): Problem: There is no physical relation that connects general terms with the corresponding entities. >General terms, >Correspondence. Otherwise: it would have to be a functional relation (multiple realization): problem: it should take "true of" or "refers" as basic concepts. >Basic concepts/Schiffer. A causal theory (for a theory of mental representations) (e.g. reliability theory) needs no semantic terms (true of, referenced) as basic concepts. >Reliability theory. Instead: substitutional quantification or translation of M-sentences into the metalanguage of the theory. >Substitutional quantification, >Metalanguage. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Contradictions | Russell | IV 78 Principle of Contradiction/laws of thought/Russell: a sentence is not a law of thought. - Belief in it is an idea, but not the sentence itself, but a fact concerning the outside world. >Thought/Frege. If that what we believe, were not true of the things of the outer world, the ((s) wrongly assumed) fact that we are forced to think so, would be no guarantee that the sentence cannot be wrong. This shows that it is not a law of thought. >World/Thinking, >Logic, >Laws of thinking. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 |
| Decidability | Hintikka | I 7 Standard Semantics/Kripke Semantics/Hintikka: what differences are there? The ditch between them is much deeper than it first appears. Cocchiarella: Cocchiarella has shown, however, that even in the simplest quantifying case, of the monadic predicate logic, the standard logic is radically different from its Kripkean cousin. Decidability: monadic predicate logic is, as Kripke has shown, decidable. Kripke semantics: Kripke semantics is undecidable. Decidability: decidability implies axiomatizability. I 208 Decision Problem/predicate calculus/Hao Wang: thesis: the problem corresponds to the task of completely filling the Euclidean surface with square dominoes of different sizes. At least one stone of each size must be used. E.g. logical omniscience now comes in in the following way: At certain points I can truthfully say according to my perception: (5) I see that this Domino task is impossible to solve. In other cases, I cannot say that truthfully. >Logical omniscience. Problem/HintikkaVsBarwise/HintikkaVsSituation Semantics/Hintikka: according to Barwise/Perry, it should be true of any unsolvable Domino problem that I see the unsolvability immediately as soon as I see the forms of available stones because the unsolvability follows logically from the visual information. Solution/semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: according to the urn model there is no problem. >Possible world semantics. I 209 Omniscience/symmetry/Hintikka: situational semantics: situational semantics needs the urn model to solve the second problem of logical omniscience. Semantics of possible worlds: on the other hand, it needs situational semantics itself to solve the first problem. >Situation semantics. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Descriptions | Cartwright | I 3 Explanation/Description/Physics/Cartwright: in modern physics the phenomenological laws are considered as being descriptive, the fundamental laws as being explanatory. Problem: the explanatory power comes at the cost of the adequacy of description Explanatory power (of laws) The semblance of truth comes from a false explanation model: wrong connection of laws with reality. I 4 Cartwright instead: Def "Simulacrum" View/Cartwright: of explanation: Thesis: the way from theory to reality is this: theory > model > phenomenological law Phenomenological Laws/Cartwright: are true of the objects of reality (or can be). Fundamental Laws/Cartwright: are only true of the objects in the model. >Fundamental laws/Cartwright. Explanation/Cartwright: is not a guide to the truth. I 57 Description/Laws of Nature/LoN/Physical Laws/Cartwright: E.g. the gravitation law does not describe the behavior of the objects, because electrical forces also play a role - (Coulomb's law) - no charged body behaves according to the gravitation law. And every massive body is a counter-E.g. to Coulomb's law. Solution: "... if no other forces..." - without ceteris paribus. >ceteris paribus. I 131 Description/Physics/Cartwright: false: that we have to depart from existence assumptions to come to a description according to which we can set up the equations. Correct: the theory has only few principles to move from descriptions to equations - these principles certainly require structured information. - And the "descriptions" on the right side have to satisfy many mathematical requirements. >Equations, >Principles. The best descriptions are those that best match the equations. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Designation | Geach | I 52 Naming/Denotation/Two-Names Theory/GeachVsAristoteles: Incorrect approximation of predication and naming: as if predicates were (complex) names : "on the mat". >Naming, >Predication, >Attribution, >Names, >Predicates, >Aristotle. ((s) "The man stabbing Caesar to death stabbed the one stabbed by Brutus.") Geach: Additionally, Geach would use a link. Two-names theory/Aristotle/Geach: "Socrates is a philosopher" should be true because the thing is named. GeachVs: "Philosopher" (general term) is not a name for "all (or every) philosopher". >General terms. --- I 153f Intentionality/naming/Parmenides/Geach: one cannot name anything that does not exist. (Geach pro) - ((s) Existence introduction is not arbitrary, not without premise). >Existence, >Existence statement, >Existence/Parmenides, >Introduction, >Nonexistence, >Fiction. E.g. Geach dreamed of a girl and wants to call it "Pauline". - On the other hand, acquaintance is sufficient - presence is not necessary. Problem: is the girl even more imaginary, if he has not dreamed of her? Geach: that is a sure sign that this is all nonsense. >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief. Geach with Parmenides: "There is only that what exists." GeachVsParmenides: However, one can talk about non-existent objects. - E.g. talking about absent friends without knowing that he is dead, changes the truth value, but not the fact that these are sentences. >Truth value, >Reference. Imaginary girls are not competing for identification in the dream. - If it is true of no identifiable girl that I dreamed of her, then I have not dreamed of any girl. >de re, >de dicto, >Identification. Solution: "I dreamed of a girl, but it is not true of a certain girl that I dreamed of her". - This is similar to: it is not true of a certain stamp that I want it. --- I 252 Predication/Geach: predication can be done without naming: in an if-that-sentence or in an or-sentence, a term P can be predicated of a thing without naming the thing "P". E.g. "If that what the policeman said is true, then he drove faster than 60". This does not call the policeman's sentence true. - (> Conditional). Predication/naming: centuries-old error: that the predicate is uttered by the thing. Frege: Difference >naming / >predication, >designation: to name a thing "P", a sentence must be asserted! But a property is also predicted in a non-assertive sub-clause (subset). Therefore, naming must be explained by predication, not vice versa. >Naming. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Each/All/Every | Cresswell | I 157 "Every" /"every logician"/Cresswell: the set of all logicians. (Or the 2nd order property to be true of the set of all logicians). Universal Qantifier/Cresswell: is a unique such quantity - Problem: - "the most" "most": Here there is no clear such set. >Universal Quantification, >Existential quantification, >Domain, >Individuation, >Identification, >Reference. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Essentialism | Quine | Lauener XI 58 QuineVsEssentialism/Quantification/Lauener: quantification takes no account of the terminology - e.g. Fx is true if there is an object that satisfies that, no matter how it is called - e.g. 9 is the successor of 8 whether it is the number of planets or not. >Quantification/Quine. Lauener XI 175 Essentialism/singular term/general term/modal logic/Follesdal/Lauener: a semantics of modalities must distinguish between singular terms on the one hand and general terms and sentences on the other: i.e. between expressions that have a reference ((s) reference object) and expressions that have an extension ((s) a specifiable set). >Singular Terms/Quine, >General Terms/Quine. Quantification into opaque contexts/solution/FollesdalVsQuine: to be able to quantify into opaque contexts, we then have to make these contexts referentially transparent and at the same time extensionally opaque. Essentialism: that is what essentialism means: Def referential transparency/Follesdal/Lauener: what is true about an object applies to it, no matter how we refer to it. Def extensional opacity/Follesdal/Lauener: among the predicates true of an object, some apply necessarily and others accidentally. Quine VII (b) 21 QuineVsEssentialism: what is considered essential is arbitrary: a rational biped must be bipedal (because of its feet), but it does not have to be rational. The latter is relative. VII (h) 151ff QuineVsModal Logic: The modal logic makes essentialism necessary, i.e. one cannot do without necessary features of the objects themselves, because one cannot do without quantification. Actually, there is nothing necessary about the objects "themselves", but only in the way of reference. VII (h) 156 Barcan formula: You have to accept an Aristotelian essentialism if you want to allow quantified modal logic. ((s) Therefore, Kripke calls himself an essentialist.) > Barcan formula. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Q XI H. Lauener Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982 |
| Excluded Middle | Geach | I 76ff Law of excluded middle/Geach: the law is valid without any exception. Even Aristotle 9 Chap. De Interpretatione: tomorrow's sea battle: no refutation. No multi-valued logic: if we get the same truth value, if we ascribe P and its negation, then if P u P and P v P. - The same as for simple predication. Geach: only exception: vagueness. >Vagueness, cf. >Multi-valued logic. I 74 (A) For any x, either x is F or x is not F (B) For any predicate P and any object x, either P or its negation is true of x. I 75 in most cases we can treat (A) and (B) as equivalent. At first glance, the two look less fundamental than: (C) Either p or not p (D) Every sentence is either true itself or has a true negation Negation/Predicate Negation/Geach: the negation used in (A) and mentioned in (B) is the predicate negation. Negation/Sentence negation/Geach: The negation used in (C) and mentioned in (D) is the sentence negation. Negation/Everyday language/Geach: Here it is usually a part of the sentence that is negated, but the effect is that the whole sentence is negated. >Negation. I 76 Excluded Third/Geach: Semantic formulations often use the term "true" or "false" while omitting negation: E.g. For each predicate P and each object x, P is either true of x or false of x. E.g. Each proposition is either true or false. GeachVs: I cannot see any advantage in this. Negation must be used explicitly anyway. We lose nothing if we say instead of "false" that the negation is "true of". Excluded Middle/Quantification/Geach: The reason for my quantification of the law in (A) is to make it clearer what can be considered as a substitution of "x", e.g., no empty names. >Quantification. Empty names: are a matter of how to make them right. Question: why can't we use "every man" for x? I 78 Excluded Middle/Geach: Seems more substantial than other laws because it seems to be a premise like "either so and so or not so and so". or: "If so...then so...and if not so...then not so..." GeachVs: this is not a good argument, because, whatever comes out of "Either p or not p" and "If p then q" and "If not p then r" follows would also follow from the last two premises alone! Wittgenstein: with such superfluous assumptions we have to look for a hidden deception. When one realizes that one is to be taken by surprise, one then looks for the mistake in the wrong place. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Existence | Leibniz | Holz I 48/49 Existence/world/outside/reason/Leibniz: a sufficient reason for existence cannot be found in the series of facts, but also not in the whole set-up. Because also the composition, like the series needs a reason. Leibniz calls the existence reason "extramundan" because it cannot be found within the series (series reum). >Inside/outside/Leibniz, >World/Leibniz. Holz: that does not mean "outside the world"! Literally it means: Leibniz: "apart from the world, there is a dominating one." Not just like the soul in me but more like myself in my body, but of much higher reason. Existence reason/outside/outer/Leibniz: The reason for unity is the form determinateness of its all-round connection, not the linearity of a sequence or series. To this extent the existence reason of the world (as the totality of the connections) is not in the world, but it conditions it as a world. This "ultima ratio rerum" establishes the world and makes it". It is the connecting principle. >Totality/Leibniz. Holz I 70 Existence/Leibniz: of it we can have no idea, except through the perception of beings. Therefore, perception is the formal unity and universality of all the contents that enter into it. Holz I 71 "We have no other idea of existence than that we perceive that the things are perceived". Perception/Leibniz: provides now, as self-perception, the idea of the continuity and contiguity of existence as such (which is evident to us in the existence of our own self). >Perception/Leibniz, >Experience/Leibniz. Existence/Experience/Leibniz: Existence cannot be thought, it has to be experienced, because the sentence "non-being is" is contradictory. (However, only in relation to the whole). Existence/Being/Leibniz: the falsification of the universal negation allows the tautology "the being is"! In contrast to any particular tautological statement like e.g. "The House is the House", which is only a concept or essence definition and does not include existence. Only the universal proposition of being transcends from a logical definition into an ontological axiom. Since it is related to the whole, there can be only one case of necessity of existence, namely that of the whole. In the bodies themselves, there is no basis of existence, only in the total context, which ultimately includes the entire chain (all relationships in the universe). In the individual bodies you will never find the reason why they are like that and not different. Existence/Being/Leibniz: the falsification of the universal negation allows the tautology "the being is"! In contrast to any particular tautological statement like e.g. "The House is the House", which is only a concept or essence definition and does not include existence. Only the universal proposition of being transcends from a logical definition into an ontological axiom. Since it is related to the whole, there can only be one case of necessity of existence, namely that of the whole. >Necessity/Leibniz. In the bodies themselves, there is no reason of existence, only in the total context, which ultimately includes the entire chain (all relationships in the universe). In the individual bodies you will never find the reason why they are like that and not different. Holz I 72 Existence/Necessity/Identity/Being/Leibniz: the sentences "The being is" and "Only one being is necessary" are in a very specific follow-up ratio: The proposition "the being is" is an identical proposition, i.e. its opposite is contradictory. Thus existential and copulative (copula) use of "is" coincide here. One could also say "being is being" in order to make clear that the predicate is necessary for the subject. But: For example, "the stone is a being stone": this sentence is not identical, the being does not necessarily belong to the stone! The stone could only be thought of. Therefore, we need the perception to be convinced of existence. But this is not only true of bodies, but also of general, e.g. the genus human, it does not exist neccessarily. Holz I 73 The necessity of existence is valid only by the world as a whole. Holz I 75 Unity/Substance/LeibnizVsSpinoza: the ultimate ratio is necessarily only one reason, not a multiplicity, because it is the structure of the whole. Leibniz, therefore, does not need to sacrifice the multiplicity of things in order to reach the one and only world. The substance of Spinoza is replaced by him with the "harmonie universelle". Existence/Leibniz: Question: "Why is there anything at all and not rather nothing?". This question also remains in existence when we have secured the unity of the multiplicity. There could still be nothing! Holz I 76 Assuming that things must exist, one must also be able to specify the reason why they must exist in this way and not otherwise. Holz I 91 Existence/Leibniz: "Why is there something and not rather nothing?" 1. The reason why something exists is in nature: the consequence of the supreme principle that nothing happens without reason. 2. The reason must lie in a real being or in a cause. 3. This being must be necessary, otherwise a further cause would have to be sought. 4. So there is a cause! Holz I 92 5. This first cause also has the effect that everything possible has a striving for existence, since no universal reason for the restriction to only certain possible can be found. 6. Therefore it can be said that everything possible is intended for its future existence. (Because possibility is striving). 7. It does not follow from this that everything that is possible also exists. This would only follow if everything together were possible. 8. However, some possibilities are incompatible with others. 9. Thus arises the series of things that exists through the greatest range of all possibilities. 10. As fluids assume spherical form (largest content), there is in the nature of the universe a series with the greatest content. 11. Thus the most perfect exists, for perfection is nothing but the quantity of materiality. (Best of all worlds, >best world). 12. Perfection, however, is not to be found solely in matter, but in form or variety. Holz I 93 13. It follows from this that matter is not everywhere alike, but is made by the forms itself to be unequal. (There are further 12 theses on the level of consciousness theory). Holz I 120 World/Existenz/Leibniz: is as a whole contingent. There is no reason to see why this world must be. But we can see that it is a totality of all that is real and possible. That is, the principle of deduction fails at the first substance, which can no longer be made intelligible, or is no longer derivable by itself. Holz I 12 Question: Why is anything at all and not nothing? Although we cannot see why this world is, we can still see that this world is possible! And many other possible beside it as well. Then we can reformulate the question: Why does this world exist and not another? >Possible world/Leibniz, >Possibility/Leibniz. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Existence | Woods | II 248f Existence/Tradition/Woods: existence is no predicate. GeachVsTradition: that is only correct, as long as not conceived temporally - Tradition: as predicate would make any statement necessary. >Necessity, >Predication, >Existence predicate. DummettVsTradition: this is not true. Solution: higher-order predicate, but not like "rare". Dummett: this is no problem for truth conditions, if constructed as "PeS":"true of everything". >Truth conditions. II 250 But this does not have to be a primitive predicate. Problem: Self identity cannot change with time. >Identity, >Self-identity. II 254 Predicate/Existence/Woods: E. g. "there were dodos": Dodo: one-digit predicate that is only true of an object if it belongs to the extension of the predicate at that time - i. e. relative to the time of the utterance - with some predicates one associates the non-applicability with the passing away of the object, with others not. Always true during existence: e.g. "Human". Cf. >Presupposition. Sometimes true, but only if object exists: e.g."sleeps". Sometimes true, but even if object does not exist: e.g. famous. See also >Intrinsic, >Extrinsic. II 258 Existence/Time/Woods: other approach: Predicates should carry temporal relativization, not the quantifiers. >Quantifiers. Then indices and demonstratives are necessary. >Demonstratives, >Index words, >Indexicality. Indexical singular terms with the attribution function* should be treated in such a way that objects are linked with expressions by triplets from a sequence, a person and a time. "There were dodos": Dodo here two-digit predicate, true of object at a time when it is a dodo. - Here too the implication of past existence is carried by the meaning of "dodo". >Predicates, >Singular terms. II 259 Problem: future existence cannot be expressed if "F" is the only predicate - past and future are indistinguishable - solution: combining both approaches: a) Indexical sentence operators. b) To introduce time into predicates: so that one can say that it is now true that something is F in the future and that it will be true that something is F then. >Time, >Past, >Present, >Future. II 262 Existence/Woods: should not be treated as a "Type 1 predicate", i. e. only to be meaningfully applied if the object already exists, e. g. "human being" - solution: Existence predicate should be treated as the 2nd level quantification. >Quantification, >Second Order Logic. |
WoodsM II Michael Woods "Existence and Tense" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Expectations | Gadamer | I 272 Expectation/Understanding/Hermeneutics/Gadamer: The fact that someone who speaks the same language understands the words he or she uses in a familiar sense like me is a general prerequisite that can only be questioned in individual cases - and the same applies in the case of the foreign language that we think we know in an average way and presuppose this average use of language when understanding a text. What is true of the pre-opinion of language use is no less true of the pre-opinion of content with which we read texts and I 273 that make up our pre-understanding. >Understanding, >Prior knowledge, >Hermeneutics. The question here is just as much how one is to find one's way out of the spell of one's own pre-opinions. Certainly it cannot be a general prerequisite that what we are told in a text fits in seamlessly with my own opinions and expectations. Cf. Philosophical theories about the >Principle of charity, >Hermeneutic Circle/Heidegger. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Explanation | Bigelow | I 274 Modality/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: in the explanation of the modalities, the causation can now enter as a local feature. Best in the semantics of possible worlds. >Modalities, >Causation, >Possible worlds, >Semantics of possible worlds. I 275 Causation/Bigelow/Pargetter: is always an input for an explanation, never an output. >Causal relationship, >Probability. Probabilistic Theory/Causation/Bigelow/Pargetter: pro: it shows that it is misguided to use causation as an undefined concept. Causation rather longs for explanation. We need to find out more about the causal relation. And the probabilistic theory contributes to this. BigelowVsProbabilistic theory: however, it combines causation too closely with modal terms and reverses the priorities. Pro: Nevertheless, there are often connections between causation and modality. Modality/explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: thesis: the explanation is based on the causation of modality. But causation cannot be taken as an unexplained basic concept. >Basic concepts. I 286 Causation/Bigelow/Pargetter: its explanation creates four problems: I 287 1. Macroscopic forces: how plausible is it that they supervene on fundamental forces, and thus on basic physical causes? >Supervenience. 2. How can we justify the choice of forces instead of other physical ingredients? >Forces 3. How do we explain the connection between causation and different modal terms? 4. Forces and causes: what kind of higher-level universals are they? >Causes, >Universals. I 287 Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: there is a difference between the fundamental forces we assume and the macroscopic forces we encounter in our daily life. Definition causal relation/Bigelow/Pargetter: (see above) as an aggregate of suitable fundamental forces. >Causal relation. Problem: is the supervenience thesis true of the macroscopic on fundamental forces? Fundamental forces: remain the same, even if the special particles and their fields change. They have a strong explanatory power, e.g. they enable us to draw force parallelograms, etc. I 288 Def causation/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: he defines them by causal chains. Causal chain/Bigelow/Pargetter: needs then for every link a basic causation which requires counterfactual conditionals, for the end links there will be a derived causal relation. >Counterfactual conditional. There will always be many parallel chains, with different connections among each other. This can lead to a complex network. Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: the metaphysical apparatus we employ does not claim to be adequate for the totality of the causal relations. But for some. >Metaphysics. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Explanation | Cartwright | I 3 Explanation/Description/Physics/Cartwright: in modern physics, the phenomenological laws are considered as being descriptive, the fundamental laws as being explanatory. >Fundamental laws, >Laws, >Natural laws, >Physics. Problem: the explanatory power comes at the cost of the adequacy of the description. 1) explanatory power (of laws) does not speak for truth 2) even for falsehood, because we need ceteris paribus laws 3) the semblance of truth comes from a false explanation model: wrong connection of laws with reality. >Truth, >Reality, >ceteris paribus. I 4 Cartwright instead: Def "Simulacrum" View/Cartwright: of explanation: Thesis: the way from theory to reality is this: theory > model > phenomenological law - Phenomenological Laws/Cartwright: are true of the objects of reality (or can be). Fundamental Laws/Cartwright: are only true of the objects in the model - E.: is not a guide to the truth. I 11 E/Physics/Cartwright: wrong question: "which is the correct equation?" - Different models bring different aspects - causal explanation: not in scientific practice, we do not tell sometimes one, sometimes another causal story. >Theories, >Models. I 44 E/CartwrightVsTradition: has nothing to do with truth - ((s)> Truth/M.Williams / >Truth/Horwich). I 47 E/Cartwright: after the laws of nature (LoN) are known, we still have to decide which factors should occur in an explanation - the decision of which is, however, not suggested by our knowledge of the laws of nature. I 50 Laws of Nature are never sufficient to explain something in a particular moment - the reasons to believe in them are not normal reasons, because we have never tested them - only reasons: explanation strategy - I 52 E: is still needed even after complete description. >Description, >Observation. I 70 E/All/Generalization/VsSuper Law/C: E.g. "Why is the quail in my garden shaking its head?" - "Because all of them do it" - no explanation! - Nor: E.g. "All carbon atoms have 5 energy levels" - Super laws in turn require the application of individual laws - and these do not represent facts. I 73 Explanation/Cartwright: Uses causes - ((s) not laws) - (EmpiricismVsCauses). I 92 E/LoN/Cartwright: it is not the fundamental laws (laws of nature) that I need for the explanation, but E.g. properties of electrons - plus assumptions about the specific situation. I 94 f Explanation/Grünbaum: a more comprehensive law G explains a less comprehensive law L which it contains not through the causes of L. I 96 Explanation/Duhem: does not draw a "veil" from reality - Explanation/Cartwright: explaining a set of phenomenological laws means giving a physical theory of them - without explaining these laws. I 103 Explanation/W. Salmon/Richard Jeffries: E. are no arguments. I 152 Explanation/Duhem: Organization (order of knowledge). Hacking I 96~ Explanation/Cartwright/Fraassen: if something is an explanation, it is no reason to believe it. I 99 Anti-Realism: E are not a feature of the truth but of adequacy. >Adequacy. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Expressions | Meixner | I 71 Expression/Express/Meixner: expressing something is not referencing. >Reference. Functions can be expressed by unconfirmed expressions. >Functions, >Unsaturated. Predicate: expresses a property, it does not denominate it! >Predicates, >Properties, >Naming, >Denotation. Predicate: is a linguistic indicator of universals, more direct than names. >Universals, >Names. I 102 Expression/Denominating/Meixner: Facts are expressed by sentences and denominated by that-sentences (subordinate clauses). >States of affairs, >That-sentences, >Levels/order, >Description levels, >Exemplification. I 118 Expressions/Expressing/Meixner: sentences can express something that is not in line with their meaning, e.g. "the sentence on page n line 1 is wrong ...". >Propositions, cf. >Paradoxes. I 152 Expressing: sentence expresses both a proposition and a fact (if it expresses something different from its meaning) - proposition: content of the sentence - fact: is unambiguously determined by this sentence content (proposition). >Content. I 153 Expressing: concepts such as universals through predicates. Satisfaction: concepts are satisfied by entities. >Satisfaction. Exemplification: universals by entities - instantiating/instantiation: concepts and universals by entities (inverse to instantiation: concepts and universals apply to entities) Cf. >True of. I 154 Expression/Expressing: Predicates express concepts or properties (universals). - concepts do not express anything, universals do not express anything, properties express nothing, they are expressed. Sentence: expresses proposition or fact. Fact, proposition: express nothing, they are expressed. E.g. "author of Waverley", "the person who is identical with Scott" do not express the same universal singularisation, but they do denominate the same individual. E.g. "brother of..."/"only brother of": ((s) can apply to the same individual, or "only" to none.) |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Gavagai | Peacocke | I 84 Gavagai/EvansVsQuine: his proposal, to interpret rabbits as unseparated rabbit parts has the consequence that what is always true of a unseparated rabbit part, also is true of another unseparated part of that rabbit. >Predication, cf. >Ostension, >Ostensive definition, >Definition, >Definability, >True-of, >Satisfaction. Then there are no limits to vagueness. >Limits, >Vagueness. The price of denying that is to make the identification of predicates empirically unlimited - this also applies to the attribution of actions. >Predicates, >Identification, >Ascription, >Actions, >Arbitrariness. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Genes | McGinn | I 235 McGinn: Genes have representation abilities without semantics. >Representation, >Semantics. Genes/McGinn: 2nd possibility: that it is less useful for the brain to develop a potential solution to our philosophical problems than it is for the genes (genetic code). Genetic Code/Genes/McGinn: contain principles encrypted by the genes Principles that go beyond the reach of human reason and yet answer some of the bewildered questions of reason? ((s) VsMcGinn: from all these arguments that it would be highly useful it does not follow that it is). Obviously, the genetic code is a rule for the construction of animal bodies including the brain and mind. >Brain, >Mind. I 228 Genes/McGinn: one of their most amazing features is the ability to store information. Likewise, the ability to copy the entire reproductive process. Errors occur only very rarely. That means that genes are virtually incapable of learning! Environmental changes lead to virtually no change in the construction rules for the next generation, no matter how disastrous they may be. Only random mutation. While the reason is a paragon of flexibility, genes are the culmination rigid behavior. >Behavior. I 229 McGinn: thesis: It could be that the genes (discussed above) have solved our philosophical problem, at least partially. Because firstly, they must have already solved the purely physical problems of the construction: i.e. they represent plans for the construction of the body, and secondly what is true of the body, also applies to the mind. As far as a mental feature is biologically sound, genes must contain instructions for building organisms with this feature. (Building consciousness, also the I, freedom of will, intentionality, all kinds of knowledge.) >Body, >Intentionality, >Existence, >Consciousness, >Knowledge. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| God | Nozick | II 152 God/Plato/Nozick: Plato’s thesis: "God is beyond being". Nozick: advantage: there is no "outisde". >Inside/outside, >Plato, >Being. Neither it does exist, nor it does not exist. - It is beyond the categories. >Categories. Predicates/Nozick: contain a presupposition that they may be true of something at all. >Presupposition, >Predicates, >Predication. Question: Does the term pair existence/nonexistence have such a presupposition? >Existence, >Non-existence. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Goedel | Quine | XIII 82 Goedel/Goedel Theorem/Quine: Evidence/Self-Evidence/Quine: it is too much to ask that a proof should be self-evident. E.g. Euclid's parallel axiom is not self-evident. E.g. set theory is also not self-evident because it is shaken by paradoxes. Self-Evidence/Quine: we find it in a small number of axioms of number theory. They are the axioms of Dedekind, which are called the axioms of Peano. Elementary Number Theory/Quine: there was always the question whether there were still valid laws that could not be derived from the axioms. They existed! That was a question of adequacy. Laws/Quine: the question of further, still undiscovered laws seemed to be a problem of all branches of mathematics. By supplementing the axioms, perhaps this could be remedied? But Goedel proved in 1931 that this cannot be done! Goedel/Quine: proved that there can be no complete deductive system for even the smallest fragment of mathematics, such as Elementary Number Theory. XIII 82 Tendency: Goedel/Quine: proved that there can be no complete deductive system for even the smallest fragment of mathematics, such as the elementary number theory. Def Elementary Number Theory/Quine: includes digits, notation for plus, times, power and equality. >Numbers/Quine. XIII 83 Sentence operators: for "not", "and" and "or" and the quantifiers "Each number x is such that..." and "there is a number x so that...". The numbers are the positive integers and the zero. With this you can express e.g. Fermat's last theorem. Goedel/Quine: Thesis: No axiom system or other deductive apparatus can cover all truths that can be expressed even in this most moderate notation. Any valid proof procedure will disregard some true sentences, even infinitely many of them. Self-Evidence/Mathematics/Goedel/Quine: therefore we must drop the requirement of self-evidence. Wrong solution/Quine: could one not simply take all discovered truths as axioms? Vs: this is not impossible because there could be no axiom system with infinitely many axioms - which exist. Rather, it is the case that a proof must be able to be examined in finite time. Goedel/Goedel's Theorem/Quine: is related to the reflexive paradoxes. The point is that the notation of the elementary number theory must be able to speak about itself. ((s) Self-Reference). Goedel Numbering/Goedel Number/Quine: ...+... XIII 84 Mention/Use/Goedel/Quine: Goedel's evidence also requires this distinction. For example, the digit "6" names the number 6 and has the Goedel number 47. We can say that the Goedel number 47 names the number 6. Syntax/Arithmetic/Goedel/Quine: after all expressions have their naming by Goedel numbers, the syntactic operations can be mirrored by expressions, by arithmetic operations via numbers. Quote/Goedel/Quine: Problem: the corresponding notation is not part of symbolic logic and arithmetic. Quotation marks cannot be simply named by Goedel numbers. Quote/Quine: of an expression: names this expression. Goedel Numbers/Goedel number/Quine: 47 names 6, furthermore 5361 names 47 if 53 and 61 are randomly the Goedel numbers of the digits "4" and "7". ((s) Quotation marks sic). Quote/Goedel/Quine: the quote relation is represented as by the arithmetic relation that has 5361 to 47 and 47 to 6. The general relation can be expressed in the notation of the elementary number theory, though not easily. The arithmetic reconstruction of syntactic concepts like this was a substantial part of Goedel's work. Liar/Liar's Paradox/Goedel/Quine: is useful in one of the two parts where Goedel's proof can be split. The bomb explodes when the two parts are put together. The liar can be completely XIII 85 expressed by Goedel numbering with the exception of a single expression: "truth". If that could be done, we would have solved the paradox, but discredited the elementary number theory. Truth/Goedel Number/Goedel Number/Quine: truth is not definable by Goedel numbers, within the elementary number theory. >Goedel Numbers/Quine. Goedel's Theorem/Quine: formal: no formula in the notation of the elementary number theory is true of all and only the Goedel numbers of truths of the elementary number theory. (This is the one part). Other part/Quine: deals with every real evidence procedure, here it is about that every evidence must be testable. Formal: a given formula in the notation of the elementary number theory is true of all and only the Goedel numbers of provable formulas. Church/Quine: here I skip his thesis (Church-Thesis), (see recursion below). Goedel/Quine: the two parts together say that the provable formulas do not coincide with the truths of the elementary number theory. Either they contain some falsehoods, or they do not cover some truths. God forbids that. Goedel/Quine: his own proof was more direct. He showed that a given sentence, expressed in Goedel numbers, cannot be proved. Either it is false or provable, or true and not provable. Probably the latter. Wrong solution/Quine: one could add this lost truth as an axiom, but then again others remain unprovable. Goedel/N.B./Quine: ironically, it was implausible that there could be a proof procedure for all truths of the elementary number theory. This would clarify Fermat's theorem, and much more. XIII 86 On the other hand, Goedel's result hit him like a bomb. N.B.: these two shortcomings turned out to be equivalent! Because: Kleene/Quine: showed that if there is a complete evidence procedure, any statement could be tested as true or false as follows: a computer would have to be programmed to rewind any statement, in alphabetical order, the shortest first, then always longer. In the end, because of the completeness of the procedure, he will have proved or refuted every single sentence. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Hermeneutics | Dilthey | Gadamer I 180 Hermeneutics/Dilthey/Gadamer: [On the theological, especially Lutheran interpretation of the Bible]: (...) Reformation theology does not seem (...) to be consistent. By finally using the Protestant formulas of faith as a guideline for the understanding of the unity of the Bible, it too abolishes the principle of the Scriptures in favour of an albeit short-term Reformation tradition. Not only the Counter-Reformation theology has argued against this but also Dilthey(1). He mocks these contradictions of Protestant hermeneutics from the standpoint of full self-confidence of the historical humanities. Development of Dilthey's hermeneutics: First of all the hermeneutics had to break free from all dogmatic limitations and free itself, in order to ascend to the universal significance of a historical organon. This happened in the 18th century, when men like Semler and Ernesti realized that an adequate understanding of Scripture was the recognition of the diversity of their authors, thus presupposing the abandonment of the dogmatic unity of the canon. With this "liberation of interpretation from "dogma" (Dilthey), the collection of the Holy Scriptures of Christanity moved into the role of a collection of historical sources, which as written works had to be subjected not only to a grammatical but also to a historical interpretation(2). DiltheyVsTradition: The old principle of interpretation, to understand the individual from the whole, was now no longer related and limited to the dogmatic unity of the canon, but went to the comprehensiveness of the historical Gadamer I 181 reality, to the wholeness of which the individual historical document belongs. Gadamer: (...) just as there is now no longer any difference between the interpretation of sacred or profane scriptures and thus only hermeneutics exists, so in the end this hermeneutics is not only a propaedeutic function of all historiography as the art of the correct interpretation of written sources, but also overlaps the whole business of historiography itself. For what is true of the written sources, that every sentence in them can only be understood from the context, is also true of the contents they report. Their meaning is also not clear in itself. The world-historical context in which the individual objects of historical research, large and small, show themselves in their true relative importance, is itself a whole, from which all individual things are first fully understood in their sense and which, conversely, can only be fully understood from these details. Gadamer I 182 Tradition: In itself, the history of understanding has been accompanied by theoretical reflection since the days of ancient philology. But these reflections have the character of an "art doctrine", i.e. they want to serve the art of understanding, such as the rhetoric of oratory, the poetics of poetry and its evaluation. In this sense, the theological hermeneutics of patristics and that of the Reformation was also an art doctrine. DiltheyVsTradition/Gadamer: But now understanding is made as such. ((s) VsDilthey: Cf. >Hermeneutics/Schleiermacher.) Gadamer I 202 Hermeneutics/Dilthey/Gadamer: Historical interpretation can serve as a means of understanding a given text, even if it sees in it a mere source that is integrated into the whole of historical tradition. In clear methodological reflection, however, we find this expressed neither by Ranke nor by the sharp methodologist Droysen, but only by Dilthey, who consciously takes up Romantic hermeneutics and expands it into a historical methodology, indeed into an epistemology of the humanities. Ditlhey: Not only do the sources encounter as texts, but historical reality itself is a text to be understood. With this transfer of hermeneutics to history, however, Dilthey is only the interpreter of the historical school. He formulates what Ranke and Droysen basically think. Historical School/Dilthey/HegelVsHistorism/Gadamer: We will see that Hegel's philosophy of world history, against which the historical school rebelled (DiltheyVsHegel), recognized the importance of history for the being of the mind and the knowledge of truth incomparably deeper than the great historians, who did not want to admit their dependence on it. Gadamer I 245 Hermeneutics/Dilthey/Gadamer: As we saw with Schleiermacher, the model of his hermeneutics is the congenial understanding that can be achieved in the relationship between the I and the You. The author's opinion can be seen directly from his text. The interpreter is absolutely simultaneous with his or her author. This is the triumph of the philological method to grasp past spirit as present, foreign as familiar. Dilthey: Dilthey is completely imbued with this triumph. He bases on it the equality of the humanities. Just as scientific knowledge always questions the present through a discovery within it, so the scholar of humanities questions texts. In this way Dilthey believed he was fulfilling the task which he felt was his own, to justify the humanities epistemologically by conceiving of the historical world as a text to be deciphered. >Text/Dilthey. 1. Cf. Dilthey II, 126 Anm. 3 the criticism of Flacius by Richard Simon. 2. Semler, who makes this demand, admittedly means with it still to serve the sense of salvation of the Bible, provided that the historically understanding "is now also able to speak of these objects in such a way now, as the changed time and other circumstances of the people beside us make it necessary" (quoted after G. Ebeling, RGG3 Hermeneutics), i.e. history in the service of the applicatio. |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Heterology | Geach | I 84 Heterological/Heterology/Geach: E.g. ""is an obscene term" is heterological" - should have the same meaning (same meaning, synonym) as ""is an obscene expression" is not an obscene expression" (correct). - Problem: this definition ""is heterological" is heterologous" would be synonym with ""is heterological "is not heterological" - contradiction. --- I 88f Grellings Paradox/(s): a general term "is not applicable to itself" is not applicable to itself. Namely-rider/Ryle: (1) "heterological" lacks the property for which it stands, namely the absence of the property for which it stands, namely ... recourse. - Ryle: no property is ever mentioned. Geach: correct: (2) "... lacks the property for which "heterological" stands. (1) is an extension of "heterological", and just true of those words, of which (2) is not true Grelling's paradox. (1) is not at all ambiguous - otherwise it would always have to refer to the same property in all events of (1), e.g. "French".... Solution/Geach: "the property for which it stands" never denotes any specifiable property. - Various heterological epithets stand for different properties. >Paradox. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Historicity | Heidegger | Gadamer I 266 Historicity/Heidegger/Gadamer: (...) that we only make history as far as we are ourselves, means that the historicity of human Dasein in all its movement of the present and of forgetting is the condition for us to make present what has been. >Dasein/Heidegger, >History/Heidegger, >Existence/Heidegger, >Time/Heidegger. Gadamer I 267 Gadamer: [the question is] whether something for the construction of a historical hermeneutics can be gained from the ontological radicalization which was brought by Heidegger. Heidegger's intention was certainly different, and one must be careful not to draw hasty conclusions from his existential analysis of the historicity of Dasein. According to Heidegger, the existential analysis of Dasein does not imply a specific historical ideal of existence. To that extent it claims even for a theological statement about the human and his or her existence in belief an a priori neutral validity. This may be a problematic claim for the self-understanding of belief, as for instance the dispute about Bultmann shows. (>Bultmann/Gadamer, >Hermeneutics. Conversely, it is by no means excluded that there are contentwise certain (existential) preconditions for Christian theology as well as for the historical humanities, under which they stand. But just for that reason one will have to accept that existential analytics itself, according to its own intention, does not contain any idealization and therefore cannot be criticized as such (however often this has been tried). It is a mere misunderstanding, if one sees in the temporality structure of concern a certain existential ideal, which one could counter with more pleasing moods (Bollnow)(1), for example, the ideal of carelessness, or with Nietzsche the natural innocence of animals and children. One cannot deny that this, too, is an ideal of existence. With this, however, it is true of it that his structure is the existential one, as Heidegger has shown it. >Animals/Heidegger. 1. O.F. Bollnow, Das Wesen der Stimmungen, Freiburg 1943. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Identity | Bigelow | I 140 Identity/Bigelow/Pargetter: we understand this here as a 2-digit predicate, we do not need to expand the language. I 141 Axioms: A19. (x)(x = x) A20. (a u ~a (σ/λ) > σ unequal λ) Everyday language translation: if something is true of something and not true of something, then these two things cannot be identical. I 141 Contingent Identity/Bigelow/Pargetter: these two axioms have a surprising consequence: namely that all identity is necessary. Cf. >Identity/Kripke. There is then no contingent identity. Non-identity is then also necessary. So the following can be proved as theorems: NI. (x = y) > N(x = y) NNI. (x unequal y) > N(x unequal y) Semantic rule: then causes an identity statement to be true in all possible worlds or true in none. >Possible worlds, >Necessity, >Truth. Valuation rule/identity/Bigelow/Pargetter: V (=) (c, c) = W W: is the set of all possible worlds. Identity statements/Bigelow/Pargetter: are then either necessary or impossible. This is surprising and shows another illustration of the interplay between semantics and ontology. >Semantics, >Ontology. Ontology/Bigelow/Pargetter: is what is suggested to us by a streamlined and plausible semantics. Identity/Science/Bigelow/Pargetter: in the history of science there have often been discoveries that have shown us that things we thought were different are identical. Cf. >Natural kinds/Putnam, >Progress, >Science, >Knowledge. I 143 Now one should think that these are contingent identities. >Contingency. Contingent Identity/Semantics/Bigelow/Pargetter: if they like contingent identity, they would have to change the semantics. And that is not hard: Def Diversity/new: instead of saying that two things are different, if something is true of one but not true of the other, we could say that something non-modal is true of one, but not true of the other. That brings out some new systems. >Cf. >Leibniz principle, >Indistinguishability, >Distinctions. It is interesting to note that some of these systems verify NNI while they continue to falsify NI. For example, it is more difficult to allow New York and Miami to be one and the same city than to allow Miami to be two cities. Identity/BigelowVsContingent Identity/Bigelow/Pargetter: we should let the semantics decide and say that there is simply no contingent identity. Contingent Identity/Bigelow/Pargetter: instead of changing the semantics and then to allow it nevertheless, we should rather explain why they seem to exist: e.g. Theory of descriptions/Russell/Bigelow/Pargetter: provides a means to reconcile contingently with necessary identities: assertions of the form the F = the G can be analyzed as contingent by saying that the properties F and G are co-instantiated by a single thing. This is still compatible with the necessary self-identity. >Theory of descriptions/Russell, >Descriptions. Bigelow/Pargetter: through descriptions most contingent identities are explained away. I 144 Introverted Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: (see above Chapter 1) introverted realism, as can be seen here, can reinforce the extroverted realism from which it originated. >Realism/Bigelow, >Realism. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Identity | Geach | I 218 Identity/GeachVsFrege: identity is not a relation - "Is an A" does not mean "has identity with A" - (whereby "A" is a name). VsFrege: (in Frege, basic principles of artihmetics) instead of "There are just as many Fs as Gs": "Either any given object F iff it is a G, or there is a relation that is a one-to-one correspondence between the Fs and Gs". But this must not be an identity. I 226 Identity/Geach: only objects can be strictly identical. - In terms, there is only analogous identity: if they are coextensive. >Coextensive. I 238 Identity/GeachVsQuine: Thesis: Identity is relative. - If someone says "x is identical to y", this is an incomplete expression. - It is an abbreviation for "x is the same as y". - (Weird, that Frege did not represent this). >Identity/Quine. Identity/tradition/Geach: can be expressed by a single schema. (1) l- Fa (x)(Fx u x = a) - everyday-language: whatever is true of something which is identical with an object y is true of a and vice versa. From this we derive the law of self-identity: "l-a = a". Because we take "Fx" for "x unequal a", then schema (1) gives us: (2) l- (a unequal a) Vx(y unequal a u x = a) - this,of course, gives "l-a = a" I 240 Identity/Geach: if we demand strict identity, regardless of the theory in which we move, we get into the semantic paradoxes such as Grelling's or Richard's >Grelling's paradox. Solution: relative identity on theory or language, indissibility/"indiscernibility"/Quine -> Partial identity. 1. Frege, G. (1893). Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. Jena: Hermann Pohle. --- Tugendhat I 37 Identity/Dummett/Geach: "=" can only be used with reference to objects. >Equal sign. Habermas IV 158 Identity/Geach/Habermas: Peter Geach argues that identity predicates can only be used meaningfully in connection with the general characterization of a class of objects.(1) (See also Criteria/Henrich, HenrichVsGeach). E.g. Person/Identification/Habermas: Persons cannot be identified under the same conditions as observable objects. In the case of persons, spatiotemporal identification is not sufficient. Also see >Identity/Henrich. 1.P.Geach, Ontological Relativity and Relative Identity, in: K. Munitz, Logic and Ontology, NY. 1973 |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Identity | Quine | I 208ff Identity/Davidson/Quine: we are unable to pick out the relationship that is constitutive for the knowledge of the identity of an object. The reason is that every property can be considered as relevant. If the mind can only think if it establishes a clear relationship to the object, then thought is impossible. (QuineVsRussell). Identity: does not work without conceptual scheme. Identity: QuineVsHume, QuineVsLeibniz: Confusion of word and object: there is no relation between different objects but a relationship between singular terms - a = b different names. I 211 Copula form indefinite singular terms: no longer Fa but a = b = E.g. Agnes = a lamb - but: Agnes bleats: Fa. I 211 Synonymy and analyticity is graded, identity is absolute. I 365 Identity conditions strong/weak/(s):> E.g. Paul and Elmer. II 23 Identity/absolutely distinguishable: an open sentence is only fulfilled by an object. Relatively distinguishable: only fulfilled in the given order. Identity: are objects that are not relatively distinguishable, not all objects that are not absolutely distinguishable. >Objects/Quine. I 397 Theseus' ship: it is not about the term "the same" but the term "ship" - each general term has its own individuation principle. II 156ff Individuation: in our world moment-to-moment individuation by predicates - for objects at random (everything can be the object), for predicates crucial truth value. Identification between possible worlds: is dependent on predicates - for body also from space displacement, composition, etc., therefore not cross-worlds - "The same object" is meaningless. -> singular term, instead predicate. Geach I 238 Identity/GeachVsQuine: Thesis: identity is relative - if someone says x is identical to y, this is an incomplete expression. - It is an abbreviation for "x is the same A as y". (Weird that Frege has not supported this). Identity/tradition/Geach: can be expressed by a single scheme: (1) l- Fa (x) (Fx ux = a) in everyday language: whatever is always true of something that is identical to an object y, is true of a and vice versa. From which we derive the law of self-identity from: l- a = a if we take Fx for x unequal to a then scheme (1) provides us with: (2) l- (a unequal a) Vx (x unequal a u x = a) - this results in l- a = a. Geach I 240 But Geach is for relative identity. Quine V 86 Identity/Quine: initially only means extending the time pointing - then it is a relative mass term: E.g. "the same dog as" - used for individuation of absolute general term E.g. "dog". Geach: this is a reduction to a relative term - Quine: that does not work when objects overlap. V 89 Identity/Geach: is only with respect to general terms the same thing. V 161 Identity: is restricted: in terms of general terms: "the same apple" - is unrestricted: Learning: 1. Anyone who agrees with the sentences [a = b] and [a is a g] also agrees to [b a g] ((s) > transitivity). 2. Disposition, to agree on [a = b], if it is recognized that one can agree [b is a g] due to [a is a g] for any g. - Relative identity: also this kind of identity is relative, because the identity scale depends on words. - [a = b] can get wrong when adding new terms. I 162 Definition identity/Set Theory/Quine: x = y as the statement y is an element of every class, from which x is an element - characterization of the identity by using all relative clauses. V 162 Definition Identity/Set Theory/Quine: with quantification over classes is x = y defined as the statement y is a member of each class, from which x is element. Language learning: here initially still substitutional quantification - then no class, but exhaustion of relative clauses. VII (d) 65ff Identity/Quine: important: is the demand for processes or temporally extended objects - by assuming identity rather than flow kinship, one speaks of the flow instead of stages. IX 24 Definition identity/Quine: we can now simplify: for y = z - y = z stands for x (x ε y x ε z) - because we have identified the individuals with their classes. X 90 Definiton identity/Quine: then we define "x = y" as an abbreviation for: Ax ↔ Ay (z) (bzx ↔ bzy. Bxz ↔ Byz .Czx ↔ Czy .Cxz ↔ Cyz (z') (Dzz'x ↔.... .. Dzz'y .Dzxz'↔ Dzyz' Dxzz '↔ Dyzz')) - i.e. that the objects u x. y are not distinguishable by the four predicates, not even in terms of the relation to other objects z and z'. X 99 Identity/Quine: is only defined (in our appearance theory of set theory) between variables but it is not defined between abstraction expressions or their schematic letters. XII 71 Relative identity/Quine: results from ontological relativity, because no entity without identity - this is only explicable in the frame theory. - E.g. distinguishability of income classes. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Individuation | Buridan | Geach I 134 Individuation/identification/Buridan/Geach: E.g. a horse dealer has exactly three horses: Brownie, Blackie and Fallow. The customer accepts the dealer's statement: "I will give you one of my horses". But the dealer does not deliver and denies that he owes the customer anything. His argument: "I should owe you either Brownie, or Blackie or Fallow. I 135 But what I said did not refer to Blackie any more as on Fallow or the other way around and just as little on Brownie. I owe you none of the three." GeachVsBuridan: a part of the difficulties that Buridan has himself comes from the fact that he allows the conclusion of "I owe you a horse" to "There is a horse I owe you"! But even if we cannot do it in general, it seems plausible in this particular case to allow "I owe you something", so "there is something ..." We can even accept this without accepting Buridan's invalid rule. Geach: many authors believe that any case of an invalid conclusion procedure is an invalid conclusion, but that is a great logical error! Horse dealer: "If I owe you a horse, I owe you something, and that can only be a horse of mine, you will not say because of my words that it is something else I owe you! Well then: Tell me which of my horses I owe you. Solution/Buridan: One can say that x owes me y, if and only if I am even with him by giving y! Whichever of the three horses should be y, by handing out the two they will be even! So: whichever x will be, the dealer owes the customer x. I 136 It is true of Brownie, it is true of Blackie and it is true of Fallow that it is a horse that the dealer owes the customer. If we now consider e.g. only Brownie and Blackie, we could say that the dealer owes these two. But Buridan himself warns us not to confuse collective and distributive use. >Distribution. Solution: it is not the case that "there are two horses ..." But "it is true of everyone that he owes it"! Buridan: according to his own principle, we cannot conclude from "there are two .." to "The dealer owes two ..". For that would be the wrong "ratio" (aspect), namely that the dealer would have had to say, in a sentence, that he owes the two. Similarly, we cannot conclude from "Brownie is a horse that the dealer owes" (Buridan: true) to "The dealer owes Brownie". To do so, the dealer would have had to explicitly express the sentence. >Aspects, >Propositions, >Sentences. GeachVsBuridan: that cannot be allowed! I cannot conclude from "I owe you something" to "There is something that I owe you"! Cf. >Someone. E.g. The bank has stored somewhere the money of people. From this I cannot conclude: some of it is mine! But this is anything but trivial. The problem is not limited to this example. E.g. From "b F't one or another A" I cannot conclude: "There is one or another identifiable thing that b F't". That is why we must rebuild Buridan's whole theory. I 137 E.g. Geach is looking for a detective story: according to Buridan it turns out: For an x, Geach searches for x under the aspect ("ratio") "detective story". Problem: even if I was looking exactly for a detective story, there was an identifiable x not necessarily a detective story I was looking for. (?). We rather need a dyadic relation between Geach and an aspect (ratio)! Geach sought something under the ratio "detective story". The bound words are an indivisible relative term. Clearer: Geach sought something under the ratio which is evoked (appellata) by the term "detective story" Then "search ... of" is a singular relative term. We can abbreviate it: "S'te" Then we have a quote rather than a "ratio". Then we do not need to quantify via "ratio". We can say: "There is a detective story that Geach seeks" as "For an x, x is a detective story, and for a w, w is a description which is true of x, and Geach S'te w ("sought something under the ratio evoked by the particular identifier w"). Here we quantify via forms of words whose identity criteria, if not quite clear, are clearer than those of rationes. >Identity criteria, >Description, >Identification. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Information Retrieval | Norvig | Norvig I 867 Information Retrieval/Norvig/Russell: Information retrieval is the task of finding documents that are relevant to a user’s need for information. An information retrieval (IR) system can be characterized by 1. A corpus of documents. Each system must decide what it wants to treat as a document: a paragraph, a page, or a multipage text. 2. Queries posed in a query language. A query specifies what the user wants to know. The query language can be just a list of words, such as [AI book]; or it can specify a phrase of words that must be adjacent, as in [“AI book”]; it can contain Boolean operators as in [AI AND book]; it can include non-Boolean operators such as [AI NEAR book] or [AI book site: www.aaai.org]. 3. A result set. This is the subset of documents that the IR system judges to be relevant to the query. By relevant, we mean likely to be of use to the person who posed the query, for the particular information need expressed in the query. 4. A presentation of the result set. This can be as simple as a ranked list of document titles or as complex as a rotating color map of the result set projected onto a three dimensional space, rendered as a two-dimensional display. The earliest IR systems worked on a Boolean keyword model. Each word in the document collection is treated as a Boolean feature that is true of a document if the word occurs in the document and false if it does not. Norvig I 868 VsBoolean model: Problems: First, the degree of relevance of a document is a single bit, so there is no guidance as to how to order the relevant documents for presentation. Second, Boolean expressions are unfamiliar to users who are not programmers or logicians. Third, it can be hard to formulate an appropriate query, even for a skilled user. Solution: Most IR systems have abandoned the Boolean model and use models based on the statistics of word counts. A scoring function takes a document and a query and returns a numeric score; the most relevant documents have the highest scores. Relevance/weight: Three factors affect the weight of a query term: First, the frequency with which a query term appears in a document (also known as TF for term frequency). For the query [farming in Kansas], documents that mention “farming” frequently will have higher scores. Second, the inverse document frequency of the term, or IDF. The word “in” appears in almost every document, so it has a high document frequency, and thus a low inverse document frequency, and thus it is not as important to the query as “farming” or “Kansas.” Third, the length of the document. A million-word document will probably mention all the query words, but may not actually be about the query. A short document that mentions all the words is a much better candidate. Norvig I 870 Refinements of IR: One common refinement is a better model of the effect of document length on relevance. Singhal et al. (1996)(1) observed that simple document length normalization schemes tend to favor short documents too much and long documents not enough. They propose a pivoted document length normalization scheme; the idea is that the pivot is the document length at which the old-style normalization is correct; documents shorter than that get a boost and longer ones get a penalty. Stemming algorithms: Most IR systems do case folding of “COUCH” to “couch,” and some use a stemming algorithm to reduce “couches” to the stem form “couch,” both in the query and the documents. This typically yields a small increase in recall (on the order of 2% for English). However, it can harm precision. For example, stemming “stocking” to “stock” will tend to decrease precision for queries about either foot coverings or financial instruments, although it could improve recall for queries about warehousing. Stemming algorithms based on rules (e.g., remove “-ing”) cannot avoid this problem, but algorithms based on dictionaries (don’t remove “-ing” if the word is already listed in the dictionary) can. While stemming has a small effect in English, it is more important in other languages. Synomyms: The next step is to recognize synonyms, such as “sofa” for “couch.” As with stemming, this has the potential for small gains in recall, but can hurt precision. The problem is that “languages abhor absolute synonyms just as nature abhors a vacuum” (Cruse, 1986)(2). ((s) Cf. >Synonymy/Philosophical theories). Metadata: As a final refinement, IR can be improved by considering metadata—data outside of the text of the document. Examples include human-supplied keywords and publication data. On the Web, hypertext links between documents are a crucial source of information. Norvig I 884 History: The field of information retrieval is experiencing a regrowth in interest, sparked by the wide usage of Internet searching. Robertson (1977)(3) gives an early overview and introduces the probability ranking principle. Croft et al. (2009)(4) and Manning et al. (2008)(5) are the first textbooks to cover Web-based search as well as traditional IR. Hearst (2009)(6) covers user interfaces for Web search. The TREC conference, organized by the U.S. government’s National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), hosts an annual competition for IR systems and publishes proceedings with results. In the first seven years of the competition, performance roughly doubled. The most popular model for IR is the vector space model (Salton et al., 1975)(7). Salton’s work dominated the early years of the field. There are two alternative probabilistic models, one due to Ponte and Croft (1998)(8) and one by Maron and Kuhns (1960)(9) and Robertson and Sparck Jones (1976)(10). Lafferty and Zhai (2001)(11) show that the models are based on the same joint probability distribution, but that the choice of model has implications for training the parameters. Craswell et al. (2005)(12) describe the BM25 scoring function and Svore and Burges (2009)(13) describe how BM25 can be improved with a machine learning approach that incorporates click data—examples of past search queries and the results that were clicked on. Brin and Page (1998)(14) describe the PageRank algorithm and the implementation of a Web search engine. Kleinberg (1999)(15) describes the HITS algorithm. Silverstein et al. (1998)(16) investigate a log of a billion Web searches. The journal Information Retrieval and the proceedings of the annual SIGIR conference cover recent developments in the field. 1. Singhal, A., Buckley, C., and Mitra, M. (1996). Pivoted document length normalization. In SIGIR-96, pp. 21–29. 2. Cruse, D. A. (1986). Lexical Semantics. Cambridge University Press. 3. Robertson, S. E. (1977). The probability ranking principle in IR. J. Documentation, 33, 294–304. 4. Croft, B., Metzler, D., and Stroham, T. (2009). Search Engines: Information retrieval in Practice. Addison Wesley. 5. Manning, C., Raghavan, P., and Schütze, H. (2008). Introduction to Information Retrieval. Cambridge University Press. 6. Hearst,M. A. (2009). Search User Interfaces. Cambridge University Press. 7. Salton, G., Wong, A., and Yang, C. S. (1975). A vector space model for automatic indexing. CACM, 18(11), 613–620. 8. Ponte, J. and Croft, W. B. (1998). A language modeling approach to information retrieval. In SIGIR-98, pp. 275–281. 9. Maron, M. E. and Kuhns, J.-L. (1960). On relevance, probabilistic indexing and information retrieval. CACM, 7, 219–244. 10. Robertson, S. E. and Sparck Jones, K. (1976). Relevance weighting of search terms. J. American Society for Information Science, 27, 129–146. 11. Lafferty, J. and Zhai, C. (2001). Probabilistic relevance models based on document and query generation. In Proc. Workshop on Language Modeling and Information Retrieval. 12. Craswell, N., Zaragoza, H., and Robertson, S. E. (2005). Microsoft Cambridge at trec-14: Enterprise track. In Proc. Fourteenth Text Retrieval Conference. 13. Svore, K. and Burges, C. (2009). A machine learning approach for improved bm25 retrieval. In Proc. Conference on Information Knowledge Management. 14. Brin, S. and Page, L. (1998). The anatomy of a large-scale hypertextual web search engine. In Proc. Seventh World Wide Web Conference. 15. Kleinberg, J. M. (1999). Authoritative sources in a hyperlinked environment. JACM, 46(5), 604–632. 16. Silverstein, C., Henzinger, M., Marais, H., and Moricz,M. (1998). Analysis of a very large altavista query log. Tech. rep. 1998-014, Digital Systems Research Center. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Introduction | Belnap | Brandom II 94 Def "tonk"/logical particle/Belnap: 1. Rule: licenses the transition from p to p tonk q for any q. 2. Rule: licenses the transition from p tonk q to q. Thus we have a "network map for inferences": any possible conclusion is allowed! >Definitions, >Definability, >Conclusions, >Inferences, >Logical constants, >Connections. II 93 Conservativity/Conservative Expansion/Dummett: If a logical constant is introduced by introduction and elimination rules, we may call it a conservative extension of language. >Conservativity. II 94 For example, this might be true of Belnaps "tonk": the introduction rule of the disjunction and the elimination rule of the conjunction. >Disjunction, >Conjunction. PriorVsBelnap/PriorVsGentzen: this is the bankruptcy of definitions in the style of Gentzen. BelnapVsPrior: if one introduces logical vocabulary, one can restrict such definitions by the condition that the rule does not allow inferences with only old vocabulary that was not already allowed before the introduction of the logical vocabulary. (Conservative expansion). Such a restriction is necessary and sufficient. >Expansion, >Sufficiency. Brandom: the expressive analysis of the logical vocabulary provides us with a deep reason for this condition: only in this way the logical vocabulary can perform its expressive function. The introduction of new vocabulary would allow new material inferences without the constraining condition (conservativity) and would thus change the contents correlated with the old vocabulary. >Vocabulary, >Content, cf. other entries for >"tonk". |
Beln I N. Belnap Facing the Future: Agents and Choices in Our Indeterminist World Oxford 2001 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Kripke’s Wittgenstein | Wright | I 264ff Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Kripkenstein: no behavior allows us to infer internal rules (in the past) about addition, so there are no rules about meaning, not in the present, therefore, not about truth. >Rules, >Behavior, >Language behavior. I 269 Kripke’s Wittgenstein: Vs: the skeptical thought confused mention and use by concluding that all that is true of meanings, also applies to truth. See also >Private Language, >Rule Following, >Quaddition, >Mention, >Use, >Necessity/Wright. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Language Rules | Chisholm | II 68/69 Language rules/Carnap: a) what "square" is true of, is a square, b) what "rectangle" is true of, is a rectangle c) What are "square" is true of, is a rectangle - meaning postulates allow the step c) - Mention/use/Carnap: the expressions are not mentioned in the maning postulate, but only used - "(x) (Fx> Gx)" is a m.post. of S" is a statement about "F" and "G" in S. >Meaning postulates, >Mention, >Use. ChisholmVsCarnap: Tarski: on the left is a necessary condition for the truth of the expression on the right-hand side - that does not refer to language rules, but to non-linguistic entites - no sentence is true only due to the use. Cf. >Truth definition. Sauer, W. Über das Analytische und das synthetische Apriori bei Chisholm. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Lateralization of the Brain | Developmental Psychology | Upton I 71 Lateralization/Language/right hemisphere/developmental psychology/Upton: Handedness has traditionally been thought to have a strong link to brain organisation. Paul Pierre Broca first described language regions in the left hemisphere of right-handers in the nineteenth century and, from then on, it was accepted that the reverse, that is, right-hemisphere language dominance, should be true of left-handers (Knecht et al., 2000)(1). However, in reality the left-hand side of the brain dominates in language processing for most people: around 95 per cent of right-handers process speech predominantly in the left hemisphere (Springer and Deutsch, 1985)(2), as do more than 50 per cent of left-handers (Knecht et al., 2000)(1). According to Knecht et al., left-handedness is neither a precondition nor a necessary consequence of right-hemisphere language dominance (Knecht et al., 2000(1), p. 2517). Left-handedness is more frequently seen in creative and artistic individuals, such as musicians and artists, than would be expected by chance (Schachter and Ransil, 1996)(3). This might be explained by the finding that left-handers tend to have exceptional visual-spatial skills (Holtzen, 2000)(4), meaning that they are better able to recognise and represent shape and form (Ghayas and Adil, 2007)(5). Studies have shown a tendency for left-handers to score highly on intelligence tests (e.g. Bower, 1985(6); Ghayas and Adil, 2007(5)); however, it has also been noted that left-handers are more likely to have reading problems than right-handers (Natsopuolos et al., 1998), which may be related to the way they process language. >Language Development/Developmental psychology, >Brain, >Brain development. 1. Knecht, S, Dräger, B, Deppe, M, Bobe, L and Lohmann, H. (2000) Handedness and hemispheric language dominance in healthy humans. Brain, 123(12): 2512–18. 2. Springer, S.P. and Deutsch, G. (1985) Left Brain, Right Brain. New York: WH Freeman. 3. Schachter, S.C. and Ransil, B.J. (1996) Handedness distributions in nine professional groups. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 82: 51–63. 4. Holtzen, DW (2000) Handedness and professional tennis. International Journal of Neuroscience. 105: 109–19. 5. Ghayas, S. and Adil, A. (2007) Effect of handedness on intelligence level of students. Journal of the Indian Academy of Applied Psychology, 33(1): 85–91. 6. Bower, B. (1985) The left hand of math and verbal talent. Science News, 127(17): 263. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Logic | Mates | I 258 Definition logic/Mates: theory of conlcusion relation. Task: to find general laws about what follows from what - correct thinking is not a contribution to logic. >Conditional/Mates, >Consequence, >Inference, >Conclusion, >Logical laws. I 260 Logic/Aristotle/Mates: Aristotle did not yet know the distinction mention/use. >Mention/use, >Aristotle. It is the same: if a thing is contained in another, and when each is stated of the other. I 261 First clear use of variables in history - for these names are used. >Variables, >Unity and multiplicity, >Difference, >Names. Variables/Stoics: "the first", "the second", etc. (unlike Aristotle). I 262 "Zukommen"/Aristotle: goes in both directions - which shows that there is no distinction between concept and object. >Concept, >Object, >Object/Quine, >Levels/order, >Levels of Description. I 265 Terms for "Zukommen" are nouns, sensual beings, human, for "Nicht-Zukommen" substance, sensual being, number. ((s) Today the corresponding form is "true of".) >Satisfaction, >Satisfiability. I 281 Logic/Hobbes/Mates: influential (misleading) Argument: necessary truths would just come about through the random way how people like tthe o use their words. >Necessity, >Contingency, >Language use. |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
| Logical Form | Rorty | IV 116 f Distinction interior/exterior/logical form/Rorty: common form of this problem: you can not say something of the type x is understandable. IV 117 If the listener must know what a non-x is. However, this formulation is again unsatisfactory, because the concept of intelligibility is unclear when applied to things (for example, noumenon or infinite substance). >Exterior/interior, >Understanding, >Distinctions, >Being true of. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Logical Form | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 80 Logical Form/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the objects are constitutive of the logical forms of atomic sentences - the complex shapes are not independent objects - form of the object: what is a priori true of it - determines the connectability -> Compositionality. --- IV 25 Logical Form/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: we get it when we transform all arbitrary characters into variables - it depends only on the nature of the sentence, not arbitrariness - this class corresponds to the logical form. --- Tetens VII 133 Predication/Logical Form/Tractatus/Tetens: a) "the object A has the property F " ((s) predication), Fa) - b) "any object with property F, also has the property G" ((s) Universal quantification (x) (Fx> Gx)). |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 Tetens I H. Tetens Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994 W VII H. Tetens Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009 |
| Materialism | Chalmers | Stalnaker I 242 Definition Type-A-materialism/Chalmers/Stalnaker: (Chalmers 1996(1), 165-6) thesis: consciousness as far as it exists, logically supervenes on the physical for functionalist or eliminativistic reasons - Definition type-B materialism: thesis: consciousness does not logically supervene on the physical, so there is no a priori implication from the physical to the phenomenal - yet materialism is claimed. >Supervenience. 1. Chalmers, D. (1996). The Conscious Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chalmers I XIII Materialism/Chalmers: to account for consciousness, we have to go beyond the resources it provides. Chalmers I 41 Definition Materialism/Physicalism/Chalmers: the thesis that all positive facts about the world supervene globally logically on physical facts. >Supervenience/Chalmers. I 42 Materialism is true when all the positive facts about the world are entailed by the physical facts. (See also Chalmers I 364). That is, if for every logically possible world W, which is physically indistinguishable from our world, all positive facts which are true of our world are also true of world W. This corresponds to Jackson's physicalism: Definition Physicalism/Jackson: (Jackson 1994)(1): Criterion: every minimal physical duplicate of our actual world is simply a duplicate of our world (See also Chalmers I 364). >F. Jackson, >Possible Worlds. I 123 Materialism/ChalmersVsMaterialism: if my assumptions about conscious experience (phenomenal consciousness) are correct, materialism must be wrong: 1. There are conscious experiences in our world 2. There is a logically possible world that is physically identical to our actual world in which the positive facts about consciousness are not valid in our world. 3. Therefore, facts about consciousness are additional facts, beyond the physical facts. 4. Therefore, materialism is wrong. >Consciousness/Chalmers. I 124 The same conclusion can be drawn from the logical possibility of worlds with interchanged conscious experiences. >Inverted spectra. So when God created the world, after securing the physical facts, he had more to do, than Kripke says: he had to make that the facts about consciousness remain. The failure of this kind of materialism leads to a kind of dualism. >Dualism, >Property dualism. I 139 MaterialismVsChalmers: could argue that the unimaginability of certain worlds (see above) is only due to our cognitive limitations. Then the corresponding world would not even be logically possible! (This would be a possible interpretation of McGinn 1989 (1).) Analogy: one might suppose that the decision e.g. about the continuum hypothesis or its negation is beyond our cognitive abilities. ChalmersVsVs: this analogy does not work in the case of our understanding of modalities (modes of necessity and possibility). >Modality, >Possibility, >Necessity. E.g. it is also not the case that a smarter version of the color researcher Mary would know better how it is to see a color. I 144 Materialism/Chalmers: Chalmers would simply deny that Mary makes any discoveries at all. This is the strategy of Lewis (1990)(3) and Nemirov (1990)(4): Mary only acquires an additional ability (to recognize), but no knowledge. ChalmersVsNemirow/ChalmersVsLewis: Although there are no internal problems with this strategy, it is implausible. I 145 Mary really learns new facts about the nature of the experience. She has reduced the space of epistemic possibilities. Omniscience/Chalmers: for an omniscient being, there is no such narrowing of possibilities. Loar: (1990)(5) he derives from this new knowledge of Mary conditionals: "If seeing red things is like this, and seeing blue things is like this, then seeing violet things is probably like this." DennettVsJackson: (Dennett 1991)(6) Mary does not learn anything at all. She could not be deceived, e.g. by experimenters holding a blue apple instead of a red one in front of her. She has already learned the necessary from the reactions of others in her environment. ChalmersVsDennett: but this does not show that she had the decisive (phenomenal) knowledge. >Knowledge how, >Phenomena, >Qualia. 1. F. Jackson, Finding the mind in the natural world. In: R. Casati, B. Smith and G. White, eds. Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences, Vienna: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky. 2. C. McGinn, Can we solve the mind-body problem? Mind 98, 1989: pp.349-66 3. D. Lewis, What experience teaches. In: W. Lycan (Ed) Mind and Cognition. Oxford 1990 4. L. Nemirow, Physicalism and the cognitive role of acquaintance. In: W. Lycan (Ed) Mind and Cognition. Oxford 1990 5. B. Loar, Phenomenal states. Philosophical Perspectives 4, 1990: pp. 81-108 6. D. Dennett, Consciousness Explained, Boston, 1991 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Materialism | Kripke | Putnam II 189 KripkeVsMaterialism: because of "essential properties", e.g. a statue and clay are two objects, different statements are true of them. Clay: is a property: "an article which could have been spherical" - that does not apply to the statue. >Properties/Kripke, >Statue/clay. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Mention | Geach | I 74 Mention/Use/Geach: for each x: either x is white or x is not white. Mention: for each object x: either the predicate is "white" or its negation is true of x. "True-of": is a simpler term. Therefore, Tarski begins his defintion of truth with it: >Satisfaction. E.g.,"Proxy": at use - quote: at mention. Mention: "... its negation is true of ..". Negation is mentioned. Use of the negation: "x is ~ F" - ((s) Mention/(s): about the negation: "it is true" - likewise: "has a true negation".) ad I 84 Mention/Use/Quote/Geach/(s) E.g. "is an obscene expression" is not an obscene expression. I 195 Meta-language/mention/use/Geach: if p and q are meta-linguistical variables, then "~ p" means: "the negation of p" and not "it is not the case that p". >Meta language, >Variables, >Object language, >Levels/Order, >Use. I 202 Mention/use/names/sentence/Geach: names of expressions are formed by quotation marks - then at the same time mention and use. - Mentioned by the combination of its own with the quotes - used as part of a complex expression. >Quotation marks, >Name of a sentence, >Quote. Mention/Use: both are no contrasting pair. I 225 Mention/Use: E.g. a class or number is specified by mention (not use) of a property. >Classes, >Properties. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Natural Kinds | AI Research | Norvig I 443 Natural kinds/AI research/Norvig/Russell: Some categories have strict definitions: an object is a triangle if and only if it is a polygon with three sides. On the other hand, most categories in the real world have no clear-cut definition; these are called natural kind categories. For example, tomatoes tend to be a dull scarlet (…). There is, however, variation: some tomatoes are yellow or orange, unripe tomatoes are green (…). Problem: This poses a problem for a logical agent. The agent cannot be sure that an object it has perceived is a tomato, and even if it were sure, it could not be certain which of the properties of typical tomatoes this one has. This problem is an inevitable consequence of operating in partially observable environments. One useful approach is to separate what is true of all instances of a category from what is true only of typical instances. So in addition to the category Tomatoes, we will also have the category Typical (Tomatoes). - ((s) >Stereotypes/Philosophical theories, >Natural kinds/Philosophical theories). >Ontology/AI research, >Categories/AI research, >Knowledge representation/AI research. Norvig I 469 The problems associated with natural kinds and inexact category boundaries have been addressed by Wittgenstein (1953)(1), Quine (1953)(2), Lakoff (1987)(3), and Schwartz (1977)(4), among others. 1. Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical Investigations. Macmillan 2. Quine, W. V. (1953). Two dogmas of empiricism. In From a Logical Point of View, pp. 20–46. Harper and Row. 3. Lakoff, G. (1987). Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind. University of Chicago Press. 4. Schwartz, S. P. (Ed.). (1977). Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds. Cornell University Press. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Necessity | Leibniz | Holz I 40 Necessity/Leibniz: ultimately, the insight (that is, through the use of the definition instead of the defined) arises from the seen concepts that they are necessary or that they imply a contradiction. >Concept/Leibniz, >Definition/Leibniz. I 72 Existence/Necessity/Identity/Being/Leibniz: the sentences "The being is" and "Only one being is necessary" stand in a very specific follow-up ratio: The sentence "the being is" is an identical proposition, i.e. its opposite is contradictory. Thus existential and copulative (copula) use of "is" coincide here. One could also say "being is being" in order to make clear that the predicate is necessary for the subject. But: For example, "the stone is a being stone": this sentence is not identical, the being does not necessarily belong to the stone! The stone could only be thought of. Therefore, we need perception to be convinced of the existence. But this is not only true of bodies, but also of general things, e.g. the genus human, it does not exist neccessarily. >Existence/Leibniz, >Existence statement/Leibniz. I 73 The necessity of existence is valid only by the world as a whole. >World/Leibniz. I 78 Intension/Extension/Leibniz/Holz: The necessity of the totality of the world is not the modal aspect of the extensionality (or statement form, according to which a predicate is assigned to a subject), but the intensional necessity or materiality according to which the predicate is inherent in the subject. >Intension, >Extension. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Nobody, Some | Cresswell | II 98 Def someone/anyone/Cresswell: can be called "nominal" (noun phrase, NP). >Noun phrase. They are higher level functors on one-place predicates. E.g. if a is a predicate, then a sentence that says that this predicate is true of someone. Name: common names also can be used as nominal (NP). But while a name can always be treated as a NP, a NP can not be treated as a name. >Proper names. E.g. "someone" cannot be treated as a name. Noun phrases (NP) are treated as names Descriptons: are nominals. >Someone/Geach, >Descriptions. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Object | Rorty | VI 50 ff Wittgenstein has shown that the "relevant object domain" is never "there" in the relevant sense. Therefore it is the question: whether there is a way to isolate the input without reference to the "evaluative point of view". >Relevance. VI 154 Object/description/Rorty: the object is what most of the beliefs that contain it are true of. >Beliefs, >Description, >Truth. Rorty thesis: the object changes when we modify our descriptions. >Description dependence. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Ontological Commitment | Quine | Lauener XI 130 Ontological Commitment/Quine/Lauener: only exists when an object is common to all differently re-interpreted domains - (while retaining the interpretation of the predicates) - the theory only presupposes objects if it would be wrong if the objects did not exist - E.g. "objects of any kind whatsoever": here one is commited to dogs if each of the domains contains one or the other dog. XI 48 Substitutional Quantification/sQ/Ontology/Quine/Lauener: substitutional quantification does not enter into an ontological obligation in so far as the names used do not have to name anything. That is, we are not forced to accept values of the variables. XI 49 QuineVsSubstitutional Quantification: precisely with this we disguise ontology by not getting out of the language. >Substitutional Quantification/Quine. XI 133 Ontology/Modality/LauenerVsQuine: it is noticeable that in its formulations occur intensional expressions such as "must occur among the values of the variables", "must be true of" etc. Or psychological connotations such as "we look at". ChurchVsQuine: the expression "ontological commitment" is intentional. (>Intensions). XI 158 Ontology/ontological obligation/Quine/Lauener: Lauener: unsolved problem: the relationship between ontological obligation and ontology. For example, two modern chemical theories, one implies the existence of molecules with a certain structure, the other denies them. Question: do they have the same ontology despite different commitments? Quine/Lauener: would probably say yes and say that one of the two theories must be wrong. ((s) Then they have rather the same obligation than the same ontology). LauenerVsQuine: my attempts to solve these problems make me believe that not only the quantified variables (with the objects) but also the predicates play a role. Quine VII (a) 12 Ontology: the bound variable is the only way to impose ontological obligations on us. Example: we can already say that it is something (namely the value of the bound variables) that red houses and sunsets have in common. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Q XI H. Lauener Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982 |
| Opacity | Quine | I 263 Opacity: not "belief" is opaque, but the "that"! (Kronecker-Example) - ((s) CresswellVs?). I 268 Opaque context: has no significant function - Frege: "Name of a thought", "name of a property", "name of individual concepts" - Russell: "propositional attitude". >Propositional Attitudes/Quine. I 270 Opaque verb: "hunts lions" is nothing in relation and is not appointed to a Lion - Relative Term: the police chases a man. XI 175 Quantification in opaque contexts/FollesdalVsQuine: we would then have to make opaque contexts referentially transparent (what is true, is true of the object regardless of the givenness) - and at the same time makes extensionally opaque (some properties are necessary, other accidental) - this is the essentialism. >Quantification/Quine. Perler / Wild I 103 Referentially Opaque/Quine/Armstrong: basic: shows actual content of beliefs, not coreferentially replaceable expressions - transparent: substitutability by coreferential expressions: is suitable for the attribution of attitudes to animals. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Parts | Simons | I 26f Real part/mereology: there must be at least a second real part. BrentanoVs: e.g. a man is a real part of the event "sitting human" but here there is no second real part. Otherwise: Thatcher qua Prime Minister: is not part of Thatcher. >Qua-objects. Solution: supplement principles: there must be at least two real parts (if at all). There must be the possibility of separate parts and not only overlapping. >Overlapping. I 135 Predicate/part/whole/mereology/Simons: certain predicates are true of their objects because other predicates are true of their parts: e.g. Socrates was snub-nosed, because his nose was blunt, e.g. a table mountain is flat, because its upper part is flat. Predication of the whole is inherited by predication of the parts (local predication). For continuants this is even the only kind of predication. >Predicates, >Predication. Variation/continuants/mereology/McTaggart/Simons: e.g. the poker which is hot at the front and cool at the back: that is a variation on the object, but no change of the properties. It is a complex condition. On the other hand: e.g. when the entire poker gets hot, we have to say that the point in time is not the same.> >Change, >Temporal identity, >Properties. I 210 Part/whole/Simons: thesis: we reject the antisymmetry between part and whole. Then different objects can have the same parts - and these are necessarily in the same place at the same time. >Superposition. I 229 Part/Simons: the wit of this expression is that without it, we have no concept of space restrictions or perhaps of the space at all. I 235 Part/plural designation/multiplicity/Simons: (1): b is part of a: here b is a mass term (e.g. dough) or individual term (e.g. an apple) (2): b is part of a: here b must be an individual term (e.g. an apple) (3): b are parts of a: here b must be a plural term (e.g. wolves, e.g. blueberries are part of the cake, they are not "a part" of the cake. "Are part of": is the plural of "is part of". "Are parts of": is the plural of "is part of". (4): b are parts of a: here any b must be part of a, e.g. crankshaft and transmission are parts of the car, e.g. "the front" is part of the car, but not a part of the car. Whatever is a part of something, is also part of it but not vice versa. "A part of" has extra sense opposed to "part of". Component ("a part of") exists before installation and survived replacement. I 334 Part/fragment/relation/function/mereology/Simons: an arbitrary conceptual cut, e.g. "northern part of the house" is typically not closed under the relation, under which the whole is closed. >Mereology. I 337 Part/pure mereology/Simons: a mere relation of co-parts could not distinguish which objects are more unified (integrated). >Part-of-relation. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Perspective | Nozick | II 22 Perspective/Nozick: it is true of all perspectives that each perspective is particular. These relational facts are about one perspective but they are independent of each perspective. Cf. >Objectivity/Nagel. One can identify a point of view quite different from the way the world looks from it. >Point of view, >Truth, >Facts, >Relations, cf. >Way of givenness. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Philosophy | Ayers | Rorty VI 408 Philosophy/AyersVsRorty: the following theses are generally represented by the same people 1. Realism/antirealism is an important distinction 2. Dummett is right: these antirealism/realsim conflicts have been the most decisive in the history of philosophy. --- VI 409 3. Wilson is right when it expresses doubts about the contingency of the problems. 4. Ayers is right, one must not allow one's own metaphysical and epistemic theories to be influenced by one's own politics and morality. 5. Color: the problem of "the nature of color" is not solvable. The same is true of the body-soul problem. 6. Descartes' skepticism is ahistorical. 7. Sellars and Davidson are wrong when they say that the sensory organs merely play a causal role. Pro McDowell: Revival of Empiricism. 8. Identity with oneself is not dependent on description, but on intrinsic, nonrelational features. Some terms are rigid. 9. Recognition of the unspeakable is praiseworthy intellectual modesty. 10. Locke's "Essay concern human understandig" is not a signpost, but a work still to be explored that contains not yet articulated truths. RortyVsAyers: in all 10 theses above, Ayers and I have diametrically opposed views. --- VI 410 Rorty: we will never be able to establish a "purely logical" argument for or against one of the ten theses. --- VI 411 "Linguistic Idealism"/Rorty: conflict term of AyersVsSellars. RortyVsAyers: a lot has to be already in the language before a plausible appeal to the taste of onions is possible at all. --- VI 412 This also includes the notion of an inner "Cartesian stage". This also includes the notion of "consciousness" (as a notion of the 17th century). |
Ayers I M. Ayers "Locke" in: Arguments of the Philosophers London 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Presuppositions | Geach | I 82f Presupposition/(Law of the) Excluded Middle/Geach: alleged counter-example against the sentence of the excluded middle: For example, from something that is not an animal, one might assume that it is neither true nor false that it is hungry. So the predicate "animal" is presupposed. >Cf. >Counterfactual conditional. Geach: presupposition is quite different from entailment: if "hungry" entails "animal" then: "non-animal" entails "not-hungry". - Problem: from a thing "not animal" would at the same time be hungry/non-hungry. >Entailment/Geach. Def hungry/terminology/Geach: true of all that is hungry. Def not-hungry/terminology/Geach: true of everything of which "not-hungry" is true and "animal" is not true. ((s) So no object since they cannot be "not-hungry".) Geach: this eliminates categorical differences of "hungry" and "animal". >Categories, >Categorization. >Terminology/Geach. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Propositional Knowledge | Schiffer | I 214 Def Propositional knowledge/Schiffer: knowing that such and such is true of an expression. No propositional knowledge: E.g. knowing the meaning of an expression in their own language. >Knowledge. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Quantifiers | Cresswell | I 137f Quantifiers/everyday language/Quine/Kaplan/Geach/Cresswell: not 1st order: E.g. some critics only admire each other 2nd order: (Eφ)(Exφx u (x)(φx > x is a critics) u (x)(y)((φx u x admires y) > (x ≠ y u φy))). That is not equivalent to any 1st order sentence - involves plural noun phrases (plural quantification). The following is not correct: "two Fs are G". One would have to assume that "admire" should be valid in both directions - (then x is a K u y is a K u x ≠ y ... "). Better: "admire each other" is a predicate that is applied to pairs. 139 Correct: "Smart and Armstrong are present" for "S. is a and A is a". Problem: "King and Queen are a lovable couple", then "The King is an adorable ..." analog: E.g. "similar", e.g. "lessen". Solution/Cresswell: applying predicate to quantities. I 140 .. "admires another linguist" must be a predicate which is applied to all logicians. - This shows that quantification of higher level is required. >Second order logic. Problem: this leads to the fact that the possibilities to have different ranges are restricted. I 142 Higher order quantifiers/plural quantifiers/Boolos: Thesis: these do not have to go via set theoretical entities, but can simply be interpreted as semantically primitive. ((s) basic concept). Cresswell: perhaps he is right. Hintikka: game theory. >Game-theoretical semantics. CresswellVsHintikka: only higher order entities. 2nd order quantification due to reference to quantities. I 156 Branching quantifiers/Booles/Cresswell: "for every A there is a B". (x)(Ey) (x = z ⇔ y = w) u (Ax > By) (z)(Ew) 2nd order translation: EφEψ(x)(z)((x = z ⇔ φ(x) = ψ(z)) u (Ax > Bφ(x)). Function/unique image/assignment/logical form/Cresswell: "(x = z ⇔ φ(x) = ψ (z)" says that the function is 1: 1. Generalization/Cresswell: If we replace W, C, A, B, and R by predicates that are true of all, and Lxyzw by Boolos ((x = z ⇔ y = w) u Ax> By) we have a proof of non-orderability of 1st order. >Orderability. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Reference | Horwich | I XV Reference/Horwich: there is little chance for a definition. Solution/Field: "primitive reference": predicate "F" is true of x iff x is F. The name "N" refers to x iff x = N. >Reference, >Reference/Field, >Definitions, >Definability, >Language use, >Word meaning, >Meaning, cf. >World/thinking. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Reliability Theory | Schiffer | I 83 SchifferVsReliability: (as the key to representation, e.g. fuel gauge: there are false truth conditional functions possible: E-functions that do not ascribe situations but false words: E.g. "snow is white"/"Coal is white" (for mentalese). - Even under "optimal conditions". - Then it is uncertain whether the reliability has come about on the wrong way. >Fuel gauge example, >Mentalese/Language of thought. I 83ff Arthritis/reliability/mentalese/relation theory/SchifferVsFodor: ... + ... - Alfred thinks in his idiolect that he has arthritis in his thigh. Supposing there is a second function g that assigns a condition to arthrite that we connect with shmarthritis (rheumatic-like). Then: you cannot determine if Alfred is more reliable according to f (attribution of truth conditions) or g (attribution of false words). Condition (c): an M-function f is the truth conditional function for x' lingua mentis M iff the head-reliability and world-head reliability of x (thinking in M) with respect to f is greater than with respect to any other M-function. This is neither sufficient nor necessary. We do not know by which attribution function the speaker proceeds. Cf. >Quaddition. I 87 Quaddition/reliability/relation theory/belief/Schiffer: if Ralph does not understand anything about mathematics: there is no difference between two attribution functions a) correct addition, b) quaddition. Because they provide the same values for manageable numbers - and are not discernible for inconceivably large numbers because they are incomprehensible. >Reliability theory. I 104 SchifferVsReliability Theory: the functional relation that is correlated by the reliability theory with "true of" has, as one of its realizations. >arthritis/"shmarthritis". Solution: there must be an "designated role". I 104 Reliability Theory/Schiffer: Solution: adequacy by disquotation schema. - The probability that an M-function f* exists is high, given that x s believes and f*(s) e.g. is about the stock market. ((s), i.e. we assume that the people usually believe and know something true what they are talking about.) I 105 Hartry Field: if there is a functional theory for mentalese, then the reliability theory is indispensable. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Representation | Brandom | I 155f Kant-Hegel representation: Experience: inferential activity. Representation > de re attribution. Other authors on attribution. I 900 Representational contents: linguistic through and through, but not purely linguistic. The representational dimension of propositional contents becomes explicit through the social perspective nature of accounting. >Content. --- Rorty VI 179 ff Representation/Brandom/Rorty: wants to save them from Davidson, who threw them out with the bathwater. The representationalist semantic theory contains an undeniable insight: whatever has a high propositional content necessarily has such a representational side; nothing which does not have this aspect would be seen as an expression of his proposition. BrandomVsDavidson. Rorty: With this he does not mean that truth is a property, it is in fact only about approval, not about description (>metaphysics). --- Bandom I 127 Representation/Brandom: problematic: there is no room for the concept of error: representation requires accuracy - statement truth - representation is not possible without practice: red dots, blue lines on the map. >Practise, >Experience, >Error, >Deception, >Correctness. VsDescartes: does not explain what it means to understand representation, namely understanding how we are responsible for them. I 126 Representation is not an expression. I 130 VsDescartes: it is about the correctness of the representation prior to understanding. Cf. >Understanding. I 145 BrandomVsRepresentation: unclear how to come to the concept of propositional content. I 923 Representation/SearleVsDavidson: content must be understood intrinsically and before analysis - but representation of signs, sounds not intrinsic, mere object of nature - derived intentionality comes from original intentionality of the mind. I 404f Representation/Brandom: from Descartes dualistic worldview of representation and the represented. four aspects: 1) Apart from "true", representation also needs "refers to" and "means" >Reference, >Meaning. 2) distinction between intensional and extensional contexts >Extension, >Intension. 3) "of" in de re-contexts: something true of Kant but not of Hegel >de re 4) Correctness of judgment and inference. >Judgment, >Inference, >Correctness. I 412 ~ BrandomVsRepresentation: instead expressive role. I 482 Representation/Brandom: Minority (Davidson): between propositionally rich intentional states and facts - Majority: no semantic priority is the result of the pragmatic prevalence of propositional - representation is initially representation of things, Reil and properties- Brandom: if this is true, allocation of intention and success cannot be explained at the level of propositional content. I 719 Representation/Brandom: E.g. McCarthy: propositional content as worldview depends on the facts in relation to the objects they represent - representation in this sense is fundamental intentionality. >Propositional content, >Intentionality. I 719f Representation/Brandom: a) pre-conceptual: does not require grasping the specific contents - e.g. orienting oneself with a map (also possible non-linguistically) E.g. interpreting a cloud as a sign of rain.Cf. >Map example, >Natural signs/Armstrong. b) as part of a discursive practice: E.g. infer from symbols that there is a river between two cities. I 722 Assertions and beliefs with a high propositional content are necessarily representationally substantial, because their inferential structure is essentially a social one. >Propositional content. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Representation | Field | II 55 Representations/Field: if they were only related to public language, why then internal? - Solution: distinction type/token. - Question: why then referring to public language: because one can only speak with respect to types of tokens. >Type/Token, >Everyday language, >Observation language, cf. >Theory language. II 58 Representations: their syntax can be determined without regard to the meanings - if we have laws for body movements from wishes, etc. (narrow psychological theory). >Syntax, >Meaning, >Behavior, >Desire, >Explanation. II 58 Semantics/Representation: We can make truth superfluous: if we have 1. laws of beliefs from stimuli 2. laws for body movements from beliefs and desires. That would be the "narrow psychological theory": then we do not need to assume meanings in representation. II 59 But if representation should be true, it must be correlated with meanings. >Presentation. II 60 Representation without meaning: E.g. for all sentences S1 and S2 in a system: if a person believes [S1 > S2] and desires S2, then he also wants S1. Field: Meanings is not needed because the believed sentences can all be wrong. - E.g. Radical Interpretation: the native raises his rifle: a reason to believe that a rabbit is nearby - (even if he is deceived). >Gavagai, >Radical interpretation. II 61 Representation/semantics/psychology: for their psychological explanations, we do not need the semantic notions like "true" and "refers to", which usually sets sentences in relation to the world. Belief/truth: nothing compels me to assume of a person that she has believes that are true of rabbits. - ((s) It is enough when he lifts his rifle.) Truth (of internal representations): we only need this if we assume that they are reliable indicators about the world. - E.g. a child behaves guiltily - For example, if a mathematician believes in a theory, it is a reason for me to believe it, too. >Reliability. II 66 Language/representation/Schiffer: early: (Schiffer, 1972)(1): The meaning of a sentence can be explained only by the notions of believe and desire. For example, to know the meaning of "Caesar was egoistic," one must know that the proposition is conventionally correlated with believe that Caesar was egoistic. >Representation/Schiffer. Everything goes through inner representations and these can be explained without further reference to language. FieldVsSchiffer: the symbols in my representation system have gained their role by appropriation of e.g. a name in the public language. >Language use, >Language community. Animals/Field: although they are likely to have representations, meanings and therefore truth cannot be applied to them. >Animal language, >Animals. II 69 Representation/Field: one could also assume this as neither linguistic nor pictoral: E.g. "light bulb model" - that would be uninterpreted and could not explain behavior. II 77f Representation: representative terms can replace properties. - Most psychology can do without them. Advantages: Intentional terms are projective. E.g.: "He raised his rifle ...". - The truth conditions do not matter then. - The advantage of representations lies in the combination of explanation and predictions. >Truth conditions, >Predictions. II 94 Representation/StalnakerVsField: the basic relation is between words rather than between sentences or "morphemes". Not even between whole states. >Words, cf. >Word meaning. Field: that could be correct. II 154 Representation/truth conditions/translation: one can accept representation without translation and without truth conditions: solution: one accepts reactions to his believe and a corresponding threshold for his reaction. Crazy cases: e.g. the person believes that something quite different is represented . Solution: the role cannot be specified exactly, but the objective core is that there is a role. Explanation 2nd order: "sufficient similarity to our own representation" E.g. "Khrushchev blinked" as an explanation for Kennedy's action. Problem: our own representations are not objective. Deflationism: for it this is not a problem. >Deflationism. Truth conditions: we only need them if we do not know how the details of the explanation are. 1. Schiffer, St. 1972. Meaning. New York, NY, USA: Oxford, Clarendon Press |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Research | Droysen | Gadamer I 220 Research/Historics/Droysen/Gadamer: At the end of the lectures of 1882(1) there is a turn of phrase: "that we do not have the means of experiment like the natural sciences, that we can only do research and nothing but research". Gadamer: There must be another important moment for Droysen in the concept of research, and not only the infinity of the task, which, as the characteristic of an infinite progress, would have historical research in common with natural research, and which, in comparison with the "science" of the eighteenth century and the "doctrina" of earlier centuries, helped the concept of research to rise in the nineteenth century. History of the concept: This concept of "research", probably starting from the concept of the explorer who ventures into unknown territories, includes knowledge of nature as well as the historical world. The more the theological and philosophical background of the knowledge of the world fades, the more science is thought of as an advance into the unknown and is therefore called research. Gadamer: But this consideration is not enough to explain how Droysen can set the historical method in the manner cited against the method of experiment in the natural sciences by saying of history that it is "research, nothing but research". It must be another infinity than that of the unknown world which, from Droysen's point of view, distinguishes historical knowledge as research. His thought seems to be this: Droysen: Research is suited to a different, quasi qualitative infinity, if what is being researched can never be seen for itself. This is indeed true of the historical past - in contrast to the self-giveness that the experiment represents in natural research. Experiment: Historical research, in order to recognize, always asks only others, the tradition, always new and always anew. Like the experiment, its answer never has the unambiguousness of the self-seen. >Science/Droysen, >History/Droysen, >Recognition/Droysen. Gadamer: If one now asks oneself what origin this moment of meaning has in the concept of research, which Droysen follows in the surprising juxtaposition of experiment and research, one is led, it seems to me, to the concept of consciousness research. The world of history is based on freedom, and freedom remains an ultimately inscrutable mystery of the person(2). Only the self-examination of conscience can Gadamer I 221 come close to him, and only God can know here. For this reason, historical research will not want knowledge of laws, and in any case cannot invoke the decision of the experiment. Because the historian, through the infinite mediation of the tradition, is separated from his or her object. >Understanding/Droysen, >Sense/Droysen. 1. Johann Gustav Droysen, Historik, hrsg. von R. Hübner (1935), S. 316, nach einer Nachschrift von Friedrich Meinecke. 2. But the theological impact in the concept of research is not only to be found in relationship to the unfathomable person and his or her freedom, but also in the "hidden meaning" of history, that which is "meant" in the providence of God, which we can never fully decipher. In this respect, history here is not completely alienated from hermeneutics, as it is appropriate for the discoverer of "Hellenism". Cf. vol. 2 of the Ges. Werke, p. 123f. and "Heideggers Wege", Die Marburger Theologie, p. 35ff.; vol. 3 of the Ges. Werke. |
Droys I J. G. Droysen Grundriss der Historik Paderborn 2011 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Russell’s Paradox | Logic Texts | Sainsbury V 163 Russell s paradox/properties/Sainsbury: basic problem: cases in which properties can be applied to themselves - most do not. E.g. the property of being a person is a property and not a person! So it does not apply to the property of being a person. But some properties are true of themselves. - E.g. the property of being a man is not a man. - But the property of being a non-man, is itself a non-man. >Self-reference, >Heterology, >Paradoxes. V 165 There is a relationship with Cantor's proof that the power set of each class has more elements than the class itself, but you can block Russell's paradox, and still allow the proof of Cantor. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Sai I R.M. Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 German Edition: Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993 |
| Satisfaction | Woods | II 258 Satisfaction/time/existence/Woods: Error: - to think that satisfaction (as a predicate in the meta language) would not need to be relativized to time. >Metalanguage, >Predicates, >Existence, >Existence statements. Satisfaction here is not a classic two-digit predicate, true of pairs of expressions and sequences - but if truth relative to time, it must be possible for the same sentence, to be satisfied by all sequences even in the mouth of same speaker at some times and not at other times. >Unambiguity. II 258 Satisfaction/classic/Tarski: two-digit predicate, true of pairs of expressions and sequences. >Expressions. |
WoodsM II Michael Woods "Existence and Tense" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Second Order Logic, HOL | Logic Texts | Read III 62f "All the characteristics of a great emperor"/compactness/1st Level/2nd level/Read: a categorical set of axioms for arithmetic must be a 2nd level logic. Logical form: "for every quality f, if for every person x, if x was a great general, then x had f, then Napoleon had f. But: purely syntactically you cannot decide whether this is 1st or 2nd level. What distinguishes the two is their semantics! >Syntax, >Semantics. The definition area can be arbitrary, provided it is not empty - Russell: Addition: "... and these are all..." ReadVs: that is either superfluous in an explicitly specified conjunction or wrong. Omega rule: needs the addition, however it cannot be expressed in the 1st level logic to exclude non-standard models, but it should be formulated in the 1st level (i.e. in logical terms). III 152f Logic 1st order: individuals, 2nd order: variables for predicates, distribution of predicates by quantifiers. 1st order: allows restricted vocabulary of the 2nd level: existence and universal quantifier. Other properties 2nd level are not definable in the logic of the 1st order: e.g. to be finite, or to be true of most things. >Operator, >Level (Order), >Description level. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Self | Personality Psychology | Corr I 459 Self/Personality Psychology/Robinson/Sedikides: Why are traits so stable over time? Swann’s (e.g., Swann and Schroeder 1995)(1) contends that people are motivated to confirm rather than disconfirm strongly held views of the self (see also Sedikides 1995)(2). Thus, a given self-view (e.g., that the self is high in Neuroticism) is likely to create its own reality through trait-consistent processes related to self-verification (Swann, Rentfrow and Guinn 2002)(3). See also Tamir (2005)(4). >Personality traits. Self-enhancement reflects a motive to view the self as positively as possible (Sedikides and Gregg 2008(5); Sedikides and Strube 1997)(6). On the basis of this motive, one can explain why individuals (a) view their own traits as more socially desirable than the average person (Alicke and Govorun 2005)(7); (b) interpret ambiguous trait terms in a way that reflects best on the self (Dunning, Meyerowitz and Holzberg 1989)(8); (c) choose questions likely to confirm their positive (versus negative) traits (Sedikides 1993)(9); and (d) manifest superior memory for feedback related to their positive (versus negative) traits (Sedikides and Green 2000)(10). Heterogeneity of the self: when describing themselves, individuals mention important relationships, social roles, goals and motives, preferences and values, as well as rules and strategies for self-regulation (Markus 1983(11); McConnell and Strain 2007(12)). >Self-regulation, >Self-description. When individuals rate their traits in relation to different role-contexts (e.g., in school versus at home), their traits differ in ways that are particular to a given role-context (Donahue and Harary 1998(13)). There has been an attempt to incorporate role-specific tendencies into more general models of traits (Wood and Roberts 2006)(14). Corr I 460 Hierarchies: The self is hierarchically organized. Its most abstract features are captured when individuals characterize themselves in general, irrespective of context or social role (Schell, Klein and Babey 1996)(15). Lower Level: here, social roles encompass aspects of personality that, although generalized, are specific to the role under consideration (Donahue and Harary 1998)(13). At the lowest level of abstraction, self-views are particular to a given day (Kernis, Grannemann and Barclay 1989)(16) or moment in time (Heatherton and Polivy 1991)(17). Such levels of the self function differently. For example, momentary self-esteem varies substantially from day to day, whereas this is not true of global self-esteem (Heatherton and Polivy 1991)(17). 1. Swann, W. B. and Schroeder, D. G. 1995. The search for beauty and truth: a framework for understanding reactions to evaluations, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 21: 1307–18 2. Sedikides, C. 1995. Central and peripheral self-conceptions are differentially influenced by mood: tests of the differential sensitivity hypothesis, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 69: 759–77 3. Swann, W. B., Rentfrow, P. J. and Guinn, J. 2002. Self-verification: the search for coherence, in M. R. Leary and J. P. Tangney (eds.), Handbook of self and identity, pp. 367–83. New York: Guilford Press 4. Tamir, M. 2005. Don’t worry, be happy?: Neuroticism, trait-consistent affect regulation, and performance, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 89: 449–61 5. Sedikides, C. and Gregg, A. P. 2008. Self-enhancement: food for thought, Perspectives on Psychological Science 3: 102–16 6. Sedikides, C. and Strube, M. J. 1997. Self-evaluation: to thine own self be good, to thine own self be sure, to thine own self be true, and to thine own self be better, in M. P. Zanna (ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology, vol. XXIX, pp. 209–69. New York: Academic Press 7. Alicke, M. D. and Govorun, O. 2005. The better-than-average effect, in M. D. Alicke, D. A. Dunning and J. I. Krueger (eds.), The self in social judgement, pp. 85–106. Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press 8. Dunning, D., Meyerowitz, J. A. and Holzberg, A. D. 1989. Ambiguity and self-evaluation: the role of idiosyncratic trait definitions in self-serving assessments of ability, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 57: 1082–90 9. Sedikides, C. 1993. Assessment, enhancement, and verification as determinants of the self-evaluation process, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65: 317–38 10. Sedikides, C. and Green, J. D. 2000. On the self-protective nature of inconsistency/negativity management: using the person memory paradigm to examine self-referent memory, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 79: 906–22 11. Markus, H. 1983. Self-knowledge: an expanded view, Journal of Personality 51: 543–65 12. McConnell, A. R. and Strain, L. M. 2007. Structure and content of the self, in C. Sedikides and S. Spencer (eds.), The self in social psychology, pp. 51–73. New York: Psychology Press 13. Donahue, E. M. and Harary, K. 1998. The patterned inconsistency of traits: mapping the differential effects of social roles on self-perceptions of the Big Five, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 24: 610–19 14. Wood, D. and Roberts, B. W. 2006. Cross-sectional and longitudinal tests of the personality and role identity structural model (PRISM), Journal of Personality 74: 779–809 15. Schell, T.L., Klein, S. B. and Babey, S. H. 1996. Testing a hierarchical model of self-knowledge, Psychological Science 7: 170-3 16. Kernis, M. H., Grannemann, B. D. and Barclay, L. C. 1989. Stability and level of self-esteem as predectors of anger arousal and hostelity, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 56: 1013-22 17. Heatherton, T. F. and Polivy, J. 1991. Development and validation of a scale for measuring state self-esteem, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 60: 895-910 Michael D. Robinson and Constantine Sedikides, „ Traits and the self: toward an integration“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Semantic Ascent | Stroud | I 213 Semantic Ascent / Quine: mention instead use - transition from substantive to formal speech. >Mention, >Use, >Formal speech, >Formal language, >Theoretical language. Stroud: It is still about reality and not just about language. - E.g. "Wombat" is true of some organisms. >"true-of", >Satisfaction, >Reality, >External world, >World/thinking, >Language. VsCarnap: these are not "external" questions. >External /internal, >Interior/exterior. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Semantic Value | Schiffer | I 91f Semantic Value/Schiffer: E.g. "Snow" refers to the stuff snow "is white" is true of every white thing "not" expresses the negation. Semantic value of logical constants = the truth function. of a singular term: = reference. Schiffer: semantic values play their role in determining the truth conditions. >Truth conditions. Then the semantic sense (not value) is determined by the conceptual role: Conceptual role/Schiffer: is an abstraction from the functional role: to know the functional role of a neural sentence means knowing the functional role of belief of s (or to wish that s, etc.). >Conceptual role, >Functional role. Subsentential: to know the contribution of this role to the conceptual role of the whole sentence. ((s) This is not the same as compositionality because it is about roles, not meanings.) Cf. >Compositionality, >Meaning, >Frege principle. E.g. if you believe that s, then you do not believe [not-s] etc. Problem: the semantic sense is not always determined by the conceptual role. Conceptual role: is in the head. Twin earth: the twin has the same conceptual role. On the other hand: semantic sense of predicates is surely causal - even with general terms. >General terms, >Predicates. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Sentence Meaning | Millikan | I 11 Definition sentence meaning/sense/Millikan: are the mapping functions (informally "rules") in accordance with which one would have to map it to the world if one wanted to perform its eigenfunction in accordance with a normal ((s) biological) explanation. >Terminology/Millikan. I 104 Sentence meaning/sense/sentence/Millikan: the meaning of a sentence is that it should correspond to something, not the one to which it corresponds to. >Meaning/Millikan, >Correspondence/Millikan. Sentence/word/meaning/Millikan: what is the difference between the way the combined elements of a sentence have sense and the way how "Theaitetos" has meaning? Sentence: from the fact that it is intended to correspond to something, it does not follow that there is something to which it corresponds. S: be a sentence, R: Correspondence relation. If the sentence is true, it is only that what is true of the sentence: Usually, (Ex)sRx. ((s) Normally there is a referent) On the other hand: Singular term/word/name/Millikan: from the fact that a name should normally correspond, follows however, that there is something to which it is to correspond! Should be: depends on the fact that the family of the term has a history that includes the actual correspondence with the referent. w: simple referring term r: referent. Then the following is true of w: (Ex) (Normally wRx). ((s) There is an object that normally corresponds.) R: is the correspondence relation, not the reference relation! It is the relation between w and r that is fulfilled by the fact that normally wRr - this is something quite different! >Singular term/Millikan. I 106 Reference/Millikan: the sentence meaning depends on much more fundamental types of relations than the correspondence or reference. For example, the relation of a true sentence to what it maps in the world cannot be analyzed as a reference, just as e.g. "blood pumping" cannot be analyzed as "blood pumping". ((s) > Naturalistic fallacy). |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Singular Terms | Strawson | Substitutions/Strawson/(s): of singular terms: reversible of predicates: not reversible. ((s) For this asymmetry cf. >Singular terms/Brandom, >Predicates/Brandom.) I 198 Singular Term/QuineVsGeach/QuineVsFrege/QuineVsRamsey: a singular term can occur at the places of quantifiable variables, general expressions not. Singular term: is quantifiable, General Term: is not quantifiable. >Singular terms/Quine, >General terms/Quine. StrawsonVsQuine: this distinction ist not so important. I 198 Singular Term/Quine: abstract singular terms: E.g. "piety", "wisdom": names of abstract objects - no general terms. Names of concrete objects: e.g. "Earth". On the other hand general term: E.g "philosopher". >Abstraction/Quine. StrawsonVsQuine: no good explanation: we would not like to say that this would be true of many things. Solution/Quine: in reality we make the distinction between singular term and predicates. General term/Quine: the location which is taken by them, has no own status. Decisive: predicates cannot be quantified. >Quantification/Quine, >Schematic letters/Quine. I 203 "a philosopher"/Quine: no singular term. --- IV 63 QuineVs singular Term: eliminable. StrawsonVsQuine. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Skepticism | Austin | Stroud I 41 AustinVsSkepticism: Descartes merely undertook a re-definition of "knowledge". - E.g. someone asserted there were no doctors in New York - in that, he performs a re-definition of "doctor": as someone who could cure within 2 minutes. StroudVsAustin: Descartes goes deeper. SomeVsDescartes: knowledge does not require what Descartes asserts: not dreaming and knowing that. - Knowledge/Stroud: if VsDescartes is right, then knowledge did not have to a) be entirely under logical consequence or b) penetrate all the logical consequences of our knowledge. (StroudVsVs) Stroud I 45 AustinVsSkepticism: "Enough is enough": it is not necessary to prove everything at all times in order to be able to claim knowledge. - The skeptic only asserts a lack of information. - StroudVsAustin - Austin: a "real" goldfinch is no more than a goldfinch. - Stroud: it would be absurd to argue philosophically against our usual knowledge, but that is not true of Descartes. - Dream/Austin: There are recognized procedures for distinguishing it from wakefulness - otherwise we could not use the words. I 47 Austin: it can be qualitatively distinguished whether you are actually being presented to the Pope, or just dreaming about it. Stroud I 48 Strong Thesis/Skepticism/Terminology/Descartes: We cannot know that we are not dreaming. - Austin's central thesis: the questioning of knowledge is hardly ever permitted in everyday life (if we are dreaming) - there must be specific reasons. - Austin thesis: you cannot always fool everyone. - Then Weaker Thesis/Austin: there must be a reason to doubt that we are awake - stronger: we always have to doubt it. I 57 Austin: E.g. what is considered inappropriate? -> Distinction truth/assertibility (because of the different conditions). >Truth conditions, >Assertibility conditions. Stroud I 64/65 Skepticism/Descartes/Stroud: (deeper than the one disputed by Austin) - can neither accepted be in everyday life nor in science. - Emphasis on theory and practice. Stroud: standards of justification vary from case to case - in the speech act there is no general instruction regarding what we need to consider. Stroud I 74 Def "Paradigm-Case Argument"/Knowledge/Truth/Oxford/Terminology/Austin/Stroud: in the mid-50s it was thought the skeptic would have come to the conclusion that in certain situations both S and non-S apply. Cf. >Dialethism. StroudVsAustin: in order to question the concept of "knowledge" we have ask how and why it was used. - Airplane-E.g. "He does not know" is definitely correct before the aircraft is on the ground) - But that is not the distinction between knowledge and ignorance. - Therefore, we cannot draw a skeptical conclusion from our language use. >Use, >Use theory, >Knowledge. |
Austin I John L. Austin "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Austin II John L. Austin "A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3 German Edition: Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Skepticism | Burge | Frank I 698 Skepticism/Burge: almost all currently defended answers, except the transcendental ones, agree that perceptual knowledge does not need to be justified by separately ensuring that the enabling conditions (no dummies, no mirror illusions) are met. This is true of reliability theory, of Moore's theories insisting on the immediacy of perception, and also of Quine, who believes that skepticism is just bad empiricism. >Certainty, >Knowledge, >Perception. Tyler Burge (1988a): Individualism and Self-Knowledge, in: The Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988), 649-663 |
Burge I T. Burge Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010 Burge II Tyler Burge "Two Kinds of Consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Skepticism | Rorty | Rorty VI 225 PragmatismVsSkepticism: (raw version): "We do not need to respond to skepticism at all; it makes no difference whether we respond to it or not". (WilliamsVs). >Pragmatism. Horwich I 447 Skepticism/Peirce/Rorty/Leeds: PeirceVsIdealism/PeirceVsPhysicalism: both have a common error, "correspondence" a relation between pieces of thoughts and pieces of the world that must be ontologically homogeneous. Ontological homogeneity: e.g. only relations between representations, not between representations and objects. >Skepticism/Berkeley). Peirce: this homogeneity does not need to exist. PlantingaVsPeirce: it does if the objects can only exist, for example, by showing their structure. RortyVsPlantinga: this confuses a criterion with a causal explanation. RortyVsPeirce: "ideal" unclear. >Criteria, >Causal explanation. I 448 Solution/James: "true of" is not an analyzable relation. - Therefore correspondence is dropped. >Correspondence, >Skepticism/James. Solution/Dewey: It’s just an attempt to interpose language as an intermediary instance, which would make the problem appear interesting. Rorty I 129 Skepticism/Tradition/RortyVsDescartes: not whether others are in pain is interesting - skepticism would never have become interesting, if the concept of "naturally given" had not arisen. >Skepticism/Descartes. VI 223ff Skepticism: main representative: Stroud. Stroud: speaks of a serious ongoing problem. >Skepticism/Stroud. Michael WilliamsVsStroud: the problem arises only from absurd totality demand: that everything must be explained together. >Skepticism/Michael Williams. Rorty: statements only make sense in a situation. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Sortals | Kripke | I 134 KripkeVsGeach: a sortal is certainly not a priori true of the designated object. It could turn out: e.g. Lot's guests, even if he calls them, are not people, but angels. Then why should it belong to the meaning of the name? >Sense, >Names/Kripke, >Denoting/Kripke, >Naming/Kripke, >a priori/Kripke. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Strength of Theories | Schiffer | I 44 Stronger/weaker/SchifferVsPsycho-Functionalism/SchifferVsBlock: it is unlikely that there is a theory that is weak enough to be true of all believers - and strong enough to apply to any individual belief - (to define the conditions). E.g. for sighted and visually impaired. Problem: there would have to be necessary conditions for belief defined. Strong/((s): determines the details weak/((s): applicable to many cases. >Psychofunctionalism. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Tarski | Field | I 33f Tarski/Field: According to Tarski the following two sentences are a contradiction because he needs quantities for his definition of implication: a) "Snow is white" does not imply logically "grass is green". b) There are no mathematical entities like quantities. ((s) Therefore, Field must be independent of Tarski.) Solution Field: Implication as a basic concept. >Mathematical entities, >Ontology/Field, >Tarski-scheme. --- II 124 Tarski/Truth: Tarski's truth theory is unlike disquotational truth: only for a fragment. >Disquotationalism/Field. Unrestricted quantifiers and semantic concepts must be excluded. >Quantifiers. Problem: we cannot create infinite conjunctions and disjunctions with that. (Tarski-Truth is not suitable for generalization). >Generalization. DeflationsimVsTarski/QuineVsTarski. >Deflationism. Otherwise, we must give up an explicit definition. Deflationism: uses a generalized version of the truth-schema. TarskiVsDeflationism: pro compositionality. (Also Davidson) >Compositionality. Tarski: needs recursion to characterize e.g."or". >Logical constants. II 125 Composition principle/Field: E.g. A sentence consisting of a one-digit predicate and a referencing name is true, iff the predicate is true of what the name denotes. This goes beyond logical rules because it introduces reference and denotation. >Reference, >Denotation. Tarski: needs this for a satisfying Truth-concept. Deflationism: Reference and danotation is not important for it. >Compositionality). II 141 Truth-Theory/Tarski: Thesis: we do not get an adequate Truth-theory if we take only all instances of the schema as axioms. - This does not give us the generalizations we need, e.g. that the modus ponens receives the truth. II 142 Deflationism/Tarski/Field. Actually, Tarski's approach is also deflationistic. --- Soames I 477 FieldVsTarski/Soames: Tarski hides speech behavior. Field: Tarski introduces primitive reference, and so on. >language independence. SoamesVsField: his physicalist must reduce every single one of the semantic concepts. - For example, he cannot characterize negation as a symbol by truth, because that would be circular. E.g. he cannot take negation as the basic concept, because then there would be no facts about speakers (no semantic facts about use) that explain the semantic properties. FieldVsTarski: one would have to be able to replace the semantic terms by physical terms. >Semantics. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Soames I Scott Soames "What is a Theory of Truth?", The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 411-29 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Soames II S. Soames Understanding Truth Oxford 1999 |
| Theories | Field | I 249ff Theory/object level/Field: we assume a theory here instead of the truth of the theory. Problem: the theory requires mathematical entities. >Mathematical entities, >Truth, >Description levels. I 262 Physics/theory/Language/ontology/Field: Thesis: in the typical physical language, sentences are essential for the description of observations that contain mathematical entities. Then a theory without mathematical entities does not allow any inference about distances and masses. >Physics, >Ontology. Solution: new (comparative) predicates: For example, the distance between x and y is r-times the distance between z and w, etc. - For example, the velocity of y relative to y multiplied by the time difference between z and w is r-times spatial distance between u and v (Definition acceleration without numbers). - r: is a rational number. This distinguishes the predicates in the family. >Predicates. NominalismVs: these are too many predicates. >Nominalism. --- II 46 Theory/truth/Field: it is the assertion that the axioms of the theory are true of their objects at certain points of time (or at all times) - not the theory itself. >Axioms. Variables: We leave it out here very often, but they must be understood as implicitly existing. >Variables. Instead of "pain has that and that causal role" we must say: "For every t and every c (organism) of type S to t, pain has that and that causal role in c to t". II 187 Ideal theory/Quine/Field: (Quine 1960(1), 23-4): Suppose there is an ideal theory (in the future) that could be considered as completely true: problem: this ideal theory could not correct the truth values of our actual (present) individual sentences. >Reference, >Theory change, >Meaning change, >Idealization. Reason: there is no general sense in which one can equate a single sentence of a theory with a single sentence of another theory. Quine/(s): there is no inter-theoretical translatability. - Thus there is no Truth-predicate for single sentences of a theory. - Falsehood is distributed to the whole theory. - There is no fact that distributes falsehood onto single sentences. FieldVsQuine: therefore the sentences are not "intertheoretically meaningless"! Solution/Field: "partial denotation": Newton's mass partially denoted. >Partial denotation. FieldVsKuhn/FieldVsIncommensurability: denotational refinement: (later only partial quantity) means no incommensurability. >Incommensurability. 1. Quine, W. V. (1960). Word and Object. MIT Press. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Thoughts | Frege | Dummett I 62 Consciousness Content/Frege/Dummett: the content of consciousness are sensations but not meaning. Thoughts: thoughts are the grasping of external things. Dummett I 19 Thought/Thinking/Frege: thought is not identical with the meaning of the sentence - beings with identical thoughts are possible without linguistic cover. Frege II 47 Frege: a sentence about a non-existent unicorn is without truth value, predicates cannot be attributed or denied - the thought is the same, whether there is reference ("meaning") or not. Thought: is a sentence without truth value (because "meaning" (reference) is unresolved) - the same thought in an actor without meaning - judgment: is progress from thought to its truth value. >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning. II 71 Truth Value: a truth value cannot be one part of a thought, as little as the sun can, because it is not a sense, but an object (truth value = object). >Truth value, >Object. II 76 Thought: one part must be unsaturated, as a binding agent, e.g. "falls under". Thought: not all parts of the thought may be complete, at least one should be unsaturated (predicative), otherwise they would not stick together. Dummett I 32 Frege: grasping the thought: is psychic act. The thought is not the content of consciousness. Consciousness is subjective, the thought is objective - WittgensteinVs. >">Objectivity. Frege IV 52 Thought/Frege: there is not a complete thought without a time determination. But then it is timelessly true or false. Expression/assertion/Frege: there is a difference: time determination belongs to the expression whereas truth belongs to assertion and is timeless. Timeless things are not part of the external world. >Truth, >Timelessness. --- Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 47 ff Thought/Frege: a thought is not the sentence meaning (reference), because it is possible common property of many thinkers (content, objective). Sense of the sentence: is the expressed thought (abstract). Unequal content: sense can be grasped without knowing whether the sentence has a meaning (reference, existing object). Thought/Frege: a thought is abstract. Contradiction: content, idea. Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 57ff Odd Meaning/Frege: odd meaning refers to the expressed thoughts - (thought: abstract, unequal content). Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 66ff Thought/identity criterion for thoughts/Frege/St: sentence A contains the same idea as sentence B, if (i) the assumption that A and B lead to a contradiction - (ii) vice versa - that allows us to conceive thoughts as invariant abstractions - (>partial identity: identity of thoughts) Invariant: is the thought. The thought contained in a sentence is what element A has in common with all the propositions which are logically equivalent to A, and that changes when we move on to a proposition B which is not logically equivalent to A. Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 68 Thought/Frege/St: a thought is that element of an assertion that can be true or false, and which is the object of the believing-to-be-true of epistemic subjects. >Propositions. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 SL I R. Stuhlmann Laeisz Philosophische Logik Paderborn 2002 Stuhlmann II R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz Freges Logische Untersuchungen Darmstadt 1995 |
| Time | Woods | II 254 Predicate/Existence/Woods: E. g. "there were dodos": Dodo: one-digit predicate that is only true of an object if it belongs to the extension of the predicate at that time - i. e. relative to the time of the utterance - with some predicates one associates the non-applicability with the passing away of the object, with others not. Always true during existence: e.g. "Human". Cf. >Presupposition. Sometimes true, but only if object exists: e.g."sleeps". Sometimes true, but even if object does not exist: e.g. famous. See also >Intrinsic, >Extrinsic. II 258 Existence/Time/Woods: other approach: Predicates should carry temporal relativization, not the quantifiers. >Quantifiers. Then indices and demonstratives are necessary. >Demonstratives, >Index words, >Indexicality. Indexical singular terms with the attribution function* should be treated in such a way that objects are linked with expressions by triplets from a sequence, a person and a time. "There were dodos": Dodo here two-digit predicate, true of object at a time when it is a dodo. - Here too the implication of past existence is carried by the meaning of "dodo". >Predicates, >Singular terms. II 259 Problem: future existence cannot be expressed if "F" is the only predicate - past and future are indistinguishable. Solution: combining both approaches: a) Indexical sentence operators. b) To introduce time into predicates: so that one can say that it is now true that something is F in the future and that it will be true that something is F then. >Time, >Past, >Present, >Future. |
WoodsM II Michael Woods "Existence and Tense" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Trinity | Gadamer | I 423 Trinity/Language/Gadamer: The interpretation of the mystery of the Trinity, probably the most important task that was set to the thinking of the Christian Middle Ages, is based already with the Fathers and finally in the systematic development of Augustinism in higher scholasticism on the human relationship between speaking and thinking. Dogmatics thus follows above all the prologue of John's Gospel, and as much as it is Greek means of thinking with which it tries to solve its own theological task, philosophical thinking gains through it a dimension closed to Greek thinking. When the word becomes flesh and only in this incarnation is the reality of the Spirit completed, the logos is thus freed from his spirituality, which at the same time signifies his cosmic potentiality. The uniqueness of the event of redemption brings about the entry of the historical being into Western thinking and also causes the phenomenon of language to emerge from its immersion in the ideality of the sense and to present itself to philosophical reflection. For unlike the Greek logos, the word is pure event (verbum proprie dicitur personaliter tantum)(1). Certainly, human language is only indirectly elevated to the object of contemplation. It is only in the counter-image of the human word that the theological problem of the word, of the verbum dei, namely the unity of God the Father and God the Son, is to emerge. But precisely this is for us the decisively important thing, that the mystery of this unity is reflected in the phenomenon of language. >Language/Gadamer, >Word/Ancient Philosophy, >Creation Myth/Gadamer, >Word/Augustine. I 425 Word of God/Creation/Language: The mystery of the Trinity finds its mirror in the miracle of language in so far as the word which is true because it says how things are, is nothing in itself and does not want to be anything in itself: nihil de suo habens, sed totum de illa scientia de qua nascitur. It has its being in its manifestation. This is exactly what is true of the mystery of the Trinity. Here again it is not the earthly appearance of the Redeemer as such that is important, but rather his complete divinity, his equality of essence with God. The theological task is to think in this equality of essence nevertheless the independent personal existence of Christ. For this purpose the human relationship is offered, which becomes visible in the word of the Spirit, the verbum intellectus. It is more than a mere image, for the human relationship of thinking and speaking corresponds in all its imperfection to the divine relationship of the Trinity. The inner word of the Spirit is just as essential to thinking as the Son of God is to God the Father. I 427 Trinity/Gadamer: The process of thinking is (...) not a process of change Gadamer I 428 (motus), i.e. not a transition from potency to act, but an emergence ut actus ex actu: the word is not formed only after the knowledge is completed, scholastically spoken, after the information of the intellect by the species is completed, but it is the completion of the knowledge itself. In this respect, the word is at the same time as this formation (formatio) of the intellect. >Word/Thomas, >Word of God/Gadamer. Word/Language/Thinking/Gadamer: In this way it can be understood that the creation of the Word was understood as a true image of the Trinity. It is a matter of real generatio, and real birth, although here, of course, there is no receiving part next to a begetting one. But it is precisely this intellectual character of the production of the Word that is decisive for its theological model function. There is really something in common between the process of the divine persons and the process of thinking. Trinity/Gadamer: The mystery of the Trinity, which is to be illuminated by the analogy with the inner word, must ultimately remain incomprehensible from the point of view of human thinking. If in the divine word the whole of the divine spirit is pronounced, then the processual moment in this word means something for which basically every analogy lets us down. If the divine spirit, by recognizing itself, at the same time recognizes all that exists, then the Word of God is the Word of the spirit that sees and creates everything in an intuition. The process disappears in the actuality of the divine All-Wisdom. Creation, too, is not a real process, but only interprets the order of the world as a whole in a temporal scheme.(2) 1. Thomas I. qu 34 2. It is clear that the patristic and scholastic interpretation of Genesis to some extent repeats the discussion about the right interpretation of "Timaios" that was held between Plato's disciples. (Cf. my study of "idea and reality in Plato's "Timaios". (Meeting reports of the Heidelberg Academy of Sciences, Philos.-histor. Class, 2nd Abh. Heidelberg 1974; now in vol. 6 of the Ges. Werke, pp. 242-270). |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Truth | Peirce | Wright I 66 Definiton Truth/Peirce: that what is justified on an ideal border of recognition when all empirical information is obtained. PutnamVsPeirce: one cannot simply know when one has all the information. Wright dito. Cf. >Lists, >Knowledge, >Completeness. --- Horwich I 448 Truth/Pragmatism/Rorty: Peirce: For Peirce truth is the ideal final stage. >Pragmatism, >Truth/Pragmatism. JamesVsPeirce: neglects the mind. "True of" is no analyzable relation - (at least not between inhomogeneous entities). Rorty: thus James omits correspondence. >Correspondence, >Correspondence theory, >True-of. Dewey: completes the way: only the try to interpose "language" or "ghost", can let intentionality appear interesting.(1) >Intentionality, >Language, >Mind. 1. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 |
Peir I Ch. S. Peirce Philosophical Writings 2011 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Utterer’s Meaning | Ricoeur | II 12 Utterer`s meaning/utterance meaning/Grice/Ricoeur: The concept of meaning allows two interpretations which reflect the main dialectic between event and meaning. To mean is both what the speaker means, i.e., what he intends to say, and what the sentence means, i.e., what the conjunction between the identification function and the predicative function yields. (Cf. >Grice (1957)(1)) Meaning, in other words, is both noetic and noematic. We may connect the reference of discourse to its speaker with the event Side of the dialectic. The event is somebody speaking. >Speaker’s Meaning. II 13 I/personal pronoun/Ricoeur: The personal pronouns, for exåmple, have no objective meaning. "I" is not a concept. It is impossible to substitute a universal expression for it such as "the one who is now speaking. ((s) >I, Ego, Self/Anscombe). Its only function is to refer the whole sentence to the subject of the speech event. It has a new meaning each time it is used (...). The same thing is true of the adverbs of time and space and the demonstratives, which may be considered as egocentric particulars. Discourse therefore has many substitutable ways of referring back to its speaker. >Discourse/Ricoeur. Discourse: By paying attention to these grammatical devices of the self-reference of discourse we obtain two advantages. On the one hand, we get a new criterion of the difference between discourse and linguistic codes. On the other hand, we are able to give a nonpsychological, because purely semantic, definition of the utterer's meaning. No mental entity need be hypothesized or hypostazised. The utterance meaning points back towards the utterer's meaning thanks to the self-reference of discourse to itself as an event. 1. This point has been made forcefully and convincingly by Paul Grice. See his "Meaning," Philosophical Review, 66 (1957): 377-88; "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and World-Meaning," Foundations of Language, 4 (August 1968): 225-45; "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions," Philosophical Review, 78 (1969): 147-77. |
Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976 |
| Vocabulary | Logic Texts | Read III 152 Logic 1st order: individuals. 2nd order: variables for predicates, distribution of predicates by quantifiers. 1st order logic allows restricted vocabulary of the 2nd order: existence and universal quantifier. Other properties of the 2nd order are not definable in the 1st order logic: e.g. to be finite, or to be true of most things. >Operator, >Level (Order), >Description level. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Wikipedia | Benkler | Zittrain I 198 Wikipedia/Benkler/Zittrain: Wikipedia, as a tool of group generativity ((s) for generativity see terminology/Zittrain), reflects the character of thousands of people. Benkler compares Wikipedia’s entry on Barbie dolls to that of other encyclopedias developed in more traditional ways, and finds that most of the others fail to make mention of any of the controversies surrounding Barbie as a cultural icon. (1) Wikipedia has extensive discussion on the topic, and Britannica has a share, too. Benkler freely concedes that a tool of group generativity like Wikipedia is not the only way to include important points of view that might not accord with the more monolithic views of what he calls the “industrial information economy.” More traditional institutions, such as universities, have established a measure of independence, too. And he also acknowledges that tools of group generativity can be abused by a group; there can be powerful norms that a majority enforces upon a minority to squelch some views. But he rightly suggests that the world is improved by a variety of models of production of culture, I 199 models that draw on different incentives, with different biases, allowing people to be exposed to a multiplicity of viewpoints, precluding a monopoly on truth. The same can be true of our technology, here the technology that undergirds our access to those viewpoints, and our ability to offer our own. Can groups be trusted to behave well in the absence of formal government to rein in their excesses? (2) 1. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS at 287—88. 2. See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 122 (1969). |
Benkler I Yochai Benkler The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom New Haven 2007 Zittrain I Jonathan Zittrain The Future of the Internet--And How to Stop It New Haven 2009 |
| Zero | Hilbert | Berka I 121 Def Zero/O/number/logical form/Hilbert:(1) 0(F) : ~(Ex)F(x) ((s) "There is no x for which F applies.") >Numbers, >Definitions, >Definability, >"True of". 1. D. Hilbert & W. Ackermann: Grundzüge der Theoretischen Logik, Berlin, 6. Aufl. Berlin/Göttingen/Heidelberg 1972, §§ 1, 2. |
Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstraction | Prior Vs Abstraction | I 132 Thinking/Grammar/Prior: Othello thinks of Desdemona that she ...becomes ...thinks that... Difference: whether the gap for the verb is filled, but not that for the name. Nominalization: ("old game"): instead of "Desdemona is faithful": "It is true of Desdemona that she is faithful." (Introduction of "that"). That-Sentences: pronouns are almost always through abstracta (quasi-names). (>Cook Wilson): Subject/Predicate/Wilson: E.g. "Jones's musical": here it is not predicated "is musical", or "that he is musical," but "musicality". I 133 PriorVsWilson: but the difference is not very large. Moreover, the true relation is that between "Jones" and "he". Better. Attribution of musicality. The introduction of abstractions such as "ness", etc. is always a trick. Verb/Prior: is like a sentence: its job is to make names of sentences. A verb is a sentence with one or more gaps. Verbs can be composed in the same way as sentences. Every composition of a sentence is ipso facto a composition of the verbs it contains. I 134 PriorVsAbstraction: it is not certain whether the formal presentation of ordinary language sentences requires abstraction. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Barwise, J. | Hintikka Vs Barwise, J. | II 207 Situation Semantics/Barwise/Perry/B/P/Omniscience//Hintikka: how can it solve the problem of logical omniscience?. B/P: bring the following E.g. (1) a sees how b X-t therefore (2) a sees how b Y-t If Xing logically implies to Y. ((s) E.g. walking implies moving). Problem/(s): from this follows a lot more of which one cannot always assume that a) it is seen, b) that it is known. Solution/B/P: assume that there are richer and poorer situations and relations between them. HintikkaVsBarwise/HintikkaVsSituation Semantics/Hintikka: but that’s not a triumph over the possible world semantics, for two reasons: 1) because it is now about the relation fine/coarse (fine-grained/coarse) ((s) of the description), it is nothing with which the semantics of possible worlds has to do. 2) The semantics of possible worlds has solved the problem with Rantala urn models (see above changing possible worlds). B/P: they consider only cases of omniscience that arise in the wake of the introducing new descriptive terms in the conclusion. II 208 and go beyond what is mentioned in the premises. Hintikka/Rantala: we both have seen cases that require the introduction of new individuals to ensure the validity of the inference. E.g. (3) Robert saw someone giving every boy his own book. (4) Robert saw every boy as he was given a book by someone. Question: does (3) logically entail (4)? Situations Semantics/B/P: according to her it does. Semantics of Possible Worlds/Hintikka: according to her, it is at least questionable. Decision Problem/Predicate Calculus/Hao Wang: Thesis: it corresponds to the task of filling out the Euclidean space with square dominoes of different sizes without leaving gaps. At least one piece of every size must be used. E.g. logical omniscience: comes in as follows now: At certain points, I can say truthfully according to my perception: (5) I see that this domino task is impossible to solve. In other cases I cannot truthfully say that. Problem/HintikkaVsBarwise/HintikkaVsSituation Semantics/Hintikka: according to B/P it should be true of any unsolvable domino problem that I see the insolubility as soon as I see the shapes of the available stones, because the insolubility follows logically from the visual information. Solution/Semantics of Possible Worlds/Hintikka: according to the urn model, there is no problem. II 209 Omniscience/Symmetry/Hintikka: Situation Semantics: needs the urn model to solve the second problem of logical omniscience Semantics of possible worlds: needs situations semantics in turn to solve the first problem. II 211 HintikkaVsBarwise/HintikkaVsSituation Semantics/Hintikka: you can find many problems solved with semantics of possible worlds, but not the situation semantics. Opacity/Hintikka: besides the one that is understood as the failure of substitutivity (the identity), there is one that is understood as the failure of the existential generalization (even if it is about non-existence) (see above). Questions/Hintikka: We still need a semantics for direct questions along with criteria for complete answers. (see below, see above). Direct object: can also be an event or a particular. Problem: Questions that contain a (external) quantifier. Problem: semantics for questions with T-constructions with epistemic verbs. Question: Why are W-constructions not found under the relevant verbs?. II 212 HintikkaVsSituation Semantics/HintikkaVsBarwise/Hintikka: Barwise and Perry introduce a "function c" (p 671): this seems obscure: Semantics/Hintikka: intended to provide a model that shows how speakers can refer to anything they want and can mean what they mean. Function/Semantics of Possible Worlds: here, the speaker or the listener detects a function of possible worlds on speakers. Situation Semantics/B/P: explains meaning from facts of reference-in-situation: "... a component implicitly represents the connections c between certain words and things in the world in the meaningful use of these words". HintikkaVsBarwisse/HintikkaVsSituation Semantics/: it should be the reverse: a realistic theory of meaning and reference should show how such a function c is determined by the meanings. For understanding means to detect the meanings c determined. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Berkeley, G. | Chisholm Vs Berkeley, G. | II 33 Def Immanence/Rutte: E.g. Berkeley: the concept of real external thing is absurd, because this would mean wanting to grasp the idea of an imaginary thing not thought of by anyone. (Contradiction). VsBerkeley: confusion between "not thought of" with "thought independent". Reality/Verification/Berkeley: experiences and their courses are reviewing instances for the assumption of external things. There are no specific experiences for such reviews. We can make the same predictions when denying the outside world. We cannot appeal to any other instance than our order of experience. II 34 In order to show that things are causes we would have to be able to show that we could have an experience of the external things without our experiences. But this is impossible. The same experience might exist if there were no external things. BerkeleyVsRealism: that makes realism obsolete! VsBerkeley: the same is also true of spiritualism, which Berkeley does not seem to see! (The fact that it is as superfluous as realism). II 35 Analytical philosophy/ Philosophy of language/Rutte: the language-analytical counterpart to realism is the assumption that we have learned on the basis of criteria to distinguish perception from illusion: without criteria we could not learn it. BerkeleyVs: such criteria do not exist! VsBerkeley: then we cannot even make the distinction by concepts between a perception of external things and a total hallucination! Berkeley himself already presupposes this conceptual distinction! ((s) Why?). (Rutte: elsewhere Berkeley already sees the concept of external things as absurd, but not here). Berkeley: needs no criteria, since we will never learn this distinction anyway. VsBerkeley: nevertheless this distinction can be thought in a meaningful way. The concepts "experience" and "subject-independent" are available to everyone. They can be made explicit without referring to a specific perceptual situation. III 36 RationalismVsBerkeley/Rutte: the representatives of reason can point out that de facto such a decision situation does not exist: we believe in the outside world from the start. Hume: has referred to a similar natural belief with view to the even more fundamental question of the uniformity of the world. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Carnap, R. | Stroud Vs Carnap, R. | I 182 External/internal/Carnap/Quine/Stroud: Quine seems to interpret Carnap this way. That the distinction between "category questions" and "subsets questions" corresponds to the distinction. External/QuineVsCarnap: this is nothing more than two ways of formalizing the language. If we have only one kind of bound variable for all things, it will be an external question: "Is there such and such?" if the variable goes over the whole range. (This is a question of category). Internally: if there is a variable for every kind of thing, it will be a subset question. Then the question does not refer to all the things that can exist. I 183 Philosophy/QuineVsCarnap: differs from the sciences only in the range of its categories. (Quine, Word and Object, p. 275). External/internal/QuineVsCarnap: Category questions differ from internal questions only in their generality from subset questions. We can get to the generality by letting some kind of variable go over all things. I 191 StroudVsCarnap: this introduces a "we", and something that happens to us, called "experience". That we exist and have experience cannot simply be seen as an "internal" truth of the thing language. One cannot then see the meaning of experience as the common goal of all "real alternatives", because then it is assumed that there are external things. Problem: the question of the common goal of all genuine alternatives cannot be regarded as an external question of all reference systems either, because then it becomes meaningless. But if it were "internal", what would be the difference if one were to switch from one reference system to another that does not even contain this goal? Carnap does not answer that. I 192 This makes it difficult to grasp his positive approach. CarnapVsSkepticism: misunderstands the relation between linguistic frame of expression about external objects and the truths expressed within this system of reference. StroudVsCarnap: but what exactly is his own non-sceptical approach to this relation? 1. To which system does Carnap's thesis belong that assertions of existence in the language of things are neither true nor false? 2. What does the thesis express at all then? Knowledge/internal/Carnap: for example the geometer in Africa really comes to knowledge about the mountain. StroudVsCarnap: but what does it mean in addition to the fact that this is not a truth that is independent of a reference system? Suppose for some reason we did not have the thing language and could freely choose another language. Does it follow from this that, for example, the sentence about the mountain in Africa would no longer be true? Surely we would express something completely different in a completely different language without thing expressions. But would the sentence we can make now not be true in this other language? I 193 And could it never be true if we had never accidentally adopted the thing language. Existence/Language/Skepticism/StroudVsCarnap: that cannot be right and it leads to an extreme idealism that Carnap just rejects. It is absurd because we already know enough about mountains to see that they are not influenced by a chosen language. Language/object/Stroud: things were there long before language came into being in the world. And that again is something we know "internally" in the thing language. StroudVsCarnap: then his thesis, understood as "internal" to the language, is wrong. It contradicts what we already assume it as knowledge about ourselves and external things. Empirically speaking, it leads to idealism that contradicts the known facts. CarnapVsVs: would say that of course one must not understand his thesis "empirically" and not the thing language "internally". StroudVsCarnap: but within some reference system it must be internal, otherwise it is meaningless. Problem: but this is a statement about the relation between a chosen framework and the internal statements within that framework. And if that implies that these internal statements would have been neither true nor false, if a different frame of reference had been chosen, it is still idealism, whether empirical or non empirical idealism. Truth Value/tr.v./Convention/StroudVsCarnap: the truth value of the internal sentences would depend on the choice of language (of the reference system). I 194 StroudVsCarnap: it is important to see that if this did not follow, Carnap's thesis would not be different from traditional skepticism! There would then be room for the possibility that statements about things would remain true, even if we abandoned the thing language and truth would again be independent of language. Problem: that would again lead to our choice of a linguistic framework being necessary only to formulate or recognize something that would be true anyway ((s) > metaphysical realism) independently of that framework. Theoretically: according to Carnap this would then be a "theoretical" question about the acceptability of the thing language as a whole. But in terms of objectivity, which we then presuppose. CarnapVsTradition: it is precisely the incomprehensibility of such theoretical questions that is important in Carnap. Because Problem: then it could be that even if we carefully apply our best procedures (> Best explanation), things could still be different from what we think they are. This is equivalent to skepticism. "Conditional Correctness"/Skepticism/Carnap/Stroud: Carnap accepts what I have called the "conditional correctness" of skepticism: if the skeptic could ask a meaningful question, he would prevail. StroudVsCarnap: if he now would not deny that the "internal" sentences remain true or false when changing the reference system, his approach would be just as tolerant of skepticism as tradition. ((s) So both denial and non-denial would become a problem.) Kant/Stroud: he also accepts the "conditional correctness" of skepticism. If Descartes' description of experience and its relation to external things were correct, we could never know anything about these things. Carnap/Stroud: his thesis is a version of Kant's "Copernican Turn". And he obtains it for the same reasons as Kant: without it we would have no explanation, how is it possible that we know anything at all? Reference system/frame/StroudVsCarnap: a gap opens up between the frame and what is true independently of it. ((s) If a choice between different frames is to be possible). StroudVsCarnap: in this respect, Carnap's approach is entirely Kantian. I 196 And he also inherits all the obscurity and idealism of Kant. There are parallels everywhere: for both there can be a kind of distancing from our belief. We can do a philosophical study of everyday life (as far as the conditions of knowledge are concerned). I 197 Reference system/framework/StroudVsCarnap: to which framework does Carnap's thesis belong that no propositions about external objects are true or false regardless of the choice of a reference system (language)? And is this thesis - analytical or not - itself "internal" in any framework? And whether it is or not, is it not merely an expression of Kantian Transcendental Idealism? Skepticism/StroudVsCarnap: the basic mistake is to develop any competing theory at all to tradition. I 198 A purely negative approach or deflationary use of the verification principle would simply eliminate skepticism as pointless. If that were possible, scepticism would no longer need to be undermined. But: Verification Principle/StroudVsCarnap: Problem: the status of the verification principle itself, or its acceptability. We can only use it to refute Descartes if we have a good reason to accept it as necessary. But that depends on how it is introduced. It should serve to prevent the excesses of senseless philosophical speculation. StroudVsCarnap: 1. Then we can only watch and see how far the principle can lead to a distinction that we have already made before! The only test would be sentences, which we would have recognized as senseless before! 2. But even assuming that the principle would be adequately proven as extensional and descriptive, i.e. it would distinguish between meaningful and senseless, as we do, I 199 it would not allow us to eliminate something as senseless that we had not already recognized as senseless by other means. Verification Principle/StroudVsCarnap: was incorrectly introduced ((s) with the ulterior motive of producing a result that was already fully known). Early Carnap sketches show that general laws of nature were initially wrongly excluded. Verification principle/VP/StroudVsCarnap: a correct introduction would provide a strong destructive tool that Kant was already looking for: it would have to explain why the verfication principle is correct. This would probably be identical to an explanation of how knowledge of external things is possible. Verification Principle/Hempel/Carnap/Stroud: the early representatives had in mind that 1. a sentence is meaningful only if it expresses an "actual content", 2. that understanding a sentence means knowing what would happen if the sentence were true. Verificationism/Stroud: There is nothing particularly original about this approach. What gives it the verificationist twist is the idea that we cannot even understand anything that cannot be known as true or false, or weaker: at least to believe as more rational than its opposite. StroudVsCarnap: that failed, even as an attempt to extract empirically verifiable sentences. I 205 SkepticismVsVerificationism/StroudVsVerificationism/StroudVsCarnap: even if verificationism is true, we still need an explanation of how and why traditional philosophical ((s) non-empirical) inquiry fails. ((s) should correspond here to skepticism). (>Why-question). I 207 StroudVsVerificationism/StroudVsCarnap/StroudVsHempel: it is more plausible to reject the verification principle ((s) > empiricist sense criterion) than to claim that Descartes never said anything meaningful. StroudVsVerification Principle: it will remain implausible as long as it is not understood why the traditional distinction internal/external should not be correct. I 214 Formal manner of speaking: ""Wombat" applies to (is true of) some living beings in Tasmania". QuineVsCarnap: misunderstands the semantic ascent when he speaks of external issues. But this does not reject Carnap's pragmatic approach to simplicity and fertility of theories. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Conceptual Role | Fodor Vs Conceptual Role | IV 163 Conceptual Role/CRT/Block/Fodor/Lepore: "conceptual role theory" or theory of the conceptual role, semantics of conceptual role. Thesis: the meaning of an expression is its semantic role (or inferential role). Block: believes that one version of this theory is true, but does not want to decide which one. Anyway, it is, according to Block, the only one that fulfills the conditions of the cognitive sciences. Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: Block's arguments for the conceptual role theory are not the decisive ones. But this does not lead to semantic holism anyway. It would have to be asserted together with the distinction analytic/synthetic. Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: perhaps the psychology, which Block has in mind, needs these conditions, but we do not believe that a version of the conceptual role theory fulfills them. IV 166 Fodor/Lepore/GriceVsBlock: ad 6.: (autonomous/inherited meaning) each Gricean semantics can tell the same story as Block: namely, that the meanings of sentences in a natural language depend on contents of propositional attitudes expressed by these sentences (propositional attitudes may be, for example, the communicative intentions). Grice: thesis: meanings are derived from the content of propositional attitudes (e.g. communicative intentions, >Position). IV 169 Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: 1) Now it becomes obvious: distinctions between inferential roles only solve Frege’s problem if there is an adequate principle of individuation for them. But there is no criterion for that! Block also names this as the main problem. So it is not easier to distinguish between the inferiential roles than between meanings. Twin Earth/TE/CRT/Block/Fodor/Lepore: problems with the Twin Earth are going in the a different direction than Frege’s problems (intention/extension). Frege: needs more finely grained concepts than extensions. Putnam: needs less finely grained concepts than extensional equivalence. (Eng) Synonymous expressions must be treated as extensionally different (water/twin earth water). Therefore, a common theoretical approach (CRT - conceptual role theory) is unlikely to work. Solution/Block: "two factors" version of the CRT. The two are orthogonal to each other: a) actual CRT: covers the meaning aspect of Frege IV 170 b) independent, perhaps causal theory of reference: (twin earth/water/twin earth water). Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: that has almost nothing to do with conceptual role theory. But also neither a) (meaning) nor b) (causality) are available. But let’s assume it anyway: E.g. suppose distinction meaning/reference: with "two factor" theory: we do have enough discrimination capability, but we pay a high price for it: Question: what actually holds the two factors together? IV 171 Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: precisely in the case of the twin earth, the conceptual role cannot determine the reference! Conceptual Role/Block: seems to be saying that it is indeed not the conceptual role of water that determines what it refers to, but the conceptual role of names! Their reference is causally determined, after all, according to Kripke. Conceptual Role/(s): difference: a) conceptual role of a particular concept, e.g. water. b) a word class, e.g. names. Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: but that does not solve the problem! We need something that prevents the confusion of extension and intension. What is it that excludes an expression like (see above) "prime/moisture"? Block: T is not a species concept if the causal theory of species concepts is not true of it. Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: that does precisely not prevent "water" from having the extension of a species concept, while having the logic of a numerical concept. Mention/use/Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: Block seems to be guilty of this confusion here: the problem here is how the meaning of an expression is related to the denotation if the intension does not determine the extension. Block only tells us that the concpet T, etc. falls under the extension of expressions such as "name", "species concept" if a certain semantic theory is true. This tells us how the inferential roles of "name", "species concept", etc. are related to their extensions. For those it proposes a kind of description theory: E.g. "name" is applied to "Moses", iff "Moses" has the semantic properties which the causal theory defines for names. IV 172 Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: but it does not tell us how the meaning of "Moses" defines its extension! And that is exactly the problem that the "two-factor" theory raises. Narrow Content/Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: the idea that narrow meanings are conceptual roles sheds no light on the distinction meaning/reference. A semantic theory should not only be able to ascertain the identity of meaning, but also provide a canonical form that can answer the questions about the meaning of expressions. If the latter succeeds, it is not entirely clear whether the first must succeed as well. Narrow Content/categories/twin earth/Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: problem: how to express narrow contents. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Correspondence Theory | Davidson Vs Correspondence Theory | I (e) 96 So we get rid of the correspondence theory of truth at the same time. It is the belief in it, which gives rise to relativistic thought. Representations are relative to a scheme. E.g. Something can be a map of Mexico, but only in relation to the Mercator projection, or just a different projection. Horwich I 443 Truth/Truth theory/tr.th./DavidsonVsCorrespondence theory: a truth theory presents no entities that could be compared with sentences. (A Coherence Theory of Thruth and Knowledge.): Thesis: "correspondence without confrontation." Davidson/Rorty: this is in line with his rejection of the "dualism of scheme and content". (= Thesis, that something like "mind" or "language" had a relation like "fit" or "organize" to the world). Rorty: such theories are a remnant of pragmatism. Pragmatism/Davidson/Rorty: because of the strong connection between Dewey Quine Davidson one can assume that Davidson is part of the tradition of American pragmatism. Nevertheless, Davidson explicitly denied that his break with empiricism made him a pragmatist. Def Pragmatism/Davidson/Rorty: Davidson thinks that pragmatism identifies truth with assertibility. Then DavidsonVsPragmatism. Truth/Davidson: should not be identified with anything. Truthmaker/Make true/DavidsonVsTruth makers: do not exist. Horwich I 553 Correspondence/Fulfillment/Tarski/truth theory/Davidson/Rorty: the correspondence that should be described in terms of "true of" and is supposedly revealed by "philosophical analysis" in a truth theory is not what is covered by Tarski’s fulfillment relation. The relation between words and objects, which is covered by fulfillment is irrelevant for this philosophical truth. ((s) of "Correspondence"). "true"/Explanation/Rorty: "true" does not provide material for analysis. Truth/Davidson: is nice and transparent as opposed to belief and coherence. Therefore, I take it as a basic concept. Horwich I 454 Truth/DavidsonVsTarski/Rorty: can therefore not be defined in terms of fulfillment or something else. We can only say that the truth of a statement depends on the meaning of the words and the arrangement of the world. DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory/Rorty: with that we get rid of them. Intermediate/Intermediary/Davidson/Rorty: ("tertium", "Tertia") E.g. "perspective", E.g. conceptual scheme, E.g. "point of view", E.g. language, E.g. cultural tradition. We do not need to worry about these things anymore if we drop correspondence (VsCorrespondence theory). DavidsonVsSkepticism: is triggered just by the assumption of such "tertia". "Less is more": we no longer need to worry about the details of the correspondence relation. Correspondence/Davidson/Rorty: we can regard it as trivial, without the need for an analysis. It has been reduced to a "stylistic variant" of "true". DavidsonVsSkepticism/Rorty: arises because of these intentionalist concepts that build imaginary barriers between you and the world. RortyVsDavidson: has still not shown how coherence yields correspondence. He has not really refuted the skeptics, but rather keeps them from the question. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 Quine II 56 DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory: the conception of the fact coincidence which corresponds to the whole of the experience adds nothing relevant to the simple concept of being true. No thing makes sentences and theories true, not experience, not surface irritation, not the world. (> make true). |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Davidson, D. | Cresswell Vs Davidson, D. | I 94 Davidson/CresswellVsDavidson: his analysis does not help in cases that are about distinguishing two predicates that are not true of anything (apply to nothing). Because then there is trivially a y that is x ’G-be iff. there is a y that is x’s F-be. Intensional interpretation: here the same thing applies if the two predicates apply to nothing. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Field, H. | Leeds Vs Field, H. | Field II 304 Indeterminacy/Set Theory/ST/Leeds/Field: e.g. somebody considers the term "set" to be undetermined, so he could say instead: The term can be made "as large as possible". (Leeds 1997,24) (s) "everything that is included in the term"). As such the term can have a wider or narrower definition. Cardinality of the continuum/Indeterminacy/Field: This indeterminacy should at least contain the term set membership. LeedsVsField: It is not coherent to accept set theory and to qualify its terms as indetermined at the same time. And it is not coherent to then apply classical logic in set theory. Field: It could also look like this: the philosophical comments should be separated from mathematics. But we do not need to separate theory from practice, e.g. if the belief in indeterminacy is expressed in whether the degree of the mathematician's belief in the continuum hypothesis and his "doubt degree" adds up to 1 ((s) So that there is no space left for a third possibility). Problem: A mathematician for whom it adds up to 1 could ask himself "Is the continuum hypothesis correct?" and would look for mathematical proof. A second mathematician, however, whose degree of certainty adds up to 0 ((s) since he believes in neither the continuum hypothesis nor its negation) will find it erroneous to look for proof. Each possibility deserves to be analyzed. The idea behind indeterminacy however is that only little needs to be defined beyond the accepted axioms. ((s) no facts.) Continuum Hypothesis/Field: Practical considerations may prefer a concept over one another in a particular context and a different one in another context. Solution/Field: This is not a problem as long as those contexts are hold separate. But is has been shown that its usefulness is independent from the truth. II 305 Williamsons/Riddle/Indeterminacy/Leeds/Field: (LeedsVsField): (e.g. it must be determined whether Joe is rich or not): Solution/Leeds: i) we exclude the terms in question, e.g. rich (in this example) from the markup language which we accept as "first class" and ii) the primary (disquotional) use of "referred" or "is true of" is only used for this markup language. Indeterminacy/Leeds: Is because there is no uniform best way to apply the disquotional scheme in order to translate into the markup language. Field: This is genius: To reduce all indeterminacy on the indeterminacy of the translation. FieldVsLeeds: I doubt that a meaning can be found. Problem: To differentiate between undetermined termini and those which are only different regarding the extension of the markup language. Especially if we have a number of translations which all have different extensions in our markup language. Solution/Disquotationalism: It would integrate the foreign terms in its own language. We would then be allowed to cite.(Quine, 1953 b, 135. see above chap. IV II 129-30). Problem: If we integrate "/" and "", the solution which we obtained above may disappear. FieldVsLeeds: I fear that our objective - to exclude the indeterminacy in our own language- will not be reached.It even seems to be impossible for our scientific terms! e.g. the root –1/√-1/Brandom/Field: The indeterminacy is still there; We can simply use the "first class" markup language to say that -1 has two roots without introducing a name like "i" which shall stand for "one of the two". FieldVsLeeds: We can accept set theory without accepting its language as "first class". ((s) But the objective was to eliminate terms of set theory from the first class markup language and to limit "true of" and "refer" to the markup language.) Field: We are even able to do this if we accept Platonism (FieldVsPlatonism) : II 306 e.g. we take a fundamental theory T which has no vocabulary of set theory and only says that there is an infinite number of non-physical eternally existing objects and postulates the consistency of fundamental set theory. Consistency is then the basic term which is regulated by its own axioms and not defined by terms of set theory. (Field 1991). We then translate the language of set theory in T by accepting "set" as true of certain or all non-physical eternally existing objects and interpret "element of" in such a way that the normal axioms remain true. Then there are different ways to do this and they render different sentences true regarding the cardinality of the continuum. Then the continuum hypothesis has no particular truth value. (C.H. without truth value). Problem: If we apply mathematical applications to non-mathemtical fields, we do not only need consistency in mathematics but in other fields as well. And we should then assume that the corresponding theories outside mathematics can have a Platonic reformulation. 1. This would be possible if they are substituted by a nominal (!) theory. 2. The Platonic theorie could be substituted by the demand that all nominal consequences of T-plus-set theory are true. FieldVs: The latter looks like a cheap trick, but the selected set theory does not need to be the one deciding the cardinality of the continuum. The selected set theory for a physical or psychological theory need not to be compatible with the set theory of another domain. This shows that the truth of the metalanguage is not accepted in a parent frame of reference. It's all about instrumental usefulness. FieldVsLeeds: We cannot exclude indeterminacy - which surpasses vagueness- in our own language even if we concede its solution. But we do not even need to do this; I believe my solution is better. I 378 Truth/T-Theory/T-concept/Leeds: We now need to differentiate between a) Truth Theory (T-Theory) ((s) in the object language) and b) theories on the definition of truth ((s) metalinguistic) . Field: (1972): Thesis: We need a SI theory of truth and reference (that a Standard Interpretation is always available), and this truth is also obtainable. (LeedsVsStandard Interpretation/VsSI//LeedsVsField). Field/Leeds: His argument is based on an analogy between truth and (chemical)valence. (..+....) Field: Thesis: If it would have looked as if the analogy cannot be reduced, it would have been a reason to abandon the theory of valences, despite the theory's usefulness! Truth/Field: Thesis: (analogous to valence ): Despite all we know about the extension of the term, the term also needs a physicalistic acceptable form of reduction! Leeds: What Field would call a physicalistic acceptable reduction is what we would call the SI theory of truth: There always is a Standard Interpretation for "true" in a language. Field/Leeds: Field suggests that it is possible to discover the above-mentioned in the end. LeedsVsField: Let us take a closer look at the analogy: Question: Would a mere list of elements and numbers (instead of valences) not be acceptable? I 379 This would not be a reduction since the chemists have formulated the law of valences. Physikalism/Natural law/Leeds: Does not demand that all terms can be easily or naturally explained but that the fundamental laws are formulated in a simple way. Reduction/Leeds: Only because the word "valence" appears in a strict law there are strict limitations imposed on the reduction. Truth/Tarski/LeedsVsTarski: Tarski's Definitions of T and R do not tell us all the story behind reference and truth in English. Reference/Truth/Leeds: These relations have a naturalness and importance that cannot be captured in a mere list. Field/Reduction/Leeds: If we want a reduction à la Field, we must find an analogy to the law of valences in the case of truth, i.e. we need to find a law or a regularity of truth in English. Analogy/Field: (and numerous others) See in the utility of the truth definition an analogy to the law. LeedsVsField: However, the utility can be fully explained without a SI theory. It is not astonishing that we have use for a predicate P with the characteristic that"’__’ is P" and "__"are always interchangeable. ((s)>Redundancy theory). And this is because we often would like to express every sentence in a certain infinite set z (e.g. when all elements have the form in common.) ((s) "All sentences of the form "a = a" are true"), > Generalization. Generalization/T-Predicate/Leeds: Logical form: (x)(x e z > P(x)). Semantic ascent/Descent/Leeds: On the other hand truth is then a convenient term, same as infinite conjunction and disjunction. I 386 Important argument: In theory then, the term of truth would not be necessary! I believe it is possible that a language with infinite conjunctions and disjunctions can be learned. Namely, if conjunctions and disjunctions if they are treated as such in inferences. They could be finally be noted. I 380 Truth/Leeds: It is useful for what Quine calls "disquotation" but it is still not a theory of truth (T-Theory). Use/Explanation/T-Theory/Leeds: In order to explain the usefulness of the T-term, we do not need to say anything about the relations between language and the world. Reference is then not important. Solution/Leeds: We have here no T-Theory but a theory of the term of truth, e.g. a theory why the term is seen as useful in every language. This statement appears to be based solely on the formal characteristics of our language. And that is quite independent of any relations of "figure" or reference to the world. Reference/Truth/Truth term/Leeds: it shows how little the usefulness of the truth term is dependent on a efficient reference relation! The usefulness of a truth term is independent of English "depicts the world". I 381 We can verify it: Suppose we have a large fragment of our language, for which we accept instrumentalism, namely that some words do not refer. This is true for sociology, psychology, ethics, etc. Then we will find semantic ascent useful if we are speaking about psychology for example. E.g. "Some of Freud's theories are true, others false" (instead of using "superego"!) Standard Interpretation/Leeds: And this should shake our belief that T is natural or a standard. Tarski/Leeds: This in turn should not be an obstacle for us to define "T" à la Tarski. And then it is reasonable to assume that "x is true in English iff T (x)" is analytic. LeedsVsSI: We have then two possibilities to manage without a SI: a) we can express facts about truth in English referring to the T-definition (if the word "true" is used) or b) referring to the disquotional role of the T-term. And this, if the explanandum comprises the word "true" in quotation marks (in obliqua, (s) mentioned). Acquaintance/Russell/M. Williams: Meant a direct mental understanding, not a causal relation! This is an elder form of the correspondence theory. I 491 He was referring to RussellVsSkepticism: A foundation of knowledge and meaning FieldVsRussell/M. WilliamsVsRussell: das ist genau das Antackern des Begriffsschemas von außen an die Welt. Field/M. Williams: His project, in comparison, is more metaphysical than epistemic. He wants a comprehensive physicalistic overview. He needs to show how semantic characteristics fit in a physical world. If Field were right, we would have a reason to follow a strong correspondence theory, but without dubious epistemic projects which are normally linked to it. LeedsVsField/M. Williams: But his argument is not successful. It does not give an answer to the question VsDeflationism. Suppose truth cannot be explained in a physicalitic way, then it contradicts the demand that there is an unmistakable causal order. Solution: Truth cannot explain (see above) because we would again deal with epistemology (theory of knowledge).(>justification, acceptability). |
Leeds I Stephen Leeds "Theories of Reference and Truth", Erkenntnis, 13 (1978) pp. 111-29 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Functionalism | Nagel Vs Functionalism | Frank I 64 Subject/Body/Nagel: if I am familiar with my mental states necessaryly directly, i.e. not through perception, but it is only possible to address perception findings as mine through the direct familiarity, then I have a reason not to seek the subject of the psyche in the body. In addition, I am also in an arbitrary mental state when I have no idea about its descriptive interpretation. ((s) VsNagel: (with Sellars): access only through language). NagelVsFunctionalism: if he was right, it would necessarily be true of mental states that they would be identical with functional states, but only by chance, that they are mental states, because the latter depends on their causal roles, and not on their inner epistemic nature. Nagel III 21 NagelVsFunctionalism/VsReductionism: the ordinary concept of the mental already contains the beginnings of a very different conception of objective reality. We cannot understand the idea of a different consciousness if we interpret it in a way that becomes incomprehensible when we try to apply the idea to ourselves. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Idealism | Davidson Vs Idealism | Horwich I 449 Davidson/Rorty: can he be attributed (1) - (4)? He often asserted (3), but (4) does not seem to suit him, because he is a "realist". (2) also sounds alien to him. (see above): Theses of pragmatism/Rorty: 1) "truth" has no explanatory use 2) We understand everything about the relation belief world if we understand the causal relation with the world. Our knowledge about the use of "about" and "true of" is a spin-off of a naturalistic access to linguistic behavior. 3) There is no relation of "true-making" or "true-makers". 4) There is no dispute between realism and anti-realism, because this is based on the empty and misleading assumptios that beliefs are "made true". Rorty: although Davidson does not seem to be a pragmatist because of its proximity to Tarski, I think that one can attribute all four pragmatist theses to him. Correspondence/Davidson/Rorty: Thesis: the approach about the field linguists (radical interpretation) is everything that Davidson thinks is needed to understand correspondence. Language game/External/RI/Davidson: the position of the field linguist is the only one that makes it possible to position oneself outside of the language game. He tries to make sense of our linguistic behavior. In that, it is asked how the external observer uses the word "true". ((s) then you would have to ask whether the external language game really contains the situation as an internal language game.) DavidsonVsIdealism: metaphysical and seeks ontological uniformity, hopeless DavidsonVsPhysicalism: hopes to discover such a homogeneity in the future.) Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Jackson, F. | Williamson Vs Jackson, F. | Stalnaker I 106 Global Supervenience/WilliamsonVsJackson/Stalnaker: as Jackson defines global supervenience, it is not sufficient for strong supervenience. Def Global Supervenience/Ethics/Jackson: (s) for all possible worlds (poss.w.) w and w' if w and w' are descriptively exactly the same, then they are also exactly the same from an ethical point of view. I.e. the ethical supervenes on the descriptive. I 107 WilliamsonVsJackson: shows that global supervenience in this sense can also apply if the strong supervenience does not apply: Def uniform property/Williamson/Stalnaker: be a property that is either true of all or nothing. ((s) then possible worlds may differ in that in one all things are u, in the other possible worlds is no thing u). ((s) uniform property(s): e.g. self-identity e.g. difference from other individuals). U: be the set of uniform properties N.B.: then U = U' (the closure on the set of U, properties that are definable in terms of uniform properties are themselves uniform). For example, suppose w and w' are equal in terms of all uniform properties, then w = w'. ((s) I.e. they are equal at all). So that all possible words which are the same in terms of uniform properties are also the same in terms of all properties! ((s) Because F properties are not yet introduced, see below). Then the set of all properties supervenes globally on the uniform properties. But this is not true for strong or even weak superveniences! Because two individuals existing in the same possible world will have the same uniform properties, but may differ in terms of non-uniform properties. StalnakerVsWilliamson: that is true, but it exploits the gap we have closed in the text. Therefore, it does not affect our outcome. Gap: Q: be a trait that applies to some but not all things in world w. ((s) I.e. F is not a uniform property, i.e. there are other properties besides u properties). f: be some picture of world w on itself that maps everything what is in w F, on something that is not F in w. w. will be U-indistinguishable from itself relative to figure f, but not {F}- indistinguishable from itself. ((s) Simple, because not all things are F, although all are u.) Therefore, any set of properties containing F will supervene globally on U. |
EconWillO Oliver E. Williamson Peak-load pricing and optimal capacity under indivisibility constraints 1966 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Moore, G.E. | Cartwright Vs Moore, G.E. | Horwich I 45 Correspondence theory/CartwrightVsmoore: Problem: there is also a property of coincidence (correspondence) which does not have the false proposition. And that seems to depend undeniably on the world! On a fact. Fact: the proposition is true if it is a fact that there are subways in Boston, otherwise it is false. CartwrightVsMoore/CartwrightVsRussell: it is precisely this which the theory of truth ignores as a simple, unanalysable property. But both were aware of this. ("Meinong Theory", p 75). They stuck to it, because: RussellVsCorrespondence theory, MooreVsCorrespondence theory. I 47 Fact/True proposition/Moore/Cartwright: (Moore: Some Main P, pp 262): seems to have explained his former theory wrongly there: Tact/MooreVsMoore: (late): does not consist in a proposition having a simple property while remaining the same, regardless of whether it is true or false. Even if we concede the existence of propositions. The relation of the proposition to the fact is not simply that the proposition is a constituent of the fact, one of the elements of which it is composed. Moore/Cartwright: otherwise, one would have to say that E.g. the fact that lions exist was a fact about the proposition that lions exist. But how is this relevant for Moore’s earlier theory? Because that was not what it was about, but rather that the fact that lions exist simply is the proposition. (Moore, early: fact = true proposition, not part of it) The simple property (truth) is possessed by the proposition itself. I 48 Anyone who believes that the proposition that lions exist is true, believes the corresponding proposition. The fact here is that the proposition is true. Fact/Moore: (early): consists in that the proposition possesses the simple property of truth. Fact/Moore/late: (Some Main P, misrepresenting his earlier theory): now consists in the possession of the truth (simple property) by the proposition. Important argument: then there is no identity fact = true proposition: because identity does not consist in itself having a property. ((s) A does not consist of the fact that A has the property F,> consist in, consist of, identity). Moore/Cartwright: the time of "Some Main .." he had come to the view that the relation theory of beliefs (acceptance of belief objects) is inconsistent with the identification of facts with true propositions. Now a relation was searched rather than the identity and his solution was the relation of "consisting in": Def Fact/Moore: (Some Main Problems): consists in the possession of truth by the proposition. (still simple property). CartwrightVsMoore: he saw himself that this was not very successful: there are facts that do not consist in a proposition having a certain simple property. CartwrightVsMoore: worse: once facts and propositions are distinguished, no simple property (truth) is needed anymore. Instead, we now have facts as the corresponding ones! It was precisely this inability to distinguish propositions and facts that had led Moore and Russell to the theory of truth as a simple unanalysable property!. Fact/Proposition/Moore/Cartwright: what had led Moore to start believing that propositions and facts cannot be identified?. I 49 E.g. Suppose Brown believes that there are subways in Boston. Moore/Russell/early: then there is a corresponding proposition that Brown believes. Problem: even if the belief had been wrong, Brown would have needed a faith object. Because what someone believes cannot depend on its truth!. So the believed proposition is definitely in the universe. But if the proposition is false, there is no corresponding fact in the universe. So propositions cannot be identical with facts. Ayer: this is a compelling argument. Cartwright: but for me it does not refute the early theory!. Russell/Moore/Early/Cartwright: sure, if something is true of a proposition, and it is not true of the corresponding fact, then proposition and fact are not the identical. But is this case given here? According to the early theory, the proposition would be in the universe anyway, even if it were wrong. Question: Is Moore right to say that the same does not apply to the fact? CartwrightVsMoore: it is not obvious that if the belief, e.g. that there are underground trains in Boston, was wrong, it would be necessary that something that actually exists in the universe, (namely that there are underground trains in Boston) would then be missing in the universe. Surely it would not be fact, but that does not mean that an entity would be missing if the belief had been wrong. I 50 Analogy: e.g. there is someone in the universe who can be correctly described as the author of Word and Object (namely Quine). Now, it could easily have been the case that Quine had not written the book. But that would not require Quine (= author of W + O) to not exist in the universe! E.g. Someone else might also have written the book. Furthermore, all persons who actually are in the universe, would not have had to be in the universe. Moore/Early/Cartwright: According to Moore’s earlier theory one might have thought that by analogy, something could also be in the universe that is "correctly described" with that there are underground trains in Boston, which, in the case that there were no underground trains in Boston, would not be a fact. That is wrong because of the false analogy between people and abstract belief objects). CartwrightVsMoore: (early): a follower of the early theory would have expressed the true same proposition with the following two sentences: (3) The fact that there are underground trains in Boston would not have had to be the fact that there are underground trains in Boston. and (4) The author of Word and Object would not have had to be the author of Word and Object. CartwrightVsMoore: (early): With that he would have assumed that "the fact that" would have been a rigid designator. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Peirce, Ch.S. | Rorty Vs Peirce, Ch.S. | Horwich I 444 Truth/RortyVsPeirce: it was a mistake to identify them with the "end point of the study". I 448 Ideal/Idealization/RortyVsPeirce: his term "ideal" is as unclear (fishy) as "corresponds". Problem: e.g. "how do you know that you have reached the end of your study?". Example "How do you know that we correspond to reality, rather than just tracing a convention?" Ideal/Rorty would make sense if we could find an asymptotic approach. Thus, Peirce stops halfway. And that is because he left "spirit" out and remained glued to "sign". Solution/W. JamesVsPeirce/Rorty: James went the all the way, saying that "true of" is not only a relationship between non-homogeneous entities, but not an analyzable relation itself. >Correspondence, >"true of". |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Psychologism | McGinn Vs Psychologism | II 113/114 Def panpsychism/McGinn: moves the mind back in the material world (VsHyperdualism). ("Elvis Is Everywhere"). He states that consciousness is everywhere and wafts through space. II 115 a) Hard version of panpsychism: the neurons in the brain literally feel the pain, see yellow, think about dinner - and electrons and stars do the same. McGinnVsPanpsychism: 1. this is obviously not the case. Regular matter doesn't show any sign of thirst or pain. II 116 2. The problem with panpsychism is that it makes our mind look like an epiphenomenon! Since our mind is allegedly composed of all the states of mind that were intrinsic to matter before being formed into our brains. II 117 3. If all matter had mature thoughts and feelings, why do organisms then need nervous systems and brains to be able to think and feel? b) Soft panpsychism: obvious that atoms do not have mental states, but could they not contain the mind in a diluted form or on a lower level? McGinnVsPanpsychism (soft form): Problem: It is difficult to define what that means. If dilute states should be approximately like the consciousness before falling asleep, that leads back to the hard version. Stones would therefore have something like "proto mental" states, defined as any property of matter that allows for consciousness. II 118 McGinnVs: this theory is empty. It is true of course that matter has this or that property. And of course, matter must have the ability to give rise to consciousness, because it does so constantly. b) brain plays an active role: the brain makes use of the properties of matter and transforms it by virtue of its particular structure in consciousness. McGinn pro! McGinn pro panpsychism: all matter must have the potential to co-create consciousness because in the matter of which the brain tissue is constructed there is nothing really special (!). Ultimately, all traces of matter can be traced back to the Big Bang. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Strawson Vs Quine, W.V.O. | NS I 149 Strawson/Newen/Schrenk: pro descriptive metaphysicsVsRevisionist metaphysics. Definition descriptive metaphysics/Strawson: detects which ontology suggests our every day doing and speaking. Definition revisionists Metaphysics/StrawsonVsQuine: a physicalist ontology. This stands in contrast to the everyday's way of thinking. StrawsonVsQuine: for Strawson it is just about the everyday language, not about the ontology of any language. Ontology/language/Strawson: Thesis: pro-thing-property-ontology. This is necessarily the most elementary. Because of the similarity to the subject-predicate form. --- NS I 150 Space/Time/Strawson: are tools to differentiate different cases. Transcendental/Kant: are arguments that relate to the conditions of possibility. Strawson/Newen/Schrenk: his arguments are transcendental. --- Strawson I 198 QuineVsGeach/QuineVsFrege: singular expressions (singular term) can occur at the points of quantifiable variables, general expressions cannot. Singular Term: can be quantified, general term: not quantifiable. StrawsonVsQuine: on closer inspection, these differences of approach seem far less significant. Quine strongly distinguishes between types of non-linguistic objects on one side and the distinction between singular and general terms, on the other side. (Word/object). In Quine "piety" and "wisdom" are singular expressions, namely names of abstract objects like the nouns "Socrates" and "earth" are the names of concrete objects. Abstract Singular Term/Quine: E.g. "piety" (Universal). The distinction between singular and general term is more important for Quine from the logical point of view. The singular term gives the impression, and to name only one object, while the general term does not claimed at all, to name something, although it "may be true of many things." StrawsonVsQuine: this is an unsatisfactory way of explaining that the word "philosopher" should be a general and not a singular term. We would not like to say that this expression is true of many things or people. --- Strawson I 252 Circle/StrawsonVsQuine: regardless of their captivating simplicity of this analysis, I believe that it will be unacceptable by the form in which it is created. The language terms, in which the analysis is drawn up, presuppose the existence of subject expressions of linguistic singular terms. Other consequence: we are invited, to see the expressions that replace the "Fs" and "Gs" in the quantified sentences as ordinary predicate expressions. That is allright. --- I 253 Circle/StrawsonVsQuine: but again these forms have only their place in normal language because singular terms, subject expressions occupy the place they have there. Circularity: because we cannot simultaneously regard Fs and Gs as predicate expressions and accept that they all resolve subject expressions totally in the form of quantified sentences. Circle/StrawsonVsQuine: the argument is based on the linguistic forms that require in turn the use of these expressions. StrawsonVsGadamer/StrawsonVsQuine: one could argue against that this is too narrow, one must proceed inventively. In the case one would have to say what a teaching really should say, which is, taken literally, unacceptable. --- Strawson IV 69 StrawsonVsQuine: Suppose we want to manage without quantification over properties. Does it follow that the belief in objects would be justified, but not the belief in properties? --- IV 70 Strawson: we can accept a different kind of existence. A secondary, although a usual sense of existence, which applies to properties and relations. --- IV 71 Vs: E.g. a) "There is at least one property that has no machine, namely perfect efficiency". b) "no machine is completely efficient." In a) I quantify, in b) I do not. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Reductionism | Verschiedene Vs Reductionism | Metzinger II 471 VsReductionism: if a macro-phenomenon may be the result of more than one mechanism (organization and dynamics of components), then it cannot be identified with one of these mechanisms, the reduction of macro-phenomenon to a single micro-phenomenon is impossible then. ("multiple realizability"). ChurchlandVsVs: Statement/Churchland: Explanations and thus reductions are area-specific. Simons I 214 Reductionist view of Superposition/Chisholm: Thesis: only the final constituents are real. Everything else is only a logical construction from it. SimonsVs: this contains a considerable revisionary element: it eliminates all terms and predicates that are true of such constructions that are familiar to us. ((s) Example: machines do not exist then.) Pro: emphasizes the importance of the material constitution. Vs: overlooks the fact that parts are not always ontologically superior to their whole! For example, the whole is ontologically subordinate: a heap of pre-existing stones that only remains because it is not destroyed. Example: Whole ontologically predominant: Organism: possesses properties and operates according to laws that are relatively independent of the respective material constituents. I 215 An organism survives many replacements of parts. (>Flux). DoepkeVsReductionism: the existence of the constituted objects, which retain their properties across the flux, makes it superfluous to explain why precisely these successive chemicals assume certain properties. Wright I 202 "Natural Thought"/Realism/Natural Sciences: nothing that constitutes an intuitive scientific realism requires semantic realism. I 203 1. VsReductionism: the theoretical vocabulary of natural science is not a dispensable substitute for a more basic vocabulary. 2. Statements formulated with theoretical vocabulary can be true or false in a meaningful sense, because they have to do with the representation of objective facts. |
Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Representation | Brandom Vs Representation | I40 VsRepresentations: here the mind is treated as an unexplained explainer. (Descartes). I125 BrandomVsRepresentation: very problematic: if it is understood as a term, it should make the grammatical difference between singular terms and sentences understandable through reference to the ontological difference between objects and facts. But it does not follow that it is possible to introduce the category of facts as what is in the same sense represented by and that-sentences. I 126 an ontological category of facts cannot be made understandable primarily and regardless of explaining the declarative sentences. Representation is not expression! I 132 Rebecca West: VsRepresentation: "Mind as a mirror of nature": we do not need an image of the world, "one copy of these damn things is enough." I 292 Belief: can be ambiguous: one can be convinced of something wrong. The distinction often refers to the objectivity of representations (BrandomVsRepresentationalism, instead social practice as a guarantee of objectivity.) I 404 BrandomVsRepresentationalism: four aspects: 1) in addition to "true", representations need "refers to" and "means". (Later Frege) I 405 2) distinction between intensional and extensional contexts. 3) the "of" in de-re attributions. The concept of intentional relatedness: something is true of Kant, but not of Hegel. 4) concept of objective representational accuracy of judgment and reasoning. Can be justified by direct observation, inferential determinations or reference to certificates. I 412 BrandomVsRepresentation: instead expressive role. I 690 Brandom pro representationalism: contains the indisputable insight: whatever has a propositional content, necessarily has a representational side. The objection only applies to treating the representation as fundamental. II 69 Content/Representation/BrandomVsDescartes: possession of representational content as unexplained explainer. Rorty VI 181 BrandomVsRepresentation/Rorty: instead: "making real inferential connections between claims". If we have succeeded in using a logical and semantic vocabulary, we do not additionally need to explain how they got their "psychic powers". Representation/McDowellVsBrandom: representation cannot be reconstructed from the concept of inference. "Inferentialistic" explanations of the concepts do not work. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Russell, B. | Verschiedene Vs Russell, B. | Me I 55 Hugo BergmannVsRussell: the claim of the logician to have explained the concept of existence completely through the use in mathematical logic, is an unwarranted exaggeration. MenneVsRussell: a logical analysis of the concept of existence, which is not fixed from the outset on the existence operator, provides a satisfactory result, and also a response to the question of universals. EMD II 255 Change/Existence/Phases Sortal/Michael Woods: For example, it was true of something that it was a seed in my garden. But it is not true that the seedling ceased to exist just because it is no longer a seedling. Instead, it is the case that it was true of something, that it was a seedling, and that it is no longer true of anything. Descriptions/Michael WoodsVsRussell: can we not align the name in Russell's way. "(Ex)(x is the F)": this varies in the truth values with time, provided that "the F" denotes an object only at the time of utterance. Vs: as above in relation to existence (connection to the existence quantifier). Problem: for example, "the F no longer exists": how can it ever express a truth if it is to involve the time of the past? Berka I 292 BernaysVsRussell: (1926) the 4th axiom of Principia Mathematica(1) is not independent. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Sententialism | Schiffer Vs Sententialism | I 120 Def classic sententialism/Schiffer: after him the meaning or the contents determine, which proposition one believes. I 120 And that is also the problem: DavidsonVsclassisc sententialism, VsSententionalism/VsSententialism/Schiffer: Problem: Ambiguity in one language and in several languages. 1. E.g. [Empedokles liept]: in English: he leaped (leaped, (in the Etna), in German: he loves). (Davidson 1968, 98). 2. E.g. Field: "visiting relatives can be boring". Problem: the truth conditions of belief are after the unrefined sententialism the same as those of the believed proposition. In ambiguous propositions this would then be several truth-conditions!. E.g. if there was a language in which "love is cruel" means that kangaroos are flying, then Henri must believe both!. I 123 DavidsonVsSententialism: 1.a) with a proposition as a reference object of the that-proposition, there would be a fixation on only one language. b) Because of the ambiguity then there could be several truth conditions in the same language. (1975, 165f). 2. (alsoVsFrege): A very different semantic role than normal is ascribed to the proposition: Frege and sententionalism construct "the earth moves" as a major part of a singular term, namely "that the earth moves." They both do that because of the lack of substitutability in intensional contexts. I 137 Meaning/Propositional attitude/Belief/SchifferVsSententialism: there can therefore exist no correct sententialistic theory of propositional attitude Because no man knows the content-determining characteristics. Therefore, it also no proper access to extensionalistic compositional semantics for natural languages can exist. Previously we had already seen that failed as a non-sententialistic theory. I 157 Belief/Belief systems/Quine/Schiffer: for Quine belief systems never are true, although he concedes Quine pro Brentano: ~ you cannot break out of the intentional vocabulary. But: QuineVsBrentano: ~ no propositional attitudes belong in the canonical scheme, only physical constitution and behavior of organisms. (W+O 1960, p 221). Vssententialist dualism/SD/Schiffer: 1. QuineVs: If we accept the sD, we need to acknowledge with Brentano the "importance of an autonomous science of intention". Problem: this commonsense theory would then be cut off from the rest of science. And: Isolation/Science/Wright: (Wright 1984): to be isolated from the scientific means to be discredited. Theory/Quine: if it is discredited, their theoretical terms cannot be true of something and propositions such as "I think some dogs have fleas" cannot be true. Sententialist Dualism/Field: pro: (1972, 357): Physicalism is a successful hypothesis ... that would only force a large number of experiments to be ad. I 158 We bring Quine and Field as follows together: (1) "Believes", "wishes", "means" and so on are theoretical terms (TT) of a common sense psychological theory. (2) The justification for methodological physicalism (what Field wants) and the nature of the commonsense theory require that - should the theoretical terms physicalistically be irreducible - the folk psychology must be wrong. That means the terms are true of nothing (Quine). (3) Therefore, the sD must be wrong: belief systems cannot be both: true and irreducible. SchifferVs: is not convincing. I doubt both premises. Ad (2): there is no legitimate empirical hypothesis that requires that theoretical facts on physical facts are reducible. That would only be plausible if the TT would be defined by the theory itself that it introduces. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Skepticism | Nozick Vs Skepticism | II 197 Skepticism/Nozick: we do not try to refute the skeptic. VsSkepticism: other authors: 1) when he argues against knowledge, he already presupposes that it exists. 2) to accept it would be unreasonable, because it is more likely that his extreme conclusions are wrong than that all its premises are true. NozickVs. We do not have to convince the skeptic. We want to explain how knowledge is possible, therefore it is good to find hypotheses which we ourselves find acceptable! II 198 Skepticism/Nozick: Common Variant: claims that someone could believe something even though it is wrong. Perhaps caused by a demon or because he is dreaming or because he is a brain in a vat. But how do these possibilities adopted by the skeptic show that I do not know p? (3) if p were false, S would not believe that p (as above). If (3) is a necessary condition for knowledge that shows the possibility of the skeptic that there is no knowledge. Strong variant: R: Even if p were false, S would still believe that p II 199 This conditional with the same antecedent as (3) and contradictory consequent is incompatible with (3). If (3) is true, R is false. But R is stronger than skepticism requires. Because if (3) were wrong, S could still believe that p. The following conditional is weaker than R, it is merely the negation of (3): T: Not (not p > not (S believes that p)). ((s) >Range: weaker: negation of the entire conditional stronger: the same antecedent, opposite of the consequent ((s) not necessarily negation of consequent) Here: stronger: ".... would have to believe ..." - weaker.. "... could ...") Nozick: While R does not simply deny (3), it asserts its own conditional instead. The truth of (3) is not incompatible with a possible situation (here not possible world) where the person believes p, although p is false. (3) does not cover all possibilities: (3) not p > not (S believes p) That does not mean that in all situations where not p is true, S does not believe that p. Asserting this would mean to say that not p entails not (S believes p) (or logical implication) ((s) >Entailment). But subjunction (conditional) differs from entailment: So the existence of a possible situation in which p is wrong and S still believes p does not show that (3) is false. (? LL). (3) can be true even if there is a possible situation where not p and S believes that p. (3) speaks of the situation in which p is false. Not every possible situation where p is false is the situation that would prevail if p were false. Possible World: (3) speaks of the ~p world closest to our actual world. It speaks of the non-p neighborhood. Skepticism/SK/Terminology/Nozick: SK stands for the "possibilities of the skeptic": II 200 We could dream of being misled by an evil demon or being brains in a vat. These are attempts to refute (3): (3) if p were false, S would not believe that p. But these only attempts succeed if one of these possibilities(dream, vat, demon) prevails when p is false. I.e. only in the next non-p worlds. Even if we were in the vat, (3) could be true, i.e. although - as described by skeptics - p is false and S believes p. ((s) E.g. p: "I am in the Café": false, if I'm in the vat. But I would not believe to be the vat. That is what the skeptic means. If I do not believe the truth (that I am in the vat) and do not know, then my belief is wrong. But then p means "I'm not in the vat."). NozickVsSkepticism: when the skeptic describes a situation SK that would not prevail (sic), even if p were wrong, then this situation SK (vat) does not show that (3) is wrong and does not undermine our knowledge. (see below) ((s) i.e. from the perspective VsSkepticism: the skeptic asserts that all beliefs are wrong, but that is not yet the situation that we are all in the tank). This is just the preliminary consideration, the expected one follows in the next paragraph). Condition C: to exclude skeptical hypothesis: C: not-p > SK (vat situation) does not exist ((s) That is what the skeptic denies!). That excludes every skeptical situation that fulfills C. ((s) it is only about n-p cases). Skepticism: for a vat situation to show that we do not know that p, it must be a situation that could exist if p did not exist, and thus satisfies the negation of C: Negation of C: -not (not p > SK (vat situation) does not exist) Although the vat situations of the skeptic seem to show that (3) is wrong, they do not show it: they satisfy condition C and are therefore excluded! SkepticismVs: could ask why we know that if p were wrong, SK (vat) would not exist. But usually it asks something stronger: do we know that the vat situation does not exist? And if we do not know that, how can we know that p? ((s) reverse order). This brings us to the second way in which the vat situatios could show that we do not know that p: Skeptical results Knowledge/Nozick: according to our approach, S knows that the vat situation does not exist iff II 201 (1) vat situation does not exist (2) S believes that vat situation does not exist (3) If the vat situation existed, then S would not believe that the vat situation did not(!) exist. (4) If the vat situation did not exist, then S would believe that it does not exist. (3) is the necessary condition for knowledge! It follows from it that we do not know that we are not in the vat! Skepticism/Nozick: that is what the skeptic says. But is it not what we say ourselves? It is actually a feature of our approach that it provides this result! Vat/Demon/Descartes/Nozick: Descartes would say that proof of the existence of a good God would not allow us to be in the vat. Literature then focused on whether Descartes would succeed to obtain such evidence. II 202 Nozick: could a good God not have reasons to deceive us? According to Descartes his motives are unknowable for us. Cogito/Nozick: can "I think" only be produced by something existing? Not perhaps also by Hamlet, could we not be dreamed by someone who inspires "I think" in us? Descartes asked how we knew that we were not dreaming, he could also have asked whether we were dreamed about by someone. Def Doxastically Identical/Terminology/Nozick: is a possible situation for S with the current situation, if S believed exactly the same things (Doxa) in the situation. II 203 Skepticism: describes doxastically identical situations where nearly all the believed things are wrong. (Vat). Such possible worlds are possible, because we possess our knowledge through mediation, not directly. It's amazing how different doxastically identical worlds can be. What else could the skeptic hope for? Nozick pro skepticism: we agree that we do not know that "not-vat". II 204 But that does not keep me from knowing that I'm writing this! It is true, I believe it and I would not believe it if it were not true, and if it were true, I would believe it. I.e. our approach does not lead to general skepticism. However, we must ensure that it seems that the skeptic is right and that we do not know that we are not in the vat. VsSkepticism: we must examine its "short step" to the conclusion that we do not know these things, because either this step is wrong or our approach is incoherent. Not seclusion II 204 Completed/Incompleteness/Knowledge/Nozick: Skepticism: (wrongly) assumes that our knowledge is complete under known logical implication: if we progress from something known to something entailed, we allegedly do not leave the realm of knowledge. The skeptic tries the other way around, of course: if you do not know that q, and you know that p entails q, then it should follow that you do not know that p. E.g. ((s) If you do not know that you are not in the vat, and sitting here implies not being in the vat, then you do not know that you're sitting here, if you know that the implication exists. (contraposition).) Terminology: Contraposition: knowledge that p >>: entails Then the (skeptical) principle of closure under known implication is: P: K(p >> q) & Kp > Kq. II 205 Nozick: E.g. if you know that two sentences are incompatible, and you know that the first one is true, then you know that the negation of the second one is true. Contraposition: because you do not know the second one, you do not know the first. (FN 48) Vs: you could pick on the details and come to an iteration: the person might have forgotten inferences etc. Finally you would come to KK(p >> q) & KKp Kq: amplifies the antecedent and is therefore not favorable for the skeptics. II 206 NozickVsSkepticism: the whole principle P is false. Not only in detail. Knowledge is not closed under known logical implication. (FN 49) S knows that p if it has a true belief and fulfills (3) and (4). (3) and (4) are themselves not closed under known implication. (3) if p were false, S would not believe that p. If S knows that p, then the belief is that p contingent on the truth of p. And that is described by (3). Now it may be that p implies q (and S knows that), that he also believes that q, but this belief that q is not subjunktivically dependent on the truth of q. Then he does not fulfill (3') if q were wrong, S would not believe q. The situation where q is wrong could be quite different from the one where p is wrong. E.g. the fact that they were born in a certain city implies that they were born on the earth, but not vice versa. II 207 And pondering the respective situations would also be very different. Thus the belief would also be very different. Stronger/Weaker: if p implies q (and not vice versa), then not-q (negation of consequent) is much stronger than not-p (negation of the antecedent). Assuming various strengths there is no reason to assume that the belief would be the same in both situations. (Doxastically identical). Not even would the beliefs in one be a proper subset of the other! E.g. p = I'm awake and sitting on a chair in Jerusalem q = I'm not in the vat. The first entails the second. p entails q. And I know that. If p were wrong, I could be standing or lying in the same city or in a nearby one. ((s) There are more ways you can be outside of a vat than there are ways you can be inside). If q were wrong, I would have to be in a vat. These are clearly two different situations, which should make a big difference in what I believe. If p were wrong, I would not believe that p. If q were wrong, I would nevertheless still believe that q! Even though I know that p implies q. The reason is that (3) is not closed under known implication. It may be that (3) is true of one statement, but not of another, which is implied by it. If p entails q and we truthfully believe that p, then we do not have a false belief that q. II 208 Knowledge: if you know something, you cannot a have false belief about it. Nevertheless, although p implies q, we can have a false belief that q (not in vat)! "Would not falsely believe that" is in fact not completed under known implication either. If knowledge were merely true belief, it would be closed under implication. (Assuming that both statements are believed). Because knowledge is more than belief, we need additional conditions of which at least one must be open (not completed) under implication. Knowledge: a belief is only knowledge when it covaries with the fact. (see above). Problem: This does not yet ensure the correct type of connection. Anyway, it depends on what happens in situations where p is false. Truth: is what remains under implication. But a condition that does not mention the possible falseness, does not provide us covariance. Belief: a belief that covaries with the facts is not complete. II 209 Knowledge: and because knowledge involves such a belief, it is not completed, either. NozickVsSkepticism: he cannot simply deny this, because his argument that we do not know that we are not in the vat uses the fact that knowledge needs the covariance. But he is in contradiction, because another part of his argument uses the assumption that there is no covariance! According to this second part he concludes that you know nothing at all if you do not know that they are not in the vat. But this completion can only exist if the variation (covariance) does not exist. Knowledge/Nozick: is an actual relation that includes a connection (tracking, traceable track). And the track to p is different from that to q! Even if p implies q. NozickVsSkepticism: skepticism is right in that we have no connections to some certain truths (we are not in the vat), but he is wrong in that we are not in the correct relation to many other facts (truths). Including such that imply the former (unconnected) truth that we believe, but do not know. Skepticism/Nozick: many skeptics profess that they cannot maintain their position, except in situations where they rationally infer. E.g. Hume: II 210 Hume: after having spent three or four hours with my friends, my studies appear to me cold and ridiculous. Skepticism/Nozick: the arguments of the skeptic show (but they also show only) that we do not know that we are not in the vat. He is right in that we are not in connection with a fact here. NozickVsSkepticism: it does not show that we do not know other facts (including those that imply "not vat"). II 211 We have a connection to these other facts (e.g. I'm sittin here, reading). II 224f Method/Knowledge/Covariance/Nozick: I do not live in a world where pain behavior e is given and must be kept constant! - I.e. I can know h on the basis of e, which is variable! - And because it does not vary, it shows me that h ("he is in pain") is true. VsSkepticism: in reality it is not a question that is h not known, but "not (e and not h)" II 247 NozickVsSkepticism: there is a limit for the iteration of the knowledge operator K. "knowing knowledge" is sometimes interpreted as certainly knowing, but that is not meant here. Point: Suppose a person knows exactly that they are located on the 3rd level of knowledge: K³p (= KKKp), but not k4p. Suppose also that the person knows that they are not located on the 4th level. KK³p & not k4p. But KK³p is precisely k4p which has already been presumed as wrong! Therefore, it should be expected that if we are on a finite level Knp, we do not know exactly at what level we are. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Structuralism | Field Vs Structuralism | II 328 Numbers/Structuralism/Field: it is sometimes expressed in a way that 2 is simply a point in a structure. (Resnik 1981, Shapiro 1989). Vagueness/Field: This view corresponds to the view that vagueness is in the world instead of in our language! ((s)> epistemic view). FieldVs: it seems to work well not only for numbers like "2", but also for the expressions that we use to describe structures in which there are no symmetries. Symmetry/Field: brings a problem into play here. E.g. Brandom: √-1/Root -1/Complex Numbers/Field: Problem: every complex number other than 0 (Ex -1) has two roots. (actually BrandomVsFrege, BrandomVsLogicism). "Number i": this term has introduced as a standard for one of the two, (-i is then of course the other one). Problem: even if we assume that we have somehow defined which objects are the complex numbers, which subset of them are the real numbers, and which functions of them are addition and multiplication, then our use of these expressions still leaves undetermined to which of the two roots of -1 our expression "i" refers. ((s) Because of the symmetry, it is impossible to make out a difference). Complex Numbers/Interior/Exterior/Theory/Field: within the theory of complex numbers there is no way to distinguish i and -i. There is no predicate A(x) that does not itself contain "i" and that is true of one but not of the other. Complex Numbers/Field: Of course, the practical applications are no help in distinguishing them either!. Problem: even if you say that "i" is simply a point in the system of complex numbers, the indeterminacy continues, because the complex number plane contains two structurally identical positions for the roots of -1, without distinguishing properties. 4) Incompleteness"/Mathematics/Numbers/Field: numbers are more or less incomplete objects: E.g. 2 has properties such as being the predecessor of 3 and being a prime, but no property that determines whether it is a quantity!. FieldVsStructuralism: This fourth way of seeing it is certainly not the best way to capture the "structuralist insight". II 332 Platonism/Mathematics/VsStructuralism/Field: isomorphic mathematical domains must not be indistinguishable. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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Reference |
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| Logicism/Math. | Thiel I 18/19 "Logicism" reduces Mathematics (any object) to logic. The subject of mathematics is then the subject of logic. What then is the object of logic: the logicism must say: not really a tangible object but "all objects" in the sense that their statements are true of all objects in the world .... we are creating the object. An obect "in itself" is never available!. DubislavVs: every convention must be made about anything, yes. So one must ask the convention a lists about which entity its his axioms are considered to be consistent. Lauener/Quine: XI 136 Logicism/Lauener: is related to the concept of realism: he takes sets as universals to be real. |
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Laws | Cartwright, N. | Cartwright: I have three connected arguments. Thesis 1: The obvious explanatory power of fundamental laws does not speak for their truth. Thesis 2: The way in which fundamental laws are used in explanations speaks for their falsity. We explain by ceteris paribus laws by merging causes by approximations that exceed what the fundamental laws dictate. Thesis 3: The appearance of truth comes from a bad explanatory model, I 4 that connects laws directly to reality. Cartwright instead: Def "Simulacrum-View"/Cartwright: from explanation: Thesis: the path from theory to reality goes like this: theory > model > phenomenological law. Phenomenological Laws/Cartwright: are true of the objects of reality (or can be). Fundamental Laws/Cartwright: are true only of the objects in the model. I 10 Asymmetry: Causal laws are asymmetric: Effect and cause cannot be interchanged. - On the other hand symmetrical: Laws of Association/Hume: e.g. length of shadow/height of mast. - Fraassen: Thesis: The explanatory asymmetries are not real. There is no fact about what explains what. CartwrightVsFraassen - Association/CartwrightVsHume: Association is not sufficient to distinguish between effective and ineffective strategies to fight malaria. I 51 Laws of Nature/Science/Cartwright: Thesis: There are no laws for cases where theories overlap. |
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| Theory | Cartwright, N. | I 3 Cartwright: Thesis: The path from theory to reality is as follows: theory > model > phenomenological law. Phenomenological Laws/Cartwright: are true of the objects of reality (or can be) - fundamental laws/Cartwright: are true only of the objects in the model. Explanation/Cartwright: is not a guide to truth. I 131 Description/Theory/Equation/Cartwright: Thesis: The descriptions that describe best are just not the ones to which the equations apply best. |
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| Sortal | Simons, P. | I 195 Sortal concept / Simons: the question is whether sortal concepts, which are subject to the conditions that determine what is to count at one time or over time as one thing or as several things are rather true of mereologically constant objects (Chisholm ) or variable objects (Simons, Wiggins). SimonsVsChisholm: his thesis is that most people mostly use their concepts in a wrong way, if not always. |
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| Dissimilarity | Simons, P. | I 213 "Relative Identity"/Geach: ("Theory R"), ("Sortal Theory"): thesis: for Sortals F and G it is possible to find two objects a and b, so that a and b are both Fs and Gs, a is the same F as b, but not the same G. Against it: b) Grice/George Myro: (both unpublished): VsWiggins-™ Thesis that things that are ever different are always different. c) diachronic view of superposition: thesis: superposed objects do not have to exist at the same time. For example, gold forms into a ring. When the ring is melted, it is "replaced" by the gold. I.e. they exist at different times. Change/Diachronic view: thesis: is always a replacement of one object by another. SimonsVsDiachronic view: does not explain why so many properties are transferred from the original to the later object. Solution: an (assumed) substrate would explain this. Ad (4) reductionist view of superposition/Chisholm: thesis: only the final constituents are real. Everything else is only a logical construction from it. SimonsVs: this contains a considerable revisionary element: it eliminates all terms and predicates that are true of such constructions that are familiar to us. ((s) Example machines do not exist then.) Pro: emphasizes the importance of the material constitution. Vs: overlooks the fact that parts are not always ontologically superior to their whole! |
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| Truth | Williams, M. | Horwich I XVI Truth/Michael Williams/Horwich: (Williams Chapter 27): Thesis: It is doubtful that our representation of truth has any consequences concerning access or autonomy from non-semantic facts. It could be that a fact of the form "T is true" cannot be assumed without the same being true of the fact T itself, because this is mostly by definition. But if there are metaphysical or epistemic additional assumptions, the scheme becomes questionable. And that must be rejected. (Group: Williams pro Deflationism). Metaphysics/Cognition Theory/Williams/Horwich: or one should not base epistemic or metaphysical conclusions on the quoting scheme. |
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| Existence Predicate | Woods, M. | EMD II 250 Theorem of Existence/Atomic Sentence/Existence/Universal Quantification/Woods: for individual theorems of existence, the consequence of treating E as "true of all" is less obvious: Some things depend on how we treat names and singular terms. Woods: Thesis: but there is hardly any reason why the predicate of existence E should not be treated as PeS (predicate of the first level), just like "self-identical". But this does not have to be taken as a primitive predicate! If the range of quantifiers is defined so that it only runs over existing objects, then the predicate can be defined with the help of quantification and identity. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
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