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The author or concept searched is found in the following 57 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Actions | Sellars | II 325 Action/Sellars: basic beliefs are expressed in uniformity of behavior. This does not mean that no deviations are possible, but only that the adoption of a principle is in any case characterized by a uniformity of behavior. >Regularity, >Behavior, >Beliefs, >Language behavior. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Analyticity/Syntheticity | Quine | I 120 Lasting Sentences: In lasting sentences the meaning of the stimulus is more sparse. Accordingly, the synonymy of stimuli is less plumable. > VsAnalyticity. I 339 Material implication "p impl q" is not equal to "p > q" (> mention/use) "Implies" and "analytical" are the best general terms. V 114 QuineVsAnalyticity: one can form universal categorical sentences later e.g. "A dog is an animal". Of these, we will not say that they are analytical or even true. Analyticity is as social as language. Random first examples should not have any special status. Definition Analytical/Quine: a sentence is analytical if everyone learns the truth of the sentence by learning the words. That is bound as social uniformity because of the observation character. Every person has a different set of first learned analytical sentences - therefore Vs. VI 79 Quine: HolismVsAnalyticity. >Holism/Quine. --- VII (b) 21 Analytical/QuineVsKant: Quine limits them to the subject-predicate form. They can be reformulated as following: "true by force of meaning, regardless of the facts". VsEssentialism: a creature is arbitrary: a biped must be two-legged (because of his feet), but he does not need to be rational. This is relative. VII (b) 23 Analyticity/Quine: a) logically true: "No unmarried man is married" - b) this is translatable into logical truth: Bachelor/unmarried. The problem is that it is based on unclear synonymy. Analytical/Carnap: "true under any state description" - QuineVsCarnap: this only works when the atom sentences are independent. it does not work with e.g. bachelor/unmarried. VII (b) 28ff Analyticity/Quine: we need an adverb "neccess.", which is designed in that way that it delivers truth when it is applied to an analytical truth, but then we would indeed have to know what "analytical" is. - Problem: The extensional agreement of bachelor/unmarried man relies more on random facts than on meaning. A. cannot mean that the fact component would be zero: that would be an unempirical dogma. VII (b) 37 Verification Theory/Peirce: the method is the meaning. Then "analytically" becomes a borderline case: method does not matter. Synonymous: the method of refutation and confirmation are the same. VII (b) 37 Analytical/Quine: early: a is a statement when it is synonymous with a logically true statement. VII (i) 161ff Analyticity/Quine: analyticity is an approximate truth because of meaning. That says nothing about existence. >Synonymy/Quine, >Verfication/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Behavior | Sellars | I 91 Theoretical Terms/observation/Sellars: theoretical terms are defined in behaviorist psychology not only not in terms of open behavior, but neither in terms of nerves, synapses, neuron irritations, etc. A behaviorist theory of behavior is not as such already a physiological explanation of behavior. For a structure of theoretical concepts to be suitable to provide explanations for behavior, it must be impossible to identify the theoretical concepts with the concepts of neurophysiology. >Neuroscience, >Theoretical terms, >Behaviorism, >Observation sentences, >Observation language. However, you operate under a certain regulative ideal, the ideal of a coherent system. The behavioral theory is not fixed from the outset to a physiological identification of all its concepts. >Physical/psychic. --- II 325 Action>Sellars: fundamental beliefs are expressed in uniformity of behavior. >Regularities. This does not mean that no deviations are possible, but only that the representation of a principle is in any case also characterized by uniformity of behavior. >Principles. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Beliefs | Sellars | Rorty VI 179 ff Belief/Sellars: every belief is revisable. Rorty: Belief/SellarsVsEmpiricism: can only be justified by concepts. (s) Not through "direct perception", "intuition", "experience", etc.). >Perception, >Empiricism. --- I XXXIII Ryle: had suggested to conceive mental predicates like "being convinced", "believing", etc. as expressions of dispositions, however without accounting for the fact that, again, there is an explanation instance, be it in the nature of the Freudian ego or superego. >Gilbert Ryle, >Dispositions/Ryle, >Behavior/Ryle. Ryle: being convinced means to behave in a certain way. Sellars: goes one step further than Ryle by asking how the behavioral dispositions themselves can also be explained. E.g., His tie retailer John developed a kind of theory which specifically refers to the verbal behavior of a community of Rylean ancestors. >Rylean ancestors. --- II 325 Action: fundamental beliefs are expressed in uniformity of behavior. This does not mean that no deviations are possible, but only that the representation of a principle is in any case also characterized by uniformity of behavior. >Regularity, >Behavior/Sellars. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Collective Intelligence | Sunstein | I 23 Collective intelligence/Sunstein: when questioning randomly selected groups, one usually learns very precisely what people think, e. g. election prognoses, popularity of TV shows, etc. It is something else if you want to know what is true, not what people believe. Here are some famous examples: Hazel Knight asked students many years ago how warm it was in the room. Estimates varied greatly, the mean hit the correct value but quite precisely.(1) When people need to estimate the number of beans in a container, it is similar. (2) I 24 The British scientist Francis Galton estimated the weight of an ox at an auction. The result was close to a pound.(3) Sunstein: Question: should a company rely on the judgement of previous employees when recruiting new employees? And should people question others when making decisions about their lives and obey the average result? What about environmental measures? I 25 Average/Sunstein: in which situations is an average made up of many opinions meaningful? See also... I 27 Randomness: the probability that groups are correct is higher if these groups are randomly composed. >Decision Theory/Condorcet. I 33 Problem/Sunstein: unfortunately, one must presuppose expertise from those involved in order for the outcome of collective decisions to turn out in the sense of actual circumstances. In two types of cases, the judgement of a statically selected group will be wrong: (a) where there is a tendency towards a particular result among the members (b) if the answers are worse than random answers. I 34 Test persons are often misguided by so-called anchors, e. g. numbers that are scattered into an explanation. Likewise, judges are influenced. The larger groups become, the greater the risk that such an anchor will have an effect ((s) as the same anchor is effective for each member).(4) >Anchoring effect. I 41 Statistics: should more account be taken of statistical knowledge? This depends on whether the interviewed experts were in a position to provide good answers that can then be evaluated statistically. I 49 Community/Aristotle: when several come together (...) everyone can contribute his share of virtue and moral wisdom (...) and some will understand something, others will understand something else and all together will understand everything.(5) I 54 Sunstein: here the whole is the sum of its parts and that is what was aimed for. This is a reading of Aristotle's suggestion that a group works better than a few of the best. But there is also the view that a group discussion delivers more than the sum of its parts. A form of information gathering in which the exchange of views provides creative solutions. However, there may be other ways in which synergy effects and learning can lead to a group's performance that exceeds that of the best members.(6) >Discourse, >Discourse theory. I 56 However, since uniformity is achieved during consultations and confidence in a result is generated, this can be favoured in the end, even if it contains errors. I 66 Group Pressure/Solomon Asch: In a famous experiment, Ash showed how group members swung back to a clearly incorrect assessment of the group after making correct estimates (in terms of line length). (7) >Conformity, >Conformity/Asch. Investment clubs sometimes make bad decisions when members are tied by tight social ties and dissenting opinions are censored. (8), (9) I 70 Representatives of minorities in groups often behave more reservedly and develop less weight (10). In concrete terms, they speak less and exert less influence.(11) >Minorities, >Majorities. 1. Lorge et al., “A Survey of Studies Contrasting the Quality of Group Performance and Individual Performance, 1920–1957,” 344. 2. See Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds, p. 5 3. Surowiecki, pp. xi–xiii. 4. Lorge et al. P. 346. 5. Aristotle, Politics, trans. E. Barker (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), 123. 6. See David J. Cooper and John H. Kagel, “Are Two Heads Better Than One? Team versus Individual Play in Signalling Games,” American Economic Review 95 (2005): 477; Gigone and Hastie, “Proper Analysis,” 143–53 (offering some examples of group success, while showing that such success is not typical). 7. See the overview in Solomon Asch, “Opinions and Social Pressure,” in Readings about the Social Animal, ed. Elliott Aronson (New York: W. H. Freeman, 1995), 13. 8. See Brooke Harrington, Pop Finance: Investment Clubs and the New Ownership Society (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, forthcoming). 9. See José M. Marques et al., “Social Categorization, Social Identification, and Rejection of Deviant Group Members,” in Hogg and Tindale, Group Processes, pp. 400, 403. 10. See Glenn C. Loury, Self-Censorship in Public Discourse: A Theory of “Political Correctness” and Related Phenomena, Boston University, Ruth Pollak Working Paper Series on Economics (1993), p 3. 11. See Caryn Christensen and Ann S. Abbott, “Team Medical Decision Making,” in Decision Making in Health Care, ed. Gretchen B. Chapman and Frank A. Sonnenberg (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 272–76 (discussing effects of status on exchange of information in group interactions). |
Sunstein I Cass R. Sunstein Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge Oxford 2008 Sunstein II Cass R. Sunstein #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media Princeton 2017 |
| Consistency | Feyerabend | I 39 Consistency/FeyerabendVsCoherence Theory/Coherence/Feyerabend: the consistency condition, according to which new hypotheses must coincide with accepted theories, is irrational. Diversity of theories is fruitful for science, uniformity paralyzes its critical power. >Theories. Theory/Physics/Absence of Contradiction/Duhem/Feyerabend: E.g. the theory of Newton contradicts the case law of Galileo and Kepler's laws. For example, statistical thermodynamics contradict 2nd law of thermodynamics. Wave optics, for example, contradict geometrical optics. >Physics. Important Point: this is a logical inconsistency. It is quite possible that the differences of the predictions are so small that they cannot be determined experimentally! Moreover, the theories are not inconsistent in themselves. I 40 Consistency Condition/Feyerabend: the consistency condition is far less generous: it does not eliminate a theory because it contradicts the facts, but because it contradicts a different theory whose confirmed entities it shares. cf. >Coherence. Thus, the still untested part of this theory is made the criterion. The only difference between this criterion and a more recent theory are age and habit! A defendant of the consistency condition would say that the only real improvement would be the acquisition of new facts. >Facts. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Constitutional Structures | Public Choice Theory | Parisi I 189 Constitutional structure/Public choice theory/Farber: The choice between parliamentary and presidential government is one of the major dividing lines among democratic governments. Disappointingly, public choice does not provide clear insights into the relative merits of the two systems. Parliamentarism: Empirical studies are also inconclusive, although there is some evidence that parliamentary systems are more robust on average (Ginsburg, 2010(1), pp. 271-272). Federalism: There is a much richer body of literature about federalism.* The essential benefit of decentralizing governance is that it allows laws to be tailored more closely to public preferences. If there are no spillover effects between jurisdictions, then decentralization allows each locality to adopt policies catering to its own preferences rather than imposing a "one size fits all" national uniformity. The advantages are similar to allowing consumers to buy a variety of goods rather than limiting production only to a single model preferred by a majority. This argument provides a justification for local voice by showing how it might be useful to allow existing local populations to pick their own laws. That is an argument for local voice. But besides voting on local policies, individuals can also express their preferences by moving to jurisdictions with congenial policies. This power of exit can result in better alignment between preferences and laws (Cooter, 2002(2), ch. 6). >Federalism/Public choice theory. Parisi I 192 Constitutional structure/Public choice theory/Farber: (…) majority voting by itself is not enough to produce coherent, stable outcomes except in some circumstances. In some parliamentary regimes, the solution is to delegate power to a Prime Minister or a cabinet, who can only be dislodged with difficulty before the end of her term. Governmental structures: One of the fundamental insights of public choice is that structures such as bicameralism and gatekeeper committees can limit cycling. (Cf. >Arrow’s Theorem). The reason is simply that adding veto points cuts the "win set" of proposals that can defeat any specific proposal. Essentially, giving multiple groups veto power blocks cycling except when (1) there is an identical cycle in the preferences of each of these groups, and (2) at least one proposal in the cycle is preferred to the status quo by each of these groups. In the extreme case of unanimous consent requirements, each legislator has a veto, making cycling impossible (though at the price of heavily privileging the status quo). ((s) Cf. >Veto player.) Procedural rules: Procedural rules may prevent observation of cycles in practice even in cases where the legislator's preferences do cycle. The agenda setter can potentially arrange a series of votes that will result in majority adoption of the agenda setter's preferred item in the cycle as the final outcome. Parisi I 193 Procedural rules may also limit the issue space—for instance, a committee may only have jurisdiction over a single-issue dimension, making it more likely that preferences will be single-peaked and therefore not open to cycling. The implication of these insights for statutory interpretation (Noll, McCubbins, and Weingast, 1994)(3) are an open and highly contested question (Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett, 2006(4), pp. 219-257). Some scholars argue that courts can identify the key decision-makers and their goals well enough in the legislative history to take these views into account in interpreting statutes. Others view the process as too opaque for judicial investigation and instead argue that judges should abandon the idea of legislative intent when interpreting statutes (Easterbrook, 1983)(5). Preferences: (…) the existence of incoherent preferences does not necessarily translate into indeterminate meaning, quite apart from public choice theory. Given full information and zero drafting costs, we could infer that the actions of key agenda setters and veto gates must have combined to support the proposal over an alternative that was identical other than in its application to the circumstances in question. But even with those strong assumptions, there would be no need to reconstruct the preferences of those individuals in order to interpret the statute. * See Hills, R. M. (2010) "Federalism and Public Choice," in D. A. Farber and A. J. O'Connell, eds. Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law, 207-233. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 1. Ginsburg, T. (2010). "Public Choice and Constitutional Decision," in D. A. Farber and A. J. O'Connell, eds., Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law, 261-282. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 2. Cooter, R. D. (2002). The Strategic constitution. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 3. Noll, R., M. McCubbins, and B. Weingast (writing as "McNollgast") (1994). "Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation." Law and Contemporary Problems 57(1):3-37. 4. Eskridge, W. N., P. P. Frickey, and E. Garrett (2006). Legislation and Statutory Interpretation. 2nd edition. St. Paul, MN: Foundation Press. 5. Easterbrook, F. H. (1983). "Statutes' Domains." University of Chicago Law Review 50(2): 53 3— 552. Farber, Daniel A. “Public Choice Theory and Legal Institutions”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Deliberative Democracy | Dryzek | Gaus I 144 Deliberative democracy/Dryzek: Though democracy comes in many varieties, the dominant current in democratic theory is now a deliberative one. Indeed, it is accurate to say that around 1990 the theory of democracy took a deliberative turn. Thus different accounts of democracy can be appraised in terms of the content, strength, and significance of their relation to the deliberative turn - whether in support, opposition, capture, or qualification. With the deliberative turn, the core of democratic legitimacy became instead the right or ability of those subject to a public decision to participate in genuine deliberation (see Manin, 1987(1); Cohen, 1989(2); the term 'deliberative democracy' was first used by Bessette, 1980(3)). Gaus I 145 The deliberative turn in democratic theory occurred in the early 1990s. However, it does have antecedents, reaching back to Aristotle and the Athenian polis, and encompassing conservatives such as Edmund Burke (for whom deliberation connoted mature reflection as opposed to hasty action), as well as liberals such as John Stuart Mill and John Dewey (for a good history, see the introduction to Bohman and Rehg, 1997(4)). There are also continuities in emphasis with participatory democrats such as Carole Pateman (1970)(5) who were dissatisfied with the lack of opportunity for deep democratic experience in contemporary liberal democracies. >Participation/Pateman, >Democratic theory/Pateman. Benjamin Barber's (1984)(6) 'strong democracy' can be seen in retrospect as a bridge between participatory and deliberative democracy, given his emphasis on 'strong democratic talk'. >Participation/Barber, >Democratic theory/Barber. Authenticity: deliberation). The reflective aspect means that preferences, judgements and views that are taken as fixed in aggregative models are treated as amenable to change in deliberation. Authenticity is therefore a central concern: democratic control should ideally be substantive not symbolic, involving uncoerced communication among competent participants (...). The importance of the deliberative turn was confirmed in the 1990s by the announcements of the most important liberal theorist John Rawls, and critical theorist Jürgen Habermas, that they were deliberative democrats (Rawls, 1993(7); 1997(8): 771-2; Habermas, 1996(9)). Given the sheer number of democratic theorists who now sail under the deliberative flag, as well as the historically different schools of thought from which they come (conservatism, liberalism, and critical theory), there really ought to be substantial variety among deliberative democrats. But what is now striking is less the variety than the uniformity. The assimilation happened in three ways (see Dryzek, 2000(10): 10—17). First, a commitment to deliberative principles can be used to justify some (but not all) of the rights long cherished by liberals. Other theorists emphasize deliberation in courts rather than legislatures (for example, Rawls, 1993(7): 231). Gaus I 146 Liberalism/democracy: [e.g, in later Habermas] there is no recognition of any need to democratize the economy, the administrative state, or the legal system, all of which receive easy legitimacy. >Deliberative democracy/Habermas. Dryzek: However invigorating this assimilation of deliberative democracy might be for liberalism, it may be bad news for democracy. Some deliberative liberals are not especially democratic. Notably, Rawls in the end wants to entrust deliberation to experts in public reason such as Supreme Court justices, who only need to deliberate in the personal as opposed to the interactive sense of the word (see Goodin, 2000(11), for an explicit defence of personal as opposed to interactive deliberation). >Deliberative democracy/Rawls. VsDeliberative democracy: see >Democracy/Schumpeter. 1. Manin, Bernard (1987) 'On legitimacy and political deliberation'. Political Theory, 15: 338—68. 2. Cohen, Joshua (1989) 'Deliberation and democratic legitimacy'. In Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit, eds, The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State. Oxford: Blackwell. 3. Bessette, Joseph M. (1980) 'Deliberative democracy: the majoritarian principle in republican government'. In Robert A. Goldwin and William A. Shambra, eds, How Democratic is the Constitution? Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute. 4. Bohman, James and William Rehg (1997) Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 5. Pateman, Carole (1970) Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 6. Barber, Benjamin (1984) Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 7. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 8. Rawls, John (1997) 'The idea of public reason revisited'. University ofChicago Law Review, 94: 765-807. 9. Habermas, Jürgen (1996) Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 10. Dryzek, John S. (2000) Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 11. Goodin, Robert E. (2000) 'Democratic deliberation within'. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 29: 81—109. Dryzek, John S. 2004. „Democratic Political Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Democracy | Sunstein | I 11 Democracy/Discussion/Committees/Communication/Deliberation/Psychology/Sunstein: it is controversial today whether discussion always leads to better decisions. (1) It can happen that group members put pressure on others, which can lead to extremism or unanimity with regard to false information. >Group behavior, >Group think, >J. Habermas, >Communication theory, >Communicative action, >Deliberative democracy. I 12 Group Thinking/Irving L. Janis/Sunstein: Jani's thesis: Groups can easily lead to uniformity and dangerous self-censorship by not correctly combining information and extending disagreement to a wider area.(2) The main problem is that groups usually do not use the knowledge that their individual members have. This became particularly clear in a 2004 Senate report on the CIA. (3) After this there was group pressure, neglect of alternatives, selective perception and suppression of criticism.(4) >Conformity/Psychological theories. Solution/Sunstein: in order to shed light on the weaknesses of communication in groups, we need to examine the consequences of two weaknesses: a) information influences that lead to non-disclosure of divergent information by group members. I 13 The pattern in these cases is: How can so many people be wrong? b) Social pressure: you do not want to spoil it with superiors. >SunsteinVsHabermas, Communication/Sunstein). 1. See Robert J. MacCoun, “Comparing Micro and Macro Rationality,” in Judgments, Decisions, and Public Policy, ed. Rajeev Gowda and Jeffrey C. Fox (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 121–26; Daniel Gigone and Reid Hastie, “Proper Analysis of the Accuracy of Group Judgment,” Psychological Bulletin 121 (1997): 161–62; Garold Stasser and William Titus, “Hidden Profiles: A Brief History,” Psychological Inquiry 14 (2003): 308–9. 2. Irving L. Janis, Groupthink, 2d ed., rev. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), 7–9. 3. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Report of the 108th Congress, U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq: Conclusions, 4–7 (full version, S. Rep. No. 108–301, 2004), available at http://intelligence.senate.gov. 4. Ibid. p. 4. |
Sunstein I Cass R. Sunstein Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge Oxford 2008 Sunstein II Cass R. Sunstein #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media Princeton 2017 |
| Descriptions | Goodman | I 15 Difference picture/description/Goodman: the versions that are pictures and not descriptions have no truth value (true/false, only exists for statements). Pictures cannot be linked by conjunctions. I 23 The uniformity of nature, about which we marvel or the unreliability about which we complain, belongs to a world that we have created ourselves. --- III 213 Descriptions/Goodman: descriptions differ not from pictures by the fact that they are more arbitrary, but they tend to belong to articulated rather than to dense schemata (dense: dense are, for example, real numbers; articulated/Goodman: articulated is the opposite of dense). --- IV 128 Description function/Goodman: e.g. suppose the movement of the moon. Does it rotate or does it not rotate? Well, yes and no. To say "something is moving relative to something else" does not mean that one does ascribe movement to it. (> motion, > relativity). IV 128 When I say that different sides of the moon are facing the sun at different times, that is not a statement about motion, halt or rotation. Movement disappears from the sphere of facts. We produce rotation or resting of the moon. IV 129f Fact/Goodman: all facts threaten to dissolve in convention, all nature threatens to dissolve in tricks. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Dualism | Pauen | Pauen I 35 Dualism/Pauen: two types of states that can also occur independently - interactionist dualism: mutual influence: Descartes. >Dualism/Descartes, >Eccles/Popper, >Property dualism: certain neural processes have not only their physical characteristics but additionally also mental characteristics that are theoretically independent of the neural - Typical theory: computer analogy. >Computation), >Martians, >Computer model. I 60 Consciousness as an autonomous property. >Consciousness, cf. >Monism. I 38 Dualism/Pauen: 1. explanation for the uniformity of our experiences in light of the diversity of physical realizations >Multiple realization. Integration performance of the free mind. >Mind, >Thinking. 2. Explanation of >Free will. I 39 3. Pro dualism: VsMonism: Problem of qualitative varied experience by uniform activity of nerve cells. I 56 VsDualism: Dualism has no concrete research subject. I 44 Descartes/Pauen: the distinction of substances can be justified by the imaginability of such a distinction. >R. Descartes, >res extensa, >res cogitans. The argument still plays an important role today: - Kripke uses it as the basis for its objection VsIdentifikation of mental and neural processes. >Identity Theory. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Evidence | Nozick | II 237 Knowledge/Riddles/Kripke/Nozick: conundrum: why would you seek evidence against something that you know. - You know then that the evidence must be wrong. Nozick: a theory of knowledge must be able to handle it. >Knowledge, >Theory of knowledge, >Recognition, >Certainty. Solution: conversely, if one does not know that the evidence is misleading, one should not ignore it. >Method. II 250 Evidence/hypothesis/Nozick: often evidence can apply, even if the hypothesis is false. >Truth, >Hypotheses. Test: search for data that would not apply if the hypothesis was true, but the evidence is not. - Then, the hypothesis has not passed the test. II 254f Evidence/hypotheses/Nozick/(s): the initial probability (P0) of the hypothesis must be considered. One cannot just put up any hypothesis. Therefore conclusion from P (evidence e I Hypo h)> = 0.95, P (e,~h) <= 0.05 not sure if e is more likely to follow from h-h or not, depends on which of the two weighted conditional probabilities is greater, P (el h) times P0(h) or P(e l ~ h) times P0(not-h). >Bayesianism, >Conditional probability. II 261 Evidence/hypothesis/theory/Nozick: if e is evidence for hypothesis h, depends on what other theories we have that connects e and h . Problem: the other theories could in turn be embedded in a wider context, etc. - regress. >Regress, >Context, >Dependence. PutnamVsTradition: therefore "evidence for" is not a formal logical relation. - It is rather dependent on other theories. Cf. >Ontological Relativity, >Internal Realism. II 262 Induction/evidence/logic/Nozick: the inductive logic is twofold relative 1. probability is relative to the evidence 2. There must be a principle of total evidence, which is applied to the probability statements. >Induction. Some authors: Solution: an evidence is an evidence for what it explains. >Explanation, >Causal explanation. NozickVs: much evidence is not explanatory - e.g. lightning/thunder do not explain themselves mutually. E.g. a symptom makes probably more, but they do not explain mutually. Perhaps there are quite general statistical relations between statements - e.g. principles of the uniformity of nature. >Symptoms, >Uniformity, >Regularity. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Experience | Genz | II 304 Experience/Hume/Genz: thesis: their reliability (based on uniformity) cannot be theoretically justified, because again this can only by justified by experience (circular). >Reliability, >Regularity/Hume, >David Hume. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Facts | Russell | Armstrong II 102 General fact/Russell/Armstrong: a certain large accumulation of facts which is the totality of the facts of the first level. Lewis: if this collection of less than all possible states (facts) is 1st level, then this state of higher level automatically excludes countless states from existence. Armstrong: The situation with nomic connections seems the same. Armstrong II 131 General fact/Russell/Martin: this could be a uniformity or regularity, but also different or disjunctive relations. - i.e. a "mixed world": "uniform and/or non-uniform". The disjunction itself could be general and not space-time-specific. B. Russell, ABC of Relativity Theory 144/145 Facts/Russell: can never be inferred from laws, only from other facts. >((s) explanation: Naturals laws do not evoke anything.) >Natural laws/Ryle. R V 38ff Fact/Russell/Stegmüller: it is inadmissible to regard attributes and relations together with individuals as components of facts - (violates type theory, different levels). >Type theory. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Geology | Cuvier | Gould II 102 Geology/Cuvier/Gould: Cuvier invented or adhered to the cataclysm theory(1), which gave his reputation another blow. Definition: Cataclysm Theory: A theory that believes that geological changes focus on rare episodes of global scale upheavals. Their followers do not extrapolate anything and only believe what they see. VsCataclysm Theory/VsCuvier: Opponents represent the theory of uniformity. Their representatives have won because they have read the data less empirically stubbornly (Darwin and Lyell): the exact recording is not continuous, but the gradual change lies in the missing transitions. >Darwin, >Lyell. Gould II 103 Example (thought experiment, originally from Lyell (2)): Gould: If the Vesuvius broke out again and covered telephone, television and fax in a Pompeii neighboring village, later excavators would have to note an abrupt transition from Latin to Italian, from clay scribbles to fax etc. if they adhered to the cataclysm theory. They would be forced to this conclusion because of their refusal to extrapolate. 1. Cuvier, G. 1812. Recherches sur les ossemens fossils quadrupèdes, 4. volumes, Paris: Deterville. 2. Lyell, Ch. 1830-1833. Principles of geology. 3 volumes, London: Murray |
Cuvier I Georges Cuvier Essay on the Theory of the Earth London 2003 Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Groupthink | Janis | Haslam I 182 Groupthink/Janis: Example: after the failure of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion which had been planned by a group of highly intelligent people the question came up how this failure had been possible. Janis Thesis: Although Janis concluded that the CIA’s faulty planning and lack of effective communication was partially at fault for the Bay of Pigs fiasco, he diagnosed the primary problem as stemming from social psychological processes operating within the president’s core advisory group. (Janis; 1972(1), 1982(2)). Psychological tradition: Beginning of the 1970s theory and research on group and organizational decision-making were dominated by individualistic subjective utility theory (Kramer, 1998)(3), according to which a single person’s subjective evaluations of risk and reward affect their decision-making processes. JanisVsTradition: stressed the group dynamics underlying these decisions. In particular, he theorized Haslam I 183 that the cohesiveness of groups could motivate their members to prioritize group harmony and unanimity over careful deliberation when making decisions. Haslam I 184 Def Group think/Janis: ‘Groupthink’ [is] a quick and easy way to refer to a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members’ striving for unanimity overrides their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action. (Janis, 1972(1): 9) Janis thesis: a specific set of antecedent conditions can lead the members of a group to seek consensus with one another instead of engaging in careful and deliberative decision-making. Group think model/Janis: a) the antecedent conditions expected to produce this consensus-seeking psychology, (b) a set of observable symptoms that should arise from it, which in turn result in (c) a set of defective decision-making processes. The model suggests that these defective processes tend, much of the time, to produce suboptimal collective decisions. Antecedent conditions: highly directive (e.g., charismatic or authoritarian) leaders, limited information search, and insulation of the group from outsiders with the necessary expertise to make sound decisions. Especially important: important: a strong sense of group cohesion (i.e., a strong collective bond of some sort) and a context of high stress or crisis, especially likely when confronting a complex and consequential decision. ^Haslam I 185 Groupthink symptoms: (Janis 1971)(3) Over-estimation of group worth: 1.Illusion of invulnerability 2. Belief in morality of ingroup Closed-mindedness: 3. Collective rationalization 4. Stereotypic views of outgroups Pressures toward uniformity: 5. Self-censorship 6. Illusion of unanimity 7. Pressure placed on deviants 8. Mindguarding Problems: decision-making objectives are inadequately discussed, only a few alternative Haslam I 186 solutions are entertained, originally preferred solutions are not critically examined, initially discarded solutions are not re-examined, experts are not consulted, advice is solicited in a selective and biased fashion, and the group fails to develop contingency plans. Solution/Janis: group leaders should encourage all group members to be ‘critical evaluators’ such that they are able to freely express doubts or objections. Additionally, group leaders should avoid stating their initial preferences at the onset of any decision-making venture(…). Janis advocated for the creation of several independent groups, each with their own leader, to solve the same problem. (…) group members’ opinions should be frequently challenged, either by allowing different external experts to attend meetings, or by designating select members to serve as temporary ‘devil’s advocates.’ Finally, Janis stressed the importance of ‘second-chance’ meetings in which group decisions could be reconsidered one last time before being settled or made public. Haslam I 187 Examples for groupthink: the invasion of North Korea, the Bay of Pigs, and the Vietnam War escalation. Examples not exhibiting groupthink: the Marshall Plan and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Haslam I 189 Groups/Janis: thesis: the only goal of decision-making groups is to engage in measured deliberation to make accurate and logical decisions. VsJanis: Groups may have other goals in mind, such as gaining ‘satisfaction with and commitment to the decision,’ ‘improved implementation by group members’, or even ‘diffused responsibility for poor decisions’ (McCauley, 1998(4): 148). >Group think/psychological theories. KramerVsJanis: Roderick Kramer (1998)(5) suggested that at least some of Janis’ case examples are better understood as flawed decisions arising from politicothink rather than groupthink. President Kennedy (…) sought to make accurate decisions regarding what was the best political decision (e.g., would be popular domestically) to the detriment of making the best possible military decision. In other words, careful appraisal of choices Haslam I 190 (i.e., non-groupthink symptoms) in one domain may produce apparent groupthink in another. FullerVsJanis/AldagVsJanis: Sally Fuller and Ramon Aldag (1998)(6) argue that the easy popularity of the model has distracted social psychologists. They claim that researchers have focused on testing the original parameters of the groupthink model at the expense of asking broader questions about group decision-making. (…) – ironically – some of the best evidence for the groupthink model emerges from examination of the way in which groupthink research has itself been conducted. >Group think/psychological theories. 1. Janis, I.L. (1972) Victims of Groupthink. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 2. Janis, I.L. (1982) Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 3. Janis, I.L. (1971) ‘Groupthink’, Psychology Today, November, 43–6: 74–6. 4. McCauley, C. (1998) ‘Group dynamics in Janis’ theory of groupthink: Backward and forward’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73: 146–62. 5. Kramer, R.M. (1998) ‘Revisiting the Bay of Pigs and Vietnam decisions 25 years later: How well has the groupthink hypothesis stood the test of time?’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73: 236–71. 6. Fuller, S.R. and Aldag, R.J. (1998) ‘Organizational Tonypandy: Lessons from a quarter century of the groupthink phenomenon’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73: 163–84. Dominic J. Packer and Nick D. Ungson, „Group Decision-Making. Revisiting Janis’ groupthink studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Implication | Armstrong | III 42 Material Implications/Armstrong: dissolves Hempel's paradox: (W Chart): simply all combinations: (X)(x raven and black) v (~R a blck) v (~R a ~blck) - VsRegth/Problem: Asymmetry between "it is a HU (Humean uniformity) that Fs are Gs" and "it is a law, ..." |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Induction | Genz | II 303 Uniformity/Hume: we assume a uniformity of past and future. >Regularity, >David Hume. Physics/theory/explanation/Genz: but we assume more than mere uniformity when we explain why. >Why-questions. Physics also hopes for a certain outcome of experiments that have never been conducted before. Merely uniformity is not enough. Expectation/Genz: expection is justified by an understanding of the past. It is better than regularity. Therefore, there is no "problem of induction". >Predictions. II 304 Induction/GenzVsPopper: there is no "problem of induction". Understanding is the solution rather than the acceptance of regularities. >Induction/Goodman. Principle/Genz: the disguised reality of the laws of nature is such that we can understand it by principles. >Natural laws, >Laws, >Principles. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Induction | Nozick | II 262 Induction/Evidence/logic/Nozick: inductive logic is twofold relative. - 1. probability is relative to the evidence - 2. there must be a principle of total evidence, which is applied to the probability statements. >Principles, >Evidence, >Method, >Logic. Some authors: Solution: an evidence is proof of what he says. >Explanation, >Causal explanation. NozickVs: plenty of evidence is not explanatory. - E.g. lightning/Thunder are not mutually explanatory. - E.g. a symptom makes others more probable, but they do not explain each other. >Symptoms, >Probability. Maybe there are but very general statistical relations between statements - e.g. principles of the uniformity of nature. >Regularity. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Justice | Plato | Höffe I 28 Justice/Platon/Höffe: Because of the claimed harmony, a political eudaimonism, Plato counts justice (dikaiosynê) among the highest class of goods (megista agatha)(1), which is striven for both for its own sake and for its consequences useful to the actor.(2) Höffe I 29 Justification: Only the righteous live in mutual trust with one another(3) and, because they would rather suffer injustice than commit it, find both self-respect and respect for those they care about. The unjust, on the other hand, live in discord with their fellow human beings and, because contradictory desires are at war within them, in discord with themselves. Plato's argument here is not moralizing, but exposes "selfish" expectations of happiness as self-deception, as illusion. Tyranny: The extreme figure of the unjust, the tyrant, is alone in one respect, lust, three to the power of two to the power of three, thus 729 times worse than the just and still "infinitely more in terms of moral conduct, beauty and virtue".(4) >Laws/Plato, >Constitution/Plato. Problem: Justice alone is not enough for well-being. Because of excessive covetousness it needs additional prudence (sôphrosynê), in the face of danger bravery (andreia), and for the purpose of good advice wisdom (sophia). Höffe I 30 (...) Plato [recognises] the ordinary understanding "to each his own", later known as "suum cuique", namely to reward the good, to punish the bad, to distribute burdens and advantages fairly. Idiopragy/Plato: [Plato] understands the formula in a special sense: Everyone should do (prattein) what is peculiar to him, his own (idion), namely what corresponds to his natural disposition. Thanks to this so-called idiopragy formula, justice helps the individual to achieve harmony of the driving forces, i.e. personal justice, and the community to achieve harmony of the professional groups or estates: political justice. Isomorphism: There is a uniformity between the two, isomorphism, which is why ethics and political philosophy are intertwined. Höffe I 43 In the dialogue Phaidon (...) Plato tries with four arguments ("proofs") to make the immortality of the soul credible. The belief in the afterlife is thus familiar to Plato. HöffeVsPlaton: Nevertheless, it is not easy to decide whether the final myth of the judgment of the dead is indispensable for the eudaimonistic value of justice or whether it only confirms for the hereafter what is already true for this world: a) Is it an argument decisive for the eudaimonistic assessment of this world or b) only that important addition to the view of this world, which shows how much worse off the superlativistically unjust, the tyrant, is the just? >Tyranny/Plato. 1.Politeia, II 366e 2. II 357b-358c 3. I 351d; more detailed IX 575c-576a 4. IX 587e-588a Gaus I 310 Justice/Plato/Keyt/Miller: The challenge of Gyges' ring is to show that justice pays, that it is not a necessary evil but an intrinsic good. >Gyges/Ancient Philosophy. Social justice: The response requires a definition of justice in the soul, or psyché. But instead of defining it directly Socrates first defines social justice, and then, assuming the analogy of polis and psyche, constructs a corresponding definition of psychic justice. The definition of social justice, as Socrates notes himself (Rep. IV.433a), is simply the principle of the natural division of labour, which was introduced to explain the origin of the polis. (According to Socrates, it is mutual need that gives rise to the polis rather than, as Glaucon hypothesized, fear of harm.) Keyt/Miller: this is not the economic principle championed by Adam Smith and modern economists but an implicitly anti-democratic affirmation of human inequality and implasticity. Polis: III.415a-c). The just polis is the one in which each person does the one job for which he is suited by nature and no other: rulers rule, warriors defend, and workers provision the polis (Rep. IV .432b-434c). Psyche: by an independent argument Socrates infers that the psyche has three parts analogous to the three parts of the just polis, and then, following a principle of isomorphism, defines a just psyche as one with the same structure as a just polis. Thus, in a just psyche each of the psychic elements sticks to its own work: reason rules the psyche; spirit, or thymos, defends it from insult; and the appetites provide for its bodily support (Rep. IV.441d-442b). Psychic justice turns out to be something like mental health, an intrinsic good no one wants to be without, so the challenge of Thrasymachus and Glaucon is answered (Rep. IV .444c-445b). Problems: there is an ongoing controversy, however, over the cogency of Socrates' response. For it is unclear that the Platonically 'just' man is just in the sense of the problem of Gyges' ring. >Gyges/Ancient philosophy. What prevents the Platonically just man from harming others? (The controversy, stoked by Sachs, 1963(1), has generated an enormous literature. Dahl 1991(2), is a good representative of the current state of the debate.) 1. Sachs, David (1963) 'A fallacy in Plato's Republic'. Philosophical Review, 72: 141-58. 2. Dahl, Norman O. (1991) 'Plato's defense of justice'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 51: 809-34. Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Life | Kanitscheider | I 285 Life/Universe/Possible worlds/Kanitscheider: (Investigation of Ellis and Brundrit)(1) if one makes the plausible assumption that there is a finite probability for life in galaxies of our type, then there is certainly in one of the other life-bearing systems an individual with identical genetic construction as a special living being on earth. But if there is also only one individual of a certain type, it follows immediately from the presupposed finite, non-vanishing probability that there are infinitely many genetically identical living beings in the universe at any time! Not only copies, but also their history several times existing! However, this is valid only if one refrains from the fact that the space-time allows infinitely many different localizations of the events because of its continuity. One must put a kind of finite grid over the space-time so that the finite events also occur infinitely often. I 287 The striking thing about this argument is that, in addition to cosmological data, it relies only on a relatively weak assumption that there are not an infinite number of different life forms. Physically, this is credible because there are only finitely many elements and the maximum size of stable molecules is certainly finite. So the kinds of life we know are certainly a true fraction of all possible life forms Kanitscheider: moreover, practically only carbon can be considered as a basis, silicon life is inferior to carbon life in the competition. Ellis/Brundrit(1), however, consider even more exotic objections: if a now-unknown long-range force played a role in the origin of life, so that the probability of life in larger systems would decrease, the result would still remain intact, since particle horizons exist in almost all FRW worlds, limiting the interactions. the present probabilities for life on separate Earth-like planets are independent of each other. At any point in time, there are infinitely many causally decoupled regions in a low total energy universe. I 288 Now in each of them only a finite number of viable structures can exist, the infinite multiplicity of these organisms is inevitable! If one does not want to share these assumptions, nevertheless the ways out are not less strange, under retention of the homogeneity one would have to already 1. deny that the origin of life can be estimated at all with a probability measure, or that this is vanishingly small. Or: 2. a) (with homogeneity): the space-like hypersurfaces would have to be compact (K = +1). That would be a universe with negative total energy (high density). This is not supported empirically at present. b) Way out: force solution: one would have to provide the space sections with local hyperbolic or Euclidean geometry via identification topologies with a compact connection form. Ex (k = 0): then the local geometry of spacetime can be described in the line element ds² = dt² + R²(t)[dx² + dy² + dz²] Notation: L: coordinate length. (see below identification topology, determines the galaxy number). If one chooses in this space a cube of the coordinate length L, x, y, z respectively between 0 and L, and identifies opposite sides, then this does not change the local spatial structure, but the spatial coordinates become cyclic in the sense that (t, x, y, z) and (t, x +L, y + L, z + L) represent the same event. By the new coherence form, the spatial sections have now become 3-toroi of finite volume V =R³L³. In such a finite Euclidean space, of course, there are only finitely many galaxies, just as in a space with positive curvature. so the multiplicity of things would be avoided. >Coordinate system/Kanitscheider. I 289 In exchange, however, a new parameter emerges which is not at all determined by local physics, namely the length scale of the identification topology L. The quantity L which determines the galaxy number could be determined in any number of different ways without being supported by local empirical information. However, if one sticks to the principle of choosing more exotic topologies only when prompted by empirical evidence, it follows that each of us has infinite doubles, most of them behind a particle horizon. Steady-State Theory SST would have the same consequence in temporal terms. At infinity, any particle combination for which there is even a tiny finite probability simply occurs infinitely often. Copernican Principle/Ellis: his main point was to point out that the Copernican Principle has no empirical support, on the other hand it leads to such strange consequences. I 290 Ellis: to make this clearer, he designed a Bsp alternative model universe, locally isotropic, but without Copernican principle, which nevertheless covers all empirical findings. SSS: Spherically symmetric static universe, two centers, near one we live, the other is a naked singularity. Redshift here is interpreted not as result of space expansion, but as gravitational redshift, background not as relic radiation, but as result of hot fireball sphere permanently surrounding second singularity. Cold center C, hot center S. At a point p near the cold center, the background radiation is taken as an indication that the past light cone refocuses from p toward the hot singularity. The world is spherically symmetric about S and C. If one goes from C in the direction of S, it becomes hotter and hotter. Near the singularity, all the things happen that happen in a FRW world in the deep past. Symmetrically around S, there is an area of decoupling, and even closer, an area of nucleosynthesis. Circulation, light elements drift from S to C, there heavy elements are formed, which migrate back. I 291 Such a world is dominated by the singularity as the "soul of the universe". It also provides the dominant arrow of time. Methodologically, it is now important whether one can make the correspondence between a Steady State (SSS) and a Friedman world perfect. The temporal range of circumstances favorable to life in the Friedman world is matched in the SSS by a small spatial range around C. This is a real alternative to the Copernican principle for some authors. (I.e. it looks completely different somewhere else, conclusions from our environment on distant sections of the universe are not allowed). With alternative theories one decides mostly after simplicity and uniformity points of view. Kanitscheider: The absurd consequence of the infinitely many doubles does not seem to be a sufficient argument for leaving the homogeneity assumption. >Universe/Kanitscheider. 1. Ellis, G. F. R. & Brundrit, G. B. Life in the infinite universe. Royal Astronomical Society, Quarterly Journal, vol. 20, Mar. 1979, p. 37-41. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Majorities | Hornsey | Haslam I 87 Majority/Minority/Hornsey/Jetten: There is a tacit implication in many of [the] experiments that those insubordinate subjects who are outside the hypothesis-confirming majority are a nuisance. (Jahoda 1959(1): 99; see also Moscovici, 1976(2)). >Conformity/Asch, >Conversion theory. Indeed, as Asch showed, resistance is just as common in group life as is conformity (Haslam and Reicher, 2007(3); Reicher and Haslam, 2006(4)). (…) this point is also clear when we look around us and tally both acts of conformity and resistance in daily life. Both occur and dissent is just as much part of daily life as conformity. Minority: What is more, we often like and identify with people who are able to withstand conformity pressures and rebel – in particular when they do not go along with a majority that is obviously wrong or misguided. HornseyVsTradition: When we focus on conformity instead of dissent (>Conformity/psychological theories), we also focus on understanding uniformity instead of difference, and on passive responding rather than active behaviour by group members. As a result, theorizing about dissent and the willingness to stand out is quite underdeveloped and this has led to a failure to understand the way in which groups (and society more broadly) change (see Turner, 2006)(5). Indeed, social change often has its roots in one individual (or a group of people) questioning whether the majority’s view of reality is really correct and standing firm in their belief that it is not. 1. Jahoda, M. (1959) ‘Conformity and independence’, Human Relations, 12: 99–120. 2. Moscovici, S. (1976) Social Influence and Social Change. New York: Academic Press. 3. Haslam, S.A. and Reicher, S.D. (2007) ‘Beyond the banality of evil: Three dynamics of an interactionist social psychology of tyranny’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33: 615–22. 4. Reicher, S.D. and Haslam, S.A. (2006) ‘Rethinking the psychology of tyranny: The BBC Prison Study’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 45: 1–40. 5. Turner, J.C. (2006) ‘Tyranny, freedom and social structure: Escaping our theoretical prisons’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 45: 41–6. Matthew J. Hornsey and Jolanda Jetten, “Conformity. Revisiting Asch’s line-judgment studies”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Majorities | Jetten | Haslam I 87 Majority/Minority/Hornsey/Jetten: There is a tacit implication in many of [the] experiments that those insubordinate subjects who are outside the hypothesis-confirming majority are a nuisance. (Jahoda 1959(1): 99; see also Moscovici, 1976(2)). >Conformity/Asch, >Conversion theory. Indeed, as Asch showed, resistance is just as common in group life as is conformity (Haslam and Reicher, 2007(3); Reicher and Haslam, 2006(4)). (…) this point is also clear when we look around us and tally both acts of conformity and resistance in daily life. Both occur and dissent is just as much part of daily life as conformity. Minority: What is more, we often like and identify with people who are able to withstand conformity pressures and rebel – in particular when they do not go along with a majority that is obviously wrong or misguided. HornseyVsTradition: When we focus on conformity instead of dissent (>Conformity/psychological theories), we also focus on understanding uniformity instead of difference, and on passive responding rather than active behaviour by group members. As a result, theorizing about dissent and the willingness to stand out is quite underdeveloped and this has led to a failure to understand the way in which groups (and society more broadly) change (see Turner, 2006)(5). Indeed, social change often has its roots in one individual (or a group of people) questioning whether the majority’s view of reality is really correct and standing firm in their belief that it is not. 1. Jahoda, M. (1959) ‘Conformity and independence’, Human Relations, 12: 99–120. 2. Moscovici, S. (1976) Social Influence and Social Change. New York: Academic Press. 3. Haslam, S.A. and Reicher, S.D. (2007) ‘Beyond the banality of evil: Three dynamics of an interactionist social psychology of tyranny’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33: 615–22. 4. Reicher, S.D. and Haslam, S.A. (2006) ‘Rethinking the psychology of tyranny: The BBC Prison Study’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 45: 1–40. 5. Turner, J.C. (2006) ‘Tyranny, freedom and social structure: Escaping our theoretical prisons’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 45: 41–6. Matthew J. Hornsey and Jolanda Jetten, “Conformity. Revisiting Asch’s line-judgment studies”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Mental States | Hume | I 7 Mind/Hume: the mind has no consistency itself, only psychology of affections. An affect is possible. The mind must be affected. I 9 Mind/Hume: the mind is identical with an imagination and idea. Imagination: is no fortune, but a collection without uniformity. >Imagination/Hume, >Ideas/Hume. I 14 Mind/Hume: the mind remains always passive. It is not determinative, but it is determined. The act of the mind is activated, not active. I 7ff Mind/Hume: the mind is passive, empty and filled with impressions (not ideas). It is ordered by principles: association, contiguity, causality. (Inner) impression corresponds to self-awareness, that creates the subject. Ideas are atomistic. I 61 Mind/Hume: new: in so far as the principles of morality and emotions act upon it, it ceases to be imagination and is fixed as a part of human nature (complex instead of simple effect, that is the distinction culture/nature). Animal: an animal only knows simple effects. There are no exceeding rules. I 105 Mind/Hume: the mind is identical with the idea. The mind is not subject and it does not need a subject. Also, it does not represent nature. Perceptions are the only objects. Every idea can disappear. I 18 The mind therefore is quantitative, not qualitative. Invariant: the "smallest idea": e.g. I have an idea of the part of a grain of sand, but the images of it are all the same. Def "moment of the mind": is the citation of a smallest idea, but which is sensual. I 120 The mind transforms to the subject by the two principles of affect and association. >Association/Hume. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 |
| Mind | Hume | I 7 Mind/Hume: the mind has no consistency itself, only psychology of affections. An affect is possible. The mind must be affected. I 9 Mind/Hume: the mind is identical with imagination and idea. Imagination: is no fortune, but a collection without uniformity. >Imagination/Hume, >Ideas/Hume. I 14 Mind/Hume: the mind always remains passive. It is not determinative, but it is determined. The act of the mind is activated, not active. I 7ff Mind/Hume: the mind is passive, empty, filled with impressions (not ideas). Ordered by principles are: association, contiguity, causality. (Inner) impression corresponds to self-awareness, that creates the subject. Ideas are atomistic. I 61 Mind/Hume: new: in so far as the principles of morality and emotions act upon it, it ceases to be imagination and is fixed as a part of human nature (complex instead of simple effect, that is the distinction culture/nature). Animal: an animal only knows simple effects. There are no exceeding rules. I 105 Mind/Hume: the mind is identical with the idea. It is not subject and it does not need a subject. Also, it does not represent nature. Perceptions are the only objects. Every idea can disappear. I 18 The mind is therefore quantitative, not qualitative. Invariant: the "smallest idea": e.g. I have an idea of the part of a grain of sand, but the images of it are all the same. Def "moment of the mind": is the citation of a smallest idea, but which is sensual. I 120 The mind transforms to the subject by the two principles of affect and association. >I, Ego, Self/Hume, >Association/Hume. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 |
| Natural Laws | Lyell | Gould IV 110 Natural Laws/Lyell/Gould: Uniformitarianism: the theory of Lyell (1) was a very specific and a restrictive theory of history, not (as is often mistakenly believed) a general explanation of how to proceed scientifically and methodically. Uniformity in the sense of sameness of natural laws was no longer controversial in Kelvin's time. But for Lyell it had a much stronger meaning: Uniformitarianism: 1. the speed of change should never vary greatly over time, 2. the earth should have always been about the same, so that its history had no direction, but represented a constantly dynamic equilibrium. GouldVsLyell: it was a rhetorical trick to combine the two meanings of uniformity. Thus, all opponents were disqualified as unscientific. KelvinVsUniformitarianism: his criticism of Lyell was quite legitimate in this respect. IV 103 Uniformitarianism (Theory of Ch. Lyell and James Hutton) VsCreationism. Creationism assumes a young earth created together with fossils. >Creationism. Two prerequisites for the theory of uniformity: 1. essentially unlimited time, 2. the earth retains its basic form for immeasurable time. Gould: Uniformity led to the theory of evolution. KelvinVsUniformity: Thesis: The Earth was first a liquid body. The surface is not older than perhaps 100 400 million years. (Later corrected to 20 million years). Disaster theory/Gould: (this was previously discredited). It became topical again due to Kelvin's assumption of a young earth. IV 105 VsKelvin: he based himself on the false assumption that the remaining heat of the earth is a kind of residual heat from its former liquid state. Kelvin did not know that most of the heat inside the earth is generated by radioactive decay. Radioactivity was discovered at the beginning of our century. Kelvin's theory collapsed. Thus the uniformitarianism won ((s) at that time). 1. Ch. Lyell (1830). Principles of geology. London: John Murray. |
GeoLyell I Charles Lyell Principles of Geology, Volume 1 Chicago 1990 Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Order | Thiel | Thiel I 201 Order/Mathematics/Thiel: Def Well-ordered: if an ordered set Mp is such that not only it itself, but also each of its non-empty subsets has such an element, in the sense of the order first element, then we call M< a well-ordered set. I 201/202 Well-ordered sets are special ordered sets, therefore each pairterm represents an order type for a well-ordered set and the order types can now be shown to be comparable with each other. In this sense, the order types of well-ordered sets are more "number-like" than other order types. We call them Def Ordinal Numbers. The order type of a finite set (which is well-ordered in any arrangement) coincides with its ordinal number and beyond that with its thickness. I 201f Def well-ordered: is a set, if every non-empty subset has a first element - i.e. every pairterm is also an order type - then all order types are comparable. Addition, multiplication potentiation especially: Example {1, 1, 2, 2..} shall be mapped to the naturally ordered set of basic numbers...I 202 Example {1,3,5...;2,4,6...} non-commutative. Terminology: ordinal number ω. In the case of ordinal numbers we can thus in a very specific sense go beyond the ordinal number ω of the naturally ordered set of basic numbers: The elements of a set of the power Ao of the basic numbers can still be ordered in various ways and thus lead to quite different transfinite ordinal numbers I 203 and quite different well-orders of these sets lead also in the indicated sense to "larger" ordinal numbers than . But one should not jump to conclusions about a deeper penetration into the realm of the infinite, because an ordered set with the ordinal number ω exp ω does not have the power of Ao exp Ao (which according to classical view would be the power of the continuum), but is still countable, i.e. of the same power Ao as an ordered set with the ordinal number ω. Without the condition that every quantity can be well ordered, which has not been substantiated up to now anywhere, one cannot reach higher powers. I 203 ω exp ω is still countable. Against: Power of the Continuum: Ao exp Ao ConstructivismVsCantor: Objection to the introduction of absolute transfinite numbers: arises from the definition of uniformity and similarity. They take place with recourse to illustration. According to the constructivist view, each representation must be represented as a function by a function term. However, this must refer to a fixed inventory of permitted mathematical means of expression. An illustration is then expressable or not. Example: The uniformity of two sets can be expressable in a formal system F1 (thus "exist") in another F2 however not. For a Platonist, of course, this is an untenable situation. He will say that the system F2 is simply too "weak in expression". The system would have to be extended. But according to the constructivists this is not possible: forbidden, because the means of expression necessary for their representation (or set-theoretical axioms, which would first secure the "existence" of the representation in question), would lead to a contradiction with the other means of expression or axioms. There is no known possibility to introduce transfinite cardinal numbers (and in axiomatic systems also transfinite ordinal numbers) as absolute milestones in infinity in a harmless way. |
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Papal Power | Marsilius of Padua | Gaus I 344 Papal power/fullness of power/Marsilius/Kilcullen: An explicit attack on this doctrine [of papal fullness of power] occupies (Marsilius of Padua 1980(1): Il.xxiii—xxvi, after the ground has been well prepared. All coercive power Gaus I 345 comes from the people (the 'legislator') and is entrusted to a ruler who rules in accordance with the law established by the people or by a subordinate legislator authorized by the people (1980(1): 44-9, 61-3). 1) No community can have more than one supreme ruler, who must be the source of all coercive power in the community - otherwise strife will break out (1980(1): This is the first of the four main points of Marsilius's argument against papal fullness of power: unless the pope is the supreme ruler,' pope and clergy can have coercive power only if they derive it from the supreme ruler. 2) The second point is theological: that Christ excluded the clergy from the exercise of coercive rulership (1980(1): 113-40). This rules out the possibility that the pope or any cleric might be the supreme ruler. 3) The third main point is also theological, a rejection of the view of Isidore and most churchmen, that the ruler must punish sin. According to Marsilius God wills that divine law should be enforced by sanctions only in the next world to give every opportunity for repentance (1980: 164; the contrast between 'this world' and 'the next world' was later the basis of Locke's main argument in his Letter of Toleration). Toleration/Marsilius: Marsilius does not advocate toleration: for secular ends the secular ruler may enforce religious uniformity, that is, he may enforce the divine law, but not the divine law as such (1980(1): 136, 175—9). So there is only one supreme ruler, not a member of the clergy, who does not enforce divine law as such and therefore does not coerce in any sense on behalf of the clergy. 4) Fourth, Christ gave Peter no special authority among the apostles, and Peter never was in Rome (1980: The Roman bishop therefore has no special Christappointed role in shepherding the whole Church. From these four points it follows that the doctrine of papal fullness of power is false in all its senses; in particular, the claim that the pope has supreme coercive jurisdiction over all secular rulers is false, for the pope and the clergy have no coercive jurisdiction at all, direct or indirect. Property: As for ownership of property, Marsilius sides with the Franciscans against Pope John XXII's thesis that no one can use consumable property without ownership, and argues that, in accordance with Christ's will, the pope and the clergy should all live in poverty like the Franciscans (1980: 183-4, 196-215; see Tierney, 1997(2): 108-18). Secular power: In the management of the externals of Church life, Marsilius argues that the only source of coercive authority is the secular ruler (if he is a Christian), who decides how many churches and clergy there will be, distributes Church jurisdictions, makes or approves appointments, and enforces canon law (1980(1): 65—6, 254-67), and only he can authorize excommunication (1980: 147-52). Spiritual power: The only sources of doctrinal authority in the Church are the Bible and general councils: he argues that general councils are infallible (1980(1):274-9). OckhamVsMarsilius: (William of Ockham, 1995(3):207-19, opposed Marsilius on this point, and argued that no part of the Church is infallible; see also Kilcullen, 1991(4).) >Papal power/Ockham. Marsilius/Kilcullen: Marsilius does not deny the truth of Christianity, does not deny that Christ gave spiritual powers to the clergy (their 'essential' or 'inseparable' powers, in contrast to the 'non-essential'; 1980: 235-6, 239-40), and does not deny that the clergy are the expert judges and teachers of Christian doctrine. What he denies is that Christ gave the clergy any coercive power and that Christ gave the pope any special power not possessed by other priests. 1. Marsilius of Padua (1980) Defensor Pacis, trans. Alan Gewirth. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 2. Tierney, Brian (1997) The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law and Chumh Law 1150-1625. Atlanta: Scholars. 3- William of Ockham (1995) A Letter to the Friars Minor and Other Writings, ed. Arthur Stephen McGrade, ed. and trans. John Kilcullen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 4. Kilcullen, John (1991) 'Ockham and infallibility'. The Journal ofRe1igious History, 16: 387-409. Kilcullen, John 2004. „Medieval Politial Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Parts | Millikan | I 283 Temporal part/Millikan: the temporal part is a momentary or almost momentary three-dimensional object. >Mereology. I 284 Analogously, you can split an object into time slices. >Fourdimensionalism. Just as with spatial parts, two temporal parts of a whole can never be identical. Otherwise they could not be distinguished. Identity/Self-Identity/Unity/Uniformity/Millikan: to be identical with oneself, a thing must never exemplify a principle of uniformity. E.g. also a very loosely held sheep herd is always this herd itself. Temporal identity: also plays no role in the question of self-identity: no one believes that an object state to t1 would be the same as to t2. >Temporal identity. Unity/Object/Thing/Millikan: nevertheless, we need principles of uniformity to approach objects as such. Thus, it is about the question as to which relation must have the states S1 and S2 in order to be valid as states of the same thing. I 285 Identity/unity/Millikan: thus questions of the identity of a thing do not seem to be separated from questions of the principles of uniformity. >Identity/Millikan, >Unity/Millikan. Problem: there are often different ways to summarize parts into a whole. Here we must ask which category the whole is to belong to. Self-Identity/Sameness/Millikan: slef-identity then appears relative to the category to which a thing should belong. Problem: is the water surface S1 part of the same water mass as water surface S2? Such questions are not fully defined. We need principles to summarize parts. The relations between the parts can also be more or less loose. I 286 And that has nothing to do with the identity of the whole! Whole: can also be specified by a mere list. This would identify the whole without mentioning the relations of the parts at all. And the self-identity of the whole would not be dependent on the strength of the cohesion of the parts at all. Temporal/spatial: so far the analogy between temporal and spatial parts seems to apply. Cf. >Part-of-relation. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Pointing | Quine | V 70f Pointing/indicative/Wittgenstein/Quine: Problem: how do we know which part of the area is meant, how do we recognize pointing as such. Solution: Sorting out the irrelevant by induction. Also amplification without a pointing finger or deletions with pointing finger. X 24 Indicative Pointing/Ostension/Language Learning/Quine: both the learner and the teacher must understand the appropriateness of the situation. This leads to a uniformity of response to certain stimuli. This uniformity is a behavioural criterion for what should become an observation sentence. It also makes it possible for different scientists to check the evidence for each other. >Language Learning/Quine, >Stimuli/Quine, >Observation Sentences/Quine. XI 182 Note: Pointing/indicative/Ostension/Quine/Lauener: difference: between direct and shifted ostension: Def shifted Ostension/Quine/Lauener: if we refer to a green leaf to explain the abstract singular term "green", we do not mean the perceptible green thing, because the word does not denote a concrete entity. >Ostension/Quine. XII 47 Pointing/Ostension/Color Words/Gavagai/Wittgenstein/Quine: Problem: for example the color word "sepia": can be learned by conditioning or induction. It does not even need to be said that sepia is a color and not a form, a material or a commodity. However, it may be that many lessons are necessary. >Colour/Quine. XII 56 Def Direct Ostension/Pointing/Quine: the point shown is at the end of a straight line on an opaque surface. Problem: how much of the environment should count? Problem: how far may an absent thing differ from the object shown to fall under the term declared ostensively? XII 57 Def Shifted Ostension/Pointing/Quine: For example, pointing to the fuel gauge instead of the fuel itself to indicate how much is still there. ((s) But not that the fuel gauge is still there). Example shifted: if we point to an event (token) and mean the type. E.g. pointing to grass to explain green. For example, point to an inscription to explain a letter. Double shifted: e.g. Goedel number for an expression. (1st inscription of the formula (of the expression), 2nd Goedel number as proxy for it). XII 58 The shifted ostension does not cause any problems that are not already present in the direct version. VII (d) 67 Pointing/indicating definition/Ostension/Identity/Quine: is always ambiguous because of the temporal extension! Our setting of an object does not tell us yet which summation of current objects is intended! When pointing again either the river or river stages can be meant! Therefore, pointing is usually accompanied by pronouncing the words "this river". But this presupposes a concept of river. "This river" means: "the river-like summation of momentary objects that this momentary object contains". VII (d) 68 Pointing/Ostension/Quine: the spatial extension cannot be separated from the temporal extension when pointing, because we ourselves need time for pointing at different places. VII (d) 74 Ostension/Pointing/objects/universals/Quine: how does pointing to space-time objects differ from pointing to universals like square and triangle? VII (d) 75 Square: each time we point to different objects and do not assume an identity from one opportunity to another. The river, on the other hand, assumes this identity. Attribute/Quine: the "squareness" is divided by the shown objects. But you do not need to assume entities like "attributes". Neither the "squareness" is pointed to, nor is it needed for a reference to the word "square". The expression "is square" is also not necessary if the listener learns when to use it and when not to use it. The expression does not need to be a name for any detached object. VII (d) 76 Pointing/concrete/abstract/Quine: general terms like "square" are very similar to concrete singular terms like "Cayster" (the name of the river) concerning the east version. With "red" you do not need to make a distinction at all! VII (d) 77 In everyday language, a general term is often used like a proper name. >General Terms/Quine. V 70 Pointing/Quine: is useful to introduce the anomaly. Conspicuousness/Quine/(s): should explain why from the multitude of stimuli certain stimuli are overweighted or how shapes are recognized against a background. V 89 Identity/Pointing/Quine: Problem: there is no point in showing twice and saying, "This is the same as that". Then you could still ask. "The same what? V 102 Pointing/General Terms/Quine: Problem: unique showing requires special care in some situations. Example "this body is an animal": here the outline must be carefully traced, otherwise it could be that only the hull is perceived as an animal. V 103 At the beginning we did not talk about sentences like "This body is Mama", because we have to assume a general mastery of the "is" in the predication of duration. This requires a stock of individually learned examples. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Preferences | Harsanyi | Gaus I 244 Preferences/diversity/pluralism/rational choice/Harsanyi/D’Agostino: (...) Arrow's Theorem, and its extensions, can be read as an argument for monism. Arrow courts chaos in providing, as pluralists would insist, for the recognition of diversity. >Arrow’s Theorem/D’Agostino. If the price for the avoidance of chaos is the abandonment of pluralism, this is anyway warranted by the fact that all apparent diversity is ethico-politically insignificant and merely conceals a deeper uniformity of assessments that sustains coherence in social arrangements. Harsanyi: This reading is implicit, for instance, in John Harsanyi's (1977)(1) attempt to show that, even when they differ in their assessments of options, individuals can be brought to share the same 'extended preferences' about social arrangements, and that coherent collective choice procedures can be defined on the basis of such ('extended') assessments. And, of course, it has indeed been suggested, more pertinently, that specifically liberal doctrines and institutions are incompatible with pluralism and, hence, with the evaluative diversity which this family of doctrines and arguments sanctions (see Kekes, 1992(2); Crowder, 1994(3)). D’Agostino: Much recent liberal political theory can, however, profitably be interpreted, I submit, as an attempt to find a principled basis for acknowledging the demands both of diversity and of coherence. >Arrow’s Theorem/Weale, >Diversity/D’Agostino, >Pluralism/Political Philosophy. 1. Harsanyi, John (1977) 'Cardinal welfare, individualistic ethics, and interpersonal comparisons of utility'. In his Essays on Ethics, Social Behaviour and Scientific Explanation. Dordrecht: Reidel. 2. Kekes, John (1992) 'The incompatibility of liberalism and pluralism'. American Philosophical Quarterly, 29: 141-51. 3. Crowder, George (1994) 'Pluralism and liberalism'. Political Studies, 42: 293-305. D’Agostino, Fred 2004. „Pluralism and Liberalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Principles | Barrow | I 177 Principles/laws/Barrow: special relativity makes statements about invariants of nature. - Its principles are laws about laws. >Principles, >Special Relativity, >Laws, >Laws of Nature. I 330 Cosmological Principle/Barrow: the average non-uniformity shall be the smaller, the larger the space is that is considered in the universe. >Cosmological principle, >Copernican principle, I 485 Principle/quantities/nature/natural constants/Barrow: principles do not reflect the value of the fundamental constants - instead e.g. only the fact that the energy is proportional to the mass - but not the value of the proportionality constant. >Natural constants, >Quantities (Physics). Progress/Barrow: would be the discovery of new constants or the fact that an assumed constant is no constant at all. >Progress. |
B I John D. Barrow Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996 B II John D. Barrow The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988 German Edition: Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993 B III John D. Barrow Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001 |
| Privileged Access | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 316 ff Beetle-Example/private experiences/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the existence of the beetle is not disputed - Problem: comparison only through public language - Color: problem actually the concept of color uniformity (i.e., the method of comparison). - Experiences: the problem is not that the memory can be deceptive, but it is not defined what it actually is what we should remember. - Wittgenstein: an explanation cannot be uttered. I 320 Sensations are private - sensation language cannot be private. - Wittgenstein does not criticize the metaphysics of Descartes - but his semantics. >Experience, >Sensations. Beetle-Example/language game/private experiences/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the linking of experiences with words or gestures is a semantic (logical) one - it is not about remembering one's own experiences - this is not a step in the language game. - ((s) Because it takes place without words of the public language.) I 342 It's not about imperceptibility but about the impossibility of comparison with others. >Incorrigibility. I 332f I 348 Primary language games/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Steps in them are not correctable - otherwise they could not serve as the basis of the relation language/world - in primary language games there are no criteria - but they can provide criteria as a whole for mental processes. - Terminology: "primary language games": for Wittgenstein: "beginning of the language game". >Language games. I 375 Definition Beetle Example/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: = the question whether the terms for private experiences are actually names of these experiences - that is not the same as the question of "natural expressions" for sensations. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Psychology | Quine | V 58 Psychology/Peirce: can only be based on external facts - Quine: Problem: how can you do that when you do not speak of things such as internal ideas? - Solution: Let us talk about the language - ((s)> semantic ascent/Quine) - ((s) only shared situations and language behavior) - QuineVs: (see below) Psychology is not "shared observation" but observation sentences. simple compliance - ((s) Psychology does not identify the situation. >Observation Sentences/Quine XII 91 Epistemology/Psychology/Quine: if sensory stimuli are the only thing, why not just turn to psychology? TraditionVsPsychology/Quine: this used to appear circular. No Circle/QuineVsVs: Solution: we just have to refrain from deducting science from observations. If we only want to understand the connection between observation and science, we need all the information we can get. Also those from science, which is investigating exactly this connection. >Science/Quine XII 92 Psychology/Quine: cannot provide a translation into logical, set-theoretical and observation concepts such as rational reconstruction, because we have not grown up to learn this. That is precisely why we should insist on rational reconstruction: Rational Reconstruction/Carnap/Quine: pro: it makes the physicalistic terms superfluous at the end. XII 98 Epistemology/Quine: still exists within psychology and thus within empirical sciences. Epistemology studies the human subject. Aim: to find out how observation is related to theory and to what extent theory goes beyond observation. XII 99 Rational Reconstruction/Naturalized Epistemology/Quine: the rational reconstruction survives: by giving clues to psychological processes as an imaginative construction. >Rational Reconstruction/Quine New: that we can make free use of empirical psychology. >Epistemology/Quine: Old: wanted to include empirical sciences, so to speak, to assemble them from sense data. New: now, conversely, epistemology is part of psychology. >Epistemology/Quine XI 100 Gestalt Theory/Gestalt Psychology/Quine: VsSensory Atomism. QuineVs Gestalt Psychology: no matter if shape or atoms push themselves into the foreground of consciousness, we take the stimuli as input. Priority is what is causally closer. QuineVsAntipsychologism. I 44 Evidence/Irritation/Quine: any realistic theory of evidence is inextricably linked to the psychology of stimulus and reaction. To call a stone at close range a stone is already an extreme case. I 154 Like other sciences, psychology favours the uniformity of nature already in the criteria of its concepts. A connection between the individual senses cannot succeed. No chain of subliminal relationships ranges from sounds to colors. We need a separate quality space for each of the senses. Worse still: within one space we have to distinguish between subspaces: a red and a green ball can be less far apart in the quality space of the child than from a red cloth. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Quantum Mechanics | Barrow | I 233 Quantum mechanics/QM/Atom/Uniformity/Equality/Barrow: the quantization of energy is the reason why hydrogen atoms are identical. >Energy, >Symmetries. I 235 Measurement Problem/QM/Barrow: it is about whether the quantum theory describes everything that happens in nature, including the measurement process, or not. >Measurement problem. I 237 EPR/Barrow: Paradox: we cannot predict which the two photons will move clockwise in the decay - but if we were to go to the other end of the universe, we would know instantly because of quantum mechanics that the other photon rotates in the other direction, without having measured it. - I.e. the unmeasured momentum must match reality. - It must be real, because it is predictable. Knowledge without measurement, i.e. independent of observation. >Observation, >Observation independence. Paradox: the second photon must know the direction of the other. Proof: Alain Aspect experiment, 1982. I 240 Barrow: in fact, no information is transmitted - VsEPR: simultaneity is a concept that depends on the observer. - E.g. three observers could be in motion relative to each other and to the experiment - one would see that the measurements of the spins are conducted simultaneously, while the others would first observe one or the other. I 238f John Bell/QM/Non-Locality/Barrow: (1960s): John Bell showed that every theory that describes EPR phenomena needs to have a non-local description if a simple arithmetic condition is satisfied. >Non-locality. Bell Test/Uncertainty: Uncertainty is not about the coarseness of the observer - this would be a local explanation. Bell: Each correct view of nature must be non-local. I 242 Copenhagen Interpretation/Bohr: In the traditional sense, no deeper reality can be discovered, but only a description of it. - It is useless to say that the measurement somehow changed a deeper reality. I 245 While the wave function is deterministic, linear, continuous and local, and does not know any determinate time direction, the measuring process is almost random, non-linear, discontinuous, non-local and non-reversible. >Wave function, >Measurements, >Time arrow, >Time, >Time reversal. SchrödingerVsBohr: Schrödinger's cat: is in a mixture of dead and alive, as long as we do not look. I 247 Wheeler: Problem: all astronomical measurements are made with radiation. - So according to Bohr's Copenhagen interpretation, they would only be made alive by measuring. I 253ff Copenhagen Interpretation/Many-Worlds Interpretation/MWI/Aspect/Experiment/Barrow: the assumption of non-locality was experimentally confirmed by Aspect. >Many-Worlds Theory, >Copenhagen Interpretation. Barrow: The Copenhagen and the many-worlds interpretation appear to be completely incompatible, but there is the unanimous opinion that they are experimentally indistinguishable. |
B I John D. Barrow Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996 B II John D. Barrow The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988 German Edition: Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993 B III John D. Barrow Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001 |
| Rationalism | Chisholm | II 36f RationalismVsBerkeley: we believe in the outside world from the beginning, no decision situation; similar to Hume, but very modest position. Methodology/Sciences: Strategy: better than maintaining a change -> belief in the uniformity of the world. II 39 Rationalism/Rutte: reason always appealed to already existing belief-majorities. Rason: strategy: attitude maintained when change is not attractive. This is also true for indecision. It is more attractive to maintain realism. On the other hand: Solipsism: maintaining is less attractive. Rutte, Heiner. Mitteilungen über Wahrheit und Basis empirischer Erkenntnis, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Wahrnehmungs- und Außenweltproblems. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 II 76 KantVsRationalism: mere consistency shall impose existence - (s) existence: freedom from contradiction, but not vice versa guaranteed -> Field: consistency = logical possibility. Sauer, W. Über das Analytische und das synthetische Apriori bei Chisholm. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Reality | Chisholm | II 24 Reality/real/Chisholm/Rutte: 1) this way of appearing, - 2) arranged in the way it appears - 3) the right causation. Reality must be distinguished from the outer world. >World, >Ontology, >Outer world. II 41 Reality/Rutte: we may have success by guess but only testing hypotheses implies realism and uniformity. Rutte, Heiner. Mitteilungen über Wahrheit und Basis empirischer Erkenntnis, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Wahrnehmungs- und Außenweltproblems. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Recognition | Millikan | I 13 MillikanVsHolism: It is about understanding without holism and without the myth of what is given, how we test our apparent abilities, to recognize things, and our apparent meanings. >Holism/Millikan. I 299 Consistency/Millikan: the test of them is at the same time a test of our ability to identify something, as well as the test on the fact that our concepts map what they are supposed to map. >Consistency. MillikanVsQuine: but this is not about establishing "conditions for identity". And also not about "shared reference" ("the same apple again"). This is part of the problem of uniformity, not identity. This is not the problem of deciding how to split an exclusivity class. >Terminology/Millikan. I 300 E.g. to decide when red stops and orange starts. Instead it is about learning e.g. to recognize red under other circumstances. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Redshift | Kanitscheider | I 222 Redshift/Theory: ambiguous: one thought earlier that the redshift of the spectral lines of the light of the distant galaxies is a Doppler effect. This is wrong! Not the galaxies move through the space, but the space itself expands. (Therefore it is also possible that the expansion can assume superluminal speed). But then the galaxies themselves are in rest. I 223 Theory/Empirical/Kanitscheider: nevertheless, here was a real support of the theory by theory-neutral empirical data: because the linear Hubble law (whatever value the Hubble constant may have) is logically firmly connected with the uniformity of the world at large. An empirical connection was discovered without the help of those theories for which this connection should be supporting instance. From such a law of expansion follows that every galaxy can be regarded as center of such an expansion. >Universe/Kanitscheider, >Cosmological principle/Kanitscheider, cf. >Olbers paradox, >Relativity theory. I 225 Redshift/Kanitscheider: for the cosmological interpretation the wavelength independence is important. Only then the statement can be made that the measured value of z = 1 is due to a doubling of the size of space. Since Rem approaches zero at (time-inverse) approach to the initial singularity, the redshift of very old and distant objects can go beyond all limits. At t = 0, z is infinite. However, no observable corresponds to this, since redshift is also accompanied by a slowing down of all processes. Around the big bang the physical events appear frozen. I 226 Redshift/Kanitscheider: It is important to recognize that the different interpretations are not based on relationist Vs absolutist conception of space! The interpretation, according to which the redshift is caused by the expansion of space, is of course the relativistic one, but it is not only a facon de parler, but has also empirical consequences: if the redshift would be really a velocity and not an expansion effect, the energy flux S, which is measured from a galaxy of luminosity L on the earth, not S = L / 4πR²(1 + z)², but S = L / 4πr²(1 + z)². However, this is not valid for an overlapping area with very small distances, where both theories give equal values. Redshift/Kanitscheider: there is a third explanation: light fatigue by gravitational effect. Photons experience an interaction on their way, be it with atoms or with electrons, which triggers an energy loss and thus a frequency decrease. Or the photon decays into a lower energy photon and a vector boson. Vs: One can exclude such hypothesis only by comparing the consequences with the empiric: Bsp It would have to accompany by interaction with intergalactic matter also a smearing of the pictures of distant objects. This has never been observed. Even quasars are always sharply point-like. Likewise, the spectral lines would have to become broader, which has also never been observed. Moreover, the fatigue phenomenon would have to occur depending on the wavelength, that the radiophotons decay faster than the light photons. Moreover, the static universe - which is implied by this assumption - would have no place for the background radiation. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Reduction | Quine | XII 92 Definition Reduction Sentence/Carnap/Quine: weaker than definition: provides no equivalent sentences without the term in question, but only implications. XII 93 No full explanation but only partial explanation. Implication here: the reduction sentences name a few sentences that are implied by sentences with this term and imply some other sentences, that imply sentences with this term. - This does not provide a genuine reduction, but a fictional story of language acquisition. ((s) > "Rylean Ancestors"). VII (a) 19 Conceptual Scheme/Reduction/Quine: we want to see how far a physicalist scheme can be reduced to a phenomenalist one. The latter has epistemological priority. The choice between conceptual schemes is guided by purposes and interests. XI 143 Reduction/Ontology/Quine/Lauener: for ontological reduction, it is not extensional equality that is decisive, but the preservation of the relevant structure. For example Frege's, v. Neumann's and Zermelo's definitions do not produce equivalent predicates, but are nevertheless suitable for reduction, because all three represent a structure-preserving model of arithmetic. Extensional Equality(s): ensures the uniformity of the quantities considered. The reduction then takes place at the description level. It would not reduce the ontology. XI 146 Reduction/Theory/Quine/Lauener: by the condition that an n-tuple of arguments applies to a predicate exactly when the open sentence is fulfilled by the corresponding n-tuple of values, we avert an impending trivialization. We can do this by determining the proxy function. If the truth values of the closed sentences are preserved, we can actually speak of a reduction to the natural numbers. (Ways of Paradox, p. 203). XI 145 Def Proxy Function/Quine/Lauener: is a function that assigns each object of the original theory a function of the new theory. Example "The Goedel number of". This need not be expressed in one theory or another. It is sufficient if we have the necessary means of expression at the meta level. Reduction: from one theory to another: so we need a special function for this XI 146 whose arguments are from the old theory and whose values are from the new theory. Proxy Function/Quine/Lauener: does not need to be unique at all. Example: Characterization of persons on the basis of their income: here different values are assigned to an argument. For this we need a background theory: We map the universe U in V in such a way that both the objects of U and their proxies are contained in V. If V forms a subset of U, U itself can be defined as background theory, within which its own ontological reduction is described. XI 147 VsQuine: this is not a reduction at all, because then the objects must exist. QuineVsVs: this is comparable to a reductio ad absurdum: if we want to show that a part of U is superfluous, we may presuppose this for the duration of argument U (>Ontology). Lauener: that brings us to >ontological relativity. Löwenheim/Ontology/Reduction/Quine/Lauener: if a theory of its own requires a super-countable range, we can no longer present a proxy function that would allow a reduction to a countable range. This would require a much stronger framework theory, which could no longer be discussed away absurdly as reductio ad absurdum according to Quine's proposal. XII 60 Specification/Reduction/Quine: we cannot find a clear difference between specifying one item area and reducing that area to another. We have not discovered a clear difference between the clarification of the concept of "expression" and its replacement by that of number. ((s) > Goedel Numbers). And now, if we are to say what numbers actually are, we are forced to reveal them and instead assign a new, e.g. set-theoretical model to arithmetic. XII 73 Reduction/Ontology/Quine: an ontology can always be reduced to another if we know of a reversibly unique deputy function f. Reason: for each predicate P of the old system, there is a predicate of the new system that takes over the role of P there. We interpret this new predicate in such a way that it applies exactly to the values f(x) of the old objects x to which P applied. Example: Suppose f(x): is the Goedel number of x, Old system: is a syntactical system, Predicate in the old system: "... is a section of___" an x New system: the corresponding predicate would have the same extension (coextensive) as the words "...is the Gödel number of a section whose Goedel number is___". (Not in this wording but as a purely arithmetic condition.) XII 74 Reduction/ontological relativity/Quine: it may sound contradictory that the objects discarded in the reduction must exist. Solution: this has the same form as a reduction ad absurdum: here we assume a wrong sentence to refute it. As we show here, the subject area U is excessively large. XII 75 Löwenheim/Skolem/strong form/selection axiom/ontology/reduction/onthological relativity/Quine: (early form): thesis: If a theory is true and has a supernumerable range of objects, then everything but a countable part is superfluous, in the sense that it can be eliminated from the range of variables without any sentence becoming false. This means that all acceptable theories can be reduced to countable ontologies. And this in turn can be reduced to a special ontology of natural numbers. For this purpose, the enumeration, as far as it is explicitly known, is used as a proxy function. And even if the enumeration is not known, it exists. Therefore, we can regard all our items as natural numbers, even if the enumeration number ((s) of the name) is not always known. Ontology: could we not define once and for all a Pythagorean general purpose ontology? Pythagorean Ontology/Terminology/Quine: consists either of numbers only, or of bodies only, or of quantities only, etc. Problem: suppose, we have such an ontology and someone would offer us something that would have been presented as an ontological reduction before our decision for Pythagorean ontology, namely a procedure according to which in future theories all things of a certain type A are superfluous, but the remaining range would still be infinite. XII 76 In the new Pythagorean framework, his discovery would nevertheless still retain its essential content, although it could no longer be called a reduction, it would only be a manoeuvre in which some numbers would lose a number property corresponding to A. We do not even know which numbers would lose a number property corresponding to A. VsPythagoreism: this shows that an all-encompassing Pythagoreanism is not attractive, because it only offers new and opaque versions of old methods and problems. >Proxy function. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Regularities | Fraassen | I 211 Regularity / Fraassen: practically do not exist - E.g. things that are under your full control. - E.g. content of your pocket is no regularity - no more fundamental regularities. >Simplicity. But we need to explain why things approximately obay to regularities. Hypothesis: the greater uniformity will be the truer one! - (> Gradation). Solution: postulation of microstructures. >Microstructure. I 213 Only observable regularities need to be explained. >Observability, >Unobservables, >Theoretical entities, >Theories, >Explanations. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Regularities | Genz | II 303 Uniformity/Hume: we assume a uniformity of past and future. Physics/theory/explanation/Genz: but we assume more than mere uniformity when we explain why. Physics also hopes for a certain outcome of experiments that have never been conducted before. Merely uniformity is not enough. Expectation/Genz: expectation is justified by an understanding of the past. Better than through regularities. Therefore, there is no "induction problem". >Predictions, >Induction/Genz, >Induction. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Science | Fraassen | I 34 Science/Fraassen: thesis: it is not about declaration as such, but about new statements about observable regularities. >Regularities, >Observability. I 39 Science/R. Boyd: thesis: the terms of a mature science typically refer. - We need realism, so the success of science does not look like a miracle. FraassenVsBoyd: Science does not have to explain to its own success. I 86 Unity/Science/Duhem: DuhemVs English Science: these are "broad but shallow", satisfied with a piecemeal approach (apparatus). - (Duhem per uniformity). >Duhem. I 196 Philosophy of Science/Fraassen: has nothing to do with logic or philosophy of language. - And vice versa: Fraassen thesis: language problems have nothing to do with the content of science and the structure of the world. >Method, >Theories. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Ship of Theseus | Millikan | I 287 Ship of Theseus/terminology/Millikan: S0: the original Sn: the ship, newly built from new parts. Sr: the renovated ship ((s) intermediate stage). All three are ship stages. I 287 Question: was the whole permanent whole, of which Sn was a part, the same permanent whole like that, of which S0 was a part? Or correspondingly with Sr and S0? Solution/Millikan: a solution can only be given if the principle is established before, according to which the unit (uniformity) is to be determined. Problem: it seems clear that both Sn and Sr cannot be parts of the same whole. Because they exist at the same time in different places. Problem: For example, three water surfaces S1, S2, S3, if they are designed in a way that it is unclear whether S1 and S2 are part of the same lake and correspondingly also for S1 and S3, it would be inconceivable that it would be completely clear at the same time, that S2 and S3 were not part of the same lake. N.B.: Is there perhaps an asymmetry at the end between temporal and spatial parts? Ship of Theseus: Sn and Sr cannot be stages of the same ship because they exist simultaneously but have different properties and occupy different spatial parts composed of different collections of matter, etc. Identity/Leibniz/Millikan: his undisputed principle excludes that Sn and Sr are the same ship. Unity/Uniformity/Millikan: whatever principle we choose here, it seems that it should rule out that different temporal parts could exist at the same time. Separation/Millikan: i.e. a separation should not preserve both parts equally, as in an amoeba. Unit/Millikan: a corresponding principle must maintain the Leibniz principle of the identity of the indistinguishable. Problem: the principle simply says that a thing must have the same properties as it does itself. It does not say that a part must have the same properties as another part. Ship of Theseus: then Sn and Sr could be simultaneous but spatially distant parts. Spatial/temporal/Millikan: it is rather the principle of uniformity (not the one of identity) that requires that objects have only one position at a time. Mereology/Unity/Uniformity/Millikan: we often break this principle when we say that the same thing still exists when it is broken or decomposed into its parts. Definition/thing/object/Millikan: nevertheless, we need the principle of uniformity to define objects at all. Seperation/Millikan: a ban on division would have nothing to do with the principle of identity. I 289 Ship of Theseus/Millikan: Whether we say that newly built ship or the ship built from the original parts would be the right ship, is in the end only a verbal question of the principles of uniformity that we want to apply. On the other hand: Identity/Millikan: Questions of identity are objective questions that are not only decided by the language use. >Language behavior. Unity/Uniformity/Millikan: is a question of used descriptions. >Description. Separation/fusion/identity in time/temporal/Millikan: are actually questions of the chosen (conventional) principles of unity. (Uniformity) Identity/Objectivity/Millikan: Questions of identity are objective questions in which one can be confused about what to think, not merely what one is to say. Temporal identity/Millikan: temporal identity is not more problematic than spatial identity. >Identity/Millikan, >Temporal identity. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Social Comparison Theory | Festinger | Haslam I 43 Social Comparison Theory/Festinger: Festinger (1950)(1) focused on the pressures for uniformity in groups. Festinger (1954)(2) introduced his theory of social comparison processes. Social comparison theory identified the strong need people have to evaluate their own opinions and abilities by comparing them with the opinions and abilities of others. However, he was now working on a new theory that would be transformative in the history of social psychology – what we would later know as the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957)(3). >Cognitive dissonance/Festinger, >Dissonance theory/psychological theories. 1. Festinger, L. (1950) ‘Informal social communication’, Psychological Review, 57 : 271–82. 2. Festinger, L. (1954) ‘A theory of social comparison processes’, Human Relations, 1: 117–40. 3. Festinger, L. (1957) A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Joel Cooper, “Cognitive Dissonance. Revisiting Festinger’s End of the World study”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Software | Bostrom | I 73 Software/superintelligence/Bostrom: advantages for digital intelligences: - Editability: It is easier to experiment with parameter variations in software than in neural wetware. For example, with a whole brain emulation one could easily trial what happens if one adds more neurons in a particular cortical area or if one increases or decreases their excitability. - Duplicability: With software, one can quickly make arbitrarily many high-fidelity copies to fill the available hardware base. II 74 - Goal coordination: Human collectives are replete with inefficiencies arising from the fact that it is nearly impossible to achieve complete uniformity of purpose among the members of a large group (…). - Memory sharing: Biological brains need extended periods of training and mentorship whereas digital minds could acquire new memories and skills by swapping data files. A population of a billion copies of an AI program could synchronize their databases periodically, so that all the instances of the program know everything that any instance learned during the previous hour. >Hardware/superintelligence/Bostrom. |
Bostrom I Nick Bostrom Superintelligence. Paths, Dangers, Strategies Oxford: Oxford University Press 2017 |
| Strength of Theories | Armstrong | III 77 Logical Necessity: is the strongest necessity. - Physical necessity: weaker because of contingency - still weaker: general quantification (mere uniformity). - N.B.: from a law we cannot conclude general quantification. - Law: physical necessity. >Laws. III 108 High/low/stronger/weaker/Armstrong: E.g. "N (F, G)" is logically stronger than "All Fs are Gs". The universal statement (general quantification, mere conjunction) is logically weaker than a law statement. >Law statements/Armstrong. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Subjectivity | Husserl | Gadamer I 249 Subjectivity/Husserl/Gadamer: Validity of being (German: "Seinsgeltung") now also possesses human subjectivity [in Husserl's phenomenology](1). It is therefore to be regarded just as much, i.e. it too is to be explored in the multiplicity of its modes of existence. Such an exploration of the ego as a phenomenon is not "inner perception" of a real ego, but it is also not a mere reconstruction of the i.e. relationship of the contents of consciousness to a transcendental ego pole (Natorp)(2) but is a highly differentiated subject of transcendental reflection. Cf. >Objectivism/Husserl, >Consciousness/Husserl. Way of Givenness: This reflection represents the growth of a new dimension of research compared to the mere fact of phenomena of objective consciousness, a fact in intentional experiences. For there is also a given fact that is not itself the object of intentional acts. Every experience has implied horizons of the before and after and finally merges with the continuum of the before and after present experiences to form the unity of the stream of experience. >Time Consciousness/Husserl. Gadamer I 251 Subjectivity/Husserl/Gadamer: The fact that Husserl has that "performance" of transcendental subjectivity everywhere in mind simply corresponds to the task of phenomenological constitutional research. But it is characteristic of his actual intention that he no longer says consciousness, or even subjectivity, but "life". He simply wants to go back behind the actuality of the consciousness that means, yes, also behind the potentiality of the fellow-mine to the universality of a last, which alone is able to measure the universality of what has been accomplished, i.e. what is constituted in its validity. It is a fundamentally anonymous intentionality, i.e. one that is no longer performed by anyone by name, through which the all-encompassing world horizon is constituted. Husserl, consciously countering a concept of the world that encompasses the universe of that which can be objectified by the sciences, calls this phenomenological concept of the world "the life-world," i.e., the world "into" which we live in the natural setting, which does not as such ever become representational to us, but which represents the given ground of all experience. >Lifeworld/Husserl. Gadamer I 253 Subject/Husserl/Gadamer: "The radical view of the world is a systematic and pure inner view of the self in the outward subjectivity(3). It is like in the unity of a living organism, which we can well observe and dissect from the outside, but can only understand if we go back to its hidden roots...". Subject/Husserl: In this way, the subject's behavior in the world also has its comprehensibility not in the conscious experiences and their intentionality, but in the anonymous ones of life. >I, Ego, Self/Husserl. Subjectivity/Husserl/Gadamer: (...) this is how one is led into the proximity of the speculative concept of life of German idealism. What Husserl is trying to say is that one must not think of subjectivity as an opposition to objectivity, because such a concept of subjectivity would itself be objectivistic. His transcendental phenomenology wants to be "correlation research" instead. But this says: the relation is the primary, and the "poles" into which it unfolds are "enclosed by itself"(4) just as the living encloses all its expressions of life in the uniformity of its organic being. HusserlVsHume: "The naivety of the speech of the experiencing, recognizing, the really concretely performing subjectivity leaves completely out of question, the naivety of the scientist Gadamer I 254 of nature, of the world in general, who is blind to the fact that all the truths he gains as objective ones, and the objective world itself, which in his formulas is substrate, is his own life structure that has become in him - is of course no longer possible, as soon as life comes into focus," (Husserl writes this with reference to Hume(5)). 1. Husserliana VI. 169. 2. Natorp, Einleitung in die Psychologie nach kritischer Methode, 1888; Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode, 1912. 3. Husserliana VI, p. 116. 4. Cf. C. Wolzogen, „Die autonome Relation. Zum Problem der Beziehung im Spätwerk Paul Natorps. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Theorien der Relation“ 1984 and my review in Philos. Rdsch. 32 (1985), p. 1601. 5. Husserliana VI p. 99 |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Substance | Locke | Euchner I 20 Substance/Locke: the various simple ideas have a common substance - it is corpuscular or atomic (after Boyle). Euchner I 33 Substances/Locke: Ideas about the basics of the things of the outer world, which make this appear as something unified. I 36 Substance: name of the substrate. (Creates the uniformity). Substratum: the common, which is pulled out of the recurring observations. Substance: complex idea, its essence is undetectable. >Substratum, >Substance, >Essence/Locke, >Idea/Locke. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Loc I W. Euchner Locke zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 |
| Terminology | Gould | I 190 1. Stasis: most species show little change in one direction or another during their presence on Earth. 2. Sudden appearance: in all areas of life, species do not occur due to incessant changes in their predecessors, but suddenly and "fully developed". I 191 Evolution/Gould: evolution essentially proceeds in two ways: a) Definition phyletic transformation: an entire population changes from one state to another. If all evolutionary changes were to occur in this way, life would not last long. (See Evolution/Gould). b) Definition speciation: new species branch off from existing ones. All speciation theories assume that splits occur quickly in very small populations. Most theoreticians prefer the "allopatric" speciation (which happens in a different place). This is the orthodox view. With the "sympatric" speciation, new forms appear within the distribution area of the previous form. I 198 Definition preadaption: preadaption is derived from the thesis that other functions would be fulfilled in the initial stages, e.g. half a jaw could support the gills. Half a wing may have been used to catch prey, or to control body temperature. I 240 Definition Eozoon: an Eozoon is an early form of an animal. I 256 Definition protists: protists are single cell precursors. Definition Metazoen: a Metazoen is a multicellular offspring. I 258 Definition homologous similarity in common precursors: two organisms may have the same feature because they got it from a common ancestor. Definition analogous similarity: organisms with analogous similarity have no common precursors. The two organisms have a common feature that represents the result of a separate but similar evolutionary change in independent lines of development. I 281 Definition parallelism, Definition convergence: parallelism is a separate development of similar features in the course of evolution. This occurs very often. II 56 Definition diploid: animals with paired chromosomes in both sexes are diploid. Some animals use a different trait for sex determination: the females are diploid, but the males have instead of each female pair only one chromosome and are considered to be the first males. Definition haploid: organisms with only one chromosome (half of the diploid number) are haploid. In other words, the males develop ironically from unfertilized eggs and have no father. Fertilized eggs, on the other hand, produce diploid females. Animals using this system are called Definition Haplodiploid: the males develop from unfertilized eggs and have no father. Fertilized eggs, on the other hand, produce diploid females. This can be used to control the number of females. II 57 This fascinating system can help explain the origin of social systems in ants. Or also, for example, that a male mite dies before its own birth after fertilising its sisters in the womb. At least 10% of all known animal species are haplodiploid. II 186 Definition homeotic mutation: legs or parts of legs replace a variety of structures on the head mainly antennae and parts of the mouth. Not all incorrectly placed parts are homoeoses. William Bateson (not Gregory), who later invented the word genetics, called cases only homeotically in which organs that have the same development or evolutionary origin are replaced. II 192 Viable homoeostats that emulate the primordial forms are not really reborn ancestors. Double elements are formed, no old patterns are found. II 193 These things make it clear how few genes are responsible for regulating the basic order in the body of a fruit fly. II 240 Definition zoocentric: zoocentrism is a erspective that derives general principles from the behaviour of other animals and then completely subsumes the human being into this category, because we are undoubtedly also animals. Definition anthropocentric: a point of view is anthropocentric when it tries to subsume nature in us by considering our peculiarities as the goal of life from the very beginning. The zoocentric view can be extended to the caricature, which is often referred to as "nothing but error": the human is "nothing more than an animal" (reductionism). Popular science is flooding us with the excessively broad version of zoocentrism. II 331 Definition "genetic drift"/Gould: the genetic drift is the process of random increase or decrease of the gene frequency. II 352 Definition Clade: a clade is a branch on an evolutionary tree. Cladism tries to establish the branching pattern for a number of related species. II 353 Definition sister group: the sister group forms an upside-down Ypsilon: two tribes sharing a common ancestor from which no other tribe branches off. Gorillas and chimpanzees form a sister group. We can then consider the chimpanzee gorilla group as a unit and ask which primate forms the sister group with it. II 354 Definition derived feature: properties that only occur for members of a direct lineage are derived features. For example, all mammals have hair, which is not the case with any other vertebrate. II 355 Hair is a derived feature for the class of mammals, because it has developed only once in the common ancestors of mammals and therefore identifies a true branch in the family tree of vertebrates. Common derived characteristics are common to two or more strains and can be used to identify sister groups. II 356 GouldVsCladism: most derived features are ambiguous: they either tend to be too easily delimitable, or they are adaptive enough to be developed by several strains through natural selection independently of each other. II 360 Definition classification (cladism): classification was designed for the purpose of reflecting relative dimensions of similarity. Definition phenetism: phenetism is another theory of classification, it focuses solely on the overall similarity and tries to evade the reproach of subjectivity by referring to a large number of features, all of which are expressed numerically and processed by the computer. II 374 Definition "Telegony": Telegony means that features of long extinct ancestors reappear. They are also called "descendants from afar." Telegony refers to the idea that a producer could influence offspring that were not conceived by him. Definition "Pangenesis" (1868, provisionally developed by Darwin) thesis: all cells of the body produce small particles called "Gemmulae", which circulate throughout the body, accumulate in the gametes and eventually transfer the features to the offspring. GouldVsPangenesis: since the "Gemmulae" can change, acquired features can be inherited, which would be Lamarckism. II 377 Definition orthogenesis: orthogenesis is the assumption that a pre-drawn path is followed. IV 103 Doctrine of uniformity: (represented by Charles Lyell and James Hutton) the uppermost layers of the earth have remained unchanged for millions of years. IV 153 Definition Monogeny: (19th century): thesis: Monogeny is the assumption of a common ancestry of all humans from the ancestors Adam and Eve. (Lower races were later degenerated from original perfection.) Definition Polygeny: (19th century): thesis: Polygeny is the assumption that Adam and Eve are only the ancestors of the white peoples. IV 159 Definition subspecies: a subspecies is a population inhabiting a specific geographical area. IV 357 Definition sympatric: sympatric means being in the same place. Definition allopatric: allopatric means being in separate places (assuming that species can only develop separately). III 19 The "Full House": Gould's central argument: natural reality is an accumulation of individuals in populations. Variation is not reducible but "real" in the sense that "the world" consists of it. Error: it is wrong to always describe populations (according to Plato) as "average", which is then considered "typical". III 67 "Full House": "Full House" describes the need to focus not only on an abstract measure of an average or a central tendency, but on the variation within whole systems. Error: it is an error to consider the likely outcome for a single individual as a measure of a central tendency. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Terminology | Hume | I 7 Affection/Hume: there is 1. affectivity (on sensations) and 2. the social (above the reason). I 23 Affect/affection/Hume: 1. Effects of the association: bring about generality, rules, 2. Effects of affect: give content, allow practical and moral action. Affect is not a representation. Reason does not determine action. Affect determines the act. I 31 Sympathy/Hume: sympathy leads us to abandon our interests. It is the basis of morality but only with respect to close loved ones or relatives > partisanship. The human being is less selfish than partisan. So the sympathy does not go beyond the individual interest or the affect. Human/Hume: the human is naturally selfish. Moral/Hume: moral is not dependent on instinct. I 49 Vivacity/Hume: problem: the general rule does not know an owner, it is abstract. Uniformity of the true moral judgment is not alive. I 56 General rule: unity of a reflection and an extension (here always expansion). The affect reaches beyond itself, because it reflects itself. The general rule is the reflected affect in the imagination. I 66 Affect/imagination/Hume: problem: how is the relationship that enables the affect to develop a complex effect? I 67 Solution: the principles of affect exceed the mind (like the principles of association), e.g. imagination goes easily from a remote thing to the next, but not vice versa, e.g. from brother to I, but not vice versa. An affect gives these connections a meaning. I 71 f Custom/Hume: paradox: a custom is formed gradually and is also a principle of human nature. A principle is the habit to adopt habits. So the development is itself a principle (= experience). I 89 Def Purpose/Hume/Deleuze: the purpose (Deleuze: finalité) is thought and not recognized as the original conformity of the principles of human nature with nature itself. It is the unity of origin and the qualitative determination. There are four principles: reason, instinct, procreation and growth. I 118 Affect/Hume: affect is produced by the body: a) directly from within itself: e.g. Hunger or b) with other causes: joy, pride, humility, etc. Nature has also provided the mind with certain instincts. I 139f Transcendence/Kant/Deleuze: the thinking goes beyond the imagination, without disengaging from it. The transcendental makes transcendence immanent. Something = X. HumeVsKant: in Kant's work is nothing transcendental. Instead: finality: the conformity of the subject with the given (not random). (The conformity requires a connection of the moments of the subject.) I 160 Vivacity/agile/Hume: the vivacity is the origin of the mind. It is the basic feature of the impression and not a product of principles. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 |
| Theories | Nozick | II 121 Inegalitarian Theory/Nozick: an inegalitarian theory assumes that a state is privileged as a "natural". This needs no explanation and also does not allow one. - Other situations are then differences that need to be explained. E.g. For Newton rest or uniformity of movement was the natural state. For Aristotle: rest. - inegalitarian theory does not answer, 1. Why this state is the natural. 2. Why exactly these forces are making a difference. To accept something as a natural state is also to ascribe a specific content to him. II 122 R. Harris: the thesis that something remains the same, does not need to be explained. >Regularity, >Explanations, >Constancy. NozickVs: but we have to explain why a thing for the purposes of this principle counts as the same and not in other contexts. Existence: the question concerning it, is typical inegalitary. Punchline: here we presuppose the nothing as their natural state. Cf. >Existence/Leibniz. II 126 1. We do not know what the natural state is. 2. We do not know whether there is a fundamental natural state at all. That means whether the correct fundamental theory is inegalitary. Each inegalitarian theory leaves a bare fact as inexplicable back, a "natural state". II 127 Egalitarian Theory/Nozick: needs to see much more possible states as in need of explanation. - But it asks no longer the question "Why X instead of Y?" - But always "Why X?". II 127 Egalitarian Theory/existence/nothing/Nozick: "principle of indifference" (from probability theory). - For them, there are many ways, how things could be, but only one possibility how nothing exists. - Punchline: then is the chance that something exists much greater than that nothing exists. Vs: one has to make an appropriate division into states that are to be treated as equally likely. - Many ways how things exists can be summarized as one. Extreme case: only two ways: something exists or does not exist. II 128 Under the worst assumption if we assume a division, there is a 50%-chance that something exists. - Because all other divisions have to be at least three partitions then, the chance that something exists rises for the next alternative already to two-thirds. - At the end almost 1. - Problem: the probability theory is still assuming the non-existence as the natural state - because it assumes that if something exists, then randomly - The natural state of a way is the non-realization. Solution:> richness. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Totality | Dewey | Suhr I 38 Def Totality/Dewey: A totality is not summation but uniformity and consistency. There is a preservation of balance in the multiplicity of different actions. >Actions, cf. >Complexity, >Consistency. |
Dew II J. Dewey Essays in Experimental Logic Minneola 2004 Suhr I Martin Suhr John Dewey zur Einführung Hamburg 1994 |
| Unity | Aristotle | Gadamer I 357 Unity/Uniformity/Experience/Science/Aristotle/Gadamer: (...) Therein lies the fundamental openness of experience for new experience - not only in the general sense that errors come for correction, but it is by its very nature dependent on constant confirmation and therefore necessarily becomes another itself in the absence of confirmation (ubi reperitur instantia contradictoria). Aristotle has a very nice picture for the logic of this procedure. He compares the many observations one makes with a fleeing army. (...) if in this general flight an observation is confirmed through re- Gadamer I 358 peated experience, then it stops. >Experience/Aristotle, >Knowledge/Aristotle. Thus, at this point, as it were, a first standstill in the general flight begins. If others join him, the whole army of the fugitives comes to a halt at the end and obeys the unit of the command again. The uniform mastery of the whole symbolizes here what science is. The picture is intended to show how science, i.e. general truth, can come about at all, which must not depend on the randomness of the observations, but should apply in general. >Science/Aristotle. Experience/Induction/Aristotle/Gadamer: The picture captures the peculiar openness in which experience is acquired, in this or that, suddenly, unpredictably and yet not unprepared, and from then on valid until new experience, i.e. not only determining this or that, but everything of this kind. It is this generality of experience through which, according to Aristotle, the true generality of the concept and the possibility of science comes about. The picture thus illustrates how the unprincipled generality of experience (the sequence of experience) leads to the unity of the arché (arché = "command" and "principle"). |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Unity | Millikan | I 286 Unity/uniformity/identity/principles/Millikan: The problem of unity has nothing to do with the problem of identity, but is often confused with it. Identity: is objective in nature Uniformity: is more conventional, governed by principles. >Principle, >Identity/Millikan, >Convention. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Unity | Peirce | Frank I 163 Unity/Peirce: the unity of inference is simply the unity of the object that is at issue in the end.(1) >Uniformity, >Conclusion, >Inferences. 1. Ch. S. Peirce, MS 637, Semiotische Schriften, Frankfurt 1992. |
Peir I Ch. S. Peirce Philosophical Writings 2011 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Welfare State | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 210 Welfare state/Political philosophy/Moon: Some of the programmes of the welfare state, such as public schools and old age pensions, were first developed in the nineteenth century, but what might be called the 'institutional' welfare state did not fully emerge until after World War Il, when most democratic countries adopted a more or less integrated range of programmes of welfare provision and policies of economic management. The institutional welfare state is characterized by a range of programmes designed to meet different needs and to provide security against various contingencies. >Institutions, >Institutionalism, >Education, >Education Policy, >Welfare economics. Brian Barry: At least as an ideal, as Brian Barry (1990)(1) points out, the institutional welfare state would not even require a general safety net, since specialized programmes would cover all of the different conditions that prevent people from meeting their needs. In reality, of course, there will always be some who fall between the cracks, and so the welfare state must have a programme of 'social assistance' to cover residual cases. The emergence of the institutional welfare state is reflected in the enormous growth of government expenditures to finance its programmes, both in absolute terms and in relation to national income. In the UK, for example, social expenditure increased from less than 6 percent of GNP in 1920 to 25 percent in 1996—7 (Barr, 1998(2): 171). Political theories on welfare state: tional frameworks. Students of the welfare state have offered a variety of classifications of welfare regimes, and disagree among themselves even about whether particular countries (notably, the US) even qualify as welfare states. Some students of welfare politics emphasize the difference between selective and universal welfare states (e.g. Rothstein, 1998)(3); others discern liberal, corporatist, and social democratic regimes (e.g. Esping- Andersen, 1990)(4); while yet others distinguish among social democratic, Christian democratic, liberal, and wage-earner welfare states (Huber and Stephens, 2001)(5). More philosophically oriented theorists place the welfare state in the context of different traditions of political thought, and differ- ent ideals and/or patterns of justification. Thus, some discuss the minimal state and the arguments for and against it (e.g. Nozick, 1974(6); Schmidtz and Goodin, 1998(7)); others consider the 'residual' versus the 'institutional' welfare state (e.g. Barry, 1999)(8); yet others find four distinct strands, laissez-faire, feminism, socialism, and Fabianism (Clarke, Cochrane and Smart, 1987(9)). While most recognize that class is a major concern of the welfare state, an increasing number of theorists see that gender is at least as important (Gordon, 1990(10); Fraser, 1997(11)). Cf. >Minimal State. Moon: As a political formation the welfare state tends todivide theorists who in other respects share a view Gaus I 211 of politics. Thus, defenders and critics of the welfare state include people who identify themselves as (inter alia) >conservatives, >liberals, >communitarians, >socialists, and postmodernists, and so both its critics and its defenders find themselves with strange allies and opponents. Common features: In spite of the great variability mentioned above, welfare states share important features; four of the most important are a democratic political system, a largely private market economy, a wide range of public programmes that provide monetary support or services as a matter of right, and an active role for the state in managing the economy to dampen the business cycle and to regulate economic activities. Efficiency: (...) many welfare services are provided through market transactions, such as the purchase of life or medical insurance. Why, then, should the state be involved in providing welfare, either directly in the form of specific services (such as health care or education) or in the form of resources or income to enable people to meet their own needs? Government programmes, after all, both involve an element of coercion and impose uniformity. Gaus I 212 Market: The alternative to state provision is often taken be the market, where profit-seeking firms provide consumers with goods and services. But this is an oversimplification, as families and voluntary associations also lay key roles. Private provision: The rise of the welfare state with its compulsory programmes has led to the demise of many of these voluntary associations and private firms reducing citizens' autonomy and imposing uniformity on them. The more extensive the welfare state, the more it has displaced other welfare institutions.* Efficiency: One reason for substituting state for private provision is that state provision (either of services or of resources) can sometimes be more effective than private provision, either because it can provide services or resources more cheaply, or because private provision is incapable of providing an optimal (or even adequate) level of services. For Problems: see >Market failure, >Public goods. For a Minimal welfare state: >Welfare state/Friedman. Gaus I 214 Distributional justice: A second line of argument supporting the welfare state appeals to the idea of justice rather than efficiency. The policies of the welfare state do not simply make it possible for individuals to realize their own interests more effectively, but generally redistribute income. Efficiency-based arguments normally take the outcome produced by market exchange, prior to governmental taxation and transfers, as their baseline, and show that a particular policy can at least in principle make everyone better off than they would be given that baseline. But to the extent that welfare policies deliberately redistribute income, those whose income goes down would normally (though not necessarily) be worse off; such policies could be justified, then, only by invoking values other than efficiency. >Distributive justice/welfare economics. VsEfficency-based approaches: (...) the appeal to e Iciency is itself problematic, in as much as the pretax/pretransfer baseline it takes for granted must be justified. There are some risks which we face, when we think of our lives taken as a whole, that cannot be covered by any form of private provision, because they reflect conditions into which we are born, such as congenital handicaps, genetic predispositions to certain diseases, and the cultural and economic disadvantages one's parents may suffer. >Distributive justice/Welfare economics. * See Paul (1997)(12), particularly the articles by Beito, Davies, and the references cited therein for an account of non-state forms of welfare. 1. Barry, Brian (1990) 'The welfare state versus the relief of poverty'. Ethics, 100 (June): 503-29. 2. Barr, Nicholas (1998) The Economics of the Welfare State, 3rd edn. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 3. Rothstein, Bo (1998) Just Institutions Matter. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 4. Esping-Andersen, Gosta (1990) Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Umversity Press. 5. Huber, Evelyne and John D. Stephens (2001 ) Development and Crisis of the Welfare State. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 6. Nozick, Robert (1974) Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Oxford: Blackwell. 7. Schmidtz, David and Robert Goodin (1998) Social Welfare and Individual Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge Umversity Press. 8. Barry, Norman (1999) Welfare, 2nd edn. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 9. Clarke, John, Allan Cochrane and Carol Smart (1987) Ideologies of Welfare. London: Hutchinson. 10. Gordon, Linda, ed. (1990), Women, State, and Welfare. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. 11. Fraser, Nancy (1997) Justice Interruptus. New York: Routledge. 12. Paul, Ellen, ed. (1997) The Welfare State. Cambridge: Cambridge Umversity Press. Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications Mause I 579ff Welfare State/Political Theories: given the empirical diversity of the structure of the welfare state in the various countries, one must assume that one is dealing with a mixed system in the specific case of an examined country. The term welfare state is criticized as conservative. (Schmidt 2005) (1). For the division into system types see Esping-Andersen 1990(2) and 1999(3). Mause I 581 History of the welfare state: the oldest strand of comparative welfare research used key socio-economic variables such as the state of economic development, the spread of employees in the non-agricultural sector ("employment rate") and other concepts of macro-sociological modernisation. (Customs officer 1963 (4); Wilensky 1975 (5). Functionalistic explanations: here we are concerned, among other things, with the diffusion of social policy effects across territorial borders, e.g. social learning (Hall 1993) (6). Garbage can theory: this is about the contingent interaction of political processes, one example being the multiple streams approach. (Kingdon 1984)(7). Newer approaches, on the other hand, focused on concepts such as power, conflict and institutions and examined decision-making processes. Party Difference Thesis/Hibbs: (Hibbs 1977) (8): The party-political composition of governments is significantly reflected in internationally and historically variable levels of social expenditure. (Castles 1982 (9); Schmidt 2005 ) 1. Manfred G. Schmidt, Sozialpolitik in Deutschland. Historische Entwicklung und internationaler Vergleich, Wiesbaden 2005 2. Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1990. The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Princeton 1990. 3. Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. Social foundations of postindustrial economies. Oxford 1999. 4. Zöllner, Detlev. Öffentliche Sozialleistungen und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung. Ein zeitlicher und internationaler Vergleich. Berlin 1963. 5. Wilensky, Harold L. 1975. The welfare state and equality. Structural and ideological roots of public expenditures. Berkeley 1975. 6. Peter A. Hall, 1993. Policy paradigms, social learning, and the state. The case of economic policymaking in Britain. Comparative Politics 25( 3): 275– 296. 7. Kingdon, John W., Agendas, alternatives, and public policies. Boston/ Toronto 1984. 8. Hibbs, Douglas A. 1977. Political parties and macroeconomic policy. American Political Science Review 71: 1467– 1487. 9. Castles, Francis G. The impact of parties on public expenditure. In The impact of parties: Politics and policies in democratic capitalist states, Hrsg. Francis G. Castles, 21– 96. London 1982. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aristotle | Simons Vs Aristotle | I 241 Primordial Matter/SimonsVsAristotle: the primordial matter fell from grace because of Aristotle who brought together the following two concepts: a) the substrate of change (change) and b) the carrier of properties. VsAristotle: it was an unhappy (perhaps metaphorical) formulation of "withdrawing" all attributes (shape) of the things to obtain them pure, that means as formless matter which only potentially cannot exist for real. Simons: but we do not have to bring a) and b) together. Primordial Matter/Simons: the primordial matter may well have its own special characteristics. Pro Aristotle: if we follow the chain downwards we already recognize that more and more characteristics are lost and that the micro-objects become simpler. Diversity/tradition/Simons: diversity was explained by the combination options of simpler building blocks. That would come to an end with a basic building block. Then you could explain all the qualities by relations between the constituents. This can already be found in the Tractatus. Foundation Stones/Tractatus/Simons: (2.0231-2): foundation stones are colorless. Simons: but the foundation stones have quite characteristics, even the objects of the Tractatus are not bare particulars, but their properties are modal (if they are to be essential and internally (internal) or if they are accidentally real (Tractatus 2.0233). I 291 Sum/mereology/Simons: there are even sums across the categories (mixed-categorical sums): e.g. a body and the events that happen to it ((s) its life story!). SimonsVsFour Dimensionalism: a sum is also more evidently understood than this four-dimensional block. Universal Realism/Simons: universal realism could construct individual things with properties as a sum of concrete carriers and abstract characteristics. Simons: these examples are at least not arbitrary. Whole/Wholeness/Simons: the whole appears to be equally arbitrary definition dependent (SimonsVsWholeness, Vs German Philosophy Between The World Wars). I 292 Whole/Aristotle/Simons: the whole seems to require inner relations towards a sum. Inner Relations/whole/Aristotle: e.g.: continuity, firmness, uniformity, qualitative equality, to be of the same type, to be made of the same matter. This includes species and genera. SimonsVsAristotle: the list is merely impressionistic and does not mention the most important relation: causation. Husserl/Simons: Husserl discusses the most Aristotelian problems, without mentioning his name. Def "pregnant whole"/Husserl: the "pregnant whole" is an object whose parts are connected by relation foundation (>Foundation/Husserl, Foundation/Simons). Foundation/Husserl/terminology/Simons: a foundation can be roughly described as ontological dependence (oD). Substance/tradition/Simons: the substance is (sort of) ontologically independent. Ontological Dependence/oD/Simons: to have a substantial part is ontological dependent. I 318 Independence/ontology/Simons: where independence is seen as positive (dependent objects are then those of a 2nd class) - as such many times in philosophy (rather theology) - is about the existence of God. Substance/Aristotle: the substance is a very weak form of independence. Def primary: primary ist, what can be without other things while other things cannot exist without it. SimonsVsAristotle: that is not accurate enough. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Berkeley, G. | Chisholm Vs Berkeley, G. | II 33 Def Immanence/Rutte: E.g. Berkeley: the concept of real external thing is absurd, because this would mean wanting to grasp the idea of an imaginary thing not thought of by anyone. (Contradiction). VsBerkeley: confusion between "not thought of" with "thought independent". Reality/Verification/Berkeley: experiences and their courses are reviewing instances for the assumption of external things. There are no specific experiences for such reviews. We can make the same predictions when denying the outside world. We cannot appeal to any other instance than our order of experience. II 34 In order to show that things are causes we would have to be able to show that we could have an experience of the external things without our experiences. But this is impossible. The same experience might exist if there were no external things. BerkeleyVsRealism: that makes realism obsolete! VsBerkeley: the same is also true of spiritualism, which Berkeley does not seem to see! (The fact that it is as superfluous as realism). II 35 Analytical philosophy/ Philosophy of language/Rutte: the language-analytical counterpart to realism is the assumption that we have learned on the basis of criteria to distinguish perception from illusion: without criteria we could not learn it. BerkeleyVs: such criteria do not exist! VsBerkeley: then we cannot even make the distinction by concepts between a perception of external things and a total hallucination! Berkeley himself already presupposes this conceptual distinction! ((s) Why?). (Rutte: elsewhere Berkeley already sees the concept of external things as absurd, but not here). Berkeley: needs no criteria, since we will never learn this distinction anyway. VsBerkeley: nevertheless this distinction can be thought in a meaningful way. The concepts "experience" and "subject-independent" are available to everyone. They can be made explicit without referring to a specific perceptual situation. III 36 RationalismVsBerkeley/Rutte: the representatives of reason can point out that de facto such a decision situation does not exist: we believe in the outside world from the start. Hume: has referred to a similar natural belief with view to the even more fundamental question of the uniformity of the world. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Coherence Theory | Feyerabend Vs Coherence Theory | I 39 Consistency/FeyerabendVsCoherence Theory/Consistency/Feyerabend: the consistency condition according to which new hypotheses must be consistent with accepted theories is unreasonable. Theory diversity is fruitful for science, uniformity paralyzes its critical power. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Harré, H.R. | Nozick Vs Harré, H.R. | II 121 Inegalitarian Theories/IGT/Inegalitarianism/Existence/Explanation/Nozick: IGT: they assume that a situation or a small number of states are privileged or natural, and therefore require no explanation, while other states or situations have to be explained as deviations from them. E.g. Newton considered idleness or uniformity of movement of the natural state, and everything else had to be explained by the assumption of forces. Aristotle: Idleness. Nozick: but that is not limited to theories of motion. (Footnote). IGT: distinguish two classes of states or situations: 1) those requiring an explanation 2) those that do not need an explanation, and do not allow one! IGT: are particularly suitable for questions such as: "why does X exist and Y not?" That also means that there is rather a non-N state (not nothing) than an N state. IGT: leave two questions unanswered: 1) Why should N be the natural state, and not perhaps a different species, a species N'? 2) Given N be the natural state, why are there forces that are assumed to be F and should provide deviations, and not other forces, perhaps '? Natural State/Nozick: to assuming something as nZ also means attributing a specific content to it! But here one should be careful with a priori arguments in favor of certain content. II 122 Declaration/R.Harré: Thesis: that something remains the same does not need to be explained: that is the most fundamental principle. (1970, p 248) NozickVsHarré: But do we not need an explanation of why one thing is considered as the same for the purposes of this principle, but another is not? The principle is trivialized if we say that what is always assumed as not needing no explanation, is thought to be constant with respect to a set of concepts that are fitting. ((s) circular). IGT: the question of "Why is there something and not rather nothing?" is set against the backdrop of an assumed IGT. If there was nothing, the question would have to be asked just as well (even there were nobody to ask it). "Why is there nothing instead of something?" Problem: then any causal factor that is in question for the nothing is itself a deviation from nothing! Then there can be no explanation as to why these forces F exist which does not introduce these Fs itself as explanatory factors (circular). II 123 Nothing/Nozick: now we might assume that there is a special force that produces nothingness, a "nothinging power". In the film "Yellow Submarine" there is a vacuum cleaner that absorbs everything and also absorbs itself in the end. Then there is a "pop" and a multicolored scenery emerges. According to this view, nothingness has produced something by destroying itself. Nozick: perhaps nothingness only destroys a little and still leaves room for a force for real nothing. Let us imagine a nothinging force that operates at an angle of 45°, and alternative stronger and weaker forces ...+... II 124 the nothinging force will eventually take over itself and slow itself down or this is somehow prevented... Problem: even if there was an original nothinging force, the question is still, at which point it became effective and at what angle it operated! Somehow, a 45° curve seems less random, but that is only because of our representation system: on logarithmic graph paper it looks completely random! |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Idealism | Davidson Vs Idealism | Horwich I 449 Davidson/Rorty: can he be attributed (1) - (4)? He often asserted (3), but (4) does not seem to suit him, because he is a "realist". (2) also sounds alien to him. (see above): Theses of pragmatism/Rorty: 1) "truth" has no explanatory use 2) We understand everything about the relation belief world if we understand the causal relation with the world. Our knowledge about the use of "about" and "true of" is a spin-off of a naturalistic access to linguistic behavior. 3) There is no relation of "true-making" or "true-makers". 4) There is no dispute between realism and anti-realism, because this is based on the empty and misleading assumptios that beliefs are "made true". Rorty: although Davidson does not seem to be a pragmatist because of its proximity to Tarski, I think that one can attribute all four pragmatist theses to him. Correspondence/Davidson/Rorty: Thesis: the approach about the field linguists (radical interpretation) is everything that Davidson thinks is needed to understand correspondence. Language game/External/RI/Davidson: the position of the field linguist is the only one that makes it possible to position oneself outside of the language game. He tries to make sense of our linguistic behavior. In that, it is asked how the external observer uses the word "true". ((s) then you would have to ask whether the external language game really contains the situation as an internal language game.) DavidsonVsIdealism: metaphysical and seeks ontological uniformity, hopeless DavidsonVsPhysicalism: hopes to discover such a homogeneity in the future.) Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Lewis, D. | Armstrong Vs Lewis, D. | Armstrong III 70 Def Law of Nature/LoN/Lewis: Iff it occurs as a theorem (or axiom) in each of the true deductive systems that unites the best combination of simplicity and strength. Armstrong: "each" is important: Suppose we had L3 and L4 (see E.g. above), both as a law, but both support incompatible counterfactual conditionals. Lewis: then there is no third law. ArmstrongVsLewis: that seems wrong. III 71 The least evil would be to say that an involuntary choice must be made between L3 or L4 as the third law. The price for this is the discovery that in some possible situations the view of Ramsey Lewis does not offer an involuntary response. This may not be a problem for Lewis: Law/Lewis: "vague and difficult concept". ArmstrongVsLewis: if one does not assume the regularity theory, there is a precise distinction between laws and non-laws. Vs Systematic approach/VsRamsey/VsLewis: pro: it is as they say, the manifestations of LoN can be singled out of the Humean uniformities. But: This is not a necessary truth. Their criterion is not part of our concept of LoN. ArmstrongVsLewis: it is logically possible that the uniformities (unif.) in an arbitrarily chosen subclass are manifestations of LoN, while the unif. in the residue class are purely coincidental unif... It is logically possible that every Humean uniformity is the manifestation of a LoN, that none is a manifestation or that any other subclass is this class of manifestations of LoN. Schwarz I 94 Def properties/Lewis: having a property means being a member of a class. ArmstrongVsLewis/Problem/Schwarz: you cannot explain "red" by saying that its bearer is the element of such and such a class. ((s) either, it is circular, or it misses the property, because the object (bearer) can also belong to other classes. E.g. the fact that a tomato is red is not due to the fact that it is an element of the class of red things, but vice versa.) Armstrong 1978a(1), 2,5,2,7) Schw I 95 LewisVsVs: Unlike other representatives of the universals theory, Lewis does not want to explain what it means or why it is that things have the properties that they have. Explanation/Lewis: proper explanations don’t speak of elementness. (1997c(2), 1980b(3)). However, there can be no general explanation of having properties or predication! Because the explanation has to contain predicates if it were circular. Therefore, "Having a property" is not a relation. But there is nothing more to be said about it, either. (2002a(4), 6,1983c(5): 20 24,1998b(6), 219). E.g. "A is F" is to be generally true, because A has this and that relationship with the property F: here, "A is in this and that relationship with the property F" would have to be true again, because A and F are in this and that relation with "having this and that relation", etc. 1. David M. Armstrong [1978a]: Universals and Scientific Realism I: Nominalism & Realism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2. David Lewis [1997c]: “Naming the Colours”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75: 325–342. 3. David Lewis [1980b]: “Mad Pain andMartian Pain”. In Ned Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology Bd.1, Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 216–222 4. David Lewis [2002a]: “Tensing the Copula”. Mind, 111: 1–13 5. David Lewis [1983d]: Philosophical Papers I . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 6. David Lewis [1998b]: “A World of Truthmakers?” Times Literary Supplement , 4950: 30. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Millikan Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 215 descriptive/referential/denotation/classification/Millikan: you can force a descriptive denotation to work referentially, Ex "He said that the winner was the loser." Ex (Russell) "I thought your yacht was larger than it is." I 216 Solution: "the winner" and "larger than your Yacht" must be regarded as classified according to the adjusted (adapted) sense. On the other hand: "The loser" probably has only descriptive of meaning. "Your Yacht" is classified by both: by adjusted and by relational sense, only "your" is purely referential. Quine: (classic example) Ex "Phillip believes that the capital of Honduras is in Nicaragua." MillikanVsQuine: according to Quine that's not obviously wrong. It can be read as true if "capital of Honduras" has relational sense in that context. referential/descriptive/attribution of belief/intentional/Millikan: there are exceptions, where the expressions do not work descriptively, nor purely referential, but also by relational sense or intension. Ex "the man who us drove home" is someone the speaker and hearer know very well. Then the hearer must assume that someone else is meant because the name is not used. Rule: here the second half of the rule for intentional contexts is violated, "use whichever expression that preserves the reference". This is often a sign that the first half is violated, "a sign has not only reference but also sense or intension, which must be preserved. Why else use such a complicated designation ("the man who drove us home"), instead of the name? Ortcutt/Ralph/spy/Quine/Millikan: Ex there is a man with a brown hat that Ralph has caught a glimpse of. Ralph assumes he is a spy. a) Ralph believes that the man he has caught a glimpse of is a spy. I 217 b) Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is a spy. Millikan: The underlined parts are considered relational, b) is more questionable than a) because it is not clear whether Ralph has explicitly perceived him as wearing a brown hat. Quine: In addition, there is a gray-haired man that Ralph vaguely knows as a pillar of society, and that he is unaware of having seen, except once at the beach. c) Ralph believes that the man he saw on the beach is a spy. Millikan: that's for sure relational. As such, it will not follow from a) or b). Quine: adds only now that Ralph does not know this, but the two men are one and the same. d) Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is not a spy. Now this is just wrong. Question: but what about e) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy. f) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is not a spy. Quine: only now Quine tells us the man's name (which Ralph is unaware of). Millikan: Ex Jennifer, an acquaintance of Samuel Clemens, does not know that he is Mark Twain. I 218 She says: "I would love to meet Mark Twain" and not "I'd love to meet Samuel Clemens". language-dependent: here, "Mark Twain" is classified dependent on language. So also language bound intensions are not always irrelevant for intentional contexts. It had o be language-bound here to make it clear that the name itself is substantial, and also that it is futile to assume that she would have said she wanted to meet Samuel Clemens. Ralph/Quine/Millikan: Quine assumes that Ralph has not only two internal names for Ortcutt, but only one of them is linked to the external name Ortcutt. Millikan: Description: Ex you and I are watching Ralph, who is suspiciously observing Ortcutt standing behind a bush with a camera (surely he just wants to photograph cobwebs). Ralph did not recognize Ortcutt and you think: Goodness, Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy ". Pointe: in this context, the sentence is true! ((S) Because the name "Ortcutt" was given by us, not by Ralph). referential/Millikan: Solution: "Ortcutt" is classified here as referential. referential/Millikan. Ex "Last Halloween Susi actually thought, Robert (her brother) was a ghost." ((S) She did not think of Robert, nor of her brother, that he was a ghost, but that she had a ghost in front of her). MillikanVsQuine: as long as no one has explicitly asked or denied that Tom knows that Cicero is Tullius, the two attributions of belief "Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline" and "... Tullius ..." are equivalent! Language-bound intension/Millikan: is obtained only if the context makes it clear what words were used, or which public words the believer has as implicit intentions. Fully-developed (language-independent) intension/Millikan: for them the same applies if they are kept intentionally: I 219 Ex "The natives believe that Hesperus is a God and Phosphorus is a devil." But: Pointe: It is important that the intrinsic function of a sentence must be maintained when one passes to intentional contexts. That is the reason that in attribution of belief one cannot simply replace "Cicero is Tullius" by "Cicero is Cicero". ((S) trivial/non-trivial identity). Stabilizing function/statement of identity/Millikan: the stabilizing function is that the listener translates "A" and "B" into the same internal term. Therefore, the intrinsic function of "Cicero is Cicero" is different from that of "Cicero is Tullius". Since the intrinsic function is different one can not be used for the other in intentional contexts. Eigenfunction: Ex "Ortcutt is a spy and not a spy": has the Eigenfunkion to be translated into an internal sentence that has a subject and two predicates. No record of this form can be found in Ralph's head. Therefore one can not say that Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy and not a spy you. I 299 Non-contradiction/Millikan: the test is also a test of our ability to identify something and whether our concepts represent what they are supposed to project. MillikanVsQuine: but this is not about establishing "conditions for identity". And also not about "shared reference" ("the same apple again"). This is part of the problem of uniformity, not identity. It is not the problem to decide how an exclusive class should be split up. I 300 Ex deciding when red ends and orange begins. Instead, it's about learning to recognize Ex red under different circumstances. Truth/accuracy/criterion/Quine/Millikan: for Quine a criterion for right thinking seems to be that the relationship to a stimulus can be predicted. MillikanVsQuine: but how does learning to speak in unison facilitate the prediction? Agreement/MillikanVsQuine/MillikanVsWittgenstein: both are not aware of what agreement in judgments really is: it is not to speak in unison. If you do not say the same, that does not mean that one does not agree. Solution/Millikan: agreement is to say the same about the same. Mismatch: can arise only if sentences have subject-predicate structure and negation is permitted. One-word sentence/QuineVsFrege/Millikan: Quine goes so far as to allow "Ouch!" as a sentence. He thinks the difference between word and sentence in the end only concernes the printer. Negation/Millikan: the negation of a sentence is not proven by lack of evidence, but by positive facts (supra). Contradiction/Millikan: that we do not agree to a sentence and its negation simultaneously lies in nature (natural necessity). I 309 Thesis: lack of Contradiction is essentially based on the ontological structure of the world. agreement/MillikanVsWittgenstein/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: both do not see the importance of the subject-predicate structure with negation. Therefore, they fail to recognize the importance of the agreement in the judgment. agreement: this is not about two people getting together, but that they get together with the world. agreement/mismatch/Millikan: are not two equally likely possibilities ((s) > inegalitarian theory/Nozick.) There are many more possibilities for a sentence to be wrong, than for the same sentence to be true. Now, if an entire pattern (system) of coinciding judgments appears that represent the same area (for example color) the probability that each participant reflects an area in the world outside is stupendous. ((s) yes - but not that they mean the same thing). Ex only because my judgments about the passage of time almost always matches with those of others, I have reason to believe that I have the ability to classify my memories correctly in the passage of time. Objectivity/time/perspective/mediuma/communication/Millikan: thesis: the medium that other people form by their remarks is the most accessible perspective for me that I can have in terms of time. I 312 Concept/law/theory/test/verification/Millikan: when a concept appears in a law, it is necessary I 313 to test it along with other concepts. These concepts are linked according to certain rules of inference. Concept/Millikan: because concepts consist of intensions, it is the intensions that have to be tested. Test: does not mean, however, that the occurrence of sensual data would be predicted. (MillikanVsQuine). Theory of sensual data/today/Millikan: the prevailing view seems to be, thesis: that neither an internal nor an external language actually describes sensual data, except that the language depends on the previous concepts of external things that usually causes the sensual data. I 314 Forecast/prediction/to predict/prognosis/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: we project the world to inhabit it, not to predict it. If predictions are useful, at least not from experiences in our nerve endings. Confirmation/prediction/Millikan: A perceptual judgment implies mainly itself Ex if I want to verify that this container holds one liter, I don't have to be able to predict that the individual edges have a certain length.That is I need not be able to predict any particular sensual data. I 317 Theory/Verification/Test/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: is it really true that all concepts must be tested together? Tradition says that not just a few, but most of our concepts are not of things that we observe directly, but of other things. Test/logical form/Millikan: if there is one thing A, which is identified by observing effects on B and C, isn't then the validity of the concepts of B and C tested together with the theory that ascribes the observed effects onto the influence of A, tested together with the concept of A? Millikan. No! From the fact that my intension of A goes back to intensions of B and C does not follow that the validity of the concepts, that govern B and C, is tested when the concept that governs A is tested and vice versa. Namely, it does not follow, if A is a specific denotation Ex "the first President of the United States" and it also does not follow, if the explicit intention of A represents something causally dependent. Ex "the mercury in the thermometer rose to mark 70" as intension of "the temperature was 70 degrees." I 318 Concept/Millikan: concepts are abilities - namely the ability to recognize something as self-identical. Test/Verification: the verifications of the validity of my concepts are quite independent of each other: Ex my ability to make a good cake is completely independent of my ability to break up eggs, even if I have to break up eggs to make the cake. Objectivity/objective reality/world/method/knowledge/Millikan: we obtain a knowledge of the outside world by applying different methods to obtain a result. Ex different methods of temperature measurement: So we come to the conclusion that temperature is something real. I 321 Knowledge/context/holism/Quine/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: doesn't all knowledge depend on "collateral information", as Quine calls it? If all perception is interwoven with general theories, how can we test individual concepts independently from the rest? Two Dogmas/Quine/Millikan. Thesis: ~ "Our findings about the outside world do not stand individually before the tribunal of experience, but only as a body." Therefore: no single conviction is immune to correction. Test/Verification/MillikanVsHolismus/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: most of our beliefs never stand before the tribunal of experience. I 322 Therefore, it is unlikely that such a conviction is ever supported or refuted by other beliefs. Confirmation: single confirmation: by my ability to recognize objects that appear in my attitudes. From convictions being related does not follow that the concepts must be related as well. Identity/identification/Millikan: epistemology of identity is a matter of priority before the epistemology of judgments. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Steady State Theory | Barrow Vs Steady State Theory | I 330 Cosmological Principle/Barrow: the average non-uniformity should become smaller the larger the space that is overlooked in outer space. Covariance of the laws of nature. But this is only true on a very large scale, which even surpasses that of the galaxies. The "perfect cosmological principle" of steady-state theory demands that the universe not only looks the same everywhere but also at all times. I 331 VsSteady state theory/SST: if we take the average density as a clock, the past differs radically from the present: it had a high density, the present a low density. Consistency can only be maintained if new matter is constantly created everywhere. (>Kanitscheider, Kosmologie, Stuttgart 1991, pp. 161f, 289f). |
B I John D. Barrow Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996 B II John D. Barrow The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988 German Edition: Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993 B III John D. Barrow Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001 |
| Tradition | Putnam Vs Tradition | Nozick II 261 Proof/hypotheses/Nozick: the connection is conditional (subjunktivisch), and thus a real relation in the world. Tradition instead sees a logical connection therein. That is, if it exists at all, it is of necessity. PutnamVsTradition: such a view assumes (unrealistically) that proof is assessed by an ideal theory. Nozick: whether e is a testament to h, depends on what other theories we accept that relate e and h. II. 262 Can't we simply treat "evidence of" as a formal logical relation by making the background theories explicit? Vs: 1. It is not clear whether the background theories include the counterfactual conditionals. 2. where are they to be installed? If into the proof, then there will be an e' etc. (recourse). Also, if the background theories apply and thus the relations between e and h are secured, the background theories may in turn be embedded in a wider context ... (FN 90). Contingency: counterfactual conditional is not adequately treated by the two relativities of inductive logic: 1. that probability is relative to the evidence, and 2. that there must be a principle of total evidence, which is applied to the probability statements. Def evidence/Nozick: Another attempt made by inductive logicians: the data e are proof for what they explain. (FN 91). NozickVs: there are many examples of evidence relations that are not explanatory. Ex lightning is a proof that the bang of thunder will follow, but none explains the other. Ex a symptom of a particular disease is evidence of the presence of other symptoms, but none explains the other. Each is explained by a third. II 263 Nevertheless, if there is a statistical law, then each is evidence of the other. Nozick: but that does not depend on the formal properties of e, but on deeper theories. But aren't there very general contingent truths, by virtue of which conditional or statistical relations between statements apply? Ex Keynes' principle of limited variance or principles of the uniformity of nature can be viewed as an attempt to establish something like that. (FN 92). |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
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| Unity | Fraassen, B. van | I 211 Fraassen s thesis: the greater uniformity will be the truer one! |
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| Propos. Attitudes | Lewis, D. | IV X Thesis: properties are the appropriate objects of settings. IV 135 1. Thesis defense: when propositions explain attitudes, so do properties as objects. Since I mean properties in a broader sense, this thesis is not very bold. Relation: there is a one-to-one relationship between all propositions and some properties. IV 136 Because of the one-to-one relationship, no information is lost and no information is gained. 2. Thesis: sometimes properties explain attitudes, but propositions do not! Because all P and only some E are affected, the following applies: if a property belongs to some but not to all inhabitants of a world, it does not correspond to any proposition and cannot replace any propositional object! But if we ignore objects and look at the corresponding properties, we can extend the approach: we can also allow properties other than objects for settings, without losing the uniformity of the object category. |
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