Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Experience | Stalnaker | I 219 Inner experiences/Wittgenstein/Stalnaker: 1. Wittgenstein is skeptical about the inner experience. 2. VerificationismVsInternalism. >VerificationismVsinternalism. Cf. >Inner objects, >Mentalism, >Mental Objects. Example: Inverted Spectra/Stalnaker: If this were possible, how could we report about it? Both persons (one of whom would have reversed spectra) would call red things red. The only thing that would be different would be the inner experiences, experiences that we cannot even compare because we are not in the position to do so. Recently the problem is being taken more seriously again. This raises above all problems of VsFunctionalism and VsMaterialism. It has consequences for the notion of mind, or that of consciousness and intentionality. >Inverted spectra/Stalnaker, >Other Minds, >Functionalism. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Functionalism | Stalnaker Vs Functionalism | I 219 Inverted spectra/inverted qualia//Stalnaker: if that were possible how could we talk about it? Both persons (of whom one would have a reversed spectra) would call red things red. The only thing that would be different would be the inner experiences, experiences that we cannot compare because we are not in a position to do so. Lately the problem is taken more seriously again. This raises problems especially VsFunctionalism and VsMaterialism. It has consequences for the concept of mind or the consciousness and intentionality. VsInner experiences/Stalnaker: 1. Wittgenstein is skeptical about them. 2. VerificationismVsInternalism. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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