Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 15 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Culture | Humboldt | Gadamer I 445 Culture/World/Language/Humboldt/Gadamer: Humboldt: (...) Humboldt once said that the learning of a foreign language must be the acquisition of a new point of view in the previous world view, and continues: "Just because one always, more or less, transfers one's own world view, yes, one's own language view into a foreign language, this success is not felt purely and completely"(1). No matter how much you put yourself in a foreign mind, you don't forget your own world view, even your own language view. Rather, the other world that confronts us there is not only a foreign world, insofar as it is relationally different. It has not only its own truth in itself, but also its own truth for us. The other world that is experienced there is not simply an object of exploration, of knowing oneself and knowing what is going on. Cf. >Sapir-Whorf thesis, >Relativism, >Cultural relativism, >Understanding, >Language acquisition, >Language/Humboldt. 1. W. von Humboldt, „Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaus ..“ (first printed in 1836), § 9. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Everyday Language | Fodor | II 126 Anomalies/deviation/irregularities/intuition/everyday language/Fodor/FodorVsCavell: it is not about explaining anomalies by intuitions. Instead: specifying the relevant similarity means exactly determining the rules of creation (>Rules). --- III 234 Everyday language/distinction/perception/use/FodorVsCavell: it is not true that we have different words for each perceived difference, e.g. for shapes, colors, sizes, sounds, etc. Then, from the absence of certain words does not follow that we do not perceive the corresponding difference ((s)> Whorf) Fodor: then, when requesting a distinction, you cannot fall back on the actual use of language. > FodorVsUse Theory: here, you need philosophy, not empiricism. >Empiricism, >Use theory, >Meaning, >Language Behavior, >Colour, >Form. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Incommensurability | Putnam | III 161f Incommensurability/Putnam: even before Kuhn the following could be found in Saussure: basic units of language cannot be determined from the sounds. Whorf: if individual languages have many quite different color predicates, then the meaning is reserved for individual languages. > Idiolect. DerridaVsWhorf: the meanings are not only individual languages but reserved for the individual texts. > Deconstruction. DerridaVsSaussure: the concept of the sign can be completely forgotten. PutnamVsDerrida: Derrida misunderstands Saussure's project of a theory of meaning. >Sign/Derrida, >Sign/Saussure. III 165 Solution/Putnam: the solution is to maintain the concept of meaning equality, but realizing that it may not be understood as in the sense of self-identity of objects and signified. PutnamVsDerrida (HowVsFodor): "meaning equality" is interest relative, and presupposes a normative judgment on rationality in a situation. --- V 157 Incommensurabilityy/PutnamVsFeyerabend: it is contradictory to state, Galileo's concepts are incommensurable and then to describe them in detail afterwards. One must also understand the old language to be able to say that the predictions are identical. >Meaning change. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Language | Feyerabend | I 295 Language/Whorf/Feyerabend: (Anticipated by Bacon): Thesis: Languages and the behavioral patterns associated with them are not mere means to describe events, but they also constitute events (facts). Whorf/Feyerabend: Thesis: the the "linguistic background system" (grammar) in every language is not merely a productive system for the formulation of thoughts, but forms the thoughts itself. >Sapir-Whorf thesis. I 296 Whorf/Feyerabend: there is a knowledge of "latent classifications" (male/female), intuitive, which can be more rational than manifest ones. Even a phoneme can take over distinct semantic functions. E.g. [th] occurs in English mainly in the definite article. This creates a psychic resistance against this sound in made-up words: (for example, "thob"), it is "instinctively" assigned the unvoiced th sound as in "think". But that is not an instinct. It is the "linguistic report". A formal linguistic group can be related to a chain of events, a formal class turns into a semantic one. In the course of time, it subordinates itself to a basic idea and draws other, semantically fitting words. A formal group becomes a semantic group. I 311 Style/Feyerabend: one must not overlook the possibility that a style provides an accurate representation of the world as seen by the artist and his contemporaries. Perhaps people at that time really did feel like a puppet. This would, however, be a realistic interpretation. It would correspond to Whorf's thesis that languages are not just a means of describing events, but they also shape events. VsWhorf: it seems, however, that there were indeed technical means in place to make "more realistic" art. They seem to have been abandoned intentionally! If that is true, then the influence of style (or language) on cosmology and perceptions requires additional arguments. It is not self-evident. These additional arguments (which can never be mandatory) are related to similar circumstances in other areas. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Language | Humboldt | Gadamer I 442 Language/Humboldt/Gadamer: Modern thinking about language since Herder and Humboldt (...) wants to study how the naturalness of human language - an insight laboriously wrested from rationalism and orthodoxy - unfolds in the breadth of experience of the diversity of human language construction. In recognizing an organism in every language, it seeks to study, in comparative reflection, the fullness of the means which the human spirit has used to exercise its capacity for language. Gadamer I 443 The normative interest under which [Humboldt] compares the language structure of human languages does not (...) cancel out (...) the recognition of individuality, and that means the relative perfection of each individual. It is well known that Gadamer I 444 Humboldt learned to understand each language as a separate view of the world by examining the inner form in which the primordial human process of language formation differentiates itself. Behind this thesis is not only the idealistic philosophy, which emphasizes the subject's part in grasping the world, but also the metaphysics of individuality first developed by Leibniz. Cf. >Sapir-Whorf thesis, >Relativism, >Cultural relativism. Gadamer I 445 Foreign Languages/Humboldt: (...) Humboldt once said that learning a foreign language must be the acquisition of a new point of view in the previous world view, and continues: "Just because one always, more or less, transfers one's own world view, yes, one's own language view, into a foreign language, the success is not felt purely and completely"(1). >Language Acquisition. Gadamer: What is claimed here to be a limitation and a shortcoming (and rightly so from the standpoint of the linguist who has his or her own path of knowledge in mind), is in fact the fullness of hermeneutic experience. Form/Hermeneutics/Gadamer: Linguistic form and traditional content cannot be separated in hermeneutic experience. Culture/World View/Foreign Languages/Humboldt: No matter how much you put yourself in a foreign state of mind, you do not forget your own world view, yes, your own language view. Rather, the other world that confronts us there is not only a foreign one, insofar as it is a relationally different one. It has not only its own truth in itself, but also its own truth for us. Gadamer I 446 [Humboldt] recognized the living execution of speech, the linguistic energeia as the essence of language, and thus broke the dogmatism of the grammarians. From the concept of force, which guides all his thinking about language, he has in particular also put into perspective the question of the origin of language, which was particularly burdened by theological considerations. Origin of language/Humboldt: [Humboldt] rightly emphasizes that language is human from its very beginning(2). World/Gadamer: For mankind the world as a I 447 world is there, as it has no other existence for any living thing in the world. But this existence of the world is linguistically written. This is the actual core of the sentence that Humboldt expresses with a completely different intention, that languages are world views(1). What Humboldt is trying to say with this is that language asserts a kind of independent existence vis-à-vis the individual who belongs to a linguistic community and, as he or she grows into it, simultaneously introduces him or her to a certain world relationship and world behaviour. More important, however, is what this statement is based on: that language, for its part, does not claim an independent existence in relation to the world that is expressed in it. Not only is the world only world, as far as it is expressed - language has its actual existence only in the fact that the world is represented in it. The original humanity of language thus means at the same time the original linguistic nature of the human "being-in the-world". 1. W. von Humboldt, „Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaus ..“ (zuerst gedruckt 1836),§9. 2. Ebenda, S. 60 |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Language | Pinker | I 94 Language/thinking/Pinker: we do not think in our mother tongue. Language of thought/mentalese. I 451 PinkerVsWhorf: the English have no word for gloating, but they know exactly what is meant. - All the strange feeling words can be acquired. >Sapir-Whorf thesis, >Vocbulary, >Language and thought, >World/thinking. Margeret Mead: thesis: the people of Samoa are dispassionate. PinkerVsMead: unbelievable - Derek FreemanVsMead: debunked this as misrepresentation. >Margaret Mead. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 |
| Language | Quine | X 134 Language/Carnap/Quine: the language is presented as a deductive system Carnap - 1. Formation rules: Deliver the grammar and the lexicon so that they deliver the well formed formulas - 2. Transformation rules: these provide logical truths (including the mathematical, generally the analytical truths). >Logical Truth/Quine.# VI 17 Ontology/Language/Quine: as far as the assumption of a scientific theory can be called a linguistic matter, the assumption of an ontology can also be called a linguistic matter - but not more than this. >Ontology/Quine. VI 63 Language/Observation/Translation/Quine: most of our utterances are not correlated with stimuli at all, e.g. connectives etc. VI 64 The linguist can create an archive of uninterpreted sentences and dissect them. Recurring segments can be treated as words. (Analytical hypothesis). VI 65 Ultimately, we depend on very poor data material. We can expect successive statements to have something to do with each other. Later, the translator will be dependent on psychological hypotheses. What will the jungle inhabitants most likely believe to be true? What will they probably believe? VI 66 In this case, preference is given to recognizably rational translations. But to establish an alleged grammar and semantics of the natives would be nothing more than bad psychology. Instead one should assume that the psyche of the natives is largely like ours. VI 67 When the linguist discovers an error, he will wonder how far back it goes. VI 105 Language/QuineVsMentalism: The prerequisite of language is that people perceive that others perceive something. This, however, is the seduction to overstretch the mentalistic way of speaking. Mentalism. VII (b) 26 Definition/Quine: can serve two opposite purposes: 1. abbreviation and practical representation (short notation) 2. reverse: redundancy in grammar and vocabulary. Economical vocabulary leads to longer strings. Conversely, economical vocabulary simplifies the theoretical discourse about a language. Language/Quine: by habit these two types are fused together, one as part of the other: External language: is redundant in grammar and vocabulary and economical in terms of the length of strings. Partial language "primitive notation": is economical in grammar and vocabulary. VII (b) 27 Part and whole are connected by translation rules. We call these definitions. They are not assigned to one of the two languages, but connect them. But they are not arbitrary. They should show how primitive notations can serve all purposes. VII (d) 61 Language/Translation/Whorf/Cassirer/Quine: you cannot separate the language from the rest of the world. Differences in language will correspond to differences in life form. Therefore, it is not at all clear how to assume that words and syntax change from language to language while the content remains fixed. VII (d) 77 Introduction/Language/General Term/Quine: the use of general terms has probably arisen in the course of language development because similar stimuli cause similar reactions. Language would be impossible without general terms. In order to understand them, one must recognize the additional operator "class of" or "-ness" when introducing them. Failure to do so was probably the reason for accepting abstract entities. >General Terms/Quine. VII (d) 78 Science/Language/Quine: how much of our science is actually contributed by language, and how much is an original (real) reflection of reality? To answer this, we have to talk about both the world and the language! ((s) And that is already the answer!) Quine: and in order to talk about the world, we have to presuppose a certain conceptual scheme that belongs to our particular language. Conceptual Scheme/Quine: we were born into it, but we can change it bit by bit, like Neurath's ship. VII (d) 79 Language/Quine: its purpose is efficiency in communication and prediction. Elegance is even added as an end in itself. X 34/35 Truth/Language/Quine: Truth depends on language, because it is possible that sounds or characters in one language are equivalent to "2 < 5" and in another to "2 > 5". When meaning changes over many years within a language, we think that they are two different languages. Because of this relativity, it makes sense to attribute a truth value only to tokens of sentences. Truth/World/Quine: the desire for an extra-linguistic basis for truth arises only if one ignores the fact that the truth predicate has precisely the purpose of linking the mention of linguistic forms with the interest in the objective world. X 42 Immanent/Language/Quine: are immanent in language: educational rules, grammatical categories, the concept of the word, or technically: the morpheme. ad X 62 Object language/meta language/mention/use/(s): the object language is mentioned (spoken about), the meta language is used to speak about the object language. X 87 Language/Grammar/Quine: the same language - the same infinite set of sentences can be created with different educational rules from different lexicons. Therefore, the concept (definition) of logical truth is not transcendent, but (language) immanent. (logical truth: is always related to a certain language, because of grammatical structure). >Logical Truth/Quine. Dependence on language and its grammatization. XI 114 Theory/Language/Quine/Lauener: we do not have to have an interpreted language in order to formulate a theory afterwards. This is the rejection of the isolated content of theoretical sentences. Language/Syntax/Lauener: Language cannot be considered purely syntactically as the set of all correctly formed expressions, because an uninterpreted system is a mere formalism. ((s) Such a system is not truthful). XI 115 Language/Theory/ChomskyVsQuine/Lauener: a person's language and theory are different systems in any case, even if you would agree with Quine otherwise. XI 116 Quine: (ditto). Uncertainty of translation: because of it one cannot speak of a theory invariant to translations. Nor can one say that an absolute theory can be formulated in different languages, or conversely that different (even contradictory) theories can be expressed in one language. ((s) Because of the ontological statement that I cannot argue about ontology by telling the other that the things that exist in it do not exist in me, because then I contradict myself that there are things that do not exist). Lauener: that would correspond to the fallacy that language contributes to the syntax but theory to the empirical content. Language/Theory/Quine/Lauener: i.e. not that there is no contradiction between the two at all: insofar as two different theories are laid down in the same language, this means that the expressions are not interchangeable in all expressions. But there are also contexts where the distinction between language and theory has no meaning. Therefore, the difference is gradual. The contexts where language and theory are interchangeable are those where Quine speaks of a network. V 32 Def Language/Quine: is a "complex of dispositions to linguistic behaviour". V 59 Language/Quine: ideas may be one way or the other, but words are out there where you can see and hear them. Nominalism/Quine: turns away from ideas and towards words. Language/QuineVsLocke: does not serve to transmit ideas! (> NominalismVsLocke). >Nominalism. Quine: it is probably true that when we learn a language we learn how to connect words with the same ideas (if you accept ideas). Problem: how do you know that these ideas are the same? V 89 Composition/language/animal/animal language/Quine: animals lack the ability to assemble expressions. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Mind-Dependence | Hacking | I 163 Explanation/reference/consciousness dependency/HackingVsWhorf: the use of different snow words does not prove that the existence of snow types is independent of the fact that someone is thinking of powder snow. ((s) Word usage anyway does not equal thinking independently! And existence does not follow from word usage.) >Sapir-Whorf-thesis, >Language use, >Word meaning. Hacking: but this only shows that it does not follow that our categories are dependent on consciousness. >Categories, >Categorization, >Classification, >Consciousness, >World/thinking. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis | |||
| Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis | Black | II 103 Whorf hypothesis/Black: there is a certain romantic enchamntment in the idea of the freedom to refer to reality in different, perhaps equally valid ways, while thoughts and feelings are reflected. Language, according to Whorf, should be adapted to the needs of a nation like fish, collecting berries, etc. II 104 Every language contains words that are particularly difficult to translate. Whorf: it was found that the linguistic system (grammar) of each language is not only a reproductive instrument for the expression of thoughts, but rather forms those thoughts, it is a pattern and guidance for the mental activity and for the synthesis of its ideas. The formulation of thoughts is not an independent process. It is more or less different for different grammars. We structure nature along lines that are given to us by our mother tongue. (Putnam pro). II 105 We cannot speak at all without subjecting ourselves to the order. BlackVsWhorf: that alone would not be of particular interest if Whorf had not attempted to apply this to some Native American languages. E.g. Hopi/Whorf: the Hopi do not emphasize temporal relations, nor even the distinction between time and space, instead they have two major categories, which Whorf calls "manifest": "Subjective"/"Objective": they are to correspond to realized or not yet realized things or to "budding" or "fermenting" things. Reality/Hopi/Whorf: is presented as composed mainly of events. Subject and predicate are avoided. II 106 Black: Whorf’s successors tend to quote selected suitable examples. BlackVsWhorf: for English the pendant would be that we have a strong heritage of Aristotle. With "essence", "substance", "specific", "entity", etc. But how many English speakers reflect that at all?. >Use. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Theory Dependency | Schurz | I 57 Theory dependence/observation/Schurz: at present, theory dependence is half-heartedly accepted by the majority of scientists. (Chalmers 1994(1),20-31, Nagel 1979(2),79). E.g. Suppose two theories with conflicting predictions: with complete theory dependence, I 58 then the observations of the representatives would be determined only by their theoretical expectations! These would then be self-fulfilling predictions Total circle of justification: one believes in the theory because one has observed its prediction and this because one believes in the theory. Theory dependence/Schurz: five arguments in favor: 1. Experience is theory-guided: selection of experience for relevance is essential. This selection is theory-guided: according to it, I determine which observations to look for. >Theory-ladenness. Vs: this is true, but it does not follow that observation itself is theory-guided. Proponents of contradictory theories can make the same observations. 2. Perception is an (unconscious) process of construction and interpretation: ex. ambiguities and illusions, ex. R-D-head (Jastrow), tilt pictures: are supposed to prove the theory dependence of perception. >Rabbit-Duck-Head. Vs: the cognitive psychological findings only refute the so-called direct realism, according to which we see things as they are. But they also show something else: that our perceptions are radically independent of background assumptions and background knowledge! (Fodor 1984(3), Pylyshyn, 1999(4)) Deception/Fodor: Deceptions present themselves equally to everyone, no matter how much the person has been educated about the fact that it is a deception. >Deceptions. I 59 Solution: the processes of perception are based on innate mechanisms. Theory dependence/perception/solution/Schurz: The solution is then the dependence on acquired background knowledge (not on innate mechanisms). Theory independence/perception/Schurz: individuals with different background knowledge make the same perceptions. >Background, >Perception. 3. Scientific observation data are theory dependent: here it is about observation by means of instruments (telescope, microscope etc.). Then the theories are mostly theories about the functioning of the measuring instruments. >Theory/Duhem, >Method/Duhem. pragmatic notion of observation/VsQuine: one cannot check everything at the same time. I 60 4. Continuity argument/Maxwell 1962(5)/Carnap 1962(6)/Hempel 1974(7)/Schurz: thesis: there is a continuous transition from observability with the naked eye, via glasses, magnifying glasses etc. to finally the electron microscope. Then "observation" is arbitrary. >Observation. Vs: First, the fact that there is a continuous transition between black and white does not imply that there is no difference between black and white. Second, there are distinctive cuts in this transition. 5th observation is language and culture dependent/cultural relativism: >Humboldt, >Sapir-Whorf thesis. Thesis we can only perceive what is pre-drawn in our language by concepts, Vs: from the fact that languages have special concepts, it does not follow that one cannot have certain sense experience. Sense experience/VsWhorf: experience itself is not language-dependent. This would only be so if others were not able to learn foreign observational terms by ostension. However, this ability to learn is always present. I 61 Ostension/VsWhorf: Ostension works just essentially nonverbal! >Pointing, >Ostension, >Language dependence. 1. Chalmers, D. (1994). Wege der Wissenschaft. Berlin: Springer. 2. Nagel, E. (1979). Teleology Revisited and Other Essays, New York: Columbia University Press. 3. Fodoer, J. (1984). "Observation Reconsidered". Philosophy of Science 51, 23-43. 4. Pylyshyn, Z. (1999). "Is Vision Continouus with Cognition?", Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22, 341-365. 5. Maxwell, G. (1962). "The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities". In. Feigl,H. and Maxwell,G. (eds.): Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol III, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1962. 6. Carnap, R. (1976). Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaft, 3. Aufl. München: Nymphenburger. (Engl. Orig. 1966). 7. Hempel, C. (1974). Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften. München: DTV. (Engl. Orig. 1966). |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Translation | Derrida | Putnam III 162 Saussure > Derrida: "Text": Two languages never express the same meanings. >Meaning, >Synonymy, >Sapir-Whorf thesis. |
Derrida I J. Derrida De la grammatologie, Paris 1967 German Edition: Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Translation | Putnam | V 159 Translation/Putnam: a reliable translation receives the reference (the reference). >Reference. --- I (b) 73 Translation/Davidson: a translation makes the translation of people "who believe in the truth, look for beauty and love what is good". Putnam: that is the principle of the leap of faith. Cr. >Principle of charity. I (k) 267 Def Deconstruction/Putnam: thesis: no meaning could ever be expressed in more than one language, and two languages cannot express the same meaning. (> Translation/Saussure), >Deconstruction, cf. >Sapir-Whorf thesis. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Translation | Quine | Rorty I 217 Quine: indeterminacy of translation: we look at the totality of truths about nature, also unknown and unobservable as well as future truths. My thesis is that the indeterminacy of translation even resists all of these truths, the whole truth about nature. There is not really a question of making the right choice. Also within the allotted choices under determination any theory about nature has no objective fact. >Indeterminacy, >Facts, >Objectivity, >Theories. VsQuine: Many critics believe this is a remnant of traditional empiricism (Chomsky). PutnamVsQuine: why should we not just say: translation in accordance with those manuals that have this property? This is a variant of essentialism: according to which we know from the outset that something that cannot be packed into the vocabulary of the physics of the day is so insignificant that it merely exists "in the eyes of the affected person". (subjective convenience). Quine I 90 Stimulus meaning/SM: objective reality that the linguist needs - translation, not identity but approaching stimulus meaning. I 81 Translation: is independent of stimulus meaning. E. g. "soltero" = "Bachelor" not because of a particular face. - But words are learned first through stimulus meaning, later through abstraction. I 117 Truth of categorical sentences depends on the object. - Our special denoting apparatus. - But stimulus meaning is similar for natives. - Goodman’s individuals calculus is translatable as syllogistic. I 129ff Translation: translatable: observation sentences, truth functions (conjunctions, negatives, alterations) - Identifiable: stimulus analytical sentences, stimulus synonymous occasion sentences of natives - untranslatable: stimulus synonymous occasion sentences. I 368 Animal: for them fear is equivalent to an English sentence. - Church: but this sentence has many different possible translations. I 431 Paraphrase (no synonymy): Newton could be reformulated relativistically. - That is like some sentences used in Church: "true in a higher sense". - Quine: Sometimes that is acceptable. --- II 34 Permutation: is possible if sentence-by-sentence structure is maintained. II 37 Actual: radical translation: no fact decides which of the two translation manuals is right - Actual ontologically, naturalistically - neither transcendental nor epistemological. - Physical conditions, not empirical skills are decisive. - Reinterpretation is possible only for others, not for ourselves. - Factuality like gravity, inherent to our nature. >Radical interpretation. II 61 ff Cognitive synonymy: various points in time, individual > Community > substitutability of words - same verdicts. - But this does not hold for translation. >Synonymy. --- VII (c) 60f Translation/Quine: (early): a) link a sound sequence to the circumstances - b) a synonymy of this sound sequence with English sound sequence that is associated with similar circumstances, assume - problem: the relevant properties of the circumstances are hidden in the person of the speaker (>Gavagai). Cassirer/Whorf/Quine: language inseparable from the rest of the world - differences correspond with circumstances of the form of life - Morning Star can still be a good translation of the Evening Star. - We confuse meaning and reference, because we are used to pointing to things - problem: during work alienation from direct reports, thus the clarity of potential conflicts decreases. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Words | Sapir | Lyons I 201 Word/Language/Culture/Discovery/Sapir/Lyons: Sapir tells us that illiterate native speakers were very well able to dictate sentences of their language word by word, and also to extract words from utterances and repeat them as units. >Sapir-Whorf thesis, >Words, >Word meaning, >Sentence meaning, >Language, >Language use, >Language community, >Language development. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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Reference |
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| Fodor, J. | Newen Vs Fodor, J. | NS I131 Language/Thinking/Newen/Schrenk: two main currents: 1) Thesis of the primacy of language: only beings gifted with language are able to think. The way of thinking is also influenced by the nature of the language: >Sapir-Whorf thesis 2) Thesis of the primacy of thought over language: Fodor, Descartes, Chisholm. Mentalese/Language of Thoughts/Thought Language/Fodor/Newen/Schrenk: (Literature 9-8): Thesis: the medium of thought is a language of the mind ("language of thought"). Many empirical phenomena can only be explained with assumption of mental representations, e.g. perception-based beliefs. NS I 132 Language/Fodor: it includes compositionality and productivity. Thinking/Fodor: Thesis: thinking is designed in a way that it has all the key properties of natural language already (from intentionality to systematicity). Thinking takes place with mental representations. E.g. gas gauge, fuel gauge, causal connection. Mental representations are realized through brain states. Language of the Mind/Mentalese/Fodor: is as rich as a natural language, but it is a purely internal, symbolic representation that is modified only with syntactic symbol manipulation. It is completely characterizable through its character combination options (syntax). It is only assumed to explain the dealing with propositional attitudes, it plays no role in the more fundamental mental phenomena like sensations, mental images, sensory memories. VsFodor: a) Recourse: imminent if you want to explain the properties of natural language by assuming a different language. NS I 133 b) the supporters of the thesis of the primacy of thinking cannot explain the normativity of thought with the help of social institutions such as the language. c) there can also be beliefs without an assignable mental representation. E.g. chess computer. They are nowadays programmed with statistical methods so that there is no fixable representation for the belief e.g. "I should take the queen out of the game early." Representation/Fodor/Newen/Schrenk: Fodor still assumes localizable, specifiable representations. VsFodor: nowadays, neural networks are assumed. Representation/Today/Newen/Schrenk: pre-conceptual: e.g. spatial orientation, basic cognitive skills. - - NS I 160 Conceptual Atomism/Fodor: E.g. "pet fish": typical pet: Dog, typical fish: trout, typical pet fish: Goldfish. I.e. no compositionality. Thesis: the availability of a concept does not depend on the fact that we have other concepts available. In other terms: Thesis: concepts have no structure. ((s) contradiction to the above: Fodor called concepts compositional. Extension/Predicate/Fodor. Thesis: the extension is determined by which objects cause the utterance of a predicate. VsFodor: Problem: with poor visibility it is possible to confuse a cow with a horse so that the predicates would become disjunctive: "horse or cow." NS I 161 Solution/Fodor: the correct case is assumed as the primary case. VsFodor: 1) the problem of co-extensional concepts. E.g. "King"/"Cardioid" - E.g. "Equilateral"/"Equiangular" (in triangles). 2) The problem of analytic intuitions: even though there is no absolute border between analytic and non-analytic sentences, we have reliable intuitions about this. E.g. the intuition that bachelors are unmarried. FodorVsVs: does not deny that. But he claims that knowledge of such definitional relations is irrelevant for having a concept! Concepts/Meaning/Predicate/Literature/Newen/Schrenk: more recent approaches: Margolis/Laurence. Cognitive Science. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Schurz Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 57 Theorieabhängigkeit/Beobachtung/Schurz: gegenwärtig wird sie von der Mehrheit der Wissenschaftler halbherzig akzeptiert. (Chalmers 1994,20 31, Nagel, 1979,79). Bsp Angenommen, zwei Theorien mit sich widersprechenden Voraussagen: wäre eine vollständige Theorieabhängigkeit gegeben, I 58 dann wären die Beobachtungen der Vertreter nur durch ihre theoretischen Erwartungen bestimmt! Das wären dann selbsterfüllende Prognosen Totaler Rechtfertigungszirkel: man glaubt an die Theorie, weil man deren Prognose beobachtet hat und dies deshalb, weil man an die Theorie glaubt. Theorieabhängigkeit/Schurz: fünf Argumente dafür: 1. Erfahrung ist theoriegeleitet: eine Selektion der Erfahrung hinsichtlich Relevanz ist unerlässlich. Diese Selektion ist theoriegeleitet: danach bestimme ich, nach welchen Beobachtungen ich suche. Vs: das ist richtig, aber daraus folgt nicht, dass die Beobachtung selbst theoriegeleitet ist. Vertreter widersprechender Theorien können die gleichen Beobachtungen machen. 2. Wahrnehmung ist ein (unbewusster) Konstruktions- und Interpretationsprozess: Bsp Ambiguitäten und Täuschungen, Bsp rabbit-duck-head (Jastrow), Kippbilder: sollen die Theorieabhängigkeit der Wahrnehmung belegen. Vs: Die kognitionspsychologischen Befunde wiederlegen nur den sogenannten direkten Realismus, nach dem wir die Dinge so sehen, wie sie sind. Sie zeigen aber auch etwas anderes: dass unsere Wahrnehmung radikal unabhängig von Hintergrundannahmen und Hintergrundwissen sind! (Fodor 1984, Pylyshyn, 1999) Täuschung/Fodor: stellen sich für jedermann gleichermaßen ein, egal wie weit die Person darüber aufgeklärt wurde, dass es sich um eine Täuschung handelt. I 59 Lösung: die Wahrnehmungsprozesse beruhen auf angeborenen Mechanismen. Theorieabhängigkeit/Wahrnehmung/Lösung/Schurz: ist dann die Abhängigkeit von erworbenem Hintergrundwissen (nicht von angeborenen Mechanismen). Theorieunabhängigkeit/Wahrnehmung/Schurz: Personen mit unterschiedlichstem Hintergrundwissen machen dieselben Wahrnehmungen. 3. Wissenschaftliche Beobachtungsdaten sind theorieabhängig: hier geht es um Beobachtung mittels Instrumenten (Teleskop, Mikroskop usw.). Dann handelt es sich bei den Theorien meist um Theorien über das Funktionieren der Messinstrumente. pragmatischer Beobachtungsbegriff/VsQuine: man kann nicht alles gleichzeitig überprüfen. I 60 4. Continuity argument/Maxwell 1962/Carnap 1962/Hempel 1974/Schurz: Thesis: es gibt einen kontinuierlichen Übergang von Beobachtbarkeit mit dem bloßen Auge, über Brille, Lupe usw. bis letztlich zum Elektronenmikroskop. Dann ist "Beobachtung" willkürlich. Vs: 1. impliziert die Tatsache, dass es einen kontinuierlichen Übergang zwischen Schwarz und Weiß gibt nicht, dass es keinen Unterschied zwischen Schwarz und Weiß gibt. 2. Gibt es in diesem Übergang markante Schnitte. 5. Beobachtung ist sprach- und kulturabhängig/Kulturrelativismus: >Humboldt, Sapir, Whorf. Thesis: wir können nur das wahrnehmen, was in unserer Sprache durch Begriffe vorgezeichnet ist, Vs: daraus, dass Sprachen besondere Begriffe haben, folgt nicht, dass man bestimmte Sinneserfahrung nicht machen kann. Sinneserfahrung/VsWhorf: ist selbst nicht sprachabhängig. Das wäre nur so, wenn Andere nicht in der Lage wären, fremde Beobachtungsbegriffe durch Ostension zu lernen. Diese Lernfähigkeit ist jedoch immer vorhanden. I 61 Ostension/VsWhorf: funktioniert ja gerade wesentlich nonverbal! I 106 analytisch/synthetisch/SchurzVsQuine: sein Verwerfen der Unterscheidung ist problematisch: der Bezug zwischen Sprache und Welt enthält ein konventionelles Element. Bsp wenn nicht klar ist , was "Rabe" bedeutet, kann man keine Hypothesen aufstellen. Und dieses konventionelle Element soll gerade das Analytische erfassen. ((s) analytisch/Schurz/(s): ist das Ergebnis der konventionellen Bedeutungsfestsetzung in der Sprache.) Quine/Schurz: sein Problem liegt darin, dass dieses konventionelle Moment vorwiegend in ostensiver Weise funktioniert. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Various Authors | Hofstadter Vs Various Authors | II 108 Arthur Koestler: VsKoestler: "Koestler's Fallacy": general inability to see that unusual events is likely in the long run. Reason: 1. Because we do not notice non-events, we misjudge the basis. 2. We are weak in the assessment of event combinations. 3. We overlook the principle of equivalence of curious coincidences: for one theory of the supernatural, one chance is as good as another. II 482 Sapir-Whorf-Thesis: Language controls thinking. A programmer in the language X can only think in terms offered by the language. (HofstadterVsWhorf) VsWhorf: the power of a great literary work does not come from the language into which the author was accidentally born, otherwise all Russians would have to be great writers. It also stems from the history of his experiences and his ability to make experiences. II 486 Language/Hofstadter: Question: Why is there not a single word for the phrase "Come and have a look" after so many thousand years, e.g. "Kamhuseda"? Also novels have not become shorter in the last 200 years! Reason: The ideas have another dimension. II 688 Artificial Intelligence: Avon Barr: "information-processing cognition model". "Everything interesting about cognition happens above the 100 millisecond level, the time it takes to recognize your mother. VsBarr: just as well you can say:" everything above this level..., the time you need to recognize your mother." II 701 VsBarr: confusion of levels: "cognition as arithmetic process": even if the neurons cope with sums in an analogous way, this does not mean that the epiphenomena themselves also do arithmetic. Example: if taxis stop at red, this does not mean that traffic jams stop at red. II 701 Simon: (Artificial Intelligence pioneer): Common ground between the brain and information-processing processes is obvious. VsSimon: How can he believe that? Computers still do not have subcognitive actions in the most elementary sense. There is no common sense program. ((s) See Hofstadter II 696) Def Intelligence/Simon/Newell: mind, bound in any matter that can be arranged into patterns. II 703 Symbol/HofstadterVsSimon/Nevell: for me has more to do with representative expressiveness (representation). To represent something else, something must be immensely rich. HofstadterVsSymbol Manipulation, "symbol processing": the manipulation of meaningless signs is not enough to generate understanding, although it is enough to enrich them with meaning in a limited sense of the word. (Gödel, Escher, Bach, Chapters II to VI). II 704 Computer/Artificial Intelligence/AI/Consciousness/HofstadterVsSimon/Newell: Problem: they see the computer as lifeless, passive objects and also the symbols as passive. Denotation /Hofstadter: does not happen at all on the level of symbols! Also the single ant is not "symbolic". II 720 Thinking/Boole: believed he could grasp the "laws of thinking" through rules for manipulating claims. II 723 Cognition/VsSimon/Newell: Thesis: In every truly cognitive system there must be several levels that allow a rigid syntax at the lowest level to develop into a fluid semantics at the highest level. Symbolic events are reversed into non-symbolic events. II 724 Symbol/Newell: a physical symbol is actually identical to a Lisp Atom with an attached list. ("property list"). HofstadterVs. Symbol/Bits/Hofstadter: Bits are not symbols. Meaning/Lisp/Hofstadter: The logic of Lisp does not rise from a lower level. It is fully present in the written program, even when there is no computer. |
Hofstadter I Douglas Hofstadter Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid German Edition: Gödel, Escher, Bach - ein Endloses Geflochtenes Band Stuttgart 2017 Hofstadter II Douglas Hofstadter Metamagical Themas: Questing for the Essence of Mind and Pattern German Edition: Metamagicum München 1994 |
| Whorf, B. | Black Vs Whorf, B. | II 103 Whorf hypothesis/Black: there is a certain romantic enchamntment in the idea of the freedom to refer to reality in different, perhaps equally valid ways, while thoughts and feelings are reflected. Language, according to Whorf, should be adapted to the needs of a nation like fish, collecting berries, etc. II 104 Every language contains words that are particularly difficult to translate. Whorf: it was found that the linguistic system (grammar) of each language is not only a reproductive instrument for the expression of thoughts, but rather forms those thoughts, it is a pattern and guidance for the mental activity and for the synthesis of its ideas. The formulation of thoughts is not an independent process. It is more or less different for different grammars. We structure nature along lines that are given to us by our mother tongue. (Putnam pro). II 105 We cannot speak at all without subjecting ourselves to the order. BlackVsWhorf: that alone would not be of particular interest if Whorf had not attempted to apply this to some Native American languages. E.g. Hopi/Whorf: the Hopi do not emphasize temporal relations, nor even the distinction between time and space, instead they have two major categories, which Whorf calls "manifest": "Subjective"/"Objective": they are to correspond to realized or not yet realized things or to "budding" or "fermenting" things. Reality/Hopi/Whorf: is presented as composed mainly of events. Subject and predicate are avoided. II 106 Black: Whorf’s successors tend to quote selected suitable examples. BlackVsWhorf: for English the pendant would be that we have a strong heritage of Aristotle. With "essence", "substance", "specific", "entity", etc. But how many English speakers reflect that at all?. >Use. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Whorf, B. | Dennett Vs Whorf, B. | Newen/Schrenk I 147 World/Language/Reality/Structure/Newen/Schrenk: if we hold on to realism, we must say that some languages represent reality better than others which have a completely different structure. Newen/Schrenk I 148 Sapir-Whorf Thesis/Newen/Schrenk: can already be found in Wilhelm von Humboldt. (Literature: 11-3a, Vol IV, p 27). Thesis: Speakers with different vocabulary and above all different grammar must think very differently about the world than others. E.g. Hopi language: only has words for "son" and "daughter". Problem: "uncle" and "grandfather" can only be characterized indirectly. It looks as if both are not distinguished with respect to their relationship. Newen/Schrenk I 149 DennettVsWhorf/Evolution TheoryVsWhorf/ChomskyVsWhorf/PinkerVsWhorf: the ability of language use is realized through specific areas of the brain that have been formed by evolution and are therefore genetically encoded and thus common to all humans. FodorVsWhorf: Language is already anchored in the brain. Newen/Schrenk: Problem: It may still be that we read structure into the world (idealism) instead of discovering it. But then it is unlikely that people of different cultures do it in very different ways, since the relevant biological equipment is common to all if them. Language/Reality/World/Newen/Schrenk: if the language capacity in the brain has evolved through adaptation to an environment, it is also possible that the structure of the world has left its footprints in the language. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Whorf, B. | Feyerabend Vs Whorf, B. | I 311 Style/Feyerabend: one must not overlook the fact that a style provides an accurate representation of the world as the artist and his contemporaries see it. Perhaps people really felt like puppets at that time. That would indeed be a realistic interpretation. It would correspond to the Whorfian thesis that languages are not only a means of describing events, but also shape the events. VsWhorf: however it seems as though technical resources were quite present in order to create "more realistic" art. They seemed to have deliberately refrained from it! If so, then influence of style (or language) on cosmology and types of perception require additional arguments. It is not self-evident. These additional arguments (which can never be mandatory) point to similar circumstances elsewhere. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Whorf, B. | Saussure Vs Whorf, B. | I 10 Saussure: different language worlds do not necessarily mean different thing worlds. ((s) SaussureVsWhorf). |
F. de Saussure I Peter Prechtl Saussure zur Einführung Hamburg 1994 (Junius) |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
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| Whorf | Black, Max | II 103 Whorf-thesis :/ Black: there is a certain romantic charm in the idea of ​​freedom to relate to reality in different, perhaps equally validate ways reflecting feelings and thoughts.  Language according to Whorf is adapted to the needs of people such as fish, fruits etc. |
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| Thinking | Fodor, J. | Newen / Schrenk I 131 Language / thinking / Newen / Schrenk. two main streams: First thesis of the primacy of language: only linguistically gifted beings can think. The way of thinking is also influenced by the nature of the language: "Sapir-Whorf hypothesis Second thesis of the primacy of thought before language: Fodor, Descartes, Chisholm. |
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| VsWhorf | Pinker, St. | I 451 PinkerVsWhorf: the English have no word for schadenfreude, but they know exactly what is meant - all the strange feeling words are open to understanding. |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Language | Whorf, B. | Feyerabend I 295 Whorf/Feyerabend: (von Bacon vorweggenommen): These: Sprachen und die mit ihnen verbundenen Verhaltensmuster sind nicht bloß Mittel zur Beschreibung von Ereignissen (Tatsachen), sondern konstituieren auch Ereignisse (Tatsachen). Whorf/Feyerabend: These das »linguistische Hintergrundsystem« (Grammatik) in jeder Sprache ist nicht bloß ein produktives System zur Formulierung von Gedanken, sondern formt selbst die Gedanken. Newen/Schrenk I 148 Sapir-Whorf-These/Newen/Schrenk: findet sich schon bei Wilhelm von Humboldt. (Literatur: 11-3a, Bd IV, S. 27). These: Sprecher mit verschiedenen Wortschatz und vor allem unterschiedlicher Grammatik müssen ganz anders über die Welt denken als andere. Bsp Hopi-Sprache: hat nur Wörter für "Sohn" und "Tochter". Problem: "Onkel" und "Großvater" sind nur indirekt charakterisierbar. Es sieht so aus, als würden beide nicht hinsichtlich ihrer Verwandtschaft unterschieden. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 |
| Observation | Whorf, B. | Schurz I 60 Beobachtung ist sprach- und kulturabhängig/Kulturrelativismus: >Humboldt, Sapir, Whorf. These wir können nur das wahrnehmen, was in unserer Sprache durch Begriffe vorgezeichnet ist, Vs: daraus, daß Sprachen besondere Begriffe haben, folgt nicht, daß man bestimmte Sinneserfahrung nicht machen kann. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
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