Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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| Terminology | Stalnaker | Schwarz I 30 Def Perdurantism/Schwarz: thesis: timely extended things are usually composed of temporal parts. Schwarz I 31 Def Endurantism/Schwarz: (VsPerdurantism): thesis: things are completely (not only partially) present at any time at which they exist (like Aristotelian universals). Perdurantism: perdurantism can perceive objects as four-dimensional, extended both in time and space. Endurantism: endurantism can also assume that objects have temporal parts, e.g. a football game. Stalnaker I 135f Vague Identity/Stalnaker: e.g. there are two fish restaurants Bookbinder's - only one can be identical with the original one. Endurantism: problem: B0: (the original one) is then an ambiguous name. Perdurantism: here perdurantism is unique. Stalnaker I 81 Def Individualbegriff/Stalnaker: The individual concept is a function of possible worlds on individuals. Stalnaker I 91 Def weak supervenience/Stalnaker: Weak supervenience is found within a possible world. Strong Supervenience/Stalnaker: strong supervenience is found within one or in several. Global Supervenience/Stalnaker: Global supervenience is when any two possible worlds that are B indistinguishable are also A indistinguishable. Global Supervenience: Global supervenience must be improved. So it is not even sufficient for weak supervenience. I 124 Def Identity/Possible World Relative/Stalnaker: identity is always the binary relation whose extension in any possible world w is the set of pairs such that d is in the domain of w. I 267 Def minimal subject/terminology/Stalnaker: a minimal subject is Ex anything that is a representative, something that receives, stores, or transmits information. I 192 Def kontingent a priori/zwei-dimensionale Semantik/Stalnaker: Kontingent a priori ist eine Aussage mit einer kontingenten sekundären Intension, aber einer notwendigen primären. Def notwendig a posteriori: umgekehrt: Notwendig a posteriori sind notwendige sekundäre Intensionen, kontingente primäre. Pointe: Keine Proposition ist selbst kontingent a priori oder notwendig a posteriori. Es gibt nur verschiedene Weisen, in denen notwendige und kontingente Propositionen mit Aussagen assoziiert sind. Def Charakter/Kaplan: Charakter ist gleich Bedeutung. Er ist die Funktion von möglichen (Gebrauchs-) Kontexten auf Referenten. I 212 Def Local Descriptivism/Lewis/Stalnaker: local descriptivism is simply a way of explaining one part of speech by another. ((s) According to Lewis and Stalnaker, this is the only way). I 9 Def Property/Stalnaker: (a) thin/sparse definition: a trait is a way individuals can be grouped. b) richer definition/Stalnaker: (more robust): A trait is something upon which (in relation to which) individuals are grouped. I 103 Def Fundamental property/Stalnaker: a fundamental property must provide for distinctions between individuals that could not otherwise be explained. I 154f Def essential identity/Stalnaker: all things x and y that are identical are essentially identical, i.e. identical in all possible worlds in which the thing exists. I 34 Def Implication/Proposition/Stalnaker: (here): A implies B gdw. a set consisting of A and a contradiction of B is inconsistent. I 50 Def doxastically accessible/Lewis: Doxastically accessible means being compatible with other beliefs and knowledge. I 16 Def C-Intension/Jackson: A C-intension is c(x) expressed by u in x. Def A-intension/Jackson: The A-intension is determined by the propositional thought alone. Def necessary a posteriori statement: A necessary a posteriori statement is a statement with a necessary C-intension and a contingent A-intension. Def contingent a priori statement: a contingent a priori statement is conversely one with a necessary A-intension and a contingent C-intension. I 205 Def two-dimensional propositional intents/Stalnaker: a two-dimensional propositional intents is a function with two arguments, a centered world and a possible world. Its value is a truth value (WW). Def A-intentions/primary intension/primary sentence intension/stalnaker: an A-intention is a function with one argument, one centered world. Its value is a truth value. Def C-Intension/Secondary Intension/Secondary Sentence Intension/Stalnaker: A C-Intension is a function with an argument and a possible world. Its value is a truth value. I 15 Def Metaphysics/Stalnaker: metaphysics concerns the distinctions that must be made between possibilities. I 43 Def Liberal Platonism/LP/Terminology/Stalnaker: (early thesis): If practice is legitimate, (inferences, etc.) then we are really making assertions and semantics really tells us what the assertions say. I 61f Def Proposition/Stalnaker: a proposition is no more than a subregion, or subset of possible worlds. Def assertion/Stalnaker: asserting a proposition is nothing more than locating the real world in that subset. Def true-relative-to-x: To say a proposition is true relative to a world x is to say that the world x is in the subset (of possible worlds) that the proposition constitutes. Def true simpliciter: "True simpliciter" means to say that the real world is in this subset (of possible worlds constituting the proposition). |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Benacerraf, P. | Stalnaker Vs Benacerraf, P. | I 50 Truth-conditional semantics/Stalnaker: should one differ from a mere classification of propositions into two classes of one which is called a "true". Thesis: to do that one should concentrate on the practice of asserting (assertion) concentrate not on an explanation of the reference. Assertion/Stalnaker: is more than to try to call a proposition true. Ascription of truth values/Stalnaker: is not sufficient to explain assertion and speech acts. We also need a concept of content. The ascription of truth values does not tell us why we should say something or what an assertion could cause. Content/Stalnaker: is more than ascription of a truth value. It is also an information that can be used for communication. Content/StalnakerVsBenacerraf: the formal counting of horseshoes is not sufficient for an ascription of content. Proposition/Stalnaker: may also be contingent. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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| Truth Conditional Sem. | Stalnaker, R. | I 50 Truth Conditional Semantics/Stalnaker: should be distinguished from a mere division of sentences into two classes, of which one is called "true". Thesis: in order to do this, one should focus on the practice of assertion (assertion), not on an explanation of reference. Assertion/Stalnaker: is more than trying to call a sentence true. Truth Value-Attribution/Stalnaker: is not sufficient to explain assertion and speech acts. We also need a concept of content. The truth value attribution does not tell us why we should claim something, or what a claim could do. Content/Stalnaker: is more than ascribing a truth value. It is also information that can be used for communication. Content/StalnakerVsBenacerraf: the formal counting of horseshoes is not sufficient to attribute content. |
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