Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Connectives | Strawson | I 214 Connective/Relation/Strawson: a) stating connective: (s) "is a.." b) stated connective: "is in relation to...", "is an example of...". Double-digit expressions are not designations of relations themselves! Predicable relations between things not relations themselves. >Terminology/Strawson. I 215 a) Species universals: provides classification principle, does not presuppose one - E.g. generic name. b) characterizing universals (ch. u.): e.g. verbs, adjectives: provide class · principle only for previously sorted particulars. >Universals/Strawson. But also particulars themselves provide the principle of summary: e.g. Socrates as well as wisdom. ->attributive tie: (non-relational tie between particulars of various types). I 216 Example of the characterizing tie between Socrates and the universal dying corresponds to the attributive tie between Socrates and his death. I 216 1) Species or Sample tie/Strawson: a) Fido is a dog, an animal, a terrier - b) Fido, Coco and Rover are dogs. 2) characterizing tie: e.g. Socrates is wise, is lively, argues - b) Socrates, Plato, Aristotle are all wise, all of them die. 3) attributive tie: grouping of particulars because of the characterizing tie. E.g. smiling, praying. Each is a symmetrical form: x is a characterizing tie to y. Asymmetrical: x is characterized by y. - Then y is a dependent element. I 219 Categorical criterion of the subject-predicate distinction: x is asserted to be bound non-relationallly to y i.e. universals of particulars can be predicted, but not by particulars of universals. - But even universals can be predicated by universals. I 221 New: distinction between object types instead of word types. I 227f Connective/tie/Strawson: Special case: between particulars: e.g. the catch which eliminated Compton was made by Carr. - Solution: regard is carried out, etc. as quasi-universal. - Only quasi-universal: because action and execution of the action are not different. I 229 Nevertheless: a simplification like "Compton was eliminated by Carr" has a different weighting. Point: we have transferred the role of the subject of a predication to theobjects. New criterion as a bridge between the two others. V 121f Concepts/Kant/Strawson: Objects may only change within the limits of recognition. The corresponding restrictions must somehow be reflected in the concepts. - However, it is not about a specific connective but about the existence of any such connectives. V 123 Concepts for objects are always summaries of causal law. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Copula | Strawson | I 214 Connective/Relation/Strawson: a) stating connective: (s) is a... b) stated connective: is in relation to..., is an example of... Double-digit expressions are not designations of relations themselves! >Relation. Predicable relations between things not relations themselves. I 215 a) Species universals: provides classification principle, does not presuppose one - E.g. generic name. b) characterizing universals (ch. u.): e.g. verbs, adjectives: provide class. principle only for previously sorted particulars. But also particulars themselves provide the principle of summary: e.g. Socrates as well as wisdom. ->attributive tie: (non-relational connection between particulars of various types). I 216 Example of the characterizing tie between Socrates and the universal dying corresponds to the attributive tie between Socrates and his death. I 216 1) Species or Sample tie/Strawson: a) Fido is a dog, an animal, a terrier - b) Fido, Coco and Rover are dogs. 2) characterizing tie: e.g. Socrates is wise, is lively, argues - b) Socrates, Plato, Aristotle are all wise, all of them die. 3) attributive tie: grouping of particulars because of the characterizing tie. E.g. smiling, praying. Each is a symmetrical form: x is a characterizing tie to y - asymmetrical: x is characterized by y. - Then y dependent member. I 219 Categorical criterion of the subject-predicate distinction: x is asserted to be bound non-relationallly to y i.e. universals of particulars can be predicted, but not by particulars of universals. But even universals can be predicated by universals. >Universals/Strawson. I 221 New/Strawson: distinction between object types instead of word types. I 227f Connective/Bond/Strawson: Special case: between particulars: e.g. the catch which eliminated Compton was made by Carr. Solution: regard is carried out, etc. as quasi-universal. Only quasi-universal: because action and execution of the action are not different. I 229 Nevertheless: a simplification like Compton was eliminated by Carr has a different weighting. Point: we have transferred the role of the subject of a predication to theobjects. >Predication. This is a new criterion as a bridge between the two others. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Sentences | Strawson | I 196 StrawsonVsFrege: that the parts of the sentence stick together only by unsaturated is merely metaphorical - RamseyVsFrege: no reason to consider any part as unsaturated. >Reference/Ramsey, >Particularization/Ramsey, >"unsaturated"/Frege. I 214 Connection/relation/Strawson: a) stating tie: (s) "is a .." b) stating tie: "is in relation to ..", "is an example for.." Two-digit terms themselves are not again designations of relations. >Relations. Stating relations between things are not themselves relation. I 216 1. Kind or sample tie/Strawson: a) Fido is a dog, an animal, a terrier b) Fido, Coco and Rover are dogs. 2. a) characterizing tie: E.g. Socrates is wise, is agile, argues b) Socrates , Plato, Aristotle, are all wise, all die 3. attributive tie: Summary of particulars due to the characterizing tie. E.g. smiling, praying - each of them symmetrical form: "x stands in characterizing tie to y. Asymmetrical: "x is characterized by y" - then y is a dependent element. I 219 Categorical criterion of the subject-predicate distinction: "x is asserted bonded as non-relational to y" i.e. that universals can be predicted by particulars, but not particulars of universals. - But also universals can be predicated by universals. >Universals/Strawson. I 221 New: distinction between fact types instead of word types. --- IV 53 Sentence/Strawson: the general form of the sentence is: "It behaves so and so". |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Terminology | Strawson | I 134 M-predicates/Strawson: predicates that can be also correctly applied to purely mathematical bodies: E.g. "weighs 5 kg" "is in the living room". P-predicates: applicable to persons: E.g. "smile", "suffer pain", "go for a walk", "believe in God". VII 118/19 Description/Meaning/Strawson: e.g. "He": minimal descriptive meaning. E.g. "Blue Grotto": maximum descriptive meaning. E.g. "The Blue Grotto": middle position, "impure" proper name. I 185 A-expressions: are substantive B-expressions: are predicative. I 239f Universal/particular/introduction: Class (1): (universal): expressions of which one (without empirical facts) cannot know what they introduce class (2) (paricular) also without empirical fact possible to know what they introduce - both are incomplete (1) presuppose implicit expressions, have factual weight (2) have no factual weight. I 241 Subject/predicate/thing/particular/universal: 3. Criterion: expressions introducing particulars can never be predicate expressions - Definition subject-expression: presents a fact by itself (complete) Predicate A: incomplete "is married to John" is not a fact by itself. I 32ff Logically individuating description: "the first", "the only" etc. Pure individuating description: the only dog who was born at sea" Quasi-pure: the tallest man who has lived so far. Except for probability considerations no reasons that pure individuating descriptions apply to something. I 215 a) Type-universals: provides classification principle, does require none - E.g. generic names b) characterizing universals: E.g. verbs, adjectives: deliver classification-principle - only for previously classified particulars. But also particulars themselves provide "principle of summary": E.g. Socrates as well as wisdom -> "attributive tie": (non-relational relation between particulars of different types). Newen ) 93 Def implication: A imp B iff. it can not be that A is true but B is false. Def presupposition: A presupposes B iff. B must be true in order for A to have any specific truth value. V 13 Def "Sense Principle" / Strawson: there is no legitimate use of ideas or concepts that would not refer to the empirical conditions of its application. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Universals | Strawson | I 88 Universals/Strawson: E.g. repeated tone - same chord in various concert halls. I 176 Universals/Strawson: Tradition: only universals and particular-universals (E.g. be-married to John) can be predicted. Particulars can never be predicted. >Particulars/Strawson. Cf. >Concept/Frege, >Object/Frege. I 215 a) Type-universals: provides classification principle, does require none - E.g. generic names b) characterizing universals: E.g. verbs, adjectives: deliver classification-principle - only for previously classified particulars. But also particulars themselves provide "principle of summary": E.g. Socrates as well as wisdom -> "attributive tie": (non-relational relation between particulars of different types). I 216 Example of characterizing tie between Socrates and the universal death corresponds to the attributive tie between Socrates and his death - see copula/Strawson. I 251 Universals/Quine/Strawson: should only appear as predicates. Pro "nominalism". >Nominalism. StrawsonVsQuine: the language terms of this analysis, already presuppose the existence of subject-expressions. I 250 Essential feature-universals/essential feature-localizing findings/Strawson: E.g. it rains now - snow falls - here is water. No subject-predicate sentences: here no characterizing-universals, but types of material. Also no type-universals. - This is the least to make any empirical statements. Introduction with demonstrative does not require particulars. >Introduction/Strawson. E.g. Cat as an essential feature: a) for the same cat, b) for another cat. I 277 Essential-feature-universal/essential feature-localizing/Strawson: the corresponding essential feature-findings actually introduce things - but are not subject terms or subject phrases - "here"/"now" set no limits - (even if they are quantifiable, "there is no point in time "). I 279 Things are not introduced by space and time adverbs. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| |||