Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 10 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Causal Theory of Knowledge | Brandom | I 310ff Causal theory of knowledge/GoldmanVs/Barn facades: classic causal theory: Knowledge for the wrong reasons no knowledge. Alvin Goldman: example: residents of real-barn province expresses genuine knowledge - the knowledge of the resident of the fassade province no real knowledge - Problem: mere chance whether real barn - the difference of circumstances has influence, even if they are causally irrelevant. >Barn facades. Quantity: few (unrecognizable) sparrow dummies do not turn a reliable onlooker into an unreliable one; they will, however, when there are many dummies - reliability is the correct term for the barn ((s) The method does not change when many dummies are used.) I 312 Goldman: underlines the possibility of gerrymandering: it depends on whether you are in the center or at the edge of the province when it comes to allocating values. >Gerrymandering. --- II 149 Knowledge/Causal Theory of Knowledge/Goldman/Brandom: objective probability can only specified relative to a reference class - but the world itself does not distinguish such classes - so the choice of the reference class in turn is not determined objectively by naturalistically specifiable facts. >Facts. II 149 f Barn facades/Goldman/Brandom: VsCausal Theory - Pioneer of reliability theories - Causal chain must be ideal - E.g. facades of provinces, each with changed practices: fake/real ... etc. - then it depends entirely on the choice of the reference class, whether the sight of a real barn is knowledge - maximum reliable: the narrowest reference class. Internalism/twin earth: it could be argued that the internal states are similar - Goldman/Brandom: all in all, the presence of fakes (barn facades) in the surroundings is causally irrelevant. >Cf. >Twin earth. II 152 Brandom: the circumstances are external! ((s) so it is true?). BrandomVsQuine: Goldman does not support the naturalistic epistemology, because knowledge is independent of the choice of the reference class - so one argument place remains empty. - It depends on how we describe the convinced person: as a citizen of the country, the state, etc. And that would be just the naturalistically formulated ones. - Definition naturalistic blind spot of the reliability theories/Brandom: whether an observer is reliable or not depends on the choice of reference classes (barn province), and thus on external circumstances that have nothing to do with the object under observation. II 155 Reliability theories: good reason for not separating belief from good inference - difference: knowledge/authorization for knowledge. >Reliability theory. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Conditions of Satisfaction | Searle | II 87 Truth Conditions/Searle: example x sees a yellow station wagon. The truth terms are: (a) certain conditions of satisfaction, (b) certain phenomenal characteristics of the experience. The conditions of performance are: that there is a yellow station wagon and that this station wagon causes the experience. The phenomenal characteristics: determine the satisfaction conditions. (So the experience determines these conditions.) >Truth condition, >Experience, >Satisfaction, >Satisfiability. II 89 Twin Earth/particularity/satisfaction conditions/Searle: e.g. what if the content of Bill's visual experience is decisive for the fact that the presence of Sally (and not of twin Sally) is one of the satisfaction conditions of his experience? >Twin earth. How can qualitatively identical visual experiences have different particulate satisfaction conditions? It is not the question of how to determine that. Rather, what is decisive about the experience here on earth is that it can only be fulfilled by a special, previously identified woman. (It does not matter whether one can determine this or not). II 105 Apparent paradox: Conditions of performance/house/house façade/Searle: if the conditions of performance of the experience in the case of the house differ from those in the case of the façade and if these conditions are determined by different experiences, then gradually the impression arises as if almost every quality could be the condition of performance of a visual experience. >Barn facades/Goldman, >Causal theory of Knowledge. We not only say "it looks like a house" but also "he looks drunk" or "he looks intelligent". >">Appearance. II 106 The characteristics themselves seem to entail very strict conditions for what can occur as conditions for the fulfilment of visual experiences. It is hard to believe that characteristics such as intelligence should be able to play a causal role in a visual experience. Searle: but according to my theory it should actually be like this. Solution: we need to distinguish between two types of properties: (a) those that are decided by looking, and (b) those requiring further testing. II 107 Features: looking intelligent is in a way independent of intelligence that looking red is not independent of being red. >Properties/Searle. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Counterfactual Conditionals | Nozick | II 172 Counterfactual Conditionals/Co.Co./Overdeterminism/Knowledge/Nozick. Counterfactual conditionals help exclude cases of overdeterminism - i.e. cases where multiple independent causes are sufficient in themselves. >Overdetermination, >Cause, >Effect, >Knowledge, >Sufficiency. II 174 Example Barn Facades/Alvin Goldman/Nozick: if there are many fakes, we should not speak of knowledge. >Barn Façades, >Causal Theory of Knowledge. II 175 Counterfactual Conditional/Nozick: shows covariance. >Covariance. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Epistemology | Brandom | II 146 Naturalized Epistemology/Quine/Brandom: knowledge as a product of processes that can be described in physical terms - if beliefs can be naturalized, then they are also knowledge. >Knowledge, >Naturalized epistemology. II 147 InternalismVs: it is about having of reasons - VsVs: reliability is about objective probability - BrandomVs: this falls short of a completely naturalistic analysis of knowledge (>barn facades). II 149 Objective probability only relative to a reference class. >Reference classes. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Knowledge | Burge | Frank I 698 Knowledge/Thought/Enabling Conditions/Burge: We do not ask anyone to assure themselves that the light is not being deflected by a mirror or that he is not facing a dummy when he takes a piece of bread. In fact, it is part of our common understanding of the objectivity of perception that there is no general guarantee for distinguishing something from an imitation. The possibility of deception (error) is part of the essence of the objectivity of perception. >Objectivity, >Perception, >Forgeries, >Barn facades. This is true in every-day life, but even in philosophy it is true that perception knowledge does not require knowledge about the enabling conditions. Frank I 704 Knowledge/Self-Knowledge/Content/Perception Knowledge/Burge: if the background conditions are so different that there is a different reference object in their own self-referential thinking, then they are so different that there is another thought. >Self-knowledge. But the person remains in the same reflexive position, in turn, to authoritatively know what she thinks. E.g. in a slow transition from the earth to twin earth, the epistemic claims are justified if the person thinks "I'm thinking that water/twin-earth water is a liquid." They are right in both cases. Burge: the fact that the person knows nothing about the changeover is irrelevant to the truth and justification of the judgments! >Twin earth, >Justification. The answer to the question of a person who has noticed the conversion "Do I now think of water or twin-water?" is obvious: both! Because both terms are needed! Tyler Burge (1988a): Individualism and Self-Knowledge, in: The Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988), 649-663 |
Burge I T. Burge Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010 Burge II Tyler Burge "Two Kinds of Consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Knowledge | Goldman | II 149/150 Alvin Goldman/knowledge/BrandomVsGoldman: Goldman's theory paved the way for the reliability theories, but it is a two-edged sword with regard to naturalized epistemology. >Epistemology naturalized, >Reliability theory. For his example, it is important that we assume that the causal chain is an ideal one. II 151-155 For example barn facades: one can imagine the facades of the province as embedded in a country with real barns, this in turn embedded in a state with facades, embedded in a continent with real facades, these on a planet with facades, this in turn embedded in a planet system with real barns and so on. Whether it is about knowledge when seeing a real barn, is then completely dependent on the choice of the reference class. The closest reference class is then highly reliable. There is much to be said against genuine knowledge. This reveals the inadequacy of classical internalism of justification. But e.g. twin earth/Brandom: a modern internalist could claim that the "internal states" are the same. All they have in common is that the subject cannot keep them apart. >Internalism, >Externalism, >Twin Earth. McDowell: but this fact does not have to be considered sufficient to identify their contents! >Content, >Identification. Goldman/Brandom: overall, the presence of barn façades in the area is causally irrelevant. II 152 Barn facades/Goldman: the candidate is not a reliable perceiver of barns. Brandom: the special thing about this case is that the circumstances are external. >Circumstances . BrandomVsGoldman: "Goldman's insight", however, does not support the naturalized epistemology because the knowledge is completely dependent on the choice of the reference class. An argument place therefore remains empty. >Knowledge, >Causal theory of knowledge. It depends on how we describe the convinced: as a member of the country, of the federal state, etc. And that would be precisely the naturalistically formulated facts. They then lead to different judgments about the reliability of the observer. Brandom: situations like those of the example can quite possibly arise. From this follows the: definition "blind spot" of the reliability theories/Brandom: whether or not an observer is reliable is dependent on the choice of reference classes (barn province), and thus on external circumstances which have nothing to do with the observed object. >Reference classes, >Blind spot. |
Gold I Alvin I. Goldman Reliabilism and Contemporary Epistemology: Essays Oxford 2015 |
| Mistakes | Bateson | I 371 Mistake/Bateson: two types: Type A: an organism can correctly use information that tells it from what set of alternatives to choose. Afterwards, it can happen that it chooses the wrong alternative. Type B: the organism chooses from the wrong set of alternatives. Now two sets of alternatives can have common elements. Then it can happen that an organism decides for the wrong reasons for the right alternative. This form of error inevitably reinforces itself. >Reference classes, >Reference systems, >Delusions, cf. >Causal theory of knowledge, cf. >Barn facades. |
Bt I G. Bateson Steps to an Ecology of Mind, Collected Essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution, and Epistemology, San Francisco 1972 German Edition: Ökologie des Geistes. Anthropologische, psychologische, biologische und epistemologische Perspektiven Frankfurt 1985 |
| Overdetermination | Nozick | II 172 counterfactual conditional/overdetermination/knowledge/Nozick: counterfactual conditionals help to exclude cases of overdetermination. >Counterfactual conditionals. That is, cases where multiple independent causes are sufficient for themselves. II 174 E.g. Barn facades: if there are many fakes, one should not speak of knowledge. >Causal theory of knowledge, >Barn facades, >Reliability theory, >Gerrymandering. II 175 Counterfactual conditional: shows covariance. >Covariance. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Perception | Searle | Skirbekk Wahrheitstheorien Frankurt/M 1996 I 28 Meanings are in the head (SearleVsPutnam), because perception is self-referential. Perception itself provides the fulfillment conditions. Skirbekk I 78ff Perception/Searle: we perceive the whole house, not just facades, but that is no inference. Perception is linked to a representation system (e.g. language). > E.g. Barn facades/Goldman, > Reliability Theory/Goldman; > more autors on Reliability Theory. Searle II 296 Perception/Searle: perception is nailed to the world: by the causal self-referentiality of intentional content. ((s) The perception delivers the satisfaction conditions that the object must have.) Name/proper name/Searle: here there is no intentional causation. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Skirbekk I G. Skirbekk (Hg) Wahrheitstheorien In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt 1977 |
| Reference Classes | Nozick | II 264 Reference class problem/Nozick: E.g. reliability: the reference class of beliefs can not exist in the beliefs acquired so far, because it may have been a coincidence so far that the method was reliable. >Reliability, >Regularity, >Knowledge, >Certainty, >Causal Theory of Knowledge, >Barn facades, >Falsification, cf. >Skepticism. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dretske, F. | Lehrer Vs Dretske, F. | Brendel I 218 Knowledge/Externalism/Internalism/Lehrer/Brendel: (Lehrer 1990b. 252) Thesis: LehrerVsInternalism, LehrerVsExternalism: Both answers to the question of what needs to be added to true conviction in order to obtain knowledge are wrong. (Lager) Solution/Lehrer: Thesis: Connection of internalism and externalism: Def Knowledge/Lehrer/Brendel: Is a rational connection of subjective states and truth, of mind and world. [ist eine rationale Verbindung subjektiven Zuständen und Wahrheit, zwischen Geist und Welt.] Three conditions: 1. Knowledge must be distinguished from accidental true conviction 2. It must be "articulable" in principle 3. The epistemic subject must know and must be able to recognize the difference between information and misinformation. Metaknowledge/Lehrer/Brendel: The third condition makes it necessary to have the term "metaknowledge". LehrerVsExternalism: Cannot represent metaknowledge (to recognize misinformation in light of my knowledge of information). LehrerVsDretske: Creating information is not a sufficient condition for knowledge; It also needs to know that the information is correct, e.g. defective measuring instruments do not lead to knowledge. I 219 Important argument: the temperature can coincidentally match the one indicated on the display of the defective measuring instrument. Solution/Lehrer: We need background information (e.g. barn facades) LehrerVsReliability theory: There would not be knowledge there as well. Reliability theoryVsVs: this is only valid for causal theories, die die r.th. selber ablehnt. Causal Theory/c.th.Lehrer/Brendel: It exceeds c.th. if Lehrer demands that the subject can recognize wrong information. LehrerVsExternalism/Brendel: By recognizing misinformation any variety of externalism must be rejected as well. |
Lehr I K. Lehrer Theory of Knowledge Oxford 1990 Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
| Goldman, A. | Brandom Vs Goldman, A. | II 151-155 BrandomVsGoldman: his theory paved the way for theories of reliability, but it is a double-edged sword in terms of naturalized epistemology. For his example it is important that we assume that the causal chain is an ideal one. E.g. barn facades / Brandom: you can think of the province as embedded in a country with real barns, this in turn embedded in a state with facades, embedded it in a continent with real ... But e.g. Twin Earth: a modern internalist could claim that the "internal states" be the same. All they have in common is that the subject can not tell them apart. McDowell: this fact has not to be considered as sufficient for the identification of their contents! Goldman / Brandom: it shows that the presence of barn facades in the area is causally irrelevant. BrandomVsGoldman: "Goldman s insight,"does not support the naturalized epistemology, because the knowledge is totally dependent on the choice of the reference class. An argument position therefore remains blank. It depends on how we describe the convinced person: as an inhabitant of the country, the state, etc. And that would be just the naturalistic formulable facts. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Internalism | Brandom Vs Internalism | Brandom II 151 E.g. Barn facades: you can picture this facades province as embedded in a country with real barns, this in turn embedded in a state with facades, embedded in a continent with real barns, that on a planet with facades which is in turn embedded in a planetary system with real barns etc. Whether the sight of a real barn is knowledge would then entirely dependent on the choice of the reference class! Maximum reliability is given with the narrowest reference class. VsInternalism: Many things speak agains real knowledge. This reveals the inadequacy of the classical justification-based internalism. But E.g. twin earth: a modern internalist could assert that the "internal states" are equal. All they have in common is that the subject cannot distinguish. McDowellVsInternalism: But this fact does not have to be regarded as sufficient to identify its contents!. Goldman/Brandom: all in all, it turns out that the presence of barn facades is causally irrelevant in the surroundings. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 |
| Naturalism | Brandom Vs Naturalism | II 147 Naturalized epistemology/Brandom: allows us to prove knowledge states as products of natural processes which are completely understandable in more or less physical terms. II 148 If the concept of conviction can be naturalized, then the concept of knowledge can also be naturalized. InternalismVs: knowledge is about having a reason. VsVs: Reliability theories are about objective probabilities. BrandomVs: that falls short of providing a completely naturalistic analysis of knowledge. (> Barn facades). |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
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