Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 15 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Active/passive | Chomsky | Lyons I 258 Active/Passive/Transformational Grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: although subject and object are interchanged, identity or similarity prevails between the two corresponding sentences in the deep structure. However, this is also a prerequisite for determining that subject and object can be exchanged. >Transformational grammar, >Subject, >Object, >Grammar, >Syntax. Problem: there is disagreement about whether dissimilation prevails here or not. For example, suppose that "the shooting of the hunters" is not ambiguous. Problem: then we would still require the grammar to be written in the following way that a) between "the shooting of the hunters" and the transitive sentence NP1 "shoot the hunters", and b) between "the hunters shooting" and the intransitive "the hunters shoot" relationships are established. Lyons I 261 Active/Passive/Transformational Grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: (N. Chomsky, Syntactic Structures, Berlin, New York 1957) Passive (optional) Structural descriptions: NP – Aux – V NP Structural change: X1 – X2 - X3 – X4 > X4 – X2 + be + en – V – by + X1 (Notation: concatenation: sometimes „+“, sometimes “–„ (is not explained here). different: (formally more precise): NP1 – Aux – V – NP2 > Aux + be + en – V – by + NP1 T-rule: contains two parts: the description (analysis, notation: SA, SB) and the change (structural change, notation: SC, SV). By definition, T-rules are only effective in chains that can be analyzed by means of the elements indicated in their structural description. Transformation: its result is exactly what has already been described in the alternative representation of the rule: NP1 – Aux – V – NP2 > Aux + be + en – V – by + NP1 What does it mean that the chain can be analyzed using four elements (NP, Aux, V and NP)? I 262 The following chains resulted from the rules: from (1): NP + VP (2): NP + Verb + NP (3) : NP sing + Verb + NP sing (4): T + N + 0 + Verb + T + N + 0 (6): T + N + 0 + Aux+ V + T + N + 0 (7) T + N + 0 + C + M + have + en + V + T ü N + 0. Rule (3) n d(4) was applied twice (4), because NP sing f both positions were selected in the output of rule (2). Rule (5) was not applicable. Rule (7): Au has been replaced by C + M + have + en. The edition of (7) is a core chain which is underlied by the type of corresponding active and passive sentences, e.g. "The man will have read the book" and "The book will have been read by the man". Passive transformation: now we apply them to the chain: where none of the elements specified in the structural description with respect to the passive transformation occur in the core chain. Furthermore, we did not come across the chain NP + Aux + V + Np at any stage of deriving the core chain through the PS rules. Therefore, we review the rules again to create the constituent structure of the desired core chain: By rule (1): ∑ (NP + VP) (2): ∑ (NP + VP)(Verb + NP)) (3): ∑ (NP (NP sing) + VP(Verb + NP(NP sing))) (4): ∑ (NP (NP sing (T + N + 0)) + VP(Verb + NP(NP sing(T + N + 0)))) (6): ∑ (NP (NP sing (T + N + 0)) + VP(Verb (Aux + V)+ NP(NP sing(T + N + 0)))) (7): ∑ (NP (NP sing (T + N + 0)) + VP(Verb (Aux (C + M + have + en) + V)+ NP(NP sing(T + N + 0)))). This is the constituent structure of sentences that is the basis of sentences such as "The man will have read the book" and "The book will have been read by the man." (active/passive). Lyons I 262 Definition Phrase Marker/P-Marker/Grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: if a chain is represented with constituent parentheses and parentheses indices (labelled-bracketing), this is referred to as a formation marker or P-marker. Def parenthesis index: labelled-bracketing/terminology: Designation of a node in the tree diagram or symbol in front of a parenthesis. I 263 Def Dominate/Dominance/Chomsky/Lyons: a symbol dominates an entire parentheses expression when the parentheses in the P marker is opened immediately after this symbol. In the tree diagram: The symbol dominates everything that is derived from the node indicated by the symbol. Def (structural) analyzability/grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: (is a condition for the application of T-rules): if a chain without residual elements can be broken down into subchains, each of which is dominated by a symbol given in the structural description of the T-rules, then the chain satisfies the conditions defined by the structural description (SB). Passive transformation/Chomsky/Lyons: (is optional) and looks like this: {T + N + 0} + {C + M + have + en} + {V} + {T + N + 0} NP1 - Aux - V - NP2 Transformation: due to the operation of the actual T-Rule (in the structural change), a further chain (no more core chain) results as output, which then serves with its P-marker as input for further T-Rules. >Unambiguity. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Brains in a Vat | Putnam | VI 391 Brains in a vat/BIV/metaphysical realism/Putnam: brains in a vat is a part of metaphysical realism, not of internal realism. Then "verified" does not imply "true". >Internal realism, >Metaphysical realism. --- V 21f Brains in a vat/Reference/Putnam: the language of brains in the vat does not refer to anything in the outside world. There is no reference. They cannot even think "We are brains in a vat". V 77ff Bracketing/Putnam: parenthetical thoughts have no reference conditions that would make them true. Internalism: (existential questions only within a theory:) as brains in a vat we cannot think here that we are in the vat, except the bracketed sense. V 179 Brains in a vat/PutnamVsBrains in a vat: our worldview is coherent, because, taken as a whole, it includes an explanation of our activity of coping and developing a world theory. --- I (a) 21 Brains in a vat/Putnam: brains in a vat cannot refer to brains in a vat. Meanings are not in the head. I (f) 156f Brains in a vat/Putnam: brains in a vat is no problem for internalism, there are no possible worlds. Externalism: here it is possible that some brains are outside the vat. >Internalism, >Externalism. Realism: realism asserts extrinsic connections between signs and things that help explain the nature of the reference. PutnamVs: e.g. textbooks are the main cause of my beliefs about electrons, but my use of the word "electron" does not refer to these books. VsRealism: realism cannot determine the "right kind of causality". >Reference. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Contract Theory | Buchanan | Brocker I 562 Contract Theory/Buchanan/Kersting: On the one hand, contract theories are individualistic in that they attribute the legitimacy of state rule and the recognition worthiness of normative principles to the consent of individuals; on the other hand, they are democratic, since they demand that power organisations and political-moral principles must answer equally to everyone. They are also proceduralistic: the criterion of legitimacy and justification is the possible contractual agreement of all. (1)(2) Brocker I 564 Contract Theory/Buchanan: Buchanan has developed a realistic contract theory that is consistently characterized by an economic reasoning and only accepts principles and institutions if they can only be traced back to the contractual harmony of subjective preferences. (see Kersting 2010) (3). Problem/Kersting: a contract is in a way a thought experiment, which cannot be understood by all concerned equally. Here there are arguments based on interests or situations (so-called "wisdom arguments"). Solution/Buchanan: his contract theory frees the economism of the contract content argument from the contractual moral bracketing and extends it to the entire structure of the contractualist argument. See Buchanan 1975 (4) See Anarchism/Buchanan. Brocker I 565 Contracts/Buchanan: Contract negotiations only take place when (...) it is advantageous for the natural state dweller with the best natural means of power. See Equilibrium/Buchanan. Brocker I 566 Negotiations/Buchanan: Negotiations are conducted to reduce unproductive defence costs. Both A and B recognize that they are better off if they can save on defence costs. Relationship: The "natural balance" (see Equilibrium/Buchanan) has a certain stability. The parties can only improve their position through a disarmament agreement. Brocker I 573 KerstingVsBuchanan: The starting position chosen by Buchanan is unsuitable (...) in terms of legitimation theory. On the basis of contract theories that operate with real, realistic, counterfactual idealizations and normative framework conditions, it is not possible to develop a satisfactory theory of justification or even one that does justice to the minimum conditions of justification theory. Brocker I 575 KerstingVsBuchanan: It is the violence in Buchanan that draws up the contracts. The coontract provides only the legal seal of natural power-sharing. 1. Wolfgang Kersting, Politische Philosophie des Gesellschaftsvertrags, Darmstadt 2005., S. 19-55 2. Wolfgang Kersting, Vertragstheorien. Kontraktualistische Theorien in der Politikwissenschaft, Stuttgart 2016, S. 9-34. 3. Wolfang Kersting, »Kritik des Wirtschaftsliberalismus«, in: ders. (Hg.), Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit. Die moralischen Grundlagen der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft, Frankfurt/M. u. a. 2010, 11-26. 4. James M. Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty. Between Anarchy and Leviathan, Chicago/London 1975. Dt.: James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit. Zwischen Anarchie und Leviathan, Tübingen 1984. Wolfgang Kersting, „James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Denotation | Quine | I 257 Indefinite terms do not denote objects. An indefinite singular term must therefore be in a purely denoting position: E.g. "The tax auditor is looking for someone" (the position is denoting - "someone" is not denoting). "Purely denoting" unambiguous (substitutability of identity) is not: "Tullius was a Roman" is trochaic - E.g. Tax auditor is looking for the director: -> propositional attitudes. Expression in quotation marks is not purely denoting. It has an ambiguous reference. Every truth function is transparent for denotation. Words denote, sentences do not denote (no singular term). Nevertheless, a sentence has a meaning: the singular term formed by bracketing of the sentence (this is no proposition). A proposition here is: completion of correct sentence to a timeless one. A timeless sentence is "The door is open": which door? This does not denote anything. I 413f Object: that what is denoted by singular terms, names and accepted as values. (But singular term is eliminated!) - E.g. "glimmer", but not "glimmeriness". II 61 ff Naming: is a name or singular term. Denoting: is to predict - both are referencing, not meaning various descriptions can name the same thing but have a different meaning. VII (a) 10ff Singular Term/Quine: a singular term must not denote. It has a gap between meaning and denotation. VII (c) 48ff Singular Terms/Quine: singular terms designate ("name"). >Singular Terms/Quine. A general term: means (denotes). - (> Descriptions). VII (h) 140 Purely denoting position/Quine: E.g. "Giorgione was called so because of his size". "So" is not purely denoting. Correct would be: "Giorgione was called Giorgione because...". This is then usable: "Barbarelli was called Giorgione because...". Missing substitutability signals is not a purely denoting position. One might say: The following incidents were non-denoting: "9" and "Evening Star" or "number of planets" in (15) - (17) but it is not about that. The point is that the substitution makes true statements false. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Epoché | Ricoeur | I 42 Epochè/Ricoeur: [Context: Ricoeur's discussion of religious belief in the context of the foundations of hermeneutics]. Can (...) a phenomenology of the "sacred" remain in a "neutral" attitude, determined by the epoché, by the bracketing of absolute reality and any question touching the absolute? The epoché demands that I participate in the faith in the reality of the religious object, but in a neutralized way: that I believe with the believer, but without making the object of his faith absolute. But even if the researcher as such can and must practice this method of bracketing, the philosopher as such can I 43 and must not evade the question of the absolute validity of his object; because if I were interested in the "object", I could give priority to caring about the object, despite all considerations of cause, origin or function (... ). >Hermeneutics/Ricoeur, >Beliefs/Ricoeur, >Religious Belief/Ricoeur, >Interpretation/Ricoeur. |
Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976 |
| Intensions | Putnam | V 47 Sense/Frege: the sense is an extra-mental entity ("old" intension). The thought content, which is detected is, on the other hand, a new intension. PutnamVsFrege: there are meaning differences that escape the intension, i.e. understanding not only by linking with intension. VsFrege: detecting follows only by representation, not from the 6th sense. Representation is determined by the environment (twin earth). >Twin earth/Putnam. V 48f Bracketing/Husserl: bracketing means the talk about what is going on in someone's head, without a condition relating to actual nature of the objects. Twin earth: e.g. the "belief that a glass of water is in front of him (namely for the believer himself, in full non-bracketed sense). >More authors on twin earth. V 49 "Notional world"/Dennett: the "notional world" is a set of bracketed beliefs of a subject. The reference of course is the actual substance (twin earth). Intension/tradition: the notional world determines the intension. PutnamVs: this is wrong, therefore we have no uniform concept of meaning anymore. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Object | Sellars | II 315/16 Object/Sellars: an object is named and not predicated. >Predication, >Naming, >Objects. Fact/Sellars: a fact is predicated and not named. (Although the name of a statement can be made). >Facts, >Name of a sentence, >Description levels. --- II 319f Def "natural language object"/Sellars: linguistic objects with abstracted background. >Bracketing. We abstract from our knowledge in order to think of the objects as natural objects. II 324 Natural language objects: Solution: natural linguistic objects as linguistic counterparts are non-linguistic objects (not facts!). >Searle’s background) One can speak of them as "proper names". This adopts Wittgenstein's idea that basic statements must be construed as proper names, occurring in a certain way. >Names/Wittgenstein, >Wittgenstein, |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Operators | Fodor | I 150 Operator/law/truth function/Fodor: it is a law, defines a non-truth-functional context (or not all the truth functions of natural-kind predicates are themselves natural-kind predicates). E.g. the inference from a premise of the form (P comprises R) and (Q comprises S) to a conclusion of the form (P v Q) comprising (R v S) is valid! >Validity. Natural kinds: Not a natural kind predicate is e.g. either friction or sunlight, because there is no law by friction or by sunlight either heat or photosynthesis are produced even if the individual disjuncts are laws. >Laws. Nevertheless: liberal reductionism: are amounts to a bracketing of individual disjunctions. Bridge statements: must be laws. From truth-functions follow no natural kinds, e.g. bumble bee or bat. >Bridge laws, >Truth functions, >Disjunction. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Phenomenology | Holz | II 89 Bracketing/Husserl/Holz: The assertion of existence is put in brackets. The sole object of phenomenological investigation: the objective content of consciousness. >Existence statement, >Existence, >Ontology. This content already contains the essence of what he meant - wood: that is Cartesian. >Cartesianism. II 100 Ontological difference/thinking/Descartes/Holz: The ontological difference disappears in the thinking of thinking - because the content of consciousness already contains all essential determinateness, without assumption of existence. >Bracketing. |
Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Propositions | Quine | I 332 A sentence is a universal - Value of the variable: is the proposition (object) - remains in place even after a singular term! - Proposition resists change of the truth value. - Proposition remains nameless in x0p. Words denote - sentences do not! (No singular term)! - Nevertheless, a sentence has meaning: the singular terms formed by bracketing of the sentence (no proposition!). >Singular Term/Quine I 343 Modal Logic: Church/Frege: a modal sentence is a proposition. I 347 Proposition here: completion of correct sentence to a timeless sentence - timeless sentence "The door is open": which door? This denotes nothing. I 355 Vs Propositions: translations must also mean propositions. - Actually right proposition cannot be explored by behavior (>Gavagai). - Proposition eliminated: synonymy is indefinable - scientific truth is indefinable (only within the theory) (> Quine, Word and Object, 1960, §16)(1). I 358 Proposition: no common meaning of translated sentences: indeterminacy of translation - propositions could all be quite different. >Translation/Quine I 358 Proposition as bearers of truth: there is no reason why one should refer to timeless sentences and not to the sentences themselves. Sentence: The door is open- bracketing: needed to find out what the sentence expresses in a situation. What could the speaker have said? (Propositions do not help there). 1. Quine, W. V. (1960). Word and Object. MIT Press VII (f) 109 Propositions/Quine: if anything, they should be regarded as names of statements. VII (h) 157 Proposition/Quine: in relation to sentences as attributes, in relation to open sentences - Proposition "The number of planets is > 7" - is unequal the proposition "9 > 7". X 32 Proposition/Object/Quine: If a sentence is supposed to be the name of a proposition (some writers pro, QuineVs), then the proposition is an object - then correct: p or not p for all propositions p - then p is here not even a variable over an object, and once scheme letter of sentences, but only variable - (No semantic ascent necessary). XII 39 Sentence/proposition/propositional attitude/translation/ChurchVsQuine: if a sentence bears the meaning instead of the proposition, then there is a problem: E.g. Edwin believes the German sentence S translate into English: a) leave sentence, b) reproduce in indirect speech in English: then both are not equivalent. - QuineVsVs: admitted, but unclear concept of everyday language equivalence. - Quine: I still do not accept linguistic forms as objects of propositional attitudes: too artificial. >Propositional Attitudes/Quine |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Reality | Carnap | Stroud I 182 Def reality/real/Carnap: to be an element of a system in which it is successfully fitted - then the question of the system as a whole is not possible. >Systems, >Existence, >Existence statements. Carnap VI 86 Reality/Carnap: the distinction between real and non-real objects is not at the beginning of the constitution system. >Constitution system. It occurs only at a relatively high level. I.e. Bracketing/Carnap: we bracket our experiences, i.e. we do not ask the question about the reality of our appearances. Cf. >Bracketing/Husserl. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Sentences | Quine | I 252f "Purely indicative" unambiguous (substitutability of identity) not: "Tullius was a Roman" is trochaic - An expression in quotation marks is not purely indicative - ambiguous reference. - Every truth function is denotation-transparent. I 332 Sentence = Universal! - Value of the variables: Proposition (object) - remains intact even after the elimination of the singular term. - The proposition resists a change of the truth value. - The proposition remains nameless in "x0p". I 337 Sentence: is not the class of its expressions, otherwise non-expressed sentenceswould be = zero class (all would have the same meaning). - A sentence is not a property of expressions either. - Solution: sentence as a consequence: class of pairs. - Partial sign: class of expression incidents. I 336 Words describe - sentences do not (no singular term)! - Nevertheless, a sentence has a meaning: the singular term is formed by bracketing the sentence. (not a proposition!) - Proposition here: completion of the correct sentence to a timeless sentence - timeless sentence "The door is open": which door? denotes nothing. --- Prior I 35 Sentence/Quine: is not an object - Then also no quantification, no bound variables for it - PriorVsQuine: unproblematic: E.g. "J. believes p": J. does not believe anything, this ultimately stands for a sentence. --- Quine VII (f) 109ff Sentence/QuineVsFrege: sentences must not be regarded as names and "p", "q" not as variables, accept the entities as entities named through expressions as values. --- X 31 Sentence/Quine: we speak only of sentences if we want to generalize - (and we cannot do that through objects). X 35 Semantic ascent/Quine: this mention of sentences is only a technical necessity that arises when we want to generalize in one dimension, which cannot be grasped by a variable. --- XII 39 Sentence/Proposition/Propositional attitude/Translation/ChurchVsQuine: if sentence bears the meaning instead Proposition, then problem: E.g. Edwin believes the German sentence S - English Translation: a) leave sentence, b) reproduce in indirect speech in English: then both are not equivalent - "QuineVsVs: admitted, but unclear concept of everyday language equivalence. Quine: still not accepts linguistic forms as objects of propositional attitude: too artificial. >Propositional attitudes. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Someone | Geach | I, 7ff "f(any)": "f(a) or f(b)" - "f(one): "either "f(a) or "f(b). Problem: in some contexts, this does not make a difference: kissing/marrying - E.g.: all/every boy. Love anyone: same truth value as John and Tom love Mary or both love Jane but not Both love Mary or Jane >Truth value. E.g. Everyone (any boy) loves a .. : same truth value as John loves one and Tom loves one .., or "J loves M v K and T love M v K" but also "anybody loves M v K" and so also: "(J loves M v K) and (T loves M v K)". GeachVs: the whole breaks down! Solution: Strawson: we need single rules for each case. Geach: solution: Bracketing: a) "every boy (loves some girl)" b) "(every boy loves) some girl". Correct in the case: "for every boy there is a ... " 2. (Ey) (x) (x loves y). I 117 Somebody/everyone/one: "Applicative expressions"/E. Johnson: an applicative expression is added to events such as "an astronomer", "every man," etc. >Each/every/Geach, >All/Geach. "Expressive expressions": are a subclass of Applicative expressions. - They correspond to quantifiers. - (This is Quines 2nd insight; >Syntax/Geach), >Quantifiers. VsTradition: Applicative expressions are not to be analyzed as relative clauses. >Relative clauses. E.g. "Socrates had a dog and it bit Socrates": false; not conjunction of two sentences and then ask for reference of "it". - "This dog" does not help at all! >Anaphora, >Index words, >Indexicality. Conjunction does not work because negation of both sentences does not have any contradiction: "... did not own a dog or he did not bite Socrates". >Universal Quantification, >Existential quantification, >Domain, >Individuation, >Identification, >Reference. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Terminology | Chomsky | Lyons I 262 Definition Phrase Marker/P-Marker/Grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: if a chain is represented with constituent parentheses and parentheses indices (labelled-bracketing), this is referred to as a formation marker or P-marker. Definition parenthesis index: labelled-bracketing/terminology: designation of a node in the tree diagram or symbol in front of a parenthesis. I 263 Definition Dominate/Dominance/Chomsky/Lyons: a symbol dominates an entire parentheses expression when the parentheses in the P-marker is opened immediately after this symbol. In the tree diagram: The symbol dominates everything that is derived from the node indicated by the symbol. Definition (structural) analyzability/Grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: (is a condition for the application of T-rules): if a chain without residual elements can be broken down into subchains, each of which is dominated by a symbol given in the structural description of the T-rules, then the chain satisfies the conditions defined by the structural description (SB). Passive transformation/Chomsky/Lyons: (is optional) then looks like this: {T + N + 0} + {C + M + have + en} + {V} + {T + N + 0} NP1 - Aux - V - NP2 Transformation: due to the operation of the actual T-Rule (in SV), a further chain (no more core chain) results as output, which then serves with its P-marker as input for further T-Rules. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Terminology | Husserl | Chisholm II 153 Noema/Husserl: the act itself constitutes the object. We separate files and transcendental objects. II 154 ChisholmVsHusserl: the noema explains nothing. --- Husserl I 19/57 Husserl: research strategy: scheme part-whole. General thesis: the existence of the world is not questioned, only our statements about it. The scheme true/false cannot be recognized by mere observation. I 37 Real/Husserl: the real is not intentional, but also: the color quality experiences an "objectifying view" and the "perception complexion" is also real. Meaning/Husserl: meaning is constituted by what is meant by a sign, the speaker gives the sound a sense. We refer to an object by meaning. Meaning/Husserl: meaning is the power of consciousness. Phenomenological pre-understanding: all objects exist only as intentional units. I 39 Noema(thought)/Husserl: noema has a a) a relational sense: as intension and b) a subject core as a carrier. Noesis: is performance or the nature of the conception sense (Greek: noesis = perception). I 53 "Principle of all principles"/Husserl: "the principle of all principles" is the requirement that only one "originally given view" may be the reason of knowledge, e.g. mathematical axioms. Husserl excludes here any reference to empirical statements and creates the relation of consciousness to itself as a suitable method, a "way of givennes to oneself". I 58 Bracketing (era): prior knowledge is enclosed in parentheses. I 42 f Def Noesis: is a performance or the nature of the conception sense (Greek: the perception, comprehension). I 43 Def Noema: Greek: noema means the idea. There are two aspects of the intentional object: a) noematic meaning (content): it is the "how" of the determinations. And b) it is a coherent sense unit in the abundance of various provisions. I 44 b) Noematic object (objectively) "core": is the linking point and support of various predicates. That, with what an identical "something" is being held. I 65 ff A horizon of possibilities is given by any act of consciousness. I 67 Interior Horizon/Husserl: the interior horizon is the anticipation of the dimension of meaning. Outside horizon: means that perception is not limited to one object, but to the entire space of possible objects. I 68 Appresentation: is co-meaning. I 69 Apperception: rethinks contents of sensation into attributes of objectivity. Truth/Husserl: truth is tied to the process of closer definition. Eidetic variation/Husserl: the eidetic variation is activated by contingencies. Constitution/Husserl: constitution is a performance of consciousness when an object is given to us to look at. I 45 Thought/Husserl: if one understands thinking as a process, you can see that predicates can convert. I 72 Def Kinesthesia/Husserl: kinesthesia is the conscious moving during perception i.e. >body awareness. The body is turned into the organ of perception. The sensations can no longer be regarded as single, completed, last units, depending on the way of thinking. They are in a sequence. I 85 Transcendental Ego/Husserl: the transcendental ego has a primordial sphere: initially there are only own things in the private sphere. We assume others to be a transcendental ego as we are. (> Empathy). Intersubjectivity/Husserl: intersubjective are a) objects, b) social. Objectivity/Husserl: objectivity arises through a variety of perspectives. Environment/Husserl: environment is a) set by the intentional consciousness and b) set by a communicating association of people. The communicative environment is previous to any selfish. I 89 Def primordiality/Husserl: this includes all experiences of experience, including the introductory experiences of consciousness that are fundamental to the foreign experience. The consequence of this would be that experiences of consciousness can be experienced by the other in their original condition. Such a conception would encompass different modes of consciousness as original: both objective and personal. --- Tugendhat I 167 "Syncategorematic"/Husserl: sycategorematic expressions are not representing an object. Tugendhat I 177 Husserl: main term "species": "species" comes from the Greek "eidos", which means "sight" or "appearance" (common feature in Kant, term). |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| |||
No results. Please choose an author or concept or try a different keyword-search.