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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brains in a Vat | Evans | Frank I, 554f Brains in a vat/Evans: there are no truth-makers in ths case If the subject learns the truth, it would have to consider "nowhere". It is meaningless to identify themselves: "I am a brain" - body and localization crucial. Different: brain transplant: there is a history here: the brain would be experienced as "somewhere". ((s) Cf. >Identity/Parfit.) |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Memory | Evans | Frank I 535 Memory/Evans: memory does not provide knowledge. (Ryle dito) - But memory shows other aspects of the "I". >Knowledge, >Aspects. Frank I 544 Quasi-memory/q-memory/Shoemaker: "Quasi-memory": "q-memory" - For example, if there are such false memories, then it makes sense to say "Someone stood before a burning tree, but was that I? " - EvansVs: even if this is possible, it does not follow that the normal judgments must be based on an identification. - It is not about decomposition: "someone stood .. I was the one". I 550 Q-memory: is in fact, from someone else. I 551 A) A subject q remembers an event whose witness it was not. B) Subsequently, the subject q remembers the fact of being a witness - appear/appearance/Evans: it is still correct to say that an apparant memory to have done something, is necessarily an apparent memory that one has done it oneself - (+) purely verbal move: does not show that it is possible for the subject to appear as if there was a tree, without it seeming to it as if there was the tree where it is. I 552 One must state a certain knowledge about the mental states of a subject, e.g. from five minutes ago - this kind of memory is neither a matter of the permanence of an opinion nor a shadow. - The original ability belongs to the equipment of every intelligent creature. I 547 Memory/Evans: e.g. brain transplantation, after which the subject asserts: "Something was F" - This is no judgment, no knowledge, but a mere presumption. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Necessity | Simons | I 269 Necessity of origin/organism/Kripke: (1972(1), 312ff, 1980(2), 110ff): thesis: an organism could not have descended from another cell of origin as it actually did (Simons pro). But the zygote is still no permanent essential part because it dies early. Phase-sortal/McGinn: e.g. "child" and "adult" are accordingly also zygotes. >Sortals. I 270 Solution/Simons: it is essential for the organism, that it follows from sexual reproduction and that it has its zygote as an initial spurious part. However, it is unclear whether the brain is an essential part (> Brain Transplant, see also Identity/Parfit, >Body/B. Williams). I 295 Necessary Existence/Simons: necessary existence is only possible with abstract objects: e.g. universals, numbers, etc. Problem: if something exists necessarily, everything else depends on it. >Existence. 1. Kripke, S. A. (1972). Naming and Necessity, in: Davidson/Harmann (eds.) (1972), 253-355 2. Kripke, S. A. (1980). Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Truthmakers | Evans | Frank I 554f Brains in a vat/BIV/Evans: in the situation of the brains in a vat there are no truth-makers - if the subject learns the truth, it would have to hold itself for "nowhere located". Senseless/meaningless: to identify himself: "I am a brain". - The body or localization is crucial. Contrary to this: e.g. brain transplant: here there is a history: the brain would be experienced as "somewhere". ((s) Cf. >Identity/Parfit). Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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