Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 26 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Allport | Lamiell | Corr I 73/74 Allport/personality traits/Lamiell: Allport (1937)(1) argued that person characterization must somehow be possible outside of the framework of common traits. After all, he reasoned, psychologists working in non-research settings, e.g., as counsellors or clinicians, face daily the challenge of characterizing their clients in ways often peculiar to each one of them individually, and hence not necessarily on the basis of considerations about how that client compares with others along some pre-specified dimension(s) presumed applicable to all (‘common traits’). Within the mainstream, Allport’s arguments along this line were widely (and sometimes harshly) dismissed, e.g. LundbergVsAllport Lundberg 1941(2), p.383. SarbinVsAllport: Sarbin 1944(3), p. 214. …“ Either they are making statistical predictions in an informal, subjective, and uncontrolled way, or else they are performing purely verbal manipulations which are unverifiable and akin to magic.” LamiellVsTradition: see >Measurement/traits/Lamiell. Corr I 79 Allport/Lamiell: Allport’s conjectures (…) might well merit the serious consideration they never received in his lifetime. The findings of several investigations carried out by the present author in collaboration with various colleagues offer substantial empirical support for this view (Lamiell and Durbeck 1987(4); Lamiell, Foss, Larsen and Hempel 1983(5); Lamiell, Foss, Trierweiler and Leffel 1983(6)). 1. Allport, G. W. 1937. Personality: a psychological interpretation. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston 2. Lundberg, G. A. 1941. Case-studies vs. statistical methods: an issue based on misunderstanding, Sociometry 4: 379–83 3. Sarbin, T. R. 1944. The logic of prediction in psychology, Psychological Review 51: 210–28 4. Lamiell, J. T. and Durbeck, P. 1987. Whence cognitive prototypes in impression formation? Some empirical evidence for dialectical reasoning as a generative process, Journal of Mind and Behaviour 8: 223–44 5. Lamiell, J. T., Foss, M. A., Larsen, R. J. and Hempel, A. 1983. Studies in intuitive personology from an idiothetic point of view: implications for personality theory, Journal of Personality 51: 438–67 6. Lamiell, J. T., Foss, M. A., Trierweiler, S. J. and Leffel, G. M. 1983. Toward a further understanding of the intuitive personologist: some preliminary evidence for the dialectical quality of subjective personality impressions, Journal of Personality 53: 213–35 James T. Lamiell, “The characterization of persons: some fundamental conceptual issues”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009 The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Analogies | Ricoeur | I 29 Analogy/Symbol/Interpretation/Ricoeur: [There is a tradition of symbol definitions that is too narrow]: it consists in characterizing the bond between meaning and sense in the symbol through the analogy. For example, analogies between stain and defilement, between deviation and sin, between burden and sinfulness; [in general] in a sense, the analogy between the physical and the existential. I 44 In this connection from sense to sense lies what I have called the fullness of language. This fullness consists in the fact that the second sense is, so to speak, inherent in the first sense. >Symbol/Eliade. But when we say this, have we not already violated the phenomenological "neutrality"? I admit it. I admit that what lies in the depth of that interest in full language, in bound language motivates to find that reversal of the movement of the I 45 thought is what "turns" to me and makes me the called subject. And this reversal takes place in the analogy. To what extent does that what binds the meaning to the meaning bind me? [It binds me] in that the movement which leads me to the second sense makes me conform to what has been said; [it] makes me share in what has been proclaimed to me. The similarity in which the power of the symbol lies and to which it owes its revealing power is not, in fact, an objective agreement that I could consider as a relationship spread out before me; it is an existential alignment of my being with [the] being, according to the movement of analogy. |
Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976 |
| Arithmetics | Thiel | Thiel I 225 Arithmetics/Lorenzen/Thiel: Arithmetics is the theory in which the infinite occurs in its simplest form, it is essentially nothing more than the theory of the infinite itself. Arithmetics as the theory of the set of signs (e.g. tally-list) is universal in the sense that the properties and relations of any other infinite set of signs can always be "mapped" in some way. The complexity of matter has led to the fact that a large part of the secondary literature on Gödel has put a lot of nonsense into the world on metaphors such as "reflection", "self-reference", etc. >Self-reference, cf. >Regis Debray. I 224 The logical arithmetic full formalism is denoted with F. It contains, among other things, inductive definitions of the counting signs, the variables for them, the rules of quantifier logic and the Dedekind-Peanosian axioms written as rules. >Formalization, >Formalism. I 226 The derivability or non-derivability of a formula means nothing other than the existence or non-existence of a proof figure or a family tree with A as the final formula. Therefore also the metamathematical statements "derivable", respectively "un-derivable" each reversibly correspond unambiguously to a basic number characterizing them. >Theorem of Incompleteness/Gödel. Terminology/Writing: S derivable, $ not derivable. "$ Ax(x)" is now undoubtedly a correctly defined form of statement, since the count for An(n) is uniquely determined. Either $An(n) is valid or not. >Derivation, >Derivability. I 304 The centuries-old dominance of geometry has aftereffects in the use of language. For example "square", "cubic" equations etc. Arithmetics/Thiel: has today become a number theory, its practical part degraded to "calculating", a probability calculus has been added. >Probability, >Probability law. I 305 In the vector and tensor calculus, geometry and algebra appear reunited. A new discipline called "invariant theory" emerges, flourishes and disappears completely, only to rise again later. I 306 Functional analysis: is certainly not a fundamental discipline because of the very high level of conceptual abstraction. Invariants. I 307 Bourbaki contrasts the classical "disciplines" with the "modern structures". The theory of prime numbers is closely related to the theory of algebraic curves. Euclidean geometry borders on the theory of integral equations. The ordering principle will be one of the hierarchies of structures, from simple to complicated and from general to particular. >Structures. |
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Behavioral Economics | Alchian | Henderson I 93 Behavioral economics/Alchian/Henderson/Globerman: Alchian never addressed the arguments of behavioural economists directly. But his framework addresses the main concern raised by their arguments, namely, that conventional economic models that assume rational maximizing decision-making have limited predictive content and are poor guides to public policy. >Profit maximization/Alchian. Profit maximization/incomplete information: Indeed, in a sense, Alchian anticipated modern behavioural economics by acknowledging that most managers of firms do not and, indeed, cannot operate as pure profit-maximizers given the uncertainty and incomplete information characterizing the business environment. Economic success/Alchian: However, (…) Alchian argued persuasively that predictions from economic models that assume rational decision-making would be reasonably predictive over time. Selection: The reason is that the for-profit environment selects for success. Firms whose managers implement strategies that lead to higher profits, whether the strategies were chosen intentionally or by accident, do better in the marketplace, while firms that make worse decisions do worse and may even disappear. >Consumer behavior/Alchian. |
Alchian I Armen A. Alchian William R. Allen Exchange and Production: Competition, Coordination and Control Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 1977 Henderson I David R. Henderson Steven Globerman The Essential UCLA School of Economics Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 2019 |
| Comparisons | Lamiell | Corr I 82 Comparison/personality psychology/traits/LamiellVsTradition/LamiellVsEpstein//Lamiell: In order for an individual to be ‘higher than’ or ‘lower than’ or ‘equal to’ some other(s) with respect to some dimension of characterization, that individual must be somewhere along that dimension prior to any and all such between-person comparisons. This means that there must be some meaningful rationale for characterizing individuals that does not appeal to between-person comparisons and that, indeed, constitutes an epistemic precondition for such comparisons. Interactive measurement is just such a rationale. See >measurement/Lamiell, >person/Lamiell, >interaction/Lamiell. James T. Lamiell, “The characterization of persons: some fundamental conceptual issues”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Connectives | Strawson | I 214 Connective/Relation/Strawson: a) stating connective: (s) "is a.." b) stated connective: "is in relation to...", "is an example of...". Double-digit expressions are not designations of relations themselves! Predicable relations between things not relations themselves. >Terminology/Strawson. I 215 a) Species universals: provides classification principle, does not presuppose one - E.g. generic name. b) characterizing universals (ch. u.): e.g. verbs, adjectives: provide class · principle only for previously sorted particulars. >Universals/Strawson. But also particulars themselves provide the principle of summary: e.g. Socrates as well as wisdom. ->attributive tie: (non-relational tie between particulars of various types). I 216 Example of the characterizing tie between Socrates and the universal dying corresponds to the attributive tie between Socrates and his death. I 216 1) Species or Sample tie/Strawson: a) Fido is a dog, an animal, a terrier - b) Fido, Coco and Rover are dogs. 2) characterizing tie: e.g. Socrates is wise, is lively, argues - b) Socrates, Plato, Aristotle are all wise, all of them die. 3) attributive tie: grouping of particulars because of the characterizing tie. E.g. smiling, praying. Each is a symmetrical form: x is a characterizing tie to y. Asymmetrical: x is characterized by y. - Then y is a dependent element. I 219 Categorical criterion of the subject-predicate distinction: x is asserted to be bound non-relationallly to y i.e. universals of particulars can be predicted, but not by particulars of universals. - But even universals can be predicated by universals. I 221 New: distinction between object types instead of word types. I 227f Connective/tie/Strawson: Special case: between particulars: e.g. the catch which eliminated Compton was made by Carr. - Solution: regard is carried out, etc. as quasi-universal. - Only quasi-universal: because action and execution of the action are not different. I 229 Nevertheless: a simplification like "Compton was eliminated by Carr" has a different weighting. Point: we have transferred the role of the subject of a predication to theobjects. New criterion as a bridge between the two others. V 121f Concepts/Kant/Strawson: Objects may only change within the limits of recognition. The corresponding restrictions must somehow be reflected in the concepts. - However, it is not about a specific connective but about the existence of any such connectives. V 123 Concepts for objects are always summaries of causal law. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Copula | Strawson | I 214 Connective/Relation/Strawson: a) stating connective: (s) is a... b) stated connective: is in relation to..., is an example of... Double-digit expressions are not designations of relations themselves! >Relation. Predicable relations between things not relations themselves. I 215 a) Species universals: provides classification principle, does not presuppose one - E.g. generic name. b) characterizing universals (ch. u.): e.g. verbs, adjectives: provide class. principle only for previously sorted particulars. But also particulars themselves provide the principle of summary: e.g. Socrates as well as wisdom. ->attributive tie: (non-relational connection between particulars of various types). I 216 Example of the characterizing tie between Socrates and the universal dying corresponds to the attributive tie between Socrates and his death. I 216 1) Species or Sample tie/Strawson: a) Fido is a dog, an animal, a terrier - b) Fido, Coco and Rover are dogs. 2) characterizing tie: e.g. Socrates is wise, is lively, argues - b) Socrates, Plato, Aristotle are all wise, all of them die. 3) attributive tie: grouping of particulars because of the characterizing tie. E.g. smiling, praying. Each is a symmetrical form: x is a characterizing tie to y - asymmetrical: x is characterized by y. - Then y dependent member. I 219 Categorical criterion of the subject-predicate distinction: x is asserted to be bound non-relationallly to y i.e. universals of particulars can be predicted, but not by particulars of universals. But even universals can be predicated by universals. >Universals/Strawson. I 221 New/Strawson: distinction between object types instead of word types. I 227f Connective/Bond/Strawson: Special case: between particulars: e.g. the catch which eliminated Compton was made by Carr. Solution: regard is carried out, etc. as quasi-universal. Only quasi-universal: because action and execution of the action are not different. I 229 Nevertheless: a simplification like Compton was eliminated by Carr has a different weighting. Point: we have transferred the role of the subject of a predication to theobjects. >Predication. This is a new criterion as a bridge between the two others. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Descriptions | Russell | Cresswell I 117 Descriptions/Russell: are never names - Other authors VsRussell: Descriptions are names, but not of normal objects but of intensional objects (various objects in different worlds). - CresswellVs intentional objects. >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief, >Mental objects. Geach I 61 Description/Russell is never a name: E.g. The Duke of Cambridge is also a pub, but the Duke does not sell beer. Newen I 90 Theory of Descriptions/Russell: E.g. 1. There is at least one author of "Waverley" (existence assertion) - 2. There is at most one author of "Waverley" (uniqueness assertion) - 3. Whoever wrote "Waverley", was a Scott (statement content) - E.g. The current King of France/empty names: At least one king of France is bald - 2. At most one - 3. whoever ... is bald - E.g. identity: at least one denounced Catiline - 2. At most one ... - 1* at least one wrote "De Oratore" - 2* at most one ... - 3. Whoever denounced Catiline, wrote ... - E.g. negative existence sentences "It is not the case that 1. At least one .. - 2. At most one ... - RussellVsFrege: thus one avoids to accept Fregean sense as an abstract entity. Truth-value gaps/RussellVsFrege: they too are thus avoided. I 92 N.B.: sentences that seemed to be about a subject, are now about general propositions about the world. >Fregean sense, >Truth value gap. Russell I VIII E.g. Waverley - all true sentences have the same meaning - e.g. "Author of Waverley." Is no description of Scott - Description (labeling) is not the same as assertion - this does not refer to an object. - StrawsonVs - A sentence with "Waverley" says nothing about Scott, because it does not contain Scott. I 46 Descriptions/Russell: are always in the singular E.g. "father of" but not "son of" (not clear - always presuppoes quotes without "the": "jx": "x is φ" - instead of (ix)(jx) in short "R'y": the R of y, "the father of y" - characterizing function, not propositional function all mathematical functions are distinctive features. >Function/Russell. I 96 Description/Principia Mathematica(1)/Russell: "The author of Waverley" means nothing - we cannot define (ix)(jx) only its use - (> ?concept=Definitions">definition, definability). 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Flor III 122 Descriptions/Russell/Flor: are not names - reason: otherwise it would result in a mere triviality: "a = a" or something wrong. E.g. "The Snow man does not exist" is something different than to say, "Paul does not exist" - Descriptions: incomplete symbols - ((s) If description were names, they could not fail.) >Incomplete symbol, >Names. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 Flor I Jan Riis Flor "Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor II Jan Riis Flor "Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor III J.R. Flor "Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Flor IV Jan Riis Flor "Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Economic Success | Alchian | Henderson I 90 Economic Success/Alchian/Henderson/Globerman: „Realized positive profits, not maximum profits, are the mark of success and viability. It does not matter through what process of reasoning or motivation such success was achieved. The fact of its accomplishment is suffcient. This is the criterion by which the economic system selects survivors: those who realize positive profits are the survivors; those who suffer losses disappear.“(1) Example: You and many other people in a city - let's say Chicago - want to leave Chicago by car. You have many routes to choose from. But, it turns out, of all the routes you and others might choose to drive, only one route has gas stations. What will happen? People who don't use that one route will not get very far. The only drivers who will go far are those who choose the route that has gas stations. Information: Alchian: in a justly famous article, "Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory," in the 1950 Journal of Political Economy, Armen Alchian uses the driving-from-Chicago example to help explain why economists can predict the behaviour of people who run firms, even if those people don't have perfect information. Of course, firms don't have perfect information and so Alchian's reasoning is important. Maximum profit/economic theories: (…) [there] was a heated debate in economics journals in the 1940s about whether it was reasonable to assume that firms maximize profits. a) Defenders of that assumption argued that firms acted as if they maximized profits. b) Some critics of the assumption argued that the fact of uncertainly meant that they couldn't maximize profits. c) Alchian (…) did not argue that firms act as if they maximize profits. Uncertainty/imperfect information/Alchian: (…) he agreed with one critic, Gerhard Tintner, that when firms' managers cannot have certainly, the very concept of profit maximization is suspect. But, argued Alchian, that does not mean that we can't predict the behaviour of firms. Akin to the evolution that Charles Darwin studied, when firms "evolve," those that make what, in retrospect, are good decisions, even if the decisions are random, will do better and be more likely to survive than those that make bad decisions. >Evolution, >Darwin, >Darwinism, >Social Darwinism, >Imperfect information, >Uncertainty. Survival of theories: Example: Imagine that the supply of labour falls, so that wage rates rise. In economic theory, efficient organizations would respond to the increase in wage rates by substituting, at the margin, capital inputs, such as machinery and equipment, for labour. So the result of the higher wages would be less employment of labour.* Henderson I 91 Now imagine that no organization initially responds in this textbook manner, but that some firms are operating, for whatever reason, with a Iower labour-to-capital ratio than other firms. Assume that all firms start with the same costs. Now, as a consequence of the increase in wage rates, the firms with a Iower ratio of labour to capital will have Iower costs than the other firms. This, in turn, means that the former will have a higher probability of survival in the competitive process. The end result is that surviving firms will operate with Iower ratios of labour to capital much as would have been the case had managers deliberately substituted capital for labour as textbook descriptions of effcient management behaviour would prescribe. Innovation/Alchian: To some extent, decision-makers will be guided by “successful” behaviour that they see around them and will adopt that behaviour to the extent they can. New behaviours that produce more efficient or preferable outcomes than existing behaviours will also be imitated, a process that Alchian calls “adaptive behaviour to innovation.” Success/Alchian: But his point is that even if firm managers made decisions randomly, the competitive process would weed out firms that made retrospectively bad decisions and that the firms that made retrospectively good decisions would be more likely to survive. Solution/Alchian: An economist need not assume that firms maximize profits. Economists are able to predict behaviour of the firms that survive without the strong assumption of profit maximization. >On Behavioral economics, >Behavioral economics as author. Henderson I 93 Behavioral economics/Alchian: Alchian never addressed the arguments of behavioural economists directly. But his framework addresses the main concern raised by their arguments, namely, that conventional economic models that assume rational maximizing decision-making have limited predictive content and are poor guides to public policy. >Profit maximization/Alchian. Profit maximization/incomplete information: (…) in a sense, Alchian anticipated modern behavioural economics by acknowledging that most managers of firms do not and, indeed, cannot operate as pure profit-maximizers given the uncertainty and incomplete information characterizing the business environment. Economic success/Alchian: However, (…) Alchian argued persuasively that predictions from economic models that assume rational decision-making would be reasonably predictive over time. Selection: The reason is that the for-profit environment selects for success. Firms whose managers implement strategies that lead to higher profits, whether the strategies were chosen intentionally or by accident, do better in the marketplace, while firms that make worse decisions do worse and may even disappear. * That, by the way, is why so many economists over the decades have been critical of increases in the minimum wage. They want People who want to work to have jobs. 1. Armen Alchian (1950), "Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory." |
Alchian I Armen A. Alchian William R. Allen Exchange and Production: Competition, Coordination and Control Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 1977 Henderson I David R. Henderson Steven Globerman The Essential UCLA School of Economics Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 2019 |
| Horizon | Husserl | Gadamer I 250 Horizon/Time Consciousness/Husserl/Gadamer: [With the term horizon] Husserl apparently tries to capture the transition of all the excluded intentionality of meaning into the supporting continuity of the whole. After all, a horizon is not a rigid boundary, but something that wanders along with it and invites further penetration. Thus the horizon intentionality, which constitutes the unity of the >stream of consciousness, corresponds to an equally comprehensive horizon intentionality on the objective side. For everything given as being is given worldly and thus carries the world horizon with it. >Way of Givenness. Self-Criticism/HusserlVsHusserl: In his "Retractations to Ideas I", Husserl emphasized in explicit self-criticism that at that time (1923) he had not yet sufficiently grasped the significance of the world phenomenon(1). The theory of transcendental reduction, which he had communicated in the ideas, thus had to become more and more complicated. The mere suspension of the validity of the objective sciences could no longer suffice, because even in the completion of the "epoch", the suspension of the being of scientific knowledge, the world remains valid as a given one. In this respect, the epistemological self-contemplation that asks for the a priori, the eidetic truths of the sciences, is not radical enough. HusserlVsNew Kantianism/DiltheyVsNew Kantianism: This is the point at which Husserl could know himself in a certain harmony with the intentions of Dilthey. In a similar way, Dilthey had fought the criticism of the New Kantians, in so far as the decline to the epistemological subject was not enough for him. >Subject/Dilthey. Dilthey: "There is no real blood running in the veins of the cognitive subject that Locke, Hume and Kant construct"(2) Dilthey himself went back to the unity of life, to the "point of view of life" and, similarly, Husserl's "life of consciousness" is a word he apparently took over from Natorp, already an indicator of the later widely accepted tendency, not only of individual experiences of consciousness, but of the veiled, anonymous implicit intentionalities Gadamer I 251 to study the consciousness and in this way to make the whole of all objective rules of being understandable. Later this means: to enlighten the achievements of the "performing life". >Subjectivity/Husserl. 1. Husserl Ill, 390: "The great mistake of starting from the natural world (without characterizing it as a world)" (1922), and the more detailed self-critique Ill, 399 (1929). The concept of horizon (and horizon consciousness is, according to Husserliana VI, 267, also inspired by W. James' concept of "fringes". The impact that R. Avenarius (Der menschliche Weltbegriff. Leipzig 1912) had on Husserl's critical turn against the "scientific world" was last pointed out by H. Lübbe in the "Festschrift für W. Szilasi" (Munich 1960) (cf. H. Lübbe, Positivismus und Phänomenologie (Mach und Husserl), FS W. Szilasi, pp. 161-184, esp. p. 171 f.). 2 Dilthey, Ges. Schriften, vol. 1. p. XVIII. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Innovation | Schumpeter | Rothbard III 856 Innovation/Schumpeter/Rothbard : [In his theory of business cycles] Schumpeter turned to a fourth element, which for him was the generator of all growth as well as of business cycles - innovation in productive techniques. >Business cylcles/Schumpeter. Innovations/RothbardVsSchumpeter: (…) innovations cannot be considered the prime mover of the economy, since innovations can work their effects only through saving and investment and since there are always a great many investments that could improve techniques within the corpus of existing knowledge, but which are not made for lack of adequate savings. This consideration alone is enough to invalidate Schumpeter's business-cycle theory. >Innovations/Rothbard. Clusters of innovation: Finally, Schumpeter's explanation of innovations as the trigger for the business cycle necessarily assumes that there is a recurrent cluster of innovations that takes Place in each boom period. Why should there be such a cluster of innovations? Why are innovations not more or less continuous, as we would expect? Schumpeter cannot answer this question satisfactorily. The fact that a bold few begin innovating and that they are followed by imitators does not yield a cluster, for this process could be continuous, with new innovators arriving on the scene. Schumpeter offers two explanations for the slackening of innovatory activity toward the end of the boom (a slackening essential to his theory). On the one hand, the release of new products yielded by the new investments creates diffculties for old producers and leads to a period of uncertainty and need for „rest“. Hansen stagnation thesis: Schumpeter's second explanation is that innovations cluster in only one or a few industries and that these innovation opportunities are therefore limited. After a while they become exhausted, and the cluster of innovations ceases. This is obviously related to the Hansen stagnation thesis, in the sense that there are alleged to be a certain limited number of "investment opportunities" - here innovation opportunities - at any time, and that once these are exhausted there is temporarily no further room for investments or innovations. Opportunity/RothbardVsSchumpeter: The whole concept of "opportunity" in this connection, however, is meaningless. There is no limit on "opportunity" as long as wants remain unfulfilled. The only other limit on investment or innovation is saved capital available to embark on the projects. But this has nothing to do with vaguely available opportunities which become "exhausted"; the existence of saved capital is a continuing factor. As for innovations, there is no reason why innovations cannot be continuous or take Place in many industries, or Why the innovatory pace has to slacken. KuznetsVsSchumpeter: As Kuznets has shown, a cluster of innovation must assume a cluster of entrepreneurial ability as well, and this is clearly unwarranted. VsVs: Clemence and Doody, Schumpeterian disciples, countered that entrepreneurial ability is exhausted in the act of founding a new firm.(1) But to View entrepreneurship as simply the founding of new firms is completely invalid. Entrepreneurship is not just the founding of new firms, it is not merely innovation; it is adjustment: adjustment to the uncertain, changing conditions of the future.(2) This adjustment takes Place, perforce, all the time and is not exhausted in any ssingle act of investment. 1. S.S. Kuznets, "Schumpeter's Business Cycles," American Economic Review, June, 1940, pp. 262- 63; and Richard V. Clemence and Francis S. Doody, The Schumpeterian System (Cambridge: Addison-Wesley Press, 1950), pp. 52 ff 2. In so far as innovation is a regularized business procedure of research and development, rents from innovations will accrue to the research and development workers in firms, rather than to entrepreneurial profits. Cf. Carolyn Shaw Solo, "Innovation in the Capitalist Process: A Critique of the Schumpeterian Theory," Quarterly Journal of Economics, August, 1951, pp. 417-28. Sobel I 9 Invention/Innovation/Schumpeter/Sobel/Clemens: While invention is the creation or discovery of a new product or process, innovation is the successful introduction and adoption of a new product or process in the commercial marketplace. Innovation is basically the economic application of inventions. while Henry Ford did not invent the automobile, his innovation was the use of the assembly line and large-scale manufacturing that brought the price of the automobile within reach of the average family. In each of these cases, the innovator is different from the inventor, and it is the innovator’s role with which Schumpeter is concerned. Perhaps an even more important factor in distinguishing invention from innovation is that most inventions never turn into innovations - that is, not all inventions are profitable business ideas. Incentives/Schumpeter: According to Schumpeter in his later, and perhaps most famous, book Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (CSD)(1), “[i]n some cases, however, it is so successful as to yield profits far above what is necessary in order to induce the corresponding investment. These cases then provide the baits that lure capital on to untried trails” (CSD(1): 90). That is, the lure of profits is the incentive for entrepreneurial discovery and capital investment. This is one reason that government policies that reduce the rewards from innovation can be harmful to economic growth and prosperity. Taxation/innovation/Schumpeter: When regulations or taxes reduce the potential profitability of future innovations, fewer attempts are made to discover them. As Schumpeter notes in his book The Economics of Sociology and Capitalism (ESC)(2): Entrepreneurial profit proper … arises in the capitalist economy wherever a new method of production, a new commercial combination, or a new form or organization is successfully introduced. It is the premium which capitalism attaches to innovation … If this profit were taxed away, that element of the economic process would be lacking which at present is by far the most important individual motive for work toward industrial progress. Sobel I 10 Even if taxation merely reduced this profit substantially, industrial development would process considerably more slowly, as the fate of Austria plainly shows … there is a limit to the taxation of entrepreneurial profit beyond which tax pressure cannot go without first damaging and then destroying the tax object. (ESC(2): 113–114) Sobel I 11 Innovation/economicy/Sobel/Clemens: A growing, vibrant economy depends not only on entrepreneurs discovering, evaluating, and exploiting opportunities to create new goods and services, but also on the speed at which ideas are labeled as successes or failures by the profit-and-loss system. >Business failure/Schumpeter. Innovation/Schumpeter: „Yet innovations in the economic system do not as a rule take place in such a way that first new wants arise spontaneously in consumers and then the productive apparatus swings round through their pressure. We do not deny the presence of this nexus. It is, however, the producer who as a rule initiates economic change, and consumers are educated by him if necessary; they are, as it were, taught to want new things, or things which differ in some respect or other from those which they have been in the habit of using.“ (TED(3): 65) „To produce means to combine material and forces within our reach … To produce other things, or the same things by a different method, means to combine these materials and forces differently. In so far as the “new combination” may in time grow out of the old by continuous adjustment in small steps, there is certainly change, possibly growth, by neither a new phenomenon nor development in our sense. In so far as this is not the case, and the new combinations appear discontinuously, then the phenomenon characterizing development emerges. For reasons of expository convenience, henceforth, we shall only mean the latter case when we speak of new combinations of productive means. Development in our sense is then defined by the carrying out of new combinations.“ (TED(3): 65–66) 1. Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1942). Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy [CSD]. Harper & Brothers. 2. Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1991). The Economics of Sociology and Capitalism [ECS]. Edited by Richard Swedberg. Princeton University Press. 3. Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1934). The Theory of Economic Development [TED]. Harvard University Press. |
EconSchum I Joseph A. Schumpeter The Theory of Economic Development An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, Cambridge/MA 1934 German Edition: Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Leipzig 1912 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 Sobel I Russell S. Sobel Jason Clemens The Essential Joseph Schumpeter Vancouver 2020 |
| Inventions | Schumpeter | Sobel I 9 Invention/Innovation/Schumpeter/Sobel/Clemens: While invention is the creation or discovery of a new product or process, innovation is the successful introduction and adoption of a new product or process in the commercial marketplace. Innovation is basically the economic application of inventions. while Henry Ford did not invent the automobile, his innovation was the use of the assembly line and large-scale manufacturing that brought the price of the automobile within reach of the average family. In each of these cases, the innovator is different from the inventor, and it is the innovator’s role with which Schumpeter is concerned. Perhaps an even more important factor in distinguishing invention from innovation is that most inventions never turn into innovations - that is, not all inventions are profitable business ideas. Incentives/Schumpeter: According to Schumpeter in his later, and perhaps most famous, book Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (CSD)(1), “[i]n some cases, however, it is so successful as to yield profits far above what is necessary in order to induce the corresponding investment. These cases then provide the baits that lure capital on to untried trails” (CSD(1): 90). That is, the lure of profits is the incentive for entrepreneurial discovery and capital investment. This is one reason that government policies that reduce the rewards from innovation can be harmful to economic growth and prosperity. Taxation/innovation/Schumpeter: When regulations or taxes reduce the potential profitability of future innovations, fewer attempts are made to discover them. As Schumpeter notes in his book The Economics of Sociology and Capitalism (ESC)(2): Entrepreneurial profit proper … arises in the capitalist economy wherever a new method of production, a new commercial combination, or a new form or organization is successfully introduced. It is the premium which capitalism attaches to innovation … If this profit were taxed away, that element of the economic process would be lacking which at present is by far the most important individual motive for work toward industrial progress. Sobel I 10 Even if taxation merely reduced this profit substantially, industrial development would process considerably more slowly, as the fate of Austria plainly shows … there is a limit to the taxation of entrepreneurial profit beyond which tax pressure cannot go without first damaging and then destroying the tax object. (ESC(2): 113–114) Sobel I 11 Innovation/economicy/Sobel/Clemens: A growing, vibrant economy depends not only on entrepreneurs discovering, evaluating, and exploiting opportunities to create new goods and services, but also on the speed at which ideas are labeled as successes or failures by the profit-and-loss system. >Business failure/Schumpeter. Innovation/Schumpeter: „Yet innovations in the economic system do not as a rule take place in such a way that first new wants arise spontaneously in consumers and then the productive apparatus swings round through their pressure. We do not deny the presence of this nexus. It is, however, the producer who as a rule initiates economic change, and consumers are educated by him if necessary; they are, as it were, taught to want new things, or things which differ in some respect or other from those which they have been in the habit of using.“ (TED(3): 65) „To produce means to combine material and forces within our reach … To produce other things, or the same things by a different method, means to combine these materials and forces differently. In so far as the “new combination” may in time grow out of the old by continuous adjustment in small steps, there is certainly change, possibly growth, by neither a new phenomenon nor development in our sense. In so far as this is not the case, and the new combinations appear discontinuously, then the phenomenon characterizing development emerges. For reasons of expository convenience, henceforth, we shall only mean the latter case when we speak of new combinations of productive means. Development in our sense is then defined by the carrying out of new combinations.“ (TED(3): 65–66) 1. Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1942). Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy [CSD]. Harper & Brothers. 2. Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1991). The Economics of Sociology and Capitalism [ECS]. Edited by Richard Swedberg. Princeton University Press. 3. Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1934). The Theory of Economic Development [TED]. Harvard University Press. |
EconSchum I Joseph A. Schumpeter The Theory of Economic Development An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, Cambridge/MA 1934 German Edition: Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Leipzig 1912 Sobel I Russell S. Sobel Jason Clemens The Essential Joseph Schumpeter Vancouver 2020 |
| Justification | Lamont | Gaus I 230 Theories/principles/justification/Lamont: (...) theories [on distributive justice] have been characterized mainly according to the content of their approach to the moral demands of welfare (or luck) and responsibility. It is important to note here some of the complications of these characterizations and Gaus I 231 also other ways of conceptualizing the distributive justice literature. Most theorists are accurately described by a number of non-equivalent labels. The classifications used here are widespread in the contemporary literature, but there are nevertheless subtle differences in the ways different authors use these labels. Content/principle/justification: one important distinction is between the content of a distributive principle, and its justification. Content: 'Content' refers to the distribution ideally recommended by a principle, whereas 'justification' refers to the reasons given in support of the principle. Theorists can be distinguished and labelled according to the content of their theory or according to the justification they give. Problems: 1) (...) the common labels used here refer sometimes to the content and other times to the justifications for various positions. 2) (...) most groups of theories have justifications from a number of different sources and single writers even will sometimes use more than one source of justification for their theory. Most combinations of content and justification, in fact, have been tried. For instance, different libertarians use natural rights, desert, utilitarianism or contractarianism in the justification of their theories; different desert theorists use natural rights, contractarianism and even utilitarianism (Mill 1877(1); Sidgwick, 1890(2)). Partly this comes about because there are different versions of justifications which nevertheless, due to some similarity, share the same broad label. Contract theory: For instance, contractarianism features in the justifications of many theories, and covers both Hobbesian and Kantian contractarians, after Thomas Hobbes and Immanuel Kant (Hampton, 1991(3)). A) Hobbesian contractarians, such as David Gauthier, attempt to justify morality in terms of the self-interested reasons individuals have for agreeing to certain terms of social co-operation. B) Kantian contractarians, such as John Rawls, appeal to moral reasons to justify the terms of social cooperation that would be worthy of consent, usually arguing for distributions on the egalitarian end of the spectrum. A Hobbesian contractarian, as you might suspect, is more likely to argue for libertarian oriented systems (Buchanan, 1982(4); Gauthier, 1987(5); Levin, 1982(6)). However, there are also followers of Hobbes who insist his contractarianism is better read to justify some important aspects of the welfare state, rather than a merely minimalist government (Kavka, 1986(7); Morris, 1998(8): ch. 9; Vallentyne, 1991(9)). So theorists who share the 'contractarian' label may also be characterized by a libertarian rejection of redistribution or an egalitarian insistence on widespread distribution (...). Equality/egalitarianism: the most common alternatives to characterizing distributive justice theories along the dimensions of welfare and responsibility have been to characterize them either along the related dimension of equality, or according to the degree of egalitarianism the theories prescribe. So each of the theories already surveyed here could alternatively be categorized according to its treatment, or approach, to equality (Joseph and Sumption, 1979(10); Rakowski, 1991)(11). >Equality/Sen. Sen: in his influential lecture 'Equality of what?' (1980)(12), Amartya Sen addresses the question of what metric egalitarians should use to determine the degree to which a society realizes the ideal of equality. A range of alternative variables for what should be equalized have since been introduced (Daniels, 1990(13)) and refined, including the resource egalitarians discussed above (Dworkin, 2000)(14), equal opportunity for welfare (Arneson, 1989(15); 1990(16); 1991(17)), equal access to advantage (Cohen, 1989)(18), and equal political status (Anderson, 1999)(19). Gaus I 232 Concepts/content/theories: Another complication (...) comes from differences in how the very topic of distributive justice itself is conceived, with some theorists emphasizing process rather than content or justification. Principles: [many theories] address the question of distributive justice by recommending principles intended as normative ideals for institutions, which themselves will significantly determine the distribution of resources. These theories reflect progress and a growing consensus throughout most of the twentieth century about what is not acceptable. For example, all of the theories on offer reject the inequalities characteristic in feudal, aristocratic, and slave societies, as well as the inequalities inherent in systems that restrict access to goods, services, jobs or positions on the basis of race, gender, ethnicity or religion. Deciding processes: On the other hand, some theorists believe that the ongoing existence of reasonable disagreement reflects importantly on the very nature of distributive justice. They argue that, within the area of reasonable disagreement about what are the best distributive ideals, the additional questions to examine are whether the processes for deciding distributive questions are just. So, some argue that certain distributive justice issues should be dealt with at the constitutional level, variously described, while other issues are properly decided at the legislative level. Just processes; a subgroup of these theorists also take the view that some decisions about distributive justice issues can be partly or fully justified because they are the result of a just process (Christiano, 1996(20); Gaus, 1996(21)). Rational argument alone may be able to exclude some systems as unjust, but others will be justified not simply on the grounds of their content, but also by the process by which they were reached. >Liberalism/Lamont. 1. Mill, John S. (1877) Utilitarianism, 6th edn. London: Longmans, Green. 2. Sidgwick, Henry (1890) The Methods of Ethics, 4th edn. London: Macmillan. 3. Hampton, Jean (1991) 'Two faces of contractarian thought'. In Peter Vallentyne, ed., Contractarianism and Rational Choice: Essays on David Gauthier 's Morals by Agreement. New York: Oxford University Press, 31—55. 4. Buchanan, Allen (1982) 'A critical introduction to Rawls' theory of justice'. In H. Gene Blocker and Elizabeth H. Smith, eds, John Rawls' Theory of Social Justice: An Introduction. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press. 5. Gauthier, David Peter (1987) Morals by Agreement. Oxford: Clarendon. 6. Levin, Michael (1982) 'A Hobbesian minimal state'. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1 1 (4): 338-53. 7. Kavka, Gregory S. (1986) Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 8. Morris, Christopher (1998) An Essay on the Modern State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 9. Vallentyne, Peter (1991) Contractarianism and Rational Choice: Essays on David Gauthier's Morals by Agreement. New York: Cambridge University Press. 10. Joseph, Keith and Jonathan Sumption (1979) Equality. London: Murray. 11. Rakowskl, Eric (1991) Equal Justice. Oxford: Clarendon. 12. Sen, Amartya (1980) 'Equality of what?' In Sterling M. McMurrin, ed., Tanner Lectures on Human Values, vol. I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 195-220. 13. Daniels, Norman (1990) 'Equality of what: welfare, resources, or capabilities?' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 50 (Fall): 273-96. 14. Dworkin, Ronald (2000) Soveæign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 15. Arneson, Richard (1989) 'Equality and equal opportunity for welfare, Philosophical Studies, 56: 77-93. 16. Arneson, Richard (1990) 'Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism and equal opportunity for welfare', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19: 159-94. 17. Arneson, Richard (1991) 'Lockean self-ownership: towards a demolition', Political Studies, 39 (l): 36-54. 18. Cohen, G. A. (1989) 'On the currency of egalitarian justice'. Ethics, 99 906_44. 19. Anderson, Elizabeth (1999) 'What is the point of equality?' Ethics, 109 (2): 287-337. 20. Christiano, Thomas (1996) The Rule of the Many: Fundamental Issues in Democratic Theory. Boulder, CO: Westview. 21. Gaus, Gerald (1996) Justificatory Liberalism. New York: Oxford University Press. Lamont, Julian 2004. „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Life | Gould | I 227 ff Beginning/life/Gould: e.g. at the end of 1977, fossil prokaryotes were discovered in South Africa, which were about 3.4 billion years old. This is a much earlier beginning of life than previously assumed. Definition prokaryotes: prokaryotes are e.g. bacteria and blue-green algae, among others and they form the kingdom of the Definition Monera: Monera have no organelles, no nuclei, no mitochondria. A short time later it was announced that these methane bacteria are not closely related to other Monera at all. Common ancestors had to be much older! The oldest dated rocks in West Greenland are 3.8 billion years old. So there is very little time from the creation of decent living conditions to the creation of life itself. Perhaps the emergence of life (primitive life) is as inevitable as that of feldspar or quartz. If methanogens are listed separately, they form a sixth kingdom. Biologists today distinguish between Eukaryotes and prokaryotes rather than between plants and animals. Because of a common RNA sequence, the prokaryotes must have had a common precursor at some point in time. I 234 The assumption of a steady evolutionary speed is probably impossible to maintain. The early methanogens may have developed much faster. I 260 Form/life/organism/evolution/physics/Gould: stability is created by the fact that a living being is large enough to penetrate into an area where gravity surpasses the forces that take place on the surface. As the ratio of surface to volume decreases with growth, an increasing size is the safest way into this area. The Earth's physical environment contains numerous habitats, which are only available to organisms that are larger than single-celled organisms. The multicellularity probably originated in several places independently of each other. It has the two main features of analogue similarity: 1. it is relatively easy to reach and both highly adaptable and flexible and 2. it is the only possible route to the benefits it brings. With the exception of ostrich eggs, individual cells cannot grow very large. I 261 The multicellularity has probably arisen even within the individual kingdoms several times. Most biologists believe that it occurs in plants and fungi through amalgamation. These organisms are the descendants of protist colonies. (Protists: protists are unicellular organisms, see Terminology/Gould) For example, some Volvox colonies with a fixed number of cells are regularly arranged. The cells may differ in size and the reproductive function may be limited to those of them located at a pole. I 264 Larger animals have such a low ratio of outer surface to volume that they need to form internal organs to increase the available surface area. I 288 Ratio of surface to volume: the ratio of surface to volume is very high in small organisms. Heat is generated by the volume of the body and radiated at its surface. Therefore warm-blooded animals have a particularly high energy requirement. Field mice must eat all the time. The ratio was so low for the large dinosaurs that they could get by without an insulation layer. I 311 Shape/life/physics/size/Gould: the character of Morgan in E. L. Doctorow's "Ragtime" was wrong when he thought that large mammals were geometric copies of their smaller relatives. Elephants have relatively larger brains and thicker legs than mice. He is right in that larger animals are often similar to smaller relatives in the same group. Galileo already gave a classic example: the strength of a leg is a function of the cross-section. The weight that the legs have to carry varies with their volume. In order for the bodily functions to remain the same, animals must change their form when they become larger: "scaling theory". E. g. from crab spider to tarantula, the scale of relatives reaches up to a thousand times the body weight of the smallest specimen. Here too, the scale runs regularly: the duration of the heartbeat increases only 4/10 times as fast as the body weight. I 312 Small animals move through life much faster than large ones, their heart beats faster, they breathe more frequently, their pulse is faster, their "fire of life "burns" faster: in mammals, the metabolic rate increases by only three quarters as fast as the body weight. Smaller ones tend to live shorter than large ones. I 313 However, the homo sapiens lives much longer than a comparable mammal of the same size: See Neoteny/Gould. The importance of the astronomical time is by no means to be denied; animals must measure it in order to survive. I 315 Breathing time and heartbeat increase about 0.28 times faster than body weight; the body weight can be reduced, leaving mammals of any size to breathe once at about 4 beats. For all mammals, regardless of their size, they also breathe about 200 million times during their lifetime, the heart beats about 800 million times. I 318 ff There are magnetotactic bacteria that orient themselves according to the fields and move accordingly. They thus resist the mechanism of Brownian movement. It was discovered that the magnets are distributed in the body of the bacteria in the form of about 20 small particles. Question: why is there this distribution of magnetism on particles, and why are these particles about 500 Angstrom large (1 Angstrom = 1 ten millionth of a millimetre). They form a chain in the body of the elongated bacteria. I 320 If these particles were a little smaller (about one-fifth smaller) then they would be "superparamagnetic", i. e. a magnetic reorientation of the particles could be effected at room temperature. If, on the other hand, they were twice as large, for example, the particles would form their own magnetic range within the particles, pointing in different directions. What can such a small creature do with a magnetic field? The room for movement during the few minutes of their existence is probably only a few centimetres. It does not really matter which way it goes. It can now be decisive for a bacterium to move downwards. Now gravity can be felt at least as well without a magnetic field. However, this only applies to large organisms. I 322 Insects and birds live in a world dominated by forces that affect the surface. Some of them can run on water or hang down from the ceiling because the surface tension is so strong and the gravitation is relatively weak. Gravity is hardly a problem for insects and for bacteria not at all. II 325 Life/sense/Gould: thesis: the history of life has some weak empirical tendencies, but in essence it is nowhere to be found. IV 196 Life/multicellular organisms: life only existed for 600 million years. This time is divided into three major parts: Palaeozoic (old earth age), Mesozoic (earth middle age) and Cenozoic (modern earth age). All problematic cases take place in the Palaeozoic. Surprisingly, there is a superordinate pattern: although the number of problematica (organisms that had no future in evolution and therefore, due to their rarity and isolation are difficult to allocate) is declining towards the modern age, it is amazing how they almost completely disappear towards the end of the Palaeozoic. In the early history of multicellular organisms, the problematica must have flourished. IV 303 Life/Gould: life as a result of structural and functional complexity cannot be broken down into its chemical components and cannot be explained in its entirety by laws. Function: e.g. the cell membrane controls many processes in the cell. How can we interpret the functions of cells by breaking them down into molecular components? III 207 Life/development/complexity: Gould: 7 arguments 1. Life must begin on the left wall (minimum complexity). 2. There must be temporal stability of the original bacterial form. The prokaryotes (organisms without nucleus, chromosomes, mitochondria and choroplasts) consist of breathtakingly diverse groups, which are collectively called "bacteria" and the "blue-green algae", also called bacteria (cyanobacteria), which make use of the photosynthesis. More than half the history of life is the history of prokaryotes. 3. In order for life to spread, a more and more right-wing distribution had to develop. 4. Characterizing a total distribution by an extreme value in a tail is short-sighted. More than 80% of all species are arthropods, and as a rule all members of this tribe are considered primitive. Moreover, the forms that occupied the right tail over time do not form an uninterrupted evolutionary sequence. It is a colorful row that is not connected. Time Sequence: bacteria, eukaryotic cell, marine algae, jellyfish, trilobite, nautilus, shellfish, dinosaurs, sabre-toothed tigers, homo sapiens. 5. Causality lies on the ((s) left) wall (lowest complexity) and in the extension of the range of variations. The right tail is not cause, but effect. III 212 6. The only way to reintroduce progress is logically possible, but empirically most likely wrong. The first living creature stands on the left wall but the first mammal, the first flowering plant or the first clam starts from the middle and the offspring can move in both directions. But there are good reasons to assume a preference for the direction to the left, because parasitism is a very common evolutionary strategy, and parasites are anatomically usually built simpler than their independent ancestors (Vs progress!). So the whole system could contain subordinate counterlines. Empirically, the finds show no preference to the right! 7. Even a narrow-minded limitation to the right tail (>complexity) does not lead to the desired conclusion, namely a predictable, meaningful evolution to the supremacy of a conscious being. The right tail must exist statistically, but what kind of living things exist cannot be predicted at all. It is by no means determined by the mechanisms of evolution! If evolution were to repeat itself, the development to human-like beings would be virtually impossible, because of the extreme improbability. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Mind | Chalmers | I 11 Mind/Chalmers: conscious experience is not all there is to the mind. Cognitive sciences has had almost nothing to say about consciousness, but about mind in general as the internal basis of behaviour. >Cognitive psychology, >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Behavior. Mind/Chalmers: a) phenomenal concept of mind: the conscious experience of mental states. That is what I will concentrate on. >Spirit, >Mental states, >Experience. b) The psychological concept as a causal or explanatory basis of behaviour. ChalmersVsDescartes: Descartes may have been partly responsible for a conflation of the two concepts. >R. Descartes, >Causal Explanation. I 14 Mind/Psychology/Ryle/Chalmers: in philosophy, the shift in emphasis form the phenomenal to the psychological was codified by Gilbert Ryle (1949) (1) who argued that all our mental concepts can be analysed in terms of certain kinds of associated behaviour, or in terms of dispositions to behave in certain ways (E. g. Lycan 1987 (2)). >G. Ryle, >Dispositions. ChalmersVsRyle: Ryle intended all mental concepts to fall within the grasp of his analysis. It seems to me that this view is a nonstarter as an analysis of our phenomenal concepts such as sensation and consciousness itself. >Sensation. But Ryle’s analysis provided a suggestive approach to many other mental notions, such as believing, enjoying, wanting, pretending and remembering. >Memory, >Thinking, >Desires, >Beliefs. ChalmersVsRyle: technical problems: 1. It is natural to suppose that mental states cause behaviour, but if mental states are themselves behavioural then it is hard to see how they could do the job. >Weakness of will. 2. it was argued (Chisholm, 1957 (3), Geach, 1957 (4)) that no mental state could be defined by a single range of behavioural dispositions, independent of any other mental states. E.g. if one believes that it is raining, one’s behavioural dispositions will vary depending on whether one has the desire to get wet. It is therefore necessary to invoke other mental states in characterizing the behavioural dispositions. (GeachVsRyle, ChisholmVsRyle). >P. Geach, >R. Chisholm. 1. G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, Oondon 1949 2. W. G. Lycan, Consciousness, Cambridge 1987 3. R. Chisholm, Perceiving Ithaca, NY, 1957 4. P. Geach, Mental Acts, London 1957 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Nationalism | Morris | Gaus I 206 Nationalism/Morris: Some have claimed that nationalism, the principle 'which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent', 'determines the norm for the legitimacy of political units in the modern world' (Gellner, 1983(1): l, 49). A related thesis is that nationality is a basis for the legitimacy of states: 'Nationalism holds that the only legitimate type of government is national self-determination' (Kedourie, 1993(2): l). >Nation/Morris. MorrisVsGellner: It is a mistake, albeit an understandable one, to characterize nationalism as Gellner does; some nationalists do not seek statehood for their people, and characterizing nationalism in terms of statehood begs the question against 'liberal' or anarchist nationalism and other moderate positions. We might expect that most contemporary nationalist movements would claim a state for their nation, but one can be a nationalist without being a statist. Nation-states: If it is not the case that every nation is entitled to become or ought to become a distinct state, and if consequently not every state will be the state of a single nation, what then are nation-states? Most states today and throughout the last two centuries have been multinational states - in this respect multiculturalism is not a new invention. country. (...) the United States is multinational, and many Americans explicitly identify themselves in multinational 'hyphenated' ways (e.g. Italian-American). These two countries are interesting as they are comparatively old states. In addition, both share an Enlightenment tradition which is hostile to nationalism; each was born of an eighteenth-century revolution fought in the name of universal principles. Even if they are multinational as well as somewhat hostile to nationalism, they both seem in certain senses to be nation-states of a kind. Each is a state which has developed a 'national' culture, easily recognizable to outsiders, whose members are readily moved by sentiments of patriotic allegiance. In terms of the characterization of nation that I have invoked, there is a way in which we can say that France and the US have become in their distinct ways multinational nations and thus nation-states. 1. Gellner, Ernest (1983) Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 2. Kedourie, Elie (1993 119601) Nationalism, 4th edn. Oxford: Blackwell. Morris, Christopher W. 2004. „The Modern State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Nations | Morris | Gaus I 205 Nations/state/Morris: States (...) are also referred to as 'nation-states', perhaps to dis- tinguish them from Greek poleis or Renaissance city-republics. If we think of states and nations as different things, an interesting question is whether states must be nation-states. To raise this question we need to distinguish states and nations. >State/Morris. Def Nation/Morris: In the sense that interests us here, a nation is a society whose members are linked by sentiments of solidarity and self-conscious identity based on a number of other bonds (e.g. history, territory, culture, race, 'ethnicity', language, religion, customs) (...). A group of humans will constitute a nation in this sense in so far as the members share certain properties and in so far as they are conscious of this shared condition and recognize one another by virtue of these common properties. Nations, then, will be collections of individuals with common histories, cultures, languages, and the like, and whose members recognize other members by virtue of their possession of these attributes (see Morris, 1998(1): ch. 8). (...) this way of characterizing nations will help in explaining and evaluating certain significant ways humans have of understanding themselves. Once states and nations are distinguished, a number of possible relations become obvious. Since the entire land mass of the globe is now the territory of some state, we do not find any nation that does not Gaus I 206 overlap with a state. We can then eliminate the possible 'one nation, no state' relation. The main remaining possibilities are: - one nation + one state (e.g. Japan, Germany) - one nation + several states (e.g. the Basques, the Kurds) - several nations + one state (e.g. Canada, Switzerland, Belgium). The first possibility is the salient one as it is that adopted by nationalists and defenders of the view that national peoples are entitled to their own state. Some have claimed that nationalism, the principle 'which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent', 'determines the norm for the legitimacy of political units in the modern world' (Gellner, 1983(2): l, 49). A related thesis is that nationality is a basis for the legitimacy of states: 'Nationalism holds that the only legitimate type of government is national self-determination' (Kedourie, 1993(3): l). >Nationalism/Morris. Nation-states: If it is not the case that every nation is entitled to become or ought to become a distinct state, and if consequently not every state will be the state of a single nation, what then are nation-states? Most states today and throughout the last two centuries have been multinational states - in this respect multiculturalism is not a new invention. country. (...) the United States is multinational, and many Americans explicitly identify themselves in multinational 'hyphenated' ways (e.g. Italian-American). These two countries are interesting as they are comparatively old states. In addition, both share an Enlightenment tradition which is hostile to nationalism; each was born of an eighteenth-century revolution fought in the name of universal principles. Even if they are multinational as well as somewhat hostile to nationalism, they both seem in certain senses to be nation-states of a kind. Each is a state which has developed a 'national' culture, easily recognizable to outsiders, whose members are readily moved by sentiments of patriotic allegiance. In terms of the characterization of nation that I have invoked, there is a way in which we can say that France and the US have become in their distinct ways multinational nations and thus nation-states. 1. Morris, Christopher W. (1998) An Essay on the Modern State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Gellner, Ernest (1983) Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 3. Kedourie, Elie (1993 119601) Nationalism, 4th edn. Oxford: Blackwell. Morris, Christopher W. 2004. „The Modern State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Profit Maximization | Alchian | Henderson I 90 Profit maximization/economic Success/Alchian/Henderson/Globerman: „Realized positive profits, not maximum profits, are the mark of success and viability. It does not matter through what process of reasoning or motivation such success was achieved. The fact of its accomplishment is suffcient. This is the criterion by which the economic system selects survivors: those who realize positive profits are the survivors; those who suffer losses disappear.“(1) Example: You and many other people in a city - let's say Chicago - want to leave Chicago by car. You have many routes to choose from. But, it turns out, of all the routes you and others might choose to drive, only one route has gas stations. What will happen? People who don't use that one route will not get very far. The only drivers who will go far are those who choose the route that has gas stations. Information: Alchian: in a justly famous article, "Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory," in the 19 50 Journal of Political Economy, Armen Alchian uses the driving-from-Chicago example to help explain why economists can predict the behaviour of people who run firms, even if those people don't have perfect information. Of course, firms don't have perfect information and so Alchian's reasoning is important. Maximum profit/economic theories: (…) [there] was a heated debate in economics journals in the 1940s about whether it was reasonable to assume that firms maximize profits. a) Defenders of that assumption argued that firms acted as if they maximized profits. b) Some critics of the assumption argued that the fact of uncertainly meant that they couldn't maximize profits. c) Alchian (…) did not argue that firms act as if they maximize profits. Uncertainty/imperfect information/Alchian: (…) he agreed with one critic, Gerhard Tintner, that when firms' managers cannot have certainly, the very concept of profit maximization is suspect. But, argued Alchian, that does not mean that we can't predict the behaviour of firms. Akin to the evolution that Charles Darwin studied, when firms "evolve," those that make what, in retrospect, are good decisions, even if the decisions are random, will do better and be more likely to survive than those that make bad decisions. >Evolution, >Darwin, >Darwinism, >Imperfect information, >Uncertainty. Survival of theories: Example: Imagine that the supply of labour falls, so that wage rates rise. In economic theory, efficient organizations would respond to the increase in wage rates by substituting, at the margin, capital inputs, such as machinery and equipment, for labour. So the result of the higher wages would be less employment of labour.* Henderson I 91 Now imagine that no organization initially responds in this textbook manner, but that some firms are operating, for whatever reason, with a Iower labour-to-capital ratio than other firms. Assume that all firms start with the same costs. Now, as a consequence of the increase in wage rates, the firms with a Iower ratio of labour to capital will have Iower costs than the other firms. This, in turn, means that the former will have a higher probability of survival in the competitive process. The end result is that surviving firms will operate with Iower ratios of labour to capital much as would have been the case had managers deliberately substituted capital for labour as textbook descriptions of effcient management behaviour would prescribe. Innovation/Alchian: To some extent, decision-makers will be guided by “successful” behaviour that they see around them and will adopt that behaviour to the extent they can. New behaviours that produce more efficient or preferable outcomes than existing behaviours will also be imitated, a process that Alchian calls “adaptive behaviour to innovation.” Success/Alchian: But his point is that even if firm managers made decisions randomly, the competitive process would weed out firms that made retrospectively bad decisions and that the firms that made retrospectively good decisions would be more likely to survive. Solution/Alchian: An economist need not assume that firms maximize profits. Economists are able to predict behaviour of the firms that survive without the strong assumption of profit maximization. >Behavioral economics, >Behavioral economics as author. Henderson I 93 Behavioral economics/Alchian: Alchian never addressed the arguments of behavioural economists directly. But his framework addresses the main concern raised by their arguments, namely, that conventional economic models that assume rational maximizing decision-making have limited predictive content and are poor guides to public policy. >Profit maximization/Alchian. Profit maximization/incomplete information: (…) in a sense, Alchian anticipated modern behavioural economics by acknowledging that most managers of firms do not and, indeed, cannot operate as pure profit-maximizers given the uncertainty and incomplete information characterizing the business environment. Economic success/Alchian: However, (…) Alchian argued persuasively that predictions from economic models that assume rational decision-making would be reasonably predictive over time. Selection: The reason is that the for-profit environment selects for success. Firms whose managers implement strategies that lead to higher profits, whether the strategies were chosen intentionally or by accident, do better in the marketplace, while firms that make worse decisions do worse and may even disappear. * That, by the way, is why so many economists over the decades have been critical of increases in the minimum wage. They want People who want to work to have jobs. 1. Armen Alchian (1950), "Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory." |
Alchian I Armen A. Alchian William R. Allen Exchange and Production: Competition, Coordination and Control Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 1977 Henderson I David R. Henderson Steven Globerman The Essential UCLA School of Economics Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 2019 |
| Prosentential Theory | Grover, D. L. | Horwich I 315 Prosentential Theory/Camp, Grover, Belnap/CGB/Grover: (modification of Ramsey's approach) thesis: if we enrich everyday language slightly with propositional quantification (quantification over propositions), then we can express everything without a truth predicate ("true") that we can express with it. See T-predicate, truth predicate. I 324 Prosentential Theory/CGB: variables do not need to be connected with predicates in prosentences. Everyday Language: everyday language already has prosentences, e.g. "it is true", "that's true". Relative pronoun: a relative pronoun is only possible with individual variables - not with propositional variables (they have a sentence position). Solution: a solution offers the cross-reference - then a variable in the prosentence does not have to be connected to a verb. I 325 True/Ramsey: "true" does not have to attribute a property. CGB: true may be a fragment of the prosentence. I 334 Prosentential/CGB: thesis: we want to say in the spirit of Ramsey that all speech about the truth can be understood so that it only involves the prosentential use of "that's true". I 349 Prosentence/CGB: a prosentence must not be split (to take "the" as an anaphora - otherwise also "is true" stands alone and is then no longer referring, but characterizing (property-attributing CGBVs)). I 351 True: "true" becomes characterizing when "they" is construed as an independent pronoun (traditional, non-anaphoric). I 354 Prosentence: a prosentence never refers to a proposition (as an object of belief). ad I 352 (Prosentence/CGB/(s): a prosentence normally does not have an assertive force). See assertive force. |
Grover, D. L. Gro I D. Grover, A Prosentential Theory of Thruth, Princeton New Jersey 1992 Kamp/Grover/Belnap D. L. Grover, J L. Camp, N. D. Belnap Philosophical Studies 27 (1) 73 – 125 (1975) See external reference in the individual contributions. Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Proxy | Tugendhat | I 366 Proxy/Tugendhat: predicates are no substitute: characterization function: >characterizing. Singular term are substitutes. I 407 Stand for/Tugendhat/(s): to stand for is distinguished from reference. >Predicates, >Singular terms, >Reference. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Sentences | Strawson | I 196 StrawsonVsFrege: that the parts of the sentence stick together only by unsaturated is merely metaphorical - RamseyVsFrege: no reason to consider any part as unsaturated. >Reference/Ramsey, >Particularization/Ramsey, >"unsaturated"/Frege. I 214 Connection/relation/Strawson: a) stating tie: (s) "is a .." b) stating tie: "is in relation to ..", "is an example for.." Two-digit terms themselves are not again designations of relations. >Relations. Stating relations between things are not themselves relation. I 216 1. Kind or sample tie/Strawson: a) Fido is a dog, an animal, a terrier b) Fido, Coco and Rover are dogs. 2. a) characterizing tie: E.g. Socrates is wise, is agile, argues b) Socrates , Plato, Aristotle, are all wise, all die 3. attributive tie: Summary of particulars due to the characterizing tie. E.g. smiling, praying - each of them symmetrical form: "x stands in characterizing tie to y. Asymmetrical: "x is characterized by y" - then y is a dependent element. I 219 Categorical criterion of the subject-predicate distinction: "x is asserted bonded as non-relational to y" i.e. that universals can be predicted by particulars, but not particulars of universals. - But also universals can be predicated by universals. >Universals/Strawson. I 221 New: distinction between fact types instead of word types. --- IV 53 Sentence/Strawson: the general form of the sentence is: "It behaves so and so". |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Situations | Mischel | Corr I 28 Situations/Mischel/VsMischel/Funder: However, even though the past half-decade of social psychological literature has granted the lion’s share of explanatory power to situational forces, still missing is any real technology for defining, for characterizing, or measuring them. This lack has been noted repeatedly: Swann and Seyle (2005)(1) argue that certain current avenues of research (such as Mischel and Shoda’s (1999)(2) CAPS model) will not recognize their full potential until ‘the development of a comprehensive taxonomy of situations’ (Swann and Seyle 2005, p. 162). Mischel himself once suggested that describing differences in situations might be more productive than describing the behaviours of people in them (Mischel and Peake 1983)(3). See Situations/Asendorpf, >Situations/Funder. 1. Swann, W. B. and Seyle, C. 2005, Personality psychology’s comeback and its emerging symbiosis with social psychology, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 31: 155–65 2. Mischel, W. and Shoda, Y. 1999. Integrating dispositions and processing dynamics within a unified theory of personality: the cognitive-affective personality system. New York, NY: Guilford Press 3. Mischel, W. and Peake, P. K. 1983. Some facets of consistency: replies to Epstein, Funder, and Bem, Psychological Review 90: 394–402 Seth A Wagerman & David C. Funder, “Personality psychology of situations”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press. |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Symbols | Ricoeur | I 19 Symbol/Psychoanalysis/Dream Interpretation/Ricoeur: The dream and its analogues (...) are located (...) in an area of language that announces itself as the place of complex meanings, where in an immediate sense another sense opens up and at the same time hides itself; we want to call this region of double meaning symbol, (...) >Myth/Ricoeur, >Sense/Ricoeur, >Desire/Ricoeur. I 22 Symbol definitions: A. Too wide: a too wide definition is that which sees in the "symbolic function" the general mediating function with which the mind, the consciousness constructs all its worlds of perception and speech: For example, Ernst Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms. >Cassirer/Ricoeur. I 25 Symbol/Ricoeur: [the symbol] is a dualism of a higher degree [than the sign]. (See >Symbol/Ricoeur). It is neither the one of sensual sign and meaning, nor the one of meaning and thing (...) It is added to the previous one and superimposes it as a relationship of sense to sense (...). (>Sense/Ricoeur). So I limited the concept of symbol (...) to the ambiguous and ambiguous expressions whose semantic texture interacts with the work of interpretation that explicates its second or multiple meaning. >Interpretation/Ricoeur. I 28 There is no symbolism preceding the speaking person (...). I 29 Symbol definitions: B. Too Narrow: [too narrow a definition] consists in characterizing the band between sense and sense in the symbol by analogy. For example, analogies between spot and pollution, between deviation and sin, between burden and sinfulness; [in general] in a sense, the analogy between the physical and the existential. I 31 Interpretation: [the] connection to interpretation is not external to the symbol (...) It is precisely the double sense, the intentional orientation of the second sense within and by means of the first sense, that produces understanding (...). Therefore there is no symbol without a beginning of interpretation (...). |
Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976 |
| Terminology | Strawson | I 134 M-predicates/Strawson: predicates that can be also correctly applied to purely mathematical bodies: E.g. "weighs 5 kg" "is in the living room". P-predicates: applicable to persons: E.g. "smile", "suffer pain", "go for a walk", "believe in God". VII 118/19 Description/Meaning/Strawson: e.g. "He": minimal descriptive meaning. E.g. "Blue Grotto": maximum descriptive meaning. E.g. "The Blue Grotto": middle position, "impure" proper name. I 185 A-expressions: are substantive B-expressions: are predicative. I 239f Universal/particular/introduction: Class (1): (universal): expressions of which one (without empirical facts) cannot know what they introduce class (2) (paricular) also without empirical fact possible to know what they introduce - both are incomplete (1) presuppose implicit expressions, have factual weight (2) have no factual weight. I 241 Subject/predicate/thing/particular/universal: 3. Criterion: expressions introducing particulars can never be predicate expressions - Definition subject-expression: presents a fact by itself (complete) Predicate A: incomplete "is married to John" is not a fact by itself. I 32ff Logically individuating description: "the first", "the only" etc. Pure individuating description: the only dog who was born at sea" Quasi-pure: the tallest man who has lived so far. Except for probability considerations no reasons that pure individuating descriptions apply to something. I 215 a) Type-universals: provides classification principle, does require none - E.g. generic names b) characterizing universals: E.g. verbs, adjectives: deliver classification-principle - only for previously classified particulars. But also particulars themselves provide "principle of summary": E.g. Socrates as well as wisdom -> "attributive tie": (non-relational relation between particulars of different types). Newen ) 93 Def implication: A imp B iff. it can not be that A is true but B is false. Def presupposition: A presupposes B iff. B must be true in order for A to have any specific truth value. V 13 Def "Sense Principle" / Strawson: there is no legitimate use of ideas or concepts that would not refer to the empirical conditions of its application. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Theories | Lamont | Gaus I 230 Theories/principles/justification/Lamont: (...) theories [on distributive justice] have been characterized mainly according to the content of their approach to the moral demands of welfare (or luck) and responsibility. It is important to note here some of the complications of these characterizations and Gaus I 231 also other ways of conceptualizing the distributive justice literature. Most theorists are accurately described by a number of non-equivalent labels. The classifications used here are widespread in the contemporary literature, but there are nevertheless subtle differences in the ways different authors use these labels. Content/principle/justification: one important distinction is between the content of a distributive principle, and its justification. Content: 'Content' refers to the distribution ideally recommended by a principle, whereas 'justification' refers to the reasons given in support of the principle. Theorists can be distinguished and labelled according to the content of their theory or according to the justification they give. Problems: 1) (...) the common labels used here refer sometimes to the content and other times to the justifications for various positions. 2) (...) most groups of theories have justifications from a number of different sources and single writers even will sometimes use more than one source of justification for their theory. Most combinations of content and justification, in fact, have been tried. For instance, different libertarians use natural rights, desert, utilitarianism or contractarianism in the justification of their theories; different desert theorists use natural rights, contractarianism and even utilitarianism (Mill 1877(1); Sidgwick, 1890(2)). Partly this comes about because there are different versions of justifications which nevertheless, due to some similarity, share the same broad label. Contract theory: For instance, contractarianism features in the justifications of many theories, and covers both Hobbesian and Kantian contractarians, after Thomas Hobbes and Immanuel Kant (Hampton, 1991(3)). A) Hobbesian contractarians, such as David Gauthier, attempt to justify morality in terms of the self-interested reasons individuals have for agreeing to certain terms of social co-operation. B) Kantian contractarians, such as John Rawls, appeal to moral reasons to justify the terms of social cooperation that would be worthy of consent, usually arguing for distributions on the egalitarian end of the spectrum. A Hobbesian contractarian, as you might suspect, is more likely to argue for libertarian oriented systems (Buchanan, 1982(4); Gauthier, 1987(5); Levin, 1982(6)). However, there are also followers of Hobbes who insist his contractarianism is better read to justify some important aspects of the welfare state, rather than a merely minimalist government (Kavka, 1986(7); Morris, 1998(8): ch. 9; Vallentyne, 1991(9)). So theorists who share the 'contractarian' label may also be characterized by a libertarian rejection of redistribution or an egalitarian insistence on widespread distribution (...). Equality/egalitarianism: the most common alternatives to characterizing distributive justice theories along the dimensions of welfare and responsibility have been to characterize them either along the related dimension of equality, or according to the degree of egalitarianism the theories prescribe. So each of the theories already surveyed here could alternatively be categorized according to its treatment, or approach, to equality (Joseph and Sumption, 1979(10); Rakowski, 1991)(11). >Equality/Sen. Sen: in his influential lecture 'Equality of what?' (1980)(12), Amartya Sen addresses the question of what metric egalitarians should use to determine the degree to which a society realizes the ideal of equality. A range of alternative variables for what should be equalized have since been introduced (Daniels, 1990(13)) and refined, including the resource egalitarians discussed above (Dworkin, 2000)(14), equal opportunity for welfare (Arneson, 1989(15); 1990(16); 1991(17)), equal access to advantage (Cohen, 1989)(18), and equal political status (Anderson, 1999)(19). Gaus I 232 Concepts/content/theories: Another complication (...) comes from differences in how the very topic of distributive justice itself is conceived, with some theorists emphasizing process rather than content or justification. Principles: [many theories] address the question of distributive justice by recommending principles intended as normative ideals for institutions, which themselves will significantly determine the distribution of resources. These theories reflect progress and a growing consensus throughout most of the twentieth century about what is not acceptable. For example, all of the theories on offer reject the inequalities characteristic in feudal, aristocratic, and slave societies, as well as the inequalities inherent in systems that restrict access to goods, services, jobs or positions on the basis of race, gender, ethnicity or religion. Deciding processes: On the other hand, some theorists believe that the ongoing existence of reasonable disagreement reflects importantly on the very nature of distributive justice. They argue that, within the area of reasonable disagreement about what are the best distributive ideals, the additional questions to examine are whether the processes for deciding distributive questions are just. So, some argue that certain distributive justice issues should be dealt with at the constitutional level, variously described, while other issues are properly decided at the legislative level. Just processes; a subgroup of these theorists also take the view that some decisions about distributive justice issues can be partly or fully justified because they are the result of a just process (Christiano, 1996(20); Gaus, 1996(21)). Rational argument alone may be able to exclude some systems as unjust, but others will be justified not simply on the grounds of their content, but also by the process by which they were reached. >Liberalism/Lamont. 1. Mill, John S. (1877) Utilitarianism, 6th edn. London: Longmans, Green. 2. Sidgwick, Henry (1890) The Methods of Ethics, 4th edn. London: Macmillan. 3. Hampton, Jean (1991) 'Two faces of contractarian thought'. In Peter Vallentyne, ed., Contractarianism and Rational Choice: Essays on David Gauthier 's Morals by Agreement. New York: Oxford University Press, 31—55. 4. Buchanan, Allen (1982) 'A critical introduction to Rawls' theory of justice'. In H. Gene Blocker and Elizabeth H. Smith, eds, John Rawls' Theory of Social Justice: An Introduction. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press. 5. Gauthier, David Peter (1987) Morals by Agreement. Oxford: Clarendon. 6. Levin, Michael (1982) 'A Hobbesian minimal state'. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1 1 (4): 338-53. 7. Kavka, Gregory S. (1986) Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 8. Morris, Christopher (1998) An Essay on the Modern State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 9. Vallentyne, Peter (1991) Contractarianism and Rational Choice: Essays on David Gauthier's Morals by Agreement. New York: Cambridge University Press. 10. Joseph, Keith and Jonathan Sumption (1979) Equality. London: Murray. 11. Rakowskl, Eric (1991) Equal Justice. Oxford: Clarendon. 12. Sen, Amartya (1980) 'Equality of what?' In Sterling M. McMurrin, ed., Tanner Lectures on Human Values, vol. I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 195-220. 13. Daniels, Norman (1990) 'Equality of what: welfare, resources, or capabilities?' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 50 (Fall): 273-96. 14. Dworkin, Ronald (2000) Soveæign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 15. Arneson, Richard (1989) 'Equality and equal opportunity for welfare, Philosophical Studies, 56: 77-93. 16. Arneson, Richard (1990) 'Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism and equal opportunity for welfare', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19: 159-94. 17. Arneson, Richard (1991) 'Lockean self-ownership: towards a demolition', Political Studies, 39 (l): 36-54. 18. Cohen, G. A. (1989) 'On the currency of egalitarian justice'. Ethics, 99 906_44. 19. Anderson, Elizabeth (1999) 'What is the point of equality?' Ethics, 109 (2): 287-337. 20. Christiano, Thomas (1996) The Rule of the Many: Fundamental Issues in Democratic Theory. Boulder, CO: Westview. 21. Gaus, Gerald (1996) Justificatory Liberalism. New York: Oxford University Press. Lamont, Julian 2004. „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Universals | Strawson | I 88 Universals/Strawson: E.g. repeated tone - same chord in various concert halls. I 176 Universals/Strawson: Tradition: only universals and particular-universals (E.g. be-married to John) can be predicted. Particulars can never be predicted. >Particulars/Strawson. Cf. >Concept/Frege, >Object/Frege. I 215 a) Type-universals: provides classification principle, does require none - E.g. generic names b) characterizing universals: E.g. verbs, adjectives: deliver classification-principle - only for previously classified particulars. But also particulars themselves provide "principle of summary": E.g. Socrates as well as wisdom -> "attributive tie": (non-relational relation between particulars of different types). I 216 Example of characterizing tie between Socrates and the universal death corresponds to the attributive tie between Socrates and his death - see copula/Strawson. I 251 Universals/Quine/Strawson: should only appear as predicates. Pro "nominalism". >Nominalism. StrawsonVsQuine: the language terms of this analysis, already presuppose the existence of subject-expressions. I 250 Essential feature-universals/essential feature-localizing findings/Strawson: E.g. it rains now - snow falls - here is water. No subject-predicate sentences: here no characterizing-universals, but types of material. Also no type-universals. - This is the least to make any empirical statements. Introduction with demonstrative does not require particulars. >Introduction/Strawson. E.g. Cat as an essential feature: a) for the same cat, b) for another cat. I 277 Essential-feature-universal/essential feature-localizing/Strawson: the corresponding essential feature-findings actually introduce things - but are not subject terms or subject phrases - "here"/"now" set no limits - (even if they are quantifiable, "there is no point in time "). I 279 Things are not introduced by space and time adverbs. >Essence. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Davidson, D. | Brandom Vs Davidson, D. | I 268 Objectivity/error: it is claimed that social practices suffice to impart objective representational content on allegations! These are then objective truth conditions. Even the entire community may be wrong with such an assessment! Universal error only possible with standards, not with concepts). (BrandomVsDavidson). I 931 Davidson: wants to derive all action from reasons. Therefore, irrational acts constitute a problem for him. I 932 BrandomVsDavidson: he confuses a global condition of intentions with a local one, because he makes no distinction between determination and authorization. I 383 VsDavidson: it may be that only the score keeper (not the actor) can demonstrate the practical justification. Even in such cases, the reasons would not act as causes. I 383 In addition, you can act on the grounds that you have or not. Davidson: intentions are comprehensive judgments in the light of all beliefs and desires. I 954 BrandomVsDavidson: unsatisfactory because desires and beliefs are treated as unanalyzed basic concepts. He did not explain the practices according to which those contents can be transferred. BrandomVsDavidson: Davidson does not distinguish between interpretations between languages and within a language. The interpretation at Davidson requires explanatory hypotheses and inferences from sounds which are emanated by another person. This was rightly countered with the argument that if you speak a common language, you do not hear sounds but meanings! This is about the necessary subcompetencies. I 692 Objectivity of conceptual standards: not only can we all individually (each of us) be wrong about it, but also all together! (electron, mass in the universe). Error about proper use. > BrandomVsDavidson: collectively false beliefs possible. I 957 Davidson: even if the powder had been wet, she would have managed to bend her finger. So there is something in every action that the actor intended and that he succeeded in doing. I 958 BrandomVsDavidson: our approach does not require such a theoretical definition. Citing RDRD is enough to solve the problem with the nervous mountain climbers (Davidson). This is a concrete alternative to Davidsons’ proposal of the "causation in the right way." I 729 Brandom: it does not matter whether the usually reliable ability fails in individual cases. If I spill the wine while reaching for the bread, there does not need to be anything that I intended to do and also succeeded in doing, according to our approach. I 747 Problem: the substitution in the field of "that" does not receive the truth value of the whole attribution. Solution: the sentence tokening in this field does not belong to the actual attribution! Davidson: reference and truth value changed with attribution. I 961 BrandomVsDavidson: he does not consider the possibility of considering the relationship between "that" and the following sentence tokening as an anaphoric one instead of a demonstrative one. II 48 BrandomVsDavidson: establishing prior request! Action/BrandomVsDavidson: we started elsewhere. Three distinctions: II 126 Acting intentionally: recognition of a practical definition b. Acting with reasons: be entitled to a definition. c. Acting for reasons: here, reasons are causes in cases where the recognition of a definition is triggered by suitable reflection. NS I 166 Reference/Brandom: is not a fundamental concept for him. But he has to explain it, because it is still a central concept. Solution/Brandom: formation of equivalence classes of sentences whose position in the network of inferences is preserved when terms are exchanged by co-referential terms. Truth/BrandomVsTarski/BrandomVsDavidson: he has to bend their definition in such a way that instead of truth characterizing the concept of inference ("from true premises to true conclusions"), conversely the concept of inference characterizes that of truth. To this end, Brandom considers the position of sentences beginning with "it is true that..." in our inference-networked language game. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Essentialism | Parsons Vs Essentialism | Cresswell I 58 Essentialism/Cresswell: Part of the problem is characterizing it at all. Def Essentialism/Terence Parsons/Cresswell: (Parsons 1969): the doctrine that some things necessarily have a property that other things do not necessarily have. Limited to single-digit predicates: logical form: the following applies for a 8.1 (E.g.) N x and (E.g.)~N x (Parsons also has several-digit predicates): Cresswell: in a complex wff a (where only x is free) which is supposed to be a modal essentialist formula, we can sipmly extend the language by forming an extra predicate and adding the following formula to L(T): 8.2 (x)(a ↔ (x)). ParsonsVsEssentialism/Parsons: an essentialist proposition is false in a maximum model. And for any consistent set of closed non-modal formulas (i.e., for the models of L(T)), there is a maximum model. Point: i.e. that no physical theory contians essentialism with regard to its predicates. Provided, of course, that W consists of all models of L(T). |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Propotype Theory | Fodor Vs Propotype Theory | NS I 160 Prototype Theory/Concepts/Criteria/Newen/Schrenk: (literature (13-24) tries to find the solution for the following: Thesis: Concepts as meanings of predicates are essentially characterized by prototypes E.g. A prototype for a table is one with four legs and a quadrangular plate. In the sense of the later Wittgenstein, this specifies no definitional, but only characterizing properties. VsPrototype Theory: Problem: 1) in many cases, there are no prototypes, E.g. for the complex concept "grandmother of a bank employee with four black-haired children". 2) The prototype theory cannot reduce complex concepts to simple terms. FodorVsPrototype Theory: concepts are compositional Prototypes are not compositional Therefore, concepts cannot be prototypes. >conceptual atomism. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Prosentential Theory | Verschiedene Vs Prosentential Theory | Horwich I 344 Quote/VsProsentential Theory/Camp, Grover, Belnap/VsCGB: one accuses the prosentential theory of ignoring cases where truth of quotes, i.e. names of sentences is stated. Example (27) "Snow is white" is true. CGB: we could say here with Ramsey that (27) simply means that snow is white. CGBVsRamsey: this obscures important pragmatic features of the example. They become clearer when we use a foreign-language translation. Example (28) If „Schnee ist weiß“ is true, then… Why (28) instead of If it’s true that snow is white, then Or If snow is white, then… CGB: there are several possible reasons here. We may want to make it clear that the original sentence was written in German. Or it could be that there is no elegant translation, or we do not know the grammar of German well enough. Or example: "Snow is white" must be true because Fritz said it and everything Fritz says is true. I 345 Suppose English* has a way of formally presenting a sentence: E.g. „Betrachte __“ („Consider____"). (29) Consider: Snow is white. This is true. CGB: why should it not work the same as "snow is white is true" in normal English? VsCGB: you could argue that it requires a reference to sentences or expressions because quotation marks are name-forming functors. Quotation marks/CGB: we deviate from this representation! Quotation marks are not name-forming functors. ((s) not for CGB). Quote/CGB: should not be considered as a reference to expressions in normal English. But we do not want to follow that up here. I 346 VsCGB: one has accused the prosentential theory of tunnel vision: Maybe we overlooked certain grammatically similar constructions? Example (30) John: there are seven legged dogs Mary: that's surprising, but true. (31) John: the being of knowledge is the knowledge of being Mary: that is profound and it is true. Ad (30): of course the first half is "that is surprising" in no way prosentential. It is a characterization! VsCGB: Ad (31) "is profound" expresses a quality that Mary attributes to the sentence. Why shouldn't "true" be understood in the same way? CGB: it makes sense to take "this" here as referring to a sentence. But that would make things more complicated because then we would have to treat "that" and "it" differently in "that's true" and "it's true". CGBVsVs: 1. it is just not true that the "that" in "that's surprising" refers to an utterance (in the sense of what was said, or a proposition). What is surprising here? Facts, events or states of affairs. Statement/Surprise/CGB: a statement can only be surprising as an act. I 347 The surprising thing about the statement is the fact reported. ((s) But then the content rather than the act of testimony.) CGBVs(s): it is not the fact that there are seven legged dogs claimed to be true in (30), because that fact cannot be true! Proposition/CGB: (ad (31) Propositions are not profound. Acts can be profound. For example insights or thoughts. Truth/Act/Action/Statement/CGB: but statements in the sense of action are not what is called true. ((s) see also StrawsonVsAustin, ditto). Reference/Prosentential Theory/CGB: even if we consider "that's surprising, but it's true" as referring, the two parts don't refer to the same thing! And then the theory is no longer economic. Reference/Prosentential Theory/CGB: are there perhaps other cases where it is plausible that a pronoun refers to a proposition? Example (32) John: Some dogs eat grass. Mary: You believe that, but it's not true. Proposition: is often understood as a bearer of truth, and as an object of belief. (CGBVs). I 348 However, if "that" is understood here as a referencing pronoun, then the speaker must be a proposition. CGBVs: we can interpret "that you believe" also differently: as prosentential anaphora (as above in the example "that is wrong", with preceding negation prefix). Then we have no pronominal reference. N.B.: the point is that no property is attributed. Truth is not a property. VsCGB: another objection: it is also a "tunnel vision" that we only have "that is true" but not "that is right" in view. Or the example "exaggerated" by Austin. Example: a child says I've got 15 logs That is right. I 349 Question: should this (and e.g. "This is an exaggeration!") be understood prosententially? CGBVsVs: "that is right" is here the statement that the child counted right, that it did something right. Sometimes this can overlap with the statement that a statement is true. The overlap must exist because there is no clear boundary between language learning and use. I 349 Anaphora/Prosentential Theory/VsCGB: could not one split the prosody and take the individual "that" as an anaphora? CGBVsVs: then one would also have to split off "is true" and no longer perceive it as referencing, but as characterizing ((s) And thus attributing it as property). CGBVs: then we would have to give up our thesis that speech about truth is completely understandable without "carrier of truth" or "truth characteristic". Moreover: Reference/CGB: it is known that not every nominalization has to be referencing ((s) E.g. Unicorn). Predication/CGB: also not every predication has to be characterizing. Divine Perspective/outside/PutnamVsGod's point of view/Rorty: Putnam amuses himself like James and Dewey, about such attempts. Rorty: But he has a problem when it comes to PutnamVsDisquotationalism: it smells too reductionist, too positivist, too "behaviorist" ("transcendental skinnerism"). Truth/Putnam: when a philosopher says truth is something other than electricity because there is room for a theory of electricity but not for a truth theory, I 456 and that knowledge of the truth condition is all that could be known about truth, then he denies that truth is a property. So there is also no property of correctness or accuracy ((s) >Deflationism, PutnamVsDeflationism, PutnamVsGrover.) PutnamVs: that is, to deny that our thoughts are thoughts and our assertions are assertions. Theory/Existence/Reduction/Putnam/Rorty: Putnam here assumes that the only reason to deny is that you need a theory for an X is to say that the X is "nothing but Y" ((s) eliminative reductionism). PutnamVsDavidson: Davidson must show that claims can be reduced to sounds. Then the field linguist would have to reduce actions to movements. Davidson/Rorty: but this one does not say that claims are nothing but sounds. Instead: Truth/Explanation/Davidson: other than electricity, truth is no explanation for something. ((s) A phenomenon is not explained by the fact that a sentence that claims it is true). |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Putnam, H. | Vollmer Vs Putnam, H. | I 285 Causality/Putnam: can be characterised 1. Regular sequences (purely physical, unsatisfactory) or 2. via the concept of explanation (not purely physical), or 3. via counterfactual conditions (this requires "normal conditions" or "worlds as similar as possible"). I 285 Def Reference/Lewis/Vollmer: functional property (not simply of a living being, but) of a living being with its environment. Causality/VollmerVsPutnam: overlooks the fourth possibility of characterizing causality: energy transfer. PutnamVsVollmer: if energy transfer is to play such a large role, then activating a light switch cannot be a cause! VollmerVsPutnam: this overlooks the fact that not all the energy has to be transferred, but only a minimum of any size. I 286 PutnamVsVollmer: if you admit this, the question is still how to characterize it without counterfactual formulation. VollmerVsPutnam: this is not necessary at all, because there is a physical characterization. Reference/VsEvolution Theory: (e.g. Putnam): it is not clear which reference physical terms have at all! VollmerVsVs: once you have a physical characterization of causal relationships (energy transfer), you can also physically explicate "reference". |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
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