Dictionary of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute

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The author or concept searched is found in the following 18 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Actions Nozick II 294
Action/causation/cause/Nozick: if an action is caused, then by a consideration. - Other way round: which considerations we provide with a causal status depends on how we acted.
II 294
Free will/Nozick: difference: a) action caused (by reasons, consideration), could have been different
b) causally determined (by intractable things) could not be more different.
II 294
Decision/ethics/Nozick: is not a discovery of weighting, but attribution of relevance - then the decision is not causally determined by the weights - but not every reason is always available to everyone - E.g. history of art: not every style was always available.
II 299
Action/self-subsumtion/Nozick: a decision may be self-subsuming: they can establish principles that govern not only the act but also the weighting itself - this is not a repetition of the weighting - e.g. strategy: that the result is always the best - the decision to follow this strategy itself is an action that falls under the weighting that it attributes.
II 300
The act of decision can also refer to itself.
II 300
Decision/fulfillment model/Herbert Simons: (instead of optimization model): you choose an action that is good enough - if you don’t find one, you continue to look and reduce your expectations - the opnion of what is good enough changes. Optimization model: here the costs are also taken into account (>self-subsumtion, >self-reference)
a) looking among known alternatives
b) devising new alternatives.
II 304
Reflexive: a free decision is reflexive: it exists by virtue of the weights that are conferred on it by their own validity.
II 318f
Action/decision/free will/knowledge/belief/Nozick: actions and decisions may be seen like beliefs and facts (covariance, connection to facts) - accordingly, methods can be weighed as well.
III 321
Connection: consists in judgmental belief.

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994

Agreeableness Neurobiology Corr I 333
Agreeableness/Neurobiology: Agreeableness (…) appears to reflect a tendency toward the maintenance of social stability, encompassing traits reflecting prosociality vs. antisociality: compassion, empathy, cooperation, politeness – a general tendency to be interested in and considerate of others’ needs, desires and feelings and to refrain from aggressing or imposing one’s will on others. Such altruistic tendencies are of particular importance for social species, and traits resembling Agreeableness are found consistently in social mammals (Gosling and John 1999)(1). Agreeableness seems likely to be supported by brain systems that are involved in social information-processing. Brain regions associated with these forms of social information-processing include the medial prefrontal cortex (Seitz, Nickel and Azari 2006)(2), superior temporal sulcus (Allison, Puce and McCarthy 2000)(3), temporal-parietal junction (Saxe and Powell 2006)(4), and the mirror neuron system that includes inferior frontal gyrus and rostral posterior parietal cortex (Iacoboni 2007(5); Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004)(6). (Mirror neurons respond similarly when watching another agent perform a task and when performing it oneself.)
Corr I 334
Agreeableness, like Neuroticism, has been associated with variation of the serotonin transporter gene (Canli and Lesch 2007(7); Jang, Hu, Livesley et al. 2001(8); Wand, McCaul, Yang et al. 2002)(9), but there are other endogenous psychoactive substances in addition to serotonin that may contribute to Agreeableness, including the socio-sexual neuropeptides oxytocin and vasopressin and the sex hormones testosterone and estrogen. Oxytocin is involved in social bonding (Depue and Morrone-Strupinsky 2005)(10), and acute administration of oxytocin in human males has been found to improve their ability to identify others’ emotional states from facial expressions (Domes, Heinrichs, Michel et al. 2007)(11). Testosterone is linked to aggression, and evidence exists to suggest that higher exposure to testosterone is linked to reduced Agreeableness.

1. Gosling, S. D. and John, O. P. 1999. Personality dimensions in nonhuman animals: a cross-species review, Current Directions in Psychological Science 8: 69–75
2. Seitz, R. J., Nickel, J. and Azari, N. P. 2006. Functional modularity of the medial prefrontal cortex: involvement in human empathy, Neuropsychology 20: 743–51
3. Allison, T., Puce, A. and McCarthy, G. 2000. Social perception from visual cues: role of the STS region, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4: 267–78
4. Saxe, R. and Powell, L. J. 2006. It’s the thought that counts: specific brain regions for one component of theory of mind, Psychological Science 17: 692–9
5. Iacoboni, M. 2007. Face to face: the neural basis of social mirroring and empathy, Psychiatric Annals 37: 236–41
6. Rizzolatti, G. and Craighero, L. 2004. The mirror-neuron system, Annual Review of Neuroscience 27: 169–92
7. Canli, T. and Lesch, K.-P. 2007. Long story short: the serotonin transporter in emotion regulation and social cognition, Nature Neuroscience 10: 1103–9
8. Jang, K. L., Hu, S., Livesley, W. J., Angleitner, A., Riemann, R., Ando, J., Ono, Y., Vernon, P. A. and Hamer, D. J. 2001. Covariance structure of Neuroticism and Agreeableness: a twin and molecular genetic analysis of the role of the serotonin transporter gene, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 81: 295–304
9. Wand, G. S., McCaul, M., Yang, X., Reynolds, J., Gotjen, D., Lee, S. and Ali, A. 2002. The mu-opioid receptor gene polymorphism (A118G) alters HPA axis activation induced by opioid receptor blockade, Neuropsychopharmacology 26: 106–14
10. Depue, R. A. and Morrone-Strupinsky, J. V. 2005. A neurobehavioural model of affiliative bonding: implications for conceptualizing a human trait of affiliation, Behavioural and Brain Sciences 28: 313–50
11. Domes, G., Heinrichs, M., Michel, A., Berger, C. and Herpertz, S. C. 2007. Oxytocin improves ‘mind-reading’ in humans, Biological Psychiatry 61: 731–3

Colin G. DeYoung and Jeremy R. Gray, „ Personality neuroscience: explaining individual differences in affect, behaviour and cognition“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press

Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Brain/Brain State Bieri I 65
Brain/Bieri: e.g. suppose there is a tour guide through our brain, who explains everything to us during a visit. "It is a principle of nature that, when certain processes take place here, the human feels certain things".
Bieri: that is not our problem, we do not doubt that there are laws and necessities. What we do not understand is why they exist. We cannot see what makes it necessary in the brain for the human being to experience something.
The tour guide asks, what do you want to know? (a) why a particular happening here just brings about this experience, or (b) why there is an experience at all?
Bieri: the two questions are the same problem
I 69
Brain/consciousness/Bieri: our guide could give us a detailed circuit diagram of the brain. "Functional architecture". "They could also be realized with a different material". (Turing machine). So:
I 70
There is no more inner connection between the function and the quality of experience than between material structure and quality of experience. Tour guide: "one must not look at the brain in isolation from the body"
Bieri: then one could say VsLeibniz:
1. the happening in the "factory" gets a cognitive content in that it is legally connected to events outside, which represents it by virtue of this connection
2. by the fact that the event in question assists the whole human being in a situation-appropriate behavior.
But: our problem is not meaning, not cognitive content, but experience content!
I 71
Brain/Consciousness/Experience/Bieri: cannot we be satisfied with what we have: covariance, dependency, determination? No, if we do not reach the questionable understanding, then we do not understand how our experience can be causally effective in our behavior, so we do not understand our own subject-being.
The physiological process is causally complete. There is no place in the clockwork where episodes of experience would be necessary for it to continue.
That is, there is a complete causal explanation for everything that takes place in our brain, in which we as subjects and humans do not occur at all!
       Therefore, consciousness seems to be of no importance to any causation. It could just as well be missing, and we would stumble through the world just as we do.
((s) We need to recognize the consciousness on something else).
Our whole behavior could be alienated. This cannot be excluded because of the causal completeness.
I 72
Causation/Bieri: If we build it purely physiologically, we know how to continue it, that is, always becoming smaller. This is not possible, however, when the explanation begins with an experience. Then we have to change somewhere on the physiological level. But then we have changed the subject!
I 74
Brain/Bieri: the problem is not that we do not see something in the "factory". From this one could conclude that it is caused by something else ... Vs: but nothing else is conceivable! But that is precisely the hypothesis that we cannot think otherwise. We cannot disprove this hypothesis.
But it would sound adventurous that the facts which are relevant for the experience have nothing to do with the facts which are otherwise relevant for the functioning of the brain.
We have considered:
Causal understanding,
Structural understanding,
Functional understanding,
Understanding the whole from parts.

Bieri I
Peter Bieri
Was macht Bewusstsein zu einem Rätsel?
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Bieri III
P. Bieri
Analytische Philosophie des Geistes Weinheim 2007

Brains in a Vat Nozick II 175
Brains in a Vat/BIV/Nozick: although the belief that he is in the vat is correctly caused, the person is not susceptible to this fact. - Susceptibility would require covariance of belief and facts. ->Counterfactual Conditional: if the brains were not in the vat, they would not believe it.
II 210
Brains in a Vat/Nozick: >nonfactualism: we are not connected with the fact that we are not in the vat, even if we are not in the vat. - ((s) Even if such a fact exists).
II 244
BIV/Skepticism/NozickVsSkepticism: he calls for something too strong: there is supposed to be a q ("We are in a vat"), such that it is incompatible with any p. - In contrast, the weaker is true: for each p there is something that is incompatible with it. - (Quantifiers interchanged).

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994

Correspondence Millikan I 107
Correspondence/Correspondence Relation/Millikan: here we are dealing with the relationship between an indicative intentional icon and its real value. 1. Definition: real value is the normal condition for the exertion of the direct eigenfunction of the icon.
2. There are correspondences between transformations on both sides!
3. Each transformation on the page of the icon has a normal condition for the eigenfunction (proper performance) of the corresponding transformation of the real value.
N.B.: this is about a comparison of the transformations of icon and real value, not a correspondence of the elements of icon and real value. ((s)> covariance).
Transformation/Millikan: this is not about "parts" but about invariant and variable aspects ((s) of a whole).
E.g. bee dance: variable: direction - invariant: existence of nectar.
I 108
Transformation/Sentence/Millikan: for sentences, the most frequent transformation is substitution or negation. E.g. "Theaitetos swims" Every transformation corresponds to a possible world situation (fact, world affair).
Articulation: a fact, is determined by a group of possible transformations.
I 307
Consensus/Millikan: first you have to know something about the objective world, not the world, as we perceive it (sensory world). Consensus/judgment: consensus in judgment is not to respond to the same stimulus with the same reaction. Rarely two people react to the same stimulus with the same choice of words. There is also no agreement on how to divide the world into pieces. Instead, it is a sign that each speaker has contact with the world in its own way, and that it is the same, which is mapped in different ways.
I 329
Correspondence/Putnam: it is incoherent to assume that truth is a correspondence with the WORLD. Image/Representation/Putnam: mathematical images are omnipresent, representations are not omnipresent.
Problem: a correspondence theory based on the fact that there is a mapping relation between a complete set of true representations and the world is empty.
I 330
Solution: there must first be a distinction between images and representations. Solution: there must be an additional condition for reference, namely, that an intended interpretation is marked.
Causal theory/Putnam: a causal theory would not help here. For it is just as uncertain whether "cause" clearly refers, as if "cat" clearly refers.
Concept/Sign/Ockham/Putnam: Problem: a concept must not simply be a "mental particular", otherwise every sign merely refers to another sign again.
PutnamVsRealism/PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: it is incomprehensible how a relation between a sign and its object could be picked out, either by holding up the sign itself,
Or by holding up a different sign, e.g.
Or maybe
Meaning/Meaning rationalism/Putnam/Millikan: this is the meaning rationalism: in order to mean something, we must know what we mean and namely "know" with a very definite, meaning-rationalist shine on "know":
The relation between the head and the world must be reflected wholly in the head,
((s)> See Leibniz, the "overarching general").
PutnamVs: that would only work if there was a mysterious "direct understanding of forms" ((s) platonistic). Then the relation would not have to be mirrored again.
I 331
Correspondence/to mean/Meaning/References/MillikanVsPutnam/Millikan: Thesis: the relations between the head and the world are indeed between the head and the world. However, the understanding of these relations does not contribute to the justification of meaning and reference. They do not have to be intended so that one can refer.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Counterfactual Conditionals Nozick II 172
Counterfactual Conditionals/Co.Co./Overdeterminism/Knowledge/Nozick. Counterfactual conditionals help exclude cases of overdeterminism - i.e. cases where multiple independent causes are sufficient in themselves. II 174 Example Barn Facades/Alvin Goldman/Nozick: if there are many fakes, we should not speak of knowledge.
II 175
Counterfactual Conditional/Nozick: shows covariance.

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994

Covariance Flusser
Fl I
V. Flusser
Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996

Covariance Nozick II 54
Knowledge/Belief/Covariance/Nozick: the more a belief (co-)varies with the truth of what is believed, the better it is as knowledge - Knowledge: is what we have when our belief varies subjunctively with the truth - but if there were beings with better knowledge (possible world), our attitude would not be in the best relation to what is believed, and would no longer be knowledge - ((s) again depending on other things, extrinsic property) - II 175 Counterfactual condtional: shows covariance.
II 175ff
Covariance/Conditional/Counterfactual Conditional/Nozick: Conditional: provides only half of the covariance: if p were false, the person would not believe it - the conditional only varies with those cases where the antecedent is false. - Problem: still missing: when p>S believes that p.
II ~ 220ff
Knowledge/Connection/Covariance/Nozick: knowledge requires covariance with the facts; if they were different, I would believe other things - that is the connection (track) - Covariance/(s): if yes, then yes, if no, then no.
II 224f
Method/Knowledge/Covariance/Nozick: I do not live in a world in which pain behavior e is given and must be kept constant! - Therefore, I can know h on the basis of e, which is variable! - And because it does not vary, it shows me that h (he is in pain) is true. - VsSkepticism: in reality, it is not about the fact that h is not known, but non-(e and non-h).
II 227
Openness of knowledge: means that knowledge varies with the facts, because it is in connection with them - (>covariance).
II 283
Knowledge/Covariance/Nozick: there are different degrees of covariance of knowledge with the facts and degrees of sensitivity with respect to truth value - for evolution, it is not necessary that beings perceive all changes - let alone respond to them - our ability to develop beliefs is finer than the ability for perception - we can doubt perceptions.
II 297
Constancy/Covariance/Nozick: E.g. suppose we want to recognize the content of preferences - Then preferences must at least sometimes be kept constant from situation to situation - form of thought - ((s) that is so, because otherwise you cannot be sure whether the preference belongs to the situation or the person.) - Nozick: both people and situations must be able to share preferences - form of thought independence - otherwise there is no trinity.

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994

Experience Bieri I 63
Experiencing/Bieri: sense sensations, colors, sounds, body sensations, moods such as hatred or gaiety, instincts and needs. These states are not only present in us, they "are felt in a certain way". The experiences are only as long as they are conscious. There is no pain and no fear left when the sensations have disappeared.
Experiences are the same as they appear.
Being experienced is something else than thought, believed or judged. That something feels like this or that is something else than that I take it for this or that.
The physiological process determines the experience, not vice versa.
I 72
Causality/explanation/Bieri: if we build it purely physiologically, we know how to continue it, that is, always becoming smaller. This is not possible, however, when the explanation begins with an experience. Then we have to switch to the physiological level somewhere. But then we have changed the subject!
I 72
Experience/Bieri: it is crucial that there is no difference between appearance and reality. It follows that there is no point in assuming that one can find something else, beyond the sensation, about the nature of an experience. And what would it mean if we had assumed that we had not yet discovered the true nature of pain sensation? We know what pain is!
Experience in itself is simple, unstructured. (As for our experience page).
Now one might assume that the physiological side, which, for example, can be made visible through PET, would lead us to a hidden complexity!
Vs: nevertheless, this only leads us back to our simple experience.
Experience/Bieri: maybe we have no experience, maybe our experiences are only opinions? In this way one could dissolve the difference between cognitive consciousness and experience. So cognitive structures without an experience content?
This would not help us further, because that would be nothing more than a self-model and self-representation.
I 63
Experiences/Bieri: experience only exists as long as they are conscious - they are just as they appear - that something feels like this or that is something else than that I take it for this or that.
I 71
Brain/Consciousness/Experience/Bieri: can we not be satisfied with what we have: covariance, dependency, determination? - no, then we do not understand how our experience can be causally effective - there is a complete causal explanation for everything physiological - therefore consciousness seems to have no significance for any causation - our whole behavior might be alienated - this is not to be excluded because of the causal completeness of physiology.
I 72
(To) experience/experience/Bieri: the decisive factor here is that there is no difference between appearance and reality - so there is no point in assuming that one can also find something else, beyond the sensation, about the nature of an experience.
I 74
We have no idea what would count as a solution, as understanding.

Bieri I
Peter Bieri
Was macht Bewusstsein zu einem Rätsel?
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Bieri III
P. Bieri
Analytische Philosophie des Geistes Weinheim 2007

Knowledge Nozick II 185
Knowledge/Counterfactual Conditional/co.co./Nozick: E.g. I know that a pair of scissors is now in my drawer. - But it is not correct to say that if there is one there, that I would know then. - ((S) So something can be true, even if the counterfactual conditional is false - namely, because the method can be crucial). - ((s) So the counterfactual conditional must mention the method.).
II 189
Gettier/Nozick: Gettier - examples conclude a truth often from a (justified believed) falsehood. - condition (3) if not-p> not- (S believes that p)
excludes that often.
II 194
Knowledge/belief/Nozick: through senile stubborness knowledge becomes belief. - Similar: E.g. knowledge of future brainwashing, then we try to "cement" belief.
II 194f
Knowledge/belief/local/global/Nozick: condition (3) should be better (indexicality, "now", "here") a local belief than a global one. - Otherwise danger of stubbornness.
II 198
Need/possibility/knowledge/Nozick: if ~ p> ~ (S believes that p) necessary condition for knowledge, then possibility of skepticism shows that no knowledge exists.
II 204 f
Knowledge/non-seclusion/NozickVsskepticism: Knowledge is not completed under known logical implication (VsSkepticism - Skepticism: knowledge is complete: that is the (skeptical) principle of seclusion of knowledge: K (p >> q) & Kp> Kq: I should know allegedly the implied by the known? - Nozick: but that would be merely belief, not knowledge.
II 206
The situation where q is wrong, could be quite different from the one where p is false. - E.g. that you were born in a certain city, implies that you were born on Earth, but not vice versa.
II 227
Non-seclusion of knowledge: means, that knowledge will vary with the facts, because it is in connection with them. - (> Covariance) - notation: K = knowledge, operator "somebody knows".
II 208
Knowledge/belief/closeness/Nozick: merely true belief is complete under known logical implication. - Because knowledge is more true belief, we need an additional condition that is not-complete under implication. - Belief is only knowledge when it covaries with facts. - But that is not enough - it depends on what happens if p is false. - Problem: a co-varying belief with facts is not complete. - Punchline: because knowledge involves belief, it is not completed. - VsSkepticism: his argument needs the fact that knowledge needs covariance.
II 223
Knowledge/induction/connection/Nozick: knowledge is based on facts that would otherwise have been different - Nozick: In the past. - Therefore, the relevant non-p-world is not a possible world, which is so far identical with the real world (the actual world), and diverges from now on immediately. - It is probably logically possible that it begins to diverge in a moment. - ((s) elsewhere Lewis like Nozick: in the past there would have had to be a change, if I now suddenly act differently). - We have connections to the facts in the past that determine our predictions. -> Covariance.
II 227
Knowing that (x)Px is unequal knowledge that every single thing is P: the all-quantification has different truth conditions as the all-removal. - "(x)Px" could be wrong, although "Pa" true.

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994

Materialism Bieri I 61
"Minimal Materialism"/Bieri: is the underlying thesis here: we have no more than covariance, dependence and determinism. > Consciousness.

Bieri I
Peter Bieri
Was macht Bewusstsein zu einem Rätsel?
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Bieri III
P. Bieri
Analytische Philosophie des Geistes Weinheim 2007

Method Nozick II 214
Method/knowledge/Nozick: Problem: Some statements are such that if they were wrong, we do not use the methods by which they are true: E.g. There are eyes - E.g. I live - E.g. I am sentient - E.g. I sometimes stand with something in relation - E.g. A grandmother sees his grandson safe when he comes to visit her. But if he were dead, others would tell her he was fine, to spare her agitation. Nevertheless, this does not mean that she does not know if he is all right when she sees him. : Here it was important to keep a method fixed - here the method is to see and not hearsay. - How do we know which method someone uses? - We need to keep them fixed and observe covariance. Problem: thus we assume the method already. - Solution: know through other methods that a method is- needed but that is only possible at higher levels. - E.g. If you are irrational, you will think that you are rational - But the outsider sees that you apply irrational methods. - Problem: we cannot say that (3) is satisfied
(3) If p were not true, and the subject S uses method M, then he would not believe via M, that p is true.
We could only do this, when the methods are likely to vary. - Problem: to say that if method M would not be needed now, M would now indicate that it would now not be needed. - Solution: intersubjectivity: the person appears to be irrational to others. - Thereby, the method does not seem to need a change.

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994

Method Aronson Haslam I 254
Method/stereotype threat/Aronson, Joshua/Steele: (…) research on stereotype threat, beginning with the original paper by Steele and Aronson (1995), has not been without critique. One aspect of that critique relates to how the original research has been described in media outlets, textbooks, and by scientists directly. In their studies, Steele and Aronson covaried out participants’ prior performance on high-stakes standardized tests as assessed with their self-reported SAT (Scholastic Assessment Test) scores. This covariate analysis increases the power to detect the effect of a manipulation in the context of individual variation. However, critics have argued that this statistical caveat is too often lost in the retelling of the findings, leading people to report that the threat-free environment eliminates the racial gap in test performance (Sackett et al., 2004(1); Wicherts, 2005(2)). 1. VsAronson, Joshua/VsSteele: The problem with this conclusion is that by controlling for SAT, the authors have removed a portion of group performance differences and we simply do not know if stereotype threat or other factors led to this gap in the first place. A similar critique was lodged against Spencer et al.’s (1999)(3) research demonstrating stereotype threat impairments on highly identified women’s math performance (Stoet and Geary, 2012)(4).
2. VsAronson/VsSteele: Through the current lens of replicability, readers are increasingly skeptical of findings based on small sample sizes and effects that might seem to rely on the use of covariate analysis (Fraley and Vazire, 2014(5); Simonsohn et al., 2014(6)).

1. Sackett, P.R., Hardison, C.M. and Cullen, M.J. (2004) 10n interpreting stereotype threat as accounting for African American—White differences on cognitive tests’, American Psychologist, 59: 7—13.
2. Wicherts, J.M. (2005) 1Stereotype threat research and the assumptions underlying analysis of covariance, American Psychologist, 60 (3): 267—69.
3. Spencer, S.J., Steele, C.M. and Quinn, D.M. (1999) ‘Stereotype threat and women’s math performance’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 35:4—28.
4. Stoet, G. and Geary, D.C. (2012) ‘Can stereotype threat explain the gender gap in mathematics performance and achievement?’, Review of General Psychology, 16:93—102.
5. Fraley, R.C. and Vazire, S. (2014) The N-pact factor: Evaluating the quality of empirical journals with respect to sample size and statistical power’, PLoS ONE, 9: e109019.
6. Simonsohn, U., Nelson, L.D. and Simmons, J.P. (2014) 4p-Curve and effect size correcting for publication bias using only significant results’, Perspectives on Psychological Science,
9 (6): 666—8 1.

Toni Schmader and Chad Forbes, “Stereotypes and Performance. Revisiting Steele and Aronson’s stereotypes threat experiments”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications

Haslam I
S. Alexander Haslam
Joanne R. Smith
Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Mysticism Nozick II 660
Astral body/mysticism/Nozick: Suppose we have a theory that in a dream a body leaves the sleeping body. - Problem: if one dreams of others, must there astral bodies also arrive there? - Problem: if many dream of Marilyn Monroe, but she does not dream of so many.
II 157
Mysticism/Nozick: mystical experiences might as well be more superficial. - They do not show that they are "deeper".
II 154
People have always difficulty to describe it - but sounds and colors are not hard to describe - Incorrect use of "indescribable".
II 158
If the reality is as the mystic says, but the knowledge of it brings no evolutionary advantage, we should not expect that brain states were selected to display the reality as it is (namely, as the mystics experienced). - Meditation/"as few thoughts as possible": should we believe that there is something that corresponds to this experience? - That depends on what we believe, what meditation creates, if there were no such underlying reality. - E.g. what would the amplifier amplify if we take out the CD? - To adopt an unusual reality, would be a mistake - If a particular experience adjusts each time in the procedure (meditation), it is an artifact. - Rigid coupling shows nothing. (> Covariance).
II 160
The mystical experience does not show why it is there. - Mysticism/Nozick: I take it seriously - if not, you should justify this.

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994

Overdetermination Nozick II 172
counterfactual conditional / overdetermination / knowledge / Nozick: counterfactual conditionals help to exclude cases of overdetermination. - That is, cases where multiple independent causes are sufficient for themselves. - II 174 e.g. Barn facades: if there are many fakes, one should not speak of knowledge. - II 175 counterfactual conditional: shows covariance.

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994

Representation Dretske Pauen I 230
Meaning/Naturalization/mental representation/Dretske/Pauen: (Dretske 1994(1),1995(2)): tries like Fodor to explain the emergence of meaning in a purely naturalistic manner. However, this also extends to non-human creatures. Four aspects:
1. Causal relation between object and representation
2. Function of representation for the organism
3. Development history of acquiring
4. Possibility of change.

Sign/Meaning/Causality/Dretske/Pauen: (ad 1.) a pure causal relation can only produce a natural sign ("sign/indication"). The normative moment has no place here.

ad 2. The normative distinction between the right and the wrong of the mental representation comes into play when a device or an organ receives the function of displaying another state of affairs.

ad 3. E.g. Magnetotactic bacteria are looking for deeper, oxygen-deficient water layers.
If these bacteria were transported to the northern hemisphere, they would seek flatter, more oxygen-rich water layers!
Here it would remain unclear what exactly the object of the representation is: is it the magnetic fields or the oxygen concentration?
I 232
Dretske: admits that this is hard to decide here. Solution: most organisms have several approaches to a state of affairs.
If a representation occurs in the normal case in the presence of an enemy, one can speak of a representation of the enemy.

ad 4. It seems possible that the objection, not the enemy, but the disjunction of all stimuli, is the object of the representation. E.g. smell or silhouette, or sound.
Here the learning ability is important. Higher living beings can learn new stimuli here, with which even a complete old disjunction might be absent.
Thus the disjunction is also not considered as a representation.
VsDretske/Pauen: a causally determined sun burn is nevertheless not a representation of the sun.
I 233
Stomach upsets are no representation of spoiled food.

1. Fred Dretske 1994. If You Can't Make One, You Don't Know How It Works. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1994.tb00299.x (03.06.2020)
2. Fred Dretske 1995. Naturalizing the Mind. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Schiffer I 46
Representation/fuel gauge/Dretske/Terminology/Schiffer: (Dretske 1986)(1): "fuel gauge model of representation: it represents the fuel status because it is a reliable indicator for it. ((s) By regularity to the representation. Additional assumption: Contrafactic conditional).

1. Fred Dretske 1986. Misrepresentation. In R. Bogdan (ed.), Belief: Form, Content, and Function. Oxford University Press. pp. 17--36

Perler I 225
Mental representation/Dretske/Proust: 1. Covariance between internal condition and external situation ("Indication".) 2. The internal indicator has the function to display the external situation. Then it represents them.
3. Representations can be true or false.

Perler I: Joelle Proust Das intentionale Tier in D. Perler/M. Wild (Hg) Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt/M. 2005

Dretske I
Fred Dretske
"Minimal Rationality", in: S. L. Hurley and M. Nudds (Eds.) Rational Animals?, Oxford 2005
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Dretske II
F. Dretske
Naturalizing the Mind Cambridge 1997

Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

Perler I
Dominik Perler
Markus Wild
Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005
Representation Proust Joelle Proust Das intentionale Tier in D. Perler/M. Wild (Hg) Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt/M. 2005

I 225
Mental representation/Dretske/Proust: 1. Covariance between internal condition and external situation ("Indication").
2. The internal indicator has the function of displaying the external situation. Then it represents it.
3. Representations can be true or false.

I 227
Representation/Proust: the everyday understanding commits a petitio principii when it refers to a particular representation, which is to be based only on a difference between inside and outside or on spatial concepts. Spatial concepts can only provide a solution when it comes to explaining the use of spatial relations to distinguish terms.
I 229
Representation/Animal/Proust: we see that probably many animals have mental representations.
I 230
These are also objective. Question: are these animals that are obviously capable of a kind of proto belief, also capable of real beliefs, or do they only have non-conceptual perception abilities?

Proust I
Joelle Proust
"L’animal intentionnel", in: Terrain 34, Les animaux, pensent-ils?, Paris: Ministère de la Culture/Editions de la maison des Sciences de l’Homme 2000, pp. 23-36
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Time Feynman I 72
Def Time/Feynman: it's how long we wait. It can probably not be defined any further. It is important how we measure it. Time Measurement/Measurement: one possibility: use something that changes periodically.
History: to be able to use the day as a measure, they had to make understand that days are not always of the same length; a different instrument was needed for that, e.g. an hour glass.
But with that they had not yet proven that they are periodic! >Covariance.
We can simply say that our definition of time is based on the repetition of an obviously periodic event.

Feynman I
Richard Feynman
The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963
German Edition:
Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001

Feynman II
R. Feynman
The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA/London 1967
German Edition:
Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993

The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Internalism Nozick Vs Internalism II 280
Knowledge/Nozick: we conceive knowledge as based on an independent reality (externalism). But how does it feel from the inside? How does a person form their knowledge? (FN 105).
II 281
We may be mistaken about every single fact, there is a distance, perhaps a gap. Knowledge should, however, bring us in touch with the facts. Skepticism: if he's right, nothing shows us that the connection exists.
"Internal"/"External": are unclear concepts.
Internalism/Knowledge/Nozick: believes that if q is implied by the knowledge of p, and S knows that p, then S knows that q.
NozickVsInternalism: if that is true, then we know all implications and consequences of our knowledge (absurd). ((s) >logical omniscience/Nozick).
Externalism/Nozick: but must not be exaggerated. Even if the external fact that p is connected to us, then the connection is still external. It is beyond our horizon.
II 282
Reductionism/Nozick: E.g. phenomenalism or Berkeley. NozickVsPhenomenalism: we say that they do not take us where we want to be, to external reality.
Any theory that wants to connect us with external facts has to make the connection partly externally.
If our belief would co-vary with the facts over a broader span than over conditionals, would the connection seem closer to us?
If we had a complete connection, would it still be external? Is there not still a gap between it and us? Or is the absence of a complete connection a sign of externality? Is something external by its lack of complete covariance? (FN 105).
II 283
Perhaps it would be better if our beliefs co-varied less closely than with conditionals. But that would not satisfy NozickVsInternalism that wants to eat the external reality and keep it.

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994
Kant Nozick Vs Kant II 12
Hypothesis/How-is-it-possible questions/Nozick: a hypothesis that is false does not explain how something is possible. But maybe it increases understanding. Hypothesis: must not even be plausible.
How-is-it-possible question: can go so deep that the only answers that are sufficient, are implausible.
One should not exclude that the p with which the question began is excluded at the end. (VsKant).

II 110
Synthesis/Self/I/Nozick: VsKant: VsSynthesis: against the perspective of self-synthesizing self could be argued that it does not localize itself as an entity, it is not a "part of the equipment of the universe". possible solution:
II 111
I/Self/Property/Tradition: Thesis: the I (self) as a property. I.e. not as an object. That solves, for example, the problem of the localization and other problems: 1) Hume: "I cannot perceive myself independent of any other perception."
NozickVsHume: perhaps he has not searched thoroughly. He has done nothing specific to search for the self, has he?
2) Advantage: the approach explains why it is difficult to imagine the self without embodiment.
3) It is difficult to imagine how the self should be identical with any particular stuff.
II 112
A property is never identical with the object. The difficulty to specify the relation of a property to the object is the general reason why we can only locate the self with difficulty, but it is not a specific problem of the relation between self and body. Property/Nozick: there are at least two ways to identify a person with a property:
1) with a non-indexical, non-reflexive property: E.g. "being Robert Nozick"
2) an identification whose definition uses a reflexive pronoun of the first person: E.g. "being me". This introduces reflexivity. Right into the nature of the self at that.
I Problem: it is obscure, because it introduces the reflexivity in the nature of the self, but it explains why all public or physicalist descriptions leave me out, because they are not reflective.
Unit/Merger/I/Self/Tradition: the I merges with the "one", but does not disappear in the process. The I is a property of the one, I am not separate from it.
Reflexivity/Property: E.g. reflexive property: "being me". Problem:
1) P is the ability to be reflexively self-referring.
People have P, tables do not. I have the property P and so do you,
II 113
but you have it by virtue of the fact that you are you, I have it by virtue of the other fact that I am I. We both have the property of being me, but the property is indexical. I.e. the properties differ!
Point: they both arise from the same non-indexical property P: being reflexively self-referring!

II 318
Action/Decision/Free Will/Knowledge/Belief/Nozick: Is there a parallel between belief and action, according to the model by which we have established conditions for belief and knowledge in the previous chapter? Belief is in connection with facts (covariance).
What are actions to be connected to?
Just like beliefs should respond to facts, actions should respond to correctness or quality ("bestness", optimum, "optimal desirability", "the best").
Then we need to know the relevant facts as well.
II 319
Our actions must be sensitive to accuracy or "the best". Conditions:
(1) Action A is correct
(2) S does A on purpose (intentionally)
(III) if A were not right, S would not do A intentionally.
(IV) if A were correct, S would intentionally do A.
Distinction: "Allowed"/"the best" (nothing better). Similar:
"Maximum": several maximums possible: even if there is nothing bigger.
Maximum: only one possible. "bigger than all the others".
(3) if A was not allowed, S would not do A
(4) if A were mandatory, S would do A.
"the best":
(1) A is the best (at least maximum, perhaps maximum)
(2) S does A intentionally
(3) if A were not as good as a possible other thing, S would not do A
(4) if A were better than anything else, S would do A.
II 320
So here we can also introduce a reference to a motif M in accordance with conditions (3) and (4). Moral/Kant/Nozick: when we happen to do something moral, immoral motives may be present.
Problem: it could be that if the act is immoral, other non-moral (neutral) motives move the person to carry out the action anyway.
NozickVsKant: he would be better served with our conditions (3) and (4).
In addition, we need the inclusion of methodologies (see above, example grandmother: would still believe, even if the facts were different.
E.g. Theater/Nuclear Reactor: if it were not a play, the person would still believe it via other methods).
Action: similar: E.g. someone carries out a mandatory action after careful consideration. If it were not right, its moral quality would never have come to his attention, but he could still have chosen it. Only this time without reflection on its correctness.
Method/Action/Nozick: like with belief, methods can also be weighed against each other even with actions:
A person meets the Kantian requirements if there is a motive M for which he does a, which satisfies the conditions (3) and (4), and outweighs any other motive M' that does not satisfy (3) and (4).

II 352
Self-Choice/Action/Morality/Ethics/Free Will/Nozick: the concept of a free action as in connection with accuracy (or "the best") is defined in terms of the result. And not so much as a process. Tradition: Thinks that a free action emerges from a process of choice that could also have had an incorrect result.
How close can we get to the process of choice in a simulation?
II 353
Anyway, we will not get out of a causal nexus. 1) Locke/Hume/Tradition/Nozick: we are not free if our actions are caused.
2) Kant: we are free if our actions are in harmony with reason
3) Free actions must not be caused by any independent source,
II 354
but must come forth from our nature. (Spinoza: only God is free). Hegel: combines 2) and 3): (with Aristotle) ​​Reason and thought are the essence of man. We are free when we are limited by a law of reason in a way conscious of ourselves, which is a constitutive principle of our nature.
Nozick: is that enough? Although our actions come forth from our nature, would we then not be unfree in the extent that we are bound by our nature?
Could external sources not be as binding for us?
Why should I want to be moral?
Do I have to wish to be happy?
Why should I want to be rational?
"Your being is rationality, do what is rational to realize your nature".
Why should I realize my nature? It's bad enough that it is so difficult.
"Your nature, that is you."
If I am not really me, do I have to wish to be me? Could I not wish to be the Messiah?
"But you have no choice, you had to be what you are."
So, that is what you offer me as freedom.
Objective morality seems to be something inevitable.
Categorical Imperative/Nozick: some read it as follows:
"Do this if you wish to be rational"
"Do this if you want to be free" (absurd: command).
Freedom/Nozick: has to be something that does not bind us.
II 355
Then there can be no free will with objective morality. Law/Kant/Nozick: the law that does not bind us is the one that we give ourselves, that is not borrowed from nature, but is set by reason itself as a necessity of its own nature.
Nozick: but does that not bind us, too?
Could we not act as autonomously out of very different motives?
NozickVsKant: the status of morality in his theory is unclear.
Example: Suppose someone finds out what the categorical imperative wants and then does the opposite. "But what motive could he have for that?"
Perhaps he just wants autonomy? The chances are not good.
Morality/Freedom/Nozick: Thesis: must not only be chosen by ourselves, it must also be given by something that is in turn chosen for its part!
Only something that arises from a chosen nature will not bind us. But if the nature is chosen, how should then it be inevitable? (>self-choice, self-ownership.).
R. Nozick
I Stefansen: Nozick "Der Minimalstaat" aus Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993

II Nozick Philosophical explanations Oxford 1981
Skepticism Nozick Vs Skepticism II 197
Skepticism/Nozick: we do not try to refute the skeptic. VsSkepticism: other authors: 1) when he argues against knowledge, he already presupposes that it exists. 2) to accept it would be unreasonable, because it is more likely that his extreme conclusions are wrong than that all its premises are true. NozickVs. We do not have to convince the skeptic. We want to explain how knowledge is possible, therefore it is good to find hypotheses which we ourselves find acceptable!
II 198
Skepticism/Nozick: Common Variant: claims that someone could believe something even though it is wrong. Perhaps caused by a demon or because he is dreaming or because he is a brain in a vat. But how do these possibilities adopted by the skeptic show that I do not know p? (3) if p were false, S would not believe that p (as above). If (3) is a necessary condition for knowledge that shows the possibility of the skeptic that there is no knowledge. Strong variant:
R: Even if p were false, S would still believe that p II 199 This conditional with the same antecedent as (3) and contradictory consequent is incompatible with (3). If (3) is true, R is false. But R is stronger than skepticism requires. Because if (3) were wrong, S could still believe that p. The following conditional is weaker than R, it is merely the negation of (3):
T: Not (not p > not (S believes that p)). ((s) >Range: weaker: negation of the entire conditional stronger: the same antecedent, opposite of the consequent ((s) not necessarily negation of consequent) Here: stronger: ".... would have to believe ..." - weaker.. "... could ...") Nozick: While R does not simply deny (3), it asserts its own conditional instead. The truth of (3) is not incompatible with a possible situation (here not possible world) where the person believes p, although p is false.
(3) does not cover all possibilities:
(3) not p > not (S believes p) That does not mean that in all situations where not p is true, S does not believe that p. Asserting this would mean to say that not p entails not (S believes p) (or logical implication) ((s) >Entailment). But subjunction (conditional) differs from entailment: So the existence of a possible situation in which p is wrong and S still believes p does not show that (3) is false. (? LL). (3) can be true even if there is a possible situation where not p and S believes that p. (3) speaks of the situation in which p is false. Not every possible situation where p is false is the situation that would prevail if p were false. Possible World: (3) speaks of the ~p world closest to our actual world. It speaks of the non-p neighborhood.
Skepticism/SK/Terminology/Nozick: SK stands for the "possibilities of the skeptic": II 200 We could dream of being misled by an evil demon or being brains in a vat. These are attempts to refute (3):
(3) if p were false, S would not believe that p. But these only attempts succeed if one of these possibilities(dream, vat, demon) prevails when p is false. I.e. only in the next non-p worlds. Even if we were in the vat, (3) could be true, i.e. although - as described by skeptics - p is false and S believes p. ((s) E.g. p: "I am in the Café": false, if I'm in the vat. But I would not believe to be the vat. That is what the skeptic means. If I do not believe the truth (that I am in the vat) and do not know, then my belief is wrong. But then p means "I'm not in the vat."). NozickVsSkepticism: when the skeptic describes a situation SK that would not prevail (sic), even if p were wrong, then this situation SK (vat) does not show that (3) is wrong and does not undermine our knowledge. (see below) ((s) i.e. from the perspective VsSkepticism: the skeptic asserts that all beliefs are wrong, but that is not yet the situation that we are all in the tank). This is just the preliminary consideration, the expected one follows in the next paragraph). Condition C: to exclude skeptical hypothesis:
C: not-p > SK (vat situation) does not exist ((s) That is what the skeptic denies!). That excludes every skeptical situation that fulfills C. ((s) it is only about n-p cases). Skepticism: for a vat situation to show that we do not know that p, it must be a situation that could exist if p did not exist, and thus satisfies the negation of C:
Negation of C: -not (not p > SK (vat situation) does not exist) Although the vat situations of the skeptic seem to show that (3) is wrong, they do not show it: they satisfy condition C and are therefore excluded! SkepticismVs: could ask why we know that if p were wrong, SK (vat) would not exist. But usually it asks something stronger: do we know that the vat situation does not exist? And if we do not know that, how can we know that p? ((s) reverse order). This brings us to the second way in which the vat situatios could show that we do not know that p:
Skeptical results
Knowledge/Nozick: according to our approach, S knows that the vat situation does not exist iff II 201
(1) vat situation does not exist
(2) S believes that vat situation does not exist
(3) If the vat situation existed, then S would not believe that the vat situation did not(!) exist.
(4) If the vat situation did not exist, then S would believe that it does not exist. (3) is the necessary condition for knowledge! It follows from it that we do not know that we are not in the vat! Skepticism/Nozick: that is what the skeptic says. But is it not what we say ourselves? It is actually a feature of our approach that it provides this result!
Vat/Demon/Descartes/Nozick: Descartes would say that proof of the existence of a good God would not allow us to be in the vat. Literature then focused on whether Descartes would succeed to obtain such evidence. II 202 Nozick: could a good God not have reasons to deceive us? According to Descartes his motives are unknowable for us. Cogito/Nozick: can "I think" only be produced by something existing? Not perhaps also by Hamlet, could we not be dreamed by someone who inspires "I think" in us? Descartes asked how we knew that we were not dreaming, he could also have asked whether we were dreamed about by someone.
Def Doxastically Identical/Terminology/Nozick: is a possible situation for S with the current situation, if S believed exactly the same things (Doxa) in the situation. II 203 Skepticism: describes doxastically identical situations where nearly all the believed things are wrong. (Vat). Such possible worlds are possible, because we possess our knowledge through mediation, not directly. It's amazing how different doxastically identical worlds can be. What else could the skeptic hope for? Nozick pro skepticism: we agree that we do not know that "not-vat". II 204 But that does not keep me from knowing that I'm writing this! It is true, I believe it and I would not believe it if it were not true, and if it were true, I would believe it. I.e. our approach does not lead to general skepticism. However, we must ensure that it seems that the skeptic is right and that we do not know that we are not in the vat. VsSkepticism: we must examine its "short step" to the conclusion that we do not know these things, because either this step is wrong or our approach is incoherent.
Not seclusion
II 204
Completed/Incompleteness/Knowledge/Nozick: Skepticism: (wrongly) assumes that our knowledge is complete under known logical implication: if we progress from something known to something entailed, we allegedly do not leave the realm of knowledge. The skeptic tries the other way around, of course: if you do not know that q, and you know that p entails q, then it should follow that you do not know that p. E.g. ((s) If you do not know that you are not in the vat, and sitting here implies not being in the vat, then you do not know that you're sitting here, if you know that the implication exists. (contraposition).) Terminology: Contraposition: knowledge that p >>: entails Then the (skeptical) principle of closure under known implication is: P: K(p >> q) & Kp > Kq.
II 205 Nozick: E.g. if you know that two sentences are incompatible, and you know that the first one is true, then you know that the negation of the second one is true. Contraposition: because you do not know the second one, you do not know the first. (FN 48) Vs: you could pick on the details and come to an iteration: the person might have forgotten inferences etc. Finally you would come to KK(p >> q) & KKp Kq: amplifies the antecedent and is therefore not favorable for the skeptics. II 206 NozickVsSkepticism: the whole principle P is false. Not only in detail. Knowledge is not closed under known logical implication. (FN 49) S knows that p if it has a true belief and fulfills (3) and (4). (3) and (4) are themselves not closed under known implication.
(3) if p were false, S would not believe that p. If S knows that p, then the belief is that p contingent on the truth of p. And that is described by (3). Now it may be that p implies q (and S knows that), that he also believes that q, but this belief that q is not subjunktivically dependent on the truth of q. Then he does not fulfill
(3') if q were wrong, S would not believe q. The situation where q is wrong could be quite different from the one where p is wrong. E.g. the fact that they were born in a certain city implies that they were born on the earth, but not vice versa. II 207 And pondering the respective situations would also be very different. Thus the belief would also be very different. Stronger/Weaker: if p implies q (and not vice versa), then not-q (negation of consequent) is much stronger than not-p (negation of the antecedent). Assuming various strengths there is no reason to assume that the belief would be the same in both situations. (Doxastically identical). Not even would the beliefs in one be a proper subset of the other! E.g. p = I'm awake and sitting on a chair in Jerusalem q = I'm not in the vat. The first entails the second. p entails q. And I know that. If p were wrong, I could be standing or lying in the same city or in a nearby one. ((s) There are more ways you can be outside of a vat than there are ways you can be inside). If q were wrong, I would have to be in a vat. These are clearly two different situations, which should make a big difference in what I believe. If p were wrong, I would not believe that p. If q were wrong, I would nevertheless still believe that q! Even though I know that p implies q. The reason is that (3) is not closed under known implication. It may be that (3) is true of one statement, but not of another, which is implied by it. If p entails q and we truthfully believe that p, then we do not have a false belief that q. II 208 Knowledge: if you know something, you cannot a have false belief about it. Nevertheless, although p implies q, we can have a false belief that q (not in vat)! "Would not falsely believe that" is in fact not completed under known implication either. If knowledge were merely true belief, it would be closed under implication. (Assuming that both statements are believed). Because knowledge is more than belief, we need additional conditions of which at least one must be open (not completed) under implication. Knowledge: a belief is only knowledge when it covaries with the fact. (see above). Problem: This does not yet ensure the correct type of connection. Anyway, it depends on what happens in situations where p is false. Truth: is what remains under implication. But a condition that does not mention the possible falseness, does not provide us covariance. Belief: a belief that covaries with the facts is not complete. II 209 Knowledge: and because knowledge involves such a belief, it is not completed, either. NozickVsSkepticism: he cannot simply deny this, because his argument that we do not know that we are not in the vat uses the fact that knowledge needs the covariance. But he is in contradiction, because another part of his argument uses the assumption that there is no covariance! According to this second part he concludes that you know nothing at all if you do not know that they are not in the vat. But this completion can only exist if the variation (covariance) does not exist.
Knowledge/Nozick: is an actual relation that includes a connection (tracking, traceable track). And the track to p is different from that to q! Even if p implies q. NozickVsSkepticism: skepticism is right in that we have no connections to some certain truths (we are not in the vat), but he is wrong in that we are not in the correct relation to many other facts (truths). Including such that imply the former (unconnected) truth that we believe, but do not know.
Skepticism/Nozick: many skeptics profess that they cannot maintain their position, except in situations where they rationally infer. E.g. Hume: II 210 Hume: after having spent three or four hours with my friends, my studies appear to me cold and ridiculous.
Skepticism/Nozick: the arguments of the skeptic show (but they also show only) that we do not know that we are not in the vat. He is right in that we are not in connection with a fact here.
NozickVsSkepticism: it does not show that we do not know other facts (including those that imply "not vat"). II 211 We have a connection to these other facts (e.g. I'm sittin here, reading).
II 224f
Method/Knowledge/Covariance/Nozick: I do not live in a world where pain behavior e is given and must be kept constant! - I.e. I can know h on the basis of e, which is variable! - And because it does not vary, it shows me that h ("he is in pain") is true. VsSkepticism: in reality it is not a question that is h not known, but "not (e and not h)"
II 247
NozickVsSkepticism: there is a limit for the iteration of the knowledge operator K. "knowing knowledge" is sometimes interpreted as certainly knowing, but that is not meant here. Point: Suppose a person knows exactly that they are located on the 3rd level of knowledge: K³p (= KKKp), but not k4p. Suppose also that the person knows that they are not located on the 4th level. KK³p & not k4p. But KK³p is precisely k4p which has already been presumed as wrong! Therefore, it should be expected that if we are on a finite level Knp, we do not know exactly at what level we are.
R. Nozick
I Stefansen: Nozick "Der Minimalstaat" aus Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993

II Nozick Philosophical explanations Oxford 1981
Steady State Theory Barrow Vs Steady State Theory I 330
Cosmological Principle/Barrow: the average non-uniformity should become smaller the larger the space that is overlooked in outer space. Covariance of the laws of nature.
But this is only true on a very large scale, which even surpasses that of the galaxies. The "perfect cosmological principle" of steady-state theory demands that the universe not only looks the same everywhere but also at all times.

I 331
VsSteady state theory/SST: if we take the average density as a clock, the past differs radically from the present: it had a high density, the present a low density. Consistency can only be maintained if new matter is constantly created everywhere. (>Kanitscheider, Kosmologie, Stuttgart 1991, pp. 161f, 289f).

John D. Barrow
Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996

John D. Barrow
The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988
German Edition:
Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993

John D. Barrow
Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998
German Edition:
Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001