Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffes

 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

Enhanced Search:
Search term 1: Author or Term Search term 2: Author or Term


together with


The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Absoluteness Rorty VI 9
Truth/Rorty: truth is absolute - in contrast: relative: justification is relative. - Criterion: justification is a criterion for truth - ((s) a criterion for truth is not available. >truth criterion, >definition/criterion.
Truth/Rorty: truth is undefinable (like Davidson).
VI 28
Correspondence/absolute/RortyVsIdealism: accordance with the Absolute - so the idealism deprived the term of correspondence of its very substance.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Coherence Theory Rescher From Skirbekk, Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996
I 346
Coherence Theory/Rescher: if you do not know the meaning of an allegedly true proposition, you need other propositions. - Intuitive methods: observation - (>intuitionist theory) - ((s) Observation >criteria pragmatism: the equating of "true" and "useful to believe" needs a distinction definition/criterion. (>Criteria). Coherence/Bradley: is not the meaning of truth, but its referee (sic).
I 362
Coherence/Rescher: is not the meaning of truth.
I 366
Blanshard: truth consists of coherence. - Then coherence is also the definition of truth - RescherVsBlanshard: the step from coherence to facts is not a necessary step - coherence is also perfectly possible in fiction.
I 377
Problem: lots of independent propositions can be represented as coherent.

Resch I
Nicholas Rescher
The Criteriology of Truth; Fundamental Aspects of the Coherence Theory of Truth, in: The Coherence Theory of Truth, Oxford 1973 - dt. Auszug: Die Kriterien der Wahrheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Resch II
N. Rescher
Kant and the Reach of Reason: Studies in Kant’ s Theory of Rational Systematization Cambridge 2010

Definitions Goodman I 124
Definition/Goodman: a definition is not symmetrical: usually a definiens describes that to which it applies in more detail than the definiendum. It provides an analysis and introduces means for a systematic integration. ---
III 61
Definition coextensive, but not identical/Goodman: coextensive but not identical are e.g. featherless bipeds and definitions.
III 96
Definition/criterion/Goodman: the definition of hydrogen does not provide us with a test of how much of that is in this room.
III 126f
Definition/Goodman: even though a definition always unambiguously determines which objects it is in accordancce with, it rarely, in turn, is clearly justified by each of its individual cases. You can see, the table, to which I point, as a "steel table", "steel thing" then finally put it into a class with cars. In such a way that no label in this range applies to both. Such flexibility cannot be allowed in the case of scores.
III 169f
None of our common natural languages is a notation system. E.g. a wheelbarrow belongs to many performance classes of object-English: "wooden object", "means of transport with wheel", etc. In such a language, there is no such thing as the definition. In a system of notation, however, all scores for a given performance are coextensive, all have the same performances as a fulfillment object.
III 191f
Definition/Goodman: the difference between real and nominal defining still applies, as is already illustrated by the difference between writing a score for a pre-existing work and composing a new work. In the first case, a score is uniquely determined by a performance, in the second case a score determines a class of performances clearly.

G IV
N. Goodman
Catherine Z. Elgin
Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988
German Edition:
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

Goodman I
N. Goodman
Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978
German Edition:
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

Goodman II
N. Goodman
Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982
German Edition:
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

Goodman III
N. Goodman
Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976
German Edition:
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997