Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| All | Field | II 238 All/Field: the use of "all" without quotes is itself the subject of a reinterpretation. - ((s) There could be a contradictory, yet undiscovered property that should not be included under "all properties" - here the dft-operator would in turn help.) VsDeflationism: one could simply say "..all .. " is true iff "..any ... " Vs: in addition you need the dft-operator (definite-Op). Conditions are requested - but not indicated. Field: ditto for higher level quantification. >dft-operator, >Levels (Order), >Vagueness/Field. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Definiteness | Field | II 226 Definiteness/determined/definition/definite/vagueness/precision/(s)"definite"/Field: we cannot define "definitively true" ("determined", "determinately") by truth - we must conceive it as a reinforcement. Solution : Operator: "Definiteness-Operator"/dft-operator: this one is independent of truth-theoretical terms - but there is no physical information which decides. "Determined" as basic concept - rules correspond to those for "necessary" - then the law of the excluded middle applies - it is definitely the case that he is either bald/non-bald. N.B.: it can still be the case then that he is neither definitely bald nor definitely non-bald - because there is no distribution about disjunction. II 229 Definiteness-Operator: is used so that the deflationism can distinguish vagueness from non-vagueness - "strong-true" must be defined with definiteness-Operator. II 231 Vagueness of higher level/Field/VsFine: the definiteness-operator is more natural than the Penumbar - FieldVsPenumbra: this solution is unnatural. >Penumbra. II 228 Limit/Vagueness/definiteness-Operator/Field: We need the definiteness-operator ("determined") to characterize a certain limit from a limit. II 238 Vagueness/deflationism/Field: "definitive-operator": adds additional conditions to the game under which a statement is definitely true. - (s) Not merely literal repetition). - Referential indeterminacy/(s): then a general sentence only applies to a part. - This one is sorted out by the definiteness-operator. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Inflationism | Field | II 104 Inflationism: Frege/Russell/Tractatus/Ramsey: truth conditions are central to meaning and content. >Truth conditions. Vs: Deflationism: no truth conditions instead perhaps verification theory. >Deflationism. Verification conditions/Verification/Verificationism/Field: Verification conditions (perhaps via stimuli) are given without the that-sentences - i.e., without propositional content - then class of verification conditions instead of proposition. >Verification conditions. Inflationism: would say that these are no real propositions because these must include truth conditions. InflationismVsVerificationism. II 126 Inflationism/Field: proceeds from facts (unlike the deflationism) - in particular, facts about the use of a language. FieldVs: what kind of facts are these supposed to be? - Deflationism: homophony condition is sufficient to rule out the fact that we do not use a language with deviating reference - there are no more facts. ((s) homophony condition: "Snow is white" is true iff is snow is white). >Homophony. II 114 Deflationism: can assume facts. >Facts, cf. >Nonfactualism. Inflationist relation: "S has the truth conditions p". II 126 Questions about the truth conditions: become questions about which language the person speaks. >Language dependence. Inflationism: would consider that as a question of use - (because he assumes facts). II 220 Inflationism/FieldVsInflationism: increases the indeterminacy. >Indeterminacy, >Translation. II 230 Inflationism/Vagueness/FieldVsInflationism: Problem: Inflationism needs a thing that is "neither bald nor non-bald". Inflationism: explains example "weakly true" compositionally. >Compositionality. Supervaluation/Sorites/Inflationism: "candidate of an extension". >Supervaluation. Def strongly true: is a sentence with a vague predicate then iff it is true relative to each of the candidates of an extension. Then it is a borderline case without definition-operator (dft-operator): "Jones is bald in some, but not in all extensions". |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Norms | Field | II 244 Norm/belief/possible world/Field: Norm and belief must be distinguished by itself. If the acceptance of a norm is merely a belief of something (e.g., that action is correct according to it), then the information that is relevant for the truth value of belief (belief) must be contained in the possible world itself. - Then the norm is no longer required for the assessment of the mental state. Norm: must be part of a possible world which is independent of belief. >Possible worlds, >Beliefs, >Independence. II 245 Norm/non-factualism/Field: thesis: norm-sensitive utterances (which contain evaluative predicates) are only true relative to norms. Factualism: Factualism limits this to the norms which are not objectively false. Non-factualism/factualism: are differentiated by the fact, which statements are "simply true" (i.e. true in all norms that are not objectively wrong). Analog: dft-operator to amplify "true" in vagueness. >dft-operator. II 249 NonfactualismVsEvaluating predicates. >Values, >Ethics. II 247 Norm/ethics/disagreement/dispute/N.B: If there is no norm-sensitivity in a sentence anymore, then a contradiction between norms can no longer count as a contradiction. - ((s) between sentences). II 248 Ethics/Field: Dispute only exists about attitudes, not about facts. Problem: having an attitude is not sufficient, but accepting a reference system is necessary. >Reference systems. (Analog: having time order is not sufficient). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Second Order Logic, HOL | Field | I 37 Second Order Logic/Second Order Logic/Higher Order Logic/HOL/Field: Here, the the quantifiers have no recursive method of evidence. >Quantifiction, >Quantifiers, >Logic, >Recursion. Quantification/Field: therefore it is vague and indeterminate, but even then applies: (A > logically true (A)) & (~ A > logically true (~ A)) is always true. The vagueness refers to the A. --- II 238 Referential indeterminacy/logical operators/2nd order Logic/Field: special case: Question: can complex logical operators - e.g., unrestricted 2nd order quantifiers ((s) via properties) have any particular truth conditions? No: e.g. everything that you express with them can be reformulated (reduced) with a more restricted quantification (via sets). It does not help to say e.g. "with "for all properties" I mean for all properties". >"Everything he said"). >Truth conditions, >Sets, >Extensions, >Extensionality. All/Field: the use of "all" without quotes is itself the subject of a reinterpretation. >All/Field. ((s) There could be a contradictory, still undiscovered property which should not be included under "all properties.") Field: E.g. Acceleration near speed of light - here the definitive operator would again help. VsDeflationism: Deflationism could simply say ".. all .. " is true iff all ... Vs: in addition one needs the definitive-operator (dft-operator), which demands conditions - but it does not specify them. Field: dito with Higher Order Quantification (HOL). --- III 39 First order Logic/2nd order/stronger/weaker/attenuation/Field: to weaken the second order logic to the 1st order, we can attenuate the second-order axioms to the axiom-schemata of first-order , namely the schema of separation. Problem: not many non-standard models come in. Namely, models in which quantities that are in reality infinite, satisfy the formula which usually defines straight finiteness. >unintended models. III 92 2nd Order Logic/Field: we have it at two places: 1. At the axiomatization of the geometry of the spacetime and at the scalar order of spacetime points we have III 93 The "complete logic of the part-whole relation", or the "complete logic of the Goodman sums". 2. The binary quantifier "less than". But we do not need this if we have Goodman's sums: Goodman's sum: it's logic is sufficient to give comparisons of powerfulness. For heuristic reasons, however, we want to keep an extra logic for powerfulness ("less than"). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Terminology | Field | I 18 Explanation/Field: a) Def intrinsic explanation/Field: does not contain causally irrelevant entities (namely: mathematical entities) b) Def extrinsic explanation/Field: also contains causally irrelevant entities. For example, the attribution of finite sentences for the behavior of animals. II 159 Linguistic view/Field: assumes no meanings as mind-independent entities, but assigns words of a speaker to words of an interpreter. - The relations are based on different characteristics. - I.e. to inferences that contain this word - that's what I call "meaning-characteristic". - E.g. II 226 Definiteness/determined/definition/definite/vagueness/precision/(s)"definite"/Field: we cannot define "definitively true" ("determined", "determinately") by truth - we must conceive it as a reinforcement. Solution : Operator: "Definiteness-Operator"/dft-operator: this one is independent of truth-theoretical terms - but there is no physical information which decides. II 201 Signification/Terminology/Field: here: Relations are signed - objects are denoted. - predicates signify their extension. II 211 Def Basis/Field: here: E.g. the basis for predicates whose extension depends on other predicates: - E.g. "rabbit", "dinosaur": depend on the basis: predicate "identical". - The functional dependency of the other predicates from the basic predicate "identical" allows the partial extensions of the predicate to be correlated with the partial extension of the others. Def dependent: is a predicate, if it has a basis. - Now we can define relevance. Def Relevance/Structure/Language/Gavagai/Field: a structure partially agrees with the semantics of O, iff a) each independent term t of L denoted or signified partially m(t) b) each dependent term t of L denoted or signified m(t) with b(t) relative to the correlation of m(b(t)). ((s) in b) not partial). Still unsolved: how do we know which terms have a basis and which that is? - Problem: the words should also have a physical sense. II 287 Def "weak true"/truew/Field: "It is true that p" as equivalent to "p". Def "strongly true"/trues/Field: "It is true that p" as equivalent to "There is a certain fact that p". Det-Operator/D/Field: "It is a certain fact that". - This cannot be explained with "true". III 12 Def Principle C/Conservativity/Field: Let A be a nominalistic formulated claim. N: a corpus of such nominalistic assertions. - S a mathematical theory. A* is then not a consequence of N* + S if A is not itself a consequence of N* alone. ((s) "A* only if A", that is, if A * is not determined yet, that any nominalistic formulation is sufficient). III 60 Nominalization/Field: ... this suggests that laws about T (i.e., T obeying a particular differential equation) can be reformulated as laws over the relation between f and y. That is, ultimately the predicates Scal-Cong, St-Bet, Simul, S-Cong and perhaps Scal-Less. II 230 Def strongly true: is a sentence with a vague predicate then iff it is true relative to each of the candidates of an extension. Then it is a borderline case without definition-operator (dft-operator): "Jones is bald in some, but not in all extensions". I 152 Def Priority Thesis/PT/Crispin Wright: Thesis: the priority of the syntactic over the ontological categories. Platonism/Wright: that allows Frege to be a Platonist. I 153 Def weak Priority Thesis/PT: that each syntactic singular term also works automatically in a semantical way as a singular term. I 186 Def Moderate Platonism/mP/Field: the thesis that there are abstract objects like numbers. - Then there are probably also relations between numbers and objects. - Moderate Platonism: these relations are conventions, derived from physical relations. Def Heavy Duty Platonism/HDP/Field: takes relations between objects and numbers as a bare fact. l 189 Strong moderation condition/(Field (pro): it is possible to formulate physical laws without relation between objects and numbers. I 192 Heavy Duty Platonism/Field: assumes size relationships between objects and numbers. - FieldVs: instead only between objects. III 96 1st order Platonism/Field: accepts abstract entities, but no 2nd order logic. Problem: anyway he needs these (because of the power quantifiers). II 228 Def Weakly true/vagueness/truth/truth-predicate/Field: to be able to say general things about borderline cases. Not only that somebody represents a certain limiting case. Not weakly true/deflationism: e.g. "Either bald or not-bald is true". Then the Truth-predicate itself inherits the vagueness. It is not definitely true whether or not. Def Strongly true/Field: assuming, Jones is a limiting case: then neither "bald" nor its negation (strongly) plus classical logic: then the disjunction "bald or not bald" should be true even in strong interpretation. Law of the excluded middle: if we give it up: a) weakly true: then the disjunction is not true b) strongly true: then the disjunction is without truth value. Strongly true: is less vague, does not inherit the vagueness. II 230 Def strongly true: is a sentence with a vague predicate then iff it is true relative to each of the candidates of an extension. - Then the limiting case without definite-operator: "Jones is bald in some extensions but not in all". |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Vagueness | Field | II 227 Vagueness/revision of the logic/Field: some authors: to allow double negation, to prohibit explicit contradictions, thus also not to allow negations of the law of the excluded middle (l.e.m.). >Negation, >Double negation, >Contradictions, >Stronger/Weaker, >Excluded middle. Then old version: if Jones is a limiting case for "Jones is bald", we cannot claim either "bald" or "not-bald", so we can now. New: neither claim: E.g. "Jones is bald or not bald" nor "It is not the case that Jones is either bald or not bald." On the other hand: Field: with definite-operator (definite): "It is not the case that Jones is either definitely bald or definitely not bald". - Without law of the excluded middle: "neither bald nor not bald". II 228 Limiting case/vagueness/definite-Operator/Field: we need the definite-operator to avoid a limiting case of the a limiting case. >dft-operator, >Terminology/Field. II 228 Def Weakly true/vagueness/truth/truth-predicate/Field: to be able to say general things about borderline cases. Not only that somebody represents a certain limiting case. >Generalization. Def paradigmatic borderline case: definitely a borderline case. Not weakly true/deflationism: e.g. "Either bald or not-bald is true". Then the Truth-predicate itself inherits the vagueness. It is not definitely true whether or not. Def Strongly true/Field: assuming, Jones is a limiting case: then neither "bald" nor its negation (strongly) plus classical logic: then the disjunction "bald or not bald" should be true even in strong interpretation. Law of the excluded middle: if we give it up: a) weakly true: then the disjunction is not true b) strongly true: then the disjunction is without truth value. Strongly true: is less vague, does not inherit the vagueness. Correctness: which interpretation is the correct one is only dependent on utility. >Correctness. Per weak truth: allows infinite conjunction and disjunction. This corresponds more to the theory of validity. - Only the weak Truth-concept is supplied by the disquotation scheme. Deflationism: deflationism additionally requires the definite-operator to declare the predicate strongly true. >Deflationism. II 230 Inflationism/Vagueness/FieldVsInflationism: Problem: the I. needs a thing that is "neither bald nor not bald". Inflationism: explains e.g. "weakly true" compositional. >Inflationism. Supervaluation/Sorites/Inflationism: "candidate of an extension". >Supervaluation. Def strongly true: is a sentence with a vague predicate then iff it is true relative to each of the candidates of an extension. - Then the limiting case without definite-operator: "Jones is bald in some extensions but not in all". II 233 Vagueness/Ontology/Field: Thesis: vgueness is a deficiency of language, not of the world. >Language dependence. II 234 Vagueness/radical non-classical logic/Field: here we do not need a definite-operator or distinction between strong/weak truth: e.g. Jones is a limiting case iff it is not the case that he is either bald or not bald. Deflationism/Field: seems to save a lot of trouble, because there is no definite-operator, one would have to understand. Vs: that deceives: the trouble is only postponed: here the logical rules for "not", etc. are much more complicated. ... + ... II 228 Weakly true:...++... |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Inflationism | Field, Hartry | II 231 Inflationism / vagueness / Field: the Inflationist could say: The metaphysical order of things was just the reverse: strong metaphysical truth is explained in terms of candidates for extensions. dft-operator: is then metaphysically explained in terms of truth and thus indirectly by candidates for extension (Supervaluation). FieldVs: there s not much that can be seen as a metaphysical relation between sets and predicates. |
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