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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Continuants | Chisholm | II 176 ff Continuant/Chisholm/Simons: E.g. people, trees, cars, water waves: precisely not mereologically constant. >Mereology. Continuants are subject to flow of their parts - most parts are not necessary - no mereological essentialism. >Parts. Solution: ens sukzessivum/E.S.: not itself permanent, itself constituted from continuants E.g. ens sukzessivum: President of the United States - (Simons:this is ontologically dubious). - ens sukzessivum is modally analogous to non-negative situations. >Situations: For the terminology of mereology cf. >Peter Simons. II 178 Problem: entia sukzessiva must not have any negative parts. II 179 Solution: by adding parts an object can stop to exist. E.g. egg in fertilization. Also see >Perdurantism, >Endurantism. Simons, Peter. Tractatus Mereologico-Philosophicus? In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Essentialism | Simons | Chisholm II 173ff Mereological Essentialism/Simons: a thing must be founded in all its necessary parts. Part/whole relationship: the part-whole relationship is modal rigid (Chisholm pro). >Mereology, >Parts, >Wholes, >Part-of-relation. Vs: most things are in flux, e.g. people, water waves. Ens sukzessivum: for Chisholm any permanent thing ("continuant") obeys a particularly strict temporal version of mereological essentialism: if another permanent thing in any world at any time is part of it, this part has to be a part of it at all times and in all the worlds in which there exists the whole thing. Solution: entia sukzessiva: things in flux: are themselves not permanent but constituted from permanent things (continuants). >Continuants, >Ens successivum. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Extensionality | Simons | Chisholm II 185 Extensionality/Quine: we assume space time points instead of "durable goods". SimonsVsQuine: language without continuants (permanent object) cannot be learned. Chisholm: probably time and modality, but not temporal or modal components: either a) accept phenomena, refuse extensionality or b) reject phenomena, demand extensionality for real lasting objects. >Entia Sukzessiva. SimonsVsChisholm: it is better to accept Aristotle things with unnecessary parts: trees simply consist of matter. This is more evidence than Wittgenstein's atoms. --- Simons I 3 Extensionality/Simons: if extensionality is rejected, more than one object can have exactly the same parts and therefore more than one object can be at the same time in the same place. Then we are dealing with continuants. Continuant/Simons: everything which is not an event is a continuant (see below) or everything that can have mass. >Continuants, >Parts. I 11 Extensional Mereology/CEM/extensionality/Simons: a characteristic property of extensional mereology is the relationship "part-of-or-identical-with". This corresponds with "less-than-or-equal" relationship. Overlapping: overlapping can be used as the only fundamental concept. Limiting case: separateness and identity. I 105f Part/VsExtensional Mereology/Simons: 1. A whole is sometimes not one of its own parts. 2. Sometimes it is not transitive. 3. The existence of "sum-individuals" is not always guaranteed. That means, that the axioms, for individuals who obey any predicate, are wrong. 4. Identity criteria for individuals who have all parts in common, are wrong. I 106 5. Provides a materialist ontology of four-dimensional objects. Part/Simons: thesis: there is no uniform meaning of "part". I 117 Extensionality/Simons: extensionality is left with the rejection of the proper parts principle: I 28 Proper Parts Principle/strong/strong supporting principle: if x is not part of y, then there is a z which is part of x and which is separated from y. Solution for distinguishing sum (Tib + Tail) and whole (process) Tibbles (cat). >Tibbles-expample. Simons: the coincidence of individuals is temporarily indistinguishable (perceptually). >Superposition: superposition means being at the same time in the same place. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Phenomenalism | Pro | Simons I 190 Phänomenalismus: pro: Russell: Körper/Person: logische Konstruktion aus Sinnesdaten. - ChishomVs (trotz Analogie zur Konstruktion von entia sukzessiva aus konstanten entia per se) - Dennoch sind beide keine Phänomenalisten. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| ens sukzessivum | Chisholm, R. | Simons I 195 stand for / entia sukzessiva / Chisholm: Thesis: to stand for somtething is no relation of a unit to its parts. |
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