Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Actuality Boer 12
Actuality/Boer: (= existence) against it: being unequals existence.
---
Note I 36
Question: Does acquaintance with the object and the property shifts one into another physical state? A) if intentional states are locally supervening on non-intentional facts about the person, then not.
B) if they supervise globally, then yes.
> "There is".
---
I 14
Non-actual essences/non-updated essential properties/Boer: their possibility does not bind us to non-actual individuals whose essences they would be. Plantinga: Thesis: the former make the latter superfluous: Boer pro: that could be.
E.g. there is no obligation on a round square, but the non-exemplifiable property of being a round square.

Boer I
Steven E. Boer
Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010

Boer II
Steven E. Boer
Knowing Who Cambridge 1986

Coercion Morris Gaus I 200
Coercion/Morris: connected. Consider a 'state' without law, or one whose jurisdiction was not territorial. We would not consider it to be a genuine state. Law and territoriality are essential properties of states, part of the concept of a state. >State/Morris. Coercion: Contrast these properties with coercion or force. We can conceive of a state which
does not employ coercion or force. There is nothing in the nature of a law which requires that compliance be assured coercively. It does not seem to be, then, a conceptual truth that states are coercive.
MorrisVsRawls: Why might we think, with Rawls, that 'political power is always coercive power backed up by the government's use of sanctions'? Perhaps because of the conjunction of law and sanction. But that connection is not necessary. Some laws are not enforced by sanctions (for instance, laws governing the obligations of officials, laws establishing powers, constitutional laws). Attempts to understand the law in terms of the coercive commands of a sovereign are implausible (see Austin, 1885(1), for the classic formulation of this position; and Hart, 1994(2), for the classic refutation). >Sanctions/Morris, >Law/Morris.

1. Austin, John (1995 t 18851) The Province of Jurisprudence Determined. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2. Hart, H. L. A. (1994) The Concept of Law, 2nd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Morris, Christopher W. 2004. „The Modern State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Cross World Identity Quine II 158f
The identification between possible worlds depends on the predicates. For bodies the identification also depends on space location, composition etc. Therefore it is not a "cross world". "The same object" is meaningless. We need singular terms instead of predicates.
II 149
Possible World/Quine: a possible world is a vivid way, to assert an essentialist philosophy. In order to identify the subject in a world, essential properties are needed.
>Possible World/Quine.
Hintikka I 137
QuineVsModal Logic: there is the problem of Cross Word Identification. Cross World Identification/Quine/(s): Problem of identity conditions. If there are no identity conditions, there is no point in asking whether an individual is "the same as" one in another possible world.
HintikkaVsQuine: my modified approach goes beyond the scope of Quine's criticism.
World lines/Hintikka: are fixed by us, not by God. Yet they are not arbitrary. Their limitations are given by continuity of space and time, memory, localization, etc.
I 138
It may even be that our presuppositions turn out to be wrong. Therefore, there can be no set of world lines covering all possible worlds that we need in the Alethic modal logic. Modal Logic/Quantification/Quine/Hintikka: a realistic interpretation of the quantified Alethic Modal Logic is impossible. But for reasons deeper than Quine assumed.
Cross World Identification/HintikkaVsQuine: cross world identification is not intrinsically impossible.
Quine/Hintikka: has recently even acknowledged this with restrictions.
Solution/Hintikka: to see Cross World Identification as re-identification.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
de re Quine Brandom I 698
Quine: the central grammatical difference between these attribution types concerns the correctness of substitutions. Expressions in the de re part are "referential transparent" (co-referential expressions can be exchanged salva veritate but not in the de dicto part.) >Substitution/Quine.
Quine II 144 f
de re: it is out of range: x = planets, x = 9, 9 odd - the predicate applies to the value of a variable, not to the name! See > planets-example. de re: is the referring position!
de dicto: the meant term stands in the sentence: "neccessary" planets odd: that is wrong!
>de dicto/Quine.
II 151
de re: Example "spy" should be an essential characteristic. This is wrong. This is not belief de re! (>Essential property).

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
de re Wiggins II 293
de re must/Wiggins: thesis: in order to keep
(4)(x)(y)[(x = y)> N(y = x)]

away from opaque contexts, we have to presume must de re: E.g.

"the number of planets that is 9, must be greater than 7."

If we apply this on the relation of the identity

(lx)(ly)(x = y)

we get

necessarily [(lx)(ly)(x = y)]

or the relation which has all r and all s if they are necessarily identical. Then variant of (4):

(4l)(x)(y)(x = y) > (y has(Iz)[[necessary[(lr)(ls)[s = r]]],[x, z]])).

That needs the contingency theory: then the definition of "is necessarily identical with" depends no longer on the possible world.
>Possible worlds, >Necessity.
Problem: this might not exist in English.
II 309f
Necessity de re/Wiggins: Problem: E.g. certainly Caesar can be essentially a person, without being essentially in that way so that each sequence with Caesar satisfies in second place:
(Human(x2))

Reason: it could be that "human" would not have meant "human".
---
II 310
General problem: asymmetry, de re. E.g. Kripke: Elizabeth II is necessarily (de re), the daughter of George VI. But George VI does not necessarily have to have a daughter.
E.g. Chisholm: if a table T has a leg L, then T must have L de re as part. But, to say of the table, that it necessarily consists of substructure and board, is not the same as to say that substructure and board are necessarily parts of the table - and also not that the board is necessarily connected to the substructure.
Wiggins: nevertheless, if anything is certain, it is this:

[(lx)(ly)[xRy] = [(ly)(lx)[y converse-Rx]

It would be a perverse extreme in the other direction, if one wanted to banish the corresponding biconditional from the truth theory for L.
Wiggins: no matter what one thinks of this mereological essentialism, it means that when the legs exist, the rest of the table needs not to exist.
>Essentialism, >Mereology, >Mereological essentialism.
Solution: more specific description of the essential properties, e.g. trough points in time:

(t)(table exists at t)> (leg is part of table at t))

then

necessary[(ly)(lw)[(t)((y exists at t) > (w is part of y at t)))], [table, leg].

II 311
That secures the desired asymmetry. Problem: There is a problem because the existential generalization does not work for the necessity-of-origin doctrine.
More general solution: distinction: wrong:

[Necessary[(lx) (ly)(x consists of y], [leg, table]

There are undesirable consequences for existence that would be proven through it. And

[Necessary [(lx) (x consists of table], [leg]

this is also wrong.
And finally:

[Necessary (ly)(leg consists of y], [table]

What is right or false depending on whether Kripke or Chisholm is right.
>Necessity, >Necessity/Kripke.

Wiggins I
D. Wiggins
Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016

Wiggins II
David Wiggins
"The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Essence Lewis IV 35
Definition Essence/Lewis: the totality of the being is the average of the key attributes, of those attributes that a thing shares with all and only its own counterparts (CP) - Definition counterpart/Lewis: of something is everything that has (singular, because coextensive) the essential attribute of it - that does not mean that the attribute is the essence of the counterpart! - It does not even have to be an essential attribute of the counterpart - (s) Essence not transitive about worlds. >Transitivity, >Possible world/Lewis, >Counterparts/Lewis, >Counterpart relation/Lewis, >Counterpart theory/Lewis.
---
V 247
Event/Essence: events have their essence built in: the necessary conditions for their occurrence.
V 248
E.g. An event is necessarily a change if it is necessary that the event happens in the region when something changes throughout the region - E.g. An event is necessarily a death if it is necessary that the event only occurs in the region when something dies everywhere in the region, and not everywhere in a larger region. >Event/Lewis.
V 254
Event/Essence/Lewis: E.g. Nero singing while Rome burns. - Fire accidental. - But the singing is necessarily singing. Conclusion: we cannot find the the essential properties of events through description - they may be accidental.
V 264
Event/Essence/Lewis: There are no events that significantly involve Socrates. - I.e. which cannot happen in a region that does not contain Socrates or a counterpart of him. - ((s) Counterpart is the solution to the problem: the death of Socrates? - Lewis: counterpart relation: is more of an extrinsic matter. - counterparts are held together by similarity. - It is usually extrinsic. - LewisVsKripke: origin and role are not intrinsical.
V 265
E.g. Death of Socrates: Being involved in the same region is not sufficient (goblins might also be that), because the counterpart relation is not the same for parts as for the whole - a counterpart of a part is not necessarily a counterpart! - ((s) in a different possible world I could be missing an arm).
V 266
Lewis: E.g. Death of Socrates: assuming we have a death which involves a particular segment of individuals (whether accidental or essential, if we have one that involves it accidentally, then we have another one that it involves it essentially) - Assuming the segment is in fact part of Socrates, namely accidental. Not all counterparts are parts. - ((s) Socrates might as well have died later). - So now we finally have Socrates involved in his own death in a way that we have bypassed unseemly extrinsic events. ---
Schwarz I 54
Possible world/Essential qualities/Kripke/Schwarz: origin is an essential property. - Also biological species.
Schwarz I 227
Essence/Possibility/Possible worlds/Po.wo./Lewis: thesis: what possibilities there are is not contingent. - You can also not acquire any information about it. - Lewis: for every way how things may be, there must be a possible world - (s) Will >S5 always automatically apply to them?.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991


Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Essentialism Lewis IV 32
Definition essentialism/Aristotle: essential properties are not description dependent - QuineVs: that is just as congenial as the whole modal logic - LewisVsQuine: that is really congenial - and irrespective of analyticity. Cf. >Analyticity, >essence, >essential properties, >modal logic.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Essentialism Stalnaker I 71
Essentialism/today/VsQuine: most modal logicians today accept essentialism. QuineVsEssentialism: incorrect: it is incorrect to say that one description is better than the other, because it better characterizes essential properties of an object. >Essential property, >Possible worlds, >Modal logic.
I 72
Essence/essentialism/essential property/LeibnizVsQuine/Stalnaker: thesis: every property of every individual constitutes its essence and only the existence of the thing as a whole is contingent. >Leibniz.
I 74
Anti-Essentialism/quantified modal logic/Stalnaker/conclusion: in order to connect the two, we need real semantic conditions for atomic predicates. Reason:
(Ex)N(Fx) > (x)N(Fx) is a theorem, but not its substitution instance
(Ex)N(Rxy) > (x)N(Rxy). If something necessarily is father of x, then everything is necessarily father of x. Of course, only intrinsic predicates are in question, but this is assumed and not explained.
>Intrinsicness.
I 85
Essentialism/Stalnaker: questions about essentialism are questions about how far it is appropriate and possible to abstract. >Abstraction.

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

Events Kim Schwarz I 132
Event/LewisVsKim: definition: Def Event/Kim: (Kim 1976)(1): a triple of a thing, a time and a property.
LewisVsKim: (1986f(5),196) that is too fragile:
Schwarz I 133
This assigns too many essential properties to events. For example, a football match could have happened a little later or a little different. Or would it have been another game then? Bennett: (1988(4),§23 24) intuitively the question has no sense.
Schwarz: that's not what Lewis is all about. But fragility is what matters when it comes to causes and effects:
Def Fragility/fragile/Event/Lewis/(s): a modified event would not be the same but different. Then modification cannot be expressed at all: "what was modified?
>Identity, >Identification, >Similarity, >Distinctions, >Classification.
Counterfactual analysis: according to it, A causes B if B would not have happened without A.
>Counterfactual conditionals.
Question: under what circumstances would one event have happened (even if it was different) and under what circumstances would it have been replaced by another. This will lead to problems later on.
Cause/effect/Lewis/Schwarz: both are no intuitive event. For example acoustic feedback: here the later temporal parts are caused by the earlier ones. (1986f(5),172f).
>Cause, >Effect.
Similarly: e.g. the temporal parts of persons are linked by causal relationships!
>Temporal identity, >Parts, cf. >Continuants, >Person.
But these temporal parts are not events in the intuitive sense. Causes such as the presence of oxygen in an explosion (ok, as a cause) are also not an event in the everyday sense. (1986d(6),261).
Event/BennettVsLewis/MellorVsLewis/Schwarz: shouldn't Lewis rather speak of "facts"? "that p causes q".
Fact/Schwarz: if you understand them as classes of space-time regions, this is not an alternative, but only a terminological variant.
>Facts, >Space-time regions.

1. Jaegwon Kim [1976]: “Events as Property Exemplifications”. In Myles Brand und Douglas Walton
(ed.), Action Theory, Dordrecht: Reidel, 159–177
4. Jonathan Bennett [1988]: Events and Their Names. Oxford: Clarendon Press
5. D. Lewis [1986f]: Philosophical Papers II . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press
6. D. Lewis [1986d]: “Events”. In [Lewis 1986f]: 241–269

Kim I
J. Kim
Philosophy of Mind 2010


Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Extensionality Bigelow I 368
Set/Identity/Bigelow/Pargetter: a set will change when it receives an additional item or loses one. Logical form: extensional axiom:
(y)(N(y ε x) v N ~ (y ε x)).

Everyday translation: "Either something is an element of a given set in all possible worlds or in no world. It cannot be element in some worlds, "but not in others".
Principle of Predication/Bigelow/Pargetter: this is an instance of this principle. (See 3.2).
>Predication.
It applies to quantities, but not to universals. A universal is only a set if the extensional axiom applies.

Essential properties/Bigelow/Pargetter: have a very similar character as sets.
Universals: also have essential properties.
Sets: for them, the set of elements is essential.

Sets/Bigelow/Pargetter: are universals. Their essential property, the extensionality is a reflection of the determining essences of universals.
>Sets, >Set theory, >Universals.

Elemental relation/Bigelow/Pargetter: acts in both directions. All elements taken together could not exist without simultaneously constituting this set. The individual elements could of course. Therefore, belonging to a set is not an essential feature of an element, taken alone ((s) of an individual?).
Definition plural essence/plural essence/Bigelow/Pargetter: is then the essential that affects all elements of a set simultaneously.
I 369
It always affects a plurality of things. "To be one of this group of things".
Extensionality axiom/Bigelow/Pargetter: does not yet ensure the existence of sets. This is achieved by the comprehension scheme.
>Extensionality, >Comprehension.

Comprehension scheme/comprehension/abstraction scheme/Bigelow/Pargetter: asserts that for each description there are a lot of things that fulfill this description. (Possibly the empty set). This is one of the dramatic examples for the resulting of ontological conclusions from semantic assumptions.
Formally. Let ψ(x) be an open sentence, then

(Ey)(x)((x ε y) ⇔ ψ (x)).

Problem: fortunately or unfortunately the comprehension scheme contains a contradiction: ((s) E.g. possible instance of the schema: "The set of objects that do not belong to a set.
Priest: (1979)(1) concludes that some contradictions are true.
Comprehension scheme/Bigelow/Pargetter: but is not valid because of the contradiction.
Ontology/Bigelow/Pargetter: the decision about what exists should precede the semantics. The semantics can then modify them.
I 370
Therefore, we should not expect that the comprehension scheme is valid. BigelowVsComprehension Scheme: E.g. Suppose a general description, which we want to call an "open-ended type". Perhaps there is a property to be one of the things shared by many of these things that fulfill this description. But then there may be many other things that fulfill the description that do not have the property of being one of these things. There may be things that do not have the property, but they meet the description.

E.g. It may also be that the property of the form "be one of these things" is fulfilled by some, but not by all, things which fulfill the description.

VsComprehension scheme/Zermelo-Fraenkel/ZF/Bigelow/Pargetter: Zermelo-Fraenkel propose a replacement for the comprehension scheme: Separation:

Separation/separation axiom/Bigelow/Pargetter: with the help of other axioms, it entails the existence of sufficient sets for the purposes of mathematics. Especially for the reduction of geometry to the number theory. ...+...
>Number theory.

1. Priest, G. (1979). The logic of paradoxes. Journal oof Philosophical Logic 8. pp. 219-41.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Extrinsic Extrinsic, philosophy: intrinsic refers to properties that an object must have in order to be this object. This is not the same as the distinction between essential and non-essential properties. For example, the property of being known by many is an extrinsic property for a human. The person would be the same without this property. See also intrinsicness, essence, properties, features, necessity.

Extrinsic Rorty I 31
extrinsic properties/intrinsical/mental/Rorty: problem: how to distinguish extrinsic from intrinsic properties. >Essential properties, >intrinsic properties, >Essentialism, >properties.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Identity Boer I 13
Identity/Boer: well-known individuals, characteristics and relations seem to have "identities" in the sense that there is something that makes them what they are. ((s) identity as a "set of (typical) properties"). Solution/Boer: then we could link actuality/existence with identity:
principle

(E!) A being is existing/actual iff an essential property is exemplified by him.

Non-actual/non-existent: here there are two possibilities then:
A) an essential property of N is not exemplified (e.g. fictional figures, "merely possible individuals" e.g. Superman).
>Possibilism.
Also Plantinga as an actualist pro)
>Actualism.
(B) N has no essential properties. For example, it is assumed that fictional characters are essentially fictional, that is, they could not be real. Then there might be at best an imitation of Superman. The fictional Superman is then a thing without individual essence.
If one accepts this, one can still maintain the thesis that all things are necessarily self-identical.
>Self-identity.

Boer I
Steven E. Boer
Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010

Boer II
Steven E. Boer
Knowing Who Cambridge 1986

Identity Theory Kripke Frank I 32
Identity Theory/mental/physical/Kripke/Frank: the identity theory teaches the diversity of the logical subjects of the physical and the psychic. I attribute the physical to a naturalistic vocabulary (syntactic structures), the mental to a mentalistic one (semantic structures). >Physical/psychic, >Naturalism, >Mentalism.
Frank I 32
KripkeVsIdentity Theory: the identity theory will not go further than that an identity between syntactic and semantic structures would, if at all, be based on the fact that the semantic is not without the syntactic, but this does not sufficiently determine it through the syntactic - which is a variant of the supervenience thesis. >Supervenience.
Frank I 114
KripkeVsIdentity Theory: it is conceivable that a psychic event (e.g. pain) occurs without a physical event - hence the two are not identical. It is not an essential property of the sensation of pain to be a psychic event - it is rather only an accidental property. >Pain/Kripke, >Properties/Kripke.
Frank I 123
KripkeVsIdentity Theory: identity theory asserts a contingent identity - however, as it is necessary, we cannot speak of a deception if we try to imagine that the identity statement is false! It could have turned out that pain is not C fiber stimulation: this is no analogy to heat/molecular motion. We pick out heat because of its contingent property that it feels a certain way. We pick out pain by the necessary property to feel like pain. KripkeVsLewis: the causal role suggests the misconception that the cause of pain is contingent. >Contingency/Kripke, >Causal role.

Saul A. Kripke (1972): Naming and Necessity, in: Davidson/Harmann (eds.) (1972), pp. 253-355.

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Individuation Searle V 251
Individuation/Identification/Fregean sense/Searle: no manner of presentation (>way of givenness) is connected with a single predicate, because that is not an identifying description, e.g. Leo Peter and Gustav Lauben do not know that they are talking about the same person. Kripke: needs >essential properties to solve the problem. >Information processing/Psychology, >Computation, >Connectionism, >Model.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Induction Goodman I 23
Defi Induction/Goodman: induction requires that some classes are seen as relevant classes by excluding others. >Relevance. ---
II 82
The sharpest criticism VsHume/Goodman: Hume's analysis relates at best to the origin of predictions, not to their entitlement.
II 88
The problem of induction is not a problem of proof, but a problem of definition of the difference between justified and unjustified predictions. >Justification, >Prediction.
II 89
There is mutual adjustment between definition and language use.
II 101f
Grue/Goodman: problem: the same data supports contrasting predictions. Question: in what essential property must hypotheses be the same > law: are not in connection with e.g. an object in my pocket. "Grue" does not work as a conventional non-law-like hypotheses (it is limited in space or time) - one can reverse the derivation: red and green from gred and reen.
II 109
Law-like or resumable hypotheses are not to be characterized purely syntactically.
II 95
What confirms certain data, is not what is obtained by generalization of separate individual cases, but that which is obtained by generalization of the entire body of data material.

G IV
N. Goodman
Catherine Z. Elgin
Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988
German Edition:
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

Goodman I
N. Goodman
Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978
German Edition:
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

Goodman II
N. Goodman
Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982
German Edition:
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

Goodman III
N. Goodman
Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976
German Edition:
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

Intrinsicness Intrinsic: Intrinsic are properties which are not caused by relationships to other objects, e.g. to have a certain age. Intrinsic properties are not to be confused with essential properties, e.g. a certain age is usually not essential for an object. Extrinsic properties are, e.g. to be famous, that is to say, properties which arise from the fact that there are other objects, and these other objects have a relation to the object in question.

Intrinsicness Rorty VI 106
Intrinsic/observer-relative/RortyVsSearle: Searle’s distinction serves no useful purpose. - Searle says: "essential" - Rorty: we ask: "essential what for?"
VI 126
Intrinsic/extrinsic: we cannot decide which description applies to the intrinsic characteristics. >Description, >Observation language, >Observation sentence, >Attribution, >Essence, >Searle.
VI 146 f
Intrinsic/extrinsic/RortyVsSearle: one can only defend intrinsic characteristics if one can claim that knowledge of these characteristics is not identical with the knowledge on how to use the words used to describe these characteristics. >Extrinsic, >Essentialism, >Essential properties, >Language use.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Materialism Kripke Putnam II 189
KripkeVsMaterialism: because of "essential properties", e.g. a statue and clay are two objects, different statements are true of them. Clay: is a property: "an article which could have been spherical" - that does not apply to the statue. >Properties/Kripke, >Statue/clay.

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984


Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Method Sherif Haslam I 147
Method/Sherif: Sherif knowingly adopted a model of intergroup relations based upon small-group interactions (Sherif, 1951)(1). At the same time, however, by moving out of the laboratory and choosing to conduct intensive field experiments, Sherif was ultimately able to test hypotheses and make inferences that extended well beyond the scope of nearly all social-psychological experimentation prior to, and since, his groundbreaking work. >Robbers Camp Study/Sherif.
The first challenge that Sherif and colleagues faced was the translation of their broad conceptual notions of groups and intergroup relations into specific experimental practices. Sherif began the empirical work by attempting to define precisely the ‘minimal essential properties of groups’ (Sherif et al., 1955(2): 371). Note that the very claim that groups have ‘properties’ reveals Sherif’s belief that groups had a material reality.
Haslam I 148
Sherif 1969(3): 223: Interactions: a) between people within at least two separate groups
b) between groups.
Method/Sherif: three experimental phases
1) ingroup formation
2) intergroup conflict 3) reduction of intergroup conflict. >Robbers Cave Experiment/Sherif.
Each study incorporated slightly different variants of these phases, and Experiment 2 did not involve the third phase. In each study, the participants were boys who were naïve to the experimental hypotheses and, in fact, to the fact that they were taking part in an experiment at all. Instead, they believed they were attending a normal summer camp.
Participants: In selecting participants, Sherif and his colleagues actively worked to ensure ‘homogeneity of subjects as to sociocultural and personal backgrounds’ (Sherif et al., 1961(4): 59). (…) this meant that if they ultimately came to behave viciously towards each other, this could not be attributed to any inherent deficiencies in their character or background.
Haslam I 155
1. VsSherif: One common criticism of Sherif’s work – levelled by both biographers and critical social psychologists (e.g., Brannigan, 2006(5); Grandberg and Sarup, 1992(6)) – is that, for him and his colleagues, hypothesis testing typically came rather late in the research process. That is, following immersion in a given problem the researchers would develop insights about the nature of the problem, which they would then seek to confirm empirically. As a result, Sherif and his colleagues have been criticized for seeking to devise experiments that would verify (rather than test) their hypotheses (e.g., see Sherif, 1948(7): 357). For epistemological reasons, this type of approach will tend to have high external validity, but it is not well suited to the discovery of new insights (Cherry, 1995(8)).
Haslam I 156
2. VsSherif: In relation to theory, several authors (e.g., Brewer and Brown, 1998(9); Turner, 1975(10)) have also stressed that Sherif and his colleagues failed to distinguish between competition based on real, material competition and more symbolic competition (e.g., based on values, prestige, social status). 3. VsSherif: one of the major strengths of Sherif’s research – its location in the field (as opposed to laboratory) – is also one of its biggest weaknesses. Because there were so many variables interacting in the field experiments (e.g., mutual frustration, ingroup bullying, intergroup attribution, the anticipation of competition, the consequences of winning or losing), it remains almost impossible to discern specifically what it was about any given situation that led to the observed effects (Dion, 1979(11); Rabbie, 1982(12); Platow and Hunter, 2001(13)).

1. Sherif, M. (1951) ‘A preliminary experimental study of inter-group relations’, in J.H. Rohrer and M. Sherif (eds), Social Psychology at the Crossroads. New York: Harper & Row. pp. 388–424.
2. Sherif, M., White, B.J. and Harvey, O.J. (1955) ‘Status in experimentally produced groups’, American Journal of Sociology, 60: 370–9.
3. Sherif, M. and Sherif, C.W. (1969) Social Psychology. New York: Harper & Row.
4. Sherif, M., Harvey, O.J., White, B.J., Hood, W.R. and Sherif, C.W. (1961) Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation: The Robbers Cave Experiment. Norman, OK: Institute of Group Relations, University of Oklahoma.
5. Brannigan, A. (2006) Introduction to the Aldine Translation Edition of M. Sherif: Social Interaction: Processes and Products. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
6. Grandberg, D. and Sarup, G. (1992) ‘Muzafer Sherif: Portrait of a passionate intellectual’, in D. Grandberg and G. Sarup (eds), Social Judgment and Intergroup Relations: Essays in Honor of Muzafer Sherif. New York. Springer-Verlag. pp. 3–54.
7. Sherif, M. (1948) An Outline of Social Psychology. New York: Harper.
8-Cherry, F. (1995) The ‘Stubborn Particulars’ of Social Psychology: Essays on the Research Process. London: Routledge.
9. Brewer, M.B. and Brown, R.J. (1998) ‘Intergroup relations’, in D.T. Gilbert, S.T. Fiske and G. Lindzey (eds), The Handbook of Social Psychology, 4th edn. New York: McGraw-Hill. pp. 554–94.
10.Turner, J.C. (1975) ‘Social comparison and social identity: Some prospects for intergroup behaviour’, European Journal of Social Psychology, 5: 1–34.
11Dion, K.L. (1979) ‘Intergroup conflict and intragroup cohesiveness’, in S. Worchel and W.G. Austin (eds), The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole. pp. 33–47.
12. Rabbie, J.M. (1982) ‘The effects of intergroup competition on intragroup and intergroup relationships’, in V.J. Derlega and J. Grzelak (eds), Cooperation and Helping Behaviour: Theories and Research. New York: Academic Press. pp. 123–49.
13. Platow, M.J. and Hunter, J.A. (2001) ‘Realistic intergroup conflict: Prejudice, power, and protest’, in M. Augoustinos and K.J. Reynolds (eds), Understanding the Psychology of Prejudice and Racism. London: Sage. pp. 195–212.


Michael W. Platow and John A. Hunter, „ Intergroup Relations and Conflicts. Revisiting Sherif’s Boys’ Camp studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications


Haslam I
S. Alexander Haslam
Joanne R. Smith
Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Modal Logic Quine II 152
Modal Logic/Quine: The entire modal logic is context-dependent - what is the role of someone or something? It is on the same level as essential properties. (Essentialism).
VII (h) 151
Modal Logic/ontology/Quine: instead of Venus as a material object we now have three objects: Venus term, morning star term, evening star term - avoiding opaque contexts: class names as objects rather than classes, numerical names as objects instead of numbers - number concept/number of planets concept: a term is not larger/smaller than another one - reason: necessity is not satisfied by physical objects (> Necessity/Hume). - Necessity/possibility: is only introduced by way of reference, not by the objects - necessity concerns relations, not objects (not existence) - Frege: "sense (meaning) of names" Quine: Problem: individuation requires analyticity and synonymy - E.g. (s) "The term Morning Star necessarily includes the appearance on the morning sky.
VII (h) 151f
Modal Logic/Quine: makes essentialism necessary, i.e. you cannot do without necessary traits of the objects themselves, because you cannot do without quantification - QuineVsModal Logic: actually there is nothing necessary to the objects "themselves", but only in the way of reference.
VII (h) 151
Modal Logic/Ontology/Quine: the condition that two names for x must be synonymous is not a condition for objects, but for singular terms - no necessity de re - Venus does not decide about morning star/evening star. - ((s) The conditions are equivalent not the objects. > necessity.
VII (h) 154
Modal Logic/Church/Quine: quantified variables should be limited to intensional values ​​- Proposition: complex names of intensional objects - then instead of necessity operator for whole sentences: Necessity predicate is based on complex names ("propositions") - no modal logic in the narrower sense. >Propositions/Quine.
VII (h) 154
Modal Logic/Smullyan/Quine: there is a strict separation of proper names and (overt or covert) descriptions - names which denote the same objects are always synonymous (if x = y, then nec. x = y.) - In this case, sentences like (number of the planets = 9) which do not have a substitutable identity must be analyzed by descriptions rather than through proper names (Quine pro). - QuineVs: one must still consider opaque contexts, even if descriptions and other singular terms are eliminated all together. >Proper Names/Quine.
VII (h) 154
Modal Logic/Necessity/Planet Example/Quine: the only hope is to accept the situation as described in (33): there are exactly x planets) and still insist that the object x in question is necessarily more than 7! (> Essentialism). - An object itself, regardless by what it is named or not named, must be considered in a way that it has some traits necessarily and others by chance! And notwithstanding the fact that the random traits stem from a way of reference, as well as the necessary ones from other modes of reference - ~nec. [p. (x = x)] where "p" stands for any random truth.
VII (h) 156
Modal Logic/Quine: one must accept an Aristotelian essentialism, if one wants to permit quantified modal logic.
VII (h) 156
Modal Logic/planet/Quine: the property of being bigger than 9 = the property of being bigger than 9 - but wrong: the property of exceeding the number of planets = the property of being bigger than 9 (s) New: although now the number is the same, the property is not the same - (E.g.) (x = The property of being greater than x = the property to be greater than 9) - any non-truth-functional language leads to opaque contexts.
X 107
Modality/modal/Quine: Problem: extension-identical (coextensive) predicates are not interchangeable salva veritate. >Modalities/Quine.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Modal Properties Putnam I (g) 189
Nature/essence/Kripke: e.g. statue: the statue and the piece of clay are two items. The fact that the piece of clay has a modal property, namely, "to be a thing that might have been spherical" is missing in the statue.
VsKripke: that sounds initially odd: e.g. when I put the statue on the scale, do I measure then two objects?
E.g. it is equally strange to say that a human being is not identical with the aggregation of its molecules.
Intrinsic Properties/Putnam: e.g. suppose, there are "intrinsic connections" to my thoughts to external objects: then there is perhaps a spacetime region in my brain with quantity-theoretical connections with an abstract object which includes some external objects. >Intrinsic, >Extrinsic.
Then this spacetime region will have a similar quantity-theoretical connection with other abstract entities that contain other external objects.
Then the materialist can certainly say that my "thoughts" include certain external objects intrinsically, by identifying these thoughts with a certain abstract entity.
Problem: if this identification should be a train of reality itself, then there must be real essences in the world in a sense that the set theory cannot explain.
Nature/essential properties/PutnamVsKripke: Kripke's ontology presupposes essentialism, it cannot serve to justify it.
>Essentialism, >Essence.
I (g) 190
Term/possible world/Putnam: modern semantics: functions about possible worlds represent terms, e.g. the term "this statue" unequals the phrase "this piece of clay". PutnamVsPossible Worlds: question: in the actual world, is there an object to which one of these terms significantly and the other only accidentally applies to? Possible worlds provide too many objects. PutnamVsKripke/PutnamVsEssentialism: Kripke's ontology presupposes essentialism, it cannot justify it. Modal properties are not part of the materialistic means of the world but Kripke individuated objects by their modal properties.
Essential Properties/Putnam: I have not shifted them into "parallel worlds" but instead into possible states of the actual world (other liquid than H20 water) which is insofar essentialist that we have thus discovered the nature of water. We just say water should not be anything else (intention). That is our use and not "built into the world" (intrinsic, Kripke ditto). VsMaterialism: this does not help the semantic reading because it presupposes reference (materialism wants to win reference from "intrinsic" causal relationship).
>Materialism, >Reference, >intrinsic.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Necessity Kripke I 116
Necessary/not a priori: e.g. Goldbach’s conjecture: it will turn out with necessity. >Goldbach's conjecture, >necessary a posteriori.
I would suggest, however, that it is not a necessary fact that Aristotle has the logical sum of the properties which are usually attributed to him.
Kripke (VsTradition): molecular motion is necessarily identical with heat. We have discovered it, but it could not have been otherwise.
Physical truths are necessary:
e.g. heat = molecular motion - but this has no analogy to mind-brain identities.
>Identity theory, >Pain/Kripke.
I 116
Def necessity/Kripke: identity assertions in which both expressions designate rigidly constitute necessity. E.g. »Water is H20". Water could not have been something else. It is essential for water that it is this material with this atomic structure. Where there is no H20, there is no water. >Rigidity/Kripke.

Frank I 121f
Necessary/Kripke: compounds formed with two or more rigid designation expressions are necessary, e.g. that pain simply feels like pain. Contingent/Kripke: e.g. the fact that there are living beings on this planet (namely us) who feel heat a certain way. E.g. that heat feels to us as it feels. Tradition: a brain condition could also occur without pain.
I 122
Necessary/essential properties/KripkeVsTradition: the type of picking out pain (by experience) and the brain state (configuration of molecules) in both cases is essential and not accidental. The brain state could be singled out through contingent facts, but not the pain.

Saul A. Kripke (1972): Naming and Necessity, in: Davidson/Harmann (eds.) (1972), pp. 253-355.


Kripke I 144
Necessary properties do not have to belong to the meaning. (The periodic table was discovered later). Scientific discoveries do not change the meaning. Meaning does not arise from properties. >Meaning/Kripke, >Properties/Kripke.
---
Stalnaker I 188
Necessary a posteriori/Kripke/Stalnaker: typical cases: statements that contain names e.g. Hesperus = Phosphorus (see below: they were determined by different causal chains). Statements about natural kinds: e.g. "the atomic weight of gold is 79". >Morning star/evening star, >Natural kinds/Kripke.

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Necessity Putnam Kripke I 141
Necessity/needed/Putnam: "cats are animals" is less necessary than "bachelors are unmarried". ---
Putnam V 72
Metaphysically Necessary/Kripke: Putnam: it is "metaphysically necessary" that water is H20, but that is explained by earthly chemistry and earthly facts about speaker intentions regarding reference. When describing a hypothetical liquid which is not H20 and merely resembles water, one does not describe any possible worlds, in which H2O is not water.
V 274
Metaphysically Necessary/heat/Kripke/Putnam: possible Worlds, where heat does not corresponds with molecular motion, are possible. Language: but then we say that there is a different mechanism that triggers heat sensation. Identity/heat/molecular motion/Kripke: the identity is necessary, but not a priori. The statement is empirical, but necessary.
>Necessary a posteriori.
Molecular motion is an essential property of the temperature.
KripkeVsMoore: then equating goodness with utility maximization cannot only be contingently wrong.
KripkeVsNon-Cognitivism: from the fact that the words are not synonymous, one cannot conclude that the characteristics are not identical.
>Non-cognitivism, >Synonymy.
V 279
Pro Moore: Moore was right that our concepts of natural science are more neutral as opposed to ethical ones. VsMoore: but that does not mean that the good did not exist.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000


Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984
Necessity Quine I 344/45
Properties/Quine: are no necessary or contingent properties (VsModal Logic) - are only more or less important properties. >Properties/Quine.
II 143 ff
"Nec." is predicate in laws, extensional, no quote, but unclear - "Q" (functor) modal logic, intensional de re: is out of range: x = planets, x = 9, 9 odd - predicate applies to value of the variable, not to the name. - De Re: referencing position.
De dicto: the term that is meant is in the sentence: "nec." planets odd: is wrong.
De re: E.g. spy should be an essential property (wrong) - not a belief de re (essential property).
Modal Logic/Quine: the entire metalanguage is context-dependent - what role does someone or something play? - Same level as essential properties.
Necessity/(Quine: the whole concept only makes sense in the context!
propositional attitude/Quine: is preserved! - But not de re.
>de re/Quine, >de dicto/Quine.
VII (h) 152
Necesity/Quine: works only for intensional objects, they should necessarily be like this or like that (s) conceptually.
X 133
Necessity/principle/Quine: the principle of minimum mutilation is what underlies the logical necessity: it can explain the nature of the necessity which is connected to the logical and mathematical truth. - ((s) > Simplicity).
Rorty IV 60
Necessary/contingent/Quine: there is no distinction between necessary and contingent truths.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Necessity de re Wiggins II 309f
Necessity de re/Wiggins: Problem: E.g. certainly Caesar can be essentially a person, without being in that way so that each sequence with Caesar satisfies in second place: (Human (x2)). Reason: it could be that "human" did not mean human.
>Possible worlds, >Meaning.
General problem: asymmetry, de re.
E.g. Kripke: Elizabeth II is necessarily (de re), the daughter of George VI. But George VI does not necessarily have to have a daughter.
E.g. Chisholm: if a table T has a leg L, then T must have L de re as part. But, to say of the table, that it necessarily consists of substructure and board, is not the same as to say that substructure and board are necessarily parts of the table - and also not that the board is necessarily connected to the substructure.
Wiggins: nevertheless, if anything is certain, it is this:

[(λx)(λy)[xRy] = [(λy)(λx)[y converse-Rx]

It would be a perverse extreme in the other direction, if one wanted to banish the corresponding biconditional from the truth theory for L.
Wiggins: no matter what one thinks of this mereological essentialism, it means that when the legs exist, the rest of the table needs not to exist.
>Essentialism, >Mereology,
>Mereological essentialism.
Solution: more specific description of the essential properties, e.g. trough points in time:

(t)(table exists at t)> (leg is part of table at t))

then

necessary[(λy)(λw)[(t)((y exists at t) > (w is part of y at t)))], [table, leg].

II 311
That secures the desired asymmetry. Problem: There is a problem because the existential generalization does not work for the necessity-of-origin doctrine.
More general solution: distinction: wrong:

[Necessary[(λx)(λy)(x consists of y], [leg, table]

There are undesirable consequences for existence that would be proven through it. And

[Necessary [(λx) (x consists of table], [leg]

this is also wrong.
And finally:

[Necessary (λy)(leg consists of y], [table]

What is right or false depending on whether Kripke or Chisholm is right.
>Necessity, >Necessity/Kripke.

Wiggins I
D. Wiggins
Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016

Wiggins II
David Wiggins
"The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Non-Existence Boer I 7
Non-existence/search/propositional attitudes/Boer: E.g. someone who is looking for the fountain of youth or e.g. someone who worships Zeus, is looking for something and worships something. One cannot say that he is not looking for anything
This leads to (D3):

(D3) R is an existence-independent relation = It is possible for an existing thing to have the relation ^R to something that is not an existing thing.

Boer: the application of (D3) now depends on how we interpret "some" and "existing".

Existence/Classical logic: to be value of a bound variable. Problem: then you can have no relation to an existing thing that is not an existing thing ((s). That is, classical logic leads to a contradiction on a more elementary level).
Relation/classical logic: must deny that there are such relations at all.
Solution: then you have to regard "looking for the fountain of youth" as a simple form without complexity, i.e. no relational verb with a singular term.
---
I 12
Existence-independence/conceptual dependency/non-actuality/"there is"/"exists"/Boer: distinction between "exists" and "there exists": VsNon-Actualism/Boer: this is fixed on shady entities like potential fat men. (Unrealized Possibilities).
BoerVsVs: these are overreactions.
Solution/Boer: a metaphysical basis for the distinction exist/be without ontological overpopulation.
---
I 13
Non-actual/non-existent: here there are two possibilities then: A) an essential property of N is not exemplified (e.g., fictional figures, "merely possible individuals" e.g. Superman)> Possibilism, also Plantinga pro as an actualist)
(B) N has no essential properties. For example, it is assumed that fictional characters are essentially fictional, that is, they could not be real. Then there might be at best an imitation of Superman. The fictional Superman is then a thing without individual essence.
If you accept this, you can still maintain the thesis that all things are necessarily self-identical.
---
I 16
Existence-independence/referential quantification/non-actualism: causal relations cannot be existence-independent. On the other hand, relations to non-existent objects must be existence-independent. E.g. search, worship, etc. can be relations to non-existent objects.

Boer I
Steven E. Boer
Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010

Boer II
Steven E. Boer
Knowing Who Cambridge 1986

Pain Kripke I 167
A certain sensation (pain) could not have existed without being a sensation. >Pain/Kripke.
Pain: it is a mistake to think that a pain S and a brain condition B could exist independently.
>Identity theory/Kripke.
---
Rorty I 93
Kripke/Rorty: same epistemic situation: even in the absence of heat you can be in the same epistemic situation that you can feel the heat sensation. Pain: in the case of pain and other mental phenomena this is not possible. Being in the same epidemic situation that would exist if there was a pain means to be in pain.
I 174
Heat: although "heat" is a rigid designator, the reference is determined with respect to an accidental property. >Rigidity/Kripke, >Reference/Kripke.
Pain: pain is a rigid designator whose reference is determined by an essential property of the reference (LewisVs).
>Essence/Kripke.

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Pain Rorty I 83f
Pain/Descartes: pain are particulars RortyVs). Their being is constituted in a single property: painfulness.
---
I 93f
Pain/Kripke/Rorty: difference: a) heat: Even in the absence of heat you can feel heat - (same epistemic situation)
b) Not so in the case of pain.
Difference: a) reference in heat is determined by an accidental property - b) in pain: by an essential property.
>Pain/Kripke, cf. >Necessity a posteriori.
I 127 f
E.g. The not yet speaking child knows in the same way that it is in pain, as the plant knows the direction of the sun and the amoeba the temperature of the water. Knowledge: this way of knowledge, however, is unrelated to what a user of language knows, if he knows what pain is.
Wittgenstein: it is a mistake to think that we learn what pain is in this second sense in putting our knowledge, of what pain in the first sense is, in a linguistic construct.
>Linguistic disguise.
I 128
Wittgensteinians: make a fuss about the facts about behavior and environment. RortyVs: these are irrelevant to the nature of pain. Because the nature of pain is simply determined by what is named.
---
VI 172
Rorty: Pain, people and beliefs (I'm not so sure with hairstyles) are not entities, about which one can learn to talk by obtaining succinct definitions. >Definition.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Particulars Stalnaker I 72
Bare particular/anti-essentialism/BIT/Stalnaker: thesis: for every individual and every property there are possible worlds in which the individual has this property, and other possible worlds in which it does not. >Bare particulars, >Possible Worlds, >Essentialism.
Exception: self-identity. Problem: we need special semantics for that.
I 72/73
Essential properties/bare individual things/theoretical terms/particulars/Stalnaker: from the perspective of the theory of the bare particulars there are undeniable essential properties. 1) Something that is necessarily an essential property of everything, e.g. the ability to be self-identical, e.g. to be either a kangaroo or not a kangaroo, e.g. to be colored when red.
2) Def referential properties/Ruth Marcus: (1967)(1) the following attributes are essential for Babe Ruth: e.g. being identical with Babe Ruth, e.g. either being identical with Babe Ruth or fat, e.g. being fat when Babe Ruth is fat, e.g. having the same weight as Babe Ruth. This also applies in possible worlds where Babe Ruth is a tricycle.
3) Possible worlds-indexed properties/Plantinga: (1970)(2) possible worlds-indexed properties are undeniable essential properties, e.g. call the real world Kronos - then being-snub-nosed-in-Kronos is defined as the property that something/someone has in any possible world iff. this person/thing has the normal accidental property to be snub-nosed in Kronos (actual world).
Important argument: this imposes no restrictions on an individual as to which properties it could have had.
>Properties, >Necessity, >Necessity de re, >Accidens, >Essence, >Essential property, >Essentialism.

1. Ruth Barcan Marcus (1967): Essentialism in modal logic, Nous 1, (1):91-96.
2. Alvin Plantinga (1970): "World and Essence", Philosophical Review 79, pp. 461-92.

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

Platonism Boer I 14
Platonism/Boer: (Boer pro) considers the realm of the actual properties and relations as a whole, i.e. we assume that any property or relation that exists, exists necessarily. (Quantity/(s) contains all elements necessarily). N.B.: from this follows -given principle E! - that the indistinguishability of identity also applies to properties and relations.

(E!) A being is existing/actual if an essential property of it is exemplified.

(See below chapter 4: but we define their identity differently).
"Only possible"/property/relation/Boer: thus we are determined on the thesis that there are no "merely possible" properties or relations, but there could be merely possible individuals.
>Ontology, >Properties, >Relations, >Indistinguishability,
>Identity.

Boer I
Steven E. Boer
Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010

Boer II
Steven E. Boer
Knowing Who Cambridge 1986

Possible Worlds Quine Dennett I 140
Possibility/Possible objects/Quine: the possible fat man in the entrance, and the possible bald man in the entrance: are they the same possible man, or are they two different possible men? Are there more possible thin men than possible fat men standing in the entrance there? Or would their resemblance make them one? Are no two possible things equal? Or is the concept of identity not applicable to possibilities?
>Possibility/Quine, >Identity/Quine.
Quine II 149
Possible World/Quine: is vivid way to make a point for essentialist philosophy. In order to identify an object in a possible world essential properties are needed. (>Essentialism).
II 158
And what would the analog values be in other worlds? Simply the sums of physical objects in all worlds, whereby the inhabitants are connected indiscriminately. Example: One of these values would be "Napoleon with his counterparts in other worlds" another would consist of Napoleon with various completely different dissimilar inhabitants of other worlds. Therefore, quantification by means of objects across worlds in no way requires that we make any sense of the term "counterpart". Just as any momentary objects at different times form time segments that belong not only to one, but to countless temporally extended objects. (QuineVsLewis). >Counterpart theory, >Counterparts.
Quantification over one area is no more difficult than over several areas, unless there are additional difficulties with regard to the possible world.
This exists indeed: not in quantification but in the predicates.
>Predicates/Quine.
II 159
By means of an arbitrary series of worlds, you can transform anything into anything via easy to take steps. The devastating difference is: that the series of momentary cross sections is imposed on us by our real world in a unique way, while they are placed in possible worlds of fantasy. Example: How does quantification in modal contexts depend on cross-world identitfications? We are looking at: "(Ex)QFx". The problem does not lie in quantification as such: "x" extends across all worlds, but "Fx" requires that the predicate "F" is fulfilled in all worlds.
>Quantification/Quine.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Proper Names Names, proper names, philosophy: the status of proper names is a relatively new philosophical problem. S. A. Kripke has treated it as one of the first in “Naming and Necessity” (three lectures at Princeton University 1970, reprint Cambridge, 1980). Against the traditional bundle theory, according to which the meaning of names lies in the properties, or at least in the essential properties of their bearers, Kripke develops a causal theory of the names, which ultimately goes back to a baptism in the broader sense. The decisive point is that the name is associated with the person but it is not required that the person has any additional properties. See also causal theory, possible worlds, rigidity, rigid designators, descriptions.

Proper Names Wittgenstein Wolf II 14
Bundle theory/names: proposed by Wittgenstein and Searle > Essential properties; >Bundle theory/Kripke.
Wolf II 150
Names/Wittgenstein: I use the name N with no fixed meaning - Philosophical Investigations §79. ---
Hintikka I 302/303
Name/Object/Convention/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: as long as the links between language and the world are unanalyzed name-relations, the possible connections of the symbols are determined only by their own nature - by their own nature - name-relations are conventional - but the nature of the signs states itself - if we transform signs into variables, they are only dependent on the nature of the sentence -> logical form.- Meaningless connections must be prohibited by the convention - they are not excluded by the symbols themselves - so that the reflection is maintained - late : VsReflection - late: VsName-Relation.
Hintikka I 22
Names/existence/border/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: in a logically formed language all names must denote something. But one cannot specify how many objects there are. >Denotation, >Ontology.
I 51
Object/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: to the widespread misconceptions about the Tractatus counts the notion that what he calls "objects" does not include any relations and properties. Hintikka: the terminological counterpart of this error is: names are logically singular terms, so that predicates (including symbols for relations) cannot fall within that definition (falsely).
I 60ff
Signs/relation/name/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: not the complex sign "aRb" says that it is in a certain relation to b, but that "a" stands in a certain relation to "b", says aRb. (3,1432) (quotation marks sic) - But Wittgenstein wants something else: The number of names that appear in the elementary proposition must be the same, according to Tractatus as the number of objects in the situation illustrated by the sentence. But about which situation it is, is not determined, however, solely by the name of a and b. Copi: (wrongly) thinks that Wittgenstein through the phrase "in certain respects" basically abstracts from relation-signs and performs an existential generalization. (HintikkaVsCopi). >Existential generalization.
I 71
Names/existence/Wittgenstein: "I want to call 'name' only what cannot stand in the connection "X exists". And so one cannot say "Red exists" because, if red did not exist, it could not be talked about it. >Existence statements. Names/existence/Wittgenstein: the existence of an object is seen from the fact that its name is used in the language. For the logical rules of inference is then a well-formed language to be presupposed that the individual constants are not unrelated. >Individual constants.
I 85
Object/name/language/Socrates/Theaetetus/Hintikka: for the original elements of which everything is composed, there is no explanation. Everything that actually exists, can only be described with names, another determination is not possible. Neither it is, nor it is not. So the language is also an interweaving of names.
I 127
Elementary proposition: does not consist of a series of names for individual things that are held together by additional links, but it consists of a series of "names" for objects that belong to different but matching logic types.
I 149
Picture Theory/Image Theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: "Names are points, sentences, arrows, they have sense. The sense is determined by the two poles of true and false." >Sense. ---
II 84
Name/Meaning/Wittgenstein: the meaning of the words "Professor Moore" is not the owner - 1. the importance does not go for a walk - 2. the same words also appear in a sentence like E.g. "Professor Moore does not exist" - meaning is set within the language - by explanations.
II 88
Number/Wittgenstein: the numbers in a pattern book are the names of the patterns.
II 365
Name/object/Wittgenstein: between the two there is no real relationship. >Object. ---
VI 71
Name/elementary proposition/Wittgenstein/Schulte: the names of the elementary proposition are fundamentally different from the nature of proper names. They are primitive signs that cannot be defined closer by any definition - but they can be explained by explanations - explanations are sentences that contain primitive signs - unlike a code elementary propositions do not obey appointment rules.
VI 172
Names/WittgensteinVsFrege/Schulte: late: the owner is not the meaning of the name. ---
IV 22
Name/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: the name means the object. (3.203). >Proper names.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Properties Dummett I 72
Properties/Dummett: Properties can be weakly or strongly objective: Def weakly objective: "not dependent on individuals" - intersubjective
Def strongly objective: not dependent on anything - but no existence follows from it.
>Objectivity, >Strength of theories.
I 72
The child has no idea of ​​objectivity in the strong sense. The concept of color as objective in the weak sense is no guarantee that it is also objective in the strong sense: it could be that it is similar to the case of "interesting". Ex: it is not an essential property of "taste" that apart from the reactions of humans and animals who take a sample in their mouth there are other means to determine whether it is sweet. >Colour.
III (c) 139
Names/Meaning/logical constants/Dummett: if each attribute can be omitted without the name of the bearer being robbed, that does not mean that the sense remains the same - You can generalize this for all words except the logical constants and prepositions. >Logical constants, >Prepositions.

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Properties Kripke I 49/50
Ryle: the description decides whether a property is necessary or contingent! (Kripke: but not all properties are accidental, some are essential.) Nature/Kripke: some properties are essential: e.g. 9 is an odd number.
Definition essential property: if we consider a property to be essential to an object, we usually mean that it would have applied to an object in any case in which it would have existed.
>Planets example, >necessary/Kripke, >necessary de re/Kripke.
I 79
The relevance of properties depends on theory (Vs sheaf theory). >Relevance.
The biblical story does not provide any necessary properties of Moses, so he could have lived without accomplishing any of these things.
I 90f
Properties: "essential" properties are perhaps not the most important property. No theory distinguishes by relevance.
I 136f
I do not want to say that only the origin and substance are essential. Properties: there could even be a substance that has all the identifying properties, and yet is not gold, e.g. fool’s gold.
I 138
Each property could turn out to be wrong, therefore it is not a bundle concept.
I 139f
General names like "cat" do not express any property. ---
II 212
Kripke essential property/meaning/intention e.g. novel: it is not important whether the hero really was the Messiah, but it is important that the deeds apply to the intentioned hero. This has nothing to do with the principle of charity. >Meaning (Intending)/Kripke, >Charity Principle.

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984

Properties Quine Rorty VI 151
Major Property/holism/Quine/Rorty: at best: "property, which is necessary for the use of a certain description" - but not: "property, which is necessary for the identity of an object with itself."
Quine I 43
Features: independent existence is pointless. >Existence/Quine
I 218
Mass Term/Quine: is archaic(> (> E. Cassirer, Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, Berlin 1923-1929))) - Properties: a) Is commonality decisive? b) Is it about cattered clumps?
I 217
Features: are usually merely convenient abbreviations for long cross-references - Quine/Cassirer: features of archaic remains.
I 219
Not all abstract objects are properties: numbers, classes, functions, geometric figures, ideas, possibilities - give up or trace back to abstract objects - one can faithfully distinguished concrete objects by use of "-ness". >Object/Quine
I 322
Property abstraction (elimination) instead of "a = x(..x..)" - new: irreducible two-digit operator "0": "a0x(..x..)" - variables remain as the only ones - primacy of the pronoun. >Variables/Quine
I 344/45
Properties/Quine: there are no necessary or contingent properties (VsModal Logic) - there are only more or less important properties.
I 344
Properties/relations: meaning of timeless open sentences - is unidentifiable (How-propositions).
I 361
Elimination of relations and properties in favor of classes of ordered pairs, open sentences, general terms - even scattered objects (in the case of color) (46).
I 412
QuineVsProperties: fallacy of subtraction: to derive existence from "about" and "deals with" - "round" and "dog" are terms for physical objects - but no additional features. "Round" and "dog" are general terms for objects not singular terms for properties or classes. The same argument would be for classes instead of properties: general term symbolizes its extension as well as its intension.
>General Term/Quine
I 412
Properties: not every general term is necessarily about properties or classes - properties and classes are acceptable as values of variables.
I 464
QuineVsRussell/Whitehead: theory of incomplete symbols: eliminated classes only in favor of properties.
II 129f
Properties: are hard to individuate - not to define like classes by the same elements - various properties can get to the same things. Properties: "Zettsky" (like Russell): properties are identical when they were members of the same classes - QuineVs - solution: property is identical if two sentences ↔ (follow seperately) - unsatisfactory, less analyticity and necessity-operator.
Properties/Quine: identical when coextensive-classes: are not specified by elements, but by condition of containment (open sentence).
Property is not the same as predicate - property: open sentences - propositions: completed sentences.
Properties are not the same as classes: since no individuation principle for properties - solution "last classes" (do not belong to any other class, only have elements themselves) - like Russell: statement function only comes through their values - properties = last classes or properties = statement function.
>Classes/Quine
Properties as last classes are every element of the zero class, therefore all identical? - Vs: this identity definition only applies to theories that allow no objects who belong to no class (Unicorn).
Properties/identity: (here) are interchangeability in all contexts - Prerequisite: exhaustion of a finite lexicon by interchangeability of atomic contexts - RyleVs: Category confusion.
Properties: QuineVsCarnap/Russell: minimize grammatical categories, expand scope - if all can be attributed to "has", then all properties are extensional - rest could be listed by list.
Properties: contexts with "has" unproblematic - "contained in" prohibited (less classes) - "is" leads to circular definition of properties - properties do not count. "Nap had all properties but one": is prohibited. - however: "all properties" allowed.
II 144 f
De re: E.g. spy should be an essential property (wrong) - no belief is de re (essential property). Modal Logic/Quine: the entire modal logic is context-dependent - what role does someone or something play? - Same level as essential properties.
Necessity/Quine: the whole concept is only meaningful in context.
Property Einstein/Quine: are preserved. - But not de re.
>de re/Quine
X 95
Properties/Quine: do not exist for lack of distinctness (only amounts) - "synonymy unclear" - open sentences that apply to the same objects never determine different amounts, but differnt properties could underlie.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Properties Stalnaker I 9
Def property/Stalnaker: a) Def thin/economic definition: a property is a way in which individuals can be grouped
b) Def richer/Stalnaker: (more robust): a property is something in relation to which the individuals are grouped. To do this, we identify intrinsic properties with regions of a property-space.
>Intrinsicness.
Important argument: since the elements of the sets are not identical with the individuals that instantiate the property, this represents the independence of properties from their instantiation. ((s) So Stalnaker believes that properties also exist if they are not instantiated).
>Instantiation, >Individuals, >Individuation.
I 75
Modal Logic/ML/semantics/extensional/Stalnaker: e.g. property: a property is represented as a singular propositional function which takes an individual as an argument and delivers a proposition as a value. >Propositional functions.
Equivalent to this: property: a property is a function that takes a possible world as an argument and delivers a set of individuals as a value. It is therefore intuitively a selection rule for a class of individuals, given the facts and vice versa: a selection selective procedure for a class of individuals is a property of the selected individuals.
Cf. >Selection axiom, >Sets, >Set theory.
Problem: there is no extensional equivalent to the distinction between referential and purely qualitative properties - unlike with the distinction between essential and accidental ones.
>Essential properties, >Accidental properties.
Def Referential properties: referential properties are defined in terms of the individuals that they have.
Wrong solution: to stipulate that only accidental propositions may be selected for atomic predicates. This does not prevent that essential attributions could be true. It prevents only that they can be expressed.
Anti-essentialism/solution: the property must be defined independently of the possible worlds and the individuals.
>Essentialism.
I 78
Intrinsic Property/bare particular/theory: to identify an intrinsic property we must distinguish possible world-indexed, time-indexed and referential properties from them. These do not correspond to any particular regions in the logical space. >Intrinsicness, >Bare particulars.
E.g. having the same weight as Babe Ruth. - This is how we can represent anti-essentialism.
I 79
Kripke, early: Babe Ruth could have been a billiard ball. Kripke, later: there is a fallacy in that. Stalnaker: one cannot assume that he is actually a billiard ball, because then one could not refer to him as we already did. That is not what it is about (see below). This confuses the limits of what could actually be with the limitations of assumptions about what could counterfactually have been. >Conceivability.
Essential property/Kripke/Stalnaker: e.g. Kripke: thesis: names for natural species (natural kind terms) express essential properties.
>Natural kinds, >Essence.
Names for species are referential terms. Referential: referential means that they are determined by a causal connection.
>Causal theory of reference.
Natural kinds: natural kinds are not purely linguistic, but restrict the movement in the logical space.
Bare particulars: if one allows Babe Ruth to be a billiard ball, then one must also allow it for any other thing - then this solution is uninteresting.
I 81
Property/narrow/wide/propositional function: the distinction between 1) narrow P and 2) propositional functions: a propositional function in general is analogous to the distinction between possible individuals and concepts of individuals in general. >Narrow/wide, >Propositional functions.
I 94f
Physical non-property: a physical non-property is a complex combination of physical properties and relations (see below, e.g. golden mountain). Strong supervenience/Stalnaker: strong supervenience allows complex (composite) physical attributes to be physical properties.
>Supervenience.
Attribute: an attribute is an easy way of picking out.
>Attributes.
I 103
Def Property/Stalnaker: properties are simply a way to group individuals. Basic property/Stalnaker: basic properties must provide distinctions between individuals that could otherwise not be explained.
Problem: then basic properties cannot supervene on something else.

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

Properties Swoyer Armstrong III 160
Properties/Swoyer: thesis: properties must have "essential features" themselves. - But they are not phenomenal and do not consist of properties of properties. - Instead they have a nomic relation to other properties. ArmstrongVs: thesis: Properties can be their own nature. - Otherwise essential properties must have essential properties in turn - regress.
>Essence, >Regress.


Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Qua-Objects Fine Simons I 298
Qua-objects/Kit Fine/Simons: x qua F - or x under the description of F. Definition Basis: the underlying object Def Explanation/Fine: x qua F is always differentiated from the base.
SimonsVsFine: this is too strong, because then one would also have to distinguish "x qua self-identity" from x - also essential properties should not make up the qua. - Only contingent properties are ment to occur in the explanation.
>Mereology, >P. Simons, >Explanations.
Simons: most qua-objects have incorporated their explanation, not as a property. - (This already exists in Principia Mathematica(1)).
Qua-objects provide an ontological dependency for a conceptual dependency - e.g. fist qua clenched hand. - e.g. statue qua shaped clay.
>Statue/clay, >Conceptual dependence, >Ontological dependence.
SimonsVs: they do not achieve anything, one cannot form with them new singular terms from old.
>Singular terms, >Concepts, >Identification, >Distinctions.

1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fin I
K. Fine
The Limits of Abstraction Oxford 2008

FinA I
A. Fine
The Shaky Game (Science and Its Conceptual Foundations series) Chicago 1996


Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987
Rules Thiel Thiel I 65
Rules/Structure/Mathematics/Thiel: in all examples we have not only searched for suitable rules, on whose premises our data "fit", but rather the application of rules has only been made possible by structuring, by entering a very specific structure of the problem situation and argumentation possibilities related to it into the problem handling. >Structures.
Example Pythagorean theorem: here the right-angled triangle had to be inserted first. E.g. irrationality of root two: here the alienation of the divisor had to be recognized as an essential property.

T I
Chr. Thiel
Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995

Sensations Kripke I 152
Sensation: let us say that it is a contingent property of heat to cause these sensations in people? Finally, it is also contingent that there are people on this planet at all. So you do not know a priori which physical phenomenon produces this or that sensation.
I 167 f
Sensation: acertain inventor (Franklin) could have existed without being an inventor. But a particular sensation (pain) could not have existed without being a sensation.
>Pain/Kripke.
I 167f
Sensation: sensation is a mediator. Mental and physical: the mental and physical are no mediator, but identity (KripkeVs)!
>Identity theory.
Sensation: sensation has mediators between external phenomenon and observer.
>Physical/psychic.
I 167
One can have such a sensation without the presence of heat. In the case of pain and other mental phenomena that is not possible. Heat sensation is not equal to pain sensation. >a posteriori, >a priori.
I 175
Heat: heat is rigid. Reference is determined by accidental properties (sensation, even without heat, deception possible). Pain: pain is rigid. The reference is determined by essential properties: if it feels like pain, it is pain. >Rigidity, >Reference.
What God really has to do is turn this molecular movement into something that is perceived as heat! In order to do that, he must create some sentient beings. They can then go on and understand that the phrase "heat is the motion of molecules" expresses an a posteriori truth.
I 175
In the case of excitation of the C-fibers, God would additionally have to make us feel this excitement as pain, and not as a tickle or as heat or as nothing. The relation between the two phenomena is not the identity. >Identity/Kripke.

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984

Social Groups Sherif Haslam I 147
Social Groups/Sherif: Sherif began the empirical work (>Robbers Camp Study/Sherif) by attempting to define precisely the ‘minimal essential properties of groups’ (Sherif et al., 1955(1): 371). Note that the very claim that groups have ‘properties’ reveals Sherif’s belief that groups had a material reality.
Haslam I 148
Def Group/Sherif: a social unit which consists of a number of individuals who, at a given time, stand in more or less definite interdependent status and role relationships to one another and which explicitly or implicitly possess a set of values or norms regulating the behavior of members at least in matters of consequence to the group. (Sherif et al., 1955(1): 372). Platow/Hunter: a group, in Sherif’s work, is more than a psychological representation.

1. Sherif, M., White, B.J. and Harvey, O.J. (1955) ‘Status in experimentally produced groups’, American Journal of Sociology, 60: 370–9.


Michael W. Platow and John A. Hunter, „ Intergroup Relations and Conflicts. Revisiting Sherif’s Boys’ Camp studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications


Haslam I
S. Alexander Haslam
Joanne R. Smith
Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Structures Thiel I 65
Rules/Structure/Mathematics/Thiel: in all examples we have not only searched for suitable rules, on whose premises our data "fit", but rather the application of rules has only been made possible by structuring, by entering a very specific structure of the problem situation and argumentation possibilities related to it into the problem handling. Example Pythagorean theorem: here the right-angled triangle had to be inserted first. E.g. irrationality of root two: here the alienation of the divisor had to be recognized as an essential property.
>Rules.

T I
Chr. Thiel
Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995

Terminology Boer I XI
TI/Boer: Thesis: Believe as a 2-digit relation to a special kind of property ("thought content"). Spelling: German writing (fracture). ---
I XI
Stock: Relation theory: Boer pro: belief as a relation to thought content (certain property) STI/Boer: Semantics for belief attribution, which considers substitutional opacity in belief reports as a genuine semantic feature.
Thesis: these two together solve many known puzzles.
Object-dependent senses/Frege/Boer: these are to be defended here (Boer pro Frege).
---
I 6
Participating/Participation/Boer: a thing that does not participate in the world is either e.g. a non-existent thing or a non-space-time individual, a non-existent or false proposition, a non-existent or non-persisting state, a non-existent or unexplained property or relation, or a non-existent or non-occurring event. So more precisely:

(D2) R is a participation-independent relation = it is possible for an existing thing to have a relation R to a thing that does not participate in the world.

E.g. mental reference: would then be intentional simply because one can think of abstract as well as of concrete individuals (also unexemplified properties, etc.).

Relation/Participation/Boer: although a tolerant actualist who acknowledges the existence of relations at all, accepts that some relations are participation-independent, the relation of such relations is not limited to existing things.
(D2) only requires that an existing thing has such a relation to a non-participating thing.
Relation R: from the fact that someone has R to something does not follow that this something participates in the world ((s) one can think of abstract objects).
Non-existence: if there are non-existent things, there is nothing in (D2) that forbids one to have a participation-independent relation like mental reference to them. ((s One can think of something non-existent) That at most will be rejected by a very strict nominalism.
---
I 12
Notation/Boer: N: be an entity of a given type
(E: spelling in the book: black letter)
EN: be the essential property of things of this type N iff
---
I 13
i) EN can be exemplified (i.e., that there may be such a thing) ii) necessary: a thing exemplifies EN iff it is identical to N.
Haecceitas: of N. the property to be N. This would be trivially the essence of N.
---
I 13
Definition normal/terminology/Boer: if we wanted to name things for which it is possible that they exist/that they are actual.
Definition abstract/terminology/Boer: be a thing for which it is not possible that it exists/is actual.

Fiction/fictitious/Boer:
a) in the first sense: (mere Possibilia): normal, if non-existent.
b) as essentially fictional: abstract.

Boer I
Steven E. Boer
Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010

Boer II
Steven E. Boer
Knowing Who Cambridge 1986

Universals Bigelow I VII
Universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: pro: they help to create a unified picture and to understand probabilities. They help to establish a unified theory of modalities (possibility, necessity) that we find in science. >Probability, >Modalities, >Possibility, >Necessity.
I 82
Universals/science/Bigelow/Pargetter: we have encountered universals that are useful for physics, now we are looking at those that are useful for chemistry: Chemical components: are structures made up of elements.
Universal: is the property of having a certain structure, which in turn is related to the universals that determine the elements.
These are structural universals.
Structural universals/Bigelow/Pargettesr e.g. expressed by the predicate "to be methane" or "Methane"; Instantiated: by a carbon atom and four hydrogen atoms in a certain constellation.
>Essence, >Properties.
This constellation is an essential property.
Instantiation: by methane molecules.
>Instantiation.
N.b.: this universal is intrinsically connected to other universals: the universals, being hydrogen, being carbon and be bound.
>Intrinsicness.
I 87
Structural Universals/Level/Bigelow/Pargetter: Level 1: material individuals who have the property of being butane or methane, etc. These are then methane molecules, etc. These individuals have parts with different properties and relations.
Level 2: Properties and relations of the individuals of the 1st Level.
Property: For example, the property to be methane.
Level 3: Relations or proportions between properties or relations between individuals, no matter whether they are properties of the 1st or 2nd level (sic) of these individuals. For example,"having the same number of instances as".
Cardinal numbers/Frege: Frege needed this construction for the cardinal numbers.
Family: this relation between properties have the form of a family, including e.g. "having twice as many instances","having four times as many instances", etc.
Proportion: these "numerical" proportions will also exist between more complex properties of the 2nd level: e.g. "conjunctive property: being carbon and be part of this molecule".
>Proportions.
For example, if the molecule is methane, these two properties are in a ratio characterized by the proportion 4:1.
Structural universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: we can then characterize it as a relational property of an object. It relates the molecule to various properties. These properties are being carbon, being hydrogen and being bound.
Universal: e.g. being methane: is then identical with a highly conjunctive relational property of the 2nd level of an individual (molecule).
I 88
Property: the property of being methane stands in a pattern of internal proportions to other properties, e.g. being hydrogen, being bound, etc. Mereology/Chemistry/Bigelow/Pargetter: but these relations are not mereological.
>Mereology.
Relations/Bigelow/Pargetter: these relations are internal relations and they are essential.
Essentialism/Bigelow/Pargetter: pro: we need essential properties here. But this is better than seeking refuge in magic (see above).
>Essentialism.
I 89
Universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: could not exist as these universals if they were not in these relations with each other. These are the structural universals.
I 164
Universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: a full theory of universals needs a pre-semantic source for universals (pre-semantic/s): something that does not require truthmakers. >Truthmakers, >Semantics.
Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: we need something that instantiates something without ever being instantiated.
Existence of 2nd level/Bigelow/Pargetter: is also required by a theory of universals. From which, however, you cannot deduce any existence of the 1st level without additional premises.
Causes as structural universals.
>Levels/order, >Description levels, >Derivation, >Derivability
I 293
Fundamental Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: are vectors. >Vectors.
Basic forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: are aggregates of vectors: thesis: they are structural universals.
>Forces.
For example, mass: each specific mass corresponds to a specific property. Nevertheless, massive objects have something in common: that they have mass. This corresponds to a relation of a higher level.
These relations are internal and essential, not external. That is, the particular mass properties could not be them if they were in different relations to other objects.
>Exterior/interior, >Extrinsic.
Common: this is the fact that all massive things are related to other massive things.
Property of the 1st level: Example: velocity in the plane.
Relation 1st level: For example, difference in velocity or direction. Therefore, there are two relations of the 1st level.
Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: are more complex vectors, since they themselves are relations of the 2nd level. Fundamental forces can be of different sizes and directions.
I 293
They are thus in a cluster of internal relations of higher degrees to other fundamental forces. That makes sure that they are a family with something in common. Necessary/Properties/Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: the fact that one fundamental force is twice as great as the other, or perpendicular to another; it is not contingent.
Solution: they would otherwise be different from the forces they are.
On the other hand,
Contingent: whether things are connected by a force is contingent.
>Contingency, >Necessity.
Structural Universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: (see above: methane example)
Forces: the constitutive properties of structural universals can also be fundamental forces, including vectors with size and direction.
Internal relations: there are many of them within a structural universal. And they also establish the connections to individuals.
Cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: we said it is local. So it cannot be a relation only between completely nonlocal universals.
Structural universals: must therefore have a local element.
Solution: their relational properties embed particulars as well as universals.
Fundamental cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: if it is a structural universal, it will be a conjunctive relation of a higher level between single events.
>Causes, >Causation.
I 294
Causal relations/Bigelow/Pargetter: after all, they have a rich and essential nature. And they are not primitive basic concepts. They are explained by vectors and structural universals. They exist independently alongside causes and effects. >Causal relations, >Effect.
Modalities/Bigelow/Pargetter: some are essentially causal. But:
Cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: is not essentially modal for its part.
>Modalities, >Causation.
I 378
Universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: are things in the world like others. In particular, they are namable. >Naming, >Identification, >Individuation.
I 379
There is no essential connection between universals and predicates. I.e. universals can be in subject position. ((s) But can we quantify via them?). Therefore, we have no problem with higher-level logic (2nd level logic). >Predicates, >Predication.
Universals: should not be dominated by semantic theory. They should not have to be arranged according to a hierarchy. Nevertheless, they have a hierarchical pattern with individuals as a basis.
Paradoxes: are avoided by prohibiting universals from instantiating themselves or other universals.
Self-reference/Bigelow/Pargetter: however, this is only a problem if mathematics is based a priori on logic alone. And we do not want that. For example, we do not assume that each linguistic description determines a quantity.
>Self-reference, >Sets, >Set theory, >Descriptions, >Mathematics, >Logic, >Ultimate justification.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990


The author or concept searched is found in the following 13 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Armstrong, D. Kripke Vs Armstrong, D. Frank I 121
KripkeVsIdentity Theory: Does not fulfill this easiest requirement: Pain must be felt as pain, otherwise it is not a pain! Causal role: e.g. intention elicits action, pain, behavior when in pain. Identity theories/KripkeVsLewis/KripkeVsArmstrong: Usually assume that stimuli and causal roles change a particular brain state to a particular psychological state. This suggests erroneously that the representatives claim that this causation is contingent. Or that the identity of this brain state with different mental states is random.
Identity theory:
1. X is a brain condition 2. The fact is contingent that pain is being caused by a particular stimulus. (This sounds quite plausible after all) and evokes a certain behavior.
The brain state can now also exist without causing the appropriate behavior.
Thus, it seems that 1) and 2) claim that a certain pain could have existed without having been pain.
Identity/KripkeVsIdentity theory: if x = y, then x and y share all their properties. Including their modal characteristics.
E.g. if x is the pain and y is the brain state, it is an essential property of x to be a particular pain and an essential characteristic of y to be a particular brain state!
If the relationship between the two is indeed identity, then y needs to correspond to a particular pain, and x needs to correspond to a particular brain condition, namely y.
Both statements, however, seem to be wrong.


Saul A. Kripke (1972): Naming and Necessity, in: Davidson/Harmann
(eds.) (1972), 253-355

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Armstrong, D. Verschiedene Vs Armstrong, D. Arm III 90
Natural Laws/universalities/Armstrong: the state, the law N(F,G) is a two-digit U, i.e. a relation between states. Pavel TichyVsArmstrong: N(F,G) cannot be a two-digit attribute and a () digit attribute (its expression for states) at the same time.
ArmstrongVsVs: why not be a two-digit attribute and a state at the same time? Certainly not a two-digit and zero-digit attribute at the same time (same level). A zero-digit attribute would be a second order universal, a second order state.
Wright I 176
Disposition/JohnstonVsArmstrong: the simple conditional formulation of dispositional properties fails because it does not take seriously enough that essential properties are attributed here. Problem cases: Change, mimicry, masking. (So ceteris paribus condition) E.g. Masking: an angel prevents the falling object from breaking,
E.g. Strong current deflects the compass needle
I 177
Mimicry: even if an object is not subject to disposition, additional conditions may nevertheless occur: For example, although the spark plug is defective, a random gas mixture provides the ignition. WrightVs: these are nice considerations, which certainly correspond to our intuitive thinking. But can we expect them to be developed with sufficient precision? ((s) To replace the expected disposition).





Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Essentialism Stalnaker Vs Essentialism I 72
Bare-Particular-Anti-Essentialism//b.-p.-AE/Stalnaker: thesis: for each individual and each property there are possible worlds (poss.w.), in which the individual has this property and other poss.w., in which it does not. Exceptions: multiple exceptions are required: a) tautological properties as e.g. to-be-identical-with-itself. For such properties it is not valid that they could be omitted in some poss.w..
Vs: 1. we need a special semantics for the b.-p.-AE. This must be different from the standard semantics for modal logic (ML). In Leibniz's anti-essentialism that was not necessary. His formal semantics can be viewed as a special case of possible worlds semantics.
Vs: 2. I want to present an alternative semantics that makes sense out of the theory of bare particular. It does not require that the AE is true. But the AE is embedded in a natural way in a formal condition for models in this semantics.
Bare particulars/Stalnaker: I do not want to defend it but while I am doubting that the bare-particulars-thesis is metaphysically true, I think that the fact that it does not make sense within the extensional semantics shows a limitation of this extensional semantics.
Essentialism/Stalnaker: it is for me not primarily about to argue VsEssentialism but to formulate by a formally correct representation of the counter-doctrine (AE) some new questions about the obligations the essentialism has.
I 72/73
Anti-Essentialism/AE/Stalnaker: we examine the thesis that all properties of all objects are accidental. Here we need three types of exceptions, three types of undeniably essential attributes. They were discussed by Ruth Marcus (1967) Terry Parsons (1967 and 1969). ((s) bare particulars/b.p./Stalnaker/(s): theory of the b.p.: thesis that there may be things without properties as an alternative to the thesis that all things have essential properties.)

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Identity Theory Newen Vs Identity Theory Newen I 168
Nature/Essential/Kripke/Newen: E.g. original meter shows that objects (or substances) have essential and non-essential properties. E.g. Essential: that water is H2O. Therefore, the proposition is a necessary truth a posteriori.
Identity Theory/Philosophy of the Mind/Newen: Thesis: mental states are identical with physical states.
KripkeVsIdentity Theory: (modal argument): identity is always necessary identity.
But: E.g. zombies could we similar to us, but not feel pain.
I 169
If this is possible, identity is no longer a necessary identity, and therefore no identity. Identity TheoryVsVs: could argue that the necessary identity applies only to humans.

New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008
Kim, Jaegwon Lewis Vs Kim, Jaegwon V 249
Character/Naming/Event/Lewis: one could think that the following is sufficient: "the F en from A to T". f is the property expressed by the predicate f,
a is the individual designated by A,
t is the time denoted by T.
The designations do not have to be rigid! >Rigidity.
"Constitutive triple." (Kim, "Causation, Nomic Subsumption and the Conept of Event", 1973)(1)
Furthermore, the occurrence of the event is somehow connected to the fact that the property f belongs to the individual a to t.
Property/Question: how does a property belong to an individual to t? Perhaps because it really is a characteristic of time sections or a relation of individuals at times.
LewisVs: then it would be all too easy to attribute a character simply by setting up a triple. I.e. "the F-en from A to T" denotes the event, so that it is necessary, if and only if f belongs to a to t. ((s) For example, it rains necessarily on Tuesday if it is necessary that it rains Tuesday). >Events/Lewis.
LewisVsKim: this does not satisfy the needs of counterfactual analysis of causation. Sometimes an event can actually be caused by a constitutive property,
V 250
an individual and a time can be substantially specified. But not in general for events that we call by naming.
Problem: if the being is too rich, it is too fragile. It's hard to modify without destroying it. It cannot occur anywhere except in its constitutive time. Our everyday causes and effects are more robust.
((s) it would be incomprehensible to have an individual, which can only occur once in one place at a time, because one would have no language use for it, i.e. the meaning of something that only occurs once cannot be determined by predicates, which can also be assigned to other things, if these predicates are to come essentially only to this individual.
Schwarz I 132
Event/LewisVsKim: definition: Def Event/Kim: (Kim 1976)(2): a triple of a thing, a time and a property.
LewisVsKim: (1986f(5),196) that is too fragile:
Schwarz I 133
This assigns too many essential properties to events. For example, a football match could have happened a little later or a little different. Or would it have been another game then? Bennett: (1988(4),§23 24) intuitively the question has no sense.
Schwarz: that's not what Lewis is all about. But fragility is what matters when it comes to causes and effects:
Def Fragility/fragile/Event/Lewis/(s): a modified event would not be the same but different. Then modification cannot be expressed at all: "what was modified?
Counterfactual analysis: according to it, A causes B if B would not have happened without A. Question: under what circumstances would one event have happened (even if it was different) and under what circumstances would it have been replaced by another. This will lead to problems later on.
Cause/effect/Lewis/Schwarz: both are no intuitive event. For example acoustic feedback: here the later temporal parts are caused by the earlier ones. (1986f(5),172f). Similarly: e.g. the temporal parts of persons are linked by causal relationships! (see above 2.3). But these temporal parts are not events in the intuitive sense. Causes such as the presence of oxygen in an explosion (ok, as a cause) are also not an event in the everyday sense. (1986d(6),261).
Event/BennettVsLewis/MellorVsLewis/Schwarz: shouldn't Lewis rather speak of "facts"? "that p causes q".
Fact/Schwarz: if you understand them as classes of space-time regions, this is not an alternative, but only a terminological variant.


1. Jaegwon Kim [1973]: “Causes and Counterfactuals”. Journal of Philosophy, 70: 570–572
2. Jaegwon Kim [1976]: “Events as Property Exemplifications”. In Myles Brand und Douglas Walton
(ed.), Action Theory, Dordrecht: Reidel, 159–177
4. Jonathan Bennett [1988]: Events and Their Names. Oxford: Clarendon Press
5. D. Lewis [1986f]: Philosophical Papers II . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press
6. D. Lewis [1986d]: “Events”. In [Lewis 1986f]: 241–269

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Kripke, S. A. Dummett Vs Kripke, S. A. Wolf II 361
Rigid Designators/DummettVsKripke: (Frege): in modal contexts: Descriptions: to be construed as precluding the modal operator (MO), proper names: include MO E.g. Kripke: St. Anne did not have to be mother of Mary but still St. Anne, DummettVsKripke: "St. Anne" is not a predicate, not a candidate for being an accidental property of someone
BurckhardtVsDummett: false justification: "St.Anne" simply as a rigid designator - by Dummett: in essential properties it is different.

Stalnaker I 173
DummettVsKripke: (M. Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language, London 1973, 232) there can be no proper name, whose whole purpose is to have an object as a reference, without sense that defines the object somehow. Stalnaker: what kind of argument could indicate that we are not only speaking no such language, but that we are not even able to do it?

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Kripke, S. A. Putnam Vs Kripke, S. A. I (a) 35
Names/Kripke/Putnam: central point: you can use a proper name to refer to a thing or a person, without having true beliefs regarding X.
I (a) 36
The use of the name includes the existence of a causal chain. PutnamVsKripke: right: knowledge of a speaker does not have to set the reference in his idiolect.
The use of names is common.
Now you might say that terms of physical quantities are also proper names, not of things but of quantities.
----
I (g) 189
Nature/essence/Kripke: E.g. Statue: The statue and the piece of clay are two items. The fact that the piece of clay has a modal property, namely, "to be a thing that might have been spherical", is missing to the statue.
VsKripke: that sounds initially odd: E.g. when I put the statue on the scale, do I measure then two items?
E.g. Equally strange is it to say, a human being is not identical with the aggregation of its molecules.
Intrinsic properties/Putnam: E.g. Suppose there are "intrinsic connections" of my thoughts to external objects: then there is perhaps in my brain a spacetime region with set-theoretical connections with an abstract object which includes certain external objects.
Then this spacetime region will have a similar set-theoretical connections with other abstract entities that contain other external objects.
Then the materialist can certainly say that my "thoughts" include certain external objects intrinsically, by identifying these thoughts with a certain abstract entity.
Problem: but if this identification should be a train of reality itself, then there must be in the world essences in a sense that cannot be explained by the set theory .
Nature/essential properties/PutnamVsKripke: Kripke's ontology presupposes essentialism, it cannot serve to justify him.
Modal properties are not part of the materialistic establishment of the world..
But Kripke individuates objects by their modal characteristics.
Essential properties/Possible Worlds/Putnam: I, myself,(1975) spoke of "essential properties" but not in parallel worlds, but in other possible states of our world.
Example: We can imagine another "possible world" (not parallel), in which a liquid other than water has the taste of water, but none, in which H2O is not water.
This is insofar a kind of essentialism, as we have thus discovered the nature of water.
We just say water should not be anything else.
I (g) 192
And that was already our intention, when we did not know the composition of H2O. Nature/essence/Putnam: is in this sense, however, the product of our use of the word. It is not "built into the world".
Nature/Kripke/Putnam: so it is also justified by Kripke.
Putnam: both our conception of "nature" does not help the materialists.
This purely semantic interpretation presupposes the reference. It cannot support the reference as an "intrinsic correlation" between thought and thing".
---
I (i) 246
Truth/legitimate assertibility/Kripke Wittgenstein: that would only be a matter of general agreement. PutnamVsKripke: then this would be a wrong description of the terms that we actually have. And a self-confuting attempt to take an "absolute perspective".
---
Rorty VI 129/130
Causal theory of reference: PutnamVsKripke/Rorty, self-criticism, PutnamVsPutnam: the description of the causal relationships between a something and other things is nothing more than the description of characteristics that are neither in a greater nor lesser extent in a"intrinsic" or in an "extrinsic" relationship with it. So also the feature "to be described by a human being". PutnamVsSearle: Vs distinction "intrinsic"/"relational".

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Mill, J. St. Burks Vs Mill, J. St. Wolf II 139
Description/Meaning/Burks: most people do not have complete knowledge and yet use the signs correctly. Name/Meaning/Burks: since names generally have several meanings (objects), there is no essential predicate.
Some predicates may be causally more important than others.
In any case, a possibly essential property does not consist in a conjunction of properties!
Any given designated has more properties than those referred to by its proper name (or description).
II 140
Description/Meaning/Burks: for example, "this brown table was red yesterday" is not a contradiction: the description is not complete anyway. Name/Meaning/Mill: the property on the basis of which a name is assigned is not part of the meaning. Otherwise we would abolish the name if the thing loses the property.
Name/Token/BurksVsMill: different occurrences of the same name type often have different meanings, but always denote the same thing.
II 141
Name/Existence/Meaning/Burks: a description could have a meaning and still not designate anything.
II 142
Of course one could say that an expression is a name only if it really has something designated, but then the question depends on empirical facts and not on purely linguistic considerations. Burks: "name" should be a purely grammatical category.
Abbreviation/Burks: strange: for "this time" there is an abbreviation: "now",
but not for "this hat".

Burks I
Arthur W. Burks
"A Theory of Proper Names", in: Philosophical Studies 2 (1951)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Burks II
A. W. Burks
Chance, Cause, Reason 1977

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993
Parsons, Ter. Stalnaker Vs Parsons, Ter. I 73
Bare particulars/modal logic/ML/semantics/Stalnaker: the problem is now to connect the bare particulars-theory with these three restrictions with the quantified modal logic (ML).
I 74
Terence ParsonsVs/Stalnaker: T. Parsons attacked this proof theoretically (1969). Anti-essentialism/T. Parsons: question: what axioms do we need for a full and reasoned anti-essentialist theory? That means a theory that prevents any questionable ascription of essential properties?
StalnakerVsParsons: problem: some of his propositions are not theorems: e.g.
Theorem: (Ex)N(Fx) > (x)N(Fx).
((s) if F is a necessary property for an object then this applies to all such objects x) E.g. if a square is necessary angular, then all squares).
Stalnaker: but the following substitution instance is not a theorem:
(Ex)N(Rxy) > (x)N(Rxy).
((s) If something is necessary the father of y, all is necessary the father of y.)
Stalnaker: that means the atomic predicate "F" does not represent any property as it should normally be but just a random property of a certain kind.
This is not bad per se but imposes the semantics additional burdens. Because the rules have to pick out suitable properties as values for atomic predicates. ((s) QuineVs - Quine: predicates do not represent properties).
properties/anti-essentialism/predicates/Stalnaker: in distinguishing it is naturally about between intrinsic, qualitative characteristics and referential or possible world-indexed properties. Only the former come into question.
StalnakerVsParsons: this one requires this but does not explain it.
Atomic predicate/Stalnaker: this concept cannot help because it is purely syntactic and cannot make a semantic job by itself.
Anti-essentialism/quantified modal logic/Stalnaker/conclusion: to connect the two, we need real semantic conditions for atomic predicates.

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Physicalism Nagel Vs Physicalism Frank I 147
NagelVsPhysicalism: if mental processes are indeed physical processes, then there is a way how it essentially is to be subject to certain physical processes. What this is remains a mystery. Identity/Physical/Mental/Necessary/Contingent/Nagel: the description would therefore not be a contingent one, like the one between a cause and a specific effect. It would be necessary that a certain physical state felt a certain way. (like Kripke).
The subjective nature of my experience is the essential property.
VsPhysicalism: but it is ignored in such analyzes.
It is the individual, by virtue of which the experience is necessarily what it is.
Like Kripke: I find the hypothesis that a certain brain state should necessarily have a certain subjective character incomprehensible.
From a theory that regards the relation of both as contingent, no such explanation can be gained!
But even a theory that assumes necessary identity still confronts us with Kripke's problem of why it seems to be contingent!
I 148
NagelVsPhysicalism: the meaning of "is" in "mental states are physical states" is unclear. NagelVsPhysicalism: is as unclear as to laypeople the statement that all matter is energy.
If we construct the reference of mentalistic terms to physical events on the basis of the ordinary model, either separate subjective events resurface as the effects through which the mentalist reference to physical events is ensured or we get a false explanation for how mentalist terms denote.

Thomas Nagel (1974): What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, in: The Philosophical
Review 83 (1974), 435-450


Nagel III 15
NagelVsPhysicalism: has no explanation of perceptions and particular perspectives that we share with the experiences of different types of beings that apparently still exist. Not to mention the mental activity of the formation of an objective view on physical reality.
((s) Objectivistic physics cannot explain common sensations (experiences).

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979

Nagel I
Th. Nagel
The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997
German Edition:
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

Nagel II
Thomas Nagel
What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987
German Edition:
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

Nagel III
Thomas Nagel
The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980
German Edition:
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

NagelEr I
Ernest Nagel
Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Property Dualism Schiffer Vs Property Dualism I 150
Schiffer: Thesis: There is no irreducible belief properties. Suppose there were, then we have the following reductio ad absurdum: if there are any, they cannot be irreducible. This has unacceptable consequences:
(1) Ava is n in a neural state token. n has B, the non-pleonastic property to be a belief that a car is coming) and B is not identical to any property which is intrinsically to be specified in a non-mentalist, non-intentionalist vocabulary.
We have already said that there is a full neuro physical explanation for Ava's stepping back, and we assume that implies:
(2) there is a neurophysiological property P of n's, which is the most comprehensive property that enters the neurophysiological explanation of Ava's stepping back and therefore is necessary and sufficient that n is a cause of the stepping back.
The property P is now completely explanatory of the body movement.
(3) But if there is a non-pleonastic property B, then it also is a causal essential property, in view of the cause of stepping back. If n had not have had B, n (the neural state token) had not caused Ava's stepping back.
Def Property Dualism/Schiffer/(s): assumes the simultaneous existence of physical and irreducible mentalistic or intentional properties.
SchifferVsProperty Dualism: assuming the property dualism for (1), it is not possible, then one have to explain the simultaneous truth of (1) - (3), and follow one of the four ways (A) - (D), which are all wrong:
A.
Property Dualism/Schiffer: could argue that the causal efficacy of B (the irreducible mental, intentional property) cannot be explained in terms of the effectiveness of P. So that there is no causal overdetermination at the level of the causes (as we assume, as belief-Z-tokens = neural Z-Tokens) but at the level of causal laws. (…+…)
I 152
B. Property Dualism/Schiffer: could be argued that the belief properties must not be embedded in a causal law, but that it is a simple, primitive, naked metaphysical fact that B (mental Z-Token) is causally significantly in this way.
SchifferVs: 1. that is as if to say that B is causal, but not included in any law of causality. (…+…)
C.
Property Dualism/Schiffer: could try as epiphenomenalism: that the neural Z token has n P caused that it also has B.
Causality/Epiphenomenalism: the causal relevance is then inherited.
SchifferVsProperty Dualism/SchifferVsEpiphenomenalism: the talk of "nomological appendages" shows that B does not even now do the empty part of a superfluous jobs! (…+…)
D.
Property Dualism/Schiffer: last rescue: supervenience: to have B "superveniere" on the Doing of P, where "supervenience" to be a primitive metaphysical relationship that is to have nothing to do with causation, but rather to have something to do with a primitive form of Entailment (to Include).
So: although B is not identical or contained in P, and although there is no formal Entailment, it should be a naked, inexplicable fact that there is no possible world in which a state has P but not B. (…+…)

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Quine, W.V.O. Stalnaker Vs Quine, W.V.O. I 71
Essentialism/today/VsQuine: most modal logicians today contradict Quine and accept the connection between modal logic (ML) and essentialism and accept the essentialism. Instead of, like Quine back then, saying: "so much the worse for quantified ML" they say, "so much the better for the essentialism".
I 72
Essence/essentialism/essential property/LeibnizVsQuine/Stalnaker: contradicted Quine in the first way: thesis: each property of each individual constitutes his nature and only the existence of the thing as a whole is contingent. today: David Lewis with his counterpart theory is a modern successor of Leibniz.
Counterpart/Lewis: things of the actual world have counterparts in other possible worlds (poss.w.). Things that resemble them more than any other thing. Therefore, no individual can have accidental properties, properties that they are lacking in another poss.w..

I 201
Quine/Stalnaker: taught us to be skeptical about the idea of necessity, analyticity and knowledge a priori. However, he did not question the empiricist assumptions that these concepts stand and fall with each other. KripkeVsQuine/Stalnaker: only Kripke pulled apart these concepts by finding examples of truths that are necessary although they are only a posteriori knowable and those that still are contingent but still a priori knowable.

II 24
Belief/Mentalese/Field/Stalnaker: his thesis was to reinterpret the intentional-psychological relation into a psychological but non-intentional and a semantic but not psychological relationship - between a sentence and the expressed proposition.
Belief ascription/Quine/Stalnaker: his goal was to generalize the ascription. By this an obligation to singular propositions should be avoided.
StalnakerVsQuine: but the project changes its character when it comes to the general case.
De re-ascription/Stalnaker: should better not be regarded as indirect and vague,
II 25
but simply as examples that show the essential characteristics of the intentional: Ascription: if we ascribe intentional states, the types, properties and relations to which we refer here, we see the world and with them we characterize the world as someone sees it.
Important argument: that is just not an indirect but a direct way to get to the content.

II 160
Def singular proposition/Stalnaker: here e.g. a singular proposition ascribes Ortcutt to be a spy. Structured singular proposition/Stalnaker: (for those for whom propositions are structured entities): then singular propositions are those which have an individual as a constituent. (StalnakerVsStructured propositions).
Singular proposition/poss.w.-semantics/semantics of possible worlds/Stalnaker: for those for whom the propositions are sets of poss.w., (Stalnaker pro)): then a singular proposition is a proposition whose truth depends on the properties of a particular individual.
Singular proposition/Stalnaker: the identity of a singular proposition is a function of an individual instead of a concept or givenness of an individual.
StalnakerVsQuine: this semantic approach is simpler and less ad hoc than that of Quine.
II 161
De re/ascription/belief de re/singular proposition/sing Prop/StalnakerVsQuine/Stalnaker: the semantic approach understands the ascription of a belief de re then as ascription of a particular faith (unlike Quine). What it means to believe a singular proposition? How is it to believe that Ortcutt himself is a spy? And not only that the person fulfills the description or a belief subject that is given in a certain way?
Problem: suppose Ralph knows Ortcutt in two different ways (beach, brown hat). Which singular proposition about Ortcutt does he believe?
bad solution: many authors think that there would have to be a special relation of acquaintance here.
Acquaintance/Stalnaker: problem: to provide a semantic relation for them.
1. the first strategy makes belief de re then too easy: e.g. Poirot believes that it was the butler simply due to the two facts that 1. the butler was it and 2. Poirot believes that it was the person who was it.
2. the second strategy makes belief de re too difficult: then Ralph, who knows Ortcutt, has two contradictory convictions.
Solution: a) to strengthen the relation of acquaintance so that misidentifications are impossible.
Vs: such mistakes are almost always possible! Then you could have only de re-convictions about yourself.
b) the "divide-and-conquer" argument: we tell the story of Ralph in two parts.
1. Ralph sees Ortcutt with a brown hat
2. Ralph sees Ortcutt at the beach.
II 162
Then it is quite natural that in Ralph believes in one story that Ortcutt is a spy, and not in the other story. There is no reason to assume that Ralph would have had to change his mind in between.
II 163
De re/ascription/belief de re/StalnakerVsQuine/StalnakerVsKaplan/Stalnaker: thesis: we assume instead propositions as sets of poss.w.. Pragmatic Analysis/pragmatics/Stalnaker: has in common with the semantic that certain convictions are ascribed but - unlike the semantic - it does not assume a particular type of propositions and also does not require an increased acquaintance relationship.
That means the individuals of which something is believed are not constituents of the proposition.
Proposition: its purpose is to pick out a subset of the relevant context set.
Ascription/de re/Stalnaker: (all authors): the way how the ascribing formulates its ascription is independent of the way the believer would formulate his conviction or the way how he thinks about the individual
Pragmatic approach/Stalnaker: (…+…)

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Russell, B. Wessel Vs Russell, B. I 14
Ontology/Logic/Psychology/RussellVsLaws of Thought: it is not important that we think in accordance with laws of thought, but that the behavior of things corresponds to them. Russell: what we believe when we believe in the sentence of contradiction is not that our consciousness is constructed this way. We do not believe, for example, that we cannot think at the same time that a tree is a beech and not a beech either. We believe that if the tree is a beech, it cannot be not a beech at the same time.
I 15
And even if belief in the sentence of contradiction is a thought, the sentence of contradiction itself is not a thought, but a fact concerning the things of the outside world. If what we believe would not apply to the things of the outside world, then the fact that we are forced to think like this would not guarantee that the sentence of contradiction cannot be wrong (this shows that it cannot be a law of thought).
WesselVsRussell: logical laws do not concern the outside world! They do not give us any information about the outside world.
The validity results only from the determination of the use of the signs!
Of course, such phrases can also be formulated ontologically, but they are not ontological statements. Where else would we have the certainty that they are unrestrictedly valid? We cannot search the world endlessly.
I 123
Subjunction/Material Implication/Frege/Wessel: Frege calls it "conditionality".
I 123/124
Difference: between the subjunction A > B and a logical conclusion in which the only conclusion rule accepted by Frege is to conclude from A > B and A to B. ((s) modus ponens).
Russell/Whitehead/Principia Mathematica(1): took over from Frege.
"Essential property" of the implication: what is implied by a true statement is true. Through this property, an implication provides evidence.
Def Implication/Russell/Principia Mathematica(1): p > q = def ~ p v q.(Materials Implication).
WesselVsRussell: this is just inappropriate and misleading! It is purely formal!
Implication/Conclusion/Wessel: the implication has a completely different logical structure than the consequence:
Subjunction: > is a two-digit proposition-forming operator and p > q is synonymous with ~p v q.
Conclusion (implication): "q follows logically p" or "P implies q" is a statement about statements: "From the statement p follows logically the statement q". "Follows from" is a two-digit predicate - not an operator.
Conclusion (also called implication) refers to linguistic structures. Notation l-.
Subjunction: > refers to facts.


1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wessel I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999

The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Natural Kind Kripke, S.A. Schiffer I 56
natural way / Kripke / Putnam: it seems reasonable to assume that the element-ness is determined in a natural way by empirically established internal structures.
I 277
Not all biologists agree that natural kinds are determined by the genotype.
Staln I 79
natural kind/ Kripke (1972) names for natural kinds express essential properties. Names for species are referential terms - unlike regular expressions for properties.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Essential Properties Kripke, S.A. Staln I 79
Essential property/Stalnaker: (only for the sake of discussion): E.g. Kripke: names for natural kinds (natural kind terms) do express essential properties.
Essentialism Lewis, D. Staln I 72
Nature / essentialism / essential property / LeibnizVsQuine / Stalnaker: any property of any individual constitutes its essence and only the existence of the thing as a whole is contingent.   Today: David Lewis with his counterpart theory is a modern successor of Leibniz.
  Counterpart / Lewis: things of the actual world have counterparts in other worlds. Things that resemble them more than any other thing. Therefore, no individual has accidental properties, properties which depart him in other worlds.
Object/Property Stalnaker, R. I 72/73
Anti-Essentialism/Stalnaker: let us examine the thesis that all properties of all objects are accidental. Here we need three kinds of exceptions, three kinds of indisputably essential attributes. They were discussed by Ruth Marcus (1967) and Terry Parsons (1967, 1969). Example Operationalism: according to him the property to be one meter long would be a referential property, because the operationalist believes that this is defined as a property to be of the same length as x, where x is a certain object ((s) as Babe Ruth above).
Possible World Indexed Properties/Plantinga/Stalnaker: (Plantinga 1970) are indisputable essential properties.