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The author or concept searched is found in the following 29 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Autism | Baron-Cohen | Slater I 150 Autism/ToM/Theory of Mind/Baron-Cohen: In order to test their hypothesis that children with autism lack a theory of mind (>Theory of Mind/Dennett, >False-Belief Task/psychological theories), Baron-Cohen et al. (1985)(1) presented this task to 20 children with autism, 14 children with Down’s syndrome (DS), and 27 typically developing (TD) children. In line with their predictions, they found that as many as 16 of the 20 children with autism failed the task whereas children with Down’s syndrome and TD children passed it 86% and 85% of the time, respectively. The results were all the more striking given that average intelligence levels in the autism group exceeded both that of the DS and of the TD group and that every participant in the autism group succeeded in answering both control questions. The authors interpreted these results as evidence for a selective impairment in mentalistic reasoning in autism, independently of general intelligence or general reasoning abilities. In other words, the reason why participants in the autism group fail the belief question is that they are unable to grasp that Sally’s belief about where the marble is hidden is different from their own knowledge of where the marble really is: they lack the ability to represent other people’s mental states. >False-Belief Task/Happé. Slater I 152 VsBaron-Cohen: 1) The ToM account does not provide a full account auf autism. 2) ToM deficits are not specific to autism, 3) ToM deficits are not universal in autism. There are now theories about the non-social features of autism, including restricted repertoire of interests, insistence on sameness, and peaks of abilities (e.g., enhanced rote memory, higher prevalence of savant skills, increased perception of pitch etc.). >Autism/psychological theories. It is important to note, however, that these first two criticisms are problematic only If one considers that there ought to be a single explanation for all the symptoms found in ASD. Slater I 153 If (…) one considers, that such a unitary explanation is unlikely to exist, absence of specificity and lack of explanatory power for non-social features of autism are no longer issues. >Theory of Mind/Baron-Cohen, >Autism/psychological theories. 1. Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A., & Frith, U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind.” Cognition, 21, 13—125. Coralie Chevallier, “Theory of Mind and Autism. Beyond Baron-Cohen et al’s. Sally-Anne Study”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Autism | Psychological Theories | Slater I 148 Autism/psychological theories: Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASDs) are characterized by a triad of symptoms: impaired social development, impaired communication skills and a narrow repertoire of interests and activities. Over the last three decades, a number of theories have been put forward to explain this unique combination of impairments. Kanner: The disease was first described in 1943 by child psychiatrist Leo Kanner who reported the case of 11 children presenting a combination of symptoms that was unique enough to call it a separate syndrome: the fundamental disorder, he explained, “is the children’s inability to relate themselves in the ordinary way to people and situations from the beginning of life” (Kanner, 1943)(1). Asperger: Hans Asperger reported a similar condition in a group of four children observed in his Vienna practice and concluded his paper in similar ways to Kanner: “the fundamental disorder of autistic individuals” he argued, “is the limitation of their social relationships” (Asperger, 1944)(2). Slater I 150 Autism/psychological theories: the hypothesis, of a lack of theory of mind (ToM: “How does one demonstrate that an individual has the capacity to conceive mental states?”) in autism has had a significant impact on the way cognitive researchers view the architecture of the mind Slater I 151 and it has been taken as strong support for the idea that the human brain is equipped with a ToM (Theory of Mind) module. >Theory of Mind/Premack/Woodruff, >Theory of Mind/Dennett. In fact, following Baron-Cohen et al.’s (1985)(3) findings, autism soon became a test case for many theories of typical development where the ToM module is thought to play a central role (see e.g., Frith & Happé, 1995(4); Happé, 1993(5)). >False-Belief Task/Happé. The “mindblindness” hypothesis prompted an enormous amount of research designed to assess the scope of the theory and to derive further predictions from it. Happé/Frith: (Happé and Frith 1995)(4) the model put forward by Baron-Cohen et al. (1985)(1) is useful to the study of child development (…) because it allowed for a systematic approach to the impaired and unimpaired social and communicative behavior of people with autism. >VsBaron-Cohen. Slater I 152 Two important cognitive accounts of non-social deficits in ASDs, which have been mainly construed as compatible with the ToM account but offer additional explanatory power, were put forward. These are: 1) the executive dysfunction hypothesis, referring to a difficulty in planning how to achieve a goal and a tendency to become fixated on one activity or object, which accounts more specifically for the stereotypes (including repetitive and stereotyped motor activities), planning difficulties, and impulsiveness (Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1991(6)) often found in the condition; and 2) Weak Central Coherence, (a difficulty in combining several pieces of information to form an overall understanding of an issue), which provides an interesting account for the peaks of abilities observed in tasks requiring detail-focused rather than holistic processing (Frith & Happé, 1995(4); Happé, 1999(7)). Slater I 153 It has been argued that autism ought to be tackled by a multiple-deficit approach and that “it is time to give up on a single explanation for autism” (Happé, Ronald, & Plomin, 2006(8); see also Pennington, 2006(9)). Construed within this multiple deficit framework, neither the fact that ToM deficits can be found in other conditions, nor the fact that ToM deficits do not explain the third element of the triad 1) The ToM account does not provide a full account auf autism. 2) ToM deficits are not specific to autism, 3) ToM deficits are not universal in autism; (or, for that matter, many other features of autism like motor clumsiness, sensory sensitivities, and so on) are relevant to assess the validity of the account. 1. Kanner, L. (1943). Autistic disturbances of affective contact. Nervous Child, 2, 217—2 50. 2. Asperger, H. (1944). Die “Autistischen Psychopathen” im Kindesalter. European Archives of Psychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience, 117,76—136. 3. Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A., & Frith, U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind.” Cognition, 21, 13—125. 4. Frith, U., & Happé, F. (1995). Autism: Beyond ‘theory of mind.” In: J. Mehler& S. Franck (Eds), Cognition on cognition (pp. 13—30). Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 5. Happé, F. (1993). Communicative competence and theory of mind in autism: A test of relevance theory. Cognition, 48, 101—119. 6. Ozonoff, S., Pennington, B. F., & Rogers, S. J. (1991). Executive function deficits in high-functioning autistic individuals: Relationship to theory of mind. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 32, 1081—1105. 7. Happé, F. (1999). Autism: cognitive deficit or cognitive style? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 3, 216— 222. 8. Happé, F., Ronald, A., & Plomin, R. (2006). Time to give up on a single explanation for autism. Nature Neuroscience, 9, 1218—1220. 9. Pennington, B. F. (2006). From single to multiple deficit models of developmental disorders. Cognition, 101,385—413. Coralie Chevallier, “Theory of Mind and Autism. Beyond Baron-Cohen et al’s. Sally-Anne Study”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Causal Explanation | Cartwright | I 10 Causal Explanation/Cartwright: Here, truth is critical - (but explanatory power does not guarantee truth). - But it's only the truth of deeply settled causal principles and phenomenological laws. >Explanation, >Description, >Truth, >Causality, >Causal laws, >Physics. I 82 Causal Explanation/Important Argument/Cartwright: in causal explanations we do not have to assume redundancy (possibility of alternative explanation or alternative causes) as with the mathematical (theoretical) explanation - theoretical explanation: can be justified by inference on the best explanation - causal explanations not - instead: they have an independent test for their truth: the controlled experiment. >Experiments. I 89 Declaration/Fraassen: the truth of an explanation cannot be inferred from its success. - E.g. Ptolemaic astronomy - ultimately not on the existence of theoretical entities. Duhem: truth is an external feature of explanations. >Truth/Duhem, >Explanation/Duhem. I 91 Different: in causal explanations, truth is inherent - a false cause makes the causal explanation false. >Causes. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Criteria | Kuhn | Rorty I 356 Kuhn: Choice between theories, not by rules but by values. Criteria: "The fact of conformity, consistency, scope, simplicity and fruitfulness." See also >Simplicity, >Explanatory Power, >Theories. |
Kuhn I Th. Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1962 German Edition: Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen Frankfurt 1973 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Criteria | Popper | Flor II 479 Criterion: is no criterion of sense. The principle of falsification does not say that all other kinds of statements are cognitively pointless or empty. Even basic propositions can be criticized. Their assumption is not justified by our experiences. >Protocol sentences, >Sense/Science. --- Flor II 479 Differentiation Criterion/Popper: it is going to be a proposal for a determination. Only a matter of decision. Can only be justified by analyzing its logical consequences: >fertility, >explanatory power, etc. Principle of falsification = principle of differentiation. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Flor I Jan Riis Flor "Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor II Jan Riis Flor "Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor III J.R. Flor "Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Flor IV Jan Riis Flor "Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Deductive-nomological Explanation | Schurz | I 223 Deductive-nomological explanation/Hempel/Schurz: (Hempel 1942(1), Hempel/Oppenheim 1948(2), Vs: Stegmüller 1969(3), Salmon 1989(4)). Deductive-nomological: Explanans: set of premises: from strictly general propositions G and antecedent A (singular propositions). Explanandum: conclusion E. (sing proposition). Consequence condition: E is a deductive consequence of G and A. Ex G: All metals conduct electricity A: This vase is metallic E: Therefore it conducts electricity. Law: law premises are never definitely verifiable. Model: therefore the epistemic model version is more important. I.e. it is about acceptance and not about truth against a background knowledge. >Background, >Knowledge, >Models, >Model theory. I 224 Potential Explanation/Hempel: Here merely logical consistency of the premises is required. This is important when evaluating hypotheses in terms of their explanatory power. >Best explanation. I 224 Covering law/Dray/Schurz: (Dray 1957)(5): simplest case of a deductive nomological explanation: here antecedent and explanandum are implicatively connected by a single law. Logical form: (x)(Ax > Ex), Aa/Ea. >Covering laws. HempelVsDray/HempelVsCovering law: Hempel's own model includes more complex explanations. Ex. planetary positions explained from initial conditions plus laws of nature. I 228 Law/Explanation/Schurz: Deductive-nomological explanation of law by higher-level theories cannot be directly applied to the causality requirement. ((s) Schurz/(s): laws are explained by higher-level theories). Law of nature/problem/Schurz: A law is not a spatiotemporally localized fact and can therefore not be the subject of a causal relation. Law/causality/explanation/Schurz: Many laws are not causal: E.g. the laws of evolution are not causal. Also in physics: Explanation due to symmetry principles, Ex many explanations in quantum mechanics. >Explanation/Hempel, >Explanation/Hegel, >Explanation/Scriven, >Causality, >Causal explanations, >Laws, >Law-likeness, >Laws of nature. 1. Hempel, C. (1942). "The Function of General Laws in History". In: The Journal of Philosophy 39, (abgedruckt in ders. 1965, 221-243.) 2. Hempel, C. & Oppenheim, P. (1948). "Studies in the Logic of Explanation", >Philosophy of Science 39, 135-175. 3. Stegmüller, W. (1969). Probleme und Resultate der Wissenschaftstheorie und Analytischen Philosophie. Band I:Wissenschaftliche Erklärung und Begründung. Berlin: Springer. 4. Salmon, W. (1989). Four Decades of Scientific Explanation. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 5. Dray, W. (1957). Laws and Explanation in History. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Deflationism | Field | I 91 Deflationism/knowledge/Field: Thesis: we do not know the consistency of the axioms e.g. The quantity theory or the theory of the real numbers. - For this would require mathematical entities - Conditional possibility principle/Field: (this would also admit Frege): if non-modal form, then knowledge alone from thinking about the logical form. - Deflationism/Field/(s): leads to that, that we have no mathematical knowledge as far as mathematical entities (m.e.) are concerned, since they do not exist. I 108 VsDeflationism/model theory/proof theory/Field: Problem: because there are no mathematical entities (m.e.) the (platonistic) schemes (MTP) If there is a model for "A", then MA - and (MS). If there is a proof of "~A" in F) then ~ MA - only trivially true - solution: modal surrogates or schemes: (MTP #) If N(NBG > there is a model for "A"), then MA - and (MS#) If N(NBG > there is a proof for "~A" inF) then ~MA - (F: here language) - "A" a sentence - NBG: Neuman/Bernays/Gödel - MA: "possibly A" - I 110 Conclusion: the deflationism has no problem with the model theory if it is about to find out something about possibility and impossibility. I 113 Deflationism/Field: deflationism does not say that the mathematical statements mean something different, but that what they mean cannot be literally known. Deductivism: always asserts that what AQ means is that which follows A from another statement. Deflationism: must not isolate statements - here other statements are not relevant to the meaning of A. II 104 Inflationism: Frege/Russell/Tractatus/Ramsey: truth conditions are central for meaning and content. - Vs: Deflationism: does not need truth conditions. II 108 Deflationism/Field: Main point: that the deflationism does not need truth condtions. - He also does not need any verificationism. Deflationism must also exclude the possibility of a physical reduction of truth conditions. II 114 Logical connection/Deflationism: one main advantage seems to be that deflationism does not have to make the choice between facts. Solution: one can easily explain in his own words what it is that "or" the truth table obeys: It follows from the truth functional logic together with the logic of the disquotational truth-predicate, without mentioning any facts about the use. "P" is true iff p follows by conceptual necessity through the cognitive equivalence of the right and left side. Problem: conceptual necessity is not sufficient to show that "or" the truth table is sufficient. - We still need generalization. II 116 Deflationism/Gavagai: for deflationism there is nothing to explain here - it is simply part of the logic of "refers" that "rabbit" refers to rabbits. II 117 Reference/Deflationism: if truth conditions are unimportant, then reference cannot play a central role. Solution: not reference is the basis but observations about our practice of concluding. - Then reference is purely disquotational - E.g.: "Gödel does not refer to the discoverer of the incompleteness sentence" but "Gödel is not the discoverer ..." - then semantic ascent. II 118 Causal theoryVsDeflationism: the deflationism cannot say that all we need for that, that my word for Hume refers to Hume, is the disquotation scheme. Nevertheless, the deflationist can accept that the causal network that explains what else would be mysterious: the correlation between believe and facts about Hume. II 119 Deflationism: the border to the inflationism is blurred because we have to construct something that could be considered as an inflationist relation "S has the truth conditions p", or not. II 127 VsDeflationism: 1. He cannot distinguish between "Either he is a hairdresser or not a hairdresser" and - "Either he is a fascist or not a fascist". 2. It cannot explain the explanatory power of the truth conditions - (E.g. For behavior and success) 3. It cannot distinguish between vague and non-vague discourse 4. It cannot deal with truth attribution in other languages 5. It gives "true" false modal properties ((s) "necessarily true" or "contingent true") 6. It cannot deal with ambiguity, indices, and demonstrativa 7. It cannot explain learning. --- Ad II 260 Deflationism/Nonfactualism/Conclusion/Field/(s): the deflationism (disquotationalism) does not accept any facts which, for example, are relevant why a word refers to a thing. - For deflationism, it is senseless to ask why "entropy" refers to entropy. - ((s)(use/(s): would be such a fact.) >Disquotationalism, >Minimalism, >Quote/Disquotation. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Descriptions | Cartwright | I 3 Explanation/Description/Physics/Cartwright: in modern physics the phenomenological laws are considered as being descriptive, the fundamental laws as being explanatory. Problem: the explanatory power comes at the cost of the adequacy of description Explanatory power (of laws) The semblance of truth comes from a false explanation model: wrong connection of laws with reality. I 4 Cartwright instead: Def "Simulacrum" View/Cartwright: of explanation: Thesis: the way from theory to reality is this: theory > model > phenomenological law Phenomenological Laws/Cartwright: are true of the objects of reality (or can be). Fundamental Laws/Cartwright: are only true of the objects in the model. >Fundamental laws/Cartwright. Explanation/Cartwright: is not a guide to the truth. I 57 Description/Laws of Nature/LoN/Physical Laws/Cartwright: E.g. the gravitation law does not describe the behavior of the objects, because electrical forces also play a role - (Coulomb's law) - no charged body behaves according to the gravitation law. And every massive body is a counter-E.g. to Coulomb's law. Solution: "... if no other forces..." - without ceteris paribus. >ceteris paribus. I 131 Description/Physics/Cartwright: false: that we have to depart from existence assumptions to come to a description according to which we can set up the equations. Correct: the theory has only few principles to move from descriptions to equations - these principles certainly require structured information. - And the "descriptions" on the right side have to satisfy many mathematical requirements. >Equations, >Principles. The best descriptions are those that best match the equations. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Explanation | Bigelow | I 274 Modality/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: in the explanation of the modalities, the causation can now enter as a local feature. Best in the semantics of possible worlds. >Modalities, >Causation, >Possible worlds, >Semantics of possible worlds. I 275 Causation/Bigelow/Pargetter: is always an input for an explanation, never an output. >Causal relationship, >Probability. Probabilistic Theory/Causation/Bigelow/Pargetter: pro: it shows that it is misguided to use causation as an undefined concept. Causation rather longs for explanation. We need to find out more about the causal relation. And the probabilistic theory contributes to this. BigelowVsProbabilistic theory: however, it combines causation too closely with modal terms and reverses the priorities. Pro: Nevertheless, there are often connections between causation and modality. Modality/explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: thesis: the explanation is based on the causation of modality. But causation cannot be taken as an unexplained basic concept. >Basic concepts. I 286 Causation/Bigelow/Pargetter: its explanation creates four problems: I 287 1. Macroscopic forces: how plausible is it that they supervene on fundamental forces, and thus on basic physical causes? >Supervenience. 2. How can we justify the choice of forces instead of other physical ingredients? >Forces 3. How do we explain the connection between causation and different modal terms? 4. Forces and causes: what kind of higher-level universals are they? >Causes, >Universals. I 287 Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: there is a difference between the fundamental forces we assume and the macroscopic forces we encounter in our daily life. Definition causal relation/Bigelow/Pargetter: (see above) as an aggregate of suitable fundamental forces. >Causal relation. Problem: is the supervenience thesis true of the macroscopic on fundamental forces? Fundamental forces: remain the same, even if the special particles and their fields change. They have a strong explanatory power, e.g. they enable us to draw force parallelograms, etc. I 288 Def causation/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: he defines them by causal chains. Causal chain/Bigelow/Pargetter: needs then for every link a basic causation which requires counterfactual conditionals, for the end links there will be a derived causal relation. >Counterfactual conditional. There will always be many parallel chains, with different connections among each other. This can lead to a complex network. Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: the metaphysical apparatus we employ does not claim to be adequate for the totality of the causal relations. But for some. >Metaphysics. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Explanation | Cartwright | I 3 Explanation/Description/Physics/Cartwright: in modern physics, the phenomenological laws are considered as being descriptive, the fundamental laws as being explanatory. >Fundamental laws, >Laws, >Natural laws, >Physics. Problem: the explanatory power comes at the cost of the adequacy of the description. 1) explanatory power (of laws) does not speak for truth 2) even for falsehood, because we need ceteris paribus laws 3) the semblance of truth comes from a false explanation model: wrong connection of laws with reality. >Truth, >Reality, >ceteris paribus. I 4 Cartwright instead: Def "Simulacrum" View/Cartwright: of explanation: Thesis: the way from theory to reality is this: theory > model > phenomenological law - Phenomenological Laws/Cartwright: are true of the objects of reality (or can be). Fundamental Laws/Cartwright: are only true of the objects in the model - E.: is not a guide to the truth. I 11 E/Physics/Cartwright: wrong question: "which is the correct equation?" - Different models bring different aspects - causal explanation: not in scientific practice, we do not tell sometimes one, sometimes another causal story. >Theories, >Models. I 44 E/CartwrightVsTradition: has nothing to do with truth - ((s)> Truth/M.Williams / >Truth/Horwich). I 47 E/Cartwright: after the laws of nature (LoN) are known, we still have to decide which factors should occur in an explanation - the decision of which is, however, not suggested by our knowledge of the laws of nature. I 50 Laws of Nature are never sufficient to explain something in a particular moment - the reasons to believe in them are not normal reasons, because we have never tested them - only reasons: explanation strategy - I 52 E: is still needed even after complete description. >Description, >Observation. I 70 E/All/Generalization/VsSuper Law/C: E.g. "Why is the quail in my garden shaking its head?" - "Because all of them do it" - no explanation! - Nor: E.g. "All carbon atoms have 5 energy levels" - Super laws in turn require the application of individual laws - and these do not represent facts. I 73 Explanation/Cartwright: Uses causes - ((s) not laws) - (EmpiricismVsCauses). I 92 E/LoN/Cartwright: it is not the fundamental laws (laws of nature) that I need for the explanation, but E.g. properties of electrons - plus assumptions about the specific situation. I 94 f Explanation/Grünbaum: a more comprehensive law G explains a less comprehensive law L which it contains not through the causes of L. I 96 Explanation/Duhem: does not draw a "veil" from reality - Explanation/Cartwright: explaining a set of phenomenological laws means giving a physical theory of them - without explaining these laws. I 103 Explanation/W. Salmon/Richard Jeffries: E. are no arguments. I 152 Explanation/Duhem: Organization (order of knowledge). Hacking I 96~ Explanation/Cartwright/Fraassen: if something is an explanation, it is no reason to believe it. I 99 Anti-Realism: E are not a feature of the truth but of adequacy. >Adequacy. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Explanation | Fraassen | I 23 Explanation/FraassenVsReichenbach: the unlimited demand for explanation leads to the demand of hidden variables. I 25 Explanation: if mere regularity makes a macroscopic theory poor, then the same happens to a microscopic one - coincidence: also coincidence can have an explanation. I 39 Explanation/FraassenVsAugustinus: the fleeing of the mouse from the cat must not be explained by perception. But with Darwin: the fleeing mice survive. There is no account by reason. Analogously it applies that the successful sciences survive - without this having to be explained. I 86 Theory/Explanation: For example, one could have two types of mechanics, one for physiologies and one for astronomers. Problem: one cannot explain a complex phenomenon with this - e.g. man who is walking on the moon - if both theories have no common models, a new theory on lunar gravitation must be established - empirical adequacy: requires the integration of these "mini-theories". I 87 Explanation: if we consider some kind of questions to be more important, this is no reason to believe that the theory that explains them is more probable - however, the social situation of the researcher plays a role in the evaluation of theories. >Evaluation. I 93 Explanation/Ernest Nagel: explanation is the organization and classification of our knowledge - FraassenVsFeyerabend: he misunderstood the fact: that this is a function of interests - FraassenVsFeyerabend: then one can stop to research if one believes, what one says - naive view of scientific security - then the scientists ought to swear by an oath that they are looking for explanations -FraassVsFeyerabend: in reality one must always doubt the adequacy. I 97f Explanation/FraassenVsTradition: explanation does not have to be true! a) "we have an explanation" (has to do with acceptance) b) "the theory explains" (without acceptance) - e.g. Newton's theory was wrong nevertheless it explains much. ((s) then a theory cannot be a conjunction of sentences, for then no sentence may be false.) Harman: Explanation leads to acceptance. >Acceptability. Explanation/Fraassen: something does not require that theory coincides with the world as a whole. I 98 One cannot assert the truth of a theory before its explanatory power - Explanation: is not an additional property for empirical adequacy - e.g. "the computer computes" - no one would say "the hammer struck the nail". I 106 Explanation/VsHempel/Morton Beckner: e.g. evolution is not deterministic - e.g. the giraffes's neck is not determined by dietary scarcity - only by the compatibility of genetic and natural selection mechanisms - Putnam: also Newton's explanation is no deduction, but a demonstration of compatibilities. I 110 Definition Explanation/Friedman: S explains P iff P is a consequence S which is "relative" to K and S "reduces" or "unifies" the set of its own consequences relative to K. I 111 Explanation: Problem: Incompleteness: disease explains a rare secondary disease that is triggered by it - but not why this patient is affected. Asymmetry: e.g. length of the shadow: is always in relation with a certain sun position. Causation: only goes in one direction. >Causation, >Equations, >Asymmetry. I 111 Why question: does not occur when the spectrum is explained by the atomic structure. I 124 Explanation: has to do with "why" - to find prominent factors in the causal network. Problem: the network as a whole does not explain typical cases - science, however, describes the network - ((s) therefore science does not equal an explanation. Explanation must at least say that there is a structure that can be described in principle - though never fully.) Cf. >Network/Quine. I 146 Explanation: for evaluating a response to a why question as an explanation, it is not a matter of whether this is true - the evaluation uses only the part of the background information that provides the general theory about these phenomena plus additional information that does not include the facts to be explained - ((s) e.g. framework conditions). >Reference frame. I 155 Explanation/Description/Fractions: explanation and description do not differ in the information - but explanation: is a three-digit relation theory-fact-context - description: is two-digit: theory-fact - Explanation: is an applied science (not pure science). I 205 Explanation/Thomas Aquinas/Fraassen: everything that is explained must be explained by something else. I 206 The premises must contain more than the conclusion - in addition: generalization: e.g. that all magnets attract iron. >Generalization. I 213 Explanation/Fraassen: only observable regularities require explanation. >Regularities, >Observability. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Explanation | Hempel | Bigelow I 299 Explanation/tradition/laws/Hempel/Bigelow/Pargetter: (Representatives: Hempel and Oppenheim 1948(1), Hempel 1965(2), Mill 1843/50(3), Jevons 1877(4), Ducasse 1925(5), Feigl 1945(6), Popper 1945(7), Hospers 1946(8)). Hempel/terminology/spelling/Bigelow/Pargetter: O: result L: laws C: conditions (sets of sentences, as premises) Then "O" could also be seen as a set of sentences. But we are talking about compound sentences. Then we have: L C O Initial conditions/Hempel/Bigelow/Pargetter: initial conditions are sometimes not needed at all. Sometimes, however, the laws alone do not explain the case: for example, Halley's comet comes back in 60 years, for this we need information about certain facts, it does not only follow from the laws. The facts are contingent, of course. I 301 Non-statistical explanation/Hempel: thesis: if L and C explain O, then they must entail O logically. Otherwise, we have at best a sketch of the explanation that requires further assumptions. Bigelow/Pargetter: this does not yet fully express the idea of the explanation by "deriving from laws": the laws must be used and not only mentioned. In other words, there must be a reliance on laws. BigelowVsHempel/BigelowVsTradition: N.B.: but these are just apparant explanations! I 302 Just as quackers and magicians often provide an explanation with reference to prestigious natural laws, which turns out to be circular on closer inspection. Solution/Hempel: to exclude this, Hempel demands that additionally the premises must be true and O would not have followed if C alone had been without the laws (L). BigelowVsHempel/BigelowVsTradition: there are still a lot of refinements to be made and special cases to consider. Lewis would call that the "one patch per hole" method. Statistical explanation/probabilistic/Hempel/Bigelow/Pargetter: (Hempel 1965) here it is impossible to find laws that predict the exact result. However, it may be very likely in certain cases. Or more likely if the law is true than if it was not true. I 303 The statistical explanations are something like derivations from the thing to be explained. And indeed such derivatives, which originate from invalid conclusion. Logical form: the conclusion should be probable, given the premises. Variants: one can demand a high probability from the outset. Or it should be higher than O's without the premises or weaker: that O only has to be made to a certain degree likely, etc. (Lit: Salmon 1982). Bigelow/Pargetter: all this does not differ significantly from the non-statistical explanation. Statistical laws are also part of the set of laws. Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: with Hempel's help, we can now broaden our concept of explanation. I 304 If we get the probability of a result, we have explained the result a little bit as well. Statistical explanation/Hempel/Bigelow/Pargetter: in the end, it is all about whether a result comes out or is likely. We can summarize both cases. "Statistical"/Hempel/Bigelow/Pargetter: "statistical" is only served to attenuate the requirement of logical validity. Explanation/Hempel/Bigelow/Pargetter: thesis: an explanation is an open process. This is important. Both the initial conditions can be varied, as well as the laws derived from other laws. Kepler's laws, for example, have been traced back by Newton to deeper ones. These then logically entail the Kepler ones. I 305 Openness/Hempel: openness is that you may be able to find deeper and even deeper laws. Bigelow/Pargetter: that is one of the strengths of his theory. >Laws, >Natural laws. 1.Hempel, C.G. and P. Oppenheim: Studies in the Logic of Explanation PS, 1984, p. 15. 2.Hempel, C. G.: Aspects of Scientific Explanation, in: Aspects of Scientific Explanation in the Philosophy of Science. New York 1965: The Free Press. 3. Mill, J. St.: A System of Logic, 1843. 4. Stevons W. J.: The Principle of Science: A Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method, 2nd edition London 1877: Macmillan Press. 5. Ducasse, C. J.: Explanation, Mechanism and Teleology. Journal of Philosophy 22. pp. 150-5. 6. Feigl, H.: Operationism and Scientific Method. Psychological Review 52, 1945, pp. 250-9, 284-8 7. Popper, K. R.: The Open Society and Its Enemies. London 1945. 8. Hospers, J.: On Explanation. Journal of Philosophy 43, 1946, pp. 337-56. Schurz I 224 Explanation/Law/Hempel: The law premises can often be omitted! Humanities/Hempel/Schurz: claimed to be able to provide explanations for them, too, by assuming that laws rule here, too. VsHempel: but these laws are not strict. Hempel: late: for it probabilistic explanation. Schurz I 224 Potential Explanation/Hempel: Here merely logical consistency of the premises is required. This is important when evaluating hypotheses in terms of their explanatory power. >Best explanation. Schurz I 225 Explanation/Hempel/Schurz: is the answer to a why-question. Why-question/Hempel: a) Explanation seeker: asks for causes. b) Justification seeker: asks for reasons of belief. I 226 Causes: can serve as reasons for justification. (Also vice versa!). >Causes, >Justification. Structural equality/prediction/explanation/Hempel/Schurz: (early and middle Hempel): Thesis: explanation and prediction are structurally equal. Popper: ditto: causality = prediction-eduction. Explanation and prediction differ only in the pragmatic time circumstances of the becoming known of premises and conclusion. Prediction: here only the premises are known first. Explanation: vice versa. (...) ex ante reasoning/Hempel: = prediction, potential explanation. Explanation: = ex ante reasoning. ManyVs: (...) >Structures, >Microstructure, >Causal explanation/Schurz, >Explanation/Schurz. |
Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II Carl Hempel Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950 German Edition: Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Functional Explanation | Bigelow | I 323 Definition Functional Explanation/Function/Bigelow/Pargetter: with a functional explanation we describe existing patterns by reference to future events or states. It is possible that these may never occur. >Induction. Why: we explain, e.g. why we have teeth by pointing out their function. Problem: to explain the function of causally inactive patterns or elements. I 324 Problem: because the future conditions may not even arise, we do not describe any real properties. Properties/Bigelow/Pargetter: properties of a system are derived from its causal history, not from its function! Therefore, they do not depend on the function of the system! >Properties, >Function. Backward causation/Bigelow/Pargetter: is simply excluded with this. Function/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: therefore, the function of a system is correspondingly redundant. The function can of course be mentioned, but description is more than mentioning possible effects. >Evolution, >Darwinism. Functional Explanation/Science/Bigelow/Pargetter: there are three approaches that we consider to be generally correct. They all have in common that functions have no significant explanatory power. I 325 E.g. Evolution/Bigelow/Pargetter: the theories of functional explanation do not allow to explain evolution by saying that a pattern has formed because it fulfils a certain function. Functional Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: our theory will be a realistic one. I 332 Functional Explanation/function/Bigelow/Pargetter: thesis: we want a theory that is forward oriented. Functions can and should be explained by reference to future events and states. Analogous to the explanation of dispositions. Analog: our explanation has an analog: the explanation of the evolution-theoretical concept of survival (fitness). (Lit. Pargetter 1987)(1). VsDarwinism/VsDarwin/Bigelow/Pargetter: frequent objection: the "survival of the able" is an empty tautology. >Survival. BigelowVsVs: the objection is based on the assumption that fitness could only be determined retrospectively. He also assumes that the fact that some individuals survive is exactly what constitutes efficiency. (circular). BigelowVsAetiologic theory: is based on the same misunderstanding. It then claims that also the property of having a function is a retrospective property constituted by the history of survival. Thus, the concept of function is deprived of its explanatory potential. I 333 Circularity/Bigelow/Pargetter: this objection is often erroneously raised VsDarwinism. Fitness/solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: however, it is not defined retrospectively, but is analogous to a disposition. Subjunction/subjunctive/conditional/fitness/Bigelow/Pargetter: Fitness is a subjunctive property: it determines what would happen if these or that circumstances were to occur. >Subjunction. This subjunctive property supervenes on the morphological character of the individual or species. There is no circularity. >Supervenience, >Circularity. Biological function/Bigelow/Pargetter: the same applies to them as to fitness. They are two sides of the same coin. Fitness/Bigelow/Pargetter: means looking forward. 1. Pargetter, R. (1987). Fitness. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 68. pp.44-56. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Induction | Popper | I 110 Induction principle: trying to delete it from the science, would not be different from taking out the decision about truth and falsehood of the theories of science. The induction principle can only be a general proposition. If you try to regard it as an "empirically valid" proposition, so the same questions immediately occur again, which leaded to its introduction. We would have to use inductive reasoning to justify it: regress. --- I 115 Induction: We reject them because there is no suitable criterion of demarcation. No indicator of empirical, non-metaphysical character of a theoretical system. Demarcation criterion: it will be a proposal for a fixing. Solely responsibility of the decision. To be justified only by analyzing its logical consequences: fertility, >explanatory power, etc. --- Schurz I 15f Induction/PopperVsInduction/Schurz: Popper thesis: science can get along entirely without induction - many VsPopper - theoretical term (Popper: Problem: because observation statements are theory-laden, the border between >observation terms and >theoretical terms is not sharp). |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Information | Bigelow | I 68 Information/Movement/Causality/Speed of Light/Bigelow/Pargetter: an image can be transmitted faster than light: e.g. a laser cannon on earth can swing on the surface of the Jupiter moon Callisto and move an image from one point to another through the angular speed, which is faster than the speed of light. I 69 This is possible because there is no causal process under way here. The point at a time is not the same thing as the point at another time, the point is not an object. >Causality, >Causation. N.B.: then in the case of this point there is only one Ockhamistic speed, no vector. Saying "it" moved was misleading. It also has no identity in time. >Temporal identity. Cause: is the movement of the laser cannon on Earth. >Causes. N.B.: therefore, the existence of a pattern of 2nd level of positions does not imply the existence of a property of the 1st level of the instantaneous velocity. >Levels/order, >Description levels. Newton: shows again that instantaneous velocity (property of the 1st level) does not imply properties of the 2nd level (sequence of positions). Flux theory: this is what it needs, the logical independence of properties 1st and 2nd level. Nevertheless, it must accept an intimate connection between the two. >Flux/Bigelow. False solution: to say that the point of light receives its identity from the numerical identity. That would be a dubious combination of first and second level properties. I 70 Vs: if, for example, a world of Malebranche - God creates the moving objects at any time in any place - is a logical possibility, then there is no implication (entailment) between Ockhamistic speed and velocity according to the flux theory (2nd and 1st level of properties). >Malebranche, >Entailment, >Implication, >William of Ockham. Bigelow/Pargetter: That is why we say that the connection between Ockham speed and flux speed is not guaranteed by a metaphysically necessary connection, but by a contingent natural law. >Laws of nature, >Contingency. Motion/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: Ockham's change of location is often explained by instantaneous speed. The reason is that there is no other possibility according to the laws of nature. >Motion, >Change. Moment/Bigelow/Pargetter: this vector understands velocity among itself. Moment is not an intrinsic property (or "invariant"), but is relativized to a frame of reference. >Reference systems. Vector/Natural Laws/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: Vectors play an important role in natural laws. It is they who give the natural laws their explanatory power. Intrinsic property/Vector/Bigelow/Pargetter: each vector constitutes an intrinsic characteristic of an object at a time. ((s) No contradiction to above, if related to point of time). Velocity/acceleration/Bigelow/Pargetter: their connection is mediated by their role in natural laws. Gravitational Acceleration/Galilei/Bigelow/Pargetter: is actually not quite constant, because gravitation becomes stronger when approaching the center of gravity. And it is increasingly accelerating. Galilei, however, assumes constancy. I 71 Explanation/Quantity/Bigelow/Pargetter: not all quantities play an explanatory role such as acceleration and velocity. For example, the change in acceleration (see above gravitational acceleration) does not play an explanatory role. That is why we do not assume a vector for them. All we need here is "Ockham's" pattern of acceleration. No flux. However, we do need the flux for the underlying vectors of velocity and acceleration. >Intrinsic. Vector/Physics/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: there is no reason to assume vectors above the level of acceleration, neither flux vectors nor Ockhamist vectors. >Vectors. Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: this shows an explanatory link between flux vectors and patterns in time. >Explanations, >Causal explanation. This connection is not a close logical or metaphysical one, but a looser, a nomological one. >Metaphysics, >Metaphysical possibility, >Nomothetic/idiographic. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Laws, fundamental | Cartwright | I 3 Explanation/description/Physics/Cartwright: in modern physics the phenomenological laws are considered descriptive, the fundamental laws are considered explanatory - problem: the explanatory power is lost in favor of the descriptive adequacy. >Physics, >Natural laws, >Laws, >Adequacy, >Explanation. I 102 Nature/reality/laws/Natural Laws/Cartwright: without accepting God and a book of nature we have no reason to assume that the phenomenological laws are derived from the fundamental laws. >Phenomena. I 112 Fundamental laws/Natural Laws/Cartwright: represent rather the relations between properties than between individuals - practice: for the engineer it is about objects instead of properties. >Properties, >Relations, >Objects. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Morning Star/Evening Star | Block | Fodor IV 168 Conceptual Role/Fine-Grained/Block/Fodor/Lepore: Problem: whether the conceptual (inferential) roles of morning star and evening star differ depends on how inferential roles themselves are individuated. This, in turn, depends on how fine-grained or coarse-grained they are perceived. a) as coarse-grained as the individuation of extensions: then the roles of MS/ES are not distinguished! (s) This is, in turn, distinguished from the distinction between the meta-language and the object language, for example, that "bachelor" starts with B). E.g. Suppose our concept of inference was based on material equivalence: IV 169 Then all coextensive expressions will have the same inferential roles. Conversely: E.g. if the inferential roles are as fine-grained as orthography (not only ES/MS but also distinction "bachelor" and "unmarried man"), then we lose the explanatory power for the (presumable) fact that synonymous expressions, other than merely coextensive ones, are substitutable salva veritate. Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: 1) now we see: distinctions between inferential roles only solve Frege's problem if there is an adequate individualization principle for them. But there is no criterion for this! Block also called this the main problem. Thus it is not easier to distinguish between inferential roles than between meanings. > Fine grained/coarse grained. |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Natural Laws | Bigelow | I 113 Natural Laws/Counterfactual Conditional/Bigelow/Pargetter: are often formulated in terms of "ideal systems". To do this, they need the counterfactual conditionals. I 114 Similarly, thought experiments need counterfactual conditionals. I 214 Law/Antiquity/Bigelow/Pargetter: For example,"What goes up must fall". Lucrez: what consists mainly of soil or water has to move downwards. "Down" was a marked direction. Atomism: Representative: Lucrez: Little astronomical knowledge yet. Aristotle/Ptolemaios: believed that everything that consists mainly of earth or water moves to the center of the cosmos, and since it moves to the center of the earth, it must be the center of the cosmos. I 215 Antiquity/Bigelow/Pargetter: in one respect Aristotle is closer to the truth, in other respects it is Lucrez. He was right that the center of the earth is not marked. Natural Laws/Physics/Biology/Bigelow/Pargetter: a one-sided diet with examples from physics does not necessarily lead to a correct view of the natural laws. Instead, here are some examples from biology: Generalization/Biology: For example, a living being has father and mother of the same species as it itself. (Today we know that this has some exceptions). I 216 It was a surprise to discover that this also applies to some plants. I 217 Generalization: most of them have an exception. For example, without exception: perhaps the generalization "All mammals have a mother". Exceptions/counter-examples/Bigelow/Pargetter: one should not overestimate the threat posed by exceptions to laws. Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: we are looking for two things: a) something that is more than regularity, on the other hand b) less than a regularity without exception. It may be that we have discovered with a law an important property of the cases that are sufficient for it, even if not all cases satisfy it. Modal/Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: the commonalities that satisfy the law are modal. Law/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: we do not always need a law, for example to know that our cat is pregnant. >Generality, >Generalization. I 220 Laws/Bigelow/Pargetter: are improved: e.g. Aristotle - Copernicus - Newton. Copernicus: still thought that the material of the moon does not fall towards the earth, but towards the moon center. Therefore the moon is round. Newton/(s): first explained the circular motion of the moon. Aristotle: thesis: everything (earthly and watery) falls to a center and this is coincidentally the center of the earth. N.B.: thus he fulfils the quasi-copernican theory! I 221 VsAristotle: his theory was nevertheless wrong. But not because any movement would have been different, but because the reasoning was wrong: it is about gravity, Aristotle considered the center of the earth to be the center of the cosmos. Error: was not that Aristotle thought that no object would fall in a different direction, but because he thought that no object could fall in a different direction. (Necessity). I 221 Law/Laws/Bigelow/Pargetter: are generalizations (description of regularities) plus attribution of necessity. (Dretske 1977(1), Tooley 1977(2), Armstrong 1978(3), 1983(4)) >Possibilia, >Counterfactual conditional. Bigelow/Pargetter: if they are wrong, they must be strictly wrong or empty. (Cartwright 1983(5), Hacking 1983(6)). I 222 Definition Laws/Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: are truths about Possibilia. Understanding/Bigelow/Pargetter: Actualia cannot be fully understood without understanding Possibilia. ((s) Here understanding is associated with objects, not sentences.) >Understanding. Possible Worlds/Understanding/Bigelow/Pargetter: we understand the actual world only by locating it in the logical space of possible worlds. >Possible worlds, >Possible worlds/Bigelow, >Actual world. Natural Law/Laws of nature/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: cannot be adequately described in a non-modal language. Because a natural law is not just a regularity. >Regularities, >Regularity theory, >Modalities, >Theory language. Logical form: i.e. a natural law cannot be merely defined as (x)(Fx > Gx). Logical form: of a natural law will often be a universal generalization (UG). >Universal generalization. But it can also be another generalization or other form of sentence. >Universal generalization. >Generality, >Generalization We assume, however, that natural laws (UG) will be involved and therefore have the following form: I 223 natN (x)(Fx > Gx). Natural necessity/Bigelow/Pargetter: entails that natural laws involve counterfactual conditionals. Because they are about what would happen, not just what already happens. And even if things were different in certain respects. I.e. in addition to regularity (x)(Fx > Gx) it will be true that every F would be a G ((s) Logic of 2nd level!) Logical form/(s) counterfactual conditional instead of quantification of 2nd level: (x) Fx would be > would be Gx) we take this together as a truthmaker of the proposition natN (x)(Fx > Gx) (see above). >Truthmakers. Natural Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: this is the view of natural laws that we defend. LewisVsBigelow: (Lewis, 1979)(7) the theory is circular. >Natural laws/Lewis. I 226 Non-modal Theory/Natural Laws/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: (instead of relative necessity:) most non-modal theories of natural law are derived from Hume. Then we can accept nomic necessity as a relative necessity, without falling into a circle. >Necessity, >Necessity/Bigelow, >Necessity/Hume. N.B.: then we can simply accept nomic necessity as a relative necessity and rely on it being based on independent access to laws! Explanation: so it makes sense to use laws to explain nomic necessity rather than vice versa. And this is much less obscure than modal arguments. >Modalities. I 227 BigelowVsVs: modal explanations are not so mysterious. BigelowVsHume: Humean theories are not able to explain these non-modal properties of the laws, they have less explanatory power. >Explanations, >Causal explanation. 1. Dretske, F.I. (1977). Laws of nature. Philosophy of Science 44, pp. 248-68 2. Tooley, M. (1977). The nature of laws. Canadian Journal of Philosphy 7, pp. 667-98. 3. Armstrong, D.M. (1978). Universals and scientific realism. Cambridge University Press. 4. Armstrong, D.M. (1983). What is a law of nature? Cambridge University Press. 5. Cartwright, N. (1983). How the laws of physics lie. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 6. Hacking, I. (1983). Representing and intervening: Introductory topics in the philosophy of natural science. Cambridge University Press. 7. Lewis, D. K. (1979) Counterfactual dependence and time's arrow, Nous 13 pp.455-76. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Personality Traits | Mischel | Corr I 46 Traits/Mischel: Mischel (1968)(1) revived [the] consistency debate (see > Consistency/Mischel) by more empirical evidence, proposing a ‘magic limit’ of .30 for what he called the ‘cross-situational consistency of behaviour’. His conclusion was that traits exist only in the eye of the observers but have no reality, because behaviour is so much situation-dependent. >Situations, >Personality. 1. Mischel, W. 1968. Personality and assessment. New York: Wiley Jens B. Asendorpf, “Personality: Traits and situations”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press. Corr II 102 Personality Traits/Mischel/Eysenck, Michael W.: According to [Mischel], what happens very often in personality research and theorizing is as follows: ‘To invoke trait names as explanatory entities … confuses constructions about behaviour with the causes of behaviour’. >Lexical hypothesis, >Lexical studies. Mischel is alleging that the entire trait approach is based on a circular argument and so lacks explanatory power (…). Second, Mischel (1968)(1) was sceptical of the value of inferring personality traits on the basis of observers’ ratings of other individuals: ‘The conviction that highly generalised traits do exist may reflect in part (but not entirely) behavioural consistencies that are constructed by observers, rather than actual consistency in the subject’s behavior (…). >Behavior, >">Experiments, >Method. II 103 [Mischel 1968] was also skeptical of the value of self-reports, arguing that they can be inaccurate because of ‘a variety of distorting motivational forces, including deliberate faking, lack of insight and unconscious defensive reactions’ (p. 69)(1). The fourth major criticism made by Mischel (1968, pp. 9–10)(1) was based on the argument that support for the value of the trait-based approach ‘would require demonstrating that people do behave consistently across many diverse situations (…). II 104 The fifth major criticism that Mischel (1968)(1) made of the trait approach was an extension of his fourth criticism (…). (…) he argued that this strongly implies that their behaviour is determined primarily by the specific nature of each situation. II 107 VsMischel: (…) Mischel does not consider at all the possibility that individual differences in major personality traits or factors might be determined at least in part by genetic factors. Vukasović and Bratko (2015)(2) [found that] 39% of individual differences in extraversion were due to genetic factors, as were 42% of individual differences in neuroticism and 30% of those in psychoticism. >Heritability, >Neuroticism. II 108 [Looking at Mischel’s second and third argument] it is clear that Mischel (1968)(1) expected little correspondence between self-report and rating data. [This can be refuted by looking at several studies, e.g. by Costa and McCrae (1988)(3)]. >R. McCrea, >P.T. Costa. [They] carried out a study on married couples which included comparing self-reports and spouse ratings for three factors assessed by the NEO Personality Inventory: Neuroticism, Extraversion and Openness. Self-reports and ratings for neuroticism correlated +.54, and the correlations were +.60 and +.52 for extraversion and openness, respectively. These findings are most plausibly explained on the basis that the validity of raters’ judgements tends to increase with increased length of knowledge of the other person. II 109 We now consider Mischel’s (1968)(1) fifth criticism discussed above by looking briefly at research that has compared the predictive power of individual differences in personality with situational differences. Sarason, Smith and Diener (1975)(4) calculated the percentage of the variance (differences in behaviour among individuals) accounted for by personality and by the situation across 138 experiments. On average, the situation accounted for 10.3% of the variance whereas personality accounted for 8.7% of the variance. Thus, behaviour was not determined substantially more by situational factors than by personality. 1. Mischel, W. (1968). Personality and assessment. London: Wiley. 2. Vukasović, T., & Bratko, D. (2015). Heritability of personality: A meta-analysis of behaviour genetic studies. Psychological Bulletin, 141, 769–785. 3. Costa, P. T., & McCrae, R. R. (1988). Personality in adulthood: A six-year longitudinal study of self-reports and spouse ratings on the NEO Personality Inventory. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 853–863. 4. Sarason, I. G., Smith, R. E., & Diener, E. (1975). Personality research: Components of variance attributable to person and situation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32, 199–204. Eysenck, Michael W.: “The Challenge to Trait Theory Revisiting Mischel (1968)”, In: Philip J. Corr (Ed.) 2018. Personality and Individual Differences. Revisiting the classical studies. Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne: Sage, pp. 101-114. |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Political Science | Waltz | Brocker I 628 Political Science/International Policy/Theory/Waltz: 1. International policy must be regarded as an independent area of analysis. 2. Laws must be established in this area, 3. At least a theoretical assumption must be made. >International politics. These assumptions are to be tested for their usefulness for the theory to be established, not for any truth or falsity. >Theories, >Method. Theories: should be judged by their explanatory power. As explanatory systems, theories cannot take details into account.(1) >Theories/Waltz. 1.Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Reading, Mas. 1979 S. 117. Carlo Masala, „Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolWaltz I Kenneth N. Waltz Man,the State and War New York 1959 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Process Philosophy | Kanitscheider | II 175 Process philosophy/Whitehead/Kanitscheider: Attempt to establish a synthesis of science and religion. nothing is changed in the development of nature (Like deism). >Deism, >Religion, >Theology. II 176 The process philosophy works with the method of the double aspects. It does not doubt the continuity of development, it postulates an external and an internal aspect of nature God: source of novelty and order. Inwardly interwoven with the course of the world, he has a transcendent component, but with a part of his being he is an immanent part of the world. >Process/flux, >World, >Reality, >World/thinking, >Knowledge. II 176 KanitscheiderVsProcessPhilosophy/KanitscheiderVsWhitehead: The weakness lies in the double-aspect character: there is no possibility of testing the divine efficacy in the sequence of events. The explanatory power is zero. >Aspects, >Double Aspect Theory/Fechner. No iota changes if no transcendent causer is at work. Metaphysical "bandwagon effect" (free rider). >Metaphysics. ((s) The "influence on everything" can be cut away if it is uniform). Kanitscheider: The expression "influence on everything" can only be meant metaphorically. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Realism | Boyd | Horwich I 492 Scientific Realism/Richard Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd's defense of the scientific realism is much more complex than what we have seen so far: Horwich I 493 Does it require a substantial (explanatory) scientific concept? >Realism, >Internal Realism/Putnam, >Truth. Boyd: more indirect way than Putnam: the (approximate) truth of our theories explains the instrumental reliability of our methods. >Method, >Reliability. Method/Boyd: method is not theory neutral! On the contrary, because they are formed by our theories, it is their truth which explains the success of the methods. >Theory dependency. Boyd/M. Williams: thus he turns a well-known argument on the head: BoydVsPositivism. >Positivism. Positivism/Theory: Thesis: the language of observation must be theory neutral. Likewise the methodological principles. >Observation Language. IdealismVsPositivism: VsTheory Neutrality. e.g. Kuhn: the scientific community establishes the "facts". >Science/Kuhn. Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd cleverly makes the theory-ladenness of our methodological judgments the basis of his realism. These methods, which are so loaded as our theory, would not work if the corresponding theories were not "approximately true in a relevant manner". >Theory ladenness. N.B.: one cannot accuse him of making an unacceptable rigid separation of theory and observation. >Observation. Ad. 1. Vs: that invalidates the first objection Ad. 2. Vs: Boyd: it would be a miracle if our theory-loaded methods worked, although the theories proved to be wrong. There is no explanation for scientific realism. Ad. 3. Vs: Horwich I 494 M. Williams: this is not VsScientific realism but VsPutnam: PutnamVsBoyd: arguments such as those of Boyd establish a causal role for the scientific concept. BoydVsPutnam: they do not do that at all: "true" is only a conventional expression, which does not add any explanatory power to scientific realism. Truth/explanation/realism/Boyd/M. Williams: explaining the success of our methods by the truth of our theories boils down to say that the methods with which we investigate particles work because the world consists of such particles that are more or less the way we think. Cf. >Redundancy theory. Conclusion: but it makes no difference whether we explain this success (of our methods) by the truth of the theories or by the theories themselves! M. Williams pro deflationism: so we need no substantial concept of truth. >Deflationism. Horwich I 494 Truth/M.Williams: truth has no substantial role - and no explanatory role: no difference whether we explain success by truth of theory or by theory itself (pro deflationism) Scientific Realism/M. Williams: some might object that according to the scientific realism our present theories are not true in one way or another, but simply and literally true. M. Williams: that can be, but even the deflationist truth is in a sense realistic, because it does not insist on reconstructing the scientific concept epistemically. Horwich I 495 Anti-Realism/Boyd: (BoydVsAnti-Realism/BoydVsDummett): two types: a) "empirical" thesis that theories must be re-interpreted instrumentalistically b) "constructivist" thesis (Kuhn): that the world must be constructed from the theoretical tradition of the scientific community >Literal truth, >Bare truth. M. Williams: if that means that objects are not simply "given", then practically everyone is constructivist today. Deflationism/M. Williams: deflationism does not have to face any version of constructivism. >Constructivism. Boyd/M. Williams: his scientific realism does not ask whether a substantial explanation is necessary in terms of "correspondence." His realism is more "empirical" (in Kant's sense) than "transcendental". It is not concerned with truth but with empirical relations between truths. >Empiricism, >Correspondence. |
Boyd I Richard Boyd The Philosophy of Science Cambridge 1991 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Rules | Habermas | III 148 Rules/Habermas: For example, rules of operation (e. g. calculation rules) have no explanatory power; following them does not mean, as in the case of following rules of action, that the actor refers to something in the world and orients himself/herself towards claims of validity that are linked to motivational reasons for action. >Addition, >Quaddition, >Rule following, >Kripkes' Wittgenstein, >Nonfactualism. IV 36 Rules/Habermas: based on the model by Mead (see Internalisation/Mead) we assume that A does not produce his utterance (gesture, symbol) with the intention of following a rule and not in the expectation that the listener or listeners recognize the utterance as conforming to the rules. >Internalization/Mead. Behavioural expectations have only prognostic meaning, the conventional meaning component is missing. This means that expectations can be disappointed, but incorrect behavior cannot be recognized. According to Mead, the interaction works up to here through a mutual anticipation of reactions. (1) IV 39 Only when context-dependence has been overcome does the symbolic use of expressions or gestures of interaction occur. According to Mead, we can then say that meaning identity results from conventionally defined rules of use for symbols. >Use, >Symbols, >Understanding. 1. G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society (Ed) Ch. W. Morris (German) Frankfurt 1969, S. 86. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Settlement Bargaining | Experimental Economics | Parisi I 85 Settlement bargaining/Experimental economics/Sullivan/Holt: One popular hypothesis - explored by many scholars but most often attributed to Priest and Klein (1984)(1) - is the idea that litigants may fail to settle their disputes when they form incompatible expectations about the prospects of a trial outcome.* Of present concern, an important series of experimental studies explore the idea that self-serving bias may cause litigants to develop incompatible beliefs about the strength of their respective sides of a legal dispute.** Methodology/study design: (see Loewenstein et al. 1993(9)) subjects were randomly paired and assigned roles as either plaintiff or defendant in a mock tort dispute. Each subject was then provided about 30 pages of case materials (testimony, reports, diagrams, etc.) describing the events and transactions alleged to support a cause of action. Both sides were given the same information; (...). Self-serving bias: Of the many experiments conducted using this basic framework, two in particular demonstrate the explanatory power of self-serving bias in driving settlement impasse. In the first such experiment, subjects were assigned roles and given time to read the case materials as above; but before engaging in any actual negotiation, they were first asked to guess what the judge’s secret damages award Parisi I 86 had been (Loewenstein et al., 1993)(9). These predictions were provided in strict confidence to the experimenter and were incentivized by small monetary rewards for guesses sufficiently close to the actual award. The collected data reveal strong evidence of self-serving bias (...). In a second experiment, the authors confirmed the causality of self-serving bias in explaining the systematic divergence of expectations by modifying the experimental design so that subjects read the case materials and provided damages estimates before being assigned their roles as plaintiff or defendant (Babcock et al., 1995)(10). In contrast to the previous results, predictions evinced no systematic bias by eventual role assignment in this experiment. Furthermore, after being assigned their litigation roles, the subjects that had interpreted the case information from an ex ante neutral posture achieved significantly higher rates of settlement than the subjects that had read the case information already aware of their litigation roles. Information asymmetry: Another popular hypothesis for the failure of litigants to achieve efficient settlement posits that verdict-relevant information is asymmetrically distributed between the parties to a legal dispute. Settlement inefficiencies are then explained by the strategic attempts of litigants to signal or extract private information during the litigation process (e.g. Bebchuk, 1984(11); Reinganum and Wilde, 1986(12)).*** Economic models of settlement bargaining under asymmetric information predict both settlement failure (i.e. trials) and settlement delay (i.e. late settlement) under appropriate conditions (see e.g. Spier, 1992(13), 1994(14)). A recent experiment on settlement bargaining clearly demonstrates both predictions of the asymmetric information hypothesis (Sullivan, 2016(15)). For in-court-bargaining see >Jurisdiction/Experimental economics. * This general model of settlement failure has been advocated by Gould (1973)(2) and Shavell (1982(3)) among many others. For an experimental study specific to Priest and Klein's selection hypothesis, see Stanley and Coursey (1990)(4). ** For details and additional background, see Babcock and Loewenstein (1997)(5). For alternative studies conducted with the same basic design, see Babcock, Loewenstein, and Issacharoff (1997)(6), Babcock and Pogarsky (1999)(7), and Pogarsky and Babcock (2001)(8). *** Kennan and Wilson (1993)(16) provide a detailed treatment of the role of asymmetric information in general bargaining models. For a survey of economic experiments on bargaining under asymmetric information, see Roth (1995)(17). 1. Priest, G. L. and B. Klein (1984). “The Selection of Disputes for Litigation.” Journal of Legal Studies 13(1): 1–55. 2. Gould, J. P. (1973). “The Economics of Legal Conflicts.” Journal of Legal Studies 2: 279–300. 3. Shavell, S. (1982). “Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs.” Journal of Legal Studies 11(1): 55–81. 4. Stanley, L. R. and D. L. Coursey (1990). “Empirical Evidence on the Selection Hypothesis and the Decision to Litigate or Settle.” Journal of Legal Studies 19(1): 145–172. 5. Babcock, L. and G. Loewenstein (1997). “Explaining Bargaining Impasse: the Role of Self-Serving Biases.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 11(1): 109–126. 6. Babcock, L., G. Loewenstein, and S. Issacharoff (1997). “Creating Convergence: Debiasing Biased Litigants.” Law & Social Inquiry 22(4): 913–925. 7. Babcock, L. and G. Pogarsky (1999). “Damage Caps and Settlement: a Behavioral Approach.” Journal of Legal Studies 28(2): 341–370. 8. Pogarsky, G. and L. Babcock (2001). “Damage Caps, Motivated Anchoring, and Bargaining Impasse.” Journal of Legal Studies 30(1): 143–159. 9. Loewenstein, G., S. Issacharoff, C. Camerer, and L. Babcock (1993). “Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining.” Journal of Legal Studies 22(1): 135–159. 10. Babcock, L., C. Camerer, G. Loewenstein, and S. Issacharoff (1995). “Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining.” American Economic Review 85(5): 1337–1343. 11. Bebchuk, L. A. (1984). “Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information.” RAND Journal of Economics 15(3): 404–415. 12. Reinganum, J. F. and L. L. Wilde (1986). “Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs.” RAND Journal of Economics 17(4): 557–566. 13. Spier, K. E. (1992). “The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation.” Review of Economic Studies 59(1): 93–108. 14. Spier, K. E. (1994). “Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-Shifting Rules.” RAND Journal of Economics 25(2): 197–214. 15. Sullivan, S. P. (2016). Why Wait to Settle? An Experimental Test of the Asymmetric Information Hypothesis, Journal of Law & Economics, forthcoming. 16. Kennan, J. and R. Wilson (1993). “Bargaining with Private Information.” Journal of Economic Literature 31(1): 45–104. 17. Roth, A. E. (1995). “Bargaining Experiments,” in J. H. Kagel and A. E. Roth, eds., Handbook of Experimental Economics, 253–348. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Sullivan, Sean P. and Charles A. Holt. „Experimental Economics and the Law“ In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Situations | Mischel | Corr I 28 Situations/Mischel/VsMischel/Funder: However, even though the past half-decade of social psychological literature has granted the lion’s share of explanatory power to situational forces, still missing is any real technology for defining, for characterizing, or measuring them. This lack has been noted repeatedly: Swann and Seyle (2005)(1) argue that certain current avenues of research (such as Mischel and Shoda’s (1999)(2) CAPS model) will not recognize their full potential until ‘the development of a comprehensive taxonomy of situations’ (Swann and Seyle 2005, p. 162). Mischel himself once suggested that describing differences in situations might be more productive than describing the behaviours of people in them (Mischel and Peake 1983)(3). See Situations/Asendorpf, >Situations/Funder. 1. Swann, W. B. and Seyle, C. 2005, Personality psychology’s comeback and its emerging symbiosis with social psychology, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 31: 155–65 2. Mischel, W. and Shoda, Y. 1999. Integrating dispositions and processing dynamics within a unified theory of personality: the cognitive-affective personality system. New York, NY: Guilford Press 3. Mischel, W. and Peake, P. K. 1983. Some facets of consistency: replies to Epstein, Funder, and Bem, Psychological Review 90: 394–402 Seth A Wagerman & David C. Funder, “Personality psychology of situations”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press. |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Statements | Hempel | II 139 Isolated Statement/Hempel: problem: if the isolated statement is excluded, then the same explanatory power will result from the theory T". E.g. (S1): (x) (P1x> (Qx P2x)) (which is not a logical truth): P1 and P2: observation predicate Q: theoretical construction. Carnap: this is an analytical statement because all its consequences are truths of logic. >Analyticity, >Theories, >Explanation, >Observation sentences, >Observation language, >Theoretical terms. |
Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II Carl Hempel Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950 German Edition: Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 |
| Theoretical Entities | Field | I 16 Theoretical entities/unobservable/mathematics/physics/Field: are theoretical entities like electrons justified by the same methodology as mathematical entities (numbers, etc.)? Quine-Putnam argument: many physical theories require fixation on numbers, but functions, etc. not on electrons. >Indispensability argument. Stronger: Electrons cannot be accepted without mathematics. N.B.: one could not say that the best explanations involving mathematical entities are weaker than those involving electrons, because the explanations would be the same. >Best Explanation, >Mathematical entities. I 261 Theoretical terms/observation/observation sentences/ontology/physics/Field: a theory which is assuming e.g. subatomic particles can be observing-wise equivalent to one which does not assume it. - That is, the theoretical entities can be eliminated for observation sets. Then the theory has less explanatory power. Mathematical entities: are not so easy to eliminate. --- III 7 Theoretical entities/physics/unobservable/utility/Field: theoretical entities play a role in strong theories from which we can derive a large number of phenomena. - ((s) Phenomena, predictions, observations: are derivable from physical entities, not from mathematical entities). >Theoretical entities, >Observations, >Phenomena. III 8 A theory without e.g. subatomic particles: would not have simple principles. If a theory without theoretical entities produced the same consequences as one with theoretical entities, this theory could never be tested. >Measurements. III 14 Theoretical entities/Field: Theories about nobservable things are certainly not conservative. They lead to real new conclusions about observable things. - Unlike theories with mathematical entities. Mathematical entities are true-maintaining within nominalistic inferences. >Nominalism, cf. >Platonism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Theory of Mind | Baron-Cohen | Slater I 149 Theory of Mind/ToM/autism/false-belief task/Baron-Cohen: How does one demonstrate that an individual has the capacity to conceive mental states? Baron-Cohen et al. 1985)(1) children are told a story involving two dolls, Sally and Anne, playing with a marble. Sally puts the marble away in a basket, and leaves the room. In Sally’s absence, Anne takes the marble out and plays with it. Once she has finished playing, she puts the marble away in a box. Sally returns and the child is asked where Sally will look for the marble. The child passes the task if she answers that Sally will look where she first put the marble; the child fails the task if she answers that Sally will look in the box (where the marble really is). Two additional control questions are asked to make sure that the child understood the scenario: a reality question: “Where is the marble really?” and a memory question: “Where was the marble at the beginning?” Slater I 152 VsBaron-Cohen: 1) The ToM account does not provide a full account auf autism. 2) ToM deficits are not specific to autism, 3) ToM deficits are not universal in autism. There are now theories about the non-social features of autism, including restricted repertoire of interests, insistence on sameness, and peaks of abilities (e.g., enhanced rote memory, higher prevalence of savant skills, increased perception of pitch etc.). >Autism/psychological theories. Slater I 152 It is important to note, however, that these first two criticisms are problematic only If one considers that there ought to be a single explanation for all the symptoms found in ASD. Slater I 153 If (…) one considers, that such a unitary explanation is unlikely to exist, absence of specificity and lack of explanatory power for non-social features of autism are no longer issues. 1. Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A., & Frith, U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind.” Cognition, 21, 13—125. Coralie Chevallier, “Theory of Mind and Autism. Beyond Baron-Cohen et al’s. Sally-Anne Study”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| War | Waltz | Brocker I 623 War/Eyplanation/International Policy/Waltz: What explanations are there for the emergence of wars in international politics? Most explanatory approaches can be divided into three categories: a) human nature, b) the internal order of states, c) the structure of the international system. Ad a) Waltz calls these explanations "first level": such anthropological approaches have little scientific explanatory power. >Explanations, >Causal explanation. Ad b) "Second level": Explanations by the ruling orders of states cannot satisfactorily answer the causes of war: states have waged wars time and again in history - irrespective of their internal structure. This applied to democracies as well as authoritarian systems. Solution/Waltz: it must be the international political environment that has a lot to do with how states behave. (1) System competition/Waltz: thesis: the presence of different competing states constitutes an anarchic system in which the absence of rule between states promotes conflict and war between them. (2) >Conflicts, >Governance, >Peace. 1. Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, State and War, New York 1959, p. 122f. 2. Ibid. p. 184-185 Carlo Masala, „Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolWaltz I Kenneth N. Waltz Man,the State and War New York 1959 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
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| Best Explanation | Fraassen Vs Best Explanation | Field I 15 Principle of the Best Explanation/Field: Suppose we have a) certain beliefs about the "phenomena" that we do not want to give up b) this class of phenomena is large and complex c) we have a pretty good (simple) explanation that is not ad hoc and from which the consequences of the phenomena follow d) one of the assumptions in the explanation is assertion S and we are sure that no explanation is possible without S. Best Explanation: then we have a strong reason to believe S. False: "The phenomena are as they would be if explanation E was correct": As If/Field: As-if assertions that are piggyback passengers on true explanations may not be constructed as explanations themselves (at least not ad hoc). Then the principle is not empty: it excludes the possibility that we accept a large and complex set of phenomena as a brute fact. (van FraassenVsBest Explanation: 1980) Best Explanation/BE/Field: the best explanation often leads us to believe something that we could also test independently by observation, but also to beliefs about unobservable things, or unobservable beliefs about observable things. Observation: should not make a difference here! In any case, our beliefs go beyond what is observed. I 16 Important argument: if no test was done, it should make no difference in the status of the evidence between cases where an observation is possible and those where no observation is possible! A stronger principle of the best explanation could be limited to observable instances of belief. FieldVs: but that would cripple our beliefs about observable things and would be entirely ad hoc. Unobserved things: a principle could be formulated that allowed the inference on observed things - that have been unobserved so far! - while we do not believe the explanation as such. FieldVs: that would be even more ad hoc! I 25 VsBenacerraf: bases himself on an outdated causal theory of knowledge. I 90 Theory/Properties/Fraassen: theories have three types of properties: 1) purely internal, logical: axiomatization, consistency, various kinds of completeness. Problem: It was not possible to accommodate simplicity here. Some authors have suggested that simple theories are more likely to be true. FraassenVsSimplicity: it is absurd to suppose that the world is more likely to be simple than that it was complicated. But that is metaphysics. 2) Semantic Properties: and relations: concern the relation of theory to the world. Or to the facts in the world about which the theory is. Main Properties: truth and empirical adequacy. 3) pragmatic: are there any that are philosophically relevant? Of course, the language of science is context-dependent, but is that pragmatic? I 91 Context-Dependent/Context-Independent/Theory/Science/Fraassen: theories can also be formulated in a context-independent language, what Quine calls Def "External Sentence"/Quine. Therefore it seems as though we do not need pragmatics to interpret science. Vs: this may be applicable to theories, but not to other parts of scientific activity: Context-Dependent/Fraassen: are a) Evaluations of theories, in particular, the term "explained" (explanation) is radically context-dependent. b) the language of the utilization (use) of theories to explain phenomena is radically context-dependent. Difference: a) asserting that Newton’s theory explains the tides ((s) mention). b) explaining the tides with Newton’s theory (use). Here we do not use the word "explains". Pragmatic: is also the immersion in a theoretical world view, in science. Basic components: speaker, listener, syntactic unit (sentence or set of sentences), circumstances. Important argument: In this case, there may be a tacit understanding to let yourself be guided when making inferences by something that goes beyond mere logic. I 92 Stalnaker/Terminology: he calls this tacit understanding a "pragmatic presupposition". (FraassenVsExplanation as a Superior Goal). I 197 Reality/Correspondence/Current/Real/Modal/Fraassen: Do comply the substructures of phase spaces or result sequences in probability spaces with something that happens in a real, but not actual, situation? ((s) distinction reality/actuality?) Fraassen: it may be unfair to formulate it like that. Some philosophical positions still affirm it. Modality/Metaphysics/Fraassen: pro modality (modal interpretation of frequency), but that does not set me down on a metaphysical position. FraassenVsMetaphysics. I 23 Explanatory Power/Criterion/Theory/Fraassen: how good a choice is explanatory power as a criterion for selecting a theory? In any case, it is a criterion at all. Fraassen: Thesis: the unlimited demand for explanation leads to the inevitable demand for hidden variables. (VsReichenbach/VsSmart/VsSalmon/VsSellars). Science/Explanation/Sellars/Smart/Salmon/Reichenbach: Thesis: it is incomplete as long as any regularity remains unexplained (FraassenVs). |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Best Explanation | Cartwright Vs Best Explanation | I 4 VsBest Explanation/BE/Cartwright: the falsity of the fundamental laws is a direct consequence of their explanatory power. And that is precisely what speaks against the conclusion regarding the best explanation (CartwrightVsAbduction/CartwrightVsPeirce, CartwrightVsBest Explanation). Tradition by BE: skepticism, idealism, positivism. I 89 Theoretical entities/Best explanation/BE/Cartwright: arguments VsBE have no effect on the assumption of theoretical entities, for explanations which assume theoretical entities are causal explanations. BE: are not causal explanations, but theoretical explanations. I 90 Redundancy/Explanation/Truth/Duhem: (see above) because there are always alternative explanations, truth must be independent from the satisfaction through explanations. Duhem/Cartwright: his argument is sometimes read epistemically: we cannot know which ones of several alternative laws are true, yet they are ultimately incompatible. CartwrightVs: this is a misreading. Because this is a general characteristic of our knowledge and does not reflect the specialty in Duhem’s attack DuhemVsBest Explanation. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Boyd, R. | Putnam Vs Boyd, R. | Williams II 492 Scientific Realism/Richard Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd's defense of scientific realism is much more complex than what we have considered so far: Williams II 493 Is a substantial (explanatory) truth concept necessary? Boyd: more indirect approach than Putnam: the (approximate) truth of our theories explains the instrumental reliability of our methods. Method/Boyd: is not theory neutral! On the contrary, because they are formed by our theories, it is their truth that explains the success of the methods. Boyd/M. Williams: thus it turns a well-known argument on its head: BoydVsPositivism. Positivism/Theory: Thesis: the observing language must be theory neutral. The methodological principles likewise. IdealismVsPositivism: VsTheory Neutrality. E.g. Kuhn: the scientific community determines the "facts". Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd turns the >theory ladenness of our methodological judgments very cleverly into the base of his realism. Thesis: Methods that are as theory-laden as ours would not work if the corresponding theories were not "approximately true in a relevant way". Point: thus he cannot be blamed of making an unacceptably rigid separation between theory and observation. Ad. 1) Vs: this invalidates the first objection Ad. 2) Vs: Boyd: it would be a miracle if our theory-laden methods functioned even though the theories proved to be false. For scientific realism, there is nothing to explain here. Ad. 3) Vs: Williams II 494 M. Williams: this is not VsScientific Realism, but VsPutnam: PutnamVsBoyd: arguments like that of Boyd do not establish a causal explanatory role for the truth concept. BoydVsPutnam: they don't do that: "true" is only a conventional expression which adds no explanatory power to the scientific realism. Truth/Explanation/Realism/Boyd/M. Williams: explaining the success of our methods with the truth of our theories boils down to saying that the methods by which we examine particles work, because the world is composed of such particles that are more or less the way we think. Conclusion: but it makes no difference whether we explain this success (of our methods) by the truth of the theories or by the theories themselves! M. Williams pro Deflationism: so we do not need a substantial truth concept. Putnam I (c) 80 Convergence/Putnam: there is something to the convergence of scientific knowledge! Science/Theory/Richard Boyd: Thesis: from the usual positivist philosophy of science merely follows that later theories imply many observation sentences of earlier ones, but not that later theories must imply the approximate truth of the earlier ones! (1976). Science/Boyd: (1) terms of a mature science typically refer (2) The laws of a theory that belongs to a mature science are typically approximately true. (Boyd needs more premises). I (c) 81 Boyd/Putnam: the most important thing about these findings is that the concepts of "truth" and "reference" play a causally explanatory role in epistemology. When replacing them in Boyd with operationalist concept, for example, "is simple and leads to true predictions", the explanation is not maintained. Truth/Theory/Putnam: I do not only want to have theories that are "approximately true", but those that have the chance to be true. Then the later theories must contain the laws of the earlier ones as a borderline case. PutnamVsBoyd: according to him, I only know that T2 should imply most of my observation sentences that T1 implies. It does not follow that it must imply the truth of the laws of T1! I (c) 82 Then there is also no reason why T2 should have the property that we can assign reference objects to the terms of T1 from the position of T2. E.g. Yet it is a fact that from the standpoint of the RT we can assign a reference object to the concept "gravity" in the Newtonian theory, but not to others: for example, phlogiston or ether. With concepts such as "is easy" or "leads to true predictions" no analogue is given to the demand of reference. I (c) 85/86 Truth/Boyd: what about truth if none of the expressions or predicates refers? Then the concept "truth value" becomes uninteresting for sentences containing theoretical concepts. So truth will also collapse. PutnamVsBoyd: this is perhaps not quite what would happen, but for that we need a detour via the following considerations: I (c) 86 Intuitionism/Logic/Connectives/Putnam: the meaning of the classical connectives is reinterpreted in intuitionism: statements: p p is asserted p is asserted to be provable "~p" it is provable that a proof of p would imply the provability of 1 = 0. "~p" states the absurdity of the provability of p (and not the typical "falsity" of p). "p u q" there is proof for p and there is proof for q "p > q" there is a method that applied to any proof of p produces proof of q (and proof that this method does this). I (c) 87 Special contrast to classical logic: "p v ~p" classical: means decidability of every statement. Intuitionistically: there is no theorem here at all. We now want to reinterpret the classical connectives intuitionistically: ~(classical) is identical with ~(intuitionist) u (classical) is identified with u (intuitionist) p v q (classical) is identified with ~(~p u ~q)(intuitionist) p > q (classical) is identified with ~(p u ~q) (intuitionist) So this is a translation of one calculus into the other, but not in the sense that the classical meanings of the connectives were presented using the intuitionistic concepts, but in the sense that the classical theorems are generated. ((s) Not translation, but generation.) The meanings of the connectives are still not classical, because these meanings are explained by means of provability and not of truth or falsity (according to the reinterpretation)). E.g. Classical means p v ~p: every statement is true or false. Intuitionistically formulated: ~(~p u ~~p) means: it is absurd that a statement and its negation are both absurd. (Nothing of true or false!). |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM I Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Carnap, R. | Hempel. Vs Carnap, R. | II 139 Isolated Statements/Hempel: we could establish a criterion for the elimination of isolated statements: Def (4.1) a theoretical system is cognitively significant iff. it is partially interpreted up to at least the degree that none of its primitive statements is an isolated statement. Vs: but that can wrongly exclude well-supported statements. E.g. a system contains the primitive statement (S1) (S1) (x)(P1x > (Qx P2x) wherein P1 and P2 are observation predicates while "Q" is supposed to be a theoretical construction (see above). Now S1 is not a truth or falsity of formal logic. And if further S1 is excluded from the set of primitive statements of T, then the system T’, which is thus obtained, has exactly the same systematic i.e. the same explanatory power as T. The method may be too strict. S1 is an E.g. for what Carnap calls analytical statements! (Of course, it is not a truth of formal logic). Reason: all their consequences are truths of formal logic. II 140 HempelVsCarnap: E.g. Suppose our system T contained the additional statement (S2) (x) (P3x> (Qx P4x)) wherein P3 and P4 are additional observation predicates. From the standpoint that "any bilateral reduction statement is analytical" (Carnap), S2 would then be as analytical as S1. Still, the two statements taken together contain non-analytical consequences that are expressible solely in terms of observation predicates: (O) (x)(~(P1x u P2x u P3x u ~P4x) u ~(P1x u ~P2x u P3x u P4x)). We would hardly want to alow the consequence that the conjunction of two analytical statements may be synthetic. Analyticity/HempelVsCarnap: if the concept can be applied to statements of interpreted deductive systems at all, then it must be relativized with respect to the present theoretical context. It must also be put into perspective with view to the rules of the language at hand. II 141 Isolated Statement/Hempel: if we apply the other strategy and discard S1 as isolated statements, we arrive at an analogous conclusion. Whether a statement is isolated or not depends on the linguistic frame and theoretical context. |
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| Causal Theory | Verschiedene Vs Causal Theory | Davidson II 107 Causal explanations owe their explanatory power to the laws from which they can be derived. (GlüerVs: that is imprecise: If there is no corresponding law, the explanatory power of the statement is not in question, but wrong). |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Cognition Theory | Searle Vs Cognition Theory | I 8 SearleVsCognition Psychology: Black Box, the cognitive scientists repeat the worst mistake of the behaviorists: they insisted to examine only objectively observable phenomena. So they left the essential characteristics of the mind aside. In the big black box they only found a lot of small black boxes. I 217 cognition theory: Here it is claimed, we would have drawn a conclusion, when we look at a tree from one and then know that he has a back. SearleVsCognition theory: On the contrary, what we do is simply this: we see a tree as a real tree. The background is not a control system. I 222 SearleVs Cognitive Science/VsCognition: the basic assumptions of cognitive science are wrong. Cognitive Science: neither the examination of the brain nor the study of consciousness is of interest or value. Although the cognitive mechanisms are actually in the brain, and some of them refer to the awareness a superficial expression, but we are interested in the intermediate level, where actual cognitive processes happen, which are inaccessible to the consciousness. These processes are not only factually special principle unconsciously. Typical representatives: Chomsky, Marr, Fodor. I 256 Explanation/SearleVsCognitivism: Thesis: many of our cognitive science explanations do not have the explanatory power, we attach to them. To save them, we will have to make a reversal of its logical structure: as it took place during the transition from pre-Darwin biology to the biology à la Darwin. I 256/257 The brain produces states of consciousness, and that is all. As for the mind, this is already the whole story. There are the blind neurophysiological processes and there is consciousness, otherwise however there is nothing. No rule-following, no mental information processing, no unconscious inferences, no mental models, no original drafts, no two and a half dimensional images, no language of the mind, and no universal grammar. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Covering Law | Hempel. Vs Covering Law | Schurz I 224 Potential Explanation/Hempel: here, merely the logical consistency of the premises is required. This is important when it comes to assessing hypotheses regarding their explanatory power (>best explanation). Covering Law/Dray/Schurz: (Dray 1957): Simplest case of a deductive-nomological explanation: here, antecedent and explanandum are implicatively connected by a single law. logical form: (x)(Ax › E.g.), Aa/Ea. HempelVsDray/HempelVsCovering Law: its own model includes more complex statements, one E.g. planetary positions, which can be explained by initial conditions plus natural laws. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Deflationism | Field Vs Deflationism | I 102 Applicability/Mathematics/VsDeflationism: Problem: (see above): Deflationism cannot explain the benefits of the proof theory without having to assume it truth ((s) and thus the existence of mathematical entities (ME). Two attempts at a solution:. 1) there may be a nominalist proof theory which is just as good as the Platonic one. But that would only be a change of subject, as long as nothing more is explained. 2) trying to the explain Platonic proof th. without assuming that it is true. Field II 126 VsDeflationism/Field: 1) Vs: if one simply accepts the T-sentences, that has nothing to do with the content. ((s) Due to equivalence which requires only equal truth values). So the language is cut off from the world. E.g. "There are gravitational waves" is true iff there are gravitational waves has, disquotationally seen, nothing to do with gravitational waves. So we should have a connection between our use of the term "gravitational waves" and gravitational waves, regardless of the scheme. DeflationismVsVs/Field: but Deflationism allows that precisely: it allows for facts that II 127 Refer sentences on gravitational waves regardless of the disquotational truth. E.g. laws of physics. The use is not the only fact that exists here. 2) VsDeflationism/Field: (most important): it cannot explain the explanatory power of the truth conditions E.g. for explanation of behavior, or the explanation of how far behavior is successful. 3) VsDeflationism/Field: it cannot distinguish between a vague and non-vague discourse or between a discourse which is based on facts and one that is not. The following are less important and are discussed in the following sections. 4) VsDeflationism: it cannot handle truth attributions in other languages. 5) VsDeflationism: it gives "true" false modal properties (s) "necessarily true" or "contingently true"). 6) VsDeflationism: it cannot handle ambiguity, indices and demonstratives. 7) VsDeflationism: it cannot explain how we learn from others. FieldVsVs: 4 - 7 per Deflationism. Here my version of Deflationism is radical. II 135 Index Words/Demonstratives/Truth Conditions/Deflationism/Field: we must distinguish two stages of sentences that contain them: 1) focuses on sentence types: there must be no unrelativized T predicate here E.g. a sentence type like "I do not like her" has no truth value. Solution: we can associate a truth value corresponding to a pair of objects : then the sentence is true relative to if b dislikes x. Field: this is not "strictly disquotational", because it involves a grammatical change. 2) Then we need access of unrelativized truth for sentence tokens. That means we must assign an object to each index element. I/Now: is no problem here: that’s "the author of the utterance" or "the time of the utterance". But that is not possible with the others. VsDeflationism: for assigning "this" or "he" we need semantic terms, i.e. it does not work in a purely disquotational way. II 137 Learning/VsDeflationism/Field: Thesis: you need inflationism to explain the learning from others, because we assume that most of what other people tell us is true. ((s) so it is purely disquotational, not merely a repetition, or "true, if the sentence is repeated, because you do not learn meanings from repetition, you need something like paraphrases.). VsDeflationism/Field: 1) with learning some kind of translation must be involved so that a certain inter-personal synonymy is presumed in the inference. 2) even purely disquotational truth + synonymy is not sufficient: E.g. My friend Charley said that in Alabama (a southern state) there was a feet of snow (which never happens). II 138 VsDeflationism/Solution: the reformulated inference works, because a more substantial property is attributed than merely disquotational truth. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Disquotation | Putnam Vs Disquotation | Putnam VII 431 Truth/Putnam: the only reason one can have to deny that truth is a property would be that one is physicalist or phenomenalist. Or maybe a culture-relativist. Truth/property/Putnam: only reductionist theories deny that truth is a property. (PutnamVsDisquotationalism: >Disquotationalism). Truth/Putnam: is a property - >PutnamVsDeflationism - Rorty: (R. Rorty, The Mirror of Nature): truth is no property. --- Horwich I 455 Divine perspective/outside/PutnamVsGods perspective/Rorty: Putnam is amused as James and Dewey about such attempts. Rorty: but he has a problem when it comes to PutnamVsDisquotationalism: this one is too reductionist, to positivistic, to "behaviorist" for him ("transcendental Skinnerism"). Truth/Putnam: if a philosopher says, truth is something other than electricity because there is probably room for a theory of electricity but not for a truth theory, Horwich I 456 and that the knowledge of the truth conditions was everything what one could know about the truth, then he denies that truth is a property. Thus, there is then no property of the correctness or accuracy ((s)> Deflationism, PutnamVsDeflationism, PutnamVsGrover. PutnamVs: that is, to deny that our thoughts are thoughts and our assertions assertions. Theory/existence/reduction/Putnam/Rorty: Putnam assumes here that the only reason to deny is that one needs a theory for an X, to say that the X is "nothing but Y". ((s) eliminative reductionism). PutnamVsDavidson: Davidson must show that assertions can be reduced to noise. Then the field linguist must reduce acts on motions. Davidson/Rorty: but he does not say that assertions were nothing but noise. Instead: Truth/explanation/Davidson: unlike electricity truth is no explanation for something. ((s) A phenomenon is not explained that a sentence which it claims, is true). Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 --- Horwich I XIV VsDeflationism/Horwich: provides no explicit truth-definition, but is only based on a scheme (disquotational scheme). Horwich I XVI Truth/simple/unanalysable/Russell/Moore/Cartwright/Horwich: if truth is unanalysable basic concept (VsDeflationism), then it is completely independent of awareness. That is, truth gets something metaphysical. Problem: then we cannot assume that the propositions which we believe, have this property. Then the skepticism follows. --- Horwich I 457 Correctness/PutnamVsDavidson: although he shares his distaste for intentionalist terms, (and therefore does not consider truth as an explanation), he nevertheless wishes a representation of what kind of statement it is, to be correct. Putnam/Rorty: he wants that because he is afraid that the "inside view" of the language game where "true" is an appreciative term - is weakened, if it is not philosophically supported. Because: If language is only production of noise - without normative element - then the noises that we utter are nothing but "an expression of our subjectivity". Normativity/standard/language/Putnam: why should there be no normative elements in the language game? That would be the inside view of the language game. RortyVsPutnam: thus it still depends on a synoptic God's perspective to be brought together in the inner view and outside view of the language game. Norm/JamesVsPutnam/DeweyVsPutnam: we cannot take such a God's perspective. That is, we cannot solidify our standards in that we support them metaphysically or scientifically. Truth/appreciation/PragmatismVsPlato/DeweyVsPlato/RortyVsPutnam: we should not repeat Plato's error, and interpret expressions of appreciation as the names of esoteric entities. --- Williams II 497 Belief/PutnamVsDavidson: that most are true, is not guaranteed by the methodology of interpretation, because the stock of beliefs is constantly changing. Therefore, we can only give a sense (ii) if we explain the reliability of learning and that can only do the realism. Causal theory/correspondence/Putnam: the reliability of learning: would represent us as reliable signal transmitters. What would the truth theory add? It announced that the sentence is true iff the condition exists. This is the correspondence, which is involved in the causal theory, it is precisely the correspondence that is established by the truth definition. Deflationism/correspondence/M. Williams: the minimal correspondence is also available for him. That is, Putnam's argument does not guarantee physical correspondence or another substantive theory. Williams II 502 Truth/Putnam: must be substantial ((s) explanatory role, truth as a property, PutnamVsDeflationism). Otherwise it leads to cultural relativism. PutnamVsCultural relativism: an extreme culture-relativist may himself not even consider a thinker or speaker, as opposed to a mere noise maker. ((s) speaking not distinguishable from sound). This is mental suicide. PutnamVsDisquotationalism: has no explanatory power, unless something is said about the concept of assertion. M. WilliamsVsPutnam: do we need that? Putnam: to be able to view ourselves as thinkers, speaking must be more than noise-making and then we must be able to explain to ourselves what it means to understand a sentence. PutnamVsmetaphysical Realism/M. Williams: although Putnam finds this picture sympathetic, he prefers to explain meaning in terms of situation appropriate use. Problem: that we do not stop that there are various inguistic practices ((s) different communities) and therefore different ways of justification. Solution: ideal justification. And that is how Putnam understands truth. Truth/PutnamVsDisquotationalism: if we say nothing about the truth in terms of assertibility conditions, we do not get a concept of objective truth, which allows the cultural relativism to escape. Then we identified truth implicitly with assertibility relative to the norms of a particular community. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Extensionality | Simons Vs Extensionality | I 116 Extensionality/Simons: we leave extensionality with the rejection of ≤. I 117 ≤: the relation ≤ is not antisymmetric, it is a partial order, that means it is reflexive and transitive. In terms of it one can define a symmetric predicate: Def coincidence of parts/mereology/spelling/Simons: SD16 x ≤≥ y ≡ x ≤ y u y ≤ x. Coinciding individuals are perceptually indistinguishable for their period of coincidence. They are in superposition. Def superposition/mereology/Simons: they occupy the same place at the same time. Question: (see below): do all superposed objects coincide mereologically? By rejecting the proper parts principle we receive an abundance of descriptions and explanatory power. SimonsVsExtensionality: extensionality is too ascetic for mereology. I 251 Part/SimonsVsExtensionality/VsCEM/VsExtensional Mereology/Simons: we see which abundance we have to give up if we want to remain extensional, because now we have three concepts of part instead of one, which throws together the SSP and there may be even more. CEM/Extensional Mereology/Simons: extensional mereology is actually a substantive thesis: individuals who are of the same material are identified. Coincidence-Principle/Simons: 1. For the two more powerful coincidence concepts of identity and the strong coincidence we refuse it. 2. For weak coincidence we allow it, provided we consider only superimposed material individuals. Strictly weak inclusion: e.g. there is no reason to deny that Caesar's heart is weakly included in the matter of Caesar. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Hume, D. | Bigelow Vs Hume, D. | I 226 Non-modal theory/Laws of Nature/LoN/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: most non-modal theories of the LON descended from Hume. Then we can assume nomic necessity to be a relative necessity without falling into a circle. Important argument: then we can just assume nomic necessity as a relative necessity and rely on it being based on an independent approach to laws! Explanation: So it makes sense to make use of laws to explain nomic necessity, rather than vice versa. And that’s much less obscure than modal arguments. I 227 BigelowVsVs: modal explanations are not so mysterious. BigelowVsHume: Hume’s theories are unable to explain these non-modal properties of the laws, they have less explanatory power. I 233 "Full generality"/"Pure" generality/Hume/BigelowVsHume/Bigelow/Pargetter: may not contain any reference to an individual: This is too weak and too strong: a) too strong: E.g. Kepler’s laws relate to all the planets, but therefore also to an individual, the sun. b) too weak: it is still no law. E.g. that everything moves towards the earth’s center. I 235 LoN/BigelowVsHume/Bigelow/Pargetter: in our opinion, it has nothing to do with them, E.g. whether they are useful, or whether they contradict our intuitions. Counterfactual conditional/Co.co/LoN/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: for the Humean, Counterfactual Conditional are circular, if they are to represent LoN. We ourselves only use a Counterfactual Conditional when we have recognized something as a law! When we ask ourselves whether something is a law, we ask ourselves not whether it fulfils a Counterfactual Conditional. I 236 HumeVsBigelow/Bigelow/Pargetter: our modal approach for LoN is circular. BigelowVsVs: it is not! BigelowVsHume: most of Hume’s theories of the LON are circular themselves, with one exception: the theory that Lewis reads out of Ramsey. Ramsey/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: this theory is based on the logical relations of laws among each other (coherence). (Ramsey 1929, 1931, Lewis 1973a, Mellor 1980). I 237 BigelowVsLewis/BigelowVsHume/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problem: if theories are sets of propositions, propositions must not be sets of possible worlds! For then the best theory for a possible worlds would have to be an axiom: the one-class of this possible worlds All facts of the world are then theorems of the axiom. There would be only one law for each world. No two possible worlds would have a law in common. I 267 BigelowVsHume: went too far in his rejection of necessity in laws. But not far enough in his rejection of the necessity approach to causality. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Maxwell J.C. | Cartwright Vs Maxwell J.C. | I 4 Explanation/Truth/van Fraassen/Cartwright: provocative question: (The Scientific Image): "What has explanatory power to do with truth?" Challenge/Fraassen: it is to be shown that if x explains y and y is true, then x should also be true. Cartwright: this may well apply to the case of causal explanations, but only then! I 5 And this kind of declaration only applies when the process is taking place! E.g. Radiometer: (closed glass container with windmill wings, one side black, one white, William Crookes 1853). When light falls onto the container, the blades rotate. Thesis 1: light pressure. (Vs: this proved to be insufficient). Thesis 2: rotation caused by movement of the gas molecules in the container. MaxwellVs: the molecules move in all directions. Solution/Maxwell: instead: different heat levels produced disordered (tangential) pull that let the gas move along the surface. (...). I 6 CartwrightVsMaxwell: he uses the Boltzmann equation and the continuity equation as a fundamental laws, both of which I do not believe. I 154 CartwrightVsMaxwell: the medium that he describes is merely a model, it does not exist anywhere in a radiometer. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Various Authors | Fraassen Vs Various Authors | Hacking I 93 Best explanation/Fraassen: should be rejected, even if one accepted theories! Theories can clarify something and explain it, but they are not literally true. Hacking I 95 Def best explanation/Peirce: "conclusion to the best explanation". Method of hypothesis or abduction. When there is an explanation that makes otherwise unintelligible things understandable, this should probably be right. Peirce later took refrain. Fraassen I 110 Explanation/James Greeno/Fraassen: makes a proposal in relation to statistical theories: A universal explanation is less problematic and more relevant than an assessment of knowledge with respect to individual cases (individual events). (FN 17). Greeno/Fraassen: adopts as a model of a theory one that assumes a single probability space Q as correct plus two partitions (or ranges of variables) of which one is the explanandum and the other is the explanans. I 111 E.g. sociology cannot explain why a particular rich kid stole a car in San Francisco, but it can claim factors such as income and residential area as explanatory factors. Explanatory force: its level is measured brilliantly in Greeno: I: measures the information that the theory supplies for M: variable for the explanandum on the basis of S: the explanans. Maximum: (of explanatory power) is reached when all related probabilities P (Mi I Sj) are 0 or 1 (the deductive nomological case) and Minimum: is reached if the related probabilities are 0, namely, when S and M are statistically independent of each other. FraassenVsGreeno: that encounters the same old problems: E.g. Suppose S and M describe the behavior of barometers and storms: Suppose the probability that the barometer falls (M1) is equal to the probability that there will be a storm (S1). Namely 0.2 and the probability that there will be a storm, given that the barometer falls is equal to the probability that the barometer falls, given that there will be a storm, namely = 1! In this case, the variable I (information) is at its maximum. Problem: it is also there if we swap storm and barometer!. Explanation: we have none for either case. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
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Reference |
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| Theoretical Entities | Pro | Field III 8 FieldVsFraassen: Field per theoretical entities - due to greater explanatory power in explaining the phenomena - Cartwright ditto. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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Reference |
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| Laws | Cartwright, N. | Cartwright: I have three connected arguments. Thesis 1: The obvious explanatory power of fundamental laws does not speak for their truth. Thesis 2: The way in which fundamental laws are used in explanations speaks for their falsity. We explain by ceteris paribus laws by merging causes by approximations that exceed what the fundamental laws dictate. Thesis 3: The appearance of truth comes from a bad explanatory model, I 4 that connects laws directly to reality. Cartwright instead: Def "Simulacrum-View"/Cartwright: from explanation: Thesis: the path from theory to reality goes like this: theory > model > phenomenological law. Phenomenological Laws/Cartwright: are true of the objects of reality (or can be). Fundamental Laws/Cartwright: are true only of the objects in the model. I 10 Asymmetry: Causal laws are asymmetric: Effect and cause cannot be interchanged. - On the other hand symmetrical: Laws of Association/Hume: e.g. length of shadow/height of mast. - Fraassen: Thesis: The explanatory asymmetries are not real. There is no fact about what explains what. CartwrightVsFraassen - Association/CartwrightVsHume: Association is not sufficient to distinguish between effective and ineffective strategies to fight malaria. I 51 Laws of Nature/Science/Cartwright: Thesis: There are no laws for cases where theories overlap. |
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| Action-Th. | Davidson, D. | II 86 ff Reason/Cause/Action Theory/Explanation/Davidson/Glüer: Reasons are causes: Two relations: 1. logical-conceptual 2. causal. Both only ensure the combined explanatory power. II 91 ff Action/Event/Davidson/Glüer: Actions are events in the world of material objects and as such can be described differently. II 105 ff Event/Action/DavidsonVs "logical-connection thesis": Thesis: Explanations of action can be interpreted as singular causal statements. I.e. in contrast to the "logical-connection-thesis" as statements about two distinct events. |
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| Explanation | Fraassen, B. van | I 23 Explanatory Power/criterion/theory/Fraassen: how good is explanatory power as a criterion for choosing a theory? In any case, it is one. Fraassen: thesis: the unlimited demand for explanation leads to the inevitable demand for hidden variables. (VsReichenbach/VsSmart/VsSalmon/VsSellars). Science/Explanation/Sellars/Smart/(Salmon/Reichenbach: thesis: it is imperfect as long as any regularity remains unexplained. (FraassenVs). I 100 Thesis: explanation is not an additional property beyond empirical adequacy. I 134 Def Explanation/Fraassen: Thesis: An explanation is not the same as a proposition or list of propositions, nor an argument, but an answer to a why-question. Even if explanations are propositions, of course. A theory of explanation must therefore be a theory of why-questions. I 213 Explanation/Regularity/Fraassen: Thesis: are only regularities of observable phenomena that must be explained! |
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| Explanation | Searle, J.R. | I 256 Explanation / SearleVs cognitivism: many of our cognitive scientific explanations do not even have the explanatory power that we attach to you. If we try to save them, we will need to make a reversal of their logical structure as it took place during the transition from pre Darwinian biology to biology à la Darwin. |
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