Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Conditional Wright I 54
Minimalism/logic/conditional/Wright, Cripsin: we cannot ask for more than for a statement to obviously appear as a conditional. Wright: there are no "deeper" notions of a "real" conditional tense" or "deeper" notion of an assertoric content.
>Content, >Assertion, >Assertibility.
For our purposes, surface features suffice, even though it were certainly be possible to fix the corresponding features.
 ((s) In particular, no metaphysical assumptions about a "true-making realm" are necessary.)
>Truthmakers.
Expression theory/Wright: must make a distinction between genuine and merely apparent conditionals:
e.g. genuine conditional: If it rains tomorrow, the visit is canceled
e.g. apparent conditional: If you behave badly, the visit is canceled.
Cf. >Truth evaluability.

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

Content Wright I 45
Content/"Deep Content"/"Deep Reference"/Wright: can be masked or simulated by syntax. (negations, conditionals). >Expression Theory.
((s) For the expression theory the question is: do the sentences have content or is it only simulated syntactically?)
>Syntax, >Signs, >Meaning, >Reference.
Common basis of realism and anti-realism: that this is not the case!
>Realism, >Anti-realism.
 E.g. with Frege's numbers, there is no deep reference. The suitability of an expression to refer to one object depends on its syntax. It ensures that it can function as a singular term.
>Singular terms, >Numbers/Frege.
Then no more questions can be asked whether the object reference is successful. However, it is conceded that the appropriate contexts in which this is the case are true. (No "deep reference",or "deep content".)
I 44
Syntactic Surface Characteristics: it must be ensured that a sentence that contains a truth predicate can be embedded in conditionals and has significant negations. >Negation, >Truth-predicate.
Content/Wright: must satisfy discipline and surface syntax (e.g. conditional, negation) of a discourse. The thus secured content is enough to qualify a truth predicate (by platitudes).
>Discourse, >Platitudes.
I 157
Content/Wright: in conditions: is needed to prevent expressions like "whatever it takes" (> role/Wright, > circularity). - Solution: independence condition: fulfillment must be logically independent of the details of the extension of the terms (projectivistic terms such as color, morality, humor ) - then only terms within intensional operators - WrightVs provisional equations for moral discourse.
I 242f
Def wide cosmological role: (I 250) a content has a wide cosmological role iff the mention of facts of which it consists can occur at least in certain types of explanations of contingencies; explanations whose possibility is not only guaranteed by the minimum capacity for truth of the discourse. >Minimalism.
((s) Truth evaluability: this is about the question whether a truth value (true/false) can be attributed at all in some cases as e.g. moral judgments or assertions about the comical.)
E.g. thesis: morality has no wide cosmological role.
Wide cosmological role of content: we want to measure its reach for a discourse on the extent to which the provision of the various facts can potentially contribute to the explanation of all those things that have nothing or not directly something to do with our attitudes by which we conceive such facts as objects.
I 248
Cosmological role: explanation of meaning/content not from our attitudes. >Meaning, >Content, >Conventions, >Language community.

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008


The author or concept searched is found in the following controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Various Authors Wright Vs Various Authors I 256
Expression Theory/Wright: wants to persuade us to reclassify certain propositions in a theoretical framework of solid concepts of "real" assertions, "real" truth, etc., in order to convince us that mathematical propositions actually function as imperatives. Wittgenstein/WrightVsExpression Theory: but one can show that precisely this distinction between "genuine" truthful contents and "merely grammatical" assertions does not exist!
Rather, the merely grammatical ideas are the only general ideas, the truth and the assertoric content that we have!
Of course, a philosophical discourse can be motivated by making differences disappear.
I 257
But differences that merely call a philosophical picture into question must not have a significant influence on the integrity of the language game in question.

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008