Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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Entry
Reference
Introduction Strawson I 187
Term/expression/thing/introducing/Strawson: everything what is introduced by an expression in an uterance is a thing. Term: StrawsonVsQuine: here also non-linguistical, thing.
>Terms.
I 188
VsGeach: does not distinguish between the various types of introduction to the speech. - One can say, a statement says something about every thing that is inserted into it, not only about the things that have been introduced in a referring manner - (also on smoking) - "is wise" is purportedly introduced, Socrates is not. >Assertion, >Predicates/Geach, >Predicates/Strawson, >Predication/Geach.
I 192
But still no difference between assertive and facts-introductory mode, because the latter is also predicating.
I 193
Assertive mode primary.
I 194
Introduction: indicative verbal form: introduces thing in a statement - substantive: has no such implication can also introduce lists of things - VsFrege: is determined that terms cannot only be introduced non-substantively - hence the paradox that "is wise" is an object, not a term - (not introduced in the assertive mode).
I 196
StrawsonVsFrege: that the parts of the sentence only stick together by unsaturated is merely metaphorical - RamseyVsFrege: no reason to consider any part as unsaturated. >Unsaturated.
I 232ff
Particular/Introduction: by identifying description - so that speakers and hearers mean the same particular. >Particulars/Strawson.
I 234
Introductory description must not specify texture: E.g. the city in which I lived - but true empirical statement.
I 235
For universals nothing corresponding.
I 236
But no facts about the world but about the language - ((s) no truthmaker.)
I 238
When universals are introduced into language, no empirical certainty of truth of sentences needed.
I 239
Special case: if universal is not introduced through expression but through description, then confirmation trough empirical sentence necessary. - E.g. instead of "flu": "John's Disease". >Description, >Intension.
I 239f
Universal/particular/introduction: Class (1): (universal): expressions of which one (without empirical facts) cannot know what they introduce
class (2) (paricular) also without empirical fact possible to know what they introduce - both are incomplete
(1) presuppose implicit expressions, have factual weight
(2) have no factual weight.
I 241
Subject/predicate/thing/particular/universal: 3. Criterion: expressions introducing particulars can never be predicate expressions - Definition subject-expression: presents a fact by itself (complete)
Predicate A: incomplete "is married to John" is not a fact by itself.
I 242
E.g. "generosity is a more amiable virtue than intelligence" - "generosity" and "intelligence" do not present a covert joint fact.
I 242
General/individual: the affinity between the grammatical and the categorical criterion for subject/predicate distinction explains also the traditional concatenation of the two distinctions.
I 254ff
Introduction/particular: so far only quasi as quantification according to an empirical condition. >Quantification.
New/Strawson: other sense of introducing: introduction of a practice, to introduce particular in the 1st sense - then also
E1: introduces particular,
E2: classes of particulars.
Then prerequisite2 V2: class of things (or universals) which can be introduced. - Where is then the asymmetry between particular and universal?
I 258
Connection of the two theories: an EF1 of a particular of the relevant class, we can think in such a way that it is a fact of the v2 class v1.
I 263
Both theories are independend, but connectable.
I 259
Particular/Introduction: sentences in which certain types of particulars are introduced, cannot be traced back to those in which they do not occur. E.g. statements about Nations cannot be traced back in statements via people - but they have statements about people as a prerequisite2
Problem: What is at the end of the chain?
>Feature-universals.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Universals Strawson I 88
Universals/Strawson: E.g. repeated tone - same chord in various concert halls.
I 176
Universals/Strawson: Tradition: only universals and particular-universals (E.g. be-married to John) can be predicted. Particulars can never be predicted.
>Particulars/Strawson.
Cf. >Concept/Frege, >Object/Frege.
I 215
a) Type-universals: provides classification principle, does require none - E.g. generic names b) characterizing universals: E.g. verbs, adjectives: deliver classification-principle - only for previously classified particulars.
But also particulars themselves provide "principle of summary": E.g. Socrates as well as wisdom -> "attributive tie": (non-relational relation between particulars of different types).
I 216
Example of characterizing tie between Socrates and the universal death corresponds to the attributive tie between Socrates and his death - see copula/Strawson.
I 251
Universals/Quine/Strawson: should only appear as predicates. Pro "nominalism".
>Nominalism.
StrawsonVsQuine: the language terms of this analysis, already presuppose the existence of subject-expressions.
I 250
Essential feature-universals/essential feature-localizing findings/Strawson: E.g. it rains now - snow falls - here is water. No subject-predicate sentences: here no characterizing-universals, but types of material.
Also no type-universals. - This is the least to make any empirical statements.
Introduction with demonstrative does not require particulars.
>Introduction/Strawson.
E.g. Cat as an essential feature:
a) for the same cat,
b) for another cat.

I 277
Essential-feature-universal/essential feature-localizing/Strawson: the corresponding essential feature-findings actually introduce things - but are not subject terms or subject phrases - "here"/"now" set no limits - (even if they are quantifiable, "there is no point in time ").
I 279
Things are not introduced by space and time adverbs. >Essence.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993



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