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The author or concept searched is found in the following 34 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aggregate Capital | Economic Theories | Harcourt I 155 Aggregate capital/Economic theories/Harcourt: (…) once heterogeneity of capital goods is introduced, the parables based on jelly no longer necessarily apply. ((s) Here the (neoclassical) „parables“ again:) Harcourt I 122 (1) an association between lower rates of profits and higher values of capital per man employed; (2) an association between lower rates of profits and higher capital-output ratios; (3) an association between lower rates of profits and (through investment in more 'mechanized' or 'round-about' methods of production) higher sustainable steady states of consumption per head (up to a maximum); (4) that, in competitive conditions, the distribution of income between profit-receivers and wage-earners can be explained by a knowledge of marginal products and factor supplies. Harcourt I 156 In particular, it may no longer be argued that r equals the marginal product of 'capital' (even in an equilibrium situation), nor may the distribution of income be deduced from a knowledge of the elasticity of the FpF envelope alone. >Elasticity. Furthermore, we are now unable in general to start from the FpF envelope and derive an *as if, well-behaved, production function from it. This has led some writers to look elsewhere than to the concept and properties of an aggregate production function ('as if or real) and marginal productivity concepts to explain the distribution of income (…). Harcourt I 157 The backlash to this argument has been the contention that the existence or not of an aggregate production function (in the sense of a unique relationship between value capital per head and output per head) and marginal productivity relations in distribution theory are not one and the same thing, as Champernowne [1953-4](1) showed long ago. Bliss [1968b](2), for example - but he is only the leading species of a large genus - argues that if we assume equilibrium (a most important proviso) and price-taking, cost-minimizing, profit-maximizing behaviour under perfectly competitive conditions in linear models, factors as a matter of logic must receive their marginal products, suitably defined, even though an aggregate production function may not be shown to exist. The key points of the argument are two: 1) first, that we impose strict equilibrium assumptions; 2) secondly, that businessmen are profit-maximizers and price-takers. A subsidiary point is that in linear models, marginal products at points (corners) may only be defined as lying within a range that is given by the partial derivatives that lie on either side of them. Factors/revenues/costs: Within this range of indeterminancy, it is obvious that if any factor was not paid the value of its marginal product, a change in output consequent upon using more or less of it would add more to (or subtract less from) revenues than to (from) costs, so violating the assumptions that profits are maximized and that the economy is at equilibrium. (That the economy may not in fact get to an equilibrium position even if one can be shown to exist, that these relationships do not apply in out-of-equilibrium positions and that the real world is usually in the latter state, no one would deny.) Solow: Solow makes the same point as Bliss in several of his papers cited earlier, Solow [1962a(3), 1963b(4)] and Solow, Tobin, von Weizsacker, and Yaari [1966](5), where typical marginal productivity results are obtained without any reference to aggregate capital - or its marginal product. His latest statement may be found in his reply [1970(6)] to Pasinetti [1969](7). Having stated that he does not hold 'a peculiar version of "marginal-productivity" theory' - 'peculiar because it seems to insist (as a matter of principle, not of convenience) on aggregating the whole stock of capital into one number, and because it means by marginal productivity the derivative of net output with respect to the value of this stock of capital' (Solow [1970](6), p. 424) - he concludes his article as follows: Harcourt I 158 „. . . nobody is trying to slip over on [Pasinetti] a theory according to which the rate of profits is higher or lower according to whether the existing 'quantity of capital' is lower or higher, and as such represents a general technical property of the existing 'quantity of capital'. That is just what neoclassical capital theory in its full generality can do without.“ (pp. 427-8.) Garegnani/Pasinetti: Garegnani [1966(8), 1970a(9), 1970b](10) and Pasinetti [1969(7), 1970(12)] in particular, have come back strongly on this one (no suggestion of reswitching is implied). Garegnani points out that, in their formulation of marginal productivity theory, not all the neoclassical economists (early, late, or neo-neo) were either groping for or using an aggregate production function which could be interpreted 'as if it behaved like a well-behaved, one-commodity one. Thus its destruction both at an economy and at an industry level (which he demonstrates in his paper [1970a](10)) is not a conclusive refutation of the marginal productivity theory of value and distribution. 'Expressing the conditions of production of a commodity in terms of a production function with "capital" as a factor is a feature of only some versions of the traditional theory . . .' (Garegnani [1970a](10), p. 422.) He mentions Marshall and J. B. Clark 'who thought that the principle of substitution, drawn from a reformulation of the Malthusian theory of rent in terms of homogeneous land and "intensive" margins, could be applied without modification to labour and "capital".' But this transition foundered on the fact that 'capital' cannot be measured in a physical unit but must be measured as a value, one which, moreover, changes whenever r and w change, i.e. one which is not independent of distribution. Moreover, it changes in such a way as not to allow us to say that the marginal products of 'capital' and labour are equal to their respective rates of remuneration. All is not yet safe, because, Garegnani argues, 'traditional theory - reduced to its core as the explanation of distribution in terms of demand and supply-rests in fact on a single premise', what Pasinetti [1969](12), p. 519, calls 'an unobtrusive postulate': „This premise is that any change of system brought about by a fall in r must increase the ratio of 'capital' to labour in the production of the commodity: 'capital' being the value of the physical capital in terms of some unit of consumption goods, a value which is thought to measure the consumption given up or postponed in order to bring that physical capital into existence.“ (Pasinetti [1969](12), S. 519) >Capital demand/Garegnani. 1. Champernowne, D. G. [1953-4] 'The Production Function and the Theory of Capital: A Comment', Review of Economic Studies, xxi, S. 112-35 2. Bliss, C. J. [1968b] 'Rates of Return in a Linear Model', Cambridge: unpublished paper. 3. Solow, R. M. [1962a] 'Substitution and Fixed Proportions in the Theory of Capital', Review of Economic Studies, xxrx, pp. 207-18. 4. Solow, R. M. [1963b] 'Heterogeneous Capital and Smooth Production Functions: An Experimental Study', Econometrica, xxxi, pp. 623-45. 5. Solow, R. M., Tobin, J., von Weizsacker, C. C. and Yaari, M. [1966] 'Neoclassical Growth with Fixed Factor Proportions', Review of Economic Studies, xxxm, pp. 79-115. 6. Solow, R. M [1970] 'On the Rate of Return: Reply to Pasinetti. Economic Journal, LXXX, pp.423-8. 7. Pasinetti, L. L. [1969] 'Switches of Technique and the "Rate of Return" in Capital Theory', Economic Journal, LXXIX, pp. 508-31. 8. Garegnani, P. [1966] 'Switching of Techniques', Quarterly Journal of Economics,LXXX, pp. 554-67. 9. Garegnani, P. [1970a] 'Heterogeneous Capital, the Production Function and the Theory of Distribution', Review of Economic Studies, XXXVII (3), pp. 407-36. 10. Garegnani, P. [1970b] 'A Reply', Review of Economic Studies, XXXVII (3), p. 439. 11. Pasinetti, L. L. [1970] 'Again on Capital Theory and Solow's "Rate of Return" ', Economic Journal, LXXX, pp. 428-31. |
Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 |
| Alienation | Marx | Eco I 238 Alienation/MarxVsHegel/Eco: Hegel does not distinguish between externalization and alienation(voluntary/involuntary). >Alienation/Hegel. Eco: he could not, because as soon as the human objectifies himself in the world of the things he has created, in nature, which he has changed, a kind of inevitable tension arises, whose poles on the one hand are the control of the object and on the other hand the complete losing oneself in it in a balance that can only be dialectical, i.e. consists in a permanent struggle. Habermas IV 501 Alienation/Marx/Habermas: in Marx and in the Marxist tradition, the concept of alienation has been applied above all to the way of life of wage workers. With the transition to value theory, however, Marx has already freed himself from the educational ideal determined by Herder and Romanticism(1). Value theory only retains the concept of exchange and thus a formal aspect of distributive justice. With the concept of transforming concrete labour into abstract labour, the concept of alienation loses its certainty. He no longer refers to the deviations from the model of an exemplary practice, but to the instrumentalization of a life presented as an end in itself. >Life/Marx. 1.Ch.Taylor, Hegel, Cambridge1975, S. 5-29; deutsch Frankfurt 1977. Höffe I 364 Alienation/Marx/Höffe: (...) the Paris manuscripts(1) [expand] the critique of national economy into a philosophical anthropology about the nature of the human and his/her work. >National Economy/Marx. Anthropology/Marx: The guiding concept is the concept of alienation known from Rousseau's social contract and Hegel's phenomenology of the mind: that the human becomes alien to his/her nature. Alienation/Hegel: For Hegel, the alienation that the slave experiences in confrontation with the master, nature and him- or herself is a necessary phase in the formation of consciousness. Marx: Marx, on the other hand, plays through Hegel's complex dialectic for the "material", basic economic relationship, for the "hostile struggle between capitalist and worker". Like Hegel, >Master/Slave/Hegel), Marx also ascribes to the first inferior, the slave, now the worker, the greater possibility of liberating him- or herself from alienation. In a captivating analysis, he blames the main obstacle to a better society, the private ownership of the means of production, for a fourfold alienation: alienation from the product of work, from the nature of work, from oneself as a worker and from society: 1) First, the worker -and in a modified form also the owner of capital- is alienated from his/her product, since the worker does not enjoy the commodity him- or herself; moreover, nature faces the worker as a hostile world. 2) Second, the laborers alienate themselves from themselves, from their life activity, for, since he/she does not affirm labor, he/she feels " with him- or herself when he/she is apart from labor and apart from him- or herself when he/she is working; his/her work is in essence forced labor. Höffe I 365 3) (...) Thirdly, (...) the human alienates him- or herself from his/her being generic, since he/she does not find himself in the work of the genus, the worked nature. 4) (...) he/she still alienates him- or herself from his/her fellow humans, since they do not meet him/her as a human, but merely as laborers, and thus as means for his/her own individual life. 1. K. Marx, Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte (1844) (Pariser Manuskripte) |
Marx I Karl Marx Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957 Eco I U. Eco Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967 German Edition: Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Eco II U, Eco La struttura assente, Milano 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Beauty | Kant | Gadamer I 50 Beauty/Kant/Gadamer: Kant's teaching of free and affectionate beauty(1) [is] strange and much disputed.Kant discusses here the difference between "pure" and "intellectual" taste judgement, which corresponds to the opposition of "free" and "attached" beauty (attached to a concept). Pure beauty of pure taste judgement/Kant: For example, the free beauty of nature and - in the field of art - ornament. "Attached" (conceptually defined) beauty/Kant: e.g. human, animal, building. Gadamer I 51 Gadamer: (...) this is an indirect description of what an "object under a certain concept" represents and therefore belongs to the conditional, unfree beauty: the whole realm of poetry, the fine arts and architecture, as well as all natural things that we do not look at for their beauty alone like the ornamental flower. >Art Beauty/Kant, >Natural Beauty/Hegel. Gadamer I 52 Conceptual beauty/Kant/Gadamer: (...) certainly there is no talk of beauty where a certain concept of understanding is schematically sensitized by the imagination, but only where the imagination is in free agreement with the understanding, i.e. where it can be productive. But this productive formation of the imagination is richest not where it is absolutely free, (...) but where it lives in a latitude which the unifying striving of the intellect does not so much erect as a barrier to it as it does to stimulate its play. Ideal of Beauty/Kant: An ideal of beauty exists (...) only of the human form: in the 'expression of morality' "without which the object would not generally be pleasing". Judgement according to an ideal of beauty is then, as Kant says, of course not merely a judgement of taste. Gadamer I 53 Only of the human form, precisely because it alone is capable of a beauty fixed by a concept of purpose, is there an ideal of beauty! This doctrine, established by Winckelmann and Lessing(2), gains a kind of key position in Kant's foundation of aesthetics. For it is precisely this thesis that shows how little a formal aesthetic of taste (arabesque aesthetics) corresponds to Kant's thought. Normal idea/ Kant: The doctrine of the ideal of beauty is based on the distinction between the normal idea and the idea of reason or ideal of beauty. The aesthetic normal idea can be found in all genres of nature. How a beautiful animal (...) has to look (...), that is a guideline for judging the individual specimen. This normal idea is thus a single view of the imagination as the "image of the genus floating between all individuals". But the representation of such a normal idea does not please by beauty, but only because "it does not contradict any condition under which alone a thing of this genre can be beautiful". It is not the archetype of beauty, but merely of correctness. Human Gestalt: This also applies to the normal idea of the human figure. But in the human form, there is a real ideal of beauty in the "expression of the moral". (...) take this, together with the later teaching of aesthetic ideas and beauty, as a symbol of morality. Then one realizes that with the teaching of the ideal of beauty, the place is also prepared for the essence of art. Gadamer I 54 Gadamer: What Kant obviously wants to say is this: in the depiction of the human Gestalt, the depicted object and that which speaks to us as artistic content in this depiction are one. There can be no other content of this representation than that which is already expressed in the form and appearance of the portrayed person. Gadamer I 55 Ideals/Kant/Gadamer: It is precisely with this classicist distinction between the normal idea and the ideal of beauty that Kant destroys the basis from which the aesthetic of perfection finds its incomparably unique beauty in the perfect meaningfulness of all being. Only now is "art" able to become an autonomous phenomenon. >Art/Kant, >Art/Hegel. Gadamer I 492 Beauty/Kant/Gadamer: Kant's fundamental definition of aesthetic pleasure as an uninterested pleasure does not only mean the negative, that the object of taste is neither used as useful nor desired as good, but it means positively that "existence" cannot add anything to the aesthetic content of pleasure, to the "pure sight", because it is precisely the aesthetic being that is representing itself. Morality: Only from the moral point of view there is an interest in the existence of the beautiful, e.g. in the song of the nightingale, whose deceptive imitation is something morally offensive according to Kant. Truth/GadamerVsKant: Whether it really follows from this constitution of aesthetic being that truth must not be sought here because nothing is recognized here, is of course the question. In our aesthetic analyses, we have described the narrowness of the concept of knowledge that causes Kant's question here, and from the question of the truth of art we had found our way into hermeneutics, in which art and history merged for us. >Hermeneutics/Gadamer. 1. Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, § 16ff. 2. Lessing, Entwürfe zum Laokoon Nr. 20 b; in Lessings Sämtl. Schriften ed. Lachmann, 1886ff., vol. 14, p. 415. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Classification | Gould | I 215 Classification/Gould: objectivity of species: indigenous have almost everywhere the same classifications as us. I 217 Higher units (genera): higher units cannot be defined objectively in the hierarchy of Linné, because they are combinations of species and do not occur separately in nature. They do not reproduce together, nor do they influence each other in any other way. You cannot bring people and dolphins together in one order and chimpanzees in another. These orders are therefore by no means arbitrary. Although chimpanzees are genealogically related to our neighbours, do we belong to the same genus or to different genera within the same family? Species are the only objective, taxonomic units of nature (not genus, kingdom, order). >Order, >Categorization, >Categories. I 221 Other classifications: for example, the Fore in New Guinea have a single word for all butterflies, but they divide up the birds like Linné. I 230ff Classification/Gould: with the discovery of methanogens, which are not bacteria at all, the NY Times erroneously wrote that a third kingdom between plants and animals had been discovered. I 232 Biologists had abandoned this dichotomy for a long time. Today, no one tries to squeeze all single-celled organisms into the two large groups. Traditionally, they are recognized for more complex shapes. Today a system of 5 kingdoms is widespread: 1. plants, 2. animals, 3. mushrooms, 4. protists (single-cell eukaryotes, including amoebas with nucleus, mitochondria, and other organelles), as well as 5. prokaryotic monera. If methanogens are listed separately, they form a sixth kingdom. Biologists today distinguish between eukaryotes and prokaryotes rather than between plants and animals. The prokaryotes must have had a common precursor due to a common RNA sequence. I 234 The assumption of a steady evolutionary speed is probably impossible to maintain. The early methanogens may have developed much faster. II 70 Classification/Gould: historical changes in the classifications are the petrified signs of mental overthrow. II 71 Classification/Foucault/Gould: why should we group together the poor, the unemployed and the mentally ill? Foucault argues that the birth of modern trading companies has led to a new definition of a cardinal sin, which must be made invisible by locking them away. This sin was inactivity.(1) II 72 Foucault: Thesis: the things that are omitted from the taxonomies are just as important as those included. >Taxonomy. II 359 Classification/Gould: GouldVsCladism: some of our best known and most convenient groups no longer exist if the classification is to be based on Cladograms. E.g. then there is no such thing as a fish any more. There are about 20,000 species of vertebrate scales and fins living in the water, but they do not form a cohesive cladistic group. But must classifications be based exclusively on cladistic information? This is the most intense debate in evolutionary biology. II 360 The Cladist rejects the similarity altogether as an illusion. Against it: the pheneticist, who concentrates on the overall similarity, pursues a questionable ideal of objectivity. 1. M. Foucault (1965). Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason trans. by R. Howard, (London: Tavistock. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Classification | Linné | Mayr I 187 Upward Classification/Mayr: Linné himself applied upward classification from 1770 onwards: it is more suitable; classes are differentiated and then grouped together in superordinate groups. Unfortunately, there is no strict methodology in Linné. There was no theoretical basis for the ranking. >Order, >Systems, >Species. Mayr I 192 Linné: a typical hierarchy is characterized by the fact that there are no transition types. Great discontinuity. In Linné there are large gaps between the taxa. Darwin: forces gaps between original and derived taxa. >Taxonomy. I 200 Linné: binary nomenclature. Genus name and typal surname. Each species has a single "type"(copy). VsLinné: such a "type" is not very typical for a species! >Stereotypes, >Prototypes. Species description/new: not exclusively based on type (Linné). Variability is also taken into account I 295 Linné assigns chimpanzees to the genus homo. >Species/Linné. |
Linné I Carl von Linné A general system of nature, through the three grand kingdoms of animals, vegetables, and minerals Charleston, SC 2009 Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Concepts | Aristotle | Gadamer I 436 Concepts/Aristotle/Gadamer: [in the] Epagoge-Analysis(1) (...) Aristotle (...) had left open in the most ingenious way how general concepts are actually formed. (...) he thus [takes] into account (...) the fact that the natural formation of concepts in language has always been in progress. In this respect, also according to Aristotle, the formation of linguistic concepts possesses a completely undogmatic freedom, in that what is seen as common in experience and thus leads to the general, has the character of a mere preliminary work, which stands at the beginning of science, but is not yet science. Proof/Science/AristotleVsSpeusippus/AristotleVsPlato: If science sets up the compelling ideal of proof, it must go beyond such procedures. Thus Aristotle criticized Speusipp's doctrine of the common as well as Plato's dihairetic dialectic from his ideal of proof. See >Analogies/Speusippus; >Language/Aristotle. 1. An. Post. B 19. --- Adorno XII 50 Concept/Aristotle/Diogenes Laertius/Adorno: according to Diogenes Laertiues Aristotle uses different names for the same thing: in this way, he calls ideas also form (eidos), genus (genos), pattern (paradigm) and beginning (principle, ark). |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Congruence | Lyons | I 242 Def Congruence/Grammar/Lyons: (grammatical correspondence) of genus, number and case between verb and noun. (in all languages). The constituents are considered to be of equal rank, in contrast to the regimen, where the verb rules the "object" and the "subject" the verb (tradition). Congruence: between words of the same category Rection: (see below) between words of different categories. I 244 Congruence/Regimen/Modern Grammar/Lyons: new: here we describe the difference in the terms endocentric/exocentric. >Terminology/Lyons. Rection/Hockett: Rection can only be found in exocentric constructions. For example, ad urbem, differs distributionally from the constituents ad, and urbem. Congruence/Hockett: Congruence can be found in endocentric constructions, in a binding beyond hierarchical structures i.e. direct constituents, I 245 between certain predictive attributes and subjects. Congruence/Lyons: Congruence thus prevails both in endo- and in exocentric constructions e.g. un livre intéressant coincides distributionally with un livre, against this: Le livre est intéressant : (here too there is congruence between livre and intéressant) is exocentric, because its distribution differs from that of le livre on the one hand and that of intéressant on the other. >Distribution/Lyons. LyonsVsHockett: thus it is not true (as many have claimed) that a subject's number is determined by the person and the verb's number. What is also incorrect is (which is even more often claimed) that the subject and not the verb determines or vice versa, that rather subject and verb form a category that belongs to the construction of which they are members. Solution/Lyons: (see below) Numerus and person are nominal categories, which can be identified flexibly or otherwise somehow in the surface structure of the verbal complex. >Surface structure, >Deep structure. Tradition: expresses it this way: "The verb corresponds to the subject in number and person". I 245 Congruence/Subject-verb-congruence/context-independent/Lyons: Example (1a) The dog bites the man (1b) The dog bites the men I 246 (1c) The dogs bite the man (1d) The dogs bite the men (2a) The chimpanzee eats the banana usw. Context-independent Grammar/Lyons: e.g (1) ∑ > NP sing + VP sing or NP plur + VP plur. (2) VP sing > V sing + NP (3) VP plur > V plur + NP (4) NP > NP sing or NP plur (5) NP sing > T + N sing (6) NP plur > T + N plur (7) N sing > N + 0 (Zero) (8) N plur > N + s (9) V sing > V + s (10) V plur > V + 0 More than one symbol is replaced at a time. Lexical Substitutions/Lyons: here we assume that their rules are outside grammar. >Lexicon, >Grammar. I 247 Congruence/context-dependent grammar/Lyons: Suppose we want to take into account the fact that the subject's number determines the verb's number. I 248 We follow approximately Chomsky's "Syntactic Structures" (N. Chomsky, Syntactic Structures, Berlin, New York 1957): (here still without transformational rules): (1) ∑ > NP + VP (2) VP > Verb + NP (3) NP > NP sing or NP plur (4) Verb > V + s/in the context NP sing + ... or V + 0/in the context NP plur + ... (5) NP sing > T + N + 0 (6) NP plur > T + N + s New: Here we get along with only 6 instead of 10 rules. New: It completely disappears that the noun is the carrier word of the nominal complex. Context dependency: N.B.: according to rule (1) all sentences created by these rules are of the same type (NP + VP). Rule (3): The number becomes a category of the nominal complex, regardless of whether it occurs as subject or object. Rule (4): The number in the verb is determined by the preceding nominal expression. That depends on the context. N.B.: in this way the rule can only be formulated in a system of concatenation rules (see above I 212: linear). The nominal expression on the left determines the congruence, not the expression on the right. I 249 Subject/object: since the left-standing nominal complex is derived from the NP created by rule (1), it can be interpreted as a subject and not as an object. >Transformational grammar, >Transformation rules. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Darwinism | Vavilov | Gould II 132ff Darwinism/Variation/Evolution/Vavilov/Gould: Vavilov had collected barley, oats and millet from a wide variety of different breeds of wheat from various locations, and noted that within the different species of a genus, but also frequently within the species of related groups, remarkably similar series of varieties could be found. >Evolution. Law of Homologues series in Variation/Vavilov: Thesis: The new species arise by developing genetic differences that rule out crossbreeding with related species. But the new species is not all genetically different from its ancestors. Most of them remain untouched. The parallel variations thus represent the "play through" of the same genetic abilities, which are inherited as blocks of one species to another. Gould: Darwin does not disagree with such a thesis, since it gives the selection an important role. >Selection, >Inheritance. The variation is only the raw material. It arises in all directions and is at least not arranged in an adaptive way. The direction is slowly being determined by natural selection, as the more adapted generations proliferate. >Adaption. However, if the possibilities are very limited and one species shows all of its different varieties, then this choice cannot be explained by selection alone. That's how Vavilov sets himself apart from Darwin. >Darwinism, >Ch. Darwin. VavilovVsDarwin: Variation does not take place in all directions, but in classes that are analogous to those of chemistry and crystallography. GoudlVsVavilov: Vavilov underlined the creative role of the environment. |
Vavilov I Nikolai I. Vavilov Origin and Geography of Cultivated Plants Cambridge 2009 Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Existence | Leibniz | Holz I 48/49 Existence/world/outside/reason/Leibniz: a sufficient reason for existence cannot be found in the series of facts, but also not in the whole set-up. Because also the composition, like the series needs a reason. Leibniz calls the existence reason "extramundan" because it cannot be found within the series (series reum). >Inside/outside/Leibniz, >World/Leibniz. Holz: that does not mean "outside the world"! Literally it means: Leibniz: "apart from the world, there is a dominating one." Not just like the soul in me but more like myself in my body, but of much higher reason. Existence reason/outside/outer/Leibniz: The reason for unity is the form determinateness of its all-round connection, not the linearity of a sequence or series. To this extent the existence reason of the world (as the totality of the connections) is not in the world, but it conditions it as a world. This "ultima ratio rerum" establishes the world and makes it". It is the connecting principle. >Totality/Leibniz. Holz I 70 Existence/Leibniz: of it we can have no idea, except through the perception of beings. Therefore, perception is the formal unity and universality of all the contents that enter into it. Holz I 71 "We have no other idea of existence than that we perceive that the things are perceived". Perception/Leibniz: provides now, as self-perception, the idea of the continuity and contiguity of existence as such (which is evident to us in the existence of our own self). >Perception/Leibniz, >Experience/Leibniz. Existence/Experience/Leibniz: Existence cannot be thought, it has to be experienced, because the sentence "non-being is" is contradictory. (However, only in relation to the whole). Existence/Being/Leibniz: the falsification of the universal negation allows the tautology "the being is"! In contrast to any particular tautological statement like e.g. "The House is the House", which is only a concept or essence definition and does not include existence. Only the universal proposition of being transcends from a logical definition into an ontological axiom. Since it is related to the whole, there can be only one case of necessity of existence, namely that of the whole. In the bodies themselves, there is no basis of existence, only in the total context, which ultimately includes the entire chain (all relationships in the universe). In the individual bodies you will never find the reason why they are like that and not different. Existence/Being/Leibniz: the falsification of the universal negation allows the tautology "the being is"! In contrast to any particular tautological statement like e.g. "The House is the House", which is only a concept or essence definition and does not include existence. Only the universal proposition of being transcends from a logical definition into an ontological axiom. Since it is related to the whole, there can only be one case of necessity of existence, namely that of the whole. >Necessity/Leibniz. In the bodies themselves, there is no reason of existence, only in the total context, which ultimately includes the entire chain (all relationships in the universe). In the individual bodies you will never find the reason why they are like that and not different. Holz I 72 Existence/Necessity/Identity/Being/Leibniz: the sentences "The being is" and "Only one being is necessary" are in a very specific follow-up ratio: The proposition "the being is" is an identical proposition, i.e. its opposite is contradictory. Thus existential and copulative (copula) use of "is" coincide here. One could also say "being is being" in order to make clear that the predicate is necessary for the subject. But: For example, "the stone is a being stone": this sentence is not identical, the being does not necessarily belong to the stone! The stone could only be thought of. Therefore, we need the perception to be convinced of existence. But this is not only true of bodies, but also of general, e.g. the genus human, it does not exist neccessarily. Holz I 73 The necessity of existence is valid only by the world as a whole. Holz I 75 Unity/Substance/LeibnizVsSpinoza: the ultimate ratio is necessarily only one reason, not a multiplicity, because it is the structure of the whole. Leibniz, therefore, does not need to sacrifice the multiplicity of things in order to reach the one and only world. The substance of Spinoza is replaced by him with the "harmonie universelle". Existence/Leibniz: Question: "Why is there anything at all and not rather nothing?". This question also remains in existence when we have secured the unity of the multiplicity. There could still be nothing! Holz I 76 Assuming that things must exist, one must also be able to specify the reason why they must exist in this way and not otherwise. Holz I 91 Existence/Leibniz: "Why is there something and not rather nothing?" 1. The reason why something exists is in nature: the consequence of the supreme principle that nothing happens without reason. 2. The reason must lie in a real being or in a cause. 3. This being must be necessary, otherwise a further cause would have to be sought. 4. So there is a cause! Holz I 92 5. This first cause also has the effect that everything possible has a striving for existence, since no universal reason for the restriction to only certain possible can be found. 6. Therefore it can be said that everything possible is intended for its future existence. (Because possibility is striving). 7. It does not follow from this that everything that is possible also exists. This would only follow if everything together were possible. 8. However, some possibilities are incompatible with others. 9. Thus arises the series of things that exists through the greatest range of all possibilities. 10. As fluids assume spherical form (largest content), there is in the nature of the universe a series with the greatest content. 11. Thus the most perfect exists, for perfection is nothing but the quantity of materiality. (Best of all worlds, >best world). 12. Perfection, however, is not to be found solely in matter, but in form or variety. Holz I 93 13. It follows from this that matter is not everywhere alike, but is made by the forms itself to be unequal. (There are further 12 theses on the level of consciousness theory). Holz I 120 World/Existenz/Leibniz: is as a whole contingent. There is no reason to see why this world must be. But we can see that it is a totality of all that is real and possible. That is, the principle of deduction fails at the first substance, which can no longer be made intelligible, or is no longer derivable by itself. Holz I 12 Question: Why is anything at all and not nothing? Although we cannot see why this world is, we can still see that this world is possible! And many other possible beside it as well. Then we can reformulate the question: Why does this world exist and not another? >Possible world/Leibniz, >Possibility/Leibniz. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Feminism | Beauvoir | Brocker I 307 Feminism/Beauvoir: For Beauvoir - as in the French language - human/homme and man/homme are identical, she equates being human in the existentialist sense with masculinity, more precisely: it is the men who have so far been able to realize the essence of humanity. Women, on the other hand, experience a contradiction between their humanity and their "femininity". In order to become truly human, women must conquer the various privileges of men, which undoubtedly changes the relationship between the sexes, but not the idea of being human. >Feminism/Young. KusterVsBeauvoir: Already in the first chapter of her book (1) it crystallizes, what is going to pervade the whole Brocker I 308 work: the devaluation of the reproductive potency of women as a limitation of their possibility of individualization and as enslavement to the genus (2). Lundgren-GothlinVsBeauvoir: Beauvoir also repeats the habitual devaluation gesture of patriarchal culture in her description of female physicality, sexuality, lived motherhood and the traditional female caring activities (3). KusterVsBeauvoir: an intellectual hostility to the body that mainly affects the female body. Moreover, Beauvoir's ethical premises reproduce the opposites of body and mind, nature and culture anchored in the Western tradition, of immanent mere life and transcendent good life, and thus gender-hierarchical dualisms, to which gender-segregated spheres of life have always corresponded to. 1. Simone de Beauvoir, Le deuxième sexe, Paris 1949. Dt.: Simone de Beauvoir, Das andere Geschlecht. Sitte und Sexus der Frau, Reinbek 2005 (zuerst 1951). 2. Ebenda S. 49f 3. Eva Lundgren-Gothlin, »The master-slave dialectic in ›The Second Sex‹«, in: Elizabeth Fallaize (Hg.), Simone de Beauvoir. A Critical Reader, London/New York 1998, 93-108. Friederike Kuster, „Simone de Beauvoir, Das andere Geschlecht (1949)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Gavagai | Quine | I 59ff Gavagai: the totality of the sentences can be permuted so that verbal behavior remains, but correlation disappears - translation manuals can be internally consistent and mutually incompatible. I 67 Gavagai: this is about stimuli, not rabbits. - (> forgery). - A verification shall be carried out by the community. V 119 Reference/Gavagai/Quine: problem: we do not know whether the child who agrees to "red" also referred to red - Red: can be a general term for set of red surfaces - or a general term for any visible color spot - but not for parts of color spots - this does not allow abstraction - no problem: to realize that the reference is made to the mere presence of red - different translation manuals lead to different translations. >General Terms/Quine, >Translation/Quine. VI 73 Gavagai/Quine: the translation vagueness in particular should not be shown with that, because the translation with "Look, a rabbit" is well secured - the point was that the reference is not determined by the translation. Because "Gavagai" is a whole sentence, there was no compensation possibility - Reference/explanation: reference is explained by quote eradication "rabbit" refers to rabbit. --- XII 18 Gavagai/Quine: must neglect differences such as "There is a rabbit" and "Look, a rabbit" - no single term can be attributed, but only an entire sentence in which "rabbit" appears - do not assume objectification - even if the presence of rabbits is an expression condition, they might still be temporal stages or rabbit parts - not sufficient: to ask whether "an X is present" - solution: "the same x" - expression conditions are not sufficient to know whether the stranger refers to an object - Solution: A-u-B is at least acknowledgment for whole sentences. XII 47 Gavagai/Quine: Problem: a whole rabbit is given iff a non-severed part or a temporal stage is given. XII 48 Gavagai/color/color word/generic term/mass term/Quine: the big difference between "Rabbit" and "Sepia" is that "Sepia" is a mass term like "water" - "Rabbit" on the other hand, is a term of crushed reference. Therefore it cannot be dominated without the individuation principle. One must know where one rabbit ends and another one begins - that does not work by pointing (ostension) - where does a Gavagai end and where does another one begin? - inextricably - ((s) Because Gavagai is not a mass term, that is important.) - Important argument: if you take the part of the universe, which consists of rabbits, it is identical to the part, which consists of un-severed rabbit parts and with the one that consists of temporal stages of rabbits - only difference: how to split it - ostension cannot teach that - pointing to a whole is always also pointing to its parts and vice versa. XII 50 Translation Manual: offers no solution: Problem: stage/part/rabbit: perhaps we always ask in a foreign language "Do they belong together?" instead of "Is it the same?" without knowing it. XII 51 Gavagai/Quine: behaviorist criterion: a stable, relatively homogeneous object against a background will probably be denoted by a relatively short term - but merely imposed on the foreign language - (yet reasonable hypothesis). XII 52 Gavagai/native tongue/part/whole/time stage/Quine: within our own language, we can distinguish between whole rabbits, rabbit parts and rabbit stages, because the apparatus of individuation (plural, pronoun, identity, quantification, etc.) is determined - when translating from another language, this itself is subject to indeterminacy. XII 53ff Gavagai/Japanese/classifier/Quine: 1) numeral "5" 2) animal classifier 3) "Ox" - Explanation A: declined numeral of the genus "animal" (ox: individuative term, here for all cattle) - B: 3rd word here is a mass term "lifestock" (e.g. here only cattle) - Japanese: in both cases it is "five cattle" - German: both are equally good translations - both fit into language behavior - reference (extension): is different. >Translation/Quine, >Indeterminacy/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Ideas | Plato | Gadamer I 434 Ideas/Plato/Gadamer: The idea, the true being of the thing, is not recognisable in any other way than in going through (...) mediations. But is there a realization of the idea itself as this particular and individual? >Mediation. Is not the essence of things a whole in the same way that language is a whole? Recognition: Just as in the unity of speech the individual words only gain their meaning and relative unambiguity, so too, true cognition of the essence can only be achieved in the whole of the relational structure of ideas. Knowledge/Whole/Parmenides: This is the thesis of the Platonic "Parmenides". From this, however, the question arises: in order to define even a single idea, i.e. to be able to distinguish in what it is from everything else that is, does one not have to know the whole? Gadamer: One can hardly escape this consequence if, like Plato, one conceives the cosmos of ideas as the true structure of being. Speusippos: In fact, it is reported by the Platonist Speusipp, Plato's successor in the leadership of the Academy, that he drew this conclusion. We know from him that he particularly cultivated the search for the common (homoia), going far beyond what was generalization in the sense of the logic of the genus, by using analogy, i.e. the proportional equivalent, as a research method. >Analogies/Speusippus. Bubner I 27 Ideas/The Republic/Plato/Bubner: it is no accident that the theory of ideas is developed in The Republic (>philosopher king). Problematic: that also the practical good should belong to the ideas. Bubner I 28 Definition Ideas/Plato: The reasons of being of everything real. Bubner I 51 Being/Parmenides: had forbidden to attribute a being to non-being. >Existence/Parmenides, >Appearance/Parmenides, >Existence predicate/Parmenides. Being/Appearance/PlatoVsParmenides: the solution of the problem of being has to be re-established, in memory of the linguistic nature of the concept. Only in language can the concept of being express what it means, and also the concept of being is only meaningful in propositions. Ideas/Plato: now only one step is needed to introduce the community of ideas among themselves: the presocratic ontology provides, as a matter of course, the concepts of being, rest, and movement. Each determination is now itself and not another. Thus, determinateness implies negation. Here the dialectics finds its highest field of activity as the doctrine of the relations between one and many. Cf. >Ontology/Plato, >Unity and multiplicity. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Infinity | Russell | Bertrand Russell Die Mathematik und die Metaphysiker 1901 in: Kursbuch 8 Mathematik 1967 11 Most numbers are infinitely large, and to infinity one can add additional numbers as often as one wants, without changing the character of the number. 19 Russell: there is also a largest infinite number: this is the number of objects in total, regardless of species and genus. Cantor proved that there is no largest infinite number, and if he were right, the contradictions would appear again in refined form in the concept of infinity. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 |
| Language | Nominalism | Gadamer I 439 Language/Essence/Nominalism/Gadamer: (...) with the nominalistic dissolution of the classical logic of essence, the problem of language also [enters] a new stage. Suddenly, it is of positive importance that one can articulate things in different ways (though not arbitrarily) in terms of their agreement and difference. If the relationship between genus and species can be legitimized not only from the nature of things - with the model of the "real" species in the self-construction of living nature - but also in another way in relation to the human and his name-giving sovereignty, then the historically grown languages, their history of meaning as well as their grammar and syntax, let themselves be understood as variation forms of a logic of experience, a natural, i.e. historical experience (which itself still includes the supernatural). The division of words and things, which each language does in its own way, represents everywhere a first natural concept formation, which is very far away from the system of scientific concept formation. It follows the human aspect of things completely, the system of its needs and interests. What is essential in one thing for a linguistic community can be assigned with other things, perhaps quite different ones, of a uniform designation I 440 if they all have the same essential side. The naming (impositio nominis) in no way corresponds to the essence of science and its classification system of genus and species. Rather, measured against this system, it is very often accidentals from which the general meaning of a word is derived.Cf. >Language/Renaissance, >Language/Middle Ages. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Mentalese | Black | II 99 Mentalese/language of thought/Black: precursor: Ockham. Ockham presumed for it even genus, case, number. BlackVs: neither speaker nor listener uses it to refer to images in the mind. Instead: public articulation. >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief, >Mental states, >Meaning, >Communication, cf. >Beetle example, >Mentalism. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Metaphors | Aristotle | Ricoeur II 47 Metaphor/Aristotle/Ricoeur: (...) we read in Aristotle's Poetics that a metaphor is "the application to a thing of a name that belongs to something else, the transference taking place from genus to species, from species to genus, from species to species, or proportionally.“(1) His Rhetoric takes this definition for granted, simply adding a marginal note concerning the use of comparative images, which are characterized as a special form of the proportional metaphor in which the comparison is explicitly marked by a comparative term such as "is like". Comparison, in other words, is an expanded form of Ricoeur I 48 metaphor. Cicero and Quintilian later inverted this model and said that a metaphor is simply an abridged comparison. >Metaphor/Ricoeur. RicoeurVsAristotle: [We will need a] revision (...) [that] shifts the problem of metaphor from the semantics of the word to the semantics of the sentence. 1. Aristotle, Poetics, XXI, 4. |
Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976 |
| Natural Kinds | Sellars | I 50 Disjunction/SellarsVsLocke: should allow not only the idea of being- A-and B but also the being-A-or B! SeallarsVsLocke: Locke thought, a triangle is the "idea of equal-sided and unequal-sided". >Idea/Locke, >Disjunctive predicates, >Generalization, >Generality, >Ideas. I 51 Disjunction: the idea of a genus is the idea of the disjunction of all its species. So the idea of the triangular is the idea of the inequilateral or equilateral. SellarsVsLocke: he thought it was the idea of the inequilateral and equilateral. And that is of course the idea of an impossibility. >Contradictions. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Necessity | Leibniz | Holz I 40 Necessity/Leibniz: ultimately, the insight (that is, through the use of the definition instead of the defined) arises from the seen concepts that they are necessary or that they imply a contradiction. >Concept/Leibniz, >Definition/Leibniz. I 72 Existence/Necessity/Identity/Being/Leibniz: the sentences "The being is" and "Only one being is necessary" stand in a very specific follow-up ratio: The sentence "the being is" is an identical proposition, i.e. its opposite is contradictory. Thus existential and copulative (copula) use of "is" coincide here. One could also say "being is being" in order to make clear that the predicate is necessary for the subject. But: For example, "the stone is a being stone": this sentence is not identical, the being does not necessarily belong to the stone! The stone could only be thought of. Therefore, we need perception to be convinced of the existence. But this is not only true of bodies, but also of general things, e.g. the genus human, it does not exist neccessarily. >Existence/Leibniz, >Existence statement/Leibniz. I 73 The necessity of existence is valid only by the world as a whole. >World/Leibniz. I 78 Intension/Extension/Leibniz/Holz: The necessity of the totality of the world is not the modal aspect of the extensionality (or statement form, according to which a predicate is assigned to a subject), but the intensional necessity or materiality according to which the predicate is inherent in the subject. >Intension, >Extension. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Nominalism | Gadamer | I 439 Nominalism/Language/Essence/Gadamer: (...) with the nominalistic dissolution of the classical logic of essence, the problem of language also [enters] a new stage. >Language/Gadamer. It is of positive importance that one can articulate things in different ways (though not arbitrarily) in terms of their agreement and difference. If the relationship between genus and species can be legitimized not only from the nature of things - with the model of the "real" species in the self-construction of living nature - but also in another way in relation to the human and his name-giving sovereignty, then the historically grown languages, their history of meaning as well as their grammar and syntax, let themselves be understood as variation forms of a logic of experience, a natural, i.e. historical experience (which itself still includes the supernatural). >Language development, >Classification, >Categorization/Gadamer. The division of words and things, which each language does in its own way, represents everywhere a first natural concept formation, which is very far away from the system of scientific concept formation. It follows the human aspect of things completely, the system of its needs and interests. What is essential in one thing for a linguistic community can be assigned with other things, perhaps quite different ones, of a uniform designation I 440 if they all have the same essential side. The naming (impositio nominis) in no way corresponds to the essence of science and its classification system of genus and species. Rather, measured against this system, it is very often accidentals from which the general meaning of a word is derived. >Naming, >Words, >Word Meaning, >Concepts. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Nominalism | Leibniz | Holz I 27 LeibnizVsNominalism: a genus has not only nominal status: there must be something real common to all individuals assigned to this genus. Holz: thus Leibniz has moved away from the empiricist nominalist attitude. If the general (general concepts) were nothing else than a collection of particulars, a science would not be possible by evidence. >Concept/Leibniz, >Unity/Leibniz, >Particulars/Leibniz. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Objectivity | Gould | I 215 ff Objectivity/biology/science/Gould: objectivity of species: indigenious have almost everywhere the same classifications as us. >Classification. I 216 Species/Darwin, Lamarck: species are not natural units but "purely artificial combinations", conceptual definitions. I 217 Species/Ernst MayrVsDarwin/MayrVsLamarck: "Species are a product of evolution and not of the human mind." Darwin and Lamarck could not simply explain why erratic changes should arise from gradual development. Traditional solution: one can assume that our world is changing so slowly that the configurations of the moment can be treated as constant. Higher units (genera): cannot be defined objectively in the hierarchy of Linné, because they are combinations of species and do not occur separately in nature. They do not reproduce together, nor do they influence each other in any other way. One cannot put people and dolphins in one order and chimpanzees in another. These orders are therefore by no means arbitrary. Although chimpanzees are genealogically related to our neighbours, do we belong to the same genus or to different genera within the same family? Species are the only objective, taxonomic units of nature (not genus, kingdom or order). I 221 Other classifications: e. g. the Fore in New Guinea have a single word for all butterflies, but they classify the birds like Linné. >Evolution, >Explanation. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Ontology | Leibniz | Holz I 59f Ontology/construction/world/experience/rationality/identity/Leibniz: the construction of the ontology of Leibniz has two phases: 1. Deducability of all sensible, i.e. true and knowledge having sentences are proved by reducing them to identical sentences. (Deduction/reduction). (Predicative evidence). 2. The evidence of identity is to be proved as such to the world itself. Identity as the cause of the world is to find its cause once again in the constitution of the being of the world. >Reduction/Leibniz, >Identity/Leibniz. I 78 Logical/ontological/Leibniz/Holz: this transition from the concept of the infinite ((s) infinite because of infinitely many aspects) chain contained in the experienced limited finite a priori to the idea of the necessary being of the world has, in addition to the ontological one, a logical aspect: Logical: every being, every fact, is conditioned by all others. Therefore the concepts (predicates) of all others are to be assigned to the concept of a being! The inherence of all the other concepts in each individual concept, however, does not make any sense in terms of its logical extent (extensional). It cannot be performed as a predication (operational, finite). Undesirable consequence: the concept of each individual would then be the supreme and the emptiest generic concept of all beings. >Concept/Leibniz, >Particular/Leibniz. I 79 With this, it would not be a representation of the concrete individual anymore! Solution: the relation of the individual to the general (whole) can be expressed intensional (content-logical): the concept of the individual contains all possible predicates in a unique arrangement. That is, these predicates as a whole belong to all concepts of individuals in a different arrangement. >Possibility/Leibniz, >Predicate/Leibniz. Each concept has the same quantity of predicates, but it is not identical with all other concepts because the arrangement is correspondingly different. I 91 Logical/ontological: thus the logical constitution of the subject-being proves to be the ontological constitution of the world. Genus/World/Leibniz: the world can also be represented as the supreme genus, ontologically as the fullness of all possible reality. >Totality/Leibniz, >Ultimate justification/Leibniz. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Phylogenetics | Gould | II 351 Phylogenesis/order/classification/Gould: since phylogenetic lineage is our criterion for biological classification, we define groups of animals according to their family tree. For example, in 1957 it turned out that rabbits are a coherent, clearly defined genus of mammals whose phylogenetic lineage is not particularly close to rodents. II 353 Definition Sister Group: the sister group looks like an upside-down Ypsilon: two tribes are sharing a common ancestor from which no other tribe branches off. E.g. gorillas and chimpanzees form a sister group. We can then consider the chimpanzee gorilla group as a unit and ask which primate forms the sister group with it. We now have a sister group with three species, each of which is more closely related to their two partners than to any other species. What primate species is the sister group in terms of the human chimpanzee gorilla unit? Conventional: the Orang Utan. Interesting implication: there is, at least within the usual definition, nothing like a monkey! They in particular do not form a genealogical unit. II 354 Definition derived features: features are derived when they only occur for members of a direct lineage. For example, all mammals have hair, which is not the case with any other vertebrate. II 356 GouldVsCladism: most derived features are ambiguous: they either tend to be too easily delimitable, or they are adaptive enough to be developed by several strains through natural selection independently of each other. >Evolution, >Explanation, >Classification. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Propositional Content | Brandom | I 215 Propositional content/Brandom: from social structures that transmit it, fundamental representational contents - ((s) what is considered to be correct perception is socially regulated by standards.) I 217 Auxiliary hypotheses are different from person to person. I 218 Access: to pragmatics. Normativally - to semantics: inferentially - to the interaction between conceptual contents: social. I 236 Propositional content/Field/Brandom: two-staged: 1) belief in Mentalese, 2) meaning in public language. I 327 Maths propositional content: without empiricism. I 240 Propositional content/Brandom: (the believable) shall be distinguished by the pragmatic property of assertibility. I 254 Definition propositional content: that which is expressed by performances and which determines the specific characteristics of their significance within the genus of asserting. I 402 Propositional content: role as premises - starts with the concept of truth instead of inference - Definition action: make something true. I 473 Propositional content/Brandom: Thesis: cannot play a fundamental explanatory role - is parasitic to the expressive role! - It is about the act of asserting and not about what is asserted. I 873 Content/Brandom: propositional and other conceptual contents with which the behavior of the system is to be measured, cannot be justified with this behavior itself. >Justification. I 897 Propositional content/Brandom: what we mean depends on the actual circumstances, even if we do not know what they are. This is the perspective character of propositional content - hence the externalism begins at home: The contents of external definitions depend on their actions and of the truth of that which they make an assertion about. >Circumstances, >Meaning (intending), cf. >Externalism. --- II 207 Propositional content/Brandom: always also representational - propositional content can be reflected on in concepts of truth or reasons - "aboutness", "about" is not necessary in addition to representation - but propositional content must be able to be characterized non-representationally. II 263 Objectivity/Brandom: of the propositional content: the objectivity (fact) says nothing about who could reasonably assert something - and such facts would even exist without living beings - this objectivity is a characteristic that we can make understandable as a structure of the definitions and authorisations - every community that recognizes definition and authorization as a normative status can recognize propositional content that are objective in this sense. >Objectivity. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Rationalism | Locke | Arndt II 188 VsRationalism/Arndt: confusion between the simple and the general! Obscured the debate about the analyticity criterion - made falsely seem possible the derivation of properties from essential concepts. LockeVsRationalism: he avoids this by distinguishing: ascent (bottom-up): in the formation of ideas by abstraction from particular to general (from the individual to species and genus) - descent (top-down) reducing the composite (complex ideas) to the simple. >Idea/Locke, >Mind/Locke, >Order/Locke. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Loc II H.W. Arndt "Locke" In Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen - Neuzeit I, J. Speck (Hg) Göttingen 1997 |
| Representation | McGinn | I 219 Representation/knowledge pluralism/McGinn: Thesis: representation properties do not only belong to conscious beliefs but semantic predicates can be applied to configurations of another kind in the literal sense. (> Representation/Dretske). It boils down to underrepresented content that is not exclusive to reason. This allows us to focus on a comparative epistemology. We have a genus that consists of systems with syntactic and respect relevant properties, and also has a number of species, in which framework the comprehensive, naturally species break down into a special system which differ with respect to other dimensions. I 230 E.g. different animal species may have cognitive strengths and weaknesses. Genes/representation/McGinn: their construction ability is a testament for their representation capacity. (s) Representing capacity in order to be able to implement provisions. E.g. Represents the bird, the construction worker, the beaver what he builds, as a nest, dam, or house? McGinn: I would say yes, but the same task could be fulfilled by only representing parts of these things and their relationships. >Genes/McGinn. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Rules | Wittgenstein | Wright I 287 Addition/arithmetic/Wittgenstein stigmatizes an "ideal-rigid machine" or a "philosophical superlative" of the rules, namely the idea that such a purely conceptual unity and disunity are not based in an ontological way on facts that lie in human nature. Wright: better: we have to allow that such things are fixedly determined in a way that people might in principle not realize but that they still leave room for the idea that their constitution itself is somehow dependent upon the changing circumstances in the context of sub-cognitive abilities of people. --- Newen I 32 Rules/Wittgenstein: (use theory): rules are central, because the use is usually very stable. >Use theory. --- Hintikka I 242 Rules/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: middle period: Problem: rules must not become a "central entity" - Blue Book: Rules are not mere drill - instead: the rule is incorporated in the understanding, obeying, etc. - later Vs: Problem: that leads to regress. - Later: Philosophical Investigations §§ 143-242: to follow a rule is analog to following a command. I 340 Rules/language game/language/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: language games take precedence over rules. >Language games. --- II 62 Rule/music/Wittgenstein: the rule neither exists in the result of playing, nor in the result plus score. - But in the intention to play the score - the rule is included in all individual cases - it cannot be isolated, therefore. II 106 Rule/reality/world/Wittgenstein: a rule is not in relation to the reality so that we could see if they match or not - we make the grammar of color words not according to the model of reality - otherwise you could say: "these properties have this kind of grammar" - applicable rules for "red", etc. are not to be justified by anything that can be said about colors. >Grammar, >Colour. II 113 Rule/Wittgenstein: contradictions exist between rules - not between a rule and the reality. II 201 Meaning/rule/ostensive definition/Wittgenstein: a (single) rule is not sufficient to indicate the meaning - such a rule would be given by an ostensive definition - therefore an ostensive definition is not a definition - not sufficient: E.g. "This is soz" - solution:. sufficient: "This color is soz" it must be clear for what kind of thing the word stands - N.B.: differentia/genus: problem: how can we decide what the genus is? II 251 Rule/Law of Natural/Wittgenstein: Rules are not rigid as laws of nature (NG) - natural laws: are independent of us. >Natural laws. II 346 Rule/Wittgenstein: no prohibition or permission - no statement. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Russell’s Paradox | Thiel | I 313 ff Russell's Paradox/Thiel: discovered independently and earlier by Zermelo, but not published. Example: While the set of birds itself is not a bird, i.e. not a thing of the kind that it itself deals with as elements among itself, the set of all sets is obviously a set (e.g. the set of all terms is also a term). This is the exceptional case, while sets that do not contain themselves as elements are the normal case. So a set A can be "normal" or not. Therefore, we can ask in particular whether the set of all sets itself is normal or not. >Sets. If we note the explanation of the element relationship by x ε {y|B(y)} <> B(x), it follows from the assumption that R is not normal that R is an element of the set R of normal sets, i.e. normal. On the other hand, according to the condition defining R, the normality of R means that ~(R ε R) applies, i.e. that R is not an element of the set of all normal sets, i.e. not normal. From (R ε R) follows ~(R ε R) and from ~(R ε R) follows ~(~(R ε R)). I 316 The mental operation was, among other things, the transition from the statement that a thing had a property to the statement that it belonged to the set of all things with this property. This led to the "basic crisis" in mathematics. How to react? I 317 1. One could deny that such antinomies affect mathematics at all. One could simply claim that the concepts and conclusions involved do not occur in the analysis, for example. 2. One could describe the terms and conclusions used in the analysis as incorrect. I 318 3. Would it be conceivable that the antinomies would not be regarded as serious "sentences" at all? But only as imagined without evidence. Then they would be on a par with the paradoxes. If antinomies were not taken seriously in earlier times, it was also because mathematics was far from a deductive approach. I 319 In the beginning, it seemed as if the antinomies had a common error, the avoidance of which did not seem difficult any more: If one forms the sets of all sets, then this is apparently the largest set at all. But as to any set we can also form to it (e.g. "A") the power set PA which is greater than A - a contradiction. Sets of all sets: Problem: cannot be the largest, because its power set must be larger. >Power set. If one forms the set of all ordinal numbers, then this set itself determines an order type with the ordinal number Ω. From this it can be shown that it is 1 larger than the largest ordinal number in the series of all ordinal numbers. Since in this series also Ω itself must occur that would be a contradiction again. It seems that the formation of all sets goes too far and, like the formation of a top genus (summum genus) in traditional terminology, should be excluded by limiting the size of permissible sets. I 320 At first, such a ban did not seem to solve all problems, e.g. Zermelo-Russell's antinomy, at all, unless one wanted to ban all summaries without exception, which would have already impaired the structure of the analysis. Wasn't there simply a false conclusion, as in the paradoxes of the infinite of the type of infinite sets that are in a genuine part whole and yet equal in power? I 322 Russell's Antinomy/Solution: an attempt to avoid Russell's paradox: instead of always saying "all" saying "all who". Thus now the suspicion falls on the "all". Poincaré saw this suspicion confirmed and claimed: Conditions like "~(x x) are inappropriate to determine a set, because they require a circulus vitiosus. He had found this diagnosis not from Russell's antinomy, but from the antinomy constructed by Jules Richard. |
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Sexuality | Beauvoir | Brocker I 297 Sexuality/Beauvoir: According to Beauvoir, there is basically a conflict between individual and genus in every biological species. The lower the species, the more the genus and the compulsion to reproduce, the higher the species, the more individualized the individual specimens. In the human species, this conflict takes on dramatic traits and asymmetrically determines the male and female sex. While men can subordinate sexuality to their individuality, women, due to their biological constitution, are subordinated to the genus, carrying a "hostile element within them [...]: the species that feeds on them" (1). Since human existence basically means being able to put oneself in a relationship to one's own nature, the starting position of women is determined to a greater extent by their biology, but nevertheless it is not already determined. >Gender, >Gender roles, >Sex differences/Psychology, >Culture, >Cultural tradition, >Culture shift, >Body. 1. Simone de Beauvoir, Le deuxième sexe, Paris 1949. Dt.: Simone de Beauvoir, Das andere Geschlecht. Sitte und Sexus der Frau, Reinbek 2005 (zuerst 1951), S. 55 Friederike Kuster, „Simone de Beauvoir, Das andere Geschlecht (1949)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Similarity | Mayr | I 189 Similarity/Mayr: not all similarities of organisms are based on homology: three kinds of characteristic changes can simulate homology: 1st Convergent evolution: independent acquisition of the same characteristic in unrelated lines of descent, e.g. wings in birds and bats. 2nd Parallel evolution: the same with related descent lines due to genetic predisposition for this characteristic, even if it was not phenotypically pronounced in the ancestors. For example, independent acquisition of goggles by a whole family group of flies. 3rd "Setback": loss of the same developed characteristic in several descent lines. >Homology, >Evolution, >Convergence. I 190 Similarity: Darwin regards it as one of the classification criteria because there is no absolute direct correlation between branching and divergence. >Classification, >Criteria. In some family trees, all branches diverge to the same extent. Similarity/Mayr: must be determined as a first step, then the genealogy. I 373 Def similarity: certain characteristics must occur together with other characteristics from which they are logically independent. >Independence, >Method. I 190 Taxonomy: Problem: inconsistent evolution of different groups of characteristics. This can result in completely different classifications. For example, larvae in comparison to adult individuals: can fall into completely different similarity classes. For example, humans are more molecularly similar to chimpanzees than different species of the genus Drosophila among each other. I 192 Categories/Mayr: there is no reliable definition for the higher categories. Higher taxa can be described very well: e.g. birds or penguins. But the category to which they are assigned to is often subjective. >Categories, >Categorization, >Taxa. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Species | Mayr | Gould I 216 Species/Darwin/Lamarck: Species are no natural units but "purely artificial combinations"... conceptual definitions. >Order, >Systems, >Definitions, >Definability, >Classification. I 217 Species/Ernst MayrVsDarwin/MayrVsLamarck: "Species are a product of evolution and not of the human mind." >Evolution, >Evolution/Mayr. I 179 Definition Species/Mayr: device for protecting balanced, harmonic genotypes. "Biological concept of species" seeks biological reasons for the existence of species. Maybe there are other properties by chance. Biological species concept: 1. Problem: Asexual organisms do not form populations. 2. Problem: Spatial expansion with subspecies. They can become independent species in isolation over time (by acquiring new isolation mechanisms). (polytypical species). I 181 Nominalist concept of species: in nature exclusively individuals, species artificially created by humans (MayrVs: that would be arbitrariness, and nature shows that there is no arbitrariness.). I 182 Evolutionary species concept: temporal dimension, generational series of populations. MayrVs: the concept does not take into account that there are two possible ways of species development: a) Gradual transformation of a stem line into another species without altering the number of species; and b) The reproduction of species through geographical isolation. >Systems, >Definitions, >Definability. I 183 Species/Mayr: is applied to three very different objects or phenomena: 1. The species concept 2. The category species 3. The species taxa Some authors could not differentiate between them, leading to hopeless confusion in literature. Species concept: biological meaning or definition of the word "species". Category Species: certain rank in the Linnéian system. (Other categories: Order, Kingdom, Genus...) Definition Species Taxa: special populations or population groups corresponding to the species definition. They are entities ("individuals") and cannot be defined as such. Individuals cannot be defined, but can only be described and delimited. I 183 Evolution/Mayr: Species is the decisive entity of evolution. Species: a species, regardless of the individuals belonging to it, interacts as a unit with other species in the common environment. I 185 Macrotaxonomy: the classification of species (in higher-level groups) Group: mostly easily recognizable: birds, butterflies, beetles. Downward classification (actual identification). Division (aristotelian), heyday of medicinal botany. E. g. warm-blooded or non-warm-blooded - having or not having feathers. I 192 Organism types: most new types of organisms do not originate from the gradual transformation of a stem line, i. e. an existing type. Rather, a founder species penetrates into a new adaptive zone and is successful there thanks to rapid adaptive changes. For example, the more than 5000 species of songbirds are no more than the variation of a single theme. I 192 Species: the two evolutionary ways to produce a new species: a) gradual change of the phenotype and b) increasing diversity (speciation) are only loosely related. I 192 Selection pressure: may not apply if a founder species enters its very favourable adaptive zone. I 283 Species/Mayr: very conservative estimate of 10 million animal species, of which are ca. 1.5 million described. So about 15% known. Legitimate estimate: 30 million species. Only 5% are known. On the other hand, 99% of all bird species are discovered and described. In many insects, arachnids, low vertebrates probably less than 10%. The same applies to mushrooms, protists and prokaryotes. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Terminology | Heidegger | Taken and translated from Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Decease: improper form of death (fear of decease, fear of death) Ordinariness: (Average) The starting point for all investigations (from the ontic to the ontological) Fear: Fear of being in the world - Fear of being about the world (can lead to the actual being in the world) - the "what" of fear is "nothing and nowhere" but always "already there" Outstanding: e.g. debt. Death does not stand out, but is always there (factually) Obtaining: Everyday dealing with witness (caution) but also "being of existence to the world" Stock: non-substantiality of a substance, but independence of the existing self Apprehension: Being-character of the ZUHANDENEN, reference, service, usability, ontological determination of being-the inner-worldly being Cogito sum: not "I think" but "I think something" Existence: Being of the human The others: not: "the rest of the rest", but those from which one does not differ usually Ecstasy of temporality: future; past; present ("outside oneself", "actually and for oneself" "on to" "back to" "being met by") End: end of existence not "maturity"; also not "complete" Discovered-ness: does not refer to the existence-like things Determinateness: the totality of existence: anxiety-ready designing itself specifically in terms of guiltiness (not acting!) - Fear-expecting, futile grounding (GRUNDSEIN) of nothingness Openness: situated understanding Evidence: does not open up Existential: concerning the structures of being Existentials: (instead of categories) concerning the existence Existential: concerning the being Factual: always so and so decided Factuality: In fact, in the world, inner-worldly skill (including seclusion and obscurity), "already being there" Fear: (mode of mental state) approaching within the near (fear of everyday things, e.g. danger) - of inner-worldly being Caring: Being-character of being-with consideration, indulgence Birth: existentially the birth has not passed away, and death is not outstanding Speech: isolations of Man Historicity: (actual) »return of the possible« history does not provide a measurement for truth Violence: conquest of being against tendency to obscurity Expecting: improper form of the future (procure) makes the expectation possible Past: as long as existence exists, it has never passed, but has always been Conscience: Creation of the most personal can-being (openness) "good conscience" is not a conscience phenomenon at all … Gewissenhabenwollen: existentielles Wählen einer Wahl Entschlossenheit - sich selbst wählen; Übernahme der Gewissenlosigkeit Wanting-to-have-a-conscience: the existential choosing of a choice. Resoluteness: choosing oneself; the taking over of one's fundamental consciencelessness. … Gewissheit: resultiert aus dem Vorlaufen der Evidenz aus Vorhandenem überlegen Certainty: results from the anticipation of evidence, surpassing that which is [merely] present-at-hand. … Geworfenheit: Tatsache, dass wir uns die Existenz nicht selbst gewählt haben. Geworfenheit des Seins in sein »Da«: »dass es ist« (ohne woher und wohin) Thrownness: the fact that we have not chosen existence for ourselves. The thrownness of Being into its 'there': the [pure fact] 'that it is' (without a 'whence' or a 'whither'). … Grund: Boden der bereiteten Möglichkeiten, aus dem man wählen muss Ground: the soil of pre-delineated possibilities from which one must choose. … Jemeinigkeit: »ich bin«, »du bist« Bedingung der Seinsmodi - eigentlich/uneigentlich, Unmöglichkeit der Vertretung im Tod Mineness: 'I am,' 'you are' - the condition for the modes of being: authentic/inauthentic; the impossibility of being represented in death. … Kategorien: nur auf Vorhandenes anwendbar Categories: applicable only to the present-at-hand. … »Man«: »Subjekt« der Alltäglichkeit, Daseinsweise der Alltäglichkeit (Existential) The 'They': the 'subject' of everydayness; the mode of being of everydayness (an existential). … Metaphysik HeideggerVsMetaphysik: es gibt grundsätzlich kein »Dahinter« Metaphysics—Heidegger vs. Metaphysics: fundamentally, there is no 'behind' [or 'beyond']. … Mitdasein: Dasein wesenhaft Mitdasein Being-with: Dasein is essentially Being-with. … Mitsein: existential ontologische Bestimmung des Mitdaseins (Dasein umwillen Anderer) Being-with: the existential-ontological determination of Being-with-others (Dasein for the sake of others). … Möglichkeit: steht höher als Wirklichkeit Possibility: stands higher than actuality. … Neugier: Entspringen der Gegenwart (uneigentliche) Form der Zeitigung Curiosity: an arising of the present; an [inauthentic] form of temporalization. … Nicht: Existentialer Sinn der Geworfenheit The 'Not': the existential sense of thrownness. … Nichtigkeit: nicht auch wählen können (Entwurf, Geworfenheit) - nicht Mangel; gehört zur Möglichkeit eigensten Seinkönnens Nullity: the 'not' also being able to choose [certain possibilities] (Projection, Thrownness)—not a deficiency; it belongs to the possibility of one's ownmost potentiality-for-being. … Ontisch: Frageweise der positiven Wissenschaften, die Existenz betreffend Ontic: the mode of inquiry of the positive sciences, concerning existence [as a collection of facts]. … Ontologisch: Frage nach dem Sein es seien den (ursprünglicher) das Existenz Verständnis betreffend Ontological: the inquiry into the Being of entities; (more primordial), concerning the understanding of existence. … Ruf (Gewissensruf): Anruf des Daseins auf sein eigenstes Selbstseinkönnen. Aufruf zum eigenen Schuldigsein (Modus der Rede) sagt nichts aus. »Es ruft« The Call (Call of Conscience): the calling of Dasein to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-itself. A summons to one's own Being-guilty (a mode of discourse) that says nothing. 'It calls'... … Schicksal: das in der Entschlossenheit liegende fortlaufende Sichüberliefern an den Augenblick Destiny: the ongoing handing-over of oneself to the moment, which lies within resoluteness. … Schuldig: Grund-sein einer Nichtigkeit (Seinsart des Daseins) ursprünglich erst Verschuldung im alltäglichen; das Sein soll sich aus der Verlorenheit zurückholen Guilty: being-the-basis of a nullity (a mode of Being of Dasein). Primordially, [this precedes] 'indebtedness' in the everyday sense; Being is meant to win itself back from its lostness. … Selbstheit: Weise zu existieren, nicht vorhandenes Seiendes Selbstsein: Modifikation des Man Selfhood: a way of existing, not a present-at-hand entity. Being-one's-self: a modification of the 'They'. … Seyn: Schreibweise im Spätwerk, Vs traditionelle Ontologie (Note: In English, scholars often use "Be-ing" with a hyphen or leave it as the archaic "Seyn" to distinguish it from the standard "Being".) … Situation: Das je in der Entschlossenheit erschlossene Da. (Eigentlich) - (Entschlossenheit bringt das Sein in die Situation) Situation: the 'There' [Da] as disclosed in each case through resoluteness. (Authentic) — (Resoluteness brings Being into the situation). … Sorge: Beweisweise des Daseins (Sinn)/ sich vorgenommen sein des Daseins zum Sein können, dass es ist. Bedingung der Möglichkeit des Freiseins Care: the mode of proof of Dasein (Sense); the 'having-undertaken-itself' of Dasein toward the potentiality-for-Being that it is. The condition of the possibility of being free. … Sterben: Dasein stirbt, solange es existiert in der Seinsweise des Verfallens Dying: Dasein is dying as long as it exists in the mode of 'falling'. … Stimmung: Zurückbringen auf Mood: bringing [Dasein] back to... … Subjekt/Objekt: bei Heidegger höchstens als Hilfsbegriffe verwendet (statt dessen Dasein und Vorhandensein) Subject/Object: used by Heidegger at most as auxiliary terms (instead using Dasein and Presence-at-hand). … Substanz: Existenz ist die Substanz des Menschen Substance: Existence is the substance of man. … Substanzialität: Seinscharakter der Naturdinge Substantiality: the mode of Being of natural things. … Tod: Eigenste, unbezüglichste, unüberholbare Möglichkeit - Eine Weise zu sein, die das Dasein übernimmt, als äußerstes Noch nicht immer schon einbezogen Death: the ownmost, non-relational, not-to-be-outstripped possibility—a way of Being that Dasein takes over; as the ultimate 'not-yet,' it is always already included. … Uneigentlich: (Seinsmodus) Verfallenheit, »Unbewusstes« (kein benutzter Begriff) - Alltägliches Dasein (besorgend statt sorgend) Geschäftigkeit, Genussfähigkeit (nicht wertend) Inauthentic: (a mode of Being) falling; the 'unconscious' (not a term used [by Heidegger])—everyday Dasein (being 'concerned' rather than 'caring'); busyness, capacity for enjoyment (not a value judgment). … Verenden: Tiere verenden, sie sterben nicht Perishing: Animals perish; they do not die. … Verfallenheit: Zustand des Daseins in der Alltäglichkeit (z. B. dem Gerede glaubend) Falling (Falling-prey): the state of Dasein in everydayness (e.g., believing in 'idle talk'). … Verschlossenheit: Geworfenheit, vor die das Dasein eigentlich gebracht werden kann, bleibt verschlossen kein Nichtwissen, sondern sie konstituiert die Faktizität des Daseins Closedness: Thrownness, before which Dasein can authentically be brought, remains closed; not a 'not-knowing,' but rather it constitutes the facticity of Dasein. … Vertretbarkeit: Seinsmöglichkeit des Miteinanderseins, geht nicht im Falle des Todes Representability (Substitutability): a possibility of Being-with-one-another; [this] is not possible in the case of death. … Vorhandensein: alles andere Sein Presence-at-hand: every other [kind of] Being. … Vorlaufen: Ermöglichen der Möglichkeit (Möglichkeit der eigentlichen Existenz) Anticipation (Running-ahead): the making-possible of the possibility (the possibility of authentic existence). … Wahrheit: Nicht Übereinstimmung, sondern Hervortreten des Verborgenen (Aleithia, Apophansis) Truth: not correspondence, but the emerging of the hidden (Aletheia, Apophansis). … »Welt«: ontologisch: Charakter des Daseins selbst - ontologisch: das All des Seienden das innerhalb der Welt - vorhanden sein kann 'World': ontologically: a character of Dasein itself — [also] ontologically: the totality of entities that can be present-at-hand within the world." … Welt: ontisch: »worin« man lebt (öffentlich und privat) 'World': ontically: the 'wherein' one lives (public and private). … Werden : z. B. Reifen einer Frucht Becoming: e.g., the ripening of a fruit. … Wiederholung: eigentliches Gewesensein (uneigentliches Vergessen) Repetition (Retrieval): authentic 'having-been-ness' (inauthentic: forgetting). … Zeitigung: kein Nacheinander der Ekstasen; Zukunft nicht später als Gewesenheit, diese nicht früher als Gegenwart Temporalizing: no 'one after another' of the ecstasies; the Future is not later than Having-been-ness (Past), and the latter is not earlier than the Present. … Zeitlichkeit: Ursprünglich ontologischer Grund der Existenzialität des Daseins Temporality: the primordial ontological ground of Dasein’s existentiality. … Zirkel: Grundstruktur der Sorge; Zuvor Seiendes in seinem Sein bestimmen müssen und auf diesem Grund die Frage nach dem Sein erst stellen. (Heidegger verwehrt sich gegen den Vorwurf des circulus vitiosus) Circle: the fundamental structure of Care; one must determine the Being of an entity in its Being beforehand, and only on this basis can the question of Being be posed. (Heidegger rejects the accusation of a circulus vitiosus [vicious circle]). … Zuhandensein: Zeug (was im Besorgen begegnet) Readiness-to-hand: Equipment / Tools (what is encountered in 'concern'). … Zukunft: eigentlich endlich (gewisse Priorität gegenüber Gegenwart und Gewesenheit) auf sich zu Future: authentically finite (a certain priority over the Present and Having-been-ness); 'toward-itself'. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 |
| Twin Earth | Dennett | I 572 Twin Earth/Putnam/DennettVsPutnam: Putnam calls for a leap in reference, a leap in intentionality. >Intentionality. I 573f Dennett: one could now tend to think that the inner intentionality had a certain "inertia". The brain cannot focus on one thing and mean another. (Wittgenstein). Twin Earth/Dennett/VsPutnam: you cannot tell a story under the assumption that tables are no tables, even though they look like tables and are used like tables. >Language use, >Reference. Anything else would be a "living creature that looks like Fury" (but is not Fury). But if there are "Butterhorses" on the twin earth which are in all aspects like our horses, then Butterhorses are horses - not an earthly sort of horses, but horses after all. ((s) that is why the twin earth water does have a different chemical formula in Putnam: YXZ. Dennett: of course you can also represented a stricter opinion, according to which the non-earthly horses are a separate species. Both is possible. ((s) VsDennett: it depends on how you define determination). ((s) that only works with "hidden" properties) Twin Earth/DennettVsPutnam: he tries to close the gap by saying that we are referring to natural types, whether we know it or not. Dennett: But what kinds are natural? A breed is as natural as a species or a genus. >Natural kinds. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Variation | Vavilov | Gould II 132ff Variation/Evolution/Vavilov/Gould: Nikolai I. Vavilov was the leading Mendelian geneticist in Russia. In 1936, he served as the main target for the Soviet agronomist T. D. Lyssenko, who had a great influence under Stalin. Vavilov was attacked because of his theory, the so-called law of homologues rows in variation. Vavilov had collected barley, oats and millet from a wide variety of different breeds of wheat from various locations, and noted that within the different species of a genus, but also frequently within the species of related groups, remarkably similar series of varieties could be found. II 135 Definition homologous: similar due to inheritance of the same genes, Definition analogous: similar due to forced adaptation to the environment. Vavilov thesis: The new species emerge by developing genetic differences that exclude crossbreeding with related species. But the new species is not all genetically different from its ancestors. Most of them remain untouched. The parallel variations thus represent the "play through" of the same genetic abilities, which are inherited as blocks of one species to another. Gould: Darwin does not disagree with such a thesis, since it gives the selection an important role. While each variety can represent a predictable latent ability, its development in any climate or geographic region requires selection to maintain the adaptive variant and eliminate others. DarwinismVsVavilov: However, Vavilov's thesis comes into conflict with strict Darwinism, since it weakens the main doctrine that selection is the creating force of evolution. >Evolution, >Darwinism, >Ch. Darwin. II 136 Random and undirected variation plays a major role in Darwin because it determines the central position of selection by guaranteeing that the evolutionary variation itself cannot be attributed to variation. >Mutation. The variation is only the raw material. It arises in all directions and is at least not arranged preferably in an adaptive way. The direction is slowly being determined by natural selection, as the more adapted generations proliferate. However, if the possibilities are very limited and one species shows all of its different varieties, then this choice cannot be explained by selection alone. That's how Vavilov sets himself apart from Darwin. VavilovVsDarwin: Variation does not take place in all directions, but in classes that are analogous to those of chemistry and crystallography. GoudlVsVavilov: Vavilov underemphazised the creative role of the environment. II 139 Lysenko/Gould: Lysenko was a charlatan and undialectic (against his own assertion) by considering plants as modelling clay in the hands of the forming environment. Vavilov died in the name of an apparant Lamarckism. There was an excessively strict Darwinism in the Soviet Union, which misinterpreted Darwin. >Lamarckism. II 140 Gould: From today's perspective, Vavilov has cast a glimpse of something important. New species do not inherit their adult form from their ancestors. They will receive a complex genetic system and a number of development opportunities. This set of options narrows the variation width to a line along which the selection can select points that it cannot move. II 141 In recent experiments with recurring traits in bred mice one has not found Darwinian homologous series in the sense of Vavilov. The simplest and most common conclusion would be to consider snails with a smooth shell on all islands as related and those with a ribbed shell as members of another related group. However, we now know that the complex set of properties always arises independently. VsVavilov: he has overemphasized the internal limitations and reduced the power of selection too much. >Selection. |
Vavilov I Nikolai I. Vavilov Origin and Geography of Cultivated Plants Cambridge 2009 Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aristotle | Locke Vs Aristotle | II 182 Essence/Properties/LockeVsAristotle: the qualities of natural things or "substances" cannot be derived conceptually from their essence, as the Aristotelian scholastic tradition thought it possible. II 195 Knowledge/Rationalism/Aristotle/Descartes/Leibniz: assumption of innate knowledge, substantial forms and "entities" as defined and applied to knowledge. Empiricism/LockeVsAristotle: the objectivity of what is to be known and the unity of the consciousness content occurring in a general idea must be justified by the means of knowing itself. II 198 Genus/Species/LockeVsAristotle: purely artificial product is erroneously regarded as order of laws of nature. However, we can hardly escape the view that they are images of something that really exists. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding |
| Attributes | Quine Vs Attributes | III 262 General Terms/Quine: are represented by predicate letters such as "F", "G", etc. (§ 12.22, where they were simply called "Termini"). Universality/Quine: is not ambiguity! Ex ambiguous: is the singular term "Miller"! It can refer to different people in different contexts. Similarly: Singular Term: "the basement", "the President" ((s) >indefinite description). General Term: "basement", "President". Concrete Term: "Cerberus", "Unicorn" Abstract Term: "7", "3 + 4", "piety" terms for numbers, classes, attributes. Concrete General Term: "man", "red house", "house". Abstract General Term/Quine: "prime", "zoological genus", "virtue", because every virtue and every number and every species is an abstract object. ((s) then "piety" is an abstract singular term). Attribute/Quine: I do not care much for them as entities that are supposed to be different from classes. III 263 Attributes: can be considered different, even if they apply to the same things. E.g. "having a heart", "having kindneys". Classes/QuineVsAttributes: classes are easier to identify and to distinguish. If we must distinguish, then: Attribute/Quine: e.g. "human nature": Name of an attribute. Class Name/Name of a Class/Quine: "humanity". |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Hume, D. | Ryle Vs Hume, D. | I 341 Impressions/Ideas/Notion/Emotion/Hume/Ryle: Hume is known to have believed that there were both "impressions" and "ideas", both sensations and notions. He looked in vain for a demarcation line. "Ideas"/Hume/Ryle: he thought they were generally paler than impressions and later in their formation, as they are traces, references and reproductions of impressions. Yet he realized that impressions may have any degree of pallor or weakness. And that ideas, although they are representations, do not appear with the stamp "copy", just as impressions do not appear as "original". According to Hume, therefore, an inspection cannot determine whether a perception is an impression or an idea. I 342 RyleVsHume: Hume's mistake was to confuse "seeing" and seeing and "perception" and perception. And to assume that "perception" is a genus of which there are two types, namely impressions and ghosts or echoes of impressions. E.g. Ghosts: There are no such ghosts, and if they did exist, they themselves would only be impressions. And they would belong to seeing, not to "seeing". Hume's attempt to distinguish between impressions and ideas as between things that are "living" and less "alive", was one of two serious errors. Suppose first that "alive" means "agile" in Hume. Someone can vividly imagine something, but he cannot vividly see. Idea/Ryle: can be "more vivid" than a different idea, but Impressions/Ryle: cannot be described as vivid, just like babies are not more lifelike than dolls. Someone who does not play is neither convincing, nor not convincing, and can therefore not be more convincing than an actor. RyleVsHume: let us assume then, that Hume understood "alive" to mean "intensive", "strong". Then he was in error in another respect. For while emotions can be compared in terms of their strength and intensity, so they cannot be compared with ideas in this regard. E.g. if I imagine to hear a huge noise, I hear neither a loud nor a soft noise. I have no auditory sensation at all. E.g. a scream that I imagine is not deafening, but on the other hand it is not a soft murmur either. Neither does it drown an actual murmur, nor will it be drowned by it. I 370 Fantasy/Notion/Ryle: in imaginary landscapes it is pointless to ask whether they are properly imagined, like with melodies that are not yet complete. E.g. Nevertheless, the actor pretends to give a convincing representation of a Martian. I 372 "Seeing"/RyleVsHume: now we see Hume's other mistake: in the mistaken belief that "seeing" and "hearing" consists in the having of shadow sensations (which includes the other error that such a thing exists), he championed the causal theory that you cannot have a particular idea, without previously having had the corresponding sensation. The only thing that is true about this theory, is: what I see in my mind's eye, is in some way linked to what I have seen before. But the nature of this link does not correspond to Hume's idea in any way. I 373 Memory/Notion/RyleVsTrace Theory: its followers should try to imagine the case where someone has a melody going through his head over and over again. Is that a reactivated trace of an auditory sensation, or a number of reactivated traces a series of auditory sensations? |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
| Sophists | Plato Vs Sophists | Gadamer I 351 Sophisten/PlatonVsSophisten/Platon/Gadamer: Das Urbild aller leeren Argumentation ist die sophistische Frage, wie man überhaupt nach etwas fragen könne, was man nicht wisse. Dieser sophistische Einwand, den Plato im „Menon“(1) formuliert, wird dort bezeichnenderweise nicht durch eine überlegene argumentative Auflösung überwunden, sondern durch die Berufung auf den Mythos der Präexistenz der Seele. Das ist freilich eine sehr ironische Berufung, sofern der Mythos der Präexistenz und der Wiedererinnerung, der das Rätsel des Fragens und Suchens auflösen soll, in Wahrheit nicht eine religiöse Gewissheit ausspielt, sondern auf der Gewissheit der Erkenntnis suchenden Seele beruht, die sich gegen die Leerheit formaler Argumentationen durchsetzt. Gleichwohl ist es kennzeichnend für die Schwäche, die Plato im Logos erkennt, dass er die Kritik an der sophistischen Argumentation nicht logisch, sondern mythisch begründet. Wie die wahre Meinung eine göttliche Gunst und Gabe ist, so ist auch das Suchen und die Erkenntnis des wahren Logos kein freier Selbstbesitz des Geistes. Rechtfertigung durch den Mythos: (...) die mythische Legitimierung, die Plato der sokratischen Dialektik hier gibt, [ist] von grundsätzlicher Bedeutung(...). Bliebe das Sophisma unwiderlegt - und argumentativ lässt es sich nicht widerlegen -, würde dieses Argument zur Resignation führen. Es ist das Argument der „faulen Vernunft“ und besitzt insofern wahrhaft symbolische Tragweite, als alle leere Reflexion ihrem siegreichen Scheine zum Trotz zur Diskreditierung der Reflexion überhaupt führt. Vgl. >Reflexion/Gadamer; HegelVsPlaton: >Reflexion/Hegel. 1. Menon 80 d ff. Bubner I 37 DialekticVsRhetoric/Plato/Bubner: knowledge of the method makes the philosopher a free man, while the effect-oriented speaker is mired in the illusion of words. (VsSophists). Bubner I 50 Sophists/PlatoVsSophists: the sophist oscillates intangibly between different beings. The diaireses (distinctions), however, do not function by themselves, but only with the use of prior knowledge. Since the diaireses (distinction of genus and species) fail with the sophists, the insight into the inappropriateness of the method grows after a number of runs. The specifying of general terms cannot handle the sophists. This leads to a reflection on the appearance which always appears different from what it is, and thus remains elusive. I 51 Logic/PlatoVsSophists: now, formal logic does not preclude pointless links. This results in the abandonment of the distinction between the philosopher and the mere sophist. I 52 PlatoVsSophists: the ratio of the linked concepts to each other possibly obscures the relation between speech and thing. Closely related to the problem of otherness. The complex relation of otherness is no longer determinable with the sophists. Thanks to his dialectical ability, the philosopher keeps track. Thus, dialectic is not a neutral method, either. I 98 PlatoVsSophists: coherence theory instead of correspondence theory: not empiricism, but incompatible concepts criticize judgment |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Subject Philosophy | Habermas Vs Subject Philosophy | I 119 Philosophy of the Subject: (HabermasVs, NietzscheVs,) ... the nihilistic domination of subject-centered reason is conceived as result and expression of a perverseness of the will to power. I 180 ...the existence is justified out of itself. Thus, Heidegger conceives the world as a process again only from the subjectivity of the will self-assertion. This is the dead-end of the philosophy of the subject. It does not matter whether primacy is given to epistemological questions or the question of being. The monological execution of intentions, i.e. purpose activity is considered as the primary form of action. (VsCommunication). The objective world remains the point of reference. (Model of the cognitive relation). I 309 HabermasVsSubject Philosophy: the attempt to escape the unfortunate alternatives always ends in the entanglements of self-deifying subject consuming itself in acts of futile self-transcendence. Since Kant, the I simultaneously takes the position of an empirical subject in the world where it finds itself as an object among others. In the position of a transcendental subject it faces is a world as a whole which its constitutes itself as the totality of the objects of possible experiences. The attempts to understand these irreconcilable alternatives as self-generation of the mind or of the genus range from Hegel to Merleau-Ponty. HabermasVsHegel: because these hybrid undertakings pursue the utopia of complete self-knowledge, they keep turning into positivism. (Today: the body-soul problem). I 435 LuhmannVsSubject Philosophy: "Simple minds want to counter this with ethics." (Habermas: not without scorn.). HabermasVsSubject Philosophy: overall social awareness as a superordinate subject, it creates a zero-sum game in which the room for maneuver of individuals cannot be accommodated properly. ((s) Every social conflict would appear as schizophrenia.) Habermas: Solution: alternative concept strategy: public communities can be understood as a higher-level intersubjectivities. In this aggregated public there is also an overall social consciousness. This no longer needs to fulfill the precision requirements of the philosophy of the subject to the self-consciousness! Luhmann II 136 Subject Philosophy/Habermas: Problem: in philosophical discussions, ideological criticism not even survives the simplest self-application. At most, it can explain why someone is wrong, but it cannot show that there is a mistake. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
| Tradition | Wessel Vs Tradition | I 16 Universality/WesselVsTradition: according to the traditional view there are individual domains in which the logical rules supposedly do not apply: e.g. states of change. In modern intuitionist mathematics, double negation is not equated with position. Wessel's Question: why do we regard these logical laws as universal and not others? Where is the boundary between universal and nonuniversal laws? Here one should not expect reasonable answers. Logical laws, by their very nature, do not allow for exceptions, I 17 and they do not depend on any peculiarities of an area. The only thing that depends on the range is which of the known laws are used. I 329 Definition/Wessel: it is always about the introduction of a new term for an already known (introduced) term. ta ‹_›def tb or a ‹_›def b. I 330 Tradition: a more general term is always restricted. (>genus, differentia specifica). Example electron: light, negative elementary particle. ta '_'def t(b lv P u Q) (b lv P u Q: "b with the property P u Q"). WesselVsTradition: a definition can also have a completely different form: ta '_' t(a1 v ...van) (e.g. "fruit", enumeration). |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
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