Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Grue | Grue, philosophy: Artificial predicate in a thought experiment by Nelson Goodman (N. Goodman, Fact, Fiction and Forecast, Indianapolis, 1965) to illustrate his "New riddle of induction". An object x is grue iff x has been observed before time t and is green or has been observed after t and is blue, the time t being in the future. The problem of uncertainty as to whether something is green or grue arises because the set of green objects is a subset of the set of grue objects. See also induction, projectability, predicates. |
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| Grue | Carnap | IV 31 Grue /CarnapVsGoodman: "red", etc. are purely qualitative predicates; ’grue’, etc. are positional predicates. GoodmanvsCarnap: the distinction qualitative/positional is relative to a perspective on a respective base language. This could also include gred/reen as basic predicates, then "red" and "green" would have to be interpreted in relation to a time. IV 32 Then the attributions "qualitative"/"positional" was reversed. There is no perceptible color change: who understands "green" in the sense of "gred" understands understands "color" in the sense of "blolor": things of equal blolor are those which are gred etc. See more authors on >Grueness. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Grue | Chomsky | I 290 Grue/ChomskyVsGoodman: Grueness is amarginal problem - the initial question is much too vague. - You can easily find a property of language "grue bleen" which is not a property of a "languange like German" - e.g. the predicate "being similar", only applied to objects rather than to qualia. Chomsky: there is no point in time t such that we can predict of objects that they will not be similar - they could be the similar if both were green - it is a property of natural languages that they behave more like German than like "grue bleen" - but language concepts such as "German" are too vague to satisfy Goodman’s criterion - we cannot explain why the learner does not acquire grue as basis for generalisation - that certainly follows from the sensory system. >Learning, >Language acquisition, >Induction. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 |
| Grue | Putnam | V 256 Grue/Goodman: pathological predicates cannot be excluded on purely formal grounds. >Projectability. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Grue | Stalnaker | I 81 Grue/grueness/Stalnaker: grue is not a region in logical space. Logical space: principle: all relations must be grounded in intrinsic properties. >Foundation, >Logical space, >Intrinsicness. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Grue | Schurz | I 219 Grue/gred/reen/Goodman/Schurz: logical form: (B: observed. G*: gred). G*: <> ((Bxt0 > Gx) u (~Bxt0 > Rx)). Sa: emerald. Sample: {a:1 ≤ i ≤ n} Then the assertions Sai u Bat0 u Gai and Sai u Bat0 u G*ai are definitionally equivalent. If we apply the inductive generalization inference for both "green" and "gred," our sample yields the two all-hypotheses H:= "All emeralds are green" and H*: = "All emeralds are gred". Problem: However, H and H* imply contradictory predictions (green versus red) for all emeralds not observed before t0. Schurz: There is the following connection to subjective inductive permutability assumptions: for regular probability functions the permutability assumption cannot be valid for a predicate (Gx) and its pathological counterpart (G*) at the same time. Question: What criteria should we use to decide which predicates we consider to be exchangeable or inductively projectable? Many criteria have been proposed and proved to be unsuitable. Carnap: (1947(1),146, 1976(2), 211): Thesis: only qualitative predicates are inducible (projectable) "grue" is a Def "positional" predicate/Carnap, i.e. a predicate that in its definition refers to time t0. Ex grue. Def qualitative predicate/Carnap: has no definitional reference to individual constants. GoodmanVsCarnap: (Goodman 1955/75(3), 105): Problem of language dependence (sic: dependence): By mutual redefinition one can pass from our language (with "green" and "red") to a language equivalent in expressive power, in which "gred" and "reen" (G*x, R*x) function as basic terms (basic predicates): Language L (Gx,Rx primitive) Definitions in L G*x: <> ((Bxt0 > Gx) u (~Bxt0 > Rx)) R*x: <> ((Bxt0 > Rx) u (~Bxt0 > Gx)) Language L* (G*x, R*x primitive) Definitions in L* Gx: <> ((Bxt0 > G*x) u (~Bxt0 > R*x)) Rx: <> ((Bxt0 > R*x) u (~Bxt0 > G*x)). Solution/Schurz: One can distinguish between qualitative and positional predicates language-independently with respect to ostensive learnability! (s) Properties dependent on a future time cannot be shown). I 220 GoodmanVsInduction/Schurz: but this still does not answer why induction should be based on qualitative and not on positional predicates. Induction consists in extending patterns previously observed as constant into the future. In order to formulate induction rules in a meaningful way, we need to know what remained constant! And that depends on qualitative features. Positional features are pseudo-features. Pointe: That individuals are "constant" "grot" means that they change their color from green to red at t0. In this case we have done "anti-induction" and not induction. This is the reason why we have (with Carnap) for induction rules basic predicates for qualitative and not positional features. 1. Carnap, R. "On the Application of Inductive Logic", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 8, 133-147. 2. Carnap, R. (1976). Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaft, 3. Aufl. München: Nymphenburger. (Engl. Orig. 1966). 3. Goodman, N. (1955/75) Tatsache, Fiktion, Voraussage, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp. Engl, Orig. Fact, Fiction and Forecast (1955). |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Carnap, R. | Goodman Vs Carnap, R. | II 67 GoodmanVsCarnap/Reduction Sentences: the whole thing is pretty absurd. In my opinion, philosophy has the task to explicate, not to describe science (and the everyday language). The explication shall refer to pre-systematic use of the expressions of consideration, but does not need to comply with the order. It s all about economy and standardization. Schurz I 219 Grue/Bleen/Goodman/Schurz: logical form: (B: observes G*: grue) G*: ((Bxt0 > Gx) u (~Bxt0 > Rx)). Sa: Emerald. Sample: {a:1 ‹ i ‹ n} Then the assertions Sai u Bat0 u Gai and Sai u Bat0 u G*ai are equivalent b< definition. If we apply the inductive generalization conclusion both for "green" and for "grue", our sample results in the two universal hypotheses H: = "All emeralds are green" and H*: = "All emeralds are grue". Problem: H and H* imply for all emeralds not observed before t0 conflicting forecasts (green vs red). Schurz: the following relationship exists to subjective inductive exchangeability assumptions: for regular probability functions the exchangeability assumption cannot be valid at the same time for the predicate (Gx) and its pathological counterpart (G*). Question: according to which criteria should we decide which predicates we consider as exchangeable or inductively projectable? Many criteria were proposed and proved to be unsuitable. Carnap: (1947.146 1976, 211): Thesis: only qualitative predicates are inducible (projectable) "grue" is a Def "Positional" Predicate/Carnap, that is a predicate that refers to the time t0 in its definition. E.g. grue. Def Qualitative Predicate/Carnap: has no definitional reference to individual constants. GoodmanVsCarnap: (Goodman 1955/75, 105): Problem of language dependence (sic: dependence): through reciprocal re-definition it is possible to move from our own language (with "green" and "red") to a language which is equivalent in its expressiveness and in which "grue" and "bleen"(G * x * x R,) act as basic concepts (basic predicates): Re-Definition/Language Dependence/Logical Form: Language L (Gx, Rx primitive) language L* (G*x, R*x primitive) Definitions in L Definitions in L* G*x: ‹› ((Bxt0 > Gx) u (~Bxt0 › Rx)) Gx: ‹› ((Bxt0 › G*x) u (~Bxt0 › R*x)) R*x: ‹› ((Bxt0 › Rx) u (~Bxt0 › Gx)) Rx: ‹› ((Bxt0 > R*x) u (~Bxt0 › G*x)). Solution/Schurz: it is possible to distinguish between qualitative and positional predicates in terms of ostensive learnability independent of the language! I 220 GoodmanVsInduction/Schurz: this does not answer why induction should be based on qualitative and not on positional predicates. Induction consists in extending pattern that were so far observed as consistent into the future. To be able to formulate useful induction rules we need to know what remained constant! And that depends on the qualitative features. Positional features are pseudo-features. Important argument: the fact that individuals are "constantly" "grue" means that they change their color from green to red at t0 . In this case, we have carried out "anti-induction" and not induction. That is the reason why we (with Carnap) have basic predicates for qualitative and not positional features for induction rules. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Counterfactual Conditional | Field Vs Counterfactual Conditional | I 220 Problem of Quantities/PoQ/Modality/Field: but this does not exclude a possible modal solution to the PoQ: perhaps other operators can help? Anyway, I do not know how that could be excluded, even if I do not know what these operators should look like. I 221 Counterfactual Conditional/Co.Co./PoQ/Field: one suggestion is to use Counterfactual Conditional to solve the PoQ: FieldVsCounterfactual Conditional: 1) they are known to be extremely vague. Therefore, you should not rely on them when formulating a physical theory. Neither should we use Counterfactual Conditional for the development of geometrical concepts. 2) DummettVsCounterfactual conditionals: They cannot be "barely true": if a Counterfactual Conditional is supposed to be true, then there must be some facts (known or unknown facts) that can be determined without Counterfactual Conditional, and by virtue of which the Counterfactual Conditional are true. (Dummett, 1976, p.89). Then the relationism cannot use the Counterfactual Conditional for the PoQ, because in that case the principle requires: if distance relations are counterfactually defined, then situations that differ in their distance relations (like situations A and B) must also differ in non-counterfactual respects!. Substantivalism: can guarantee that. Relationism: cannot, and if it could, it would need no Counterfactual Conditional. 3) VsCounterfactual conditionals: does not work for very similar reasons for which the version with impredicative properties (P3) did not work: no theory about counterfactually defined relations works if these relations cannot also be counterfactually defined, (This is the formal reason for the metaphysical argument of Dummett, for why Counterfactual Conditional cannot be "barely true"). E.g. In order to prove the incompatibility of "double distance" and "triple distance" (given that z and w do not occupy the same point, i.e. given that zw is not congruent with zz - (logical form: local equality) - then you would need the incompatibility of the following: a) if there were a point u in the middle between x and y, then uy would be congruent with zw. b) if there were a point s between x and y, and a point t between s and y, so that xs, st and ty were all congruent, then ty would be congruent with zw. If these Counterfactual Conditional were somehow derivable from non-counterfactual statements, E.g. statements about spacetime points (ST points), then you could probably, and by way of derivation. I 222 Together with the demonstrable relations between the non-counterfactual statements win an argument for the incompatibility of (a) and (b). But if we have no non-counterfactual support, we would have to consider them as bare facts. That would not be so bad if you only needed a small amount of them, but we would need a very large number of them. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Disposition Theory | Kripke Vs Disposition Theory | Esfeld I 102 Disposition/Rule/Rule-following/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Esfeld: KripkeVsDispositions: Kripke (1982) (S.A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Cambridge, 1982): Do not help, because they are also limited. They are also unable to solve the Problem of Normativity: Why would the act that one is predisposed to do the same one should do if intending to follow the rule? No distinction possible between correct/incorrect. Kripke: He takes it on further than Quine who concentrated on behavior (Quine in Word and Object, explicitly based on Wittgenstein). I 103 Meaning/Contents: If one assumes that they were platonic objects, the problem is only deferred: How can a person capture these senses? What does it matter that a finite sequence of mental acts grasps the true meaning? (E.g. addition). Katz: Proposes that such platonic objects (Fregean Sense) themselves are finite. VsKatz: Every finite sequence can express more than one particular sense. What is the difference between both the conception of addition and quaddition? Form/KripkeVsAristotle: same problem: If you wanted to assume like A. that natural properties are inherent in all physical objects, the question is how to recognize the right ones! I 104 Grue/Natural Property: N.P. is e.g. "green" contrary to grue. Problem: Every finite number of examples instantiates more than just one natural characteristic. E.g. a table can be brown, and can also have four legs. We may not figure out which aspects a person refers to. Kripke: Asserts that Wittgenstein himself advocates the skeptical position I 105 and proposes a skeptical solution, in analogy to Hume’s solution regarding the Problem of Causation. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Disposition Theory | Verschiedene Vs Disposition Theory | Stegmüller IV 34 Disposition/Mind/Ryle: mean, meaning, intentionality: are not occurrences in consciousness, but abilities, dispositions. IV 35 I.e. in the case of plus/quus as of grue exactly the same mental history runs off together with identical mental states and consciousness processes. Conclusion: the decisive dispositions were acquired in the past. The difference then does not only exist in the present, it already existed in the past! RyleVsKripke: then I would also have used the standard function of addition in the past. IV 35/36 KripkeVsRyle: triple criticism: 1. External criticism: denies that any assumptions about dispositions are relevant at all. The problem is not understood at all. How can he invoke disposition as justification? An instruction to myself shows nothing at all. VsVs: a) I just have a hypothesis about myself. VsVsVs: why should precisely this hypothesis of countless other possible ones be the right one? IV 37 VsVs: b) We let the past rest. Right is what seems right to me now! WittgensteinVsVsVs: this leads to the fact that one can no longer speak of "right" here! 2. Internal criticism: (some people mistakenly think that Wittgenstein himself represented them): consists in specifying a criterion for a function F, which I mean by such a symbol. Def "Finity Problem"/Stegmüller: the finite cannot simply be transferred to the infinite. (Not only experiences, but also dispositions are finite). IV 38 Def "quus"/grue/Kripke's Wittgenstein/Stegmüller: Re-Definition: the skeptical problem is reproduced: the function is the quaddition that corresponds to the addition for all pairs that are sufficiently small to be added by me, and returns the result 7 for the others. Thus I have always had the same dispositions. VsDisposition Theory. Disposition Theory/Stegmüller: a) can try to defend itself by understanding disposition not literally, but as an idealization of actual practice. Ceteris paribus disposition. KripkeVs: then I would have to make more and more fantastic assumptions about what I would do if this and that happened to me. IV 39 b) The idealization could be interpreted differently: "if I had the ability..." KripkeVs: that becomes circular. It assumes that the function I mean is something fixed. The "fact" would have to be assumed that I have a very specific intention! Dilemma for the disposition theory: a) Either only disposition for a finite number of cases, or b) Idealization of the reaction. Problem: ba) if these conditions are specified precisely, nothing can be said about my reaction. bb) a fact is assumed. IV 40 KripkeVsDisposition Theory: it leaves no room for possible errors! The disposition theorist cannot defend himself here by saying that there is a gap between what he meant and what he "should mean". Because the "function that he actually means" is not fixed for him from the outset by a table independent of the disposition. IV 41 Rather, in the opinion of the dispositionalist, the function can be read from disposition. For this reason, the disposition, to make mistakes must be part of the overall disposition. Def "Skaddition"/Kripke: would be the disposition of our person including the disposition to make mistakes. IV 42 Rule/Competence/Kripke: Competence cannot explain rules because it requires rules. (This does not apply to VsChomsky). VsDisposition Theory: Similarities can also be based on the fact that we sometimes make mistakes. IV 47 Addition/Disposition Theory/Kripke's Wittgenstein: (see above "external criticism (1)"): Suppose it were true that by "+" I mean addition. Problem: what is the relation between this assumption and the kind of answer I will give to the question !117 + 159"? Disposition Theory: all variants falsely state that it is this and that descriptively comprehensible relation. Mean/intention/normative: but if one understands to mean in such a way that what I mean now determines what I should say in the future, that is normative, not descriptive. This is the main point VsDisposition. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Goodman, N. | Chomsky Vs Goodman, N. | I 287 Language learning/language acquisition/Goodman: Second language is not problematic because the acquisition of the first language is the acquisition of a "secondary symbolic system". ChomskyVsGoodman: that could have some weight if it could be shown. (For example, for the distinction of surface structure and depth structure). But we have no empirical evidence. --- I 288 ChomskyVsGoodman: Acquisition of first and second language: Fallacy: If we learn the second language easier by means of explanations from the first language, we would have had to acquire a language before the first language in order to acquire the first language (which is particularly easy). (Regress). Goodman: Acquisition of the first language is acquisition of a "secondary symbolic system" and therefore corresponds to the acquisition of the second language. Chomsky's: the primary symbolic systems that he has in mind are rudimentary and cannot be used in the same way as a first language in acquiring the second language. GoodmanVsChomsky: his theses cannot be checked because we do not have examples of "bad languages". --- I 289 ChomskyVsGoodman: There are dozens of books in which features of a universal grammar are formulated and their empirical consequences are examined, whereby each such property specifies "bad" languages. --- I 290 Grue/ChomskyVsGoodman: affects more of a border problem. The initial question is too vague. You can easily find a property, even a fairly general one, of the language "grue bleen", which is not the property of a "language like German". E.g. Chomsky: the predicate "be equal" (Structure of Appearance) applies only to objects instead of to Qualia. Now the language grue bleen has the peculiar property: "If an object A before t and an object B after t are examined, and if both are determined to be grue (or bleen), then we know that they are not like each other. But there is no such t that we could predict of these objects that they will not be equal. They could just as well be equal if both are grue (or bleen). Chomsky: it is undoubtedly a general property of natural languages that they behave more like German than "gruebleen". Thus, there is no difficulty in establishing a distinction between such languages as grue bleen and such as German. This would not suffice Goodman, of course, because one could still construct more refined examples. As long as it is only about vague terms like "like German" or "like Gruebleen", Goodman's requirement is impossible to fulfill. --- I 291 ChomskyVsGoodman: It may be relevant to induction, but not to linguistics, just as little as for any other science, such for the question of why embryos get arms and no wings within a given framework of conditions. ((s) is irrelevant because once conceptual, once empirical.) Chomsky: with this we cannot explain at all why the learner does not acquire grue as a generalization basis. Undoubtedly this follows from certain properties of the sensory system. Congenital ideas/ChomskyVsGoodman: it does not seem incomprehensible to me that any aspect of the "final state" of an organism or automaton is also an aspect of its "initial state". And this before any interaction with his environment! --- I 292 Innate ideas/ChomskyVsGoodman: in his essay, Goodman at least once admits that the mind contains ideas in some sense. Then it is obviously not incomprehensible that some of these ideas are "implanted as an original equipment" to the mind. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 |
| Goodman, N. | Verschiedene Vs Goodman, N. | Introduction Putnam II IV Some PhilosophersVsGooodman: they do not appreciate his dependence on the actual history of past inductive projections in culture. They say: a valid inductive derivation must not contain disjunctive predicates. PutnamVs: this does not work: being disjunctive, from the standpoint of logic, is a relational attribute of predicates. Whether a predicate is disjunctive depends on the truth of a language. Sainsbury V 129 Grue/SainsburyVsGoodman: To complain about a lack of anchoring would be too strong a blockade on future scientific innovation! Intuitively, the strongest lack of the predicate "grue" is that it is only true by virtue of the fact that the objects are already examined. Anne-Kathrin Reulecke (Hg) Fälschungen Frankfurt 2006 I 358 Perfect Forgery/Goodman: (Spr. d. KU, 105).): Thesis: that later I might be able to see a difference that I do not perceive yet, now states a significant aesthetic difference for me. It cannot be concluded that the original is better than the copy, but it is aesthetically valued higher. ((s) The original also contains the inventive achievement. But the copy could be more successful from a design point of view.) I 359 Römer: The investigation of forgeries should therefore not begin with the question of the relationship to the original, but with the representation that we produce according to Goodman (i.e. we do not copy a construct or an interpretation). Def genuine scientific fiction/Vaihinger: 1. contradiction to reality up to self-contradiction 2. provisional nature 3. without claim to factuality 4. expediency. RömerVsGoodman: his "scientific fiction" of a perfect forgery does not eliminate the hierarchy original/forgery. Nor does he draw any consequence from the aesthetic difference on the representation system. When a perfect forgery appears in the context of originals, its authenticity is rather confirmed. I 360 Then the forgery is a product of the representation system just like the original, only that it violates the prevailing morality. Forgery/Klaus Döhmer: (late 70s): Thesis: Forgery makes use of legitimate artistic methods while changing its objective, thus it is not an objective-material, but a subjective-intentional category. (Zur Soz. d. Knst- Fälschung, Zeitschr. f. Ästh. .u. allg. Kunst-Wiss 21/1 (1978),S 76-95). Römer: this is tantamount to a paradigm shift: forgery as a methodical problem. Anne-Kathrin Reulecke (Hg) Fälschungen Frankfurt 2006 I 406ff Def Forgery/Bolz: Forgery: deliberately represent something unreal for real. Question: Who will be harmed? Directly the collector/museum director, indirectly the art historian. Perfect Forgery/BolzVsGoodman: he does not succeed in making it clear that the concept of the original does not include any superiority over the forgery. It is not about real quality but about authenticity shaped by the history of production. 407 Aura/Bolz: in order to explain why this is important for aesthetic enjoyment, Goodman would have to resort to Benjamin's concept of aura. (Bolz pro Aura). Aura/Bolz: does not lead to the opposition original/forgery, but to uniqueness/technical reproducibility. Putnam I 256 Israel ShefflerVsGoodman: asks: "Does Goodman's philosophy result in us creating the stars?" Goodman/Putnam: G. answers: not like the brick is burning, but in a way they are already created by us. We did not create the big bear, but we made a constellation out of it. |
Sai I R.M. Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 German Edition: Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Goodman, N. | Stegmüller Vs Goodman, N. | IV 33 Grue/VsGoodman/Stegmüller: one could reply that there must be a perceptible change in colour. But: GoodmanVsVs: who understands "green" in the sense of "bleen" also understands "color" in a non-standard way as "blolor": where things of the same blolor are those that are "bleen" etc.. (>emerabines are grue, rubalds are bleen). |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Hempel, C. | Quine Vs Hempel, C. | XI 108 Projectability/Goodman/QuineVsHempel/Lauener: the complement of a projectable predicate need not be projectable. E.g. "Non-grazers" and e.g. "Non-cow" are not projectable. (>bleen-grue, authors on >Grueness). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Hockett, Ch. F. | Lyons, J. Vs Hockett, Ch. F. | Lyons I 244 Congruence/Rection/Modern Grammar/Lyons: new: here we describe the difference in the terms endocentric/exocentric. Rection/Hockett: can only be found in exocentric constructions. E.g. ad urbem, differs distributionally from the constituents ad and urbem. Congruence/Hockett: is only to be found in endocentric constructions, namely in a bond across hierarchical structures, i.e. across immediate constituents, I 245 between certain predicative attributes and subjects. Congruence/Lyons: thus prevails both in endocentric and in exocentric constructions. E.g. "un livre intéressant" coincides distributionally with "un livre", On the other hand: Le livre est intéressant : (also here there is congruence between livre and intéressant) Le livre est intéressant : (here too there is congruence between livre and intéressant) is exocentric because its distribution differs from that of le livre on the one hand and that of intéressant on the other. LyonsVsHockett: so it is not true (as many have claimed) that the number of a subject is determined by the person and the number of the verb. And also incorrectly is (which is even more often claimed) that the subject and not the verb determines, or vice versa, that rather subject and verb form a category that belongs to the construction whose members they are. Solution/Lyons: (see below) numerus and person are nominal categories that can be marked flectively or otherwise in the surface structure of the verbal complex. Tradition: expresses it like this: "The verb matches the subject in number and person". |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Hume, D. | Goodman Vs Hume, D. | II 112 Hume imagined the mind in a way that it can be caused to make forecasts according to regularities in the observable. GoodmanVsHume: We, however, see the mind as being in activity from the beginning. He corrects gradually. (Like Dennett) Sainsbury V 139 Grue/Goodman: "regularities are where we find them, and we find them everywhere." Grue/Goodman/Sainsbury: therefore, there are still many ramifications between confirmation and belief. Grue/GoodmanVsHume: shows that the regularity defined by Hume is not the only one. Problem: what is regularity after all (>regularity)? The connection of emeralds with "green" or the connection with "grue"? Problem: either we cannot explain what regularity is, then there is no induction, or we provide an explanation of regularity, which includes the unwanted connection with "grue". Regularity depends on description! This has led some people to extreme conventionalism according to which there is no separation of the world from the conventions. |
Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 Sai I R.M. Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 German Edition: Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993 |
| Hume, D. | Verschiedene Vs Hume, D. | Hacking I 68 Causality/W.C.BroadVsHume: VsRegularity: For example we can see that the siren of Manchester howls every day at the same time, whereupon the workers of Leeds let the work rest for one hour. But no causation. Hacking I 70 CartwrightVsHume: the regularities are characteristics of the procedures with which we establish theories. (>Putnam). Hume I 131 Def Atomism/Hume/Deleuze: is the thesis that relations are external to conceptions. (KantVs). VsHume: Critics accuse him of having "atomized" the given. Theory/DeleuzeVsVs: with this one believes to have pilloried a whole system. As if it were a quirk of Hume. What a philosopher says is presented as if it were done or wanted by him. I 132 What do you think you can explain? A theory must be understood from its conceptual basis. A philosophical theory is an unfolded question. Question and critique of the question are one. I 133 It is not about knowing whether things are one way or the other, but whether the question is a good question or not. Apron I 238 Lawlikeness/lawlike/Schurz: b) in the narrower sense: = physical necessity (to escape the vagueness or graduality of the broad term). Problem: not all laws unlimited in space-time are legal in the narrower sense. Universal, but not physically necessary: Example: "No lump of gold has a diameter of more than one kilometre". Universality: is therefore not a sufficient, but a necessary condition for lawfulness. For example, the universal statement "All apples in this basket are red" is not universal, even if it is replaced by its contraposition: For example "All non-red objects are not apples in this basket". (Hempel 1965, 341). Strong Hume-Thesis/Hume/Schurz: Universality is a sufficient condition for lawlikeness. SchurzVs: that is wrong. Weak Hume-Thesis/Schurz: Universality is a necessary condition for lawfulness. ((s) stronger/weaker/(s): the claim that a condition is sufficient is stronger than the claim that it is necessary.) BhaskarVsWeak Hume-Thesis. BhaskarVsHume. Solution/Carnap/Hempel: Def Maxwell Condition/lawlikeness: Natural laws or nomological predicates must not contain an analytical reference to certain individuals or spacetime points. This is much stronger than the universality condition. (stronger/weaker). Example "All emeralds are grue": is universal in space-time, but does not meet the Maxwell condition. ((s) Because observed emeralds are concrete individuals?). I 239 Natural Law/Law of Nature/Armstrong: are relations of implication between universals. Hence no reference to individuals. (1983) Maxwell condition/Wilson/Schurz: (Wilson 1979): it represents a physical principle of symmetry: i.e. laws of nature must be invariant under translation of their time coordinates and translation or rotation of their space coordinates. From this, conservation laws can be obtained. Symmetry Principles/Principle/Principles/Schurz: physical symmetry principles are not a priori, but depend on experience! Maxwell Condition/Schurz: is too weak for lawlikeness: Example "No lump of gold..." also this universal statement fulfills them. Stegmüller IV 243 StegmüllerVsHume: usually proceeds unsystematically and mixes contingent properties of the world with random properties of humans. Ethics/Morality/Hume: 1. In view of scarce resources, people must cooperate in order to survive. 2. HumeVsHobbes: all people have sympathy. If, of course, everything were available in abundance, respect for the property of others would be superfluous: IV 244 People would voluntarily satisfy the needs in the mutual interest according to their urgency. Moral/Ethics/Shaftesbury/ShaftesburyVsHume: wants to build all morality on human sympathy, altruism and charity. (>Positions). HumeVsShaftesbury: illusionary ideal. Ethics/Moral/Hume: 3. Human insight and willpower are limited, therefore sanctions are necessary. 4. Advantageous move: intelligence enables people to calculate long-term interests. IV 245 The decisive driving force is self-interest. It is pointless to ask whether the human is "good by nature" or "bad by nature". It is about the distinction between wisdom and foolishness. 5. The human is vulnerable. 6. Humans are approximately the same. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Hume, D. | Mackie Vs Hume, D. | Armstrong III 57 MackieVsHume: (1979) (Stove, et al.): overlooked the possibility that observational premises, while they do not contain any conclusion about the unobserved, still can yield a logical possibility, e.g. 99% of Fs are Gs. Then it is obviously rational to conclude that a is a G. So one can say that the observed cases provide a logical opportunity for unobserved cases. Purely mathematical argument about distribution. VsTheory of Regularity: yet there is a coherent reason why the principles of logical possibility alone cannot solve the problem of the theory of regularity. The issue with logical possibility is that it cannot distinguish between natural and non-natural classes. Ex.: grue as an unnatural predicate cannot readily be ruled out. III 58 That all emeralds are grue, has the same logical possibility (the same percentage as the green ones). Stegmüller IV 238 Virtue/Hume: distinction: natural virtue: is part of biological provisions. Moral philosophers before Hume exclusively referred to these virtues. Ex: generosity, forbearance, charitableness, altruism, moderation, impartiality. (Basis: human sympathy). artificial virtue: nothing but human inventions. Ex: respect for property; rules of transfer of property, promise, commitment to adhere to contracts, loyalty towards the government. IV 239 Artificial virtues have no natural origin. Ex: respecting other's property: 1. cannot originate from benevolence towards others: for then the respectation would depend on whether the property serves the welfare of all. 2. also, it cannot depend on whether the person concerned seems sympathetic or not. 3. sympathy is imaginable in gradations, respect for property is not. This applies mutatis mutandis to all artificial virtues. IV 240 Morality/Hume: I cannot base my duties on whether someone seems sympathetic or not. natural virtue/MackieVsHume/Stegmüller: to begin with, one would expect that the discussion of the natural virtues is much easier, since the first step (about the genesis) does not apply. Problem: (also recognized by Hume) if the natural virtues were an effluence of sympathy, they would have to run parallel. But this is not the case. Our sympathies are self-centered! We have more sympathy for people who are closest to us. IV 241 But we expect from moral judgments that they are impersonal and impartial. Thus, the seemingly absolute difference between natural and artificial virtues must partially be abandoned. The "natural" virtues, too, thus form a system of conventions. They are supposed to serve the "long-term interests" of all. The natural virtues then are such artificial virtues in which we find instinctive inclination to act accordingly. In the artificial virtues, we find no such basis. They are merely socialized. Stegmüller IV 355 Miracle/probability/Hume/Stegmüller: probability is always to be qualified by the level of information. But Hume's argument would even be valid if credibility of witnesses were a law of nature! Even then it would not be rational to believe in miracles. Miracle/Mackie: difference: a) question: on grounds of the reports, which hypotheses about laws should be assumed? b) the weight of the evidence itself. Miracle/MackieVsHume: also the reporter himself requires the notion of a well-founded natural law in order to classify the event as a miracle. IV 356 Hume does not anywhere considere the strengthening by several independent witnesses. IV 412 Teleological proof of God's existence/MackieVsHume: (by and large pro Hume): but one can interpret the conclusion by analogy in a way that God is introduced as that which caused the natural world and explains it. IV 413 But also here Hume would be proved to be correct that no further consequences arise therefrom. In particular, the relationship between God and the world remains unexplained. Science/theory/Mackie: Darwinian theory of evolution, too, does not facilitate any predictions! IV 414 Order/theory of evolution/Mackie/Stegmüller: in Darwinism order is not explained by the proposition, that God created the world for us, but that we have adapted to it. |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Inflationism | Field Vs Inflationism | II 220 Gavagai/Deflationism/Field: the question is whether the facts about our use of the equal sign determine that it stands for identity instead of partial identity. The normal axioms just make sure that it is an equivalence relation and also a congruence relation with respect to the other predicates of our language. FieldVsInflationism: amplifies the uncertainty. Even if partial identity was a "partial reference" of "=" in a primitive language that contains no predicate "is a unseparated part of", it is likely that the addition of this predicate would then exclude this. Thus, the vagueness of "rabbit" would also be reduced. II 221 These observations are based on an inflationist perspective. Deflationism/Field: reduces the indeterminacy. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Intuitionism | Mackie Vs Intuitionism | Intuitionism Stegmüller IV 175 MackieVsIntuitionism ethics: is not based on incorrect analysis but is a false (not some pointless) theory. (as objectivism). IV 176 3. The mystery of accruing (Zukommen): what is the kind of relation between the natural fact that murder is a cruel act and the moral fact that it is morally wrong? Objectivism/ethics/Stegmüller: moral falsity "accrues" or was supervenient. Sometimes called "non-causal because": the action would be morally wrong because it would be an infliction of pain. VsObjektivism: the meaning of this relation would have to be explained. IV 177 Subjectivism/ethics/Stegmüller: for him there is no such problem. He invokes the fact that such acts are condemned socially. IV 213 Ethics/morality/Mackie/Stegmüller: five theses: 1. Anti-objectivism: there are no objective values and no metaphysical substantiation. No moral law, no good in itself for mankind, no categorical imperative. (MackieVsKant). Mackie: "Argument of peculiarity": "Shall Be Done", etc. (as an entity), "Mystery of accruing". (see above). 2. VsIntuitionism: if objectivism is false, intuitionism is also based on a falsity: (special ability to recognize, moral "knowledge") . IV 214 3. VsUtilitarianism: cannot answer important questions of moral philosophy and demands a change of mankind. 4. VsUniversalization: all descriptive interpretations are only of metaethical interest. In normative interpretations the issue of justification is unresolved. The third stage U3 is congruent with illusionary utilitarianism. IV 215 5. confusion of ethics and metaethics: in normative interpretation we have 2nd order moral statements, which require moral justification themselves. "Metaethical fallacy": transition from opinions to the determination of truth. |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Kant | Wittgenstein Vs Kant | Brandom I 75 WittgensteinVsKant: standards pragmatic, not explicit. --- Münch III 327 WittgensteinVsKant: new: regulated use is viewed (only) constitutively for all intuitive beyond the realm of concepts. Kant considered the descriptive as another ability. Precisely the "view" with a radically different procedure. Elmar Holenstein, Mentale Gebilde, in: Dieter Münch (Hg) Kognitionswissenschaft, Frankfurt 1992 --- Kant I 12 I/Kant: general I (an I, which is produced by the moral) overcomes affective subjectivity. - Problem: the absolute I, in the I-experience I burden myself with the affective and sometimes psychological pathos of existence: to be unique, but still not neccessary. - Fear of nothingness, helplessness of reason. --- Kant I 13/14 The Unconditional: necessary idea of reason: to think the unconditioned without contradiction. The conditional is meaningless, must be eliminated in the moral purification of the self. --- Kant I 14 WittgensteinVsKant: In relation to the Absolute, there is nothing to see, nothing scientifically expressible anyway. "The solution to the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of this problem." --- Putnam III 220 WittgensteinVsKant/Putnam: you can read it this way that the language game so far resembles our lives, since neither the game nor life is based on reason. Thus, a core of Kantian philosophy is disputed. Wittgenstein II 35 There are no true a priori propositions (the so-called mathematical propositions are no propositions). WittgensteinVsKant. --- IV 109 Chirality/WittgensteinVsKant/Tractatus: 6.36111 right and left hand are in fact completely congruent. That you cannot bring them to cover one another has nothing to do with that. One could turn the gloves in a four-dimensional space. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Lewis, D. | Bowie Vs Lewis, D. | V 42 Ähnlichkeit/Ähnlichkeitsrelation/sim.r./Ähnlichkeitsmetrik/Mögliche Welten/MöWe/Lewis: Problem: man sollte nicht denken, dass irgendeine spezielle Ähnlichkeitsrelation (sim.r.) an die man gerade denkt, in einer allgemeinen Ähnlichkeit ein bestimmtes Gewicht haben sollte. Bsp Grueness trägt nichts zur Ähnlichkeit vor dem Zeitpunkt t bei! (>grue). Bsp was für eine Ähnlichkeit der Schriften von Wittgenstein und Heidegger sollte irgendwie zählen? Die Zahl der Vokale? Absurd. BowieVsLewis: wenn einige Vergleichsaspekte aber gar nichts zählen sollten, dann wäre die "Zentrierungsannahme" verletzt: d.h. Welten die in einer nicht beachteten Hinsicht abweichen, müssten als identisch mit unserer wirklichen Welt zählen. LewisVsVs: es gibt keine Welten, die sich nur in solchen Hinsichten von unserer unterscheiden, die nichts zählen, auch wenn sie sich unter anderem in solchen Hinsichten von unserer unterscheiden. Die Hinsichten mögen auch nicht völlig trennbar sein. Weiteres Problem: es ist allzu leicht, Unterscheidungen zu treffen und dann anzunehmen, dass sie allen Zwecken genügten! Wir müssen unterscheiden zwischen ganz verschiedenen sim.r., solchen, die offensichtliche Urteile beeinflussen, und solchen, die kontrafaktische Urteile beeinflussen. Wenn wir das nicht unterscheiden, gibt es ein Argument: VsA 2: manchmal scheint ein solches Paar von kontrafaktischen Konditionalen (KoKo) wahr zu sein: "Wenn A, wäre die Welt sehr verschieden von unserer, aber wenn A und B, dann nicht sehr verschieden". Lösung: man muss sim.r. für explizite Urteile von sim.r. für kontrafaktische Urteile unterscheiden! V 43 Es könnten sogar in der Interpretation eines einzigen Satzes solche ganz verschiedenen sim.r. auftauchen. Wir sollten uns nicht zuerst für eine Ähnlichkeitsart entscheiden und dann anschließend A2 damit testen. Damit würden wir bloß eine Kombination von A2 mit einer absurden Annahme über die Konstanz von Ähnlichkeit testen. Stattdessen müssen wir die richtige sim.r. dadurch finden, dass wir unser Wissen über Wahrheit und Falschheit von KoKo benutzen, um zusammen mit A 2 die richtigen Wahrheitsbedingungen zu finden. Diese Kombination kann dann entgegen unserem Wissen über KoKo unabhängig getestet werden, nicht A 2 allein. |
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| Milne, E.A. | Kanitscheider Vs Milne, E.A. | I 345 Space/Space-Time/Geometry/Universe/Metric/Milne: this has the surprising result that Milne's space-time metric has the same shape as the line element of Robertson/Walker, if the function R(t) = ct and the curvature k = 1 is selected. However, the mathematical terms here have a different >meaning (meaning change) They determine the equivalent observers and not the time-dependent spatial structure. The properties of the three-dimensional equivalence are very different, depending on whether they are viewed from scale t or τ . The most important difference is that space and time in t measure are not common for all egos. There is no "public space"! But all "private" spaces have an Euclidean structure. In the τ measure space and time apply to all, but the space itself is hyperbolic. The preference of the t space forces Milne to indicate how the velocity distribution of the egos, which he then identifies with the nuclei of the galaxies, looks like if there are no preferred reference systems (cosmological principle). (I 346 +). Substrate/Milne: one demands that the velocities, which are dropped in the component intervals (u,u +du), v,(v + dv), (w, w + dw) shall be assessed equally by all observers. Universe/Milne: with increasing distance the escape velocity increases and the density goes towards infinity near the point r = ct. The edge, which flees from the observer at the speed of light, creates the impression of a horizon. It itself is not occupied by galaxies, the particles (observer = galaxy) thus represent an "open" set, whose boundary prevents the human from looking into the "outer" space. The world has no windows. The weakening of the light of very distant objects acts like a curtain. The limiting spherical shell can be seen as a counterpart to the initial singularity in a certain way, because here and there the particles lie arbitrarily dense and both are inaccessible. According to the Lorentz transformation, moving clocks go slower and so every observer, although the clocks are congruent, has the impression that all spatially distant events belong to an earlier epoch. I 348 Every fundamental observer therefore considers himself to be the "oldest inhabitant" of the universe, because his own clock will indicate a later point in time for an event that takes place at his own place than any clock of another fundamental observer. All distant galaxies will therefore appear younger to us, both because the clocks of these distant objects follow, and because of the time it takes for light to reach us. If t is the age of the universe, then the most distant galaxies today can have reached ct. But what we see of them, however, is at most ½ c t away. ("radar method"). The term "age of the universe" in Milne only makes sense for members of the substrate, i.e. for certain fundamental observers. Looked on from the outside, the term is meaningless. The world is just "appearance", in no sense is it "in itself". I 348 VsMilne: Hardly anyone has violated the rules of empirical knowledge acquisition as much as he has. KanitscheiderVsMilne: The main criticism must start with the use of the subjective time lapse as the foundation of physical time without establishing a basis for the additive properties of time intervals. Only because he restricts himself to a comparative conceptual form ("sooner/later") of time, he can claim that his classification of clocks does not require any convention. He uses a relational, but a subjective time and no relatively objective, physical time. KanitscheiderVsMilne: also his method is derived because it includes the constancy of the speed of light. I 351 In other theories, the reference to natural clocks (earth rotation) or the laws of mechanics (law of inertia) are applied. God/Milne: from the dependence between the dynamic time scale and the atomic scale t one can see that the world could not have existed before the time t = 0 and therefore must have been created. GrünbaumVsMilne: the value of τ = minus infinite cannot be assigned real meaning in the same way as a finite value. It is only a "syncategorematic sign", like the transfinite cardinal number Aleph 0 and therefore the singularity of the time scale does not exclude the existence of matter for t < 0. Nor can one deduce any divine intervention from it. I 353 Substrate/KanitscheiderVsMilne: Question: in which way the substrate in Milne, which provides local rest systems everywhere in the form of continuously distributed fundamental observers, can be identified with the real galaxies. I 354 Due to the discrete set of galaxies, only a part of the fundamental observers (observation points) can be materialized. Contradiction to its strict homogeneity requirement. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Reichenbach, H. | Vollmer Vs Reichenbach, H. | II 123 Dimension/Vividness/Reichenbach/ Vollmer: congruence behaviour. (+). Learnable. VollmerVsReichenbach: Topology, but not the metric of spatial view could be genetically determined. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Relationalism | Substantivalism Vs Relationalism | Field I 191 Substantivalismus/Field: pro: weil er keine mathematischen Entitäten braucht – VsRelationismus: braucht moderaten Platonismus – daher uninteressant. I 196 FieldVsRelationismus/Physik: der R hat ernste Probleme, Newtonsche Physik auf dieser Basis, aber auch auf jeder anderen Ideologie zu entwickeln. Das zeigt die reformulierte Version des Problem der Quantitäten/Relationalismus/Field: man könnte meinen, daß man einfach die Definitionen des Substantivalismus übernimmt und nur statt "u ist eine Region" neu: "u ist ein Aggregat (von Materie)" I 197 und statt "u ist ein Punkt" neu: "u ist ein Materieteilchen in einem Moment" (instantaneous point particle), also ein minimales Aggregat (ohne echte Teile). Vs: aber das geht nicht, fast jede substantivalistische Definition schlägt mit dieser Modifikation fehl. Bsp Abstand: für die Prädikate C2,C3,C4 (s.o.) kann man nicht definieren, was es für Materieteilchen x und y wäre, doppelt so weit voneinander entfernt zu sein, wie die Teilchen z und w, in dem man sagt, daß es ein Teilchen u zwischen x und y gibt, so daß xu und yu kongruent mit zw ist. Denn es braucht ((s) empirisch) kein solches Materieteilchen zwischen x und y zu geben! S: nach ihm gibt es dort etwas, selbst wenn es dort keine Materie gibt: (s) die leere, für sich bestehende Raumzeit. mögliche Lösung: (s.u.) Modalität, ((s) "mögliche Teilchen"). falsche Lösung/Field: man könnte meinen, man müsse nur zusätzliche Ideologie einführen: vielleicht ein Prädikat xySzwtu, das bedeuten soll, daß der Abstand zwischen x und y der Abstand zw plus der Abstand tu ist. Daraus könnte man xyC2zw definieren als xySzwzw. Oder xyC3zw: als EuEv[uvC2zw & xySuvzw]. Vs: das geht nicht, weil wir xyC3zw auch haben könnten, wenn es sein kann, daß es kein u,v gibt, so daß uvC2zw!. Das gleiche gilt für jede angestrebte Ideologie. (s) Eingeführte Prädikate müssen auch auf etwas referieren und nicht nur "möglicherweise" referieren. VsRelationalismus: muß solche Prädikate immer als Grundbegriffe annehmen. I 201 VsRelationalismus/Beschleunigung/Field: Problem: der R hat als einzige trajektorie-artige regionen nur die aktualen Trajektorien ((s) keine bloß möglichen, weil er keine leere RZ akzeptiert). D.h. daß es nur sehr wenige verfügbare gibt! Nicht genug, um den Ansatz des Substantivalismus zu übertragen. D.h. nicht genug, um die Beschleunigungs Prädikate direkt anzuwenden. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Various Authors | Milne Vs Various Authors | Kanitscheider I 340 MilneVsSteady State Theory/SST/MilneVsSST: er nennt sie irrational, da sie die kontinuierliche Entstehung von Materie notwendig macht, , irrational, weil sie die Angabe der Rate verlangt, in der Materie pro Raumeinheit und Zeit entsteht. Geometrie/Raum/Milne: die Frage, welche Geometrie den realen Raum wiedergibt, sei sinnlos, es gebe nur den Darstellungsraum für die Phänomene und der könne rein willkürlich gewählt werden. Expansion/Milne: Konsequenz: E. kann nicht eindeutig beurteilt werden! Ob sie vorhanden ist, oder nicht, richtet sich nach der Wahl des mathematischen Beschreibungsapparates. d.h. des Zeitmaßstabes (> Messen). Kanitscheider: dahinter ist die Frage nach der relationalen oder absoluten Raumauffassung verborgen: Expansion im Raum oder E. des Raumes selbst? I 342 >Messen/Milne: lehnt die metrologischen Grundsätze der relativistischen Physik ab! Nicht der starre Maßstab, der die Längeneinheit angibt und nach dessen stipulativer Festlegung die physikalische Geometrie ermittelt wird, und nicht die isochronen Uhren, die nach Spezifizierung durch einen natürlichen periodischen Vorgang das Zeitmaß bestimmen, sind die fundamentalen Messgeräte. Man benötigt vielmehr allein die Zeitabläufe verschiedener, räumlich getrennter Beobachter, die in bestimmter Weise qualifiziert und untereinander in kommunikative Kongruenz gesetzt werden, zur Gewinnung eines Abstandsmaßes, das für die dreidimensionale Welt noch durch den Theodolithen ergänzt wird. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Various Authors | Lyons, J. Vs Various Authors | Lyons I 169 / I 134 Grammar/Semantics/Congruence/Lyons: we called the expressions used for the characteristics e.g. "proper name" or "appellative" grammatically. I 170 We have not yet abandoned the principle that such expressions, when they stand for word classes, are terms for distributional categories. N.B.: that leads us to semantics! Classification: due to characteristics such as "animated" etc. this often contradicts the meaning of the words (see Chapter 7 below). VsContent-Related Grammar/Lyons: this is the reason why most authors have withdrawn from "content-related grammar". In a language description, the lexicon must contain both grammatical and semantic information for each word. Lyon's thesis: there is often congruence between semantic and grammatical classification. There one can infer the grammatical information partly from the word meaning. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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| grue | Carnap, R. | Schurz I 219 Grue/CarnapVsGoodman: Example Carnap: Thesis: only qualitative predicates are inducible (projectable) "grue" is a Def "positional" predicate: its definition refers to the time t0 - GoodmanVsCarnap: one can introduce an equally expressive language with gred/reen as basic predicates - SchurzVsCarnap: positional/qualitative can be distinguished by difference in ostensive learnability - Induction/Goodman: Solution: in an induction we must know what remained constant - these are the qualitative characteristics. - "Gred" remains constant during the change! - But we used it for anti-induction. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
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