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Hyperintensionality | Cresswell | I 101 Hyperintensionality/Cresswell: (more fine-grained than worlds) - ultimately we need access to the world. >Fine-grained/coarse-grained, >Individuation, >Identification, >Possible worlds, >Cross world identity, >Centered worlds. II 72 hyperintensional proposition/hyperintensionality/Cresswell: an approach which takes worlds instead of propositions as the basic concept. >Propositions, >Basic concepts. II 73 The (one-digit) predicate is then a function of things on propositions, etc. 1st problem: we do not know a) what it is for a proposition to be true or b) for two propositions to be incompatible. >Contradictions. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
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Mentalesese | Stalnaker Vs Mentalesese | II 234 Semantic structure/belief/Stalnaker: beliefs can also be about semantic structure or about internal or external representations with a semantic structure. You can believe that a belief has a certain semantic structure II 235 without assuming a certain truth value of this belief! Semantics/belief/belief ascription/Stalnaker: why is semantic knowledge or lack of knowledge relevant to the problem of belief objects? Informational content: e.g. M and N have the same informational content. Suppose x believes M but not N. Solution/Stalnaker: then it must be the way that x either does not know what content M has or does not know what content N has. And that is purely semantic information. Information/content/belief/Stalnaker: thesis: so there must always be a difference in the information not only in the way the content is saved. (> StalnakerVsMentalese, ((s) > hyperintensionality: this concept is here not used by Stalnaker.). Since the believer precisely distinguishes between M and N a (semantic) information about the difference between necessary equivalent statements must be available to him! Semantic knowledge: is in simple cases obvious. E.g. if O’Leary does not know that 12 = a dozen (Stalnaker: a fortnight = 14 days) then he is missing information on the semantic value of certain words. ((s) Semantic value/Stalnaker/(s): e.g. the semantic value of "a dozen" is twelve pieces. (or a fortnight = two weeks). |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
Modal Realism | Stalnaker Vs Modal Realism | Stalnaker I 36 Proposition/closeness/Stalnaker: whatever propositions are, if there are any at all, there are also sets of them. And for each set of propositions it is definitely true or false, that all of its elements are true. And this is of course again a proposition. (W5) Closeness-condition: for each set of propositions G there is a proposition A so that G implies A and A implies every element of G. Stalnaker: that means that for each set of propositions there is a proposition that says that every proposition in the set is true. So I suppose that the world-stories-theorists wants to add (W5) to his theory. (W6) Equivalent propositions are identical. Problem: the problems of (W6) are known. ((s) > hyperintensionalism/ hyperintensionality): propositions that are true in the same worlds are indistinguishable, VsPossible worlds semantics). I 40 modal realism/MR/Lewis/Stalnaker: by Lewis the actual world (act. wrld.) is only a real part of a reality which consists of many parallel universes which are spatially and temporally separated. Actual world/Lewis/Stalnaker: is then indexically defined as the part that is related to us. Unrealized possibilities/Possibilia/Lewis/Stalnaker: then actually exists, but in another part of the reality. Its non-actuality only exists in its localisation somewhere else. ((s) This is only a polemical presentation: Localization must be more than "somewhere else". Localization may be not carried out by us for areas that do are not related to us because we have then no knowledge.) Modal Realism/MR/Stalnaker: divides into 1. semantic thesis: assertions about what is possible and necessary, should be analyzed in concepts about what is true in some or all parts of reality 2. metaphysical thesis: about the existence of possible worlds (poss.w.). Semantic MR/Stalnaker: problem: VsMR it could be argued that it is not possible to know the metaphysical facts about it even if the semantic part was true. I 41 Lewis: there is a parallel here to Benacerraf's dilemma of mathematical truth and knowledge. I 42 EpistemologyVsModal Realism/Stalnaker: the representatives of the epistemological argument against the MR reject the parallel between mathematical objects and realistically construed possibilia. They insist that reference and knowledge require causal relation of concrete things even if that does not apply for abstract things (numbers etc.). Knowledge/LewisVs: why should the limit between what for knowledge and reference requires a causal relation to be made in concepts of the distinction abstract/concrete? Knowledge/Lewis: instead we should say that reference and knowledge require a causal relation of contigent facts but not the one of modal reality (knowledge about what is possible and necessary). Modal Realism/knowledge/Lewis: thesis: in the context of MR, we can say that indexical knowledge requires causal relation, but impersonal knowledge does not. I 43 Platonism/mathematics/Stalnaker: pro Lewis: here knowledge does not have to be based on a causal relation. Then Benacerraf's dilemma can be solved. EpistemologyVsModal realism/Stalnaker: but I still feel the force of the epistemological argument VsMR. Reference/knowledge/Stalnaker: problem: to explain the difference between knowledge and reference to numbers, sets and cabbages and so on. I 49 Possible worlds/pos.w./MR/Vsmodal realism/knowledge/verificationism/StalnakerVsLewis: the modal realist can cite no verificationist principles for what he calls his knowledge. Conclusion: problem: the MR cannot say on the one hand that poss.w. things are of the same kind (contingent physical objects) like the real world and say on the other side that poss.w. things are of what we know in the same kind as of numbers, sets, functions. ((s) The latter are not "real" things). |
R.C. Stalnaker I Stalnaker Ways a world may be Metaphysical and Anti-Metaphysical Essays Clarendon Press Oxford New York 2003 II Stalnaker Context and Content Oxford University Press NY 1999 |
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Hyperintensionality | Cresswell, M.J. | II 74 Hyperintensionality/Cresswell: Solution: hyperintensional propositions express different propositions - despite the same intention of a and non-non-a. I.e. Thesis: different propositions can have the same intension. ((s) Hyperintensionality should therefore be a solution, not the problem). ... Proposition/Cresswell: this shows that the problem of propositional semantics is not that one should have a certain view of what propositions actually are (see above chapter 1) but that it is a general problem of compositional semantics. Cresswell: Thesis, therefore, there is no reason to abandon the intensional theory of propositions. |
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