Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Articles | Article: word before a noun or a nominalization. There are definite (the) and indefinite articles (a, an). |
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| Articles | Kamp | Cresswell I 175 Definite descriptions/Cresswell: so far we have only spoken about undefined descriptions! Undefined descriptions/Russell. Thesis: a man means "at least a man". Certain descriptions/Russell. Thesis: the man means "this particular man". Anaphora/HintikkaVsRussell: the tradition has no explanation for the anaphoric use of certain descriptions. Article/Cresswell: recent attempts to integrate the old linguistic idea into the traditional logic that the indefinite article introduces new objects in the speech while the definite article refers to already introduced entities. This corresponds to: Article/Kempson: (1975, 111)(1): thesis: definite/indefinite article should be distinguished not semantically but only pragmatically. Article/old/new/file change semantics/Heim/Cresswell: the distinction between old and new entities in connection with the article is also found in Heim (1983). I 176 There it leads to the file change semantics/Kamp/Heim: Thesis: as entities in the world the objects are not new, but only within the speech, therefore "files". (Files, "new in the files"). Definiton file/Heim/Cresswell: a file represents facts about objects for the speaker. >File change semantics, (1) Ruth M. Kempson (1975): Presupposition and the delimitation of semantics (Cambridge Studies in Linguistics, 15). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Kamp I Kamp From Discourse to Logic: Introduction to Modeltheoretic Semantics of Natural Language, Formal Logic and Discourse Representation Theory (Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy) Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Articles | Millikan | I 176 Indefinite article/Millikan: an indefinite article causes a name plus modification (description) to function purely descriptive. E.g. Henry was bitten by a poisonous snake, not by toxicity or the property of being a snake. Truth value/Truth: to have a truth value, the sentence must map a situation that involves a particular individual, that is, it must have a real value. (> Terminology/Millikan). N.B.: but it is not important which snake it was exactly, so that the sentence works properly ((s) i.e., performs its >eigenfunction). I 189 Definite article/description/Millikan: if it is used with necessary identifying descriptions, it is actually superfluous. It only develops its power with other descriptions. Unambiguous/determinateness/MillikanVsRussell: the definite article does not have the function of establishing unambiguousness. Exception: necessarily identifying dsignations, which are purely descriptive. But even then a translation into an inner name is always possible. I 189 Randomly identifying/description/definite article/Millikan: randomly identifying descriptions with "the" are indexical. And relative to the identification function, these are also necessary identifying descriptions. >Identification, >Description. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Copula | Frege | I 90 Copula/Frege: a coplua can be found in the sentence e.g. "The sky is blue". Contrast: a contrast is offered by the equation: "The number of Jupiter’s moons equals four". The four contains nothing related to Jupiter and moon. >Equal sign, >Equation, >Identity. I 109 Equal Sign/"="/Frege/(s): the equal sign links objects, not concepts or predicates with properties. By contrast, the copula/(s): links an object with a concept. >Concept, >Object. IV 100 The copula does not express identity: "sky = blue", but a simple "is". (The predicate is enclosed). Correct: "The sky is a blue thing": "A is a B". (> indefinite article). |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
| Definitions | Frege | I 15 Definition/Frege: you cannot define: "The number one is a thing" because there is a definite on the one side of the equation and an indefinite article on the other. >Equations, >Articles, >Definability. I 78 Definition/Frege: specifying a mode of operation is not a definition. I 99 Definition/Object/Introduction/Frege: the way in which an object was introduced is not a property of the object. >Introduction. The definition of an object only specifies the use of a sign, it says nothing about the object. ((s) Here: introduction of an object in the speech = definition) Introduction/Frege: after the introduction, the definition turns into a judgment about the object. I 130 FregeVsFormalism: formalism only gives instructions for definitions, not definitions as such. >Formalism. I 131 E.g. Number i/Frege: you have to re-explain the meaning of "sum". FregeVsFormalism/FregeVsHilbert: it is not enough to demand only one meaning. >Foundation. IV 100ff Definition/Object/Frege: the definite article must be on both sides here. Defining an object only specifying the use of a sign. More interesting are definitions of properties. IV 100ff Indefinable/Frege: truth and identity are indefinable as simple basic concepts. Other AuthorsVs. > truth theories, > theories of meaning. >Truth theories, >Meaning theories. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
| Descriptions | Kamp | Cresswell I 167 Indeterminate description/Kamp/Heim: indeterminate descriptions are not quantifiers, because real quantifiers cannot work beyond sentences, while pronouns can be connected anaphorically with undefined descriptions from earlier sentences. >Quantifiers, >Pronouns, >Anaphora, >Prosentential theory. Example: (5) Everyone found a cat and kept it. (6) It ran away. Only that in (5) can be anaphorically related to the cat. Cresswell I 175 Indeterminate description/Russell: conforms with existence quantification: E.g. a man: "at least a man." >Existential quantification. New Theory/Cresswell: the indefinite article introduces new objects, the specific refers to introduced ones. I 176 File change semantics/Home: thesis: as entities in the world the objects are not new, but only within the speech, therefore file change ("new in the documents") - File/Kamp/Home: represents facts about objects for the speaker. >File change semantics. |
Kamp I Kamp From Discourse to Logic: Introduction to Modeltheoretic Semantics of Natural Language, Formal Logic and Discourse Representation Theory (Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy) Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Words | Bloomfield | Lyons I 200 Lexeme/Linguistics/Lyons: in this (abstract) use we determined above that e. g."singing" is only a form of another word, while "singer" is a word of its own. >Lexemes. Modern LinguisticsVs: neglects this abstract form. e.g.: BloomfieldVsTradition: the school grammar is inaccurate because it describes units such as e.g. book, books, or e.g. do, does, did, as different forms of the same word. I 201 LyonsVsBloomfield: however, is inaccurate in that it is still up to us how we define "word". Lexeme/Lyons: let's introduce the lexeme here as the more abstract form of the word (neither phonological, nor grammatical). These abstract units, according to the syntactic rules, are present in different forms of flexion. Cf. >Morphemes, >Phonemes, >Phonology, cf. >Signs, Lexeme/Spelling/Lyons: with capital letters e.g. CUT. Lyons I 204 Def Word/Bloomfield/Lyons: (most famous modern definition): the word is the "smallest free form". Def Bound Form/Bloomfield/Lyons: Shapes that never appear alone as whole utterances. Def Free Form: a form that can occur alone as an expression. Def Smallest Free Form/Bloomfield: any free form that does not contain any part of its own. (= word). ((s)Vs: Problem: then unacceptable is not a word, because acceptable is a word). LyonsVsBloomfield: this applies to phonological rather than grammatical words. I 205 Bloomfield: did not distinguish clearly between grammatical and phonological words. BloomfieldVsBloomfield/Lyons: he himself recognised that some words are not covered by his definition, such as "the" and "a" (indefinite article). This is because they hardly ever appear as independent utterances. Solution/Bloomfield: additional criterion: treat "the" and "a" as "this" and "that". These occur sometimes freely ((s) in answers) and are in the same environment within the sentence. LyonsVsBloomfield: the definition has been accepted by many, but it does not serve the main purpose of the grammatical description to create sentences ((s) rules?) from which actual and possible expressions can be derived. All questions of classification must be subordinated to this objective. |
LingBloom I Leonard Bloomfield Language New York 1945 Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bloomfield, L. | Lyons, J. Vs Bloomfield, L. | Lyons I 201 Lexem/Linguistics/Lyons: in this (more abstract) use we have stated above that e.g. "singing" is only a form of another word, while "singer" is a word of its own. Modern LinguisticsVs: neglects this abstract form. E.g.: BloomfieldVsTradition: the school grammar is inaccurate because it designates units such as e.g. book, books, or e.g. do, does, did as different forms of the same word. I 201 LyonsVsBloomfield: but is inaccurate in that it is still up to us how we define "word". Lexem/Lyons: here we introduce the more abstract form of word (neither phonological nor grammatical). It is these abstract units that occur in different flexion forms according to the syntactic rules. Lexem/Writing/Lyons: with capital letters e.g. CUT. Word/Definition/Lyons: Problem: how to define a unit that occupies a middle rank between morpheme and proposition, so that it corresponds to some extent to our intuitions, whereby these intuitions are rather guided by the non-essential orthographic convention? Def Word/Bloomfield/Lyons: (best known modern definition): the word is the "smallest free form" ((s) in the language). Def bound form/Bloomfield/Lyons: forms that never occur alone as whole utterances. Def free form: a form that can occur alone as an utterance. Def smallest free form/Bloomfield: any free form that does not contain a part itself. (= word). LyonsVsBloomfield: this applies more to phonological than to grammatical words. I 205 Bloomfield: did not clearly distinguish between grammatical and phonological words. BloomfieldVsBloomfield/Lyons: Bloomfield himself realized that some words are not covered by his definition like "the" and "a" (indefinite article). This is because they hardly ever occur as independent utterances. Solution/Bloomfield: additional criterion: to treat "the" and "a" like "this" and "that". These sometimes occur freely ((s) in answers) and stand within the sentence in the same environment. LyonsVsBloomfield: the definition has been accepted by many, but it does not serve the main purpose of grammatical description to generate sentences from which actual and possible utterances can be derived. All questions of classification must be subordinated to this goal. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Formalism | Frege Vs Formalism | Brandom I 606 FregeVsFormalists: How can evidence be provided that something falls under a concept? Frege uses the concept of necessity to prove the existence of an object. Brandom I 609 Free Logic: "Pegasus is a winged horse" is regarded as true, although the object does not exist physically. It can serve as substituent. FregeVs. (>Read). Brandom I 620 Frege: Pegasus has "sense" but no "meaning". FregeVsFormalism: Important argument: it is not enough merely to refer to the Peano axioms, identities such as "1 = successor to the number 0" are trivial. They do not combine two different ways of picking out an object. Solution: Abstraction: it is necessary to connect the use of the expressions of the successor numbers with the already common expressions. Frege I 130 Equation/Frege: you must not put the definite article on one side of an equation and the indefinite article on the other. FregeVsFormalism: a purely formal theory is sufficient. It’s only an instruction for the definitions, not a definition as such. I 131 Number System/Expansion/Frege: in the expansion, the meaning cannot be fixed arbitrarily. E.g. the meaning of the square root is not already unchangeable before the definitions, but it is determined by these. ((s) Contradiction? Anyway, Frege is getting at meaning as use). Number i/Frege: it does not matter whether a second, a millimeter or something else is to play a role in this. I 132 It is only important that the additions and multiplication sentences apply. By the way, i falls out of the equation again. But, E.g. with "a ´bi" you have to explain what meaning "total" has in this case. It is not enough to call for a sense. That would be just ink on paper. (FregeVsHilbert). Bigelow I 182 Consistency/FregeVsFormalism/FregeVsHilbert/Bigelow/Pargetter: Existence precedes consistency. For consistency presupposes the existence of a consistently described object. If it exists, the corresponding description is consistent. If it does not exist, how can we guarantee consistency? Frege I 125 Concept/Frege: How can you prove that it does not contain a contradiction? Not by the determination of the definition. I 126 E.g. ledger lines in a triangle: it is not sufficient for proof of their existence that no contradiction is discovered in on their concept. Proof of the disambiguity of a concept can strictly only be carried out by something falling under it. The reverse would be a mistake. E.g. Hankel: equation x + b = c: if b is > c, there is no natural number x which solves the problem. I 127 Hankel: but nothing keeps us from considering the difference (c - b) as a sign that solves the problem! Sign/FregeVsHankel/FregeVsFormalism: there is something that hinders us: E.g. considering (2 - 3) readily as a sign that solves the problem: an empty sign does not solve the problem, but is only ink on paper. Its use as such would then be a logical error. Even in cases where the solution is possible, it is not the sign that is the solution, but the content. Wittgenstein I 27 Frege/Earlier Wittgenstein/Hintikka: ((FregeVsFormalism) in the philosophy of logic and mathematics). Frege dispensed with any attempt to attribute a semantic content to his logical axioms and rules of evidence. Likewise, Wittgenstein: "In logical syntax, the meaning of a sign must never play a role, it may only require the description of the expressions." Therefore, it is incorrect to assert that the Tractatus represents the view of the inexpressibility of language par excellence. The inexpressibility of semantics is merely limited to semantics, I 28 syntax can certainly be linguistically expressed! In a letter to Schlick, Wittgenstein makes the accusation that Carnap had taken his ideas, without pointing this out (08.08.32)! |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Description | Cresswell, M.J. | I 175 Certain Descriptions/Cresswell: so far we have only talked about indefinite ones! Indefinite Description/Russell: Thesis: a man means "at least a man". Certain Description/Russell: Thesis: the man means "this particular man". Anaphora/HintikkaVsRussell: tradition has no explanation for the anaphoric use of certain descriptions. Article/Cresswell: more recent attempts: to incorporate the old linguistic idea into traditional logic, that the indefinite article introduces new objects into speech, while the definite article refers to already introduced entities. This corresponds to: Article/Kempson: (1975, 111): Thesis: definite/indefinite articles should not be distinguished semantically, but only pragmatically. Old/new/article/file change semantics/Heim/Cresswell: the distinction between old and new entities in connection with the article can also be found in Heim (1983). I 176 There it leads to file change semantics/Kamp/Heim: Thesis: as entities in the world, the objects are not new, but only within the speech, hence "files". ("files", "new in the files"). Def File/Heim/Cresswell: represents facts about objects for the speaker. |
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