Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Definitions | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 228 Sense Data/Ostension/Definition/Learning/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: pointing out, the legacy of the Tractatus "Showing", can certainly serve as the only method for defining sense data. But as soon as inaccessible objects (atoms) are added, it is no longer sufficient. Showing/WittgensteinVsShowing/Ostension/Hintikka: Problem: e.g. how to show the state of California? (>Definition, >indicative definition.) Even if Wittgenstein claims on the first page of the Blue Book that all non-verbal definitions are indicative definitions, he immediately limits this: I 229 "Does the indicative definition itself need to be understood?" >Understanding. The listener must probably already know the logical status of the defined entity. For example, it is not possible to point out a non-existent object, even if you are telephoning someone who sees it. The same applies to other people's immediate experiences. And if one thinks that even the words "there" and "this" for their part are to be introduced by an indicative explanation, then this indicative indication must be quite different from the usual indicative explanation. (PI §§ 9,38). >Explanation. I 329 Color/Definition/Reference/Wittgenstein:...Now we can understand what Wittgenstein means when he says: ""red" means the color that comes to my mind when I hear the word "red"" would be a definition. No explanation of the nature of the denotation by a word. This point loses its essence if "denotation" is understood here in the sense of "name". Even a completely successful definition does not indicate what it means that the definition refers directly - i.e. without language play - to its subject. II 44/45 Ostensive Definition/Wittgenstein: it just adds something to the symbolism - it does not lead beyond the symbolism - a set of symbols is replaced by another. The explanation of the meaning of symbols is given in turn, via symbols. >Symbols. II 73 Definition/Wittgenstein: a definition is nothing more than an indication of a relevant rule - (s) context: e.g. negation.) >Negation. II 116 Calculating/Wittgenstein: the tables of multiplication are definitions. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Definitions | Anscombe | Frank I 94 Indicative Definition/Tradition/Anscombe: in the past we were convinced of the possibility of a purely ostensive definition. At the time, we were falsely impressed by the fact that we could not find a well-explained expression that corresponded to "I", "city" or "London". >Identification, >Reference, >Ostension, >Ostensive definition, >Definability. Then, for each of us, "I" should be a proper name for an object of acquaintance. (AnscombeVs). >Acquaintance. |
Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank Frankfurt/M. 1994 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Demonstration | Wittgenstein | Rorty VI 147 Indicative Definition/demonstrate/language/Wittgenstein: indicative definition presupposes that in the language a lot has been prepared already, demonstrating is insufficient without language to single out something. (Dennett pro, SearleVs, NagelVs). --- Hintikka I 95 Tell/demonstrate/logical proper name/Russell/Hintikka: "this" cannot be pronounced, only mentioned. - ((s) >mention / >use) - ((s) not pronounced in absence.) - ((s) The object can therefore not be mentioned.). >Logical proper name. I 102 We can only point to the objects of acquaintance. I 102 Demonstrate/tell/Tractatus/acquaintance/Russell/Hintikka: we can only point at the objects of acquaintance - ((s) > Logical proper names; these have to be distinguished from >Demonstratives). I 193 Indicative demonstration/ostension/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: cannot provide a criterion of continuous identity. - This is why not anything that can be demonstrated is an object. I 228 Demonstrate/ostensive definition/ostension/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: sense data can only be defined by demonstrating. - Problem: must the demonstration itself be understood? - Hintikka: the listener must probably already know the logic state of the defined entity. - "there"/"this": if, at all, to introduce by ostension, then the demonstration must be quite different in this case. - Hintikka: Wittgenstein hesitates long before he drops the indicative definition. - An alternative to the concept of meaning and attribution of meaning is hard to find. - Demonstration/Wittgenstein: basic concept: binary relation of naming. (by a name) (WittgensteinVs). I 231 Middle period: successful indicative definition can provide rules for the use. >Rules --- II 34 Demonstrate/ostension/Wittgenstein: E.g. "this is green" does not provide information about a connection between green and reality. - "This" is used as an equal sign. II 88 Language/rule/indicative definition/Wittgenstein: E.g. This is gray can either a) be a sentence or - b) a rule or a definition of language use. II 256 Ostensive definition/demonstrate/ostension/Wittgenstein: E.g. one shows someone a red square with the words "that is red". - Then it may be that he calls squares red in future. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Explanation | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 29 Inexplicable/explanation/analysis/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: not the usual language use is unanalysable and inexplicable according to Wittgenstein - but the language games are. I 190 Explanation/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Metaphysics (> Metaphysics/Duhem). Large typescript: "Supposing my face image would be two equal red circles on a blue background: what's here available in a double number, and what just once? One could say we have a color here and two locations. But it was also said that red and circular were properties of two objects, which could be called spots and which are in a certain spatial relationship to each other. Sounds like an explanation of physics. I could also answer: two red lanterns, etc. But an explanation is not required here (trying to solve our dissatisfaction by an explanation is the mistake of metaphysics) (> Metaphysics/Duhem). What is worrying to us, is the ambiguity about the grammar of the sentence "I see two red circles on a blue background." I can also say: "I see the color red in two different locations" but then the grammar of the words "spot", "location" , "color" would need to align to the words of the first sentence. The confusion arises here in that we believe that we have to decide about the presence or absence of an object (spot). Like when you decide whether what I see (in a physical sense) is a red coat or a reflex. I 238 Demonstrate/ostensive definition/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: in the lectures of the early 30s the ostensive definition is downright rejected. "The ostensive definition does not lead us beyond the symbolism ... thus we can do nothing further than to replace a symbolism with another." HintikkaVsWittgenstein: that is, one might think, blatantly wrong because gestures of pointing can well lead us away from the field of purely linguistic. WittgensteinVsVs: denies that. He explains what we accomplish through ostensive explanation is not a connection between language and reality, but a connection between the written or spoken language on the one hand and the sign language on the other hand. Ostensive explanation/Wittgenstein: is nothing more than a calculus. I 255 Explanation/WittgensteinVsExplanation/Hintikka: "Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we should see the facts as "primordial phenomena". In the later philosophy the language games are really the measure of all things. --- II 44 Indicative Definition: With this, however, nothing more is done than adding something to the symbolism. II 45 It will not lead us beyond this symbolism. We just replace a set of symbols by another. The explanation of the meaning of symbols will in turn be indicated to the symbols. II 56 Explanation/Science/Wittgenstein: we explain an event in physics by describing another event - Analysis: finding out something new - not so in philosophy. II 60 Music/Language/Wittgenstein: #, b, resolution characters are signals in the strict sense. The language does not consist of signals. A signal must be explained, and the explanation must indicate something, whereby the signal is supplemented. We explain them in the same sense as colors. Besides the word "green" we need something else, additional. II 61 Explanation/Wittgenstein: the sentence with the explanation is not in this way different from the explanation itself. The explanation of a sentence is always something like a definition that replaces a symbol set by another. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Ostension | Ostension: is the pointing to objects for the purpose of definition or description. A known problem is the indeterminacy or lack of uniqueness of the reference in pointing. For example, an object, its form, its nature, its history, its weight, etc., can be meant. See also Gavagai, pointing, to mean, indicative definition, definition, definability, statue/sound. |
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| Ostension | Wittgenstein | Graeser I 58f Meaning/Wittgenstein: "What is meaning?", "What is length?" "What is the number one?" Here we cannot point to anything, although we should point out something - Problem: "nominalization": makes us look for a thing. >Definitions, >Definability. Hintikka I 228 Ostension/Definition/Learning/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: pointing/showing - legacy of the Tractatus "showing" - can certainly serve as the only method for defining sense data. But as soon as inaccessible objects (atoms) are added, it is no longer sufficient. >Learning. Showing/WittgensteinVsShowing/Ostension/Hintikka: Problem: Example: How to show the state of California? (>Definition, >Indicative definition.) Even if Wittgenstein claims on the first page of the Blue Book that all non-verbal definitions are indicative definitions, he immediately limits this: I 229 "Does the indicative definition itself need to be understood?" The listener must probably already know the logical status of the defined entity. For example, it is not possible to point out a non-existent object, even if you are telephoning someone who sees it. The same applies to other people's immediate experiences. And if one thinks that even the words "there" and "this" for their part are to be introduced by indicative explanation, then this indicative indication must be quite different from the usual indicative explanation. (PU §§ 9,38). >Explanation. I 237 Ostension/Pointing/Indicative Definition/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: one and the same gesture can serve for a person's name, the name for a mass term, a number word, etc. - therefore showing cannot connect to reality. It is just a calculus. It is at most, a connection between written or spoken language on the one hand and sign language on the other. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Putnam, H. | Esfeld Vs Putnam, H. | I 133 EsfeldVsPutnam: our social holism is different from its externalism: it is about social practices and not about characteristics of the physical environment. I 155 Belief/Twin Earth: although the social practice on earth and the twin earth is indistinguishable, the beliefs concerned are different! Social Holism/Esfeld: the social explanation of meaning (content) is not sufficient to determine reference. (Difference Meaning/Reference). EsfeldVsPutnam: one may have reservations against the view of reference that Putnam presupposes here. Meaning/Reference/Twin Earth/EsfeldVsPutnam: if one says that the microstructure determines meaning by causal relation, then one separates not only reference but also meaning from our practices. I 156 But that does not answer Kripke's skeptical challenge! This claims that assuming natural properties that are physically instantiated does not solve the problem. Each finite series instantiates more than one natural property. ((s) Analogy to the problem of indicative definition). |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
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